

in this respect, but he regards it as a document containing "topics and sentiments the most likely to find a response in the bosoms of the Mexicans, and to promote the cause of justice, moderation, and peace." Such were properly the scope and end of the proclamation, and most ably have they been carried out.

You again advert to the subject presented in your letter of the 7th ultimo to Mr. Trist, and appear still to be laboring under an unaccountable misconception in regard to it. My letter of the 31st of May (a copy of which I herewith transmit) presents this matter in its true light. It will show you how far you have misled yourself, and how causelessly you have indulged in complaints, better characterized as reproofs, against the President and this department.

The President would not have deemed it proper that I should advert again to this subject, but for the apprehension he has that your course may obstruct the measures he has taken to procure a peace. It does not appear, from any communication made by you to this department, that you have executed or attempted to execute the order which you have received to forward the despatch from the Secretary of State addressed to the Mexican secretary of foreign affairs. The President is, however, unwilling to believe that you have not done your duty in this respect. If it has not been sent, he presumes that you have not been able to send it, and that you will, in due time, explain the causes which compelled you to detain it.

My letter, taken by itself, neither sustains nor excuses such an interpretation as you have given to it; and, taken in connexion with the facts which Mr. Trist was directed to communicate to you, and which it was expected would have been communicated with that letter, shows how idle it is to imagine that there was any attempt to place you "under the military command of Mr. Trist," or that you were "required to respect the judgment of Mr. Trist here (in Mexico) on passing events purely military, as the judgment of the President, who is some two thousand miles off." The respect due to yourself as well as that due to the President, who had placed you in chief command of our armies in Mexico, should have made you extremely reluctant to adopt such a conclusion, even on adequate proof of the fact; and to me it seems, as I am sure it will appear to others, strange indeed that you have been able to extract any such inference from my letter. You and Mr. Trist are both functionaries of the government of the United States, with important public interests confided to each in his respective sphere of action; cordial co-operation was expected; duty imposed it; the public good, the cause of humanity, demanded it. If there has been a failure in this respect—and from the tenor of your despatch the President fears that there has been—a high responsibility rests somewhere.

In relation to the direction of an armistice, or the suspension of hostilities, the President, after duly considering all you have said on the subject, does not doubt that it was an order proper and right for him to give, and consequently one which you were bound to obey. He sincerely regrets your strange misapprehension of it;

and he is wholly unable to conceive how you can reconcile with duty and subordination the making of it a topic of remark, I may say of incidental reproof of your common superior, in an official communication to a subordinate officer in another branch of the public service.

The information recently received here has caused a painful apprehension that Colonel Sours, who was bearer of despatches from this department to you, was murdered between Vera Cruz and Jalapa. I herewith send copies of the communications from this department which were entrusted to him.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. L. MARCY,
Secretary of War.

Major General W. Scott,
Commanding U. S. A. in Mexico.

N. B.—The following is an extract from a copy of an official letter purporting to have been written by you to Lieutenant Semmes, of the navy, dated head-quarters, Jalapa, May 9, 1847.

[Extract.]

"But there is at hand another functionary, who, under very recent instructions from the President of the United States, may perhaps claim to supersede me in the business of exchanging prisoners of war, as in other military arrangements. Mr. Trist, chief clerk of the Department of State, appointed minister or commissioner to Mexico, has arrived at Vera Cruz, and may be at this place with the train expected up in a few days. Perhaps you had better refer the business of your commission to him. I only make the suggestion."

[No. 29.]

HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Puebla, June 4, 1847.

SIR: I arrived here, with four troops of horse, on the 28th ult. Twigg's division came up the next day.

I enclose herewith a copy of Brevet Major General Worth's report, dated the 15th ultimo, (the original was intercepted by the enemy,) of an affair he had with General Santa Anna at Amosoque, some eight miles from this place.

The effective strength of this army has been surprisingly reduced. Besides the discharge of seven regiments and two independent companies of old volunteers, we had to leave in hospital about 1,000 men at Vera Cruz, as many sick and wounded at Jalapa, and 200 sick at Perote. Here we have on the sick report 1,017. Not a corps has made a forced march except in the pursuit after the battle of Cerro Gordo, and every possible attention has been given to the health of the troops. The general sickness may be attributed to several causes: 1. The great contrast in climates

above and below Cerro Gordo; 2. The insufficiency of clothing, but little having arrived when the army marched from Vera Cruz; and, 3. The want of salt meats, the troops not having had any oftener than one day in nine since we reached the elevated country, as our insufficient means of transportation allowed us to bring up only small quantities of bacon and no mess pork. The prevailing diseases have been chills and fevers, and diarrhœa.

Making the further deductions of the killed and wounded, the garrisons of Vera Cruz, Jalapa and Perote, and we have here but 5,820 effective non-commissioned officers, artificers, musicians and privates; a force evidently insufficient to garrison this large open city, and to march upon the capital, where, or near it, we may probably have to beat an indifferent army of from 12,000 to 25,000 men. This we could do with 4,000, but at a loss, probably, of one-fourth of our numbers; whereas with 8,000, our loss would not exceed some 300.

Not having heard of the approach of reinforcements from any quarter—not even of the 960 recruits for the old regiments, who were to embark at New York, and Newport, Kentucky—I have at length determined to abandon Jalapa, and to bring up to the head of the army the garrison of that city, with a part of the garrison of Perote, in order to be in a better condition to advance upon and to occupy the capital. See, herewith, my instructions of yesterday to Colonel Childs, the governor and commander of Jalapa.

It is ascertained that any sick or wounded men left in the road, or in small villages, would be certainly murdered by guerilla parties, rancheros, or banditti, and I am not absolutely certain that threats of punishment will render our hospitals safe, even in large cities. The want of reinforcements long promised and expected has driven me to this painful experiment.

The delay here until about the 22d instant may, however, be compensated by one important advantage. General Santa Anna has renounced the presidency; (see his printed letter herewith.) It is understood that a new government will be installed on the 15th instant, and there is good ground to hope under Herrera or Trias, both supposed to be desirous of peace with the United States. If we were previously to occupy the capital, the friends of peace (most of the leaders of the party belong to the capital) would be dispersed; or if they remained and organized under our colors, their government would be denounced and decried as set up by their army, and lose all credit and weight with the Mexican people.

We are still much embarrassed by the want of money. But little can be obtained on drafts this side of the capital; and we have not heard of the arrival of a dollar at Vera Cruz for this army. The attempt to subsist it by living at free quarters, or on forced contributions, would be the end of military operations.

I take the liberty to enclose a copy of my rejoinder to Mr. Trist. No doubt he has forwarded a copy of his most extraordinary epistle to me. To have such a flank battery planted against me, amidst critical military operations, is a great annoyance.

Considering the many cruel disappointments and mortifications I

have been made to feel since I left Washington, or the total want of support and sympathy on the part of the War Department which I have so long experienced, I beg to be recalled from this army the moment that it may be safe for any person to embark at Vera Cruz, which I suppose will be early in November. Probably all field operations will be over long before that time.

I have the honor to remain, sir, with high respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Hon Wm. L. MARCY,
Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, July 12, 1847.

SIR: Since my letters of the 31st of May and 14th [15th] of June, pointing out your entire misapprehension in regard to the mission of Mr. Trist, so far as it was assumed by you to be an interference with your military command, a part of his communications to you, as well as your letter to him of the 29th of May, has been received. This correspondence discloses a state of things between yourself and him most deeply regretted, as it is much to be feared that your personal relations are such as may compromise the most important national interests.

My previous letters on this subject, if received, must have convinced you of the groundlessness of your suspicions and the precipitancy of your conduct in this whole affair. You cannot fail to perceive that, so far from having cause to complain and indulge in disrespectful reproaches against your government on account of this mission, the utmost care was taken to secure to you all the rights and authority of your command, and to yield to all the pretensions you could properly set up as in anywise belonging to it.

Regarding, as the President feels compelled to do, your course in this matter as the result of an entire mistake as to the powers and duty of Mr. Trist, he regrets to perceive that the conduct of Mr. T., on the other hand, has not been free from error.

No two agents of the government could have been charged with duties more distinct and non-conflicting—duties less likely to bring on personal collision, where any sort of communication was required. To you was intrusted the conduct of military operations—to him the business of negotiating a peace, if a favorable opportunity should occur. Only a very limited official intercourse between you and him was required, and that was of such a character as to preclude, as it was supposed, the possibility of any misunderstanding. He was required, in the first place, to deliver to you a despatch from your government to the minister of foreign relations of Mexico. When thus delivered, all his agency in regard to it was ended. It was committed to you to be forwarded: not even the President's order to you to send it forward was communicated through him, but through this

department. To this course the most overwrought sensitiveness could not properly take the slightest exception. Your false alarm in regard to the power of the commissioner, and the misstep consequently taken—the first in the series of blunders—led him to interfere, in an unauthorized and improper manner, with an affair exclusively your own—the transmission of that despatch to the Mexican authorities. From this department Mr. Trist had no instructions whatever, and I am well assured that he had none from the President or the State Department, relative to this despatch, beyond the simple direction to place it in your hands. Whatever he may have done further than barely delivering it to you, was unauthorized. In undertaking, as he appears to have done in his letter to you of the 20th of May, to be the medium through which orders to you were to be transmitted, he has assumed authority not conferred on him, and the act is disavowed and disapproved by the President. He had no authority to give you any order whatever. The only orders from your government to you, relating to this subject, were issued through this department, and are contained in my despatches of the 14th of April, and these orders the President confidently expected you to execute. It is proper that I should say, in concluding my remarks on this point, that the President trusts that you have discovered your mistake in returning the despatch to Mr. Trist; that you have withdrawn it from him and executed the order to forward it from this department to the Mexican authorities. Should you receive from these authorities an intimation of a willingness to enter upon negotiations, you will, as a matter of course, apprise Mr. Trist of that fact, and do what may be deemed proper to facilitate the conclusion of a peace.

It is not expected that you still continue under your first strange delusion as to Mr. Trist's instructions to interfere in any manner with your military operations. My previous letters, and the extract furnished you from those instructions, must have put to flight all your misconceptions on that subject. The utmost extent of the commissioner's authority bearing on this point, was to give you written notice of the happening of a contingency on which a suspension of hostilities was to follow: not by Mr. Trist's order—not by an order communicated through him—but by the order of the President, your superior officer, conveyed to you directly by the Secretary of War.

This suspension of hostilities was not, as you saw fit to assume, to be a preliminary to, but to result from, negotiations conducted to a successful issue. Your course on receiving the first communication from Mr. Trist shut you out, for a time at least, from the information which would have secured you from the false position in which you so precipitately placed yourself. You would have learned from Mr. Trist, if an interview with him had not been obstructed, that the contingency referred to in my letter was a distinct event—not an undefined condition of things to be determined by discretion: it was a certain fact—the actual ratification of a definitive treaty of peace by the Mexican government, containing in one of its articles a stipulation for the suspension of hostilities to

follow immediately such ratification; and it should not be forgotten that it was the intention and expectation of your government that you should be as well acquainted with what constituted that contingency as the commissioner himself, before you could be required to act in reference to it; for Mr. Trist was authorized, on arriving at your head-quarters, to show you his instructions and the project of the treaty he was empowered to make. Had you been less impetuous in taking umbrage at the course pursued in this matter, and less inclined to conclude, without the least warrant for it, that your government intended disrespect to you, or was unmindful of what was due to the safety of the gallant army under your command, the dearest interests of the nation would not have been exposed to receive detriment from an ill-tempered personal altercation between two high functionaries, intrusted with important public concerns in a foreign country.

As past errors must have been discovered, the President expects that false steps on both sides have been retraced and that you and Mr. Trist are now co-operating, so far as co-operation is required, in your respective spheres of duty, to bring the war to a successful close by an honorable peace.

Your letter from Puebla, of the 4th of June, has been received and laid before the President. Considering that you had claimed, as a matter of right due to your superior rank, to be placed at the head of our armies in the field, in a state of actual war, and had earnestly besought that position as a matter of favor, the President was not a little surprised that, after so brief a period of service, you should ask to be recalled. The grounds put forth for this change of purpose have not probably had with him the influence you expected. They are of such an extraordinary character as to claim a passing notice. Of "the many cruel disappointments and mortifications I (you) have been made to feel since I (you) left Washington," you have omitted to specify a single one, and whether they are real or imaginary is left in great uncertainty. The sending of Mr. Trist to Mexico as a commissioner of peace, and the suspicion you cherished that you had been degraded by his being clothed with military authority to interfere with your rightful command, are probably prominent among these "cruel disappointments and mortifications." The exposition which has been made of that case, shows the lamentable extent to which error may prevail in personal matters when prejudice and suspicion pre-occupy the mind. Should your other undisclosed "cruel disappointments and mortifications" be of a like unsubstantial character, as it is presumed they are, you may well conclude that they constitute no sufficient motive with the President to grant the indulgence you ask.

I am unwilling to believe that the grave charge, that you have experienced so long "the total want of support and sympathy on the part of the War Department," was thrown in as a provocative to insure success to your application, and I certainly cannot concede that it rests on the slightest foundation of fact. In view of the vast diversity of human character, I ought not, perhaps, to be

surprised at any extravagance of self-delusion, yet I should be so in this instance if this is to be regarded as a well-considered allegation, reflecting the settled convictions of your mind. That it indicated the true state of your feelings at the moment it was written, I will not question; but that it is at all just towards the War Department, I must most positively deny. It is an assertion unaccompanied by facts to support it; it relates to a matter in regard to which my information must be at least as full and accurate as your own; and I feel bound, by the most solemn convictions of truth, to say that you are mistaken in the entire length and breadth of the allegation. That you have been disappointed in some of the arrangements made here, as you have in some of your own which did not depend upon the action of the War Department, is undoubtedly true; but such disappointments do not warrant or sustain the charge you have made—they do not even show that you have not had all the support from this department which was within its competence to give. The department cannot, by the mere fiat of its will, call into instant existence the means it may require, and place them where they are needed. Human agency cannot control the elements so as to make them subservient to its wishes, or to prevent them from sometimes frustrating its best concerted plans. In conducting a war such as that in which we are now engaged, the scene of operations, as you well know, is of the widest range; the machinery necessarily of vast extent and complexity; the agencies exceedingly numerous and dispersed over vast regions. That all this complication of means and agencies should respond with promptness and punctuality, in every instance, to any directing will, cannot be reasonably expected; that one failure, whether by accident, necessity, or negligence, should involve others, is inevitable; and that unforeseen disappointments should occasionally happen in working out results, should surprise no man who takes a sensible view of human affairs. That the War Department has not realized all that may have been expected in its arrangements, may be safely admitted, without laying itself open to the charge of having failed to act with energy and effect, or of having neglected any one of its essential duties, or to the still more unfounded and reckless charge of having failed to afford any support whatever to the general at the head of our armies in the field. The War Department, most deeply interested as it is in carrying the war to a successful issue, could have no motive—and by any other than a mind strangely deluded, it could not be suspected of having any motive—to do less than its utmost to insure triumph and glory to our arms; and to a charge of failure of duty in this respect, unaccompanied with any specification, it will only oppose, in its vindication on this occasion, its anxious, incessant, and strenuous efforts, zealously devoted to the conduct of the war. Regarding the inducements you have assigned for begging to be recalled as deserving to have very little influence on the question, it will be decided by the President with exclusive reference to the public good. When that shall render it proper, in his opinion, to withdraw you from your present

command, his determination to do so will be made known to you.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. L. MARCY,
Secretary of War.

Major General WINFIELD SCOTT,
Commanding U. S. Army, Mexico.

[No. 30.]

HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Puebla, July 25, 1847.

SIR: My last report was dated the 4th ultimo, from this place, enclosing a copy of my instructions (June 3) to Colonel Childs, ordering up the garrison of Jalapa, and a copy of a letter from me to Mr. Trist, of May 29.

Although daily in expectation of something of special interest to communicate, nothing has occurred of that character save a happy change in my relations, both official and private, with Mr. Trist. Since about the 26th ultimo, our intercourse has been frequent and cordial; and I have found him able, discreet, courteous, and amiable. At home, it so chanced that we had the slightest possible acquaintance with each other. Hence more or less of reciprocal prejudice, and of the existence of his feelings towards me, I knew, (by private letters,) before we met, that at least a part of the cabinet had a full intimation.

Still the pronounced misunderstanding between Mr. Trist and myself could not have occurred but for other circumstances: 1st, his being obliged to send forward your letter of April 14th, instead of delivering it in person, with the explanatory papers which he desired to communicate; 2. His bad health in May and June, which, I am happy to say, has now become good; and, 3. The extreme mystification into which your letter, and particularly an interlineation, unavoidably threw me.

So far as I am concerned, I am perfectly willing that all I have heretofore written to the department about Mr. Trist should be suppressed. I make this declaration as due to my present esteem for that gentleman; but ask no favor, and desire none, at the hands of the department. Justice to myself, however, tardy, I shall take care to have done.

Since my acknowledgment of May 7, (report No. 27,) I have had but two letters from you, dated, respectively, April 30 and May 31; received here, in the order of their date, June 6 and July 7. The duplicate of the former, borne by a special messenger from Washington, had been previously, by his imprudence, captured below Cerro Gordo, and published, with other letters found on his person, in the papers of the Mexican government.

I do not acknowledge the justice of either of your rebukes contained in the letter of May 31; and that I do not here triumphantly vindicate myself is not from the want of will, means, or ability, but *time*.

The first letter (dated February 22) received from you, at Vera

Cruz, contained a censure; and I am now rebuked for the unavoidable—nay *wise*, if it had not been unavoidable—release, on parole, of the prisoners taken at Cerro Gordo—even before one word of commendation from government has reached this army on account of its gallant conduct in the capture of those prisoners. So, in regular progression, I may—should the same army gallantly bear me into the city of Mexico in the next seven or eight weeks, which is probable, if we are not arrested by a peace or a truce—look to be dismissed from the service of my country. You will perceive that I am aware (as I have long been) of the dangers which hang over me at home; but I, too, am a citizen of the United States, and well know the obligations imposed under all circumstances by an enlightened patriotism.

Having, June 3, lost all hope of being joined by other troops than the nine hundred and odd men belonging to the old regiments of this army, and of whose approach I had had notice from the adjutant general, I ordered up Colonel Childs, with the garrison from Jalapa; but instructed him to await for that body, and any other (I was thinking only of some other party of recruits) he might chance to hear of. He waited, first, for Colonel McIntosh; next for Brigadier General Cadwalader; who, in turn, heard of, and waited for, Major General Pillow. The latter arrived here, with all those detachments, the 8th instant. But, in the meantime, I had heard that Brigadier General Pierce had reached Vera Cruz on the 28th June, and was to take up his line of march, at the latest, the 3d instant. Consequently, I expected him here, with much confidence, by the 17th, but the day before, I learned, with great disappointment, that the want of transportation and an accident would detain him at Vera Cruz till the 16th. Of course I cannot now look for him before the end of this month. I shall be obliged to wait his certain and near approach; 1st, because we need the strong reinforcement he will bring up; and, 2d, the money supposed to be with him is indispensable.

In respect to money, I beg again to report that the chief commissary (Captain Grayson) of this army has not received a dollar from the United States since we landed at Vera Cruz, March 9. He now owes more than \$200,000, and is obliged to purchase on credit, at great disadvantages. The chief quartermaster (Captain Irwin) has received, perhaps, \$60,000, and labors under like incumbrances. Both have sold drafts, to small amounts, and borrowed largely of the pay department, which has received about half the money estimated for. Consequently, the troops have some four months' pay due them. Our poverty, or the neglect of the disbursing departments at home, has been made known, to our shame, in the papers of the capital here, through a letter from Lieutenant Colonel Hunt, that was found on the person of the special messenger from Washington.

The army is also suffering greatly from the want of necessary clothing, including blankets and great coats. The new troops, (those who have last arrived,) as destitute as the others, were first told that they would find abundant supplies at New Orleans; next, at Vera Cruz, and, finally, here; whereas we now have,

perhaps, a thousand hands engaged in making shoes and (out of bad materials and at high cost) pantaloons. These articles, about 3,000 pairs of each, are absolutely necessary to cover the nakedness of the troops.

February 28, off Lobos, I wrote to Brigadier General Brooke to direct the quartermaster at New Orleans to send to me large supplies of clothing. March 16, (23,) General Brooke replied that the quartermaster at New Orleans had "neither clothing nor shoes," and that he was "fearful that unless they have been sent out to you direct, you will be much disappointed."

Some small quantity of clothing, perhaps one-fifth of our wants, came to Vera Cruz from some quarter, and followed us to Jalapa and this place.

May 30, the number of sick here was 1,017; of effectives, 5,820. Since the arrival of Major General Pillow, we have, effectives, (rank and file,) 8,061; sick, 2,215, besides 87 officers under the latter head. The arrival of Brigadier General Pierce may add about 25 per cent. to our effective strength, and I hope to advance, after leaving a competent garrison here, at the head of 9,500 men. The enemy in the capital may amount to some thirty odd thousand, including good, bad and indifferent. The health of our troops has been improving since the 20th instant.

I have been obliged to detain Major General Quitman here in the command of the volunteer division, not only on account of his very valuable services with that corps, but because I cannot send him in safety and with honor either direct to Saltillo, or via Vera Cruz, without a heavy detachment of troops, which would be of itself quite a military operation. Brigadier General Shields commands a brigade in that division.

I have large masses of papers, some of them of considerable interest, to forward; but the messenger about to depart can only take two or three letters in a small compass. Mr. Trist writes by him, and to his report I beg to refer for his prospects of opening negotiations.

I have no news from Major General Taylor later than May 23, and none of the approach of additional troops.

I have the honor to remain, with high respect, sir, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Hon. W. L. MARCY,
Secretary of War.

Endorsement.

[Placed, sealed, in the hands of Mr. Trist, the night of its date, to go by a private express, frequently before employed by him, (Mr. T.;) the express rider never before, as far as was known, having failed to deliver letters as he was directed.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

MEXICO, November, 1847.]