

reached the railroad, crossed it, and began ascending and descending the high, steep, and densely timbered spurs of the mountains, and after about an hour's march it was found that we were directly in front of the works, and not on the main ridge. The guide made a second effort to gain the ridge, and failed, so dark was it in the woods. I therefore determined to rest where we were and await daylight. With the dawn the march was resumed, and finally, by 7:30 A.M., the head of the column was on the ridge about six hundred yards west of the main fortifications, and between those he occupied and an abandoned redoubt on our left.

Here the fortifications, for the first time, were seen, and instead of two redoubts there were disclosed to us three redoubts on the west of the railroad cut, and a star fort on the east with outer works and approaches defended to a great distance by abatis, and nearer the works by stockades and other obstructions. The railroad emerges from the Allatoona Mountain by crossing this ridge through a cut sixty-five feet deep. Dispositions for the assault were now made by sending Gen. Sears's Brigade to the north side or rear of the works, Gen. F. M. Cockrell's (Missouri) Brigade to rest with its center on the ridge, while Gen. W. H. Young, with the four Texas regiments, was found in the rear of Gen. Cockrell.

Maj. Myrick had opened on the works with his artillery, and was ordered to continue his fire until the attacking force should interfere, or until he heard the volleys of musketry.

Gen. Sears was to commence the assault on the rear, and when musketry was heard Gen. Cockrell was to move down the ridge, supported by Gen. Young, and carry the works by (as it were) a flank attack. So rugged and abrupt were the hills that the troops could not be gotten into position until about 9 A.M., when I sent a summons to surrender. The flag was met by a Federal staff officer, and he was allowed seventeen minutes to return an answer. The time expired without any answer being received, whereupon Maj. D. W. Sanders, impatient at the delay, broke off the interview and returned. No reply being sent me, the order was given for the assault by directing the advance of Cockrell's Brigade. Emerging from the woods and passing over a long distance of abatis formed of felled timber, and under a severe fire of musketry and artillery, nobly did it press forward, followed by the gallant Texans. The enemy's outer line and one redoubt soon fell. Resting to gather strength and survey the work before them, again they rushed forward in column, and in a murderous hand-to-hand conflict that left the ditches filled with the dead they became masters of the second redoubt.

The third and main redoubt, now filled by those driven from the captured works on the west side of the railroad, was further crowded by those that were coming out of the fort on the east side of the road, from the attack of Gen. Sears. They had to cross the deep cut, through which our artillery poured a steady and deadly fire. The Federal forces were now confined to one redoubt, and we occupied the ditch and almost entirely silenced their fire, and were preparing for the final attack.

Pending the progress of these events I had received a note from Gen. F. C. Armstrong, dated 7 A.M., asking me at what time I would move toward

New Hope, and informing me also that the enemy had moved up east of the railroad above Kennesaw and encamped there last night. I had observed this movement when at Acworth, but at 12 M. I received another dispatch from him, written at 9 A.M., saying: "My scouts report the enemy's infantry advancing up the railroad. They are now entering Big Shanty. They have a cavalry force east of the railroad."

On the receipt of this second note from Gen. Armstrong I took my guide aside and particularly asked him if, after the capture of the place, I could move to New Hope Church by any other route than the one by the block-house at Allatoona creek and thence by the Sandtown road to the Acworth and Dallas road, and he said I could not. Here, then, was Gen. Sherman's whole army close behind me, and the advance of his infantry moving on Acworth, which changed the whole condition of affairs. Ammunition had to be carried from the wagons, a mile distant at the base of the hills, by men, and I was satisfied that it would take two hours to get it up and distribute it under fire before the final assault. I had learned from prisoners that before daylight the place had been reinforced by a brigade under Gen. Corse. I knew the enemy was at Big Shanty at 9 A.M. By noon he could reach Acworth and be within two miles of the road on which I was to reach New Hope Church. I knew Gen. Stewart had been ordered to near Lost Mountain. My men had marched all day on the 3d; worked all the night of the 3d destroying the railroad; that they had worked and marched all day on the 4th; marched to Allatoona on the night of the 4th; had fought up to the afternoon of the 5th; and could they pass the entire third day and night without rest or sleep if we remained to assault the remaining works? I did not doubt that the enemy would endeavor to get in my rear to intercept my return.

He was, in the morning, but three hours distant, and had been signaled to repeatedly during the battle. Under these circumstances I determined to withdraw, however depressing the idea of not capturing the place after so many had fallen, and when in all probability we could force a surrender before night. Yet, however desirous I was of remaining before the last work and forcing a capitulation, or of carrying this interior work by assault, I deemed it of more importance not to permit the enemy to cut my division off from the army. After deliberately surveying matters as they presented themselves to me, I sent to Gen. Sears to withdraw his men at once, moving by the route he went in, and directed Gen. Cockrell to commence withdrawing at 1:30 P.M.

Before the action commenced it was foreseen that it would be impossible to carry any wounded, on litters, to the road where the ambulances were placed, owing to the steepness of the hills, the ravines, and the dense woods. Accordingly the wounded were brought to the springs near the ridge. All who could be moved without the use of litters were taken to the ambulances. The others were left in charge of surgeons detailed to remain with them.

The troops re-formed on the original ground, west of the works, and marched to the south side near the artillery, and at 3:30 P.M. commenced the move toward New Hope. After the troops left I rode on down to Col.

Andrews's position in front of the works and directed him to remain until 5 P.M., and then withdraw and move on in our rear.

Before I commenced to withdraw the infantry from the captured works (but after the guide said I would have to return by the way I came) I sent orders to Maj. Myrick to send two batteries and caissons to a point beyond the blockhouse on the Sandtown road, to act in concert with the troops left there. Having been informed by Col. Andrews that the blockhouse at the Allatoona bridge had not been captured, I directed Capt. Kolb, with his battery that had remained with Col. Andrews, to move on and report to Gen. Cockrell for the purpose of taking the blockhouse.

Shortly after 4 P.M., and when not a person could be seen in or around the forts, I left the command of Col. Andrews and overtook the division near the blockhouse. Col. Adaire had burned the railroad bridge over Allatoona creek (over two hundred feet long), and also the duplicate of the bridge, which had been already framed to replace the old structure. Under the increased artillery fire the garrison of the blockhouse surrendered.

We captured two hundred and five prisoners, one United States flag, and the colors of the Ninety-Third Regiment of Illinois, a number of horses, arms, etc., and killed and wounded seven hundred and fifty of the enemy, being, with the garrison of the blockhouse, over one thousand.

History will record the battle of Allatoona one of the most sanguinary of the war; and when it is remembered that the enemy fought from within their strong redoubts the desperate deeds of daring performed by our troops in overcoming so many of the foe will win a meed of praise for their heroic valor.

The artillery opened about 7 A.M., and, except when the flag of truce was sent in, continued until 2 P.M.


The attack, commencing about 10 A.M., continued unremittingly until 1:30 P.M., and the rattle of musketry did not cease entirely until 3 P.M., when it died away, and a silence like the pall of death rested over the scene, contrasting strangely with the previous din of battle.

I cannot do justice to the gallantry of the troops. No one faltered in his duty, and all withdrew from the place with the regret that Gen. Sherman's movements—closing up behind us—forbade our remaining longer to force a surrender of the last work.

After leaving out the three regiments that formed no part of the assaulting force, I had but little over two thousand men.

My entire loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 799, as follows: Cockrell's Brigade: Killed, 42; wounded, 182; missing, 22. Sears's Brigade: Killed, 37; wounded, 114; missing, 200. Ector's Brigade: Killed, 43; wounded, 147; missing, 11. Staff: Captured, 1. Total: Killed, 122; wounded, 443; missing, 233; captured, 1. Grand total, 799.

Among the killed from Sears's Brigade is Col. W. H. Clark, Forty-Sixth Mississippi. He fell in the advance, near the enemy's works, with the battle flag in his hands. He was an excellent and a gallant officer. Also, were killed Capt. B. Davidson and Lieuts. G. C. Edwards, J. R. Henry, and J. D. Davis. Col. W. S. Barry, Thirty-Fifth Mississippi, and Maj.



MAJ. D. W. SANDERS.

Partin, Thirty-Sixth Mississippi, were wounded, together with Capts. R. G. Yates and A. J. Farmer and Lieuts. J. N. McCoy, G. H. Bannerman, J. M. Chadwick, J. Copewood, R. E. Jones, E. W. Brown, G. H. Moore, and Ensigns G. W. Cannon and A. Scarborough.

Texas will mourn for the death of some of her bravest and best men. Capt. Somerville, Thirty-Second Texas, was killed after vainly endeavoring to enter the last work, where his conspicuous gallantry had carried him and his little band. Capts. Gibson, Tenth Texas, Bates, Ninth Texas, Lieuts. Alexander, Twenty-Ninth North Carolina, and Dixon E. Wetzel, Ninth Texas, were killed while gallantly leading their men.

Brig. Gen. W. H. Young, commanding the Texas Brigade, was wounded. Most gallantly he bore his part in the action. Col. Camp, Fourteenth Texas, one of the best officers in the service, was seriously wounded. Also Maj. McReynolds, Ninth Texas, and Purdy, Fourteenth Texas. Of the captains wounded were Wright, Lyles, Russell, Vannoy, and Ridley, and Lieuts. Tunnell, Haynes, Gibbons, Agee, Morris, O'Brien, Irwin, Reeves, and Robertson.

In the Missouri Brigade were killed or mortally wounded Maj. W. F. Carter and O. A. Waddell, Capts. A. J. Byrne, A. C. Patton, John S. Holland, Lieuts. Thomas S. Shelly, Joel F. Yancey, G. R. Elliott, R. J. Lamb, G. T. Duvall, and W. H. Dunnica, and Ensign H. W. De Jarnette—men who had behaved well and nobly during the whole campaign.

Among the wounded are Maj. R. J. Williams, Capts. Thompson Alvord, G. McChristian, G. W. Covell, and A. F. Burns, Lieuts. Joseph Boyce, Silas H. F. Hornback, J. L. Mitchell, A. H. Todd, and H. Y. Anderson, and Ensign William A. Byrd.

I have named the killed and wounded officers in this report. The names of the private soldiers who fell or were wounded will also be filed with this as soon as they are received. It is due to the dead, it is just to the living, that they who have no hopes of being heralded by fame, and who have but little incentive except the love of country and the consciousness of a just cause to impel them to deeds of daring, and who have shed their blood for a just cause, should have this little tribute paid them by me, whose joy it was to be with them.

For the noble dead the army mourns, a nation mourns. For the living, honor and respect will await them wherever they shall be known, as faithful soldiers, who, for their dearest rights, have so often gone through the fires of battle and the baptism of blood. It would perhaps be an invidious distinction to name individual officers or men for marked or special services or distinguished gallantry where all behaved so well, for earth never yielded to the tread of nobler soldiers.

I am indebted to Gens. Cockrell, Sears, and Young for bravery, skill, and unflinching firmness.

To Col. Earp, on whom the command of the gallant Texans devolved, and to Col. Andrews, who commanded on the south side, and Maj. Myrick, commanding the artillery, I return thanks for services. Maj. D. W. Sanders, assistant adjutant general, Lieut. Wiley Abercrombie, aid, Capt. W. H. Cain, volunteer aid, Capt. Porter and Lieut. Mosby, engineers, were

zealous in the performance of their duties, and E. T. Freeman, assistant inspector general, was conspicuous for his gallant conduct. I commend the last-named to the government for promotion.

Col. E. Gates, First and Third Missouri, Maj. E. H. Hampton, Twenty-Ninth North Carolina, and W. J. Sparks, Tenth Texas, and Lieut. Cahal, of Gen. Stewart's staff, are named for gallant services.

Lieut. M. W. Armstrong, Tenth Texas, seized the United States standard from the Federals, and after a struggle brought it and the bearer of it off in triumph.

In the inclosed reports of brigade commanders will be found the names of many officers and soldiers that I know are entitled to commendation and all marks of distinction that the government can award.

The cavalry officer who was sent to cut the railroad (early in the afternoon of the 4th) and failed to perform that duty is, in my opinion, much to blame. Had he taken up the rails (and there was nothing to prevent it), reinforcements could not have been thrown in the works, and the result would have been different. After events showed that a cavalry force and *Corse's other brigade arrived just three hours after we left Allatoona*, and reinforced the garrison in the fort.

Very respectfully submitted.

S. G. FRENCH,

*Major General Commanding.*

You have now my official report of the battle of Allatoona as it was written soon after the event, and I will say here that, had I known it would have been so incorrectly reported by Gen. Corse, it would have embraced much matter of detail elucidating what occurred. I shall now proceed to copy some part of Gen. Corse's report, after which its errors will be pointed out as substantiated by facts not then known, and some that were not regarded. So, with my report, unintentional errors have been made known, as shown by subsequent information.

GEN. CORSE'S REPORT.

I directed Col. Rowett to hold the spur on which the Thirty-Ninth Iowa and the Seventh Illinois were formed, . . . and taking two companies of the Ninety-Third Illinois down a spur parallel with the railroad and along the bank of the cut, so disposed them as to hold the north side as long as possible. Three companies of the Ninety-Third, which had been driven from the west end of the ridge, were distributed in the ditch south of the redoubt, with instructions to keep the town well covered by their fire, and to watch the depot where the rations were stored. The remaining battalion of the Ninety-Third, under Maj. Fisher, lay between the redoubt and Rowett's line, ready to reinforce wherever most needed.

I had barely issued the orders when the storm broke in all its fury on the Thirty-Ninth Iowa and the Seventh Illinois. Young's Brigade of Texans had gained the west end of the ridge, and moved with great impetu-

ity along its crest till they struck Rowett's command, when they received a severe check, but, undaunted, came again and again. Rowett, reinforced by the gallant Redfield, encouraged me to hope that we were safe here, when I observed Gen. Sears's Brigade moving from the north, its left extending across the railroad (opposite Tourtellotte). I rushed to the two companies of the Ninety-Third Illinois, which were on the brink of the crest running north from the redoubt, they having been reinforced by the retreating pickets, and urged them to hold on to the spur; but it was of no avail; the enemy's line of battle swept us back like so much chaff, and struck the Thirty-Ninth Iowa in flank, threatening to engulf our little band without further ado. Fortunately for us, Col. Tourtellotte's fire caught Sears in flank, and broke him so badly as to enable me to get a staff officer over the cut with orders to bring the Fiftieth Illinois over to reinforce Rowett, who had lost very heavily. However, before the regiment sent for could arrive, Sears and Young both rallied, and made their assaults in front and on the flank with so much vigor and in such force as to break Rowett's line, and had not the Thirty-Ninth Iowa fought with the desperation it did, I never should have been able to get a man back inside the redoubt; as it was, their hand-to-hand conflict broke the enemy to that extent that he must stop and re-form before undertaking the assault on the fort. Under cover of the blows they gave the enemy the Seventh and Ninety-Third Illinois, and what remained of the Thirty-Ninth Iowa, fell back into the fort.

The fighting up to this time, about 11 A.M., was of the most extraordinary character. Attacked from the north, from the west, and from the south, these three regiments (the Thirty-Ninth Iowa and the Seventh and Ninety-Third Illinois) held Young's and a portion of Sears's and Cockrell's Brigades at bay for nearly two hours and a half. The gallant Col. Redfield, of the Thirty-Ninth Iowa, fell shot in four places, and the extraordinary valor of the men and officers of this regiment and the Seventh Illinois saved to us Allatoona.

So completely disorganized were the enemy that no regular assault could be made on the fort till I had the trenches all filled and the parapets lined with men. The Twelfth and Fiftieth Illinois, arriving from the east hill, enabled us to occupy every foot of trench, and keep up a line of fire that, as long as our ammunition lasted, would render our little fort impregnable. The broken pieces of the enemy enabled them to fill every hollow, and take every advantage of the rough ground surrounding the fort, filling every hole and trench, seeking shelter behind every stump and log that lay within musket range of the fort. We received their fire from the north, south, and west of the redoubt, completely enflading our ditches and rendering it almost impracticable for a man to expose his person above the parapet. An effort was made to carry our works by assault; but the battery (Twelfth Missouri) was so ably manned, and so gallantly fought, as to render it impossible for a column to live within a hundred yards of the work. Officers labored constantly to stimulate the men to expose themselves above the parapet, and nobly set them the example.

The enemy kept a constant and intense fire, gradually closing around

us, and rapidly filling our little fort with the dead and dying. About 1 P.M. I was wounded by a rifle ball that rendered me insensible for some thirty or forty minutes, but managed to rally on hearing some persons cry "Cease firing!" which conveyed to me the impression that they were trying to surrender the fort.

Again I urged my staff, the few officers unhurt, and the men around me to renewed exertions, *assuring them that Sherman would soon be here with reinforcements.* The gallant fellows struggled to keep their heads above the ditch and parapets in the face of the murderous fire of the enemy now concentrated upon us. The artillery was silent, and a brave fellow, whose name I regret having forgotten, volunteered to cross the railway cut, which was under fire of the enemy, and go to the fort on the east hill to procure ammunition. Having executed his mission successfully, he returned in a short time with an arm load of canister and case shot. About 2:30 P.M. the enemy were observed massing a force behind a small house and the ridge on which the house was located, distant northwest from the fort about one hundred and fifty yards. The dead and wounded were moved aside so as to enable us to move a piece of artillery to an embrasure commanding the house and ridge. A few shots from the gun threw the enemy's column into great confusion, which, being observed by our men, caused them to rush to the parapet and open such a fire that it was impossible for the enemy to rally. From this time until near 4 P.M. we had the advantage of the enemy, and maintained it with such success that they were driven from every position, and finally fled in great confusion, leaving their dead and wounded, and our little garrison in possession of the field. [See War Records.]

The above extracts from *Gen. Corse's report* are taken from an address made by Col. William Ludlow, United States army, to the Michigan Commandery, at Detroit, April 2, 1891, and I desire it to be borne in mind that he is a graduate of the Military Academy and was with Gen. Corse at Allatoona during the battle, for I shall have cause to refer to his address after a while.

There have been so many erroneous accounts given to the public of this battle, impugning of motives, *guessing* at the controlling objects that influence action, falsifying of numbers, glorifying dispatches, and complimentary orders, that won the admiration even of a Confederate lieutenant general, that I purpose, as well as I am able, to give an impartial account of it.

To do justice to the troops engaged on either side in the conflict, it will be necessary: 1. To have a knowledge of the ground or topography of the field of action. 2. The strength of the fortifications, and the time and labor bestowed on them. 3. The strength of the respective forces. 4. The ratio of inequality between men in strong fortifications and men attacking from with-

out, immediately on arrival. 5. The inspiring inducement to the garrison *not to surrender* when relief is at hand; and the advantage to be gained, if successful, compared with the risk of remaining after ascertaining that the enemy was converging on the place from every point.

1. If an examination of this topographical map be made in connection with the photographic views of the railroad cut, the star fort, and the view from the sally port, it will give you an idea of the rough mountain spurs over which we had to pass.

2. These forts and redoubts were built by a distinguished engineer in the United States army, and, with their mutual defensive relation the one to the other, form a remarkably strong line of fortifications on every side. Sherman wrote to Gen. Blair, June 1, 1864, "Order the brigade left at Allatoona to be provided with tools, and to intrench both ends of the pass very strong," and frequently he speaks of Allatoona as a "natural fortress," etc.

Beginning at the east, we have a fort about fifty feet in diameter in the interior (marked "T" on the map), near three hundred yards east of the railroad, with a deep ditch around it. Walls twelve feet thick, and having embrasures for artillery, for which it was mainly designed. This fort was connected with a line of heavy intrenchments extending to the railroad cut, and along the cut to defend the star fort "C" by a flank fire, and also the redoubt "R." Again, there are intrenchments on the east side of the railroad near the depot that sweep with a flank fire the south front of the star fort "C," the Cartersville road, depot, etc. There was also protection given by inundating the country north by a dam across the creek.

Crossing the railroad to the west, on the summit of the ridge and on the verge of the deep cut, you will find the star fort "C" surrounded by a wide ditch six feet deep. The interior is seventy-five feet in diameter, and has eight embrasures for large guns. It dominates, from its elevation, all the surrounding country, and commands the approach in every direction, completely sweeping the ridge both east and west, protecting the redoubt "R" from any force attacking it. The Cartersville road passes under the muzzle of its guns, and then runs west on the ridge, through redoubt "R."

The two forts, "T" and "C," are interior isolated works for