


heavy batteries, within easy ranges, were established. No. 1, on our right, under the command of Captain Drum, 4th artillery, (relieved late next day, for some hours, by Lieutenant Andrews, of the 3d,) and No. 2, commanded by Lieutenant Hagner, ordnance—both supported by Quitman's division. Nos. 3 and 4, on the opposite side, supported by Pillow's division, were commanded, the former by Captain Brooks and Lieutenant S. S. Anderson, 2d artillery, alternately, and the latter by Lieutenant Stone, ordnance. The batteries were traced by Captain Huger and Captain Lee, engineer, and constructed by them, with the able assistance of the young officers of those corps and the artillery.

To prepare for an assault it was foreseen that the play of the batteries might run into the second day; but recent captures had not only trebled our siege pieces, but also our ammunition, and we knew that we should greatly augment both by carrying the place. I was, therefore, in no haste in ordering an assault before the works were well crippled by our missiles.

The bombardment and cannonade, under the direction of Captain Huger, were commenced early in the morning of the 12th. Before nightfall, which necessarily stopped our batteries, we had perceived that a good impression had been made on the castle and its outworks, and that a large body of the enemy had remained outside towards the city, from an early hour, to avoid our fire, and to be at hand, on its cessation, in order to reinforce the garrison against an assault. The same outside force was discovered the next morning after our batteries had reopened upon the castle, by which we again reduced its garrison to the minimum needed for the guns.





Pillow and Quitman had been in position since early in the night of the 11th. Major-General Worth was now ordered to hold his division in reserve, near the foundry, to support Pillow; and Brigadier-General Smith, of Twiggs's division, had just arrived with his brigade, from Piedad, (two miles,) to support Quitman. Twiggs's guns, before the southern gates, again reminded us, as the day before, that he, with Riley's brigade, and Taylor's and Steptoe's batteries, was in activity, threatening the southern gates, and there holding a great part of the Mexican army on the defensive.

Worth's division furnished Pillow's attack with an assaulting party of some two hundred volunteer officers and men, under Captain McKenzie, of the 2d artillery, and Twiggs's division supplied a similar one, commanded by Captain Casey, 2d infantry to Quitman. Each of these little columns was furnished with scaling ladders.

The signal I had appointed for the attack, was the momentary cessation of the fire on the part of our heavy batteries. About eight o'clock in the morning of the 13th, judging that the time had arrived, by the effect of the missiles we had thrown, I sent an aid-de-camp to Pillow, and another to Quitman, with notice that the concerted signal was about to be given. Both columns now advanced with an alacrity that gave assurance of prompt success. The batteries, siezing opportunities, threw shots and shells upon the enemy, over the heads of our men, with good effect, particularly at every attempt to reinforce the works from without, to meet our assault.

Major-General Pillow's approach, on the west side, lay through an open grove, filled with sharp-shooters, who were speedily dislodged; when, being up with the front



of the attack, and emerging into the open space, at the foot of a rocky acclivity, that gallant leader was struck down by an agonizing wound. The immediate command devolved on Brigadier-General Cadwalader, in the absence of the senior brigadier (Pierce) of the same division—an invalid since the events of August 19. On a previous call of Pillow, Worth had just sent him a reinforcement—Colonel Clark's brigade.

The broken acclivity was still to be ascended, and a strong redoubt, midway, to be carried, before reaching the castle on the heights. The advance of our brave men, led by brave officers, though necessarily slow, was unwavering, over rocks, chasms, and mines, and under the hottest fire of cannon and musketry. The redoubt now yielded to resistless valour, and the shouts that followed announced to the castle the fate that impended. The enemy were steadily driven from shelter to shelter. The retreat allowed not time to fire a single mine, without the certainty of blowing up friend and foe. Those who at a distance attempted to apply the matches to the long trains, were shot down by our men. There was death below as well as above ground. At length the ditch and wall of the main work were reached; the scaling-ladders were brought up and planted by the storming parties; some of the daring spirits first in the assault were cast down—killed or wounded; but a lodgment was soon made; streams of heroes followed; all opposition was overcome, and several of our regimental colours flung out from the upper walls, amidst long continued shouts and cheers, which sent dismay into the capital. No scene could have been more animating or glorious.

Major-General Quitman, nobly supported by Brigadier-Generals Shields and Smith, (P. F.,) his other officers and men, was up with the part assigned him. Simultaneously with the movement on the west, he had gallantly approached the south-east of the same works over a causeway with cuts and batteries, and defended by an army strongly posted outside, to the east of the works. Those formidable obstacles Quitman had to face, with but little shelter for his troops or space for manœuvring. Deep ditches, flanking the causeway, made it difficult to cross on either side into the adjoining meadows, and these again were intersected by other ditches. Smith and his brigade had been early thrown out to make a sweep to the right, in order to present a front against the enemy's line, (outside,) and to turn two intervening batteries near the foot of Chapultepec. This movement was also intended to support Quitman's storming parties, both on the causeway. The first of these furnished by Twiggs's division, was commanded in succession by Captain Casey, 2d infantry, and Captain Paul, 7th infantry, after Casey had been severely wounded; and the second, originally under the gallant Major Twiggs, marine corps, killed, and then Captain Miller, 2d Pennsylvania volunteers. The storming party, now commanded by Captain Paul, seconded by Captain Roberts of the rifles, Lieutenant Stewart, and others of the same regiment, Smith's brigade, carried the two batteries in the road, took some guns, with many prisoners, and drove the enemy posted behind in support. The New York and South Carolina volunteers, (Shields's brigade,) and the 2d Pennsylvania volunteers, all on the left of Quitman's line, together with portions of his storming



parties, crossed the meadows in front, under a heavy fire and entered the outer inclosures of Chapultepec just in time to join in the final assault from the west.

Those operations all occurred on the west, south-east, and heights of Chapultepec. To the north, and at the base of the mound, inaccessible on that side, the 11th infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert, the 14th, under Colonel Trousdale, and Captain Magruder's field battery, 1st artillery—one section advanced under Lieutenant Jackson—all of Pillow's division—had, at the same time, some spirited affairs against superior numbers, driving the enemy from a battery in the road, and capturing a gun. In these, the officers and corps named gained merited praise. Colonel Trousdale, the commander, though twice wounded, continued on duty until the heights were carried.

Early in the morning of the thirteenth, I repeated the orders of the night before to Major-General Worth, to be, with his division at hand, to support the movement of Major-General Pillow from our left. The latter seems soon to have called for that entire division, standing momentarily in reserve, and Worth sent him Colonel Clarke's brigade. The call, if not unnecessary, was at least, from the circumstances, unknown to me at the time; for soon observing that the very large body of the enemy, in the road in front of Major-General Quitman's right, was receiving reinforcements from the city—less than a mile and a half to the east—I sent instructions to Worth, on our opposite flank, to turn Chapultepec with his *division*, and to proceed, cautiously by the road at its northern base, in order, if not met by very superior numbers, to threaten or to attack, in rear,

that body of the enemy. The movement, it was also believed, could not fail to distract and to intimidate the enemy generally.

Worth promptly advanced with his remaining brigade—Colonel Garland's—Lieutenant-Colonel C. F. Smith's light battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan's field battery—all of his division—and three squadrons of dragoons, under Major Sumner, which I had just ordered up to join in the movement.

Having turned the forest on the west, and arriving opposite to the north centre of Chapultepec, Worth came up with the troops in the road under Colonel Trousdale, and aided by a flank movement of a part of Garland's brigade in taking the one gun breastwork, then under the fire of Lieutenant Jackson's section of Captain Magruder's field battery. Continuing to advance, this division passed Chapultepec, attacking the right of the enemy's line, resting on that road, about the moment of the general retreat consequent upon the capture of the formidable castle and its outposts.

Arriving some minutes later, and mounting to the top of the castle, the whole field to the east lay plainly under my view.

There are two routes from Chapultepec to the capital—the one on the right entering the same gate, Belen, with the road from the south *via* Piedad; and the other obliquing to the left, to intersect the Great Western, or San Cosme road, in a suburb outside of the gate of San Cosme.

Each of these routes (an elevated causeway) presents a double roadway on the sides of an aqueduct of strong masonry, and great height, resting on open arches and



massive pillars, which, together, afford fine points both for attack and defense. The sideways of both aqueducts are, moreover, defended by many strong breastworks at the gates, and before reaching them. As we had expected, we found the four tracts unusually dry and solid for the season.

Worth and Quitman were prompt in pursuing the retreating enemy—the former by the San Cosme aqueduct, and the latter along that of Belen. Each had now advanced some hundred yards.

Deeming it all-important to profit by our successes, and the consequent dismay of the enemy, which could not be otherwise than general, I hastened to despatch from Chapultepec—first Clarke's brigade, and then Cadwalader's, to the support of Worth, and gave orders that the necessary heavy guns should follow. Pierce's brigade was, at the same time, sent to Quitman, and, in the course of the afternoon, I caused some additional siege pieces to be added to his train. Then, after designating the 15th infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Howard—Morgan, the colonel, had been disabled by a wound at Churubusco—as the garrison of Chapultepec, and giving directions for the care of the prisoners of war, the captured ordnance and ordnance stores, I proceeded to join the advance of Worth, within the suburb, and beyond the turn at the junction of the aqueduct with the great highway from the west to the gate of San Cosme.

At this junction of roads, we first passed one of those formidable systems of city defenses, spoken of above, and it had not a gun!—a strong proof—1, That the enemy had expected us to fail in the attack upon

Chapultepec, even if we meant any thing more than a feint; 2, That, in either case, we designed, in his belief, to return and double our forces against the southern gates—a delusion kept up by the active demonstrations of Twiggs and the forces posted on that side; and 3, That advancing rapidly from the reduction of Chapultepec, the enemy had not time to shift guns—our previous captures had left him, comparatively, but few—from the southern gates.

Within those disgarnished works, I found our troops engaged in a street fight against the enemy posted in gardens, at windows, and on house-tops—all flat, with parapets. Worth ordered forward the mountain howitzers of Cadwalader's brigade, preceded by skirmishers and pioneers, with pick-axes and crow-bars, to force windows and doors, or to burrow through walls. The assailants were soon in an equality of position fatal to the enemy. By eight o'clock in the evening, Worth had carried two batteries in this suburb. According to my instructions, he here posted guards and sentinels, and placed his troops under shelter for the night. There was but one more obstacle—the San Cosme gate (custom-house) between him and the great square in front of the cathedral and palace—the heart of the city; and the barrier, it was known, could not by daylight, resist our siege guns thirty minutes.

I had gone back to the foot of Chapultepec, the point from which the two aqueducts begin to diverge, some hours earlier, in order to be near that new depot, and in easy communication with Quitman and Twiggs as well as with Worth.

From this point I ordered all detachments and strag-



glers to their respective corps then in advance; sent to Quitman additional siege guns, ammunition, intrenching tools; directed Twiggs's remaining brigade (Riley's) from Piedad to support Worth, and Captain Steptoe's field battery, also at Piedad, to rejoin Quitman's division.

I had been, from the first, well aware that the western, or San Cosme, was the less difficult route to the centre and conquest of the capital; and, therefore, intended that Quitman should only manœuvre and threaten the Belen or south-western gate, in order to favour the main attack by Worth—knowing that the strong defenses at the Belen were directly under the guns of the much stronger fortress, called the *citadel*, just within. Both of these defenses of the enemy were also within easy supporting distance from the San Angel (or *Niño Perdido*) and San Antonio gates. Hence the greatest support, in numbers, given to Worth's movement as the *main* attack.

Those views I repeatedly, in the course of the day, communicated to Major-General Quitman; but, being in hot pursuit—gallant himself, and supported by Brigadier-Generals Shields and Smith—Shields badly wounded before Chapultepec, and refusing to retire—as well as by all the officers and men of the column—Quitman continued to press forward, under flank and direct fires—carried an intermediate battery of two guns, and then the gate, before two o'clock in the afternoon, but not without proportionate loss, increased by his steady maintenance of that position.

Quitman, within the city—adding several new defenses to the position he had won, and sheltering his corps as well as practicable—now awaited the return of

daylight under the guns of the formidable citadel, yet to be subdued.

At about four o'clock next morning, (September 14,) a deputation of the *ayuntamiento* (city council) waited upon me to report that the federal government and the army of Mexico had fled from the capital some three hours before, and to demand terms of capitulation in favour of the church, the citizens, and the municipal authorities. I promptly replied, that I would sign no capitulation; that the city had been virtually in our possession from the time of the lodgments effected by Worth and Quitman the day before; that I regretted the silent escape of the Mexican army; that I should levy upon the city a moderate contribution, for special purposes; and that the American army should come under no terms, not *self-imposed*—such only as its own honour, the dignity of the United States, and the spirit of the age, should, in my opinion, imperiously demand and impose.

At the termination of the interview with the city deputation, I communicated, about daylight, orders to Worth and Quitman to advance slowly and cautiously, (to guard against treachery,) towards the heart of the city, and to occupy its stronger and more commanding points. Quitman proceeded to the great *plaza* or square, planted guards, and hoisted the colours of the United States on the national palace—containing the halls of Congress and executive departments of federal Mexico. In this grateful service, Quitman might have been anticipated by Worth, but for my express orders, halting the latter at the head of the *Alameda*, (a green park,) within three squares of that goal of general ambition. The capital



however, was not taken by any one or two corps, but by the talent, the science, the gallantry, the prowess of this entire army. In the glorious conquest, *all* had contributed—early and powerfully—the killed, the wounded, and *the fit for duty*—at Vera Cruz, Cerro Gordo, Contreras, San Augustin, Churubusco, (three battles,) the Molinos del Rey, and Chapultepec—as much as those who fought at the gates of Belen and San Cosme.

Soon after we had entered, and were in the act of occupying the city, a fire was opened upon us from the flat roofs of the houses, from windows and corners of streets, by some two thousand convicts liberated the night before by the flying government—joined by, perhaps, as many Mexican soldiers, who had disbanded themselves and thrown off their uniforms. This unlawful war lasted more than twenty-four hours, in spite of the exertions of the municipal authorities, and was not put down till we had lost many men, including several officers killed or wounded, and had punished the miscreants. Their objects were to gratify national hatred; and in the general alarm and confusion, to plunder the wealthy inhabitants—particularly the deserted houses. But families are now generally returning; business of every kind has been resumed, and the city is already tranquil and cheerful, under the admirable conduct (with exceptions very few and trifling) of our gallant troops.

I recapitulate our losses since we arrived in the basin of Mexico.

August 19, 20.—Killed, one hundred and thirty-seven, including fourteen officers. Wounded, eight hundred and seventy-seven, including sixty-two officers.

Missing, (probably killed,) thirty-eight rank and file. Total, one thousand and fifty-two.

September 8.—Killed, one hundred and sixteen, including nine officers. Wounded, six hundred and fifty-five, including forty-nine officers. Missing, eighteen rank and file. Total, seven hundred and eighty-nine.

September 12, 13, 14.—Killed, one hundred and thirty, including ten officers. Wounded, seven hundred and three, including sixty-eight officers. Missing, twenty-nine rank and file. Total, eight hundred and sixty-two.

Grand total of losses, two thousand seven hundred and three, including three hundred and eighty-three officers.

On the other hand, this small force has beaten on the same occasions, in view of their capital, the whole Mexican army, of (at the beginning) thirty odd thousand men—posted always in chosen positions, behind intrenchments, or more formidable defenses of nature and art; killed or wounded, of that number, more than seven thousand officers and men; taking three thousand seven hundred and thirty prisoners; including thirteen generals, of whom three had been presidents of this republic; captured more than twenty colours and standards, seventy-five pieces of ordnance, besides fifty-seven wall-pieces, twenty thousand small arms, an immense quantity of shot, shells, powder, &c., &c.

Of that enemy once so formidable in numbers, appointments, artillery, &c., twenty odd thousand have disbanded themselves in despair, leaving, as is known, not more than three fragments—the largest about two thousand five hundred—now wandering in different directions, without magazines, or a military chest, and living *at free quarters* upon their own people.



In the national palace of Mexico opposite the entrance of the great reception room, there hung a portrait of the celebrated Mexican, Iturbide. Rumaging about the palace, some of the officers found, in a neglected room, a portrait of Washington. Amid the greatest enthusiasm, the frowning representative of Mexican greatness gave place to the mild benevolent countenance of the great American hero; the proper sequel to the overthrow of the forces of the Mexican nation by the army of the North American republic. From the taking of the capital to the present, all has remained quiet and tranquil. The priesthood attempted to carry out a plan for the annoyance of the American army, refusing to open the churches, and in other modes cherishing the popular ill will. But the prompt and energetic orders of General Scott brought a sudden termination upon their plans. Signor Pena y Pena, who had been called to the administration of the government of Mexico, issued an address marked by the moderation of its views, and his secretary of state followed with one similar in tenor.

In October, Senor Rosa, the secretary of state, in the name of the president called a meeting of the Mexican Congress, to assemble at Queretaro in November, the results of whose deliberations have as yet been unimportant. During the same month, the attention of the government was directed towards General Paredes, who had effected an entrance into the country in disguise, and issued a very florid address to his countrymen. The government refused his proffered services, and directed harsh measures to be taken against him.

Santa Anna, though driven from the capital, continued his indefatigable efforts in behalf of his ungrateful

country. With nearly eight thousand men he advanced upon and took Puebla, and on the 25th of September, laid siege to the American works near that city, commanded by Colonel Childs. A siege of twenty-eight days failed to induce the gallant colonel and his starved troops to depart from their intention to make a successful defense. A cannonading was briskly maintained on both sides for three days. On the 1st of October, Santa Anna sallied out from the city with a large force, in order to attack General Lane, who was on his way up from Vera Cruz with a large train, and a force of about three thousand men. On the evening of the 8th of October, information was received that Santa Anna, with four thousand men and several pieces of artillery, was prepared to dispute their passage at the pass of Pinal Venta del Final. The army prepared for a battle, when it was learned that Santa Anna himself was at the town of Huamantla, some ten miles distant, and General Lane determined to advance upon that town with a portion of his forces, Captain Walker leading the van with a force of two hundred cavalry. Santa Anna had left that morning for the pass with four thousand men, leaving his artillery with a detachment of five hundred to follow. Captain Walker dashed into the town, defeated this detachment, captured four guns, and supposing the fight to be ended, suffered his men to disperse through the town in search of guns and ammunition. With some fifty men he remained in the plaza, where he suddenly found himself fiercely attacked by the enemy's cavalry, who had seen his advance and returned to save their artillery. In the struggle which followed, the gallant captain was slain. The arrival of the infantry soon



put an end to the battle; the enemy withdrawing from the town. The Mexicans lost two of the four cannon, and some thirty wagon loads of ammunition. Santa Anna thus out-generaled, abandoned his intention of contesting the pass of Pinal. But for this manœuver the Americans must have suffered severely in this narrow and difficult pass.

After relieving the garrison at Puebla, which city was evacuated by General Rea, General Lane advanced upon Atlisco, which he captured after gaining a victory over General Rea, who contested the field with unusual spirit, having suffered a loss of more than five hundred killed and wounded.

General Santa Anna, after these reverses, fled with a small band to Tehuacan, where even these troops became mutinous for want of pay, and soon deserted him. The president then deposed him from the head of the army and appointed General Rincon to succeed him. In grief and indignation at this treatment from the executive whom he himself had just called to power, Santa Anna issued an address on the 16th of October to the army, and another on the 22d of October to the people of Mexico, both more remarkable than any of his papers for its lofty tone, for the appeal to his enemies to testify concerning his conduct, and the assertion that his enemies are in favour of peace.

We now turn our attention to the operations of the navy, which had been engaged under Commodores Conner and Perry in the difficult service of blockading the rocky coast of Mexico. On the 8th of August, and on the 15th of October, 1846, two unsuccessful attempts were made by Commodore Conner to capture the town