

history. Have patience with me, and read attentively, for it is no trifle I am determined to tell you.

The English residents, both in Puebla and Mexico, moved on the side of peace. The English minister was known to be laboring for it; his private secretary made two visits to Puebla, to forward the views of the minister. An English merchant (Mr. T.) of Puebla, being in Mexico, returned to Puebla with positive assurances of a disposition to peace in the capital. An indirect communication was established, messengers passed backward and forth. The disposition of Santa Anna in favor of peace was certified to, and considerable hopes of a peace were entertained, but, remember, *there was not an hour's delay at Puebla on this account*. At length, from the delay, the military preparations in the capital had so advanced that Santa Anna was represented as doubting whether his chiefs would allow of a peace, their confidence having arisen with their preparations; and General Scott was urged, from the capital, to make a partial advance, (as far as San Martin,) to show the Mexicans that he was in earnest. Finally, he was invited to declare his *point of attack*—HIS POINT OF ATTACK—in case of an advance upon the city. This was just before he left Puebla. It is very extraordinary that persons, in direct communication with the enemy, with Santa Anna, should have supposed it possible to draw a direct answer to such an invitation. General Scott then wrote a memorandum, one of the most remarkable ever penned by any commander in any campaign on record. He commenced by declining to indicate beforehand his point of attack upon the city, but stated that he would advance upon the capital, and would *either defeat the enemy in view of the city, if they would give him battle, or he would take a strong position from the enemy, and then, if he could restrain the enthusiasm of his troops, he would halt outside of the city and take measures to give those in the city an opportunity to save the capital by making a peace*.

I have seen the memorandum more than once, and there is every reason to believe that Santa Anna had it before him when the events at Contreras and Churubusco occurred, i. e., on the 20th of August. Now, mark, on the night of the 20th of August, some of the same Englishmen, the ministers, secretary, and the consul general included, came out of the city and represented to General Scott that the condition of affairs in the city made it in the highest degree probable that a peace could be obtained, provided he did not enter the capital with force and disperse the government. The general had, by his memorandum, already distinctly pointed out what he would do before the capital. He had accomplished the only part about which there could be any doubt; he had defeated the enemy absolutely and entirely; and it only remained, in fulfillment of his voluntary pledge, to offer (not invite) an armistice. He made the offer accordingly. What can be more extraordinary than this whole history; and what can be more creditable to General Scott, or more distinctly exhibit the civilized and humane tendencies of his mind over a passion for the mere *eclat* of military glory? If he had succeeded in making a peace, he would forever

have left in doubt whether he was enforced to it by his position—doubtful whether he had the ability to enter the city.

Is it possible to conceive of a greater sacrifice than this to a mere military man? to a man looking to his personal fame before the paramount interests of his country?

That the general deliberately took his position is sufficiently proved by his explicit memorandum at Puebla, in which he not only clearly foresees his success in the anticipated conflict of arms before the capital, illustrating both his military science and intellectual ability, but deliberately places in the back ground, out of view, his military fame, in the hope of satisfying the demands of the age on the side of peace. Reflect upon this, and the more you consider it, the higher and higher General Scott will rise in your estimation, how high soever he may be, or may have been, before this campaign. For you must consider that after putting his own fame out of the question, in order to give the peace commissioner a fair opportunity to accomplish his mission, the failure of that mission, for which General Scott was in no manner responsible, enabled the general to demonstrate even more clearly than he could otherwise have done, how completely he was master of the city at the very moment he held his fame in abeyance; for he not only entered the city, but entered it after the enemy had had over twenty days to recover from the blows inflicted on the 20th August. Besides, his entrance into the city, finally, and the consequent dispersion of the government, has proved what would have occurred had he entered on the 20th of August, while the enemy is bound to admit a double defeat—that on the 20th August, and again on the 13th of September, Santa Anna evacuating the city on the night of the 13th.

I now return to General Worth and the *Chalco route*. As I have already told you, the general had determined to take that route, upon full information, before he left Puebla. But it was important that this purpose should be concealed from the enemy. Accordingly the general advanced to Ayotla with his leading division of his four divisions, passing by the turning point by Chalco. Ayotla is before the Peñon, and the general took this position, while his rear was coming up, in order to deceive the enemy into the belief that the Peñon was to be his point of attack, that the enemy might accumulate his principal force, especially of guns, at the Peñon. On arriving at Ayotla, and without having the remotest idea of an attack on the Peñon, he ordered the engineer to make a reconnoissance of the works at the Peñon, but with *this express injunction*, not particularly to expose themselves, and *not to reconnoitre with a view to attack*; at the same time he ordered a large escort to move forward, with express orders to display itself in full view before the Peñon, the object being to attract attention and confirm the enemy in the belief that an attack was designated at that point. This escort was composed of a large body of men, with artillery, cavalry, and infantry. This sort of reconnoissance was repeated from day to day. Meantime, a man was found, a Mexican, who informed the general that he was in Santa Anna's