

HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Tacubaya, August 24, 1847.

GENERAL ORDERS, }
No. 262.

The following military convention is published for the information and strict government of the American army, its retainers and followers. Any infraction of one or more of the articles of the said convention shall be followed by rigorous punishment.

The undersigned, appointed, respectively, the three first by Major General Winfield Scott, commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States, and the two last by his excellency D. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, president of the Mexican republic and commander-in-chief of its armies, met with full powers, which were duly verified, in the village of Tacubaya, on the 22d day of August, 1847, to enter into an armistice, for the purpose of giving the Mexican government an opportunity of receiving propositions for peace from the commissioner appointed by the President of the United States, and now with the American army, when the following articles were agreed upon:

ART. 1. Hostilities shall instantly and absolutely cease between the armies of the United States of America and the United Mexican States, within thirty leagues of the capital of the latter States, to allow time to the commissioner appointed by the United States and the commissioners to be appointed by the Mexican republic to negotiate.

2. This armistice shall continue as long as the commissioners of the two governments may be engaged in negotiations, or until the commander of either of the said armies shall give formal notice to the other of the cessation of the armistice, and for forty-eight hours after such notice.

3. In the meantime, neither army shall, within thirty leagues of the city of Mexico, commence any new fortification or military work of offence or defence, or do anything to enlarge or strengthen any existing work or fortification of that character within the said limits.

4. Neither army shall be reinforced within the same. Any reinforcements in troops or munitions of war, other than subsistence now approaching either army, shall be stopped at the distance of at least twenty-eight leagues from the city of Mexico.

5. Neither army, nor any detachment from it, shall advance beyond the line it at present occupies.

6. Neither army, nor any detachment or individual of either, shall pass the neutral limits established by the last article, except under flags of truce bearing the correspondence between the two armies, or on the business authorized by the next article; and individuals of either army who may chance to straggle within the neutral limits shall, by the opposite party, be kindly warned off, or sent back to their own army under flags of truce.

7. The American army shall not, by violence, obstruct the passage, from the open country into the city of Mexico, of the ordi-

nary supplies of food necessary to the consumption of its inhabitants or the Mexican army within the city; or shall the Mexican authorities, civil or military, do any act to obstruct the passage of supplies from the city or the country needed by the American army.

8. All American prisoners of war remaining in the hands of the Mexican army, and not heretofore exchanged, shall immediately, or as soon as practicable, be restored to the American army against a like number (having regard to rank) of Mexican prisoners captured by the American army.

9. * * * * * [Omitted.] (See Mexican ratification.)

10. The better to enable the belligerent armies to execute these articles, and to favor the great object of peace, it is further agreed between the parties that any courier, with despatches that either army shall desire to send along the line from the city of Mexico or its vicinity to and from Vera Cruz, shall receive a safe conduct from the commander of the opposing army.

11. The administration of justice between Mexicans, according to the general and State constitutions and laws, by the local authorities of the towns and places occupied by the American forces, shall not be obstructed in any manner.

12. Persons and property shall be respected in the towns and places occupied by the American forces. No person shall be molested in the exercise of his profession; nor shall the services of any one be required without his consent. In all cases where services are voluntarily rendered, a just price shall be paid, and trade remain unmolested.

13. Those wounded prisoners who may desire to remove to some more convenient place for the purpose of being cured of their wounds, shall be allowed to do so without molestation—they still remaining prisoners.

14. Those Mexican medical officers who may wish to attend the wounded shall have the privilege of doing so, if their services be required.

15. For the more perfect execution of this agreement, two commissioners shall be appointed—one by each party—who, in case of disagreement, shall appoint a third.

16. This convention shall have no force or effect unless approved by their excellencies, the commanders respectively of the two armies, within twenty-four hours, reckoning from 6 o'clock, a. m., of the 22d day of August, 1847.

J. A. QUITMAN,

Major General, U. S. A.

PERSIFOR F. SMITH,

Brevet Brigadier Gen., U. S. A.

FRANKLIN PIERCE,

Brigadier General, U. S. A.

IGNACIO DE MORA Y VILLAMIL.

BENITO QUIJANO.

HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE U. S. OF AMERICA,
Tacubaya, August 23, 1847.

Considered, approved, and ratified, with the express understanding that the word "supplies," as used the second time, and without qualification, in the seventh article of this military convention, (American copy,) shall be taken to mean—as in both the British and American armies—arms, ammunition clothing, equipments, subsistence, (for men,) forage, money, and in general all the wants of an army. That word *supplies* in the Mexican copy is erroneously translated "viveres" instead of *recursos*.

WINFIELD SCOTT,
General-in-chief, U. S. Army.

PALACIO NACIONAL DE MEXICO,
August 24, de 1847.

Ratificado, suprimiéndose el artículo 9° y con esplicacion del 4° en el sentido de que la paz temporal de este armisticio se observara en la capital y veinte ocho leguas al rededor; convenido en que la palabra *supplies* se traduzca recursos, y que en ella se comprenda lo que pueda haber menester el ejército, escepto armas y municiones.

ANTONIO LOPEZ DE SANTA ANNA.

HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF THE U. S. OF AMERICA,
Tacubaya, August 24, 1847.

I accept and ratify the foregoing qualifications added by the president general of the Mexican republic.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

By command of Major General Scott.

H. L. SCOTT,
A. A. A. General.

P.

AUGUST 23, 1847.

MY DEAR GENERAL: You will, I am sure, appreciate my *motives*, when, as your friend, *fast* and *true*, I ask if you could not so modify the terms of the proposed articles of armistice, as to *authorize* a friendly intercourse of the officers and of the soldiers (to a limited extent under charge of their officers) with the city. So far as I am concerned, I care nothing about it; but your *gallant army* which has suffered *so much*, and *endured so much*, and which now

venerates your name, will, I know, be greatly *mortified* and *disappointed* at being excluded from the city with your sanction.

If I were the commanding general of the army, (anxious as I am for peace,) I should *demand the surrender* of the city. But, in any event, and at all hazards, I should *require* the surrender of *Chapultepec* and the above suggested rights of *free intercourse* with the city. In my judgment, neither the army nor country will ever be reconciled to different terms. As your friend, I cannot, in justice to my feelings, withhold the expression of my opinion.

Yours, truly,

GIDEON J. PILLOW.

To General Scott.

Q.

[Private correspondence of the New York Sun.]

Colonel E. A. Hitchcock's Letter.

MEXICO, October 26, 1847.

Since Scott has resolved to make a short cut to the presidency through the halls of the Montezumas, he has looked askance at Worth, whose soldierly and winning manners set off to so much advantage his splendid talents. Worth is the only man among the "hero generals" who has a grain of sound republican statesmanship in him; and it has been said so often among the volunteers that he was the only hero who could be scared up that could stand a political catechising, that Scott grows sour. You may depend upon it that there will be a flare up between them, and it's a chance if General Pillow and Colonel Duncan, of the artillery, don't catch a shot in the melee. Pillow is one of the brightest men in the service; brave, keen, and ready as an eagle, but death against soldiers—if they are nothing but soldiers—for presidents. "Every man to his trade," is his word, and that don't please Scott. Colonel Duncan fought like a tiger at Palo Alto and Resaca, and out of thirteen officers was one of "the three" who voted for the advance. He was in Worth's division at the storming of Monterey, and his battery was admitted to have been the most effective, though in the distribution of brevets Duncan was the only man overlooked. His relations with General Worth are likely to prove hurtful to him in Mexico, for, after being thirteen years on active duty, and serving through the whole of the Mexican war, General Scott would neither give him a short leave of absence, nor permit General Quitman to make him lieutenant governor of Mexico. To this, like all the rest, there is a secret history. The march of our army around Lake Chalco, along the base of the hills, was a brilliant and decisive master-stroke. General Scott did not think of this first, and will not pardon him who did, although he receives all the honor as commander-in-chief. General Scott arrived in the

valley some two or three days before Worth, who halted at a little town on the head of the lake. Scott's people had reported the Chalco route impracticable, and he believed it necessary to move by Peñon or Mexicalcingo; but Worth, on his arrival, sent Duncan, at that officer's own suggestion, to examine the Chalco passage. Duncan's report and Worth's representations carried the day over Scott's first intentions, and the success of the whole campaign turned upon that reconnoissance. An examination of Piñon and Mexicalcingo, since we have taken the city, clearly proves that, had either of those routes been taken, the *successful* battles in this valley would still remain to be fought. It is said that Scott, in his report, does not even mention this important *reconnoissance*, and it is certain he is no friend to either Duncan or Worth.

MEXICO, January 23, 1848.

I send you a slip from a paper, printed somewhere at the north, in which the writer endeavors to account for the rupture between Generals Scott and Worth, on the ground of envy or jealousy of the former for the latter. This slip is anonymous, and perhaps ought on that account to be despised, but I choose to dedicate a few words to it, and I believe you will credit all I may say on the subject.

The slip is dated Mexico, October 26, 1847, and the writer pretends to have discovered the jealousy of General Scott, and goes on to *predict* a rupture, intending artfully that the publicity of the rupture shall confirm his penetration into the grounds of it. But now mark: the rupture became public at Puebla some four months before the date of the slip, and before General Worth had, in any very extraordinary manner, signalized himself in the campaign in Mexico, (commencing at Vera Cruz.) So much for the date of the rupture and the date of its prediction, and this showing alone will exhibit the premeditated falsehood of the writer of the slip. But this is a trifle in comparison with other enormities in the slip. The writer gives General Worth the entire credit of the decision of General Scott to pass, via the *Chalco route*, to San Augustin. The impertinent boldness of this assertion is very remarkable, and might lead a careless reader to the belief that the writer was in the councils of the commanding general, whose very position, however, required him to conceal his objects and purposes from the enemy, to do which he was obliged to conceal them from most of his own officers, lest, by some imprudent remark, the enemy should be fully informed of his designs, and direct all his efforts to frustrate them.

I am now to give you an accurate history of the Chalco route, and I claim credit for what I shall say of it, not only from your reliance upon my veracity, but from my position in the army in this entire campaign.

After giving you this account, I intend to return to General WORTH and his difficulties with General Scott. When General Scott reached Puebla, he commenced collecting information in view of the contemplated advance upon this city. To this end he set the engineers, both civil and military, at work, i. e., the engineers

and topographical engineers. He had the principal officers of these corps before him almost daily, instructing them to procure information, and pointing out modes of obtaining it, and asking almost daily for results. We were at Puebla, as you know, many weeks, during which time Lee, of the engineers, and Turnbull, of the topographical corps, each prepared a map of the valley of Mexico in this manner: they each made an outline or skeleton map of the country, enlarged from Humboldt, embracing the established or fixed points, and then systematically filled in the details from information procured in every possible way you can imagine. These details were first entered in pencil, and held subject to correction before being *inked*, and Lee and Turnbull, thus operating, finally compared their work together and perfected each other's knowledge. I saw those maps grow daily, and almost daily heard General Scott's remarks upon them. In the general's interviews with the engineers, he was continually turning their attention upon the Chalco route, ordering them to procure all the information possible with regard to that route, expressing confidentially his purpose of taking it, to avoid the Peñon, the strength of which was perfectly well known at Puebla. Accordingly, the engineers satisfied themselves that the Chalco route was practicable. One man, in the employ of Major Turnbull, was sent from Mexico expressly to go over the route, and he returned reporting it practicable, saying that he had been entirely over it, clear into the city. Meantime, Lee had access to a multitude of people professing acquaintance with the country, whose information he "jotted" down upon his map; and while, in all he procured, he had no positive information that the route was impracticable, he fell in with a very intelligent professional surveyor, an Italian, who assured him that the route was available for the general's purposes. By the time the general left Puebla, the engineer's maps were very complete, showing all the causeways and bye-roads about the city, the lakes and canals, the bridges, &c., with a very complete exhibition of all the artificial defences from Peñon clear round the city. The general had been necessarily delayed at Puebla for reinforcements. The necessity for that delay can be easily understood by a soldier. Though he might have entered this city with the force he had at Puebla, say in June, he could not have left a garrison at Puebla, and the consequence would have been the occupation of that place by the enemy, compelling a retrograde movement to recapture it; for, even if the reinforcements—but I shall go too much aside from my present purpose by discussing the necessity of delay at Puebla. The delay itself was used in procuring information indispensable to anything but a blind advance upon the capital. This same delay was used to push negotiations for a peace, but not an hour's delay was given exclusively for this object. The very moment General Scott was in force to advance, he did advance, with a knowledge of the Chalco route I have stated, and with the full intention of taking that route. But he did not publish his intention to the army and to the enemy.

I cannot help telling you a very remarkable circumstance in this