

cavalry against cavalry, and four times his numbers; but on the 20th, I had the valuable services, as volunteer aids, of Majors Kirby and Van Buren, of the Pay Department, always eager for activity and distinction, and of a third, the gallant Major J. P. Gaines, of the Kentucky Volunteers.

I have the honor to be, etc., etc.,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

HON. WM. L. MARCY, *Secretary of War.*

CHAPTER XXXII.

ARMISTICE—NEGOTIATIONS—HOSTILITIES RENEWED—BATTLE OF MOLINOS DEL REY—CAPTURE OF CHAPULTEPEO AND MEXICO.

Report No. 33.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
TACUBAYA, NEAR MEXICO,
September 11, 1847. }

SIR:

I have heretofore reported that I had, August 24, concluded an armistice with President Santa Anna, which was promptly followed by meetings between Mr. Trist and Mexican commissioners appointed to treat of peace.

Negotiations were actively continued with, as was

understood, some prospect of a successful result up to the 2d instant, when our commissioner handed in his *ultimatum* (on boundaries), and the negotiators adjourned to meet again on the 6th.

Some infractions of the truce in respect to our supplies from the city, were earlier committed, followed by apologies on the part of the enemy. These vexations I was willing to put down to the imbecility of the government, and waived any pointed demands of reparation while any hope remained of a satisfactory termination of the war. But on the 5th, and more fully on the 6th, I learned that as soon as the *ultimatum* had been considered in a grand council of ministers and others, President Santa Anna on the 4th or 5th, without giving me the slightest notice, actively recommenced strengthening the military defences of the city, in gross violation of the 3d article of the armistice.

On that information, which has since received the fullest verification, I addressed to him my note of the 6th. His reply, dated the same day, received the next morning, was absolutely and notoriously false, both in recrimination and explanation. I enclose copies of both papers, and have had no subsequent correspondence with the enemy.

Being delayed by the terms of the armistice more than two weeks, we had now, late on the 7th, to begin to reconnoitre the different approaches to the city, within our reach, before I could lay down any definitive plan of attack.

The same afternoon a large body of the enemy was discovered hovering about the *Molinos del Rey*, within a mile and a third of this village, where I am quartered with the general staff and Worth's division.

It might have been supposed that an attack upon us was intended; but knowing the great value to the enemy of those mills (*Molinos del Rey*), containing a cannon foundry, with a large deposit of powder in *Casa Mata* near them; and having heard two days before that many church bells had been sent out to be cast into guns, the enemy's movement was easily understood, and I resolved at once to drive him early the next morning, to seize the powder, and to destroy the foundry.

Another motive for this decision—leaving the general plan of attack upon the city for full reconnaissance—was, that we knew our recent captures had left the enemy not a fourth of the guns necessary to arm, all at the same time, the strong works at each of the eight

city gates; and we could not cut the communication between the foundery and the capital without first taking the formidable castle on the heights of Chapultepec, which overlooked both and stood between.

For this difficult operation we were not entirely ready, and moreover we might altogether neglect the castle, if, as we then hoped, our reconnaissances should prove that the distant southern approaches to the city were more eligible than this southwestern one.

Hence the decision promptly taken, the execution of which was assigned to Brevet Major-General Worth, whose division was reënforced with Cadwallader's brigade of Pillow's division, three squadrons of dragoons under Major Sumner, and some heavy guns of the siege train under Captain Huger of the Ordnance, and Captain Drum of the 4th Artillery—two officers of the highest merit.

For the decisive and brilliant results, I beg to refer to the report of the immediate commander, Major-General Worth, in whose commendations of the gallant officers and men—dead and living—I heartily concur; having witnessed, but with little interference, their noble devotion to fame and to country.

The enemy having several times reënforced his line,

and the action soon becoming much more general than I had expected, I called up, from the distance of three miles, first Major-General Pillow, with his remaining brigade (Pierce's), and next Riley's brigade of Twiggs's division—leaving his other brigade (Smith's) in observation at San Angel. Those corps approached with zeal and rapidity; but the battle was won just as Brigadier-General Pierce reached the ground, and had interposed his corps between Garland's brigade (Worth's division) and the retreating enemy.

The accompanying report mentions, with just commendation, two of my volunteer aids—Major Kirby, Paymaster, and Major Gaines, of the Kentucky Volunteers. I also had the valuable services, on the same field, of several other officers of my staff, general and personal: Lieutenant-Colonel Hitchcock, Acting Inspector-General; Captain R. E. Lee, Engineer; Captain Irwin, Chief Quartermaster; Captain Grayson, Chief Commissary; Captain H. L. Scott, Acting Adjutant-General; Lieutenant Williams, Aide-de-Camp; and Lieutenant Lay, Military Secretary.

I have the honor to be, etc., etc.,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

HON. WM. L. MARCY, *Secretary of War.*

Report No. 34.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
NATIONAL PALACE OF MEXICO,
September 18, 1847. }

SIR :

At the end of another series of arduous and brilliant operations, of more than forty-eight hours' continuance, this glorious army hoisted, on the morning of the 14th, the colors of the United States on the walls of this palace.

The victory of the 8th, at the Molinos del Rey, was followed by daring reconnaissances on the part of our distinguished engineers—Captain Lee, Lieutenants Beauregard, Stevens and Tower—Major Smith, senior, being sick, and Captain Mason, third in rank, wounded. Their operations were directed principally to the south—toward the gates of the Piedad, San Angel, (Niño Perdido), San Antonio, and the Paseo de la Viga.

This city stands on a slight swell of ground, near the centre of an irregular basin, and is girdled with a ditch in its greater extent—a navigable canal of great breadth and depth—very difficult to bridge in the

presence of an enemy, and serving at once for drainage, custom-house purposes, and military defence; leaving eight entrances or gates, over arches—each of which we found defended by a system of strong works, that seemed to require nothing but some men and guns to be impregnable.

Outside and within the cross-fires of those gates, we found to the south other obstacles but little less formidable. All the approaches near the city are over elevated causeways, cut in many places (to oppose us), and flanked on both sides by ditches, also of unusual dimensions. The numerous cross-roads are flanked in like manner, having bridges at the intersections, recently broken. The meadows thus checkered, are, moreover, in many spots, under water or marshy; for, it will be remembered, we were in the midst of the wet season, though with less rain than usual, and we could not wait for the fall of the neighboring lakes and the consequent drainage of the wet grounds at the edge of the city—the lowest in the whole basin.

After a close personal survey of the southern gates, covered by Pillow's division and Riley's brigade of Twiggs's—with four times our numbers concentrated in our immediate front—I determined, on the 11th,

to avoid that network of obstacle, and to seek, by a sudden inversion to the southwest and west, less unfavorable approaches.

To economize the lives of our gallant officers and men, as well as to insure success, it became indispensable that this resolution should be long masked from the enemy; and again, that the new movement when discovered, should be mistaken for a feint, and the old as indicating our true and ultimate point of attack.

Accordingly, on the spot, the 11th, I ordered Quitman's division from Coyoacan, to join Pillow *by daylight* before the southern gates, and then that the two major-generals with their divisions, should *by night* proceed (two miles) to join me at Tacubaya, where I was quartered with Worth's division. Twiggs, with Riley's brigade and Captains Taylor's and Steptoe's field batteries—the latter of 12-pounders—was left in front of those gates to manœuvre, to threaten, or to make false attacks, in order to occupy and deceive the enemy. Twiggs's other brigade (Smith's) was left at supporting distance in the rear at San Angel, till the morning of the 13th, and also to support our general dépôt at Mixcoac. The stratagem against the south was admirably executed throughout the 12th and down

to the afternoon of the 13th, when it was too late for the enemy to recover from the effects of his delusion.

The first step in the new movement was to carry Chapultepec, a natural and isolated mound of great elevation, strongly fortified at its base, on its acclivities and heights. Besides a numerous garrison, here was the military college of the republic, with a large number of sub-lieutenants and other students. Those works were within direct gunshot of the village of Tacubaya, and, until carried, we could not approach the city on the west without making a circuit too wide and too hazardous.

In the course of the same night (that of the 11th), heavy batteries within easy ranges were established. No. 1, on our right, under the command of Captain Drum, 4th Artillery (relieved the next day for some hours by Lieutenant Andrews of the 3d), and No. 2, commanded by Lieutenant Hagner, Ordnance—both supported by Quitman's division. Nos. 3 and 4, on the opposite side, supported by Pillow's division, were commanded, the former by Captain Brooks and Lieutenant S. S. Anderson, 2d Artillery, alternately, and the latter by Lieutenant Stone, Ordnance. The batteries were traced by Captain Huger, Ordnance, and

Captain Lee, Engineer, and constructed by them with the able assistance of the young officers of those corps and of the artillery.

To prepare for an assault, it was foreseen that the play of the batteries might run into the second day; but recent captures had not only trebled our siege pieces, but also our ammunition; and we knew that we should greatly augment both by carrying the place. I was, therefore, in no haste in ordering an assault before the works were well crippled by our missiles.

The bombardment and cannonade, under the direction of Captain Huger, were commenced early in the morning of the 12th. Before nightfall, which necessarily stopped our batteries, we had perceived that a good impression had been made on the castle and its outworks, and that a large body of the enemy had remained outside, toward the city, from an early hour, to avoid our fire, but to be at hand on its cessation in order to reënforce the garrison against an assault. The same outside force was discovered the next morning after our batteries had reopened upon the castle, by which we again reduced its garrison to the *minimum* needed for the guns.

Pillow and Quitman had been in position since

early in the night of the 11th. Major-General Worth was now ordered to hold his division in reserve, near the foundery, to support Pillow; and Brigadier-General Smith, of Twiggs's division, had just arrived with his brigade from Piedad (two miles), to support Quitman. Twiggs's guns before the southern gates, again reminded us, as the day before, that he, with Riley's brigade and Taylor's and Steptoe's batteries, was in activity threatening the southern gates, and thus holding a great part of the Mexican army on the defensive.

Worth's division furnished Pillow's attack with an assaulting party of some two hundred and fifty volunteer officers and men, under Captain McKenzie, of the 2d Artillery; and Twiggs's division supplied a similar one, commanded by Captain Casey, 2d Infantry, to Quitman. Each of these little columns was furnished with scaling ladders.

The signal I had appointed for the attack was the momentary cessation of fire on the part of our heavy batteries. About eight o'clock in the morning of the 13th, judging that the time had arrived, by the effect of the missiles we had thrown, I sent an aide-de-camp to Pillow, and another to Quitman, with notice that the concerted signal was about to be given. Both

columns now advanced with an alacrity that gave assurance of prompt success. The batteries, seizing opportunities, threw shots and shells upon the enemy over the heads of our men with good effect, particularly at every attempt to reënforce the works from without to meet our assault.

Major-General Pillow's approach on the west side, lay through an open grove filled with sharpshooters, who were speedily dislodged: when, being up with the front of the attack, and emerging into open space at the foot of a rocky acclivity, that gallant leader was struck down by an agonizing wound. The immediate command devolved on Brigadier-General Cadwallader, in the absence of the senior brigadier (Pierce) of the same division—an invalid since the events of August 19. On a previous call of Pillow, Worth had just sent him a reënforcement—Colonel Clarke's brigade.

The broken acclivity was still to be ascended, and a strong redoubt, midway, to be carried, before reaching the castle on the heights. The advance of our brave men, led by brave officers, though necessarily slow, was unwavering, over rocks, chasms, and mines, and under the hottest fire of cannon and musketry. The redoubt now yielded to resistless valor, and the

shouts that followed announced to the castle the fate that impended. The enemy were steadily driven from shelter to shelter. The retreat allowed not time to fire a single mine, without the certainty of blowing up friend and foe. Those who, at a distance, attempted to apply matches to the long trains, were shot down by our men. There was death below, as well as above ground. At length the ditch and wall of the main work were reached; the scaling ladders were brought up and planted by the storming parties; some of the daring spirits, first in the assault, were cast down—killed or wounded; but a lodgment was soon made; streams of heroes followed; all opposition was overcome, and several of our regimental colors flung out from the upper walls, amidst long-continued shouts and cheers, which sent dismay into the capital. No scene could have been more animating or glorious.

Major-General Quitman, nobly supported by Brigadier-Generals Shields and Smith (P. F.), his other officers and men, was up with the part assigned him. Simultaneously with the movement on the west, he had gallantly approached the southeast of the same works over a causeway with cuts and batteries, and defended by an army strongly posted outside, to the east of the

works. Those formidable obstacles Quitman had to face, with but little shelter for his troops or space for manœuvring. Deep ditches, flanking the causeway, made it difficult to cross on either side into the adjoining meadows, and these again were intersected by other ditches. Smith and his brigade had been early thrown out to make a sweep to the right, in order to present a front against the enemy's line (outside), and to turn two intervening batteries, near the foot of Chapultepec.

This movement was also intended to support Quitman's storming parties, both on the causeway. The first of these, furnished by Twiggs's division, was commanded in succession by Captain Casey, 2d Infantry, and Captain Paul, 7th Infantry, after Casey had been severely wounded; and the second, originally under the gallant Major Twiggs, Marine Corps, killed, and then Captain Miller, 2d Pennsylvania Volunteers. The storming party, now commanded by Captain Paul, seconded by Captain Roberts of the Rifles, Lieutenant Stewart, and others of the same regiment, Smith's brigade, carried the two batteries in the road, took some guns, with many prisoners, and drove the enemy posted behind in support. The New York and South Carolina Volunteers (Shields's brigade), and the 2d Pennsylvania

Volunteers, all on the left of Quitman's line, together with portions of his storming parties, crossed the meadows in front under a heavy fire, and entered the outer enclosure of Chapultepec just in time to join in the final assault from the west.

Besides Major-Generals Pillow and Quitman, Brigadier-Generals Shields, Smith, and Cadwallader, the following are the officers and corps most distinguished in those brilliant operations: The Voltigeur regiment, in two detachments, commanded respectively by Colonel Andrews and Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Johnston—the latter mostly in the lead, accompanied by Major Caldwell; Captains Barnard and C. J. Biddle, of the same regiment—the former the first to plant a regimental color, and the latter among the first in the assault;—the storming party of Worth's division, under Captain McKenzie, 2d Artillery, with Lieutenant Selden, 8th Infantry, early on the ladder and badly wounded; Lieutenant Armistead, 6th Infantry, the first to leap into the ditch to plant a ladder; Lieutenant Rogers, of the 4th, and J. P. Smith, of the 5th Infantry—both mortally wounded; the 9th Infantry, under Colonel Ransom, who was killed while gallantly leading that gallant regiment; the 15th Infantry, under Lieutenant-

Colonel Howard and Major Woods, with Captain Chase, whose company gallantly carried the redoubt, midway up the acclivity;—Colonel Clarke's brigade (Worth's division), consisting of the 5th, 8th, and part of the 6th regiments of infantry, commanded respectively by Captain Chapman, Major Montgomery, and Lieutenant Edward Johnson—the latter specially noticed—with Lieutenants Longstreet (badly wounded, advancing, colors in hand), Pickett, and Merchant—the last three of the 8th Infantry;—portions of the United States' Marines, New York, South Carolina, and 2d Pennsylvania Volunteers, which, delayed with their division (Quitman's) by the hot engagement below, arrived just in time to participate in the assault of the heights; particularly a detachment, under Lieutenant Reed, New York Volunteers, consisting of a company of the same, with one of marines; and another detachment, a portion of the storming party (Twiggs's division, serving with Quitman), under Lieutenant Steele, 2d Infantry, after the fall of Lieutenant Gantt, 7th Infantry.

In this connection, it is but just to recall the decisive effect of the heavy batteries, Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4, commanded by those excellent officers, Captain Drum,

4th Artillery, assisted by Lieutenants Benjamin and Porter of his own company; Captain Brooks and Lieutenant Anderson, 2d Artillery, assisted by Lieutenant Russell, 4th Infantry, a volunteer; Lieutenants Hagner and Stone, of the Ordnance, and Lieutenant Andrews, 3d Artillery—the whole superintended by Captain Huger, Chief of Ordnance with this army, an officer distinguished by every kind of merit. The Mountain Howitzer Battery, under Lieutenant Reno, of the Ordnance, deserves also to be particularly mentioned. Attached to the Voltigeurs, it followed the movements of that regiment, and again won applause.

In adding to the list of individuals of conspicuous merit, I must limit myself to a few of the many names which might be enumerated:—Captain Hooker, Assistant Adjutant-General, who won special applause, successively, in the staff of Pillow and Cadwallader; Lieutenant Lovell, 4th Artillery (wounded), chief of Quitman's staff; Captain Page, Assistant Adjutant-General (wounded), and Lieutenant Hammond, 3d Artillery, both of Shields's staff, and Lieutenant Van Dorn (7th Infantry), Aide-de-Camp to Brigadier-General Smith.

Those operations all occurred on the west, south-east, and heights of Chapultepec. To the north, and

at the base of the mound, inaccessible on that side, the 11th Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hebert, the 14th, under Colonel Trousdale, and Captain Magruder's field battery, 1st Artillery, one section advanced under Lieutenant Jackson, all of Pillow's division, had, at the same time, some spirited affairs against superior numbers, driving the enemy from a battery in the road, and capturing a gun. In these, the officers and corps named gained merited praise. Colonel Trousdale, the commander, though twice wounded, continued on duty until the heights were carried.

Early in the morning of the 13th, I repeated the orders of the night before to Major-General Worth, to be with his division at hand to support the movement of Major-General Pillow from our left. The latter seems soon to have called for that entire division, standing momentarily in reserve, and Worth sent him Colonel Clarke's brigade. The call, if not unnecessary, was at least, from the circumstances, unknown to me at the time; for, soon observing that the very large body of the enemy, in the road in front of Major-General Quitman's right, was receiving reënforcements from the city—less than a mile and a half to the east—I sent instructions to Worth, on our opposite flank, to

turn Chapultepec with his division, and to proceed cautiously by the road at its northern base, in order, if not met by very superior numbers, to threaten or to attack in rear that body of the enemy. The movement it was also believed could not fail to distract and to intimidate the enemy generally.

Worth promptly advanced with his remaining brigade—Colonel Garland's—Lieutenant-Colonel C. F. Smith's light battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan's field battery—all of his division—and three squadrons of dragoons, under Major Sumner, which I had just ordered up to join in the movement.

Having turned the forest on the west, and arriving opposite to the north centre of Chapultepec, Worth came up with the troops in the road, under Colonel Trousdale, and aided, by a flank movement of a part of Garland's brigade, in taking the one-gun breastwork, then under the fire of Lieutenant Jackson's section of Captain Magruder's field battery. Continuing to advance, this division passed Chapultepec, attacking the right of the enemy's line, resting on that road, about the moment of the general retreat consequent upon the capture of the formidable castle and its outworks.

Arriving some minutes later, and mounting to the

top of the castle, the whole field to the east lay plainly under my view.

There are two routes from Chapultepec to the capital—the one on the right entering the same gate, Belén, with the road from the south, *via* Piedad; and the other obliquing to the left, to intersect the great western, or San Cosme road, in a suburb outside of the gate of San Cosme.

Each of these routes (an elevated causeway) presents a double roadway on the sides of an aqueduct of strong masonry, and great height, resting on open arches and massive pillars, which, together, afford fine points both for attack and defence. The sideways of both aqueducts were, moreover, defended by many strong breastworks at the gates, and before reaching them. As we had expected, we found the four tracks unusually dry and solid for the season.

Worth and Quitman were prompt in pursuing the retreating enemy—the former by the San Cosme aqueduct, and the latter along that of Belén. Each had now advanced some hundred yards.

Deeming it all-important to profit by our successes, and the consequent dismay of the enemy, which could not be otherwise than general, I hastened to despatch

from Chapultepec, first Clarke's brigade, and then Cadwallader's, to the support of Worth, and gave orders that the necessary heavy guns should follow. Pierce's brigade was, at the same time, sent to Quitman, and in the course of the afternoon I caused some additional siege pieces to be added to his train. Then after designating the 15th Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Howard—Morgan, the colonel, had been disabled by a wound at Churubusco—as the garrison of Chapultepec, and giving directions for the care of the prisoners of war, the captured ordnance and ordnance stores, I proceeded to join the advance of Worth, within the suburb, and beyond the turn at the junction of the aqueduct with the great highway from the west to the gate of San Cosme.

At this junction of roads, we first passed one of those formidable systems of city defences, spoken of above, and it had not a gun!—a strong proof, 1. That the enemy had expected us to fail in the attack upon Chapultepec, even if we meant anything more than a feint; 2. That in either case, we designed, in his belief, to return and double our forces against the southern gates, a delusion kept up by the active demonstrations of Twiggs with the forces posted on that