

brought to lay aside the vanity of retaining large possessions. The cession of such a disjointed part of the Republic as California, would be an advantage. In no case can it ever be profitable to the Mexican Republic, nor can it possibly remain united to it for any length of time. Therefore, by giving up this territory for the debt, would be getting rid of this last for nothing. \* \* \*

If California were ceded for the English debt, the creditors might be formed into a Company, with the difference, that they should have a sort of sovereignty over the territory—somewhat in the manner of the East India Company. This, in my opinion, would certainly bring a revenue in time which might be equal to the debt; and, under good management and with an English population, would most certainly realize all that has been predicted of this fine country."

Now, may not this sudden usurpation of the Sandwich Islands be a premonitory symptom—a step in advance to a movement upon Mexico? Look, for a moment, at the map of the world. England already has control of the Eastern part of Asia; is looking toward her possessions of the Hudson Bay Company, and is evidently excited by our Senatorial harangues on the Oregon Territory. Her rival, Russia, has encroached on the Californias by a settlement at Bodega, and is known to have attempted to procure the cession of an upland tract in the Hawaiian Islands, under the pretence of a desire "for soil to cultivate wheat." France has the Marquesas. We are prosecuting our claims on the North Western Territory. England requires a central rendezvous for her fleets in the Pacific, and she seizes the Sandwich Islands. They are in the direct line of trade from the West Coast to China. Mexico owes Great Britain an enormous debt which she is unable to pay. A project is on foot to cross the Isthmus of Panama by a railway or canal. Steam navigation has already been introduced into the Pacific, and we all know how rapidly the facilities were advanced within a few years to reach India through the Red Sea.

Now I confess to you, that, combining all these circumstances—the value of the Islands and the Main, the greediness of England, the manner in which she is pushing her Empire all over the world—I cannot but see danger in the sudden attempted seizure of the Hawaiian group, and think it time that the statesmen of our country should take a decided stand in the politics of this hemisphere.

I think I have shown the importance of these Islands to our commerce, and the value of the Californias, both as a country of vast natural resources, and as a territory which, in the hands of a European Power, would become a central point, whence it might powerfully influence the future destinies of this Continent.

"The Pacific Coast of Spanish America," says the author I have already quoted, "is, in uninterrupted extent, equal to the whole coast of the Old World from the Naze of Norway to the Cape de Verd in Africa. What reflections must this give rise to, when we consider that this line of coast comprehends Denmark, Germany, Holland, the Netherlands, Great Britain, France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, the countries around the Mediterranean, and part of Africa? And certainly the American shores are bounded by countries, naturally more rich than all these ancient and powerful countries united."

It seems, then, that the true wisdom of our Government should be directed toward the preservation of this immense territory intact, and under the growing influence of Republican systems. A wrong step in statesmanship in our day and generation, may involve us in all the foreign difficulties and questions of the "balance of power," and affect the fate of our hemisphere for centuries to come. But, under any circumstances, let it be our care to keep sacred the soil of our

immediate neighbor in the hour of her weakness, and to protect the Islands that have been founded and raised to national dignity and importance, by American zeal and American enterprise. It is our pecuniary and our political interest to do so.

## THE ENCROACHMENTS OF ENGLAND.

No one who has been in the least attentive to the diplomatic negotiations of our country, can fail to know, that the question of total political separation between this Continent and Europe, is one of no recent date.

When the revolutions of the Southern Republics were in some degree quieted, and it became evident, after the battle of Ayacucho, that the dominion of Spain must cease entirely over her American colonies, the Government of the United States hastened to interfere, by her ministers abroad, in behalf of the independence of the revolted provinces. It did so, in order to prevent the useless effusion of blood, and to produce a pacification of this hemisphere, under which the commercial interests of our Union might be fostered, and the people of the newly emancipated regions take their place among the enlightened nations of the world. In these negotiations with the European powers, both Mr. Adams and Mr. Clay produced some of the ablest state papers that adorn the archives of our Department; and it would be well to refer to them, at the present period, when the encroachments of England, on the flimsiest prettexts, are again beginning to be visible all over the world, while she is extending her sway, not only for the peaceful purposes of her commerce, but for empire and territory. The foundation of the *exclusive* system of our country, has been laid "in principles of morals and politics new and distasteful to the thrones and dominations of the Old World;" and they are now, most probably, seeking with slow and secret advance, to regain, by gradual and unheeded progress, what the political ferments of Europe, at an earlier period, forced them to abandon.

In the summer of 1825, a large French fleet visited the American seas and the coast of the United States. The purpose of this armament was unknown. But the watchful statesmen of those days regarded a visit of that character with jealous eyes; and the Minister of the United States at the Court of Paris was immediately directed by Mr. Clay, to inform the Cabinet to which he was accredited, that any such movements, made in time of peace, ought hereafter to be notified to us. Mr. Brown was instructed, at the same time, to call the attention of the French Government to the condition of the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico; and it was distinctly intimated, that inasmuch as we were altogether contented with the present ownership of these possessions, "we could not consent to their occupation by another European power than Spain, under any contingency whatever." A similar communication was made about the same time to Mr. Canning; and it is known that these frank and amicable representations were heedfully respected by the Governments both of England and France. The real purposes of the French fleet of 1825 are still utterly unknown; but the idea that its object was the occupation of Cuba and Porto Rico gained considerable ground, from the current rumor of the day, the weakness of Spain, the revolted condition of her provinces, the intimate alliance between that monarchy and France, and "the disproportionate extent of the armament to any *ordinary* purposes of peaceful commerce."



It is also known, from the interviews between Mr. Middleton and Count Nesselrode, at St. Petersburg, in August, 1825, that the Russian Cabinet had resolved to discountenance every enterprise against these Islands, and thus maintain the only state of things "that could preserve a just balance of power in the Antilles."

President MONROE, in his message to Congress in 1823, most distinctly lays down his ideas of the true policy of the United States in regard to this Continent.

"The citizens of the United States," said he, "cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow men on that (the European) side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European Powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded, or seriously menaced, that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defence. With the movements in this hemisphere, we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the Allied Powers, is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments. And to the defence of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations subsisting between the United States and those Powers, to declare, that we should consider any attempt on their part, to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere, as dangerous to our peace and safety."

"With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their Independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration, and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition, for the purposes of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European Power, in other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between those new Governments and Spain, we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur, which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security."

In March, 1826, Mr. ADAMS, then President of the United States, prepared a very luminous message on the subject of the Panama mission, in which he takes occasion to give a historical account of our relations with the new Republics, and to enforce the doctrines so clearly stated by his predecessor. He deemed the acceptance of an invitation to join in the deliberation of that Congress, as by no means violating the ancient well established policy of our nation by entangling us in dangerous alliances, and he resolved that we should concur in no engagements which would import hostility to Europe, or justly excite resentment in any of her States. "Our views," says he, "would extend no further than to a mutual pledge of the parties to the compact, to maintain the principle in application to its own territory, and to permit no colonial lodgments, or establishments, of European jurisdiction upon its own soil."

It will be perceived, therefore, that two Administrations at the commencement of the national existence of the new Republic, solemnly determined on an unequalled political and colonial separation from all European powers. They were anxious to preserve a state of mutual liberty and independence, and yet it was not deemed expedient to imitate the example of the Old World, by the formation of an American Holy Alliance, in defence of our freedom, as Europe had done in defence of legitimacy and allegiance. It, nevertheless, would seem, that as the great head of the Powers of this Continent, it becomes us *now* to persist in the policy wisely adopted near twenty years ago; and to be warned, in time, of every symptom of approaching danger.

If England extends her power, by gradual advances, from the Balize into Guatemala, (now under Indian rule,) and then into Yucatan, (now in revolt,) she will hold the key of both Americas, by controlling the passage across the Isthmus to the Pacific. If she pushes her claims on Mexico, and grasps the Californias; retains her hold on China, the mouth of the Columbia and Canada;—and, while she continues the possession of the Bermudas, sweeps our Eastern coast by armed war-steamers, masked under the peaceful disguise of West India Mail Packets(!) we will shortly find ourselves as comfortably and securely walled in by British bayonets, as the most loyal of Her Majesty's subjects could well desire.

And yet, all this would be effected by mere supineness on our part, and by neglect of determined firmness, and intimations similar to those of 1825, in regard to the French fleet, and the occupation of Cuba and Porto Rico. If I am answered, that these are dreams and visions of things that *may* occur, but perhaps will not in our day and generation; I reply, by the expression of a hope that the period of time-serving policy is over in our Union, and that the statesmanship of America is not hereafter to be confined by a horizon of four years, or, at most of eight.

If one-half the foresight that is employed in Britain to sustain a population over-taxed, over-worked, and surrounded by institutions far behind the spirit of the age, on a territory of small dimensions, were infused, especially, into the foreign relations of our own country, with its vast domain and happy people, the germ of a thousand ills would be destroyed for the future. If we *begin right* in our national career, we shall not be forced to remedy an accumulation of political errors by subsequent legislation, or, like England, to resort to unnatural stimulants and predatory wars for the purpose of infusing artificial life into a decrepit Empire.

In connection with the subject of our trade and interests in the Pacific, and the proposed junction of the Atlantic and that Ocean by a Canal across the Isthmus of Panama, I take the liberty to insert a very valuable note from Mr. Forbes's "California," relative to Steam Navigation in that Sea.

EXTRACT OF A LETTER TO THE EDITOR ON THE SUBJECT OF STEAM NAVIGATION IN THE PACIFIC, FROM A GENTLEMAN FORMERLY RESIDENT IN ONE OF THE MEXICAN PORTS ON THE PACIFIC.

LONDON, Dec. 20, 1838.

I have taken some pains to make myself acquainted with the grounds on which the "Pacific Steam Navigation Company" is founded, with its proceedings as far



as they have gone, and its prospects as far as I can comprehend them. Of this you may rest assured: that it has already received the patronage of the leading merchants trading to the Pacific; several of them having subscribed with the expressed object of forwarding an undertaking fraught with so many public benefits, while others have entered more largely into it, with the view of participating in the great profit which it promises as an investment. The *general result* given in the 34th page of Mr. Wheelwright's pamphlet, showing 466,950 dollars as the amount of annual receipts on four steamers, costing from 400,000 to 450,000 dollars, and against the same only 236,630 dollars of annual expenditure, whereby the company will realize an annual profit of 230,320 dollars, or (at 48d. exchange) £46,064, is so extraordinarily large, that my first impression was to look upon the project as one hatched by parties connected with our Stock Exchange; but on turning to schedules A. and C., I not only found that the above results were verified by a committee of British merchants residing in Lima, and presided over by Her Majesty's Consul for Peru, but that a note was added, giving reasons to hope for still larger profits, under economical arrangements in the management of the items of expenditure.

It appears that this plan, speculative though it seems, dates its rise from the circular officially issued by Her Majesty's Consul General for Peru, dated Lima, 18th June, 1826, directed to British merchants and residents generally, requesting their attention to dispatches from Her Majesty's Government, promising facilities to carry it into effect, and requesting their active coöperation. No undertaking, therefore, could originate under more respectable auspices; and from inquiries I have made, I have no hesitation in stating that the gentlemen who have taken it up in London are of the utmost respectability, and influenced by the most honorable motives.

The *Author* of "California" has not expressed himself in favor of the extension of this proposed line, from Panama to the Northern Pacific, further than as the reader may construe his remarks in pages 315 to 320. But I feel confident, after viewing the success of steam in the Arabian Gulf and Red Sea, in the Mediterranean, and backward and forward to England, at all seasons of the year; and, above all, in so many safe and expeditious voyages across the Atlantic, that the day is not far distant, when either the directors of the present Pacific Steam Navigation Company, or some new Company, will take up the *Northern line*. The numerous population along the Western coasts of Central America and Mexico, and the rich products of the adjoining provinces in gold, silver, pearls, cochineal, and indigo, ought to afford profitable employment for steamers as far up as the Gulf of California at least; and were emigration ever turning its tide to California, in the way suggested by the author, whether under the direction of Her Majesty's Government, or of a public company, the aid of steam could not fail to be required.

Under the strongest presentiment that these ideas will not lie many years inoperative, I have made calculations of the distances from Panama to the principal northern ports; which I here subjoin, as not without importance in the present inquiry. These calculations do not pretend to be exact to a mile, or to an hour; but they are sufficiently so for our purpose. Nine miles are allowed per hour.

The distances from Panama to San Diego, Monterey, San Francisco, Bodega, and Columbia river are given in two ways; first, by the line of coast, *via Mazatlan*, and second, from Panama direct.

TABLE OF DISTANCES AND HOURS STEAMING FROM PANAMA TO THE FOLLOWING PORTS, VIZ:

| From Panama to                                    |           | Miles. | Hours. |
|---|-----------|--------|--------|
| the Gulf of Nicoya,                               | - - - - - | 435    | 48     |
| the Gulf of Papagayo,                             | - - - - - | 590    | 65.30  |
| Realejo,  | - - - - - | 680    | 75.30  |
| Sonsonate,  | - - - - - | 847    | 94     |
| Yztapa,   | - - - - - | 937    | 104    |
| Socunusco,  | - - - - - | 1095   | 121.30 |
| Tehuantepec,                                      | - - - - - | 1210   | 134.30 |
| Acapulco,   | - - - - - | 1495   | 166    |
| Navidad,  | - - - - - | 1810   | 201    |
| San Blas,   | - - - - - | 1962   | 218    |
| Mazatlan,   | - - - - - | 2091   | 232    |
| Guaymas,  | - - - - - | 2448   | 272    |
| Rio Gila, where it joins the Colorado,            | - - - - - | 2793   | 310    |
| San Diego, { via Mazatlan                         | - - - - - | 3016   | 335    |
| { direct from Panama,                             | - - - - - | 2760   | 306.30 |
| Monterey, { via Mazatlan                          | - - - - - | 3376   | 375    |
| { direct,   | - - - - - | 3120   | 346.30 |
| San Francisco, { via Mazatlan                     | - - - - - | 3456   | 384    |
| { direct,   | - - - - - | 3200   | 355.30 |
| Russian Settlement at Port Bodega, { via Mazatlan | - - - - - | 3514   | 390.30 |
| { direct,   | - - - - - | 3258   | 362    |
| the British Settlement at { via Mazatlan          | - - - - - | 4034   | 448    |
| Columbia River, { direct,                         | - - - - - | 3570   | 385.30 |
| Behring's Straits, via Columbia River,            | - - - - - | 5970   | 663    |
| Woahoo, Sandwich Islands,                         | - - - - - | 4620   | 513    |
| St. Peter and St. Paul, Kamschatka, via Woahoo,   | - - - - - | 7380   | 820    |
| Jedo, in Japan, via Woahoo,                       | - - - - - | 7950   | 883    |
| Canton, via Woahoo,                               | - - - - - | 9540   | 1060   |

In the above table, the distance to Behring's Straits and the ports that follow, is given to satisfy the reader's curiosity, and not with a view to any practical utility, in the way of Steam Navigation, unless greatly improved and cheapened. It is not impossible that chemists may discover some new power, equal to steam, and producible at less expense, or that our engineers may invent some mechanical mode of propulsion for vessels, rendering the Isthmus of Panama the most direct and expeditious route, not only to these ports, but to *Manila* and the whole Eastern Archipelago.

It will be seen from this table, that the British settlement\* on the Columbia river might be reached from Panama, by steam, in nineteen days, or say about forty days from England. By the same route, the important port of San Francisco might be reached in sixteen days from Panama, or thirty-six from England; and the Russian settlement at La Bodega, in about six hours longer time. What a change in our communications, when the nearest Russian settlement on the west coast of America, will be brought within thirty-six days and six hours steaming, from our own shores; when even St. Peter and St. Paul, in Kamschatka, will be within fifty days, steaming; Jedo, within fifty-seven; Canton, within sixty-four, and Woahoo, in the Sandwich Islands, within forty-two days! Such are the wonderful results, that sooner or later may be expected from the mere power of steam, (improved and cheapened, as it may be, by fresh discoveries,) and the resumption of the *old* line of communication between Europe and the Pacific, via Chagres and Panama.

\* I call it *British*, believing we have not yet relinquished its *Northern bank*.