

CHAPTER X.

THE ARMY AND NAVY OF MEXICO.

THE MILITARY IN MEXICO BEFORE AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION —
CONFIRMATION OF ARMY — ITS POLITICAL USE. — CHARACTER OF
MEXICAN SOLDIERS — RECRUITING — TACTICS — OFFICERS. — DRA-
MATIC CHARACTER OF ARMY — RECRIMINATIONS. — CONDITION OF
THE ARMY AT THE PEACE. — ARMY ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER —
MILITARY COLONIES. — CHARACTER OF THE TRIBES. — FORTRESSES
— PEROTE — ACAPULCO — SAN JUAN DE ULUA. — REORGANIZATION
OF THE ARMY — TABULAR VIEW OF MEN AND MATERIEL. — NAVY —
EXTENT OF COAST ON BOTH SEAS. — NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT — VES-
SELS AND OFFICERS. — EXPENSES OF WAR AND NAVY.

We have already alluded, in the historical portion of this work to some of the fostering sources of the Mexican army and to the evil results its importance has produced in the country. The colonial forces designed for the maintenance of order and due subjection in New Spain, were chiefly sent from the old world until the wars in Europe required the mother country to hoard its military resources. These foreign stipendiaries for a long time sufficed to secure the loyalty of the emigrants; but as the country grew in importance and numbers, and as the Indians revolted against their task-masters, it became necessary from time to time to call out reinforcements from the colonists; and when foreign invasion was dreaded, these levies, as we have seen, were largely augmented from all parts of the viceroyalty.

The idea of military service was, accordingly, not altogether unfamiliar to the Mexican mind when the first insurrectionary movements occurred under the lead of Hidalgo; but when the violent outbreak threatened to degenerate into a war of *castes*, and to array the Indians against all in whose veins circulated Castilian blood, it became the duty of the settlers to cultivate that spirit and discipline which would, at least, preserve them from utter destruction. The succeeding war of independence converted the whole country for eleven years into a camp, and when the strife terminated in success, it was found that a people, whose natural temperament addicted them to military spectacles, had become habituated and enured to a military career.

When the war was over and the power of Spain effectually broken, the contest was transferred from a foreign enemy to domes-

tic foes. Men who had been accustomed for so long a period to military rule did not immediately acquire the habit of self-government. National police required a national army. Officers who had distinguished themselves in an epoch when laws were silent and the only authorities recognized wore the insignia of military life, did not forsake willingly the power they enjoyed. Indeed, they were the only authentic personages capable of enforcing obedience; and their adherents were soon armed against each other in all the contentions for political position which vexed the republic during the dawn of its national existence. Civil wars became habitual. An army was an element of strength and success which no military chieftain thought proper to crush. Rallying his disciplined partizans, as long as his friends or his fortune supplied their support, he was ready at a moment to take the field either for the maintenance of a leader's cause or to secure his own elevation. Nor was this mode of life disagreeable to the body of the army and inferior officers who were lodged and fed at the public expense during a period when it was difficult to find easy or agreeable civil employments in the distracted realm. Each petty subaltern and even every common soldier, clad in the livery of the state and carrying arms, was regarded by the unshod *leperos* and homeless vagrants as a personage of superior position; and thus, whilst the army became at that epoch popular with the people it had liberated from Spanish bondage, it ripened into a necessity of the aspiring politicians who craved a speedier access to power than by the slow and toilsome process of a republican canvass. The state, itself, perceiving these manifold causes of military favor, utility, and supposed need, preserved the army from all assaults by patriotic congressmen, and thus the greatest curse and burthen of the nation, — the origin and means of all its woes and all its despots, — was, from the first, riveted to the body politic of Mexico.

It must not be supposed, however, that in speaking of the Mexican army we design to compare it, either in detail or as an organized body, with the troops of this country or of Europe. Neither in the mass of its *materiel*, nor in its officers, does it vie with the trained and disciplined forces of other civilized countries. Soldiers in Mexico are rather actors in a political drama, — dressed and decorated for imposing display, — than efficient warriors whose instruction and power make them irresistible in the field. In all the engagements, or attempts to engage, which occurred in Mexico since the termination of the war of independence, there has been a laudable desire, at least among the troops, to avoid the shedding of

blood. Cities have been besieged and bombarded; magnificent arrays of forces have been made on adjacent fields; large camps have been formed and held in readiness; cannons, loaded with cannister and grape, have been discharged along the crowded highways of towns; marksmen have been placed in towers, steeples, and *azoteas*, to pick off unwary passengers; divisions have been reviewed and manœuvred in sight of each other, but, in all these revolts or *pronunciamientos*, no pitched battles were fought which actually terminated the contest by the gun and sword. The aspirant chief, or the hero he designed to displace, managed to secure the *majority* of the neighboring military forces, and as soon as the fact was unequivocally ascertained, the one who was in the *minority* fled from the scene without provoking a trial by battle. In 1840, 1841, and 1844, during the administrations of Bustamante and Santa Anna, there were various exhibitions of these sham contests; but, in all of them, we have reason to believe that the innocent non-combatant people were the greatest sufferers, and that the army escaped comparatively unscathed.

These observations are not designed to impugn the military nerve or spirit of the Mexicans, for the war with the United States and the war of their revolution, demonstrated that they unite both in quite an eminent degree. Our officers believe that the Mexican possesses the elements of a good soldier, but that he is neither trained, disciplined, nor led, so as to make him a dangerous foe. This is demonstrated by the result of the recent war and of every action fought during it. A brave show and a bold assault were not stubbornly followed up with pertinacious resolution, in spite of all resistance. The Mexicans were fighting on their own soil, for their own country, against a hated foe, yet they failed in every conflict, and with every conceivable disparity of numbers.

The great body of the army is of course composed either of Indians or mixed breeds, and the idea of nationality in its high love of a loveable country, does not in all probability, animate or inspire these classes in the hour of danger. They did not fight with a common or an understood purpose. They were rather forced mercenaries than patriots. It was not a war of enthusiasm. Every effort was made by grandiloquent proclamations and false allegations to rally and nerve them; but whenever they crossed arms with our forces, if they failed in the onset, like lions foiled in their spring, they retreated to their lair. Nevertheless, throughout the contest, there were repeated instances of courage, constancy, endurance, and persistence which satisfied our officers that under a differ-

ent system of education and command, the Mexicans would make excellent soldiers. Their horsemen, probably the best riders on the continent, paid more attention to the management of their animals than to the use of their horse's force in the charge; while their infantry and artillery avoided those close quarters which make the bayonet so powerful a weapon when directed by intrepid, unquailing arms in the presence and under the lead of unflinching company officers. Their lancers did more damage to dismounted victims than to erect and fighting foes.

With the majority of the rank and file, the army is, in all likelihood, not a profession of choice. Enlistment is now scarcely ever voluntary. When men are required for a new regiment or to fill companies thinned by death or desertion, a sergeant is despatched with his guard to recruit among the Indians and *peons* of the neighborhood. The subaltern probably finds these individuals laboring in the fields, and without even the formality of a request, selects the best men from the group and orders them into the ranks. If they resist or attempt to escape, they are immediately *lazo'd*, and, at nightfall the gang is marched, bound in pairs, to the nearest barrack, where the wretched victims of military oppression are pursued by a mournful procession of wives and children who henceforth follow their husbands or parents during the whole period of service. From the hands of the recruiting sergeant the conscript passes into those of the drill sergeant. The chief duty of this personage is to teach him to march, countermarch, and to handle an unserviceable weapon. From the drill sergeant he succeeds to the company officer, and here, perhaps, he encounters the worst foe of his ultimate efficiency.

Officers in Mexico have no thorough military and scientific education. There is a military school at Chapultepec, near the capital, but it has never been carefully and completely organized, nor has it furnished many men who have distinguished themselves in the field. The politicians, relying on the dramatic power of the army, made that army the means of reward and influence in civil life, by selecting its officers of all grades from every employment or occupation. Merchants, tradespeople, professional men, children of wealthy or ambitious families, all attained rank in the army by this unwise means, and the consequence has been that the majority of company, and perhaps even of field officers, was rather fitted to display the magnificent uniforms to which their grades entitle them than to discipline the rank and file when organized in battalions, regiments and divisions.

The picturesque and scenic efficiency of such an army will be easily admitted, and the causes of its failure in the late war will be quite as easily understood. What can be more deplorable in battle, even for the victors, than to behold an undisciplined man badly led or driven into conflict? What can be more disastrous for an officer than to stand in the midst of blood and carnage, without knowing what to do in the moment of trial when knowledge and presence of mind are imperatively needed? Can it be surprising, therefore, to observe that the columns of Mexican gazettes and pages of Mexican pamphlets published during the war, are filled with the basest crimination and recrimination or the lamest attempts at exculpation from disgraceful defeat?

A writer in the *Monitor Republicano*, speaking of the Mexican army, says, you have nothing to do but to read the writings of its generals from the commencement of the campaign, through the different actions and skirmishes in chronological order, and it will be seen that they have mutually called one another traitors, cowards, and imbeciles. He gives the following list of recriminations:—“Arista accused Torrejon, Ampudia and others; Torrejon Ampudia, while Uraga charged Arista; Jarregui accused Carrasco and various chiefs; Carrasco accused Jarregui and other generals; Mejia brought charges against Ampudia; Ampudia against him and several leaders, as Carrasco, Enciso and others, principal officers of the army. Urrea and others charged Parrodi with cowardice and treason; Parrodi accused Urrea and Romero, and Romero accused the famous Miramon of Mazatlan, the speculator in the goods taken by the troops of Urrea from those of Gen. Taylor.

Requena accused Santa Anna; Santa Anna in his turn, Requena; Torrejon and Juvera recriminate Requena; Requena, in his turn, Torrejon, Juvera and Portilla. Santa Anna accused Miñon; Miñon accused Santa Anna and his confederates. Santa Anna brought charges against Valencia, in Ciudad Victoria; Valencia in his turn, accused Santa Anna. Viscayno accused Heredia and Garcia Conde; these in turn, Viscayno. Santa Anna recriminates against Canalizo, Uraga and others at Cerro Gordo; Canalizo, Uraga, Gaona and others against Santa Anna. Santa Anna again accuses Valencia in Padierna; Valencia accuses Santa Anna, Salas and others, and Salas accuses Valencia, Torrejon and others. Santa Anna, in the first actions in the valley, accuses everybody; he accuses Rincon, Anaya, and the National Guard at Churubusco; in the other actions of September, Terrés, Bravo and others. Bravo, Terrés and others in turn, recriminate Santa Anna, Perdigon and

Simeon Ramirez. Perdigon accuses Simeon Ramirez and Terrés himself. Alvarez accuses Don Manuel Andrade, and Andrade in turn accuses him. Alcorta accuses the Andrade of the hussars, while he accuses Alcorta;—and in fine, we have before us the letters and despatches of the whole of them—we have before us their actions and skirmishes, from the battle of San Jacinto up to the ignominious capture of Gaona and Torrejon by the Poblano robber, Dominguez.”

We have quoted these passages, to prove, by Mexican authority, that our remarks upon the army are not made in a captious spirit or with a desire to undervalue its officers ungenerously.

Bad as had been the organization and conduct of the army, they were not, of course, improved by the results of the war. The *morale* and the *materiel* were both destroyed, so that when our troops withdrew during the summer of 1848, little more than a skeleton of the regiments remained to preserve order. This was, indeed, one of the greatest sources of dread to orderly Mexicans, for they feared that when all foreign restraint was suddenly removed, the country would be given up to anarchy. Without men and without means, the government justly apprehended the uprising of the mob, nor were there demagogues wanting to excite the evil passions of the masses by an outcry against the treaty. At the head of this disgraceful movement was General Paredes, who had returned from exile, but had not been trusted by the government during the conflict. The payment of the first instalment of the sum agreed upon in the treaty, however, enabled the authorities to maintain tranquillity, and as soon as comparative order was enforced by a new administration, the army was reorganized under a law passed on the 4th of November, 1848. By this act, the military establishment was greatly reduced, even on paper, and, in 1849, not more than five thousand two hundred, rank and file, were in actual service.

If there were, in reality, no need of an army in Mexico to oppose a foreign enemy, or, to preserve domestic peace, one would still be required to secure the Northern Frontier against the incursions of Indians. From the earliest periods, the Spaniards were vexed by their savage assaults, and, since the establishment of independence, the Mexicans have every year seen their people and property carried off by the robber tribes, whilst their villages, *ranchos* and *haciendas* were totally destroyed or partially ravaged.

Mexican engineers have calculated that the new boundary line, following the course of the Rio Grande and the Gila and including

a mathematical line of seventy leagues between these streams, is six hundred and forty-six leagues or about nineteen hundred miles in length. Three-fourths of this line pass through an uninhabited region, and, consequently, the savages have free access across it to the few and small settlements on the border. Such an extent of frontier, though considerably reduced from the former line anterior to the treaty, became at once an object of concern to the government, especially as the people of the United States immediately opened communications through the Indian country with the Pacific, and would probably soon control the important passes through the whole region north of the boundary. Accordingly on the 20th of July, 1848, it was decreed that eighteen MILITARY COLONIES should be created, and placed within easy communication, so as to protect the southern settlers in some degree, or to encounter and punish the savages in their forays. The greater portions of the most warlike tribes were transferred by the treaty to the United States, and, by one of its articles, we bound ourselves to aid, at least, in saving the Mexicans from their plunder if we could not totally destroy their inimical power. In the neighborhood of the boundary, from near the mouth of the Gila to the commencement of the mathematical line, before alluded to, we find the tribes known as Coyotes, Mimbrenos and Gileños, the former of whom wage war against Sonora, whilst the latter attack Chihuahua. The Apaches and Cumanches spread their numerous hordes from the vicinity of Chihuahua to the sources of the Nueces, twenty-five leagues beyond the Rio Grande. Besides these, there are, throughout this district many savage bands, supporting themselves entirely by the chase, and it is probable, according to the opinion of soldiers and captives, who have been among the tribes, that all these clans can unite thirty thousand warriors, whilst they still leave a sufficient number to protect their wigwams and villages.

Fortunately for the white races, these barbarians are not able to maintain peace among themselves. The Apaches and Cumanches are in continual strife, and never return from the "war path" without serious losses. It is not to be feared, therefore, that they will voluntarily join in a general rising against our pioneers; yet a common danger, or a common attack, might soon cement their hatred against the supposed usurper, and, directed by a man of capacity, produce even a more disastrous war than that with the Seminoles of Florida.

The Cumanches are numerous and active. They are divided

into Caihuas, Yamparicas, and Llaneros. The Apaches are braver than the Cumanches, and are known as Meselaros and Lipanes. These barbarians arm themselves with guns, rifles, lances, bows and arrows. They manage their weapons admirably, are agile horsemen, and shoot with unerring aim. Tall and majestic in figure; muscular and capable of enduring fatigue; accustomed to live on the simplest food of the forest and to win it when necessary by the arrow alone; uniting the sagacity of men with the instinct of animals, these knights of the southern wilderness realize perfectly our ideas of the daring aborigines who peopled this continent before it was subdued by the white man. Their hatred of the Mexicans and the savage fury with which they pursue their male captives of adult age, appear to denote even a stronger, if not a worthier motive than robbery in their attacks. At least six hundred women and children are borne off by them every year from the settlements to their mountain fastnesses, and they openly confess that they are not unwilling to improve their race by mingling it with the white.

In order to maintain the southern frontier intact from these savages, Mexico designs the establishment of these military colonies, and will, in all probability, support them by a second or rear line of troops from the regular army as well as by forts and strongholds erected in positions affording easy access from the wilderness to inhabited regions. A frontier so open, and thronged with such barbarous hordes, could not be protected by military colonies alone.

The principal FORTRESSES and strongholds of Mexico have hitherto been those of Perote, Acapulco, Uluá, and the citadels at Mexico and Monterey. The present government has ordered the citadel of Mexico, situated a short distance out of the town to be abandoned, as it only formed a nucleus for the assemblage of the military factionists who have constantly disturbed the peace of the republic. The citadel of Monterey is to be maintained and suitably supported.

The castle at Acapulco, an extremely important point on the southern or Pacific coast, is greatly impaired, and will require at least a hundred thousand dollars to adapt it for defence. The fortress of Perote was designed originally by the Spanish government as a depot for the treasure intended for shipment from Vera Cruz, in which the gold and silver would be safer than at an exposed sea port during that dangerous period of Castilian history, when all the nations of Europe were anxious to plunder her colo-

nies. Situated far in the interior of the country and in the midst of a wide plain, it does not absolutely command any of the approaches either from the coast to the inner states, or to the coast from the capital. It is, however, well placed as a military arsenal, and demands an expenditure of about thirty thousand dollars to render it useful to the nation.

The Castle of San Juan de Ulua, built on a reef opposite the town of Vera Cruz, is in so ruinous a state that scarcely a million and a half of dollars will suffice to restore it to its ancient splendor and power. The one hundred and twenty-four guns now within its walls are all more or less injured or dismantled. "To garrison this Castle properly," said General Arista in his report as Minister of War in 1849, "two thousand men will be required at a yearly cost of four hundred thousand dollars. If this immense treasure is squandered on the Castle, it will surely be wasted alone to preserve a vain luxury; for, as Mexico has no hope of becoming a maritime power, San Juan de Ulua must always fall into the possession of such a naval nation whenever it makes war upon us. Experienced Spanish officers have recommended the dismantling of San Juan, and they now urge it more strongly than ever, as there is far greater reason to believe that it neither defends the nation nor even the city of Vera Cruz. The French, and recently the Americans, have convinced us of this fact; the first possessed themselves early of the Castle, and the latter took the town without hindrance from the Castle." Such is the opinion of one of the most experienced Mexican generals in regard to a fortress which has hitherto been deemed impregnable, and, although we do not agree with him in regard to its entire worthlessness in the hands of abler engineers, we doubt whether its use is not greater in checking the city of Vera Cruz itself, than in commanding the approaches to it from the sea. It must be remembered that the lee of this very Castle is the only comparatively safe harbor on the gulf at present, and that until a *mole* or breakwater shall be erected elsewhere, it is only in certain seasons and under favorable circumstances that large bodies of troops may be prudently disembarked on the adjacent shores. The landing of General Scott, in 1847, was singularly fortunate in time and circumstances, for, soon after, a furious norther arose and prevented all communication between the land and the squadron. These violent gales are sudden and terrific in their rise and action at Vera Cruz, and the dreadful havoc they made among the American shipping on the coast during the war, attests the value of a military defence whose protective duties are seconded by the very

spirit of the storm. The introduction of steam power into the national marine must of course greatly modify the character of coast defences; but we would deem it not only unwise but imbecile to abandon altogether a work which at least makes, if it does not perfectly protect, an important harbor. The city of Vera Cruz, itself, is a regular fortification, and with some important improvements and repairs, may not ultimately require San Juan de Ulua to defend it from assault. These two strongholds, combined, under the command of skilful generals and garrisoned with efficient soldiers, would offer a churlish welcome to any modern power either maritime or military. Their seizure, during the winter months of tempest, would be almost impossible, and their occupation, during the summer would be as fatal, as was unfortunately proved by our troops in the June, July, and August, after the brilliant siege and inglorious surrender.

The following tabular sketch prepared from Ministerial reports, exhibits the condition of the Mexican forces at this epoch.

TABULAR VIEW OF THE RE-ORGANIZATION OF THE MEXICAN ARMY
IN 1849.

STAFF OF THE ARMY.		
12 Generals of divisions.	13 Captains.	
34 Brigadier generals.	8 Lieutenants and 2d adjudants.	
4 Colonels.	3 Ensigns.	
5 Lieutenant Colonels.	—	
1 Commandant of battalion.	80 Total.	
ENGINEER CORPS.		
1 Brigadier general.	1 Inspector.	
2 Colonels.	1 Director of hospital.	
4 Lieutenant colonels.	8 Hospital professors.	
8 Captains.	40 Surgeons.	
—	40 1st assistant surgeons.	
15 Total.	40 2d " "	
	30 Apprentices.	
	18 Surgeons for military colonies.	
	2 Ambulance companies.	
MATERIEL OF THE ARMY.		
1 Battalion of sappers, . . .	399 individuals required by law, . . .	In actual service, . . . 220
8 Battalions of infantry, . . .	6000 " " " " . . .	3526
12 Squadrons of cavalry, . . .	1800 " " " " . . .	1911
2 Battalions of artillery, . . .	1800 " " " " . . .	554
	Required by law, 9999	Only in service, 5211

THE ARMY AS REQUIRED BY LAW OF 4TH NOVEMBER, 1848.

- 17 Colonels.
- 16 Lieutenant colonels.
- 11 Commanders of squadrons, battalions and chiefs of division.
- 92 Captains.
- 108 2d adjudants, and lieutenants.
- 176 Sub-adjudants, sub-lieutenants and ensigns.
- 17 Chaplains.
- 133 1st serjeants; tambour majors; armorers; smiths.
- 584 2d serjeants.
- 1124 Corporals.
- 356 Musicians.
- 7954 Privates.
- 32 Wagon masters.
- 196 Drivers.
- 54 Arrieros.

- 1800 Cavalry horses.
- 214 Artillery horses.
- 687 Mules for purposes of traction.
- 422 Pack mules.

TABLE OF MILITIA REQUIRED IN ACTUAL SERVICE BY A DECREE OF 1ST DECEMBER, 1847.

For the battalion of Tampico.	No. on the list.	Of these there are in actual service.
1 Lieutenant colonel,	1	1
1 1st adjutant—a captain,	1	1
1 Chaplain,	1	1
4 Captains,	6	7
5 Lieutenants,	6	7
9 Sub-lieutenants,	12	5
5 1st serjeants,	6	5
16 2d “	24	14
12 Musicians,	18	17
53 Corporals,	78	16
400 Privates,	600	181
486 Total,	726	233

GARRISONS IN THE REPUBLIC. ARTILLERY.

		Guns and mortars.
In Guadalajara,	1	San Juan de Ulua, . . . 124
“ Zacatecas,	2	Perote, . . . 35
“ Jalapa,	4	Acapulco, . . . 22
“ Perote,	1	Vera Cruz, . . . 113
“ Vera Cruz,	2	Monterey,
“ Puebla,	3	Campeche,
“ Mexico,	7	Mazatlan,
“ Queretaro,	1	Mexico, 6
“ Guanajuato,	2	Tabasco, 1
“ S. Fernando de Rosas,	2	Guadalajara, 9
“ Matamoros,	1	San Luis Potosi, 8
“ Tampico,	1	Chiapas, 2
“ San Luis Potosi,	2	Chihuahua,
“ Oajaca,	1	Bustamante’s division, . . . 4
	30	324

Total number of *projectiles*, 52,019.
 The field artillery consists of 16 batteries.

NAVY.

The coast of the republic, now greatly reduced by the treaty of Guadalupe, extends on the Gulf of Mexico, from the Rio Grande or Rio Bravo del Norte, to the port of Bacalar on the east of the peninsula of Yucatan, and comprehends in this distance, about five hundred and eighty-four leagues. The Pacific coast begins one league from San Diego in Lower California, and terminates at the Barra de Ocos in the Gulf of Tehuantepec, a distance of one thousand five hundred and twenty leagues, including the coasts of the Gulf of California, or sea of Cortéz. Consequently the coasts of the republic extend, in all, two thousand one hundred and four leagues, demonstrating the admirable situation of this country for commerce with all the world. The ports which are open for foreign trade in the Mexican Gulf, are Matamoros, Tampico, Vera Cruz Campeché, Sisal, and the island of Carmen; while, on the Pacific, there are the ports of Guayamas, Mazatlan, San Blas, Manzanillo, and Acapulco, the latter of these being the best in the possession of Mexico, on the great western ocean. Its harbor is excellent; its distance from the capital is comparatively short; its population is larger than that of other towns on the coast, and in consequence of the difficulty of landing elsewhere than in the actual port, the government is effectually secured against illicit trade. It is a site

which should unquestionably be protected and fostered, not only on account of the advantages we have mentioned, but because it will become a source of riches to the new state of Guerrero, whose government will contribute to cement the peace and tend to establish the permanent dominion of good order in that quarter.

The navy of all countries originates in their commerce, but Mexico, although situated as we have shown most advantageously for trade, has hitherto possessed but few merchantmen and a small marine. The vessels of war owned by the republic, previous to the conflict with the United States, were either sold, or disarmed, dismantled and laid up, when the nation was menaced with an attack. It was evident to the Mexican cabinet, that the navy could not cope with ours, and in order to prevent its total loss, the few vessels were voluntarily withdrawn from the sea. The officers, however, were generally employed in land duties during the contest, and most of them remained in service until the summer of 1848, when the most efficient were permanently confirmed in their employments, whilst the rest were allowed to retire on unlimited leave.

In considering the actual condition of the national trade and treasury, the government did not believe, on the re-establishment of peace, that it would be justified in creating at once an extensive naval establishment, nevertheless it was convinced that the security of the coasts, the protection of its own small trade, and the interest of its maritime custom houses, rendered the creation of a *flotilla* indispensable. With this view the minister of war and marine recommended in 1849 the naval establishment which is shown in the following table.

NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT OF MEXICO, 1849.

The actual naval force consists at present of 1 schooner only; but the secretary of war recommended, in addition, the construction of:

- | | | | | |
|----------|---|---|---|-------------------------------------|
| VESSELS. | { | 1 steamer mounting | { | 1 swivel 32 paixhan, and 2 short 12 |
| | | 2 cutters suitable for coast service, capable of passing the shallow bars of rivers, of 70 or 75 tons, and carrying 1 swivel 18 pounder, and one 12 pounder each. | | pounders. |
| | | 4 launches of 20 oars, each of which must be capable of carrying an 18 pounder. | | |
| | | | | |

OFFICERS.	In Service.	On Leave
Captains <i>de Navio</i> ,	3	—
“ <i>de Fragata</i> ,	6	3
1st Lieutenant,	1	5
2d “	7	11
1st Midshipmen,	—	4
2d “	—	1
Intendentes,	2	—
Commissaries,	7	—
1° <i>Oficiales</i> ,	4	6
2° “	5	11
3° “	4	7
Clerks,	—	11

EXPENSES OF WAR AND NAVY OF MEXICO, 1849, ESTIMATED BY THE MINISTER.

Ministry of war and navy,	\$55,890.0.06
Supreme tribunal of war,	82,770.7.00
Staff of the army,	133,500.0.00
“ of the president,	10,345.4.00
Headquarters of the army,	50,399.2.06
<i>Commandancias generales and militares</i> ,	234,378.5.00
<i>Detall de plazas</i> ,	10,320.0.00
Engineers, sappers, military college and school,	218,788.5.06
Permanent artillery, political ministry, workmen and baggage train,	670,985.0.00
8 Battalions of permanent infantry,	1,290,567.1.00
1 Battalion of active infantry and 6 companies,	253,109.7.06
12 squadrons of permanent cavalry in 6 corps,	628,886.0.00
Military colonies,	727,572.0.00
Medical staff and ambulance companies,	144,025.4.00
Expenses at San Luis,	5,038.2.00
Invalids,	84,122.7.06
Staffs of the army, divisions and brigades,	43,460.3.00
Officers who by the law of 4th November, 1849, are to receive unlimited leave,	328,644.0.06
Officers on unlimited leave,	292,762.5.10
“ retired,	668,614.1.07
Disbanded troops,	101,283.3.00
Widows, orphans, and pensioners,	403,499.2.06
Rewards for bravery,	15,295.6.07
For military hospitals and extras,	100,000.0.00
For improvement and repair of military barracks,	30,241.0.00
Contract for mules for artillery trains,	34,875.6.00
Extra expenses of war,	500,000.0.00
Expenses of establishment of military colonies,	498,635.4.00
Military commission of statistics,	12,098.0.00
Naval employés, (military and political,)	55,623.7.00
Total expenses war and navy in 1849,	\$7,685.733.6.06