

by the bullet, by disease, desertion, &c., would be promptly filled, whereas only such parts of the Conscript Law as tend to weaken us are enforced, viz.: 5 per cent for furlough and 50 per cent of officers and non-commissioned officers discharged to consolidate regiments. Even Blair is amazed at this. He protests the order cannot be executed, and we should appeal to Mr. Lincoln, whom he still insists has no desire to destroy the army. But the order is positive and I don't see how we can hesitate. Grant started to-day down to Carthage, and I have written to him, which may stave it off for a few days, but I tremble at the loss of so many young and good officers, who have been hard at work for two years, and now that they begin to see how to take care of soldiers, must be turned out. . . .

If not too late, do, for mercy's sake, exhaust your influence to stop this consolidation of regiments. Fill all the regiments with conscripts, and if the army is then too large disband the regiments that prefer to serve north of the Potomac and the Ohio. Keep the war South at all hazards. If this Consolidation Law is literally enforced, and no new draft is made, this campaign is over. And the outside world will have a perfect right to say our Government is afraid of its own people. . . .

Affectionately yours,

W. T. SHERMAN.

VI

The movement against Grand Gulf — John Sherman on the progress of the war — The fall of Vicksburg — Change of sentiment in regard to General Sherman — His increasing popularity — Effects of the reduction of Vicksburg — The draft — Activity of industries in spite of war — Sherman's opinion of Grant — Letter to Major Sawyer — The ethics of warfare — The march through Georgia — General Sherman's comments on the difficulties in his way and the character of his accomplishment — The Soldier Vote — Letter to Speaker Colfax — John Sherman Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee — Special Field Order No. 6

Up to this time General Sherman had passed through various stages of popular misunderstanding and criticism, but the movements about Vicksburg referred to in the following letters seem to have resulted in the very general appreciation throughout the country, of his abilities. At this time John Sherman was in Ohio, much concerned at the turn political affairs were taking, and eager for military success because of the influence it would have upon the people.

CAMP BEFORE VICKSBURG, April 26, 1863.

My Dear Brother: To-morrow I start with my corps to bring up the rear of the movement against Grand Gulf, and, maybe, Jackson, Miss. I feel in its success less confidence than in any similar undertaking of the war, but it is my duty to co-operate with zeal, and I shall endeavor to do it. . . .

Grant came down by river, and his entire army, about seventy thousand, is now near here, but the whole country is under water, save little ribands of alluvial ground along the main Mississippi and all parallel bayous. One month ago my proposition was to fall back upon

our original plan, modified by the fact that Yazoo River could be entered by its head and could be used as far down as Greenwood, which is the mouth of Yolo-busha. If our gunboats could have passed that point, a real substantial advantage would have been gained, for it would have enabled the army to pass the Yolo-busha, whereas now it is a serious obstacle like the Rappahannock, and will have to be fought for. . . .

McClernand's corps marched from Milliken's Bend along a narrow road to Carthage. McPherson has followed, and I start to-morrow. Sixty thousand men will thus be on a single road, narrow, crooked, and liable to become a quagmire on the occurrence of a single rain. We hope to carry ten days' rations with us. Seven iron-clad gunboats and seven transports have run the Vicksburg batteries; with these we can reach Grand Gulf below the mouth of Black River, whence there is a road to Raymond sixty-five miles, and Jackson. The destruction of this road isolates Vicksburg. Now if we can sustain the army it may do, but I know the materials or food, forage or ammunition, cannot be conveyed on that single precarious road. Grant has been opening a canal from the Mississippi to Willow Bayou, three miles, and Willow Bayou roundaway and Bayou Vidal form a connected channel for forty-seven miles, terminating at Carthage, but it is crooked, narrow, and full of trees. Large working parties are employed in removing trees, but at best it is only calculated that it can be used by scows drawn by small steam tugs. It is not even contemplated that the smallest transports can navigate it. The canal itself is far from being done. I went through it yesterday in a small boat, and estimate it will take one month to give it eight feet of water with the present stage, but the water

in the river is now falling rapidly. We count on another rise in June from the Missouri, but these rises are accidental and may or not come. The great difficulty will be to support an army operating from Grand Gulf. . . .

Between the two choices open to him I far prefer Grenada. One is sure and natural, the other is difficult and hazardous in the extreme. There is no national or political reason why this army should be forced to undertake unnecessary hazard. It is far in advance of Hooker, Rosecrans, or Curtis. We have done far more than either of these armies, but have encountered more calumny and abuse than all. . . .

Banks is afraid even to attempt Port Hudson, and from all I can hear is more likely to be caged up in New Orleans than to assist us against Vicksburg. . . .

Affectionately your brother,

W. T. SHERMAN.

MANSFIELD, OHIO, May 7, 1863.

My Dear Brother: We have been eagerly watching the course of military events. Here nothing occurs worth noting. If there is any change, it is for the better. The tone of popular opinion is more patriotic. There are fewer noisy Butternuts, and most of these think their bad talk is only fair opposition to the administration. The only danger is that this will become downright opposition, resistance to the war and the laws where mobs and civil war will be the inevitable result. A good many scary people are afraid of this, but I am too well accustomed to violent political quarrels to look for danger from them. There may be occasional mobs, as there were the other day at Fort Wayne, where I made a speech, but both parties pledged themselves to the

war and only differed about the "nigger" and administration measures. The difference may widen, and unless we have decided military success, will widen until we have open and hostile war and peace parties. Then God knows what will be the result. One tendency I noticed. Nearly every man in debt is paying off his debts. The inflation of the currency and the rise of property make this easy. Unluckily for me, most of my means is or was "in bills receivable." These are paid, or will be, and so I find myself with plenty of money, but can't buy anything at reasonable prices. This is the general rule of creditors, and perhaps it is better so for the community, as the creditor class can more easily bear the loss of inflation. There is nothing in the condition at all discouraging except our military condition. This I confess looks discouraging. The defeat of Hooker, of which as yet we have not full particulars, is a terrible event. Experience should have taught us not to hope much from his army, and yet the impression was so strong after his confident assertions and his promising commencement that we all feel the disappointment. It is gloomy. Still what can we do, but fight on. . . .

I regret to notice from your letter that Grant's recent movements do not meet your approval. It was regarded as a bold and successful plan to turn the flank of the enemy, but if he is weaker from the south side of Vicksburg than from above, I do not see what we have gained. We have a telegraphic account of your recent attack on Haines Bluff, but do not understand its purpose.

As for the consolidation of regiments, it is idle for me to interpose. Halleck regulates all these matters. He is king in all questions regulating the detail affecting the army. Stanton has far less power than Halleck,

and, indeed, holds office by a frail tenure and with limited influence. It is no use for a civilian to talk to Halleck. He would regard your opinion, but certainly not mine, though we are good friends. You have been sagacious in your anticipation of military events. Charleston is not taken, the war is prolonged, and but little chance of its ending until we have a new deal.

If only the people will be patient so long, all will be well. The best of it is, they can't help themselves. The rebels won't let us have peace even if we wanted it. It may be better that the Democrats be allowed to take the helm, as they could not make peace, and then war would be more vigorous and united. . . .

This war has always seemed to me a tragic necessity. I have watched its progress, and hope to see its termination. It may, like the French Revolution, travel in a large circle, destroying all that have taken part in it; still there is no way but to go ahead. We may slowly learn wisdom in its prosecution, for we certainly have not shown it thus far. . . .

Affectionately your brother,

JOHN SHERMAN.

Late in May, 1863, it became evident that the Confederate works were too strong to be taken by assault, and on May 25th, the orders for besieging Vicksburg were given out.

WALNUT HILLS, VICKSBURG, May 29, 1863.

My Dear Brother: I received a few days since your most acceptable letter of May 7th, which met me here. You will now have a fine understanding of the whole move thus far. The move by way of Grand Gulf to secure a foothold on the hills wherefrom to assail Vicksburg, appeared to me too risky at the time, and General

Grant is entitled to all the merit of its conception and execution.

In our route we consumed the fruits of the country, broke up the important railroad communications, whipped the enemy wherever encountered, and secured the Yazoo as a base, the object for which we have contended so long and so patiently. . . .

We have Vicksburg closely invested, and its fate is sealed unless the enemy raises a large force from Carolina and Tennessee and assails us from without. In that event we must catch them at the crossing of Black, and fight them desperately.

The place is very well fortified, and is defended by twenty thousand brave troops. We have assaulted at five distinct points at two distinct times, and failed to cross the parapet. Our loss was heavy and we are now approaching with pick and shovel. If we did not apprehend an attempt on our rear, we could wait patiently the slow process of besiegers; but as this danger is great, we may try and assault again. In the mean time we are daily pouring into the city a perfect storm of shot and shells, and our sharpshooters are close up and fire at any head that is rash enough to show itself above ground.

[Not signed.]

MANSFIELD, OHIO, July 18, 1863.

My Dear Brother: I supposed when Vicksburg fell that you would have a period of rest, and perhaps might return to Ohio to find yourself popular and famous. But the fortune of war carries you into new dangers and I hope new successes. We have been very anxious for news from your movements, but as yet we have only had uncertain reports, and can only live in the hope that you will whip Johnston and win new laurels. I have just

returned from Cincinnati, where I was during the whole of Morgan's raid. How completely the tone of the press has changed in regard to you. Even the "Gazette,"¹ which has been malignant to the last degree, published quite a number of letters in which your share of the movements about Vicksburg was highly praised. I notice, however, that the editor has said nothing. All other papers, and indeed all officers and citizens with whom I converse, gave you great credit. So that now in the Northern States, and especially here in Ohio, your popularity is second only to that of Grant. You need care but little for this, as you passed through a storm of obloquy which would have submerged many an officer. Popular opinion is so changeable that it is worthless. It is founded upon rumor, and is as explosive as gas. Meade has had a foretaste of this. His drawn battle at Gettysburg relieved the country from a great danger, and he was at once a hero; he was the coming man. He has allowed Lee to escape him, and all his popular honors are lost. McClellan has succeeded in establishing the position of a party leader, and now enjoys the bad honor of being cheered by a New York mob of thieves and scoundrels, while poor Hooker is dropped by all just when he thought he had Lee in his power.

While the war goes on there is a danger looming up that seems to me more ominous than any other. It is the Presidential election next summer. We shall have a fierce canvass. . . . If the election cannot be held in the Southern States, no one is likely to get a majority of the electoral college. This must be, to secure an election by the people. All the States must be counted, and under the Constitution the successful candidate must have a majority of all the electoral votes. Can this be

¹ Cincinnati "Gazette."

secured by any one man? If not, the election then goes into the House, and who can tell the result. The war has done a great deal to shake that implicit obedience to law which has been the great conservative element, but in the struggle for so vast a prize will it not be easy to clog the machinery for a legal election? — and then civil war or anarchy is the certain result. These are only possible dangers, but it is well to look them in the face.

At present I do not stand very well with my political associates, because I have openly differed with them on important questions. But I am too well grounded in the principles of the Republican party to be shaken in my faith. Indeed, nearly all the errors into which the administration has fallen, have arisen from the advice of an old school of politicians who never belonged to the Republican party.

Affectionately your brother,

JOHN SHERMAN.

JACKSON, MISS., July 19, 1863.

My Dear Brother: The fall of Vicksburg and consequent capitulation of Port Hudson, the opening the navigation of the Mississippi, and now the driving out of this great valley the only strong army that threatened us, complete as pretty a page in the history of war and of our country as ever you could ask my name to be identified with. The share I have personally borne in all these events is one in which you may take pride for me. You know I have avoided notoriety; and the press, my standard enemy, may strip me of all popular applause, but not a soldier of the Army of the Tennessee but knows the part I have borne in this great drama, and the day will come when that army will speak in a voice that cannot be drowned. . . .

In the events resulting thus, the guiding minds and hands were Grant's, Sherman's, and McPherson's, all natives of Ohio. . . .

Jackson will never again be a point where an enemy can assemble and threaten us. . . . As soon as my detachments are in, I will return to Black River. Our men and officers must have rest. For months in trenches, working day and night in the heat and dust of the roads, all are exhausted and need rest. I hope the Army of the Potomac will finish Lee. Morgan should not escape from Indiana. Love to all.

Your brother,

W. T. SHERMAN.

CAMP 18 M. E. OF VICKSBURG,
July 28, 1863.

Dear Brother: Since my return from Jackson, I have been very busy — every general officer but two has gone on furlough, and everybody wants to go. . . .

The railroad comes within four miles of my tent, and I have its exclusive use and a telegraph at my elbow. If you come down you will find your name a passport, but should that fail you, see General Grant or McPherson in Vicksburg, and they will put you through. I don't think there is any danger on the river now unless it be on the Ohio, which you can avoid by taking cars to Cairo. Vicksburg is worth seeing, and a glance will tell you more than reams of paper why it took us six months to take the place. I am camped near Big Black, four and one-half miles northeast of where the railroad crosses it. My depot of supplies is at the crossing. Col. J. Condit Smith is my quartermaster, and should you reach that point before I am advised by telegraph, apply to him and he will send you to my camp. I have

four divisions here much reduced, but still a good stock. In the riots of New York I recognize the second stage of this war, but I trust our Government will deal with them summarily. The war has progressed as fast and as successfully as should be.

Your brother,

W. T. SHERMAN.

MANSFIELD, OHIO, Aug. 3, 1863.

My Dear Brother: Your letter dated July 19, at Jackson, is received. What you say about the injustice of the press was undoubtedly true a month ago, but it is true no longer. Since the fall of Vicksburg each of the officers named by you has been very highly lauded, and that by all parties and papers. With you it has been especially laudatory. Even your old enemy, the Cincinnati "Gazette," has in several recent numbers spoken of you in very complimentary terms, and without any apparent recollection that it has libelled you for months. With the officers of the army you stand very high. Indeed it is now unnecessary for you to care for defenders. I will think of your proposition to visit Vicksburg, and will probably do so this fall. At present I am involved in the political canvass now going on in Ohio, but shall not be long. My position does not require me to take a very active part. . . .

Affectionately yours,

JOHN SHERMAN.

General Sherman did not visit Ohio until the following Christmas.

CAMP ON BIG BLACK,
18 miles from Vicksburg,
Aug. 3, 1863.

Dear Brother:

You and I may differ in our premises, but will agree in our conclusions. A government resting immediately on the caprice of a people is too unstable to last. The will of the people is the ultimate appeal, but the Constitution, laws of Congress, and regulations of the executive departments subject to the decisions of the Supreme Court are the laws which all must obey without stopping to inquire why. All *must* obey. Government, that is, the executive, having no discretion but to execute the law, must be to that extent despotic. If this be our Government, it is the "best on earth" — but if the people of localities can bias and twist the law or execution of it to suit their local prejudices, then our Government is the worst on earth. If you look back only two years, you will see the application. There are about six millions of men in this country all thinking themselves sovereign and qualified to govern. Some thirty-four governors of States who feel like petty kings, and about ten thousand editors who presume to dictate to generals, presidents, and cabinets. I treat all these as nothing, but when a case arises I simply ask: Where is the law? Supposing the pilot of a ship should steer his vessel according to the opinion of every fellow who watched the clouds above or the currents below, where would his ship land? No, the pilot has before him a little needle; he watches that, and he never errs. So if we make that our simple code, the law of the land must and shall be executed; no matter what the consequences, we cannot err. Hundreds and thousands may honestly differ as to what the law should be, but it is rarely the case; but all

men of ordinary understanding can tell what the law is. We have for years been drifting towards an unadulterated democracy or demagogism, and its signs were manifest in Mob Laws and Vigilance Committees all over our country. And States and towns and mere squads of men took upon themselves to set aside the Constitution and laws of Congress and substitute therefor their own opinions. I saw it, and tried to resist it in California, but always the General Government yielded to the pressure. I say that our Government, judged by its conduct as a whole, paved the way for rebellion. The South that lived on slavery saw the United States yield to abolition pressure at the North, to pro-slavery pressure at the South, to the miners of California, the rowdies of Baltimore, and to the people everywhere. They paved the way to this rebellion. The people of the South were assured that, so far from resisting an attempt to set up an independent Government of homogeneous interests, the United States would give in and yield. They appealed to precedents, and proved it, and I confess I had seen so much of it that I doubted whether our Government would not yield to the pressure, and die a natural death. But I confess my agreeable surprise. Though full of corruption and base materials, our country is a majestic one, full of natural wealth and good people. They have risen not in full majesty, but enough to give all hopes of vitality. Our progress has been as rapid as any philosopher could ask. The resources of the land in money, in men, in provisions, in forage, and in intelligence, has surprised us all, and we have had as much success as could be hoped for. The Mississippi is now ours, not by commission but by right, by the right of manly power. . . . No great interest in our land has risen superior to Government, and I deem it fortunate

that no man has risen to dictate terms to all. Better as it is. Lincoln is but the last of the old school Presidents, the index (mathematically) of one stage of our national existence. . . . Our Government should become a machine, self-regulating, independent of the man. . . .

As to the press of America, it is a shame and a reproach to a civilized people. . . . I begin to feel a high opinion of myself that I am their butt; I shall begin to suspect myself of being in a decline when a compliment appears in type. I know in what estimation I am held by my press,—those who have been with me all the time,—and they are capable to judge, from private to major-generals. I saw a move to bring Grant and myself East. No they don't. . . .

We will be in Mobile in October and Georgia by Christmas if required. . . .

I see much of the people here — men of heretofore high repute. The fall of Vicksburg has had a powerful effect. They are subjugated. I even am amazed at the effect; we are actually feeding the people. . . .

Grant and wife visited me in camp yesterday. I have the handsomest camp I ever saw, and should really be glad to have visitors come down. I don't think a shot will be fired at a boat till Jeff Davis can call his friends about him and agree upon the next campaign. I want recruits and conscripts, and shall be all ready in October.

As ever, your brother,

W. T. SHERMAN.

MANSFIELD, OHIO, Aug. 29, 1863.

Dear Brother: I am very desirous to accept your invitation. The trip would be an instructive and pleasant one, and if I were not restrained by the interests of others I would surely go at once. But we are now

involved in an exciting and important political contest. The canvass in Ohio is substantially between the Government and the Rebellion, and is assuming all the bitterness of such a strife. If I should leave now, it would be like a General leaving before the day of battle. I have been speaking very often, and must keep it up. I propose, however, to arrange all my business so that I may leave soon after the election, say about the 20th of October, and will then go down the river and spend all the time until the meeting of Congress. I hope to be able to go via Vicksburg, New Orleans, Charleston, to Washington. If a favorable opportunity offers at Vicksburg and New Orleans, I wish to develop my ideas as to a reconstruction of the Union. I know these will suit you a good deal better than they will the administration, but I feel quite independent of the latter and am disposed to follow my own course. . . .

General Ord stopped with me last Sunday on his way East. We were all glad to see him, as he gave us many interesting details of your situation and operations. Your promotion as Brigadier in the Regular Army gave unusual satisfaction. I was in Dayton, Springfield, Marysville, and Stanton's¹ neighborhood and conversed with many about his attacks on you. I find he is terribly unpopular. Your recent success and his libels on you are the subject of general remarks. At one place I mentioned your name in connection with other Ohio Generals who have distinguished themselves, and the crowd stopped me and gave you three as hearty cheers as ever man got. . . .

Affectionately yours,

JOHN SHERMAN.

¹ Lieutenant-Governor Stanton, of Ohio.

After the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, the Western armies lay comparatively idle for a time; and early in the autumn General Sherman was engaged in rebuilding the Memphis & Charleston R. R. to the east so that the armies might draw supplies by that route. While engaged on this work, he was ordered to cross the Tennessee and march eastward. The battle of Chattanooga followed, and then Sherman was sent to Burnside's relief, the latter being besieged in Knoxville in November. The siege of Knoxville was raised December 5, 1863, and Sherman went slowly back to Chattanooga, and then was ordered to northern Alabama to put his army into winter quarters.

General Sherman spent Christmas of 1863 with his family, in Lancaster, Ohio, but missed seeing John, who had already gone to Washington.

MANSFIELD, OHIO, NOV. 14, 1863.

My Dear Brother:

On Tuesday next I start for Gettysburg, to take part in the pageant of a dedication of the battle-field as a national cemetery. From thence I shall probably go to Washington, two weeks in advance of the session. The very first thing I mean to do is to press the enforcement of the draft. The long delay and the various shifts and subterfuges by which the execution of the law has thus far been defeated, is disgraceful, and very injurious to the cause. . . . I notice in some of the Southern papers that a hope is entertained that the draft cannot be enforced. This is idle. The war was never more popular than at this moment. The new call will fall lightly. Ohio must send thirty-five thousand, or one to fifteen of her voters. The apportionment has been made even to townships and wards, and in very many places the quota will be made by voluntary enlistments, aided by large gratuitous

bounties from citizens. There is no lack of men or of a determination to send them. The wonderful prosperity of all classes, especially of laborers, has a tendency to secure acquiescence in all measures demanded to carry on the war. We are only another example of a people growing rich in a great war. And this is not shown simply by inflated prices, but by increased production, new manufacturing establishments, new railroads, houses, etc. . . . Indeed, every branch of business is active and hopeful. This is not a mere temporary inflation caused by paper money, but is a steady progress, and almost entirely upon actual capital. The people are prospering and show their readiness to push on the war. Taxes are paid cheerfully, and the voluntary donations for our soldiers and their families are counted by thousands. . . . I confide in your success.

Affectionately,

JOHN SHERMAN.

LANCASTER, OHIO, Dec. 29, 1863.

My Dear Brother: . . . I hear you have gone on to New York, and therefore I must go off without seeing you. I have been off the line of communication since leaving Memphis, save a few hours at Bridgeport, during which I had hardly time to put my official signature to papers demanding my hand. I have made a report of our movements up to the return to Bridgeport and enclose it with this, a copy which I brought here, and which you may keep, only, of course, under the confidence of absolute secrecy until the War Department thinks proper to make the original public. . . .

I suppose you will read this report, and I invite attention to the part referring to the assault on Tunnel Hill. I know that Grant in his report will dwell on

this same part. I was provoked that Meigs, looking at us from Chattanooga, should report me repulsed, and that Mr. Stanton should publish his letter as semi-official. Meigs apologized to me for using Thomas's name instead of mine throughout, which he charged to a copyist, but made no amends for the repulse. The whole philosophy of the battle was that I should get, by a dash, a position on the extremity of the Missionary Ridge, from which the enemy would be forced to drive me, or allow his depot at Chickamauga station to be in danger. I expected Bragg to attack me at daylight, but he did not, and to bring matters to a crisis quickly, as time was precious, for the sake of Burnside in East Tennessee, Grant ordered me to assume the offensive. My report contains the rest. Again, after the battle, Granger was ordered to push for Knoxville, but his movements were so slow that Grant, impatient, called on me, and my move was the most rapid of the war and perfectly successful. I could have gone on after Longstreet, but Burnside ranked me, and it was his business, not mine. So I reinforced him all he asked, and returned.

The Fifteenth Corps, now Logan's, and Dodge's division of the Sixteenth Corps are now at work on the railroad from Nashville to Decatur, and from Decatur to Stevenson, thus making a triangle of railroad which it is estimated will relieve the great difficulty of supplies which has paralyzed the Army of the Cumberland. This will take five weeks. I leave my headquarters at Huntsville, and go in person down the Mississippi to strike some lateral blows, to punish the country for allowing guerillas to attack the boats. I go on Friday to Cincinnati, and thence to Cairo, where with Admiral Porter I will concert measures to produce the result. I expect to send one expedition up the Yazoo, and go myself with

another up Red River, levying contributions to make good losses to boats, and punish for deaths and wounds inflicted. I think we can make people feel that they must actually prevent guerillas from carrying out their threats that though we have the river, it will do us no good. My address will be Memphis, for a month, and Huntsville after. We can hardly fashion out the next campaign, but it looks as though we should have to move from the Tennessee River. I should prefer to take Mobile and the Alabama as well as the Chattahoochee, and move east from Montgomery and Columbus, Miss.

I wish you would introduce a bill in Congress increasing the number of cadets on this basis — one from each congressional district per annum. In districts not represented, vest the appointments in the Secretary of War out of boys not over eighteen in the armies in the field, to be selected in any manner that may be prescribed by law, or by the regulation of the President. This would hold out to young fellows the prospect of getting a cadetship. Last summer we were called on to recommend candidates, and I was amazed to find so many worthy applicants. All who came forward for examination preferred West Point to a commission. The great want of the army is good subordinate officers. The army is a good school, but West Point is better. It is useless to deny that a special preliminary education is necessary to the military officers, and the cheapest school is now at West Point and is susceptible of infinite increase. . . .

I think the President's proclamation unwise. Knowing the temper of the South, I know that it but protracts the war by seeming to court peace. It to them looks like weakness. I tell them that as they cool off, we warm to the work. That we are just getting ready for the war, and I know the effect is better than to coax

them to come back into the Union. The organization of a Civil Government but complicates the game. All the Southern States will need a pure military Government for years after resistance has ceased. You have noticed the debate in Richmond, on the President's proclamation. That is a true exhibit of the feeling South. Don't fall into the error that the masses think differently. Of course property-holding classes South deplore the devastation that marks the progress of their own and our armies, but the South is no longer consulted. The Army of the Confederacy is the South, and they still hope to worry us out. The moment we relax, they gain strength and confidence. We must hammer away and show such resistance, such bottom that even that slender hope will fail them.

I still am opposed to all bounties. The draft pure and simple, annual, to fill vacancies in the ranks. Pay of men in the front increased to even forty dollars a month, and that of men at depots and to the rear diminished to a bare maintenance if not less. Four hundred dollars bounty is an absurd commentary where two-thirds draw bounty and remain absent from their rank and are discharged for disability without hearing a shot. Deal with the army as you would if you were hiring men for special work. Pay those who do the work high; those who are sick, unfortunate, or shirking, pay little or nothing. The same of officers from the major-general to lieutenant. The President must make vacancies for the rising officers, the "creations" of the war. I am willing to quit if a younger and better man can be found for my place. . . .

Your affectionate brother,

W. T. SHERMAN.

LANCASTER, Dec. 30, 1863.

Dear Brother: I have been importuned from many quarters for my likeness, autographs, and biography. I have managed to fend off all parties and hope to do so till the end of the war. I don't want to rise or be notorious, for the reason that a mere slip or accident may let me fall, and I don't care about falling so far as most of the temporary heroes of the war. The real men of the war will be determined by the closing scenes, and then the army will determine the questions. Newspaper puffs and self-written biographies will then be ridiculous caricatures. Already has time marked this progress and indicated this conclusion.

If parties apply to you for materials in my behalf, give the most brief and general items, and leave the results to the close of the war or of my career. As well might a judge or senator seek for fame outside their spheres of action as an officer of the army. We must all be judged by our own peers, stand or fall by their verdict. I know I stand very high with the army, and feel no concern on that score. To-day I can do more with Admiral Porter or the Generals than any general officer out West except Grant, and with him I am as a second self. We are personal and official friends.

Affectionately yours,

W. T. SHERMAN.

The following letters were written in the winter and spring of 1864, while General Sherman commanded the troops along the Mississippi, and John Sherman was in the Senate at Washington. General Sherman's letters contain expressions of confidence in General Grant, who had just been ordered to command the Armies of the United States.

ON BOARD JULIET,
Bound for Vicksburg in a fog,
Friday, Jan. 28, 1864.

Dear Brother:

I have organized a cavalry force to sweep down from Memphis towards Mobile, and have gathered together out of my garrisons a very pretty force of twenty thousand men which I shall command in person, and move from Vicksburg down east in connection with the cavalry named, to reach Meridian and break up the railroad connections there. This will have the effect to disconnect Mississippi from the eastern Southern States, and without this single remaining link they cannot keep any army of importance west of the Alabama River. Our armies are now at the lowest point, and so many are going home as re-enlisted veterans that I shall have a less force than should attempt it; but this is the time and I shall attempt it. It seems my luck to have to take the initiative and to come in at desperate times, but thus far having done a full share of the real achievements of this war, I need not fear accidents. . . .

You who attach more importance to popular fame would be delighted to see in what estimation I am held by the people of Memphis, Tenn., and all along this mighty river. I could not well decline an offer of a public dinner in Memphis, but I dreaded it more than I did the assault on Vicksburg. I had to speak, and sent you the report that best suited me, viz., that in the "Argus." The report of the bulletin which may reach the Northern press is disjointed and not so correct. Indeed, I cannot speak from notes or keep myself strictly to the point, but 'tis said that the effect of my crude speeches is good. . . .

I know that for us to assume that slavery is killed,