

army in 1833, when Santa Anna marched over the Chalco route and *carried artillery with him*. This was before General Worth came up, and it established, beyond the possibility of a doubt, the practicability of the Chalco route. If Santa Anna could march over the route with artillery, who would venture to deny our ability to accomplish the march? Besides, after the general's arrival at Ayotla, and before the arrival of General Worth, a Mexican had been hired to go over the route, who reported it in good order, except from some washings from the hills, which had cut the road in a few places, easily filled up, and from a few stones, here and there, easily removed—these stones having been rolled into the road by the enemy.

Thus, you see, the general's information was very perfect; but still, in order to take all the chances, and omit nothing that might certify him of the facts, he ordered General Worth to cause the route to be still further examined; and it is supposed that Colonel Duncan was sent in obedience to this very order. Duncan did not explore one-half of the road, but finding the portion over which he went passable, he reported the route good, and urged its adoption, and General Worth also urged a movement by that route. Now, I remark here, that if General Scott had acted from the information derived from Duncan alone, he would have committed a great military indiscretion, not to say an unpardonable blunder. He decided to take that route, but not upon Colonel Duncan's information, much less upon the *advice* of either Colonel Duncan or General Worth. While this matter was pending, General Scott had had his attention turned towards Mexicalcingo, to the south of the Peñon, and between that and San Augustin, the latter place being the point where the general wished to establish himself to operate upon the city. The route by Mexicalcingo to San Augustin was, comparatively, a short one, and the general caused it to be examined, intending to take it if it should prove available for his purpose, not because he believed the Chalco route impracticable, but because it offered a shorter line of march to San Augustin. The reconnoissance of Mexicalcingo resulted in the opinion that the defences at that place were very strong; and further, that there were bridges beyond, on the route to San Augustin, which the enemy would not fail to destroy; and although the general had indulged strong hopes of being able to take the shorter route, he finally concluded to take the other, the Chalco route, from which he had never fully taken his mind from before he left Puebla. Before the final reports of the reconnoissance of Mexicalcingo were received, the general was so strong in the hope of going that way that he gave some initiatory orders preparatory to a movement in that direction; but, at length, on full information of all the routes, which no other general had but himself, he decided, as I have said, upon the Chalco route. The credit of this movement is now sought to be given to General Worth, who, in the first place, of the Chalco route, had only the partial information of Duncan to act upon, while, in the next place, he was entirely ignorant of the route by Mexicalcingo. Neither General Worth nor Colonel Dun-

can had any adequate knowledge of either route, that by Chalco or that by Mexicalcingo, and both of them were profoundly ignorant of the extent of General Scott's information, which, in fact, was complete in regard to both routes. General Worth was particularly unacquainted with General Scott's purposes, and the grounds of them, for they had separated from each other at Puebla, immediately on General Scott's arriving at that city, under circumstances which General Worth should blush at the recital of. The anonymous writer, whose letter is above, says that General Scott is jealous of General Worth.

There is infinitely less cause for this than is known in our country. General Worth, on the contrary, is indebted to General Scott, indebted, indeed, I should say infinitely indebted to General Scott, for not exposing his most extraordinary mismanagement in the battle of the 8th of September, at the Molino del Rey. I would occupy too much space to tell you the whole story. The essence of it is, that with superabundant artillery at his command, General Worth ordered an infantry charge, resulting in an immense slaughter of our troops, which charge failed in its object; when the artillery was put in requisition, and drove the enemy from his position with less than half a dozen discharges, and without the loss of a man. I allude now to the enemy's *right* at Molino del Rey. Our artillery had been partially used on his left before the assault on that point. Jealousy, indeed! General Scott jealous of General Worth! General Scott adds to all the accomplishments of mere manner, conceded to General Worth, the wisdom and sagacity of a statesman, with a military science that no man in the army approaches, and but few even can at all comprehend.

I can have no wish to detract from the merits of General Worth, who, with striking manners, indeed, and great felicity in conversation, is utterly destitute of both stability and judgment. Properly speaking, Puebla did not capitulate to him, but he capitulated to the city. He conceded to the city, before entering it at all, rights in direct conflict with the general orders of General Scott, (the martial law order.) Contrary to those orders, he suffered a Mexican to be tried by a Mexican tribunal for the murder of an American, and the Mexican escaped, of course. This state of things embarrassed General Scott immeasurably. The Mexicans shrewdly claimed the rights pledged to them by General Worth, and as this placed the lives of our soldiers, and of all of us, indeed, at the mercy of Mexican assassins, who could only be tried by Mexican courts, the general, at one time, seriously contemplated the plan of withdrawing the entire army from the city, and then re-entering it without making terms; but this would have seemed somewhat a farce, and the general finally determined to throw himself upon his own original martial law order, and disregard General Worth's concessions to the city. General W. felt aggrieved, and asked for a court of inquiry. The court was ordered, and decided against him, for which he had the bad taste to look askance upon two of the officers who composed the court, one of whom, General P. F.

Smith, contributed so largely to his reputation (he even saved it) at Monterey.

But, as I said, I do not wish to detract from the reputation of General Worth, though I am amazed at the blundering infatuation of those who would represent that General Scott is jealous of him. Who built up General Worth but General Scott himself, even from his very boyhood? Who but General Scott has assisted him through all his grades and held him up to admiration? When General Scott arrived at the Brassos and ordered Worth from General Taylor, he showed his preference for him over all other generals. At Vera Cruz he gave him the advance. But during the siege, General Worth began that course of conduct which has finally separated them forever. He very publicly opposed General Scott's views at Vera Cruz, and sought to bring them into ridicule. He remarked that, "we took Monterey in three days, and here we are wasting time before Vera Cruz, not so strong as Monterey." These are his precise words.

At Plan del Rio, he embarrassed the general-in-chief by having left Vera Cruz in positive disobedience of orders, without adequate supplies, and then wrote an almost disrespectful note because he was not selected for the advance at Cerro Gordo. Passing Cerro Gordo, he was sent forward and occupied the pass of La Hoya, and took unresisted possession of Perote, these being the legitimate fruits of Cerro Gordo. Then, when the volunteers had to be discharged, and supplies had to be procured, General Worth was impatient to put himself out of position by advancing to Puebla, and began to write offensively to General Scott because not allowed to do as he pleased. Now, General W. thought only of his ability to march a certain body of men to a certain point, while General Scott was obliged to look beyond the mere march and see how his advance was to be supplied and supported. At length, General Worth was sent to Puebla, and after all, as I have said, he rather capitulated to the city than demanded its unconditional surrender; and from the time he entered the city his troops scarcely had a quiet night's rest, on account of the continual false alarms played off upon the general, to the infinite annoyance of both officers and men. These alarms continued until General Scott arrived at Puebla, from which day to the present moment of my writing, we never had anything like a false alarm, technically known in the army as a "stampede," a word most intimately associated with the name of General Worth, since the great stampede at Saltillo, which temporarily recalled General Taylor from his march on Victoria.

I wish I knew on what point, if any, you needed explanation in reference to operations here; I feel well qualified, I assure you, to answer almost any question you might put to me; not only qualified by a pretty intimate acquaintance with all that has passed here, but by my position as an impartial witness. General Pillow, according to the article I send you, is for keeping every man "to his trade;" yet he left his country petty-fogging office, in the interior of Tennessee, and presumes to consider himself competent to direct

the operations of an army, before he has had time to learn the names of the different corps essential to one. If our engineer and ordnance officers were as ignorant as himself, and he in command, his army would be in a sad predicament. But he (may be) despises details, and wishes only to concern himself with great operations, with large combinations.

There is no fool in existence who does not shelter himself from ignorance, by pretending to despise what others know. But the great objection to Pillow is not his ignorance. He was ignorant, when appointed, without any fault of his; and cannot supply the deficiency at his time of life. The grand difficulty with him is his known, and, to us, demonstrated impudence and falsehood, in writing letters to the newspapers, puffing himself for deeds he never performed, and then denying all knowledge of the letters; and, finally, by eluding, always, what an honorable man would seize upon to allow, the truth to appear before a proper court. Some scoundrel has attempted to get up an idea that the regular officers are persecuting this contemptible son of Tennessee! But why do they not persecute Quitman and Shields, both of whom are volunteers, in the same sense that Pillow is, and yet who says a word to their disparagement? General Pillow claims the credit of the fight at Contreras; yet he slept four miles from the battle ground, in San Augustin, and was not even up in the morning when the battle came off! He also claims the honors of Chapultepec, exclusively; and yet Quitman, in the judgment of all here, performed infinitely more than himself, at that very point, to say nothing of what he did afterwards. But Pillow, it is said, was wounded at Chapultepec, and could do nothing more. According to his own report, his leg was "shattered," and he continues to limp along the streets to this day. He alludes to his wound, in his official report, in some dozen places; but Captain Lee, of the engineers, is ready to point out the place where he stood when wounded, and to show that he was entirely covered from the direct fire of the enemy, and could only be hit by a ball glancing, possibly, from a tree; and then, again, Captain Lee can point out the place of perfect safety behind a rock, to which he was carried, after being wounded—all right enough; the wrong is, endeavoring to lie about it. But the most remarkable point in this business is the fact that Mr. Trist, no less a person than our commissioner, was present when the said "shattered leg" was first examined by the surgeon. Mr. Trist furnished the knife which cut open the boot, and he witnessed its removal; and he declares, though the wound was said to be just above the ankle, that there was no hole in the boot, nor was there a particle of blood either in the boot, nor on any part of Pillow's dress; so that, at the utmost, he could only have received a slight blow of some sort—possibly he struck his foot or ankle against some projecting limb, without knowing what it was. General Scott was actually hit by a spent ball, at Churubusco, but never made the least mention of it in his reports. To be like the immortal Pillow, he should have had himself carried in a litter, and should have limped to this day.

Perhaps I ought to give you some account of the present state of things, and prospects; but I do not like to make speculations as to the future, without knowing more of the people and of the country than I can, as yet, claim to know.

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The immediate cause of Worth's arrest was "in this wise:" Certain letters came, printed, from the States, written here, lauding, extravagantly—one, Pillow, the other, Worth. The general came out with a severe order on the subject, calling attention to the regulation prohibiting officers from writing letters or papers for print, until one month after a campaign; intimating, pretty plainly, that the *puffee*, in the two cases referred to, was probably the *puffer*. Pillow is already proved to have written the letter in his case. It was signed "Leonidas."

Duncan came out, at once, and admitted his agency in the other, and thus relieved Worth of the suspicion of direct agency in the matter. This gave him something to go upon. He addressed a note to General Scott. The reply, not being very satisfactory, General Worth then, instead of making out formal charges against General Scott, which he had a right to do, addressed a letter to the Secretary of War, saying he *intended* to put charges against General Scott; and availed himself of the opportunity to use certain vituperative epithets, which, as the letter was forwarded through General Scott, the general construed into disrespect to his "superior and commanding officer," and therefore ordered his arrest, and sent charges to Washington. Here the matter rests, for the present.

But Pillow, too, is in arrest! He is so; and charges, running through several sheets of paper, have been sent to Washington; and they represent him in such an odious light that one cannot think of him but with disgust. He is charged with lying, and with duplicity and treachery; in fact, his character is utterly prostrate here.

I have told you that Pillow claims credit for the Contreras fight. There are three persons here who are ready to swear that, on the evening of the 19th of August—the evening before the fight—he expressed his doubts of the operations upon Contreras; and he particularly desired Mr. Trist to bear in mind that he had nothing to do with the plan of attack suggested by General Smith, and approved, in Pillow's presence, by General Scott. The plan was reported to General Scott by Captain Lee, late in the evening of the 19th. General Pillow and Mr. Trist were present, as were some others. The plan, with a single modification, was approved by General Scott, and ordered to be executed. When Mr. Trist left the room, General Pillow followed him, and, after expressing his *doubt* of the result, he desired Mr. T. to remember that he had so expressed himself. He had then left his division in the field, in the presence of the enemy, and was at San Augustin, four or five miles distant. General Twiggs was also present when General Scott approved of the plan; and, as Lee was about to carry orders for the execution of the plan, General Twiggs arose, and General

Scott, as a matter of civility only, invited both Twiggs and Pillow to remain during the night. Twiggs said that his division was in the field, and that his place was with it. Pillow said nothing, but he remained all night, and until after the battle was fought on the morning of the 20th of August. He now claims the credit of that battle; that is, he insists that the plan was his, though he admits he was not present at the fight. He has been so hardly pushed in this matter, that though he had not the manliness to do justice to General Smith in his official report, in which he says that *his orders* were carried out, he now admits, verbally, that General Smith conceived the plan of battle independently, still insisting, in defiance of truth and honor, that it was his plan.

He is equally unfortunate in his claim that he instigated General Scott to attack Chapultepec. The precise contrary is the truth. General Pillow was most anxious that the attack should be made at the Piedad, and he made himself perfectly ridiculous to his own officers by expressing his crude notions on the subject.

Finally, when General Scott had decided to attack Chapultepec, he had a long interview with General Pillow, in the presence of Captain Lee, in which General P. raised every objection he could invent, and expressed himself so despondingly that General Scott himself, after Pillow left, said, in allusion to Pillow's difficulties, that he, General Scott, had "some misgivings"—the only instance in which he expressed the shade of a doubt as to the results of his operations in this basin. You see, then, that, instead of General Pillow's urging General Scott to the attack on Chapultepec, General S. had, on the contrary, to nerve Pillow up to the conflict, and had some "misgivings" simply because Pillow, who had to execute the order, had no heart for the business, and went to it reluctantly. What I tell you can be proved.

It is really a sad thing to be obliged to write these truths. The operations in this valley have been glorious to the American arms, and, if each one would be content with his proper share, there would be enough for all; and each one engaged in the fights, if he were to live to the age of Methuselah, might "stand on tiptoe" at the mention of the BATTLES OF MEXICO.

Pillow was unfortunate at Cerro Gordo, and has been, no doubt, impelled by his controversy with Haskell about it, to make great efforts to reinstate himself.

He was unfortunate at Cerro Gordo from two causes: first, the nature of his troops, volunteers, not accustomed to maintain the touch of the elbow under a heavy fire; and next, he, by a great oversight of his own, led his troops into the fight by the *right flank*, when the position he designed taking required him either to countermarch his entire brigade, or manœuvre by the rear rank. To countermarch required too long a time in the presence of the enemy after discovery, and as to manœuvring by the rear rank, neither he, nor any of his men, knew anything about it. This tactical movement is among the details; the *small matters* altogether beneath the lofty genius of such men as General Pillow. It is curious enough to see that, in our country, men are born to two par-

ticular professions and need no instruction. All, or most of our people, are *statesmen* and *soldiers* by nature, as Dogberry, I believe it was, learned to write.

Yours, most truly.

CITY OF MEXICO, *October 21, 1847.*

MESSRS. EDITORS: Having seen a letter in the *Picayune*, of the 20th ultimo, signed "Leonidas," I feel it my duty to say I know nothing of this letter or of its author.

If there are any disposed to attribute it to me, or who suppose I have given it my sanction, they are as *illiberal* as they are *unjust*.

All candid men, who know me, must be satisfied that I would not, myself, nor would I allow any friend to commit such an act of folly.

I am willing to be judged by my written reports; but I utterly protest against the *injustice* of being held responsible for the anonymous letters of friends or enemies.

Very respectfully,

S.

*Official despatches of General Santa Anna.*

DEPARTMENT OF WAR,  
*Tehuacan, November 19, 1847.*

The despatch of your excellency, under date of the 6th instant, informs me that, in obedience to a decree of the general Congress of which you send me a copy, relative to the documents which may exist relating to the events of the siege and loss of the capital, his excellency, in charge of the supreme executive power, directs that I shall present a report of those military operations, in order to bring them to the knowledge of the supreme government.

Complying with the wishes of the government, and with the duty imposed on me by the character of general-in-chief of the army with which I was invested at that time, I shall proceed at once to give a plain narrative of that part of my operations which is still wanting. Your excellency will perceive by the annexed note, which I was on the point of addressing to your excellency when I received your communication, and which explains its motives and object, that I had already made a report which embraced events which took place anterior to my entrance into the capital at the end of May last.

I have explained in my official documents that the object of my march from Orizaba to Puebla was to increase, equip and organize the small force I had at my command at that date, and to make a

vigorous defence in case I should be assisted by the powerful resources of that State. Unfortunately I found that city dismantled, without troops, without materials of war, as the general commanding had ordered them to other points; and by the near approach of the army of the enemy, who followed my footsteps and left me no time for any undertaking, I was forced to continue my march to the capital of the republic.

I expected to find in the capital great preparations for defence, but discovered instead symptoms of revolution, which were fortunately dispelled by my presence. I also perceived with regret that its abandonment had been determined upon, believing it destitute of means of defence, and that the administration of tobacco, the archives, and other objects, had already commenced being sent to the interior. I hastened on this account to call a meeting of all the generals present, which took place the day after my arrival. In conformity with their decision, I resolved to take charge of the government, an indispensable step in order to prepare for the defence in accordance with my wishes.

As there was so little to dispose of, and as an army, fortifications, materials of war, and above all, money were absolutely indispensable, my difficulties were as great as my efforts were required to be. On this point, I refer to vouchers, which must appear in ministerial departments, and which I beg may be presented by the ministers who had the painful task of being associated with me in those days of affliction. I do not annex them, as at this place I am deprived of my private archives; but the government can easily procure them, in order that it may be made apparent that every thing was attended to, and nothing omitted which could secure a good defence of the capital against a victorious army, provided with every appurtenance required to carry on war with success. His excellency Don Nicolas Bravo, general of division, was appointed general-in-chief of the army of the east, and General Don Manuel Rincon his second in command. His excellency General Don Gabriel Valencia, was also appointed to the army of the north, with General Don Mariano Salas as his second in command. These two generals proceeded at once to their destination; but the other two resigned, a few days afterwards, their appointments; in consequence of which, General Don Manuel Maria Lombardini was nominated general-in-chief of the army of the east, discharging his trust to the satisfaction of the government; until, owing to the approach of the enemy, I took the command-in-chief of the army, in virtue of the extraordinary powers which the supreme congress had been pleased to grant by its decree of the 20th April, for the better success of the war against our invaders. Having designated the points which were to be transiently fortified in the first and second line, not a moment was lost in obtaining materials, laborers, &c., and in less than three months respectable fortifications were raised, which were directed first by the general of brigade, Don Casimiro Liceaga, and afterwards by the chief of engineers, Don Ignacio Mora y Villamil, and these officers not only gave proofs of their skill, but labored with a perseverance and ac-