

Arriving in the Sound, near the British Governor at Victoria, a few courteous notes restored the island to its late neutral condition—the joint possession of the two parties. It is not known that the *protégé*, Harney, was even reprimanded for his rashness. He certainly was not recalled, although the measure was suggested by the writer.

Perhaps but few readers will complain of the insertion, in this narrative, of the following poem, written by Mrs. Scott, then in Paris, to cheer her husband on in his mission of peace. An English lady, a friend of the authoress, begged permission to copy the poem, which she sent to the London *Ladies' Magazine*.

Oh, Star of the West! throw thy radiance benign,
Unchanging and strong, on the warrior's way!
May the waves that surround him, by favor divine,
Be as lustrous and calm as thine own cheering ray.

"The hero of many a battle" goes now
More joyfully forth on a mission of peace:
Oh! Star of the West! be the prototype thou
Of success, whose pure blessings shall never surcease.

God prosper the barque that hath borrowed thy name!
Supplications, heartborn, to his throne are address'd
For the good, and the brave, and the pious, who claim
Our devotion—our prayers—in the "Star of the West."

They go, all unarm'd—save, with holiest views—
The ills of ambition and strife to arrest;
And the spirit of St. John (loved Apostle) imbues
Hearts, approaching his Isle, in the "Star of the West."

Unarm'd they will land! 'mid contention and wrath;
But, on high, 'tis decreed that "Peacemakers be blest."
They will follow, once more, their long, long ocean path,
And regain their own shores, with the "Star of the West."

Sail on, gallant Scott! true disciple of virtue!
Whose justice and faith every danger will breast
Nor swerve in the conflict. Heaven will not desert you,
There are angels on guard 'round the "Star of the West."

PARIS, October 6, 1859.

Of my many persevering efforts to improve the condition of the army, and, consequently, its efficiency, several proofs have been embodied in this narrative. The General Order reproduced at page 361, had in view, mainly, the protection of the rank and file against the abuses of commissioned and non-commissioned officers. I shall here add two other measures which greatly improved the comforts and usefulness of commissioned officers generally. 1. I claim credit for a long and active correspondence with military committees in the two Houses of Congress, resulting in the law that has given, since 1834, the cumulative rations

to our medical officers, that has prevented many of the most valuable from resigning on obtaining high professional skill by experience. 2. And I claim also a special agency in procuring the provision giving, since 1838, to "every commissioned officer of the line or staff, *exclusive of general officers*," "one additional ration per diem, for every five years he may have served, or shall serve, in the army of the United States." For several years in succession I had written and pressed upon the two military committees of Congress a section to that effect. Passing through Washington to the Cherokee country, in 1838, the Hon. Gouverneur Kemble, an intelligent friend of the army and member of the House Committee, called upon me on the part of the body to say that, although they could report the bill, and might carry it in the House against all opposition; yet if the chairman of the committee (McKay) and another radical member (Walter Coles) should speak against the measure in the House, its passage would be doubtful. Hence the desire that I should meet the committee.

I found the chairman gruff and immovable. At length he grumbled out — "Have you not pay enough?" I rejoined: "Leave me out; leave out

the generals." He added, "Agreed," and thence the service ration.

By that suggestion, it may be that I have lost, up to the present time (twenty-six years), the current receipts from five hundred to a thousand dollars a year, which would have been a great comfort to the declining years of an old soldier, as the bill might, in a year or two more, if not in 1838, have been passed—nothing being more reasonable—without excluding the general officers.

But an increase of physical infirmities admonishes me to bring this narrative to a close. Happily but little remains to be added.

In the Presidential canvass of 1860, it was plainly seen that a disruption of the Union was imminent. Deeply impressed with the danger, I addressed a memorial to President Buchanan on the subject, of which the following are extracts:

"OCTOBER 29, 1860.

"The excitement that threatens secession is caused by the near prospect of a Republican's election to the Presidency. From a sense of propriety, as a soldier, I have taken no part in the pending canvass, and, as always heretofore, mean to stay away from the polls.

My sympathies, however, are with the Bell and Everett ticket. With Mr. Lincoln I have had no communication whatever, direct or indirect, and have no recollection of ever having seen his person; but cannot believe any unconstitutional violence or breach of law, is to be apprehended from his administration of the Federal Government.

"From a knowledge of our Southern population it is my solemn conviction that there is some danger of an early act of rashness preliminary to secession, viz., the seizure of some or all of the following posts: Forts Jackson and St. Philip, on the Mississippi, below New Orleans, both without garrisons; Fort Morgan, below Mobile, without a garrison; Forts Pickens and McKee, Pensacola Harbor, with an insufficient garrison for one; Fort Pulaski, below Savannah, without a garrison; Forts Moultrie and Sumter, Charleston Harbor, the former with an insufficient garrison, and the latter without any; and Fort Monroe, Hampton Roads, without a sufficient garrison. In my opinion all these works should be immediately so garrisoned as to make any attempt to take any one of them, by surprise or *coup de main*, ridiculous.

"With the army faithful to its allegiance, and the

navy probably equally so, and with a Federal Executive, for the next twelve months, of firmness and moderation, which the country has a right to expect—*moderation* being an element of power not less than *firmness*—there is good reason to hope that the danger of secession may be made to pass away without one conflict of arms, one execution, or one arrest for treason. In the mean time it is suggested that exports might be left perfectly free—and to avoid conflicts all duties on imports be collected outside of the cities, in forts or ships of war."

The inauguration of President Lincoln was, perhaps, the most critical and hazardous event with which I have ever been connected. In the preceding two months I had received more than fifty letters, many from points distant from each other—some earnestly dissuading me from being present at the event, and others distinctly threatening assassination if I dared to protect the ceremony by a military force. The election having been entirely regular, I resolved that the Constitution should not be overturned by violence if I could possibly prevent it. Accordingly, I caused to be organized the *élite* of the Washington Volunteers, and called

from a distance two batteries of horse artillery, with small detachments of cavalry and infantry, all regulars.

In concert with Congressional Committees of arrangements, the President was escorted to and from the Capitol by volunteers—the regulars, with whom I marched, flanking the movement in parallel streets,—only I claimed the place immediately in front of the President for the fine company of Sappers and Miners under Captain Duane of the Engineers. To this choice body of men it was only necessary to say: *The honor of our country is in your hands.*

With a view to freedom of movement, I remained just outside of the Capitol Square with the light batteries. The procession returned to the President's mansion in the same order, and happily the Government was saved.

To show the new Administration that it was from no neglect of mine that several of our Southern forts had fallen into the hands of the rebels, I drew up and submitted the following defensive statement in March, 1861:

Southern Forts.

October 29, 1860.—I emphatically, as has been seen, called the attention of the President to the necessity of strong garrisons in all the forts below the principal commercial cities of the Southern States, including, by name, the forts in Pensacola Harbor, etc.

October 31.—I suggested to the Secretary of War that a circular should be sent at once to such of those forts as had garrisons, to be on the alert against surprises and sudden assaults.*

After a long confinement to my bed, in New York, I came to this city (Washington), December 12. Next day I personally urged upon the Secretary of War the same views, viz.: strong garrisons in the Southern forts—those of Charleston and Pensacola Harbors, at once; those on Mobile Bay and the Mississippi, below New Orleans, next, etc., etc. I again pointed out the organized companies and the recruits at the principal dépôts available for the purpose. The Secretary did not concur in one of my views, when I begged him to procure for me an early interview with the President,

* Permission not granted.

that I might make one effort more to save the forts and the Union.

By appointment, the Secretary accompanied me to the President, December 15, when the same topics, secessionism, etc., were again pretty fully discussed. There being, at the moment, in the opinion of the President, no danger of an early secession, beyond South Carolina, the President, in reply to my arguments for immediately reënforcing Fort Moultrie, and sending a garrison to Fort Sumter, said, in substance, the time had not arrived for doing so; that he would wait the action of the Convention of South Carolina, in the expectation that a commission would be appointed and sent to negotiate with him and Congress, respecting the secession of the State and the property of the United States held within its limits; and that, if Congress should decide against the secession, then he would send a reënforcement, and telegraph the commanding officer (Major Anderson) of Fort Moultrie, to hold the forts (Moultrie and Sumter) against attack.

And the Secretary, with animation, added: "We have a vessel of war (the Brooklyn) held in readiness at Norfolk, and he would then send three hundred men, in her, from Fort Monroe, to Charleston." To

which I replied, first, "That so many men could not be withdrawn from that garrison, but could be taken from New York. Next, that it would then be too late, as the South Carolina Commissioners would have the game in their hands—by first using, and then cutting the wires; that, as there was not a soldier in Fort Sumter, any handful of armed secessionists might seize and occupy it," etc., etc.

Here the remark may be permitted, that, if the Secretary's three hundred men had then (or some time later) been sent to Forts Moultrie and Sumter, *both* would now have been in the possession of the United States, and not a battery, below them, could have been erected by the Secessionists. Consequently, the access to those forts from the sea would now (the end of March, 1861) be unobstructed and *free*.

"The plan invented by General Scott to stop secession was, like all campaigns devised by him, very able in its details and nearly certain of general success. The Southern States are full of arsenals and forts, commanding their rivers and strategic points. General Scott desired to transfer the army of the United States to these forts as speedily and as quietly as possible.

The Southern States could not cut off communication between the Government and the fortresses without a great fleet, which they cannot build for years—or take them by land without one hundred thousand men, many hundred millions of dollars, several campaigns, and many a bloody siege. Had Scott been able to have got these forts in the condition he desired them to be, the Southern Confederacy would not now exist.”

—*Part of the Eulogy pronounced on Secretary Floyd, by the Richmond Examiner, on his reception at that city.*

The same day, December 15, I wrote the following note:

“Lieutenant-General Scott begs the President to pardon him for supplying, in this note, what he omitted to say this morning, at the interview with which he was honored by the President. 1. Long *prior* to the *Force Bill* (March 2, 1833), *prior* to the issue of his proclamation, and, in part, *prior* to the passage of the ordinance of nullification—President Jackson, under the act of March 3, 1807—‘authorizing the employment of the land and naval forces’—caused reën-

forcements to be sent to Fort Moultrie, and a sloop-of-war (the *Natchez*), with two revenue cutters, to be sent to Charleston Harbor [all under Scott], in order to prevent the seizure of that fort by the nullifiers, and 2. To insure the execution of the revenue laws—General Scott himself arrived at Charleston the day after the passage of the ordinance of nullification, and many of the additional companies were then in route for the same destination.

“President Jackson familiarly said at the time: ‘That, by the assemblage of those forces, for lawful purposes, he was not making war upon South Carolina; but that if South Carolina attacked them, it would be South Carolina that made war upon the United States.’

“General Scott, who received his first instructions (oral) from the President, Jackson, in the temporary absence of the Secretary of War (General Cass), remembers those expressions well.

“*Saturday night, December 15, 1860.*”

December 28.—Again, after Major Anderson had gallantly and wisely thrown his handful of men from Fort Moultrie into Fort Sumter—learning that, on

demand of South Carolina, there was great danger he might be ordered by the Secretary back to the less tenable work, or *out* of the harbor, I wrote this note to the Secretary of War:

"Lieutenant-General Scott (who has had a bad night, and can scarcely hold up his head this morning) begs to express the hope to the Secretary of War—1. That orders may not be given for the evacuation of Fort Sumter; 2. That one hundred and fifty recruits may instantly be sent from Governor's Island to reënforce that garrison, with ample supplies of ammunition and subsistence, including fresh vegetables, as potatoes, onions, turnips, etc; 3. That one or two armed vessels be sent to support the said fort.

"Lieutenant-General Scott avails himself of this opportunity also to express the hope that the recommendation heretofore made by him to the Secretary of War, respecting Forts Jackson, St. Philip, Morgan, and Pulaski, and particularly in respect to Forts Pickens and McRee, and the Pensacola Navy Yard, in connection with the last two named works, may be reconsidered by the Secretary.

"Lieutenant-General Scott will further ask the attention of the Secretary to Forts Jefferson (Tortugas),

and Taylor (Key West), which are wholly national—being of far greater value even to the most distant points of the Atlantic Coast and the people on the upper waters of the Missouri, Mississippi, and Ohio Rivers, than to the State of Florida. There is only a feeble company at Key West for the defence of Fort Taylor, and not a soldier in Fort Jefferson to resist a handful of fillibusters or a rowboat of pirates; and the Gulf, soon after the beginning of secession or revolutionary troubles in the adjacent States, will swarm with such nuisances."

December 30.—I addressed the President again, as follows:

"Lieutenant-General Scott begs the President of the United States to pardon the irregularity of this communication. It is Sunday, the weather is bad, and General Scott is not well enough even to go to church.

"But matters of the highest national importance seem to forbid a moment's delay, and, if misled by zeal, he hopes for the President's forgiveness.

"Will the President permit General Scott, without reference to the War Department,* and, otherwise, as

* The Secretary was already suspected.

secretly as possible, to send two hundred and fifty recruits, from New York Harbor, to reënforce Fort Sumter, together with some extra muskets or rifles, ammunition, and subsistence.

"It is hoped that a sloop-of-war and cutter may be ordered, for the same purpose, as early as to-morrow.

"General Scott will wait upon the President at any moment he may be called for."

The South Carolina Commissioners had already been many days in Washington, and no movement of defence (on the part of the United States) was permitted.

I will here close my notice of Fort Sumter by quoting from some of my previous reports.

It would have been easy to reënforce this fort down to about the 12th of February. In this long delay Fort Moultrie had been rearmed and greatly strengthened, in every way, by the rebels. Many powerful new land batteries (besides a formidable raft) had been constructed. Hulks, too, were sunk in the principal channel, so as to render access to Fort Sumter from the sea impracticable, without first carrying all the lower batteries of the Secessionists. The difficulty of reënforcing had thus been increased ten or twelve fold. First, the late

President refused to allow any attempt to be made, because he was holding negotiations with the South Carolina Commissioners; afterward, Secretary Holt and myself endeavored, in vain, to obtain a ship of war for the purpose, and were finally obliged to employ the passenger steamer the *Star of the West*. That vessel, but for the hesitation of the master, might, as is generally believed, have delivered at the fort the men and subsistence on board. This attempt at succor failing, I next verbally submitted to the late Cabinet, either that succor be sent by ships of war, fighting their way by the batteries (increasing in strength daily), or that Major Anderson should be left to ameliorate his condition by the muzzles of his guns; that is, enforcing supplies by bombardment, and by *bringing to* merchant vessels, helping himself (giving orders for payment), or, finally, be allowed to evacuate the fort, which, in that case, would be inevitable.

But before any resolution was taken—the late Secretary of the Navy making difficulties about the want of suitable war vessels—another Commissioner from South Carolina arrived, causing further delay. When this had passed away, Secretaries Holt and Toucey, Captain Ward of the Navy and myself—with the

knowledge of the President (Buchanan)—settled upon the employment, under the Captain (who was eager for the expedition), of three or four small steamers, belonging to the Coast Survey. At that time (late in January), I have but little doubt, Captain Ward would have reached Fort Sumter, with all his vessels. But he was kept back by something like a *truce* or armistice made (here), embracing Charleston and Pensacola Harbors, agreed upon between the late President and certain principal seceders of South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, etc., and this truce lasted to the end of that administration.

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It was not till January 3 (when the first Commissioners from South Carolina withdrew) that the permission I had solicited, October 31, was obtained—to admonish commanders of the few Southern forts (with garrisons) to be on the alert against surprises and sudden assaults. (Major Anderson was not among the admonished, being already straitly beleaguered.)

January 3.—To Lieutenant Slemmer, Commanding in Pensacola Harbor:

“The General-in-Chief directs that you take meas-

ures to do the utmost in your power to prevent the seizure of either of the forts in Pensacola Harbor, by surprise or assault—consulting first with the Commander of the Navy Yard, who will, probably, have received instructions to coöperate with you.” (This order was signed by Aide-de-Camp Lay.)

It was just before the surrender of the Pensacola Navy Yard (January 12) that Lieutenant Slemmer, calling upon Commodore Armstrong, obtained the aid of some thirty common seamen or laborers (but no marines), which, added to his forty-six soldiers, made up his numbers to seventy-six men, with whom this meritorious officer has since held Fort Pickens, and performed (working night and day) an immense amount of labor in mounting guns, keeping up a strong guard, etc., etc.

Early in January I renewed (as has been seen) my solicitations to be allowed to reënforce Fort Pickens; but a good deal of time was lost in vacillations. First, the President “thought, if no movement is made by the United States, Fort McRee will probably not be occupied, nor Fort Pickens attacked. In case of movement by the United States, which will doubtless be made known by the wires, there will be corresponding

local movements, and the attempt to reënforce will be useless." (Quotation from a note made by Aide-de-Camp Lay, about January 12, of the President's reply to a message from me.) Next, it was doubted whether it would be safe to send reënforcements in an unarmed steamer, and the want, *as usual*, of a suitable naval vessel—the Brooklyn being long held in reserve at Norfolk for some purpose unknown to me. Finally, after I had kept a body of three hundred recruits in New York Harbor ready for some time — (and they would have been sufficient to reënforce, temporarily, Fort Pickens, and to occupy Fort McRee also) — the President, about January 18, directed that the sloop-of-war Brooklyn should take a single company (ninety men from Fort Monroe, Hampton Roads), and reënforce Lieutenant Slemmer, in Fort Pickens, but without a surplus man for the neighboring fort, McRee!

The Brooklyn, with Captain Vogdes' Company alone, left the Chesapeake, for Fort Pickens, about January 22, and on the 29th, President Buchanan, having entered into a *quasi* armistice with certain leading seceders at Pensacola and elsewhere, caused Secretaries Holt and Toucey to instruct, in a joint

note, the commanders of the war vessels off Pensacola and Lieutenant Slemmer, commanding Fort Pickens, to commit no act of hostility, and not to land Captain Vogdes' Company unless that fort should be attacked!

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It was known at the Navy Department that the Brooklyn, with Captain Vogdes on board, would be obliged in open sea to stand off and on Fort Pickens, and, in rough weather, might sometimes be fifty miles off. Indeed, if so at sea, the fort might have been attacked and easily carried before the reënforcement could have reached the beach (in open sea), where alone it could land.

Respectfully submitted,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, }
WASHINGTON, March 30, 1861. }

WASHINGTON, March 3, 1861.

DEAR SIR:

Hoping that in a day or two the new President will have happily passed through all personal danger,

and find himself installed an honored successor of the great Washington, with you as the chief of his Cabinet—I beg leave to repeat in writing what I have before said to you orally—this Supplement to my printed “Views” (dated in October last) on the highly disordered condition of our (so late) happy and glorious Union.

To meet the extraordinary exigencies of the times, it seems to me that I am guilty of no arrogance in limiting the President’s field of selection to one of the four plans of procedure subjoined:

I. Throw off the *old* and assume a *new* designation—the *Union Party*; adopt the conciliatory measures proposed by Mr. Crittenden or the Peace Convention, and, my life upon it, we shall have no new case of Secession; but on the contrary, an early return of many, if not of all the States which have already broken off from the Union. Without some equally benign measure, the remaining slaveholding States will probably join the Montgomery Confederacy in less than sixty days—when this city, being included in a foreign country, would require a permanent garrison of at least thirty-five thousand troops, to protect the Government within it.

II. Collect the duties on foreign goods *outside* the ports of which this Government has lost the command, or close such ports by act of Congress, and blockade them.

III. Conquer the seceded States by invading armies. No doubt this might be done in two or three years, by a young and able general—a Wolfe—a Desaix, or a Hoche, with three hundred thousand disciplined men [kept up to that number], estimating a third for garrisons, and the loss of a yet greater number by skirmishes, sieges, battles, and Southern fevers. The destruction of life and property on the other side would be frightful—however perfect the moral discipline of the invaders. The conquest completed, at that enormous waste of human life to the North and Northwest, with at least \$250,000,000 added thereto, and *Cui bono?* Fifteen devastated Provinces! not to be brought into harmony with their conquerors; but to be held for generations by heavy garrisons, at an expense quadruple the net duties or taxes which it would be possible to extort from them, followed by a Protector or an Emperor.