

It is a remarkable fact that none of the border free States—New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, nor Iowa—have any such upon their Statute-books. The laws of these States against kidnapping are similar to those of Virginia and Kentucky. The laws of other States, so called, have never operated to release a single fugitive slave, and may be regarded simply as a protest of those States against the harsh features of the fugitive-slave law. So far as they infringe upon the Constitution, or impair, in the least, a constitutional right, they are void and ought to be repealed.

I venture the assertion, that there have been more cases of kidnapping of free negroes, in Ohio, than of peaceable or unlawful rescue of fugitive slaves in the whole United States. It has been shown that the law of recapture and the penalties of rescue have been almost invariably executed. Count up all the cases of rescue of negroes in the North, and you can find in your newspapers more cases of unlawful lynching and murder of white men in the South. These cases have now become so frequent and atrocious, as to demand the attention of the General Government. The same article of the Constitution that secures the recapture of fugitives from service and justice also secures the rights of citizens of Pennsylvania and Ohio to all the immunities and privileges of citizens of the several States. No law has been passed by Congress to secure this constitutional right. No executive authority interposes to protect our citizens, and yet we hear no threats of retaliation or rebellion from Northern citizens or Northern States. So, I trust, it may ever be.

The great danger that now overshadows us does not arise from real grievances. Plotters for disunion avail themselves of the weakness of the Executive to precipi-

tate revolution. South Carolina has taken the lead. The movement would be utterly insignificant if confined to that State. She is still in the Union, and neither the President nor Congress has the power to consent to her withdrawal. This can only be by a change in the Constitution, or by the acquiescence of the people of the other States. The defence of the property of the United States and the collection of the revenues need not cause the shedding of blood, unless she commences a contest of physical force. The increase, in one year, of our population is greater than her entire population, white and black. Either one of several Congressional districts in the West has more white inhabitants than she has. Her military power is crippled by the preponderance of her slaves. However brave, and gallant, and spirited her people may be, and no one disputes these traits, yet it is manifest she is weak in physical force. This great Government might well treat with indulgence paper secession; or the resolves of her Convention and Legislature, without invoking physical force to enforce the laws among her citizens.

Without disrespect to South Carolina, it would be easy to show that Shays's rebellion and the whiskey insurrection involved the Government in greater danger than the solitary secession of South Carolina. But the movement becomes imposing when we are assured that several powerful States will very soon follow in the lead of South Carolina; and when we know that other States, still more powerful, sympathize with the seceding States, to the extent of opposing, and perhaps resisting, the execution of the laws in the seceding States.

In this view of the present condition of public affairs it becomes the people of the United States seriously to consider whether the Government shall be arrested in

the execution of its undisputed powers by the citizens of one or more States, or whether we shall test the power of the Government to defend itself against dissolution. Can a separation take place without war? If so, where will be the line? Who shall possess this magnificent capital, with all its evidences of progress and civilization? Shall the mouth of the Mississippi be separated from its sources? Who shall possess the Territories? Suppose these difficulties to be overcome; suppose that in peace we should huckster and divide up our nationality, our flag, our history, all the recollections of the past; suppose all these difficulties overcome, how can two rival Republics, of the same race of men, divided only by a line or a river for thousands of miles, with all the present difficulties aggravated by separation, avoid forays, disputes and war? How can we travel our future march of progress in Mexico, or on the high seas, or on the Pacific slope, without collision? It is impossible. To peaceably accomplish such results, we must change the nature of man. Disunion is war! God knows, I do not threaten it, for I will seek to prevent it in every way possible. I speak but the logic of facts, which we should not conceal from each other. It is either hostilities between the Government and the seceding States; or, if separation is yielded peaceably, it is a war of factions — a rivalry of insignificant communities, hating each other, and contemned by the civilized world. If war results, what a war it will be! Contemplate the North and South in hostile array against each other. If these sections do not know each other *now*, they will *then*.

We are a nation of military men, naturally turbulent because we are free, accustomed to arms, ingenious, energetic, brave and strong. The same qualities that have en-

abled a single generation of men to develop the resources of a continent, would enable us to destroy more rapidly than we have constructed. It is idle for individuals of either section to suppose themselves superior in military power. The French and English tried that question for a thousand years. We ought to know it now. The result of the contest will not depend upon the first blow or the first year, but blood shed in civil war will yield its baleful fruits for generations.

How can we avert a calamity at which humanity and civilization shudder? I know no way but to cling to the Government framed by our fathers, to administer it in a spirit of kindness, but in all cases, without partiality to enforce the laws. No State can release us from the duty of obeying the laws. The ordinance or act of a State is no defence for treason, nor does it lessen the moral guilt of that crime. Let us cling to each other in the hope that our differences will pass away, as they often have in times past. For the sake of peace, for the love of civil liberty, for the honor of our name, our race, our religion, let us preserve the Union, loving it better as the clouds grow darker. I am willing to unite with any man, whatever may have been his party relations, whatever may be his views of the existing differences, who is willing to rely on the Constitution as it is for his rights, and who is willing to maintain and defend the Union under all circumstances, against all enemies, at home or abroad.

Pardon me, gentlemen, for writing you so fully. I feel restrained, by the custom of the House of Representatives, from engaging there in political debate; and yet I feel it is the duty of every citizen to prepare his countrymen for grave events, that will test the strength and integrity of the Government.

Believing that our only safety is in a firm enforce-

ment of the laws, and that Mr. Lincoln will execute that duty without partiality, I join my hearty congratulations with yours that he is so soon to be the President of the United States. With great respect, I remain, very truly

Your obedient servant,

JOHN SHERMAN.

MESSRS. WM. READ, D. J. COCHRAN, L. S. FLETCHER,
H. E. WALLACE, CHARLES O'NEILL, *Committee.*

Governor Moore of Louisiana took possession of the Arsenal at Baton Rouge, January 10, 1861. General Sherman comments upon this in a letter written to his brother, January 16, and regarding it as a declaration of war, sends in his resignation January 18, a copy of which he encloses to John Sherman in a letter written the same day.

ALEXANDRIA, Jan. 16th, 1861.

My Dear Brother: I am so much in the woods here that I can't keep up with the times at all. Indeed, you in Washington hear from New Orleans two or three days sooner than I do. I was taken aback by the news that Governor Moore had ordered the forcible seizure of the Forts Jackson and St. Philip, at or near the mouth of the Mississippi; also of Forts Pike and Wood, at the outlets of Lakes Bogue and Pontchartrain. All these are small forts, and have rarely been occupied by troops. They are designed to cut off approach by sea to New Orleans, and were taken doubtless to prevent their being occupied, by order of General Scott. But the taking the arsenal at Baton Rouge is a different matter. It is merely an assemblage of store-houses, barracks, and dwelling-houses designed for the healthy residence of a garrison, to be thrown into one or the other of the forts in case of war. The arsenal is one of minor importance, yet the stores were kept there for the

moral effect, and the garrison was there at the instance of the people of Louisiana. To surround with the military array, to demand surrender, and enforce the departure of the garrison, was an act of war. It amounted to a declaration of war and defiance, and was done by Governor Moore without the authority of the Legislature or Convention. Still, there is but little doubt but that each of these bodies, to assemble next week, will ratify and approve these violent acts, and it is idle to discuss the subject now. The people are mad on this question.

I had previously notified all that in the event of secession I should quit. As soon as a knowledge of these events reached me, I went to the vice-president, Dr. Smith, in Alexandria, and told him that I regarded Louisiana as at war against the Federal Government, and that I must go. He begged me to wait until some one could be found to replace me. The supervisors feel the importance of system and discipline, and seem to think that my departure will endanger the success of this last effort to build up an educational establishment. . . . You may assert that in no event will I forego my allegiance to the United States as long as a single State is true to the old Constitution.

Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN.

LOUISIANA STATE SEMINARY OF LEARNING AND
MILITARY ACADEMY,
ALEXANDRIA, JAN. 18, 1861.

Dear Brother: Before receiving yours of the 7th,¹ I had addressed a letter to Governor Moore at Baton Rouge, of which this is a copy:—

¹ Meaning the letter of the 6th.

"*Sir*: As I occupy a quasi military position under the laws of the State, I deem it proper to acquaint you that I accepted such position when Louisiana was a State in the Union and when the motto of this seminary was inscribed in marble over the main door: 'By the liberality of the General Government. The Union Esto perpetua.' Recent events foreshadow a great change, and it becomes all men to choose. If Louisiana withdraw from the Federal Union, I prefer to maintain my allegiance to the old constitution as long as a fragment of it survives, and my longer stay here would be wrong in every sense of the word. In that event I beg that you will send or appoint some authorized agent to take charge of the arms and munitions of war here belonging to the State or advise me what disposition to make of them. And furthermore, as President of the Board of Supervisors, I beg you to take immediate steps to relieve me as superintendent the moment the State determines to secede; for on no earthly account will I do any act or think any thought hostile to or in defiance of the United States.

"With respect, etc.

"W. T. SHERMAN."

I regard the seizure by Governor Moore of the United States Arsenal as the worst act yet committed in the present revolution. I do think every allowance should be made to Southern politicians for their nervous anxiety about their political power and the safety of slaves. I think that the constitution should be liberally construed in their behalf, but I do regard this civil war as precipitated with undue rapidity. . . . It is inevitable. All the legislation now would fall powerless on the South. You should not alienate such States as Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri. My notion is that this war will ruin all politicians, and that military leaders will direct the events.

Yours,

W. T. S.

In the following letter of February 1st, the General quotes the handsome note from Governor Moore accepting his resignation:—

I have felt the very thoughts you have spoken. It is war to surround Anderson with batteries, and it is shilly-shally for the South to cry "Hands off! No coercion!" It was war and insult to expel the garrison at Baton Rouge, and Uncle Sam had better cry Cave! or assert his power. Fort Sumter is not material, save for the principle; but Key West and the Tortugas should be held in force at once, by regulars if possible, if not, by militia. Quick! They are occupied now, but not in force. Whilst maintaining the high, strong ground you do, I would not advise you to interpose an objection to securing concessions to the middle and moderate States, — Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri. Slavery there is local, and even if the world were open to them, its extension would involve no principle. If these States feel the extreme South wrong, a seeming concession would make them committed. The cotton States are gone, I suppose. Of course, their commerce will be hampered.

But of myself. I sent you a copy of my letter to the Governor. Here is his answer:—

"*Dear Sir*: It is with the deepest regret I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant. In the pressure of official business I can now only request you to transfer to Professor Smith the arms, munitions, and funds in your hands whenever you conclude to withdraw from the position you have filled with so much distinction. You cannot regret more than I do the necessity which deprives us of your services, and you will bear with you the respect, confidence, and admiration of all who have been associated with you.

"Very truly, your friend and servant,

"THOS. O. MOORE."

This is very handsome, and I do regret this political imbroglio. I do think it was brought about by politicians. The people in the South are evidently unanimous in the opinion that slavery is endangered by the current of events, and it is useless to attempt to alter that opinion. As our government is founded on the will of the people, when that will is fixed, our government is powerless, and the only question is whether to let things slide into general anarchy, or the formation of two or more confederacies, which will be hostile sooner or later. Still, I know that some of the best men of Louisiana think this change may be effected peacefully. But even if the Southern States be allowed to depart in peace, the first question will be revenue.

Now, if the South have free trade, how can you collect revenues in the eastern cities? Freight from New Orleans to St. Louis, Chicago, Louisville, Cincinnati, and even Pittsburgh, would be about the same as by rail from New York, and importers at New Orleans, having no duties to pay, would undersell the East if they had to pay duties. Therefore, if the South make good their confederation and their plan, the Northern confederacy must do likewise or blockade. Then comes the question of foreign nations. So, look on it in any view, I see no result but war and consequent changes in the form of government.

In March of 1861 General Sherman started north by the Mississippi River. On the way, and after reaching Ohio, he heard discussions as to the advisability of coercion. Whereas in the South there was absolute unanimity of opinion and universal preparation for war, in the North there was merely argument and apathy. After leaving his family at Lancaster, he went to Washington, still uncertain as to his next move. While there, he called on Mr. Lincoln, and stated his fears and convic-

tions as to war and the gravity of it. Mr. Lincoln treated all he said with some scorn and absolute disregard, and remarked, "Oh, well, I guess we'll manage to keep house."¹ This, with the general unconcern regarding the necessity of military interference, discouraged General Sherman, and, greatly dispirited, he returned to Ohio, and took his family to St. Louis after ascertaining from friends that, in all probability, Missouri would stick to the Union. In writing at this time he says:—

Lincoln has an awful task, and if he succeeds in avoiding strife and allaying fears, he will be entitled to the admiration of the world; but a time has occurred in all governments, and has now occurred in this, when force must back the laws, and the longer the postponement, the more severe must be the application.

On April 8th General Sherman writes to his brother:—

Saturday night late I received this despatch: "Will you accept the Chief Clerkship in the War Department? We will make you Assistant Secretary when Congress meets.—M. BLAIR." This morning I answered by telegraph: "I cannot accept."

In writing to explain his refusal, he does not state the real reason, which was undoubtedly that he preferred active service. John Sherman's letter of April 12th approves of the determination, and states more fully his reasons for advising it. It is interesting to see, from the very first, John Sherman's belief in his brother's talents as a soldier, and conviction that he will rise to a high position in the army in the event of war. Through all of General Sherman's letters of that time there are evidences of very sincere distrust of himself and deprecation of John's flattering belief.

¹ See *Memoirs of Gen. W. T. Sherman*, Vol. I., p. 196.

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1861.

Dear Brother: I was unexpectedly called here soon after receiving your letter of the 8th, and at midnight write you. The military excitement here is intense. Since my arrival I have seen all the heads of departments except Blair, several officers, and many citizens. There is a fixed determination now to preserve the Union and enforce the laws at all hazards. Civil war is actually upon us, and strange to say, it brings a feeling of relief: the suspense is over. I have spent much of the day in talking about you. There is an earnest desire that you go into the War Department, but I said this was impossible. Chase is especially desirous that you accept, saying that you would be virtually Secretary of War, and could easily step into any military position that offers.

It is well for you seriously to consider your conclusion, although my opinion is that you ought not to accept. You ought to hold yourself in reserve. If troops are called for, as they surely will be in a few days, organize a regiment or brigade, either in St. Louis or Ohio, and you will then get into the army in such a way as to secure promotion. By all means take advantage of the present disturbances to get into the army, where you will at once put yourself in a high position for life. I know that promotion and every facility for advancement will be cordially extended by the authorities. You are a favorite in the army and have great strength in political circles. I urge you to avail yourself of these favorable circumstances to secure your position for life; for, after all, your present employment is of uncertain tenure in these stirring times.

Let me now record a prediction. Whatever you may think of the signs of the times, the Government will rise from this strife greater, stronger, and more prosperous

than ever. It will display energy and military power. The men who have confidence in it and do their full duty by it may reap whatever there is of honor and profit in public life, while those who look on merely as spectators in the storm will fail to discharge the highest duty of a citizen, and suffer accordingly in public estimation. . . .

I write this in a great hurry, with numbers around me, and exciting and important intelligence constantly repeated, even at this hour; but I am none the less in earnest. I hope to hear that you are on the high road to the "General" within thirty days.

Affectionately your brother,

JOHN SHERMAN.

From the time of General Sherman's conversation with Mr. Lincoln he distrusted the preparations of the administration, which savored greatly of militia and raw recruits. With this army General Sherman was unwilling to cast his lot, believing that he was worthy of a better command if of any. In April he writes to John:—

But I say volunteers and militia never were and never will be fit for invasion, and when tried, it will be defeated, and dropt by Lincoln like a hot potato.

And in the same letter:—

The time will come in this country when professional knowledge will be appreciated, when men that can be trusted will be wanted, and I will bide my time. I may miss the chance: if so, all right; but I cannot and will not mix myself in this present call.

The first movements of the government will fail and the leaders will be cast aside. A second or third set will rise, and among them I may be, but at present I will not

volunteer as a soldier or anything else. If Congress meet, or if a National Convention be called, and the regular army be put on a footing with the wants of the country, if I am offered a place that suits me, I may accept. But in the present call I will not volunteer.

NOTE.—Fort Sumter, situated in mid-channel at the entrance to Charleston harbor, was the commanding point in the defences of the harbor, and was occupied at the time of its bombardment by a garrison of less than 100 men under Major Robert Anderson. The first shot of the war was fired against it by General Beauregard early on the morning of April 12, 1861.

WASHINGTON, Sunday, April 14, 1861.

Dear Brother:

The war has really commenced. You will have full details of the fall of Sumter. We are on the eve of a terrible war. Every man will have to choose his position. You fortunately have the military education, prominence, and character, that will enable you to play a high part in the tragedy. You can't avoid taking such a part. Neutrality and indifference are impossible. If the government is to be maintained, it must be by military power, and that immediately. You can choose your own place. Some of your best friends here want you in the War Department; Taylor, Shiras, and a number of others talk to me so. If you want that place, with a sure prospect of promotion, you can have it, but you are not compelled to take it; but it seems to me you will be compelled to take some position, and that speedily. Can't you come to Ohio and at once raise a regiment? It will immediately be in service. The administration intend to stand or fall by the Union, the entire Union, and the enforcement of the laws. I look for preliminary defeats, for the rebels have arms, organization, unity; but this advantage will not last long. The government

will maintain itself or our Northern people are the veriest poltroons that ever disgraced humanity.

For me, I am for a war that will either establish or overthrow the government and will purify the atmosphere of political life. We need such a war, and we have it now.

Affectionately yours,

JOHN SHERMAN.

OFFICE ST. LOUIS RAILROAD CO.,
ST. LOUIS, April 22, 1861.

Dear Brother:

I know full well the force of what you say. At a moment like this the country expects every man to do his duty. But every man is not at liberty to do as he pleases. You know that Mr. Lincoln said to you and me that he did not think he wanted military men. I was then free, uncommitted. . . . I approve fully of Lincoln's determination to use all his ordinary and extraordinary powers to maintain and defend the authority with which he is clothed and the integrity of the nation, and had I not committed myself to another duty, I would most willingly have responded to his call.

The question of the national integrity and slavery should be kept distinct, for otherwise it will gradually become a war of extermination,—a war without end. If, when Congress meets, a clearly defined policy be arrived at, a clear end to be accomplished, and then the force adequate to that end be provided for, then I could and would act with some degree of confidence, not now.

I take it for granted that Washington is safe; that Pickens can beat off all assailants; that Key West and

Tortugas are strong and able to spare troops for other purposes; that, above all, Fort Monroe is full of men, provisions, and warlike materials, and that the Chesapeake is strongly occupied. Then the first thing will be the avenues of travel. Baltimore must be made to allow the free transit of troops, provisions, and materials without question, and the route from Wheeling to the Relay House kept open. Here there must be some fighting, but a march from Brownsville to Frostburg would be a good drill, via Hagerstown, Frederick, and the Potomac.

From present information I apprehend that Virginia will destroy the road from Harper's Ferry west, and maybe the Marylanders will try the balance; but, without an hour's delay, that line should swarm with troops, who should take no half-way measures.

Affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

Through all the spring months, while nominally only president of a street-car company, General Sherman's mind is engaged in defending the country, building forts, occupying positions of importance, and possessing railroads. His letters are full of military suggestions, some of which John Sherman showed the Secretary of War, Mr. Cameron, who, as it will appear, acted upon them.

Although the Confederate government had been organized and its officers chosen in February, 1861, still the border slave States, and among them Virginia, had taken no active or open part in the secession. Sumter decided them, and from that time Virginia was enrolled among the Confederate States. She seceded April 17th.

OFFICE ST. LOUIS RAILROAD CO.,
ST. LOUIS, April 25, 1861.

Dear Brother:

Virginia's secession influences some six millions of people. No use in arguing about it at all, but all the

Virginians, or all who trace their lineage back, will feel like obeying her dictates and example. As a State, she has been proud, boastful, and we may say overbearing; but, on the other hand, she, by her governors and authority, has done everything to draw her native-born back to their State.

I cannot yet but think that it was a fatal mistake in Mr. Lincoln not to tie to his administration by some kind of link the Border States. Now it is too late, and sooner or later Kentucky, Tennessee, and Arkansas will be in arms against us. It is barely possible that Missouri may yet be neutral.

It is pretty nearly determined to divert the half million set aside for the July interest for arming the State. All the bankers but one have consented, and the Governor and legislature are strongly secession. I understand today the orders at the custom-house are to refuse clearance to steamboats to seceding States. All the heavy trade with groceries and provisions is with the South, and this order at once takes all life from St. Louis. Merchants, heretofore for peace and even for backing the administration, will now fall off, relax in their exertions, and the result will possibly be secession, and then free States against slave,—the horrible array so long dreaded. I know Frank Blair desired this plain, square issue. It may be that sooner or later it is inevitable, but I cannot bring myself to think so. On the necessity of maintaining a government, and that government the old constitutional one, I have never wavered, but I do recoil from a war, when the negro is the only question.

I am informed that McClellan is appointed to command the Ohio militia,—a most excellent appointment; a better officer could not be found.

WASHINGTON, May 30, 1861.

My Dear Brother: Your recent letters have been received. One of them I read to Secretary Cameron, and he was much pleased with some of your ideas, especially with your proposition about Fort Smith and the island off Mobile. The latter is probably now in possession of the government.

It is probable that no movements will be made into the cotton States before winter. A regular plan has been formed by General Scott, and is daily discussed and reconsidered by him and other officers. The movements now occurring are merely incidental, rather to occupy public attention and employ troops than to strike decisive blows. In the meantime it is becoming manifest that the secessionists mean to retreat from position to position until they concentrate sufficient force to strike a decisive blow. I have a fear not generally shared in that now a rapid concentration is taking place and that we will, within a few days, have a terrible battle near Washington. Indeed, I don't see how it can be avoided. General Butler at Norfolk, General McClellan at Grafton, General Patterson at Charlesborough, and General Scott here, all concentrating, will surely bring on a fight in which I fear the Virginians will concentrate the largest mass. I have been all along our lines on the other side, and confess that we are weaker than I wish. Every day, however, is adding to our mass and strengthening our position. . . .

What think you of Fremont and Banks as Major-Generals of Volunteers and Schenck as Brigadier? They are all able men, though I know you don't like volunteers. These appointments are generally satisfactory, even to the regular officers, many of whom say that they had rather serve under able citizens than old-fogy officers. The old army is a manifest discredit. The desertion of

so many officers (treachery I had better say), the surrender on parole in Texas of so many officers where all the men were true to their allegiance, has so stained the whole regular course of officers that it will take good conduct on their part to retrieve their old position.

You are regarded with favor here. It will be your own fault if you do not gain a very high position in the army.

Affectionately yours,

JOHN SHERMAN.

On May 3, 1861, John Sherman writes from Philadelphia:—

The time is past for expedients. They must either whip us or we will whip them. A threat of secession is idle. Missouri can't secede, nor can Virginia secede. . . . Those Dutch troops in St. Louis will have enough backing. Thank God, the arms in the arsenal were not stolen. I am now acting as volunteer aide to Major-General Patterson. Porter, Belger, Beckwith, Patterson, Price, and others are on his regular staff.

In John Sherman's letter-book is a copy of a letter, which General Sherman wrote to Secretary Cameron in 1861, giving his reasons for not enlisting sooner. Upon receipt of this, it was decided at Washington to make him colonel of three battalions of regulars, or major-general of volunteers.

OFFICE ST. LOUIS RAILROAD CO.,
ST. LOUIS, May 8, 1861.

HON. S. CAMERON, *Secretary of War:*

Dear Sir: I hold myself now, as always, prepared to serve my country in the capacity for which I was trained.

I did not and will not volunteer for three months, because I cannot throw my family on the cold support of charity, but for the three years' call made by the President an officer could prepare his command and do good service. I will not volunteer, because, rightfully or wrongfully, I feel myself unwilling to take a mere private's place, and having for many years lived in California and Louisiana, the men are not well enough acquainted with me to elect me to my appropriate place. Should my services be needed, the records of the War Department will enable you to designate the station in which I can render best service.

Yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN.

Before leaving St. Louis, General Sherman was the unintentional witness of the first fighting in the West, of which he gives the following account:—

OFFICE ST. LOUIS RAILROAD CO.,
ST. LOUIS, May 11, 1861.

Dear Brother: Very imprudently I was a witness of the firing on the people by the United States Militia at Camp Jackson yesterday. You will hear all manner of accounts, and as these will be brought to bear on the present Legislature to precipitate events, maybe secession, I will tell you what I saw.

My office is up in Bremen, the extreme north of the city. The arsenal is at the extreme south. The State camp was in a pretty grove directly west of the city, bounded by Olive Street and Laclede Avenue. I went to my house on Locust, between Eleventh and Twelfth, at 3 P.M., and saw the whole city in commotion, and heard that the United States troops were marching from the arsenal to capture the State camp. At home I found

Hugh and Charley Ewing and John Hunter so excited they would not wait for dinner, but went out to see the expected battle. I had no such curiosity and stayed to dinner, after which I walked out, and soon met a man who told me General Frost had surrendered. I went back home and told Ellen, then took Willy to see the soldiers march back. I kept on walking, and about 5.30 P.M. found myself in the grove, with soldiers all round, standing at rest. I went into the camp till turned aside by sentinels, and found myself with a promiscuous crowd, men, women, and children, inside the grove, near Olive Street. On that street the disarmed State troops, some eight hundred, were in ranks. Soon a heavy column of United States Regulars followed by militia came down Olive Street, with music, and halted abreast of me. I went up and spoke to some of the officers, and fell back to a knoll, where I met Hugh and Charley and John Hunter. Soon the music again started, and as the Regulars got abreast of the crowd, about sixty yards to my front and right, I observed them in confusion, using their bayonets to keep the crowd back, as I supposed. Still, they soon moved on, and as the militia reached the same point a similar confusion began. I heard a couple of shots, then half a dozen, and observed the militia were firing on the crowd at that point, but the fire kept creeping to the rear along the flank of the column, and, hearing balls cutting the leaves of trees over my head, I fell down on the grass and crept up to where Charley Ewing had my boy Willy. I also covered his person. Probably a hundred shots passed over the ground, but none near us. As soon as the fire slackened, I picked Willy up, and ran with him till behind the rising ground, and continued at my leisure out of harm's way, and went home.

I saw no one shot, but some dozen men were killed, among them a woman and little girl. There must have been some provocation at the point where the Regulars charged bayonets and where the militia began their fire. The rest was irregular and unnecessary, for the crowd was back in the woods, a fence between them and the street. There was some cheering of the United States troops and some halloos for Jeff Davis.

I hear all of Frost's command who would not take the oath of allegiance to the United States are prisoners at the arsenal. I suppose they will be held for the orders of the President. They were mostly composed of young men who doubtless were secessionists. Frost is a New Yorker and was a graduate of West Point, served some years in the army, and married a Miss Graham here, a lady of great wealth and large connections. He was encamped by order of the Governor; and this brings up the old question of State and United States authority. We cannot have two kings: one is enough; and of the two the United States must prevail. But in all the South, and even here, there are plenty who think the State is their king.

As ever, yours affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

OFFICE ST. LOUIS RAILROAD Co.,
ST. LOUIS, May 20, 1861.

Dear Brother: . . . The greatest difficulty in the problem now before the country is not to conquer but to conquer as to impress upon the real men of the South a respect for their conquerors. If Memphis be taken, and the army move on South the vindictive feeling left behind would again close the River. And here in Missouri

it would be easy to take Jefferson City, Lexington, and any other point, but the moment they are left to themselves the people would resume their hatred. It is for this reason that I deem Regulars the only species of force that should be used for invasion. I take it for granted that Virginia will be attacked with great force this summer, and that the great problem of the war — Mississippi — will be reserved for the next winter. . . .

In the war on which we are now entering paper soldiers won't do. McClellan is naturally a superior man and has had the finest opportunities in Mexico and Europe. Even his juniors admit his qualifications.

Yours affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

OFFICE ST. LOUIS RAILROAD Co.,
ST. LOUIS, May 22, 1861.

My Dear Brother: I received your despatch last evening stating I would be appointed Colonel of one of the new 3 Battalion Regiments, this was I suppose an answer to my own despatch to Adjutant General asking if such would be the case. The fact is so many persons had written to me and spoken to me, all asserting they had seen or heard I was to have one of the new Regiments, that I thought the letter to me had been misdirected or miscarried. . . . I shall promptly accept the Colonelcy when received and I think I can organize and prepare a regiment as quick as anybody. I prefer this to a Brigadier in the Militia, for I have no political ambition, and have very naturally more confidence in Regulars than Militia. Not that they are better, braver or more patriotic, but because *I know* the people will submit with better grace to them than to Militia of any particular locality. . . .

I think Missouri has subsided into a quiescent state. There will be no attempting to execute the obnoxious and unconstitutional Militia Law. A prompt move on Little Rock from here and Cairo and recapture of Fort Smith from Kansas would hold Arkansas in check. A movement which could be made, simultaneous with that on Richmond. I hope no men or time will be wasted on Norfolk; it is to one side and unimportant. The capture of Richmond would be fatal to Virginia, and the occupation of Cumberland, Hagerstown and Frederick by the Pennsylvanians, whilst troops threaten Winchester from Washington would make the further occupation of Harper's Ferry useless. But after all the Mississippi is the great problem of the Civil War, and will require large forces and good troops.

Affectionately your brother,
W. T. SHERMAN.

On May 14th General Sherman received a despatch from his brother Charles in Washington, telling him of his appointment as Colonel of the 13th Regular Infantry, and that he was wanted in Washington at once. The following letter was written while he was preparing to leave St. Louis for Washington, and the next one (June 8) from Pittsburgh on his way East:—

OFFICE ST. LOUIS RAILROAD CO.,
ST. LOUIS, May 24, 1861.

Dear Brother: I have already written you so much that more would be a bore. Yours of the 21st is at hand and I can act with promptness and sufficient vigor when the occasion arises. You all overrate my powers and abilities and may place me in a position above my merits, a worse step than below. Really I do not conceive myself qualified for Quartermaster General or Major General. To attain either station I would prefer a

previous schooling with large masses of troops in the field, one which I lost in the Mexican War by going to California. The only possible reason that would induce me to accept my position would be to prevent its falling into incompetent hands. The magnitude of interest at issue now, will admit of no experiments. . . .

I have still my saddle, sword, sash and some articles of Uniform which will come into immediate play. But look out—I want the regular Army and not the 3 year men. . . .

Yours affectionately,
W. T. SHERMAN.

PITTSBURGH, Sunday, June 8, 1861.

Dear Brother: . . . Should I on my arrival find the Secretary determined to go outside the Army, and should he make advances to me, of course I shall accept. In like manner if he tenders me a brigade, I will do my best, or if a colonelcy—ditto. I still feel that it is wrong to ask for anything and prefer that they should make their own choice of this position for me. You are with Gen. Patterson. There are two A No. 1 men there, George H. Thomas Col. Second Cavalry and Cap. Sykes 3 Infantry. Mention my name to both and say to them that I wish them all the success they aspire to, and if in the varying chances of war I should ever be so placed, I would name such as them for high places. But Thomas is a Virginian from near Norfolk and say what we may he must feel unpleasantly at leading an invading Army. But if he says he will do it, I know he will do it well. He was never brilliant but always cool, reliable and steady, maybe a little slow. Sykes has in him some dashing qualities. . . . If possible I will try and see you in your new capacity of soldier before I make another dis-

tinct break. If you please you may telegraph to Mr. Chase simply that I have come to Washington on Taylor's call, but I cannot wait long, and if the Administration don't want my services, to say so at once emphatically.

Yours affectionately,

W. T. SHERMAN.

WASHINGTON, June 20, 1861.

Dear Brother: At last the order is out and I am Colonel 13 Infantry. I have been asking for orders and am this moment informed for the present, that inasmuch as Lt. Col. Burbank may enlist my Regiment, and as my personal services here are needed, I will forthwith consider myself on duty here attached to Gen. Scott's staff as Inspector General. I did not dream of this, but it really does well accord with my inclinations and peculiar nature. My duty will be to keep myself advised of the character and kind of men who are in Military service here near Washington and to report to General Scott in person. Porter can tell you what these duties will amount to. . . . I suppose you will soon be here, for from Col. Burnside I hear all of Patterson's army is on the Maryland side of the Potomac, and no possible movement will be attempted before Congress meets. . . .

In haste,

Your Brother,

W. T. SHERMAN.

IV

In command of a brigade of McDowell's army — Bull Run — At Fort Corcoran — Ordered West with General Anderson — At Cincinnati — John Sherman engaged in recruiting — Difficulties of saving Kentucky to the Union — Sherman succeeds Anderson on the latter's resignation — Weakness of his position at Louisville — Reports to General Halleck at St. Louis — At Benton Barracks — Halleck's difficulties — Ordered to Paducah — Different opinions of the brothers regarding McClellan — John Sherman on the Congressional Session of 1861-62 — The battle of Shiloh — Indignation of General Sherman at false newspaper reports — Promoted to major-general — Division order after occupation of Corinth

GENERAL SHERMAN remained on duty with General Scott only ten days (June 20-30), and then was given command of one brigade of McDowell's army, which was to move from the defences of Washington. He assumed command June 30, and went to work at once to prepare his brigade for the general advance.

CAMP OPPOSITE GEORGETOWN,
July 16, 1861.

Dear Brother: We start forth to-day, camp to-night at or near Vienna, to-morrow early we attack the enemy at or near Fairfax C.H., Germantown and Centerville, thereabouts we will probably be till about Thursday, when movement of the whole force, some 35,000 men on Manassas, turning the position by a wide circuit. You may expect to hear of us about Aquia Creek or Fredericksburg (secret absolute). . . .

If anything befall me, my pay is drawn to embrace June 30, and Ellen has full charge of all other interests. Good bye.

Your Brother,

W. T. SHERMAN.