

valley some two or three days before Worth, who halted at a little town on the head of the lake. Scott's people had reported the Chalco route impracticable, and he believed it necessary to move by Peñon or Mexicalcingo; but Worth, on his arrival, sent Duncan, at that officer's own suggestion, to examine the Chalco passage. Duncan's report and Worth's representations carried the day over Scott's first intentions, and the success of the whole campaign turned upon that reconnoissance. An examination of Piñon and Mexicalcingo, since we have taken the city, clearly proves that, had either of those routes been taken, the *successful* battles in this valley would still remain to be fought. It is said that Scott, in his report, does not even mention this important *reconnoissance*, and it is certain he is no friend to either Duncan or Worth.

MEXICO, January 23, 1848.

I send you a slip from a paper, printed somewhere at the north, in which the writer endeavors to account for the rupture between Generals Scott and Worth, on the ground of envy or jealousy of the former for the latter. This slip is anonymous, and perhaps ought on that account to be despised, but I choose to dedicate a few words to it, and I believe you will credit all I may say on the subject.

The slip is dated Mexico, October 26, 1847, and the writer pretends to have discovered the jealousy of General Scott, and goes on to *predict* a rupture, intending artfully that the publicity of the rupture shall confirm his penetration into the grounds of it. But now mark: the rupture became public at Puebla some four months before the date of the slip, and before General Worth had, in any very extraordinary manner, signalized himself in the campaign in Mexico, (commencing at Vera Cruz.) So much for the date of the rupture and the date of its prediction, and this showing alone will exhibit the premeditated falsehood of the writer of the slip. But this is a trifle in comparison with other enormities in the slip. The writer gives General Worth the entire credit of the decision of General Scott to pass, via the *Chalco route*, to San Augustin. The impertinent boldness of this assertion is very remarkable, and might lead a careless reader to the belief that the writer was in the councils of the commanding general, whose very position, however, required him to conceal his objects and purposes from the enemy, to do which he was obliged to conceal them from most of his own officers, lest, by some imprudent remark, the enemy should be fully informed of his designs, and direct all his efforts to frustrate them.

I am now to give you an accurate history of the Chalco route, and I claim credit for what I shall say of it, not only from your reliance upon my veracity, but from my position in the army in this entire campaign.

After giving you this account, I intend to return to General WORTH and his difficulties with General Scott. When General Scott reached Puebla, he commenced collecting information in view of the contemplated advance upon this city. To this end he set the engineers, both civil and military, at work, i. e., the engineers

and topographical engineers. He had the principal officers of these corps before him almost daily, instructing them to procure information, and pointing out modes of obtaining it, and asking almost daily for results. We were at Puebla, as you know, many weeks, during which time Lee, of the engineers, and Turnbull, of the topographical corps, each prepared a map of the valley of Mexico in this manner: they each made an outline or skeleton map of the country, enlarged from Humboldt, embracing the established or fixed points, and then systematically filled in the details from information procured in every possible way you can imagine. These details were first entered in pencil, and held subject to correction before being *inked*, and Lee and Turnbull, thus operating, finally compared their work together and perfected each other's knowledge. I saw those maps grow daily, and almost daily heard General Scott's remarks upon them. In the general's interviews with the engineers, he was continually turning their attention upon the Chalco route, ordering them to procure all the information possible with regard to that route, expressing confidentially his purpose of taking it, to avoid the Peñon, the strength of which was perfectly well known at Puebla. Accordingly, the engineers satisfied themselves that the Chalco route was practicable. One man, in the employ of Major Turnbull, was sent from Mexico expressly to go over the route, and he returned reporting it practicable, saying that he had been entirely over it, clear into the city. Meantime, Lee had access to a multitude of people professing acquaintance with the country, whose information he "jotted" down upon his map; and while, in all he procured, he had no positive information that the route was impracticable, he fell in with a very intelligent professional surveyor, an Italian, who assured him that the route was available for the general's purposes. By the time the general left Puebla, the engineer's maps were very complete, showing all the causeways and bye-roads about the city, the lakes and canals, the bridges, &c., with a very complete exhibition of all the artificial defences from Peñon clear round the city. The general had been necessarily delayed at Puebla for reinforcements. The necessity for that delay can be easily understood by a soldier. Though he might have entered this city with the force he had at Puebla, say in June, he could not have left a garrison at Puebla, and the consequence would have been the occupation of that place by the enemy, compelling a retrograde movement to recapture it; for, even if the reinforcements—but I shall go too much aside from my present purpose by discussing the necessity of delay at Puebla. The delay itself was used in procuring information indispensable to anything but a blind advance upon the capital. This same delay was used to push negotiations for a peace, but not an hour's delay was given exclusively for this object. The very moment General Scott was in force to advance, he did advance, with a knowledge of the Chalco route I have stated, and with the full intention of taking that route. But he did not publish his intention to the army and to the enemy.

I cannot help telling you a very remarkable circumstance in this