

Cruz, contained a censure; and I am now rebuked for the unavoidable—nay *wise*, if it had not been unavoidable—release, on parole, of the prisoners taken at Cerro Gordo—even before one word of commendation from government has reached this army on account of its gallant conduct in the capture of those prisoners. So, in regular progression, I may—should the same army gallantly bear me into the city of Mexico in the next seven or eight weeks, which is probable, if we are not arrested by a peace or a truce—look to be dismissed from the service of my country. You will perceive that I am aware (as I have long been) of the dangers which hang over me at home; but I, too, am a citizen of the United States, and well know the obligations imposed under all circumstances by an enlightened patriotism.

Having, June 3, lost all hope of being joined by other troops than the nine hundred and odd men belonging to the old regiments of this army, and of whose approach I had had notice from the adjutant general, I ordered up Colonel Childs, with the garrison from Jalapa; but instructed him to await for that body, and any other (I was thinking only of some other party of recruits) he might chance to hear of. He waited, first, for Colonel McIntosh; next for Brigadier General Cadwalader; who, in turn, heard of, and waited for, Major General Pillow. The latter arrived here, with all those detachments, the 8th instant. But, in the meantime, I had heard that Brigadier General Pierce had reached Vera Cruz on the 28th June, and was to take up his line of march, at the latest, the 3d instant. Consequently, I expected him here, with much confidence, by the 17th, but the day before, I learned, with great disappointment, that the want of transportation and an accident would detain him at Vera Cruz till the 16th. Of course I cannot now look for him before the end of this month. I shall be obliged to wait his certain and near approach; 1st, because we need the strong reinforcement he will bring up; and, 2d, the money supposed to be with him is indispensable.

In respect to money, I beg again to report that the chief commissary (Captain Grayson) of this army has not received a dollar from the United States since we landed at Vera Cruz, March 9. He now owes more than \$200,000, and is obliged to purchase on credit, at great disadvantages. The chief quartermaster (Captain Irwin) has received, perhaps, \$60,000, and labors under like incumbrances. Both have sold drafts, to small amounts, and borrowed largely of the pay department, which has received about half the money estimated for. Consequently, the troops have some four months' pay due them. Our poverty, or the neglect of the disbursing departments at home, has been made known, to our shame, in the papers of the capital here, through a letter from Lieutenant Colonel Hunt, that was found on the person of the special messenger from Washington.

The army is also suffering greatly from the want of necessary clothing, including blankets and great coats. The new troops, (those who have last arrived,) as destitute as the others, were first told that they would find abundant supplies at New Orleans; next, at Vera Cruz, and, finally, here; whereas we now have,

perhaps, a thousand hands engaged in making shoes and (out of bad materials and at high cost) pantaloons. These articles, about 3,000 pairs of each, are absolutely necessary to cover the nakedness of the troops.

February 28, off Lobos, I wrote to Brigadier General Brooke to direct the quartermaster at New Orleans to send to me large supplies of clothing. March 16, (23,) General Brooke replied that the quartermaster at New Orleans had "neither clothing nor shoes," and that he was "fearful that unless they have been sent out to you direct, you will be much disappointed."

Some small quantity of clothing, perhaps one-fifth of our wants, came to Vera Cruz from some quarter, and followed us to Jalapa and this place.

May 30, the number of sick here was 1,017; of effectives, 5,820. Since the arrival of Major General Pillow, we have, effectives, (rank and file,) 8,061; sick, 2,215, besides 87 officers under the latter head. The arrival of Brigadier General Pierce may add about 25 per cent. to our effective strength, and I hope to advance, after leaving a competent garrison here, at the head of 9,500 men. The enemy in the capital may amount to some thirty odd thousand, including good, bad and indifferent. The health of our troops has been improving since the 20th instant.

I have been obliged to detain Major General Quitman here in the command of the volunteer division, not only on account of his very valuable services with that corps, but because I cannot send him in safety and with honor either direct to Saltillo, or via Vera Cruz, without a heavy detachment of troops, which would be of itself quite a military operation. Brigadier General Shields commands a brigade in that division.

I have large masses of papers, some of them of considerable interest, to forward; but the messenger about to depart can only take two or three letters in a small compass. Mr. Trist writes by him, and to his report I beg to refer for his prospects of opening negotiations.

I have no news from Major General Taylor later than May 23, and none of the approach of additional troops.

I have the honor to remain, with high respect, sir, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Hon. W. L. MARCY,  
*Secretary of War.*

*Endorsement.*

[Placed, sealed, in the hands of Mr. Trist, the night of its date, to go by a private express, frequently before employed by him, (Mr. T.;) the express rider never before, as far as was known, having failed to deliver letters as he was directed.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

MEXICO, November, 1847.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, October 6, 1847.

SIR: No official despatch has been received from you at this department of a later date than that of the 4th of June, though we are not without authentic information of your operations to the 20th of August, and of the signal victories obtained by you and the gallant army under your command, on that and the preceding day.

Accounts upon which reliance is placed have recently reached us that the negotiations for peace have terminated unsuccessfully, and that hostilities re-commenced on the 8th or 9th ultimo. We have also the gratifying intelligence that you have succeeded in capturing the city of Mexico, and are waiting with deep anxiety for the particulars of your operations up to and including that important event.

The terms insisted on by Mexico, on which only she will consent to conclude a peace, (which also have been received here,) are so extravagant and inadmissible that there is no alternative left but to prosecute the war.

It is quite evident that the authorities of Mexico would not present and insist upon, as a basis for peace, terms which could not be entertained for a moment by us without national dishonor, were they not encouraged to continue the war by that portion of the population, as well as others, upon which the burdens of the war ought to fall, and upon which, in the further prosecution of it, they must be made to fall, as the only means now left of bringing it to a close. We have hitherto been far more forbearing than is customary in exercising the extreme and even some of the ordinary rights of belligerents. It is now evident that our leniency has not been appreciated, nor reciprocated, but, on the contrary, has been repaid with bad faith and barbarity; and is only met by a blind obstinacy, and a reckless determination to prolong the conflict.

However unwilling we may be to modify our humane policy, a change now seems to be required even by the considerations of humanity. We must take the best measures within the clearly admitted course of civilized warfare, to beget a disposition in the people of Mexico to come to an adjustment upon fair and honorable terms. It should be borne in mind that the people of Mexico, indulging, as it is evident they do, the most hostile feelings, are not less parties to the war than the Mexican army; and as a means of peace, they must be made to feel its evils.

The guerilla system which has been resorted to is hardly recognized as a legitimate mode of warfare, and should be met with the utmost allowable severity. Not only those embodied for the purpose of carrying out that system, but those who at any time have been engaged in it, or who have sustained, sheltered and protected them, are much less entitled to favorable consideration than the soldiers in the ranks of the regular Mexican army. They should be seized and held as prisoners of war, and sent to the United States if it is not convenient to hold them. Their haunts and places of

rendezvous should be broken up and destroyed. Those implicated in the murder of non-combatants, or in robbery and plunder, should be subjected to a severer treatment. Independent of restraints, &c., upon their persons, all their property and effects within our reach should be unhesitatingly seized and devoted to public use. In relation to other prisoners and officers, I refer you to my despatch of May 31. I herewith send you an extract from it relating to that subject.

Permit me to invite your attention to the despatch from this department of the 1st ultimo, (a copy of which is herewith sent,) and urge the suggestions therein contained upon your particular consideration. The burden of sustaining our forces in Mexico must be thrown, to the utmost extent, upon the people of that country—its resources should be resorted to in every manner consistent with the usages of civilized war, for that purpose; and it is hoped that your situation is such as will warrant you in making this resort, at least to the extent required for the support of our army. The men of means who have willingly contributed aid to support the Mexican army, should be forced to contribute to the support of ours.

Without a particular knowledge of your situation, of the available force you now have at your command, or of the resistance the enemy are still capable of making, nothing more than suggestions, in regard to your future proceedings, will be submitted for your consideration. I need not urge upon you the adoption of all measures necessary for holding the city of Mexico, and the principal places between that city and Vera Cruz. To open and keep open the way between these two cities would seem to be required for holding securely what is already conquered, and for future operations. For this purpose a considerable increase of your force, it is presumed, will be indispensable. Additional troops are now on the way to join your column. A force of about 3,000 men, besides Colonel Hays's mounted volunteers, has been sent from General Taylor's command, and we are advised that about 1,800 of these are now *en route* between Vera Cruz and your head-quarters, (if they have not already reached there,) under the command of Brigadier General Lane. A large number under General Cushing will soon follow. One new regiment of Ohio volunteers is now *en route*, and five more are nearly organized, and will be sent forthwith to Vera Cruz, with orders to join you. There is also a considerable volunteer force which was called out many months since, and had been slow in organizing, now on its way to your column. The adjutant general's estimate herewith of the total number of these troops, and other detachments, make the aggregate force *en route* under orders, and being mustered into service, about 15,000, since General Pierce's advance from Vera Cruz on the 14th July. How far this amount of force will be reduced by casualties before it reaches you, cannot be estimated. With this augmentation of strength it is hoped that you will be able to accomplish not only the objects before indicated, (should you deem them preferable to others,) but to carry on further aggressive operations; to achieve new conquests; to disperse the remaining army of the enemy in

your vicinity, and prevent the organization of another. Left as you are to your own judgment as to your military operations, the fullest confidence is entertained that you will conduct them in the most effective way to bring about the main and ultimate object of the war: namely, to induce the rulers and people of Mexico to desire and consent to such terms of peace as we have a right to ask and expect.

The views of the government in relation to propositions and negotiations for concluding a peace, are disclosed in a despatch from the Department of State to Mr. Trist, a copy of which accompanies this communication. By it you will perceive that he is recalled. You will embrace a proper occasion to notify the Mexican authorities of this fact.

Should they offer through you terms of accommodation, or propose to enter on negotiations, the President directs that such propositions be forwarded without delay to him; but it is not expected that your movements or measures for carrying on hostilities will be thereby relaxed, or in anywise changed.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. L. MARCY,  
*Secretary of War.*

Major General WINFIELD SCOTT,  
*Commanding U. S. Army, Mexico.*

[No. 36.]

HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Mexico, November 27, 1847.*

SIR: Since the letter recalling Mr. Trist was received, we have certain information that the Mexican government had, about the same time, appointed commissioners to meet him for negotiating the terms of a peace; and, if we had a commission here to receive them, it is believed that a satisfactory treaty might soon be agreed upon between the two belligerents. Those commissioners are understood to be now in this city, but they have not called on me or submitted to me any proposition whatever, although the government at Queretaro has been informed that I shall at all times be ready to send home any communication, looking to a renewal of negotiations, from that government. It is doubtful, however, I learn indirectly, whether the Mexican government, or its commissioners, will adopt that course.

I have now been waiting with anxiety, for nearly a month, the arrival of the reinforcements with Major General Patterson, and others, coming up from Vera Cruz. That general, in an official report dated the 10th instant, informs me that he had halted with some 2,600 men "for duty," at Jalapa; had sent his wagons back to the seaport, and expected to renew his march, in this direction, about the 20th instant. He had received my instructions of the 13th and 28th ultimo, (others await him at Puebla,) directing the regarrisoning of Jalapa with some 1,200 men, and the establishment

of at least two new posts between that city and Vera Cruz. The latter he had established at the bridge over the San Juan, and at the national bridge; but whether the 2,600 men "for duty" be a surplus over and above the new garrison at Jalapa, the report does not inform me. The instructions waiting at Puebla direct that another new post of from 400 to 500 men shall be established at Rio Frio, on the national road, about 36 miles from Puebla, and the same from this city.

Major General Patterson complains, I have no doubt justly, of the unfitness, from the want of experience, of the officers and men with him, for the service of separate posts, whence are to be feared many disorders and much waste of public property. We are here, also, very deficient in the number of field and company officers needed even for ordinary duties; and the force present is barely sufficient to garrison this large city and the castle of Chapultepec. One strong detachment is now out with the train despatched hence to Vera Cruz on the 1st instant, and before its return (about the 5th proximo) I shall have sent down another for certain supplies, not to be obtained here on advantageous terms, and in order, as in the other instance, that a portion of the wagons may be serviceable in bringing reinforcements from Vera Cruz.

I am happy to learn that Major General Butler was hourly expected at Vera Cruz early in this month. On his or Major General Patterson's arrival here, with 4,000 or more reinforcements, over and above the eastern garrisons, I shall despatch that surplus, or a force equal to it, to occupy the mining districts within — miles of Zacatecas; and, should the surplus be sufficient, I shall also occupy the mining district of San Luis de Potosi, unless propositions of peace, on the part of Mexico, of such a character as to give a strong probability of their acceptance by our government, combined with an evident steadiness of purpose at Queretaro, may possibly cause me not to disturb the government at that place, but to pass it at some distance to the right or left. An indirect overture for an armistice I have already declined.

In making the proposed distant detachments, I shall endeavor to send together about equal portions of regulars and new volunteers. The new York, South Carolina, and Pennsylvania regiments, (the 2d Pennsylvania,) with me, have been exceedingly reduced in numbers, as are also all the regular regiments.

I invite attention to the accompanying order, No. 358, respecting bullion and coins. I am engaged in collecting the statistics of finance in this country for the period a little before the commencement of this war. It is possible that if we should be able to occupy the principal mining districts and seaports of Mexico, and keep the great highways clear of guerilleros and other robbers, the per centage on the precious metals—coinage and exports—and duties on increased imports of foreign commodities, might amount to ten or twelve millions a year; but on the approach of even Mexican troops, in periods of revolution, the miners always run away from their work, and are rarely brought back in months. The some difficulty may be apprehended from the approach of our troops. Be-

sides, the mints, (some seven or eight,) by payments in advance, have, I learn, hired the privilege of coinage for a term of years, and they are mostly, if not entirely, in the hands of neutrals. And in respect to other internal resources of ordinary revenue, I suppose they cannot be made available towards the support of this army, except by the occupation of the State capitals and through the State authorities. To collect such revenue directly, by means of agents of our own—Mexican or American—would require a host of civil employes, involving much extortion, waste, and corruption. The superintendence of the latter system would be extremely repugnant to my habits and feelings. But, I repeat, I have but recently commenced the study of the subject. By the arrival of adequate reinforcements, I hope to be better informed, and, under a general system to be devised, to be able to collect, in the interior, at least a part of the means necessary to support the occupation.

I have to acknowledge despatches from the department dated July 12 and 19, both received October 31; September 1, received November 17; October 6, received November 18; and October 24, received November 16. In the despatch of the 19th July, it is said a duplicate of one dated "the 14th ultimo" is herewith enclosed. Neither copy has been received, and only the duplicate of that dated July 12. In respect to the latter, I have only time to say, that I have ample topics for reply and self-justification, but waive them for the present.

I shall probably, in three or four days, write again by the downward train. I now avail myself of a messenger who can only take a few letters and packages.

I have the honor to remain, sir, with high respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Hon. W. L. MARCY, *Secretary of War.*

HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Mexico, November 25, 1847.*

GENERAL ORDERS—No. 358.

Under instructions from the government at home, requiring that this army shall, as soon as practicable, begin to raise, within the country it occupies, the means, in whole or in great part, of maintaining the expenses of the occupation, until the federal government of Mexico shall submit terms of peace which the United States may honorably accept, it is *ordered* that no uncoined bullion, bars or ingots, either of gold or silver, shall be shipped from any port of Mexico, until the further orders of the government at home shall be made known on the subject, so as to give time for said government to fix the rate of export duty on such bullion, and perhaps a smaller duty on gold and silver coins.

As the beginning of the change of system intimated above, all rents for houses or quarters occupied by officers or troops of the army, in any city or village in Mexico, will cease as soon as con-

tracts may permit, and absolutely from and after the end of this month, wherever this order shall be received in time; and, in future, necessary quarters, both for officers and troops, where the public buildings are insufficient, will first be demanded, as required, of the civil authorities of the several places occupied by the troops, so as to equalize the inconvenience imposed upon the inhabitants, and diminish the same as much as possible.

If the authorities fail to put the troops promptly in possession of such quarters, then the commanding officer, in every such case, following out the same principle of giving the least distress practicable to the unoffending inhabitants, will cause the necessary buildings to be occupied.

Subsistence, forage, and other necessaries, for the army, will be purchased and paid for as heretofore; and the injunctions and penalties of the *martial law* order, dated February 19, 1847, originally published at Tampico, and republished several times since, with additions, will, as from the first, be strictly enforced, as also, in general, all the obligations of good morals and the most exact discipline.

By command of Major General Scott:

H. L. SCOTT,  
*A. A. A. G.*

[No. 37.]

HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Mexico, December 4, 1847.*

SIR: I had designed to send down to Vera Cruz, some five days ago, another, or a second train of wagons, under an escort, principally to furnish means of transportation, in part, for reinforcements at that city destined for this place; but learning nothing of the approach of Major General Patterson's column (or of any other) since his report from Jalapa of the 10th ultimo, and hearing unofficially that the train (400 wagons, 150 for reinforcements) despatched hence the first of that month was likely to be detained by some unknown cause at Vera Cruz, till the 1st or 5th of the present month, I have been obliged to delay the second train, as the force here and at Chapultepec "fit for duty" is only about 6,000 rank and file; the number of "sick," exclusive of officers, being 2,041.

What has detained Major General Patterson so long at Jalapa, I am at a loss to conjecture. He reported on the 10th ultimo that he would renew his march in ten days, in which case he would now have been here, but very late unofficial news from Puebla is silent on this subject. Lieutenant Colonel Johnson, who will command the first train returning up, has probably been detained at Vera Cruz, waiting for the arrival of essential articles of clothing from New Orleans. All the reinforcements which have joined me *via* New Orleans, since I left Vera Cruz, have reported that they were officially told, before leaving their respective rendezvous, they would find abundant clothing at New Orleans, and there; that the