

manded, rushed into crime with a double view; either, if fortune favored him, to appropriate to himself all the glory; or, if he failed, to throw on me the responsibility and the consequent discredit. This is proved by the statement which he hastened to publish, and which all have seen, relying, no doubt, on the credulity of the masses, and on the support which he would meet with from the factious, who are in search of every pretext for showing their hostility towards me in the atrocious manner they now do; but to such attacks, I shall only oppose facts and witnesses which will make truth prevail, and justify the rectitude of my proceedings.

In the village of San Angel I united all my forces and a part of those dispersed at Padierna, who declared that "all the ammunition being wet, and it being impossible to return the enemy's fire, the troops sought salvation in flight." I despatched two aids with orders to Generals Bravo and Gaona to fall back without losing a moment on the fortifications of the Candelaria, while I continued my retreat on Churubusco. At the bridge of Panzacola I ordered the brigade of General Rangel to return to the citadel, which he did. On passing by the convent of Churubusco I notified General Rincon of what had befallen the division of the north, in order that he might be on his guard as commander of that point; and as at that moment my principal attention was directed to the troops and trains at San Antonio Mexicalcingo, I hastened to protect them in their retreat, and stationed at the bridge of Churubusco the brigade of General Perez. At this place I was informed that General Gaona had already commenced his march on Candelaria, and that General Bravo was about moving. A few moments afterwards the companies of St. Patrick, the battalion of Tlapa, and other pickets, arrived at the bridge, all of which troops I ordered immediately to reinforce the neighboring convent of Churubusco, which was garrisoned by the battalions of Independencia and Bravo. To this point I also ordered the five pieces of artillery which I brought from San Angel. I was occupied in hastening the movements of the troops and trains from San Antonio, the vanguard of which began arriving at the bridge when in its rear the firing commenced. About the same time also the firing commenced at the convent of Churubusco. The troops of San Antonio were then thrown into confusion, and abandoned the *materiel* which they brought with them, which created great confusion, and was increased by the approach of the enemy, who arrived with intrepidity close to the trenches. An active fire was opened upon him, notwithstanding, and we succeeded in checking his first impetus, the battle raging violently. In a moment, when the firing ceased, I observed that a battalion of the enemy was proceeding by our right flank to the estate of Portales in order to take us in the rear and to cut off our retreat. To frustrate this object I ordered the colonel of the 4th battalion of light infantry to take possession, by a rapid march, of that building, and as I perceived some hesitation I went personally to have it properly executed. The battalion of the enemy being repulsed with great loss, our retreat was secured.

At Portales I received a despatch informing me that the convent

of Churubusco had surrendered, and that this occurrence had disheartened the troops who defended the bridge, so that a part were retreating with General Bravo by Mexicalcingo towards the Peñon, and others were falling back by the straight road. This further misfortune occasioned us the loss of immense *materiel*, and convinced me of the necessity of falling back without loss of time on our second line. This I did with all the forces I could unite at Portales, arriving at Candelaria between five and six o'clock at night. The troops whom General Bravo took with him could not return to the capital until the next morning.

The audacity of some of the enemy's dragoons went so far as to cross at full gallop the column which was marching from Portales to Candelaria, and they reached the parapets of this point, where being recognized they were fired upon, and all killed, except one officer who was made prisoner. This officer declared at that moment, with a good deal of candor, that, "having understood from one of our prisoners that in that troop was General Santa Anna, he had formed the resolution, with the men who were willing to follow him, to reach him and take his life, as, if they succeeded, they would acquire glory, and if they failed they would die with honor." As soon as I was informed of the declaration, I ordered that the prisoner should be treated with consideration, and I declared that, far from being offended at his boldness, I admired his valor and paid him the homage due to him.

During the remainder of the evening and the night nothing of any importance occurred; notwithstanding which, I took such steps as I judged necessary to secure the defence of our second line, which I expected would be soon attacked.

At four o'clock in the morning of the following day, every thing was prepared for the combat, in spite of the bad condition into which we had been placed by the previous occurrences; but as at 11 o'clock I received at the causeway of La Vega a despatch from General Scott, in which he proposed the armistice which is already known to the nation—a copy of which I annex, marked No. 1—and which I accepted instantly on account of our desperate situation, as will appear by No. 2.

The calamitous events at Padierna and the convent of Churubusco, the loss of one-half of our best artillery, of so many cannon and muskets, and finally the loss of more than one-third of the army, had caused such dismay, that, if the enemy had renewed his attack as I expected, he would most assuredly have occupied the city without much resistance. This conviction made me consider as an interposition of Providence this unexpected occurrence, which came to change the situation in which we were, which it effectually did. Who will deny that on the 8th September the army of the enemy escaped most fortunately from being destroyed? Alas! but for the cowardice of some of our soldiers—but for the selfishness of so many citizens—what a different aspect would the republic present at this moment!

No one will say that the conferences which took place with the commissioner of the United States were prejudicial to the interests



of the nation. Having been made public, they have already manifested to the world the extravagant and unjust pretensions of that government, which, abusing its preponderance of good fortune and our misfortunes, wished to humiliate us and deprive us of one-half of our territory. But as, in the acceptance of the armistice, motives have been attributed to me injurious to my reputation, I can no longer keep secret what, in those days, it would have been treason in me to publish.

As in the annexed report, previously referred to, will be found the events subsequent to the armistice, I conclude for the present, adding copies of the correspondence which preceded resumption of hostilities, marked Nos. 3 and 4.

Your excellency will please receive the assurance of my particular esteem. God and Liberty!

ANTONIO LOPEZ DE SANTA ANNA.

To his Excellency the MINISTER OF WAR AND MARINE.

*Manifesto of the provisional president and commander-in-chief of the army.*

In moments so critical and solemn, it becomes the duty of him who presides over the destiny of the republic to give publicity to the recent events, and I comply with pleasure, as candor has at all times been the character of my administration. The incidents of the 19th and 20th are too notorious, having been disastrous; but I am bound to present a review of them, lest they should be misrepresented, as much by the spirit of detraction and malevolence as by errors which may result from a false analysis of such grave and transcendent affairs.

The nation has witnessed the great and extraordinary efforts with which, in the space of three months, I prepared for the defence of the capital, which was on the point of being surrendered to the enemy without resistance. I have formed, armed, and equipped an army of more than twenty thousand men; I have provided a vast material for this army; I have fortified various lines, in order to remove from Mexico the ravages of the war; I have created resources in spite of the isolated position to which the government was reduced; and I have spared no toil and no labor in order to make my country appear with dignity and firmness in the contest to which it was so unjustly provoked.

In war, an accident—a thing that appears trifling—overthrows the best formed combinations. A glance at the defences which I established round the city is sufficient to discover the plan which I had proposed to myself. The forces which I had advanced on one of the flanks, supported by others stationed at convenient distances, had a point to fall back upon, well known to them, and of which I gave notice at the proper moment.

To one general, who had command of a strong division of five thousand men, with twenty-four pieces of artillery, and whose

head-quarters were at the village of San Angel, I sent orders, at 11 o'clock on the morning of the 18th, to fall back upon the town of Coyoacan, in order to form a concentration of forces, following the movements of the enemy which were already evident, and particularly to unfold my plan of operations. But this general, forgetting that no two men can command in a field of battle, and that for the execution of a plan no observation which may annul or retard it can be admitted, took upon himself to object to the orders which he had received; and as we had banished from among us obedience and discipline, so indispensable in military matters, I had to be tolerant in order to avoid greater evils, and let him, to my great regret, act, throwing upon him the responsibility of whatever might happen.

The result was as fatal as I had foreseen. He advanced, of his own accord, more than a league, and selected a position to meet the enemy, without giving me notice of his movements or intentions.

The refusal which he gave to my advice was the first news I had of his temerity, and soon after the roar of cannon showed me his position, and gave me notice that an action had commenced. Although overwhelmed with a presentiment of what was to happen, I put myself immediately at the head of a brilliant division of four thousand men and five pieces of artillery. I arrived at the moment when the enemy had cut off by the rear the position of the ill-fated general, with a respectable force, and I was hardly able to check his operations, as the night was already setting in. But I perceived with sorrow that the position was isolated; a deep ravine, and a wood occupied by the enemy, being interposed between us, it was impossible for the troops under my immediate command to advance by the only road there was, without exposing themselves as were already the others, and only one battery, which arrived late, could do any injury. The firing having ceased, our brigade took up its quarters in the neighboring village of San Angel, because, as it rained in torrents, it would have been equal to a defeat to have kept the troops in the open field.

Previous to this, however, I had ordered my aid-de-camp, Colonel Romiro, to pass the terrible ravine which was in our front, and guided by Don Jose Maria del Rio, well acquainted with the country, to reach the camp of the general, and to advise him to withdraw that very night to San Angel with his infantry and cavalry, by the only road which was left to him, spiking, previously, the artillery which it was not possible to save. My aid-de-camp succeeded, and communicated my orders between 10 and 11 o'clock that night; but instead of being obeyed with punctuality, the above named general hardly allowed my aid to speak, interrupted him by stating that he wanted six thousand men and ammunition, and sent him off with two despatches, already signed and sealed, in one of which he gives a report of the action of the evening, stating that he had beaten and put the enemy to a shameful flight, and that, in consequence, he conferred promotions on the generals, chiefs, and officers.



Early the next morning I presented myself again in the same camp, reinforced by a brigade which I had drawn from the capital, and with the intention of forcing the pass at any cost; but when I was about to commence, the enemy made his attack, which lasted ten minutes, and I witnessed, overwhelmed with despair, the defeat of those soldiers worthy of a better fate, because the general who unfortunately commanded them had cut himself off. The consequences of this success appeared terrible to my sight. The enemy could arrive by a rapid move at the capital, before it would be in my power to render assistance; the enemy could, by a flank movement, cut off my detached forces; the enemy had obtained, as a fruit of his victory, the power of bringing the whole of his forces against a part only of mine; and, finally, the enemy, owing to the insubordination and want of skill of one general, could turn to his profit the advantages of my position.

The advanced fort of San Antonio could not be maintained, because our line had been cut, and I gave orders for its garrison to withdraw, whilst I protected the fort and *tete de pont* of Churubusco. The enemy advanced and cut off part of the troops that were retreating, and appeared in front of our nearest defences. There, again, I placed myself at the head of our troops, and my efforts cost the enemy a good deal of blood. The losses, although much to be lamented, naturally proceeded from the retreat, which was hasty, unexpected, and confused, owing to the trains that had to pass through a narrow lane, flanked in its whole extent.

The defence was made from line to line until we came to the third, where I personally restrained the enemy and saved the capital, which had been so unexpectedly placed in danger.

When I was occupied on the 22d in re-organizing the forces, and manning the batteries, having placed myself again at the head of a column which should offer resistance to the last extremity, I received a communication from the general-in-chief of the enemy, proposing an armistice that might give time to listen to the propositions which may be made by the commissioner of the government of the United States, to put an end to the contest between the two nations.

I accepted the armistice, and after having had a meeting of the ministers, I resolved to listen to the above propositions.

The suspension of hostilities is always a blessing, because war is always an evil, particularly after the failure of grand combinations. To free the capital of its horrors, or at least to retard them, was an emergency which I could not resist, and more so when it presented the means of arriving at an honorable peace.

When two nations are in a state of war, they enjoy the right of reciprocally making propositions, which pre-supposes the obligation to listen. A perpetual war is an absurdity, because it is a calamity, and the instinct of self-preservation, which is stronger in nations than in private individuals, counsels us not to refuse any means which may lead to an advantageous settlement. To adopt this step, the constitution confers ample powers on me.

Devoted to interests so noble and exalted, I must at all hazards

maintain the *prestige* and respect of the supreme authority; particularly at present, when, if the factions should molest the government, they would deprive it of the liberty of deliberating, and it would fall into utter insignificance in the presence of our enemies. I will still be more explicit. Attempts at subversive sedition will be punished in an exemplary manner.

I have still a respectable body of troops, and the nation will assist me to maintain its dignity and vindicate its glory. I consider myself as free as if I had just obtained a distinguished victory, and there is no danger that the negotiations of the enemy will impose upon me, when their troops and cannon did not inspire me with fear. We will settle our difficulties amicably, if, above all things, our honor is saved; and we will again appeal to the sword, if force should be interposed to withhold from us justice and the acknowledgment of the rights of the nation.

ANTONIO LOPEZ DE SANTA ANNA.

MEXICO, August 23, 1847.

NOTE.—Copied from the New York Weekly Herald of September 18, 1847.

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*Proposed articles for an armistice offered to the commissioners on the part of the American army, to serve as a basis, &c.*

1. Hostilities shall instantly and absolutely cease between the armies of the United States of America and the United Mexican States, within 30 leagues of the capital of the latter States, to allow time to the commissioners appointed by the two republics to treat of peace.

2. This armistice shall continue as long as the commissioners of the two governments may be engaged in negotiations, or until the commander of either of the said armies shall give formal notice to the other of the cessation of the armistice, and for twenty-four hours after such notice.

3. In the meantime, neither army shall, within 30 leagues of the city of Mexico, commence any new fortification or military work of offence or defence, or do anything to enlarge or strengthen any existing work or fortification of that character within the said limits.

4. Neither army shall be reinforced within the same limits; and any reinforcement in troops or munitions of war, other than subsistence, now approaching either army, shall be stopped at the distance of at least 28 leagues from the city of Mexico.

5. Pending the armistice, the American army shall occupy no position, either for encampment or quarters, within the range of the guns of the city of Mexico, nor make any military *reconnoissance* within such range; and the Mexican forces on the southwest and west of the city of Mexico, including the garrison of Chapultepec, shall immediately retire within musket shot of that city.