

eral terms of peace that were at your disposal before you tried the fortunes of war. Will you now accept them? If you do not, we have no more proposals to make, but shall henceforward pursue a system solely dictated by our rights and our convenience.

If, as would probably be the case, this offer be refused, General Taylor should be directed to send that part of his force intended to be placed on the line, by the way of Parras and Chihuahua, to Paso del Norte and Santa Fé. This army should, at its leisure, fall back so as to occupy Perote, La Hoya, and Jalapa, in September, and, despatching all the sick and extra stores in advance, reach Vera Cruz in time to embark the beginning of November; part of the boundary line, by the way of the Rio Grande, and the rest for the different Mexican ports on the coast; all of which should be garrisoned by our troops, sustained by the navy.

This boundary and these posts on the seacoast can be maintained at a cost very little beyond what the army will require if peace be made, and will be a constant pressure on Mexico, which may finally bring her to reason. But it is absolutely necessary that this change of system should be in the first place preceded by our occupation of the city, lest it be attributed to a failure on our part in the invasion, and should not be delayed so long after that success as to appear to have been chosen only on discovering our inability to select and execute something preferable; it must come in as part of the plan adopted from the beginning, and carried out in the face of all opposition, without variation.

[Referred to in Mr. Trist's No. 6.]

HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Puebla, May 29, 1847.

SIR: Your long studied letters of the 9th and 20th instant, making 30 pages, in reply to my short note of the 7th, were handed to me under one cover at Jalapa, the morning of the 21st, when you knew, being on the spot, that I was about to march upon this place. Occupied as I was with business of much higher importance, I did not allow the seal of the package to be broken till the evening of the 22d, which I took care to have done in the presence of many staff officers. One of them, at my instance, read a part and reported to me the general character of the papers. I have not yet read them.

My first impulse was to return the farrago of insolence, conceit and arrogance to the author; but on reflection, I have determined to preserve the letters as a choice specimen of diplomatic literature and manners. The Jacobin convention of France never sent to one of its armies in the field a more amiable and accomplished instrument. If you were armed with an ambulatory guillotine, you would be the personification of Danton, Marat, and St. Just, all in one.

You tell me that you are authorized to negotiate a treaty of peace with the enemy—a declaration which, as it rests upon your

own word, I might well question; and you add, that it was not intended at Washington that I should have anything to do with the negotiation. This I can well believe, and certainly have cause to be thankful to the President for not degrading me by placing me in any joint commission with you.

From the letter of the Secretary of War to me, of the 14th ultimo, I had supposed you to be simply authorized to propose, or to concede to the enemy, the truce or armistice which usually precedes negotiations for a peace, and my letter to you was written on that supposition. If the terms of military conventions are left to me, the commander of the army, I have nothing more to desire or to demand for its safety.

In conclusion—for many persons here believe that the enemy, 20,000 strong, is about to attack this place—I have only time to ask you, in your future communications to me to be brief and purely official; for if you dare to use the style of orders or instructions again, or to indulge yourself in a single discourteous phrase, I shall throw back the communication with the contempt and scorn which you merit at my hands.

I remain, sir, officially, &c.,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

To NICHOLAS P. TRIST, Esq.,

&c., &c., &c.

A true copy:

GEO. W. RAINES,

Lieutenant, and A. A. D. C.

From the "Bulletin of the Democracy,"—Mexico, May 1, 1847.

[This is a new paper, violently opposed to Santa Anna.]

"GENERAL BASADRE.

"We have just learnt that this gentleman has set out to-day for the States of the interior, and we have heard some unfavorable comments on the subject. It is said," &c., [here some remarks upon the general's conduct on previous occasions.]

"And what, it is now asked, may now be the mission of General Basadre? The replies are various, and even contradictory, although most of them are to the effect that he goes charged by the ministry to negotiate in certain States to bring their authorities to consent not to oppose the *foreign mediation* which the government has it in contemplation to admit; to dispel the impressions which the disaster of Cerro Gordo may have caused against General Santa Anna, so that the legislatures may elect him president; and finally, if his election should prove impossible, to negotiate, in order that it may fall upon some person who shall be under the exclusive influence of the peace party, as are Ocampo, Elorriaga, and Anaya. Unhappy country!"

“FOREIGN MEDIATION.

“The *Diario del Gobierno* has recommended, in good terms, that this shall be admitted; and it is added, by public report, that Mr. Minister Baranda is the author of the article in which this mediation is indirectly recommended. Be on the alert, ye legislatures and governments of the States.”

From the same paper—May 4, 1847.

“IMPORTANT—FOREIGN MEDIATION.

“In our two last numbers we have informed the public of the advanced steps which were being taken in this most grave business, in which the ministry did not appear to be pursuing the straightest and most becoming course. The report of the committee (of which Messrs. Otero and Lafragua form part) recommending that the proceedings on the subject of the mediation offered by the English government should be referred to the executive, in order that this branch of the government should determine upon the subject, in accordance with its faculties—which, in truth, amounted to saying ‘let the mediation be admitted.’ This report having been rejected by the house, it now appears that the government, consulting nothing but its incapacity, its supineness, and its want of courage, and above all its audacity towards the Mexican people and its debility towards the enemy, has resolved to venture the whole, and under its own responsibility to accept the said mediation. Señor Baranda, as is affirmed, is the man who has loaded himself with this responsibility, instigated by Santa Anna; and sure that although he may sell and sacrifice the country, he will enjoy the same impunity that he did for the famous decree of the 29th November.”

“Señor Anaya has been dragged to the brink of the precipice, carrying the country with him.”

“We knew, and we know, that Señor Anaya cannot be a fit president for a time of war; as neither can Elorriaga or Ocampo, nor any other over whom the peace party exercises exclusive influence,” &c., &c., &c.

From *El Republicano*—Mexico, May 10, 1847.—Leading editorial.

“PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC.

“The popular election of the high functionaries of the State has, in some cases, the disadvantage, in others the advantage, of being the result of the impressions by which the multitude are affected at the moment,” &c., &c., &c. “By the decree of the 1st of April of this year, the State legislatures are to proceed to the election of president of the republic on the 15th of the present month, (May.) The circumstances under which this important act is to be performed could not be more grave or solemn. The republic panting in a struggle of life or death, the army destroyed, the

greater part of her territory occupied by the invader, the very capital closely threatened, in no case,” &c., &c.

“So that if we attend solely to our critical state, the approaching election of president might appear a matter of great delicacy; but upon taking a broader view of the subject, it is easy to perceive that it offers at present fewer difficulties, fewer conditions to fulfil, than under other circumstances incomparably less sad than the present. Because, in the first place, the signification which should be attached to the election of our first magistrate is simple, for this is the character of the great question which now pre-occupies all minds. Peace or war is the only thing which, at the present day, is to speak the character of the person to be elected to govern us. Peace or war is the first question now agitated, and before the urgency of which all others have disappeared. Peace or war, therefore, is what the result of the election is to signify.”

“Inasmuch as the discussion of the project of a constitution is already far advanced and about to close, the continuance in office of the President now to be elected will, according to every probability, be exceedingly short; and consequently it is not necessary, with reference to the future, even to take into consideration the political creed upon other points which may be held by the chief magistrate whose election is impending. *Happy should we be, if, during the ephemeral existence which is allotted to him, we could be exposed to the risk of his occupying himself upon other subjects, in consequence of his having first brought to a happy end the war in which we are now straitened.*”

“Nor must we allow ourselves to be governed by such an error as would be that of seeking for a man whose qualities should correspond to the difficulties of the circumstances. If this were the problem, we should confess that the acts of the legislatures should come in blank; for we do not know, the nation does not know, the man whose high personal qualities are equal to cope with the precipitancy and violence of the events of the day. But we must not deceive ourselves. They are not to be controverted by one man, but by the whole country; and therefore what we should seek for is a candidate who, desiring the confidence of the country, can cause it to rise (the whole of it) at his voice; one who will not meet with invincible resistances from any of the parties existing among us, and who therefore shall be able to bring into play all the elements of resistance which reside in the nation.”

“Thus it is that the signification which, according to our view of the matter, should be attached to the election of President, is simple and easy to be found; for the determination in favor of war is now general, even amongst many of those who formerly were for peace,” &c., &c., &c.

From the same paper—Mexico, May 11, 1847.

"National Congress, session of the 29th April, 1847.—The delegation from the State of Chihuahua presented the following protest, &c.

'Protest of the permanent delegation of the State of Chihuahua:

'The delegation from the honorable legislature of,' &c., 'with a view to saving the rights and interests of their constituents, protest before the nation and the whole world against the force of the United States, which has invaded the territory of the State,' &c., &c.

'They protest, in the name of the State, against any treaty of peace whereby all or any of the citizens of Chihuahua should lose their character of Mexicans; and they recommend most earnestly that no treaty be concluded or ratified by Mexico which shall not establish a sufficient security that neither the government of the United States, nor the citizens of that nation, shall buy from the savages the plunder obtained by robberies committed within the Mexican territory; nor furnish them, on any account, with means for making war; nor drive them upon our territory by purchasing from them their lands; nor favor their incursions, directly or indirectly.

'Finally, they declare that the State of Chihuahua, free, sovereign, and independent in her internal government, is a constituent and integral part of the Mexican republic,' &c., &c., &c.

On motion of Señor *Lafragua*, [see his name before,] resolved, "That Congress has heard with the most profound sentiment of satisfaction the patriotic protest, which in moments so solemn the permanent delegation of, &c., has presented on the subject of the war," &c., [order for printing and distributing amongst the States.]

The same paper contains an address from the governor of Michoacan to the legislature, dated Morelia, April 29, 1847, urging them to make the following protest: [the result not given.]

"May the legislature, therefore, be pleased to protest, as the Executive protests, before the republic and the world, that never, never, never will it recognize any treaty which may be made on the subject of peace with the United States, unless their forces shall previously have disoccupied our entire territory; and unless that government shall recognize our right to a proper indemnity for the evils which it has caused us."

In the address which thus concludes, the following passage occurs in regard to the condition on which it is supposed that peace with the United States could alone be obtained:

"Peace, peace would be for Mexico, at the very moment, but the stamp of indelible ignominy, and for her new conquerer the most advantageous condition. Let us examine for a moment what would be the conditions that he would impose. To take of our territory such and such parts as might permit him to establish himself on

the Pacific by direct communications with his Atlantic possessions; to compel us to pay him the expenses of the war, swelling the amount by interests, and charges for advances, and premiums of exchange; and finally to seize upon a guaranty for the punctual payment of such demand; and by way of guaranty, none more convenient than that which he has already indicated, to hold in his keeping all our ports. Now, for Mexico, all this would be to lose over the hope of ever being able to pay her enormous national debt—to lose, in the proceeds of the maritime customs, the possibility of meeting, without great vexations upon her citizens, even the expenses of her internal administration," &c., &c., &c.

"Renunciation of the presidency before the National Congress, by General Don Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna.

[This document, under date Mexico, 28th May, 1847, has been circulating here in the streets for two or three days, hawked about according to the custom of the country. The motive of his resignation is thus stated:]

"The men who fear to defend the country, who aspire to peace, see that they cannot attain it so long as I shall be at the head of the government, because they know that my determination has been to fight until death. The various parties who have torn each other to pieces, and who even at this moment forget the common peril, are playing away their aspirations and hope, by means of a change, to become lords of the power which is already escaping from the hands of the nation, unless a powerful and decisive effort be made to defend it. The views of the external enemy, the conflicting interests of parties in the interior, have fixed their regards upon my person—the common target of all; and I find myself placed in a position, I will not say dangerous, for I do not fear danger, but exceedingly difficult, and in which I can do nothing. The endeavors at a revolution are a matter of public notoriety, and the government holds in its hands the clue to the plot; and it is also notorious that the enemy does not dare to advance from Puebla upon Mexico, in pursuance of his impudent boast, unless he be aided by a revolutionary movement of this capital. This revolutionary movement I can ward off by a word; and this word it is my duty to utter, as the last and most efficacious service which it is left me to render. It is the formal renunciation, which I make by the present note, of the presidency *ad interim* of the republic, with which I have been honored by the nation. My conviction is, to intimate that I do not hesitate to affirm that I ought not any longer to remain in the post, nor even retain the title of President of the republic. Accordingly, I entreat the sovereign Congress immediately to accept this renunciation at my hands, and to declare itself to be in permanent session, in order that it may appoint the person who is to take upon himself so delicate a charge," &c., &c., &c.

[Of the result of this movement on the part of Santa Anna, nothing is known, by me at least. It has been currently reported in town ever since yesterday morning, (the 2d June) that a paper of the 29th had been received at head-quarters. What this may contain I know not.]

It is to be remarked, that before this step was taken by Santa Anna, most if not all the ultra State-rights men and real liberals had probably left their seats in Congress. I infer this from various passages in the papers I have had access to; this being the plan resorted to by them for preventing the adoption of the new modification of the constitution of 1824, which they will not consent to, because it retains the exclusion of liberty of conscience, and the military and ecclesiastical favors.]

[No. 7.]

PUEBLA, June 13, 1847.

SIR: Knowing how great must be the desire of the President to receive intelligence from this quarter, I despatched, by a courier to Vera Cruz, last Sunday night, a copy of a letter which I had just transmitted, in duplicate, to Mr. Bankhead, her Britannic Majesty's minister at Mexico. It had been my intention, when the arrangement for the departure of that courier was made, conjointly with another person to write to you; but no time was left me for this purpose, and I preferred sending the copy of my letter without accompaniment, to missing the opportunity altogether. Under the same cover was a second copy of the letter referred to in my No. 6, as having been received by me from a gentleman of great experience in this war, as well as of a very clear and comprehensive mind.

The committee of Congress to which it had been referred, had reported in favor of referring it to the Executive, to be acted upon by it agreeably to its constitutional faculties; (and the way in which these would be exercised was looked upon as not doubtful;) but this report—which the newspaper in which I had seen it mentioned had spoken of as having been rejected—had not been acted upon, the vote upon it having constantly been prevented by one artifice or another of the two factions, the *puros* and the *moderados*, fearful alike of the responsibility of either passing or defeating the measure. I will add, that since this conversation with \*\*\*\*\* I have read, in the Mexico "Courier Français" of the 28th April, General Santa Anna's letter of the 22d April, (after his Cerro Gordo defeat,) to General Anaya, the President substitute. The conclusion proves that he thought an exhortation against a "disgraceful treaty" as not being out of place, when addressed to the government at that moment: "You must not, my friend, give us up for dead. In the name of God, above all, do not allow yourself to conclude with the enemy a disgraceful treaty, which would make our position still worse." This, in itself, is nothing; and I should have passed it over as a mere ad captandum flourish, but for the

other evidences of a disposition, at that period, not to enter into a "disgraceful treaty," but to abandon the position of refusal to listen to offers to negotiate.

It has for some time appeared to me perfectly obvious that the advance of our army upon Mexico (or, in other words, the occupation of that city) at this time, would be attended with consequences extremely adverse to peace; in a word, to the object which has constituted with our government the motive to the vigorous prosecution of the war. Should the Mexican government remain at the capital after its occupation by us, there would then be the plea of actual duress, to oppose as well to the doing of anything, as to the validity of anything which might be done. But they certainly would not remain. They would disperse after appointing some remote place at which to meet; and this would immensely increase whatever advantages may now be possessed by those among them who are bent upon using all possible means for preventing the re-establishment of peace. This same view was expressed by \*\*\*\*\* without any remark from me to elicit it; and being thus confirmed in its correctness, I purpose making it the subject of a communication to the general-in-chief. Aware that if any such ground were afforded, it might very possibly have the effect of inducing a determination to pursue a course of the reverse of the one suggested by me, I shall take particular care that my communication affords no ground whatever for the pretence that he has been dictated to, or interfered with in the discharge of his duties.

In my last, I stated that no intelligence of any sort had been communicated to me from head-quarters since my arrival. This still continues to be the case. My reply to General Scott, commenced on the road between Vera Cruz and Jalapa, and concluded at the latter place, (and of which a copy has been transmitted to you,) contains this passage: "The interests of the public service require that I be kept advised of the opportunities which are to occur by government expresses, or other public means, for sending communications to Washington; and this object can be fulfilled by a general direction on the subject, from the commanding general to the proper officers. The same reason may render it important that any intelligence received by the commanding general, respecting the political affairs of the country, be communicated to me. On the other hand, should any prospect open of the occurrence of the contingency upon which hostilities are to be suspended, no time will be lost by me in bringing it to the knowledge of the commanding general."

The intimations here conveyed proceeded from an excess of caution on my part, and not from any belief that anything of the kind could be at all necessary to secure such a line of conduct between public servants possessing even the most ordinary degree of common sense, and actuated by even the most ordinary degree of fidelity to the public interests. It appeared to me as a thing nowise admitting of doubt, that the general-in-chief, entrusted as he is with means of every kind for obtaining intelligence at the public cost, could not fail to consider himself bound in duty to the country to

communicate to me any intelligence so obtained, which might be of the remotest interest to our government, in connexion with the object of my mission. In this expectation I am sorry to say I have been disappointed. Not even a newspaper has been communicated to me. I have even been prevented from obtaining a sight of papers, in consequence of their being retained far longer than is usual in regard to borrowed newspapers even in ordinary times. In one instance, for example, I heard, as a matter of common talk, that an interesting Mexico paper (in French) of the 29th May, had been received at head-quarters. Several days after, my inquiries after this paper proved so far successful, that I obtained the address of a French resident who receives it. Upon applying to this gentleman, I was informed that the governor, General Worth, had sent to him for it. I afterwards succeeded in obtaining one, and it proved to be the "Courier Français," containing, from the "Razonador," the most important indication that the Mexican press has afforded since the war began. The next day, the same thing happened in regard to several numbers of the "Republicano," or the "Monitor Republicano," (I forget which) down to the 30th of May, that had been received by an English merchant. They also, he informed me, had been sent for by General Worth; and they had been transferred by him to head-quarters: at least, I heard such papers spoken of as having been received there. Five days after, I again made application for them, and they had not yet been returned. To-day, Mr. Kendall, on visiting this house, (General Smith's head-quarters,) mentioned having seen and examined, either at General Scott's or at General Worth's, (I forget which,) a number of Mexico papers down to the 8th instant. These are specimens of what is constantly occurring, and of the regard shown for the public interest in this respect. Had a different course been pursued, and had the newspapers so obtained, by virtue of the public posts occupied by the persons who possess themselves of them, been sent for my perusal, after they had served all the military purposes which they were susceptible of—had this been done, I should doubtless have discovered at a much earlier day—and greatly, perhaps, to the public advantage—how totally General Scott was in error when he informed me, that there no longer existed in this republic even so much as "a government *de facto*."

Among the papers mentioned by Mr. Kendall was one containing some intercepted correspondence to this army, which has been taken on its way from Vera Cruz to Jalapa, in charge of a Mr. Sowers and eight men. Mr. S. and three others were killed, and the remaining five captured. It seems to be a very extraordinary piece of business that such papers should be entrusted to such keeping, and I fear that it is likely to turn out a very disastrous one, for one of the published letters is said to be from Colonel Hunt, (quartermaster at New Orleans,) indicating an utter want of pecuniary resources in our government; and the Mexicans, so Mr. K. said, are exulting in the idea that our money has run out, and that all that is necessary is for them to hold out a little while longer.

On the 2d instant, General Santa Anna withdrew his resignation of the presidency *ad interim*. At the time when I last wrote, it was impossible, with the lights I had, to form a satisfactory opinion in regard to the character of that proceeding on his part, the resignation. This point is now settled by the fact, which I can state with positiveness, that its withdrawal took place on the very day when it was to be acted upon *and accepted*. A want of firmness alone on the part of the majority in Congress, and not any lack of disposition to release him, has prevented the formal acceptance of the resignation without regard to the withdrawal.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. P. TRIST.

Hon. JAMES BUCHANAN,  
Secretary of State.

PUEBLA, June 6, 1847.

SIR: Perceiving, from the published accounts of the proceedings of the Mexican Congress, that a proffer of the mediation of her Britannic majesty's government has recently been presented by you to that of Mexico, and finding myself placed at this moment, with reference to the same object for which that proffer was made, in a position of the gravest responsibility, it has occurred to me that I might, without any breach of the delicacy which belongs to the subject, venture so far as to address to you the inquiry contained in the present note.

I left Washington on the 17th of April, charged with a communication from the Secretary of State of the United States to the Minister of Foreign Relations of the Mexican republic, the object of which is explained by the following passage:

"The President will not again renew the offer to negotiate, at least until he shall have reason to believe that it would be accepted by the Mexican government. Devoted, however, to honorable peace, he is determined that the evils of war shall not be protracted one day longer than shall be rendered absolutely necessary by the Mexican republic. For the purpose of carrying this determination into effect with the least possible delay, he will forthwith send to the head-quarters of the army in Mexico Nicholas P. Trist, esq., the officer next in rank to the undersigned in our department of foreign affairs, as a commissioner invested with full powers to conclude a definitive treaty of peace with the United Mexican States."

This note was, immediately upon my arrival at Vera Cruz, on the 6th May, forwarded by express to the general-in-chief of the army of the United States, then at Jalapa, with a view to its being transmitted by him under a flag of truce.

From causes into which it is not necessary here to enter, the note has not yet been transmitted; and, until yesterday, I saw no reason to regret this delay, having been led to believe that there no longer existed "a government, even *de facto*, in this republic," to which the note from my government could be delivered. Of