

Landero and Morales, laid down their arms and were paroled, and the American flag was raised over the city which never before had been in the power of an invader.

General Worth was appointed temporary governor of Vera Cruz, from which General Scott at once set out towards Mexico. On the 17th of April he approached the defile of Cerro Gordo, always reputed impregnable, and defended by Santa Anna with twenty thousand men, to oppose whom were twelve thousand Americans.

The following orders and despatch express the events of this day better than any other account or description can, and will place General Scott at the head of the great commanders of the age.

HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY, }
Plain Del Rio, April 17, 1847. }

(General Orders, No. 111.)

The enemy's whole line of intrenchments and batteries will be attacked in front, and at the same time turned early in the day to-morrow—probably before ten o'clock, A. M.

The second (Twiggs's) division of regulars is already advanced within easy turning distance towards the enemy's left. That division has orders to move forward before daylight to-morrow, and take up position across the National Road to the enemy's rear, so as to cut off a retreat towards Jalapa. It may be reinforced to-day, if unexpectedly attacked in force, by regiments—one or two taken from Shields's brigade of volunteers. If not, the two volunteer regiments will march for that purpose at daylight to-morrow morning, under Brigadier-General Shields, who will report to Brigadier-General Twiggs on getting up with him, or the general-in-chief, if he be in advance.

The remaining regiment of that volunteer brigade will receive instructions in the course of this day.

The first division of regulars (Worth's) will follow the movement against the enemy's left at sunrise to-morrow morning.

As already arranged, Brigadier-General Pillow's brigade will march at six o'clock to-morrow morning, along the route he has carefully reconnoitred, and stand ready as soon as he hears the report of arms on our right—sooner, if circumstances should favor him—to pierce the enemy's line of batteries at such point—the nearer the river the better—as he may select. Once in the rear of that line, he will turn to the right or left, or both, and attack the batteries in reverse, or if abandoned, he will pursue the enemy with vigor until further orders.

Wall's field battery and the cavalry will be held in reserve on the National Road, a little out of view and range of the enemy's batteries. They will take up that position at nine o'clock in the morning.

The enemy's batteries being carried or abandoned, all our divisions and corps will pursue with vigor.

This pursuit may be continued many miles, until stopped by darkness or fortified positions towards Jalapa. Consequently, the body of the army will not return to this encampment, but be followed to-morrow afternoon, or early the next morning, by the baggage trains for the several corps. For this purpose, the feebler officers and men of each corps will be left to guard its camp and effects, and to load up the latter in the wagons of the corps.

As soon as it shall be known that the enemy's works have been carried, or that the general pursuit has been commenced, one wagon for each regiment, and one for the cavalry, will follow the movement, to receive, under

the directions of medical officers, the wounded and disabled, who will be brought back to this place for treatment in the general hospital.

The surgeon-general will organize this important service and designate that hospital, as well as the medical officers to be left at that place.

Every man who marches out to attack or pursue the enemy will take the usual allowance of ammunition, and subsistence for at least two days.

By command of Major-General Scott,
H. L. SCOTT, A. A. A. General.

HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Plain del Rio, fifty miles from Vera Cruz,
April 19, 1847. }

SIR: The plan of attack sketched in general orders No. 111, herewith, was finely executed by this gallant army, before two o'clock P. M. yesterday. We are quite embarrassed with the results of victory—prisoners of war, heavy ordnance, field-batteries, small arms, and accoutrements. About three thousand men laid down their arms, with the usual proportion of field and company officers, besides five generals, several of them of great distinction: Pinson, Jarrero, La Vega, Noriega, and Obando. A sixth general, Vasquez, was killed in defending the battery (tower) in the rear of the whole Mexican army, the capture of which gave us those glorious results.

Our loss, though comparatively small in numbers, has been serious. Brigadier-General Shields, a commander of activity, zeal, and talent, is, I fear, if not dead, mortally wounded. He is some miles from me at the moment. The field of operations covered many miles, broken by mountains and deep chasms, and I

have not a report, as yet, from any division or brigade. Twiggs's division, followed by Shields's (now Colonel Baker's) brigade, are now at or near Jalapa, and Worth's division is in route thither, all pursuing, with good results, as I learn, that part of the Mexican army—perhaps 6000 or 7000 men—who fled before our right had carried the tower, and gained the Jalapa road. Pillow's brigade, alone, is near me, at this depot of wounded, sick, and prisoners, and I have time only to give from him the names of 1st Lieutenant F. B. Nelson, and 2d C. C. Gill, both of the 2d Tennessee foot (Haskell's regiment), among the killed, and in the brigade 106, of all ranks, killed or wounded. Among the latter, the gallant brigadier himself has a smart wound in the arm, but not disabled, and Major R. Farqueson, 2d Tennessee; Captain H. F. Murray, 2d Lieutenant G. T. Sutherland, 1st Lieutenant W. P. Hale (adjutant), all of the same regiment, severely, and 1st Lieutenant W. Yearwood, mortally wounded. And I know, from personal observation on the ground, that 1st Lieutenant Ewell, of the rifles, if not now dead, was mortally wounded, in entering, sword in hand, the intrenchments around the captured tower. Second Lieutenant Derby, Topographical Engineers, I also saw, at the same place, severely wounded, and Captain Patton, 2d United States infantry, lost his right hand.

Major Sumner, 2d United States dragoons, was slightly wounded the day before, and Captain Johnston, Topographical Engineers—now lieutenant-colonel of infantry—was very severely wounded some days earlier, while reconnoitering.

I must not omit to add that Captain Mason and 2d Lieutenant Davis, both of the rifles, were among the very severely wounded in storming the same tower.

I estimate our total loss in killed and wounded may be about 250, and that of the enemy 350. In the pursuit towards Jalapa (twenty-five miles hence), I learn we have added much to the enemy's loss in prisoners, killed, and wounded. In fact, I suppose his retreating army to be nearly disorganized, and hence my haste to follow, in an hour or two, to profit by events.

In this hurried and imperfect report, I must not omit to say that Brigadier-General Twiggs, in passing the mountain range beyond Cerro Gordo, crowned with the tower, detached from his division, as I suggested before, a strong force to carry that height, which commanded the Jalapa road at the foot, and could not fail, if carried, to cut off the whole, or any part of the enemy's forces from a retreat in any direction. A portion of the first artillery, under the often distinguished Brevet-Colonel Childs, the 3d infantry, under Captain Alexander, the 7th infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Plymton, and the rifles, under Major Loring, all under the temporary command of Colonel Harney, 2d dragoons, during the confinement to his bed of Brevet Brigadier-General P. F. Smith, composed that detachment. The style of execution, which I had the pleasure to witness, was most brilliant and decisive. The brigade ascended the long and difficult slope of Cerro Gordo, without shelter, and under the tremendous fire of artillery and musketry, with the utmost steadiness, reached the breastworks, drove the enemy from them, planted the colors of the 1st artillery, 3d and 7th infantry—the enemy's flag still flying—and, after some minutes of sharp firing, finished the conquest with the bayonet.

It is a most pleasing duty to say that the highest praise is due to Harney, Childs, Plymton, Loring, Alexander, their gallant officers and men, for this bril-

liant service, independent of the great result which soon followed.

Worth's division of regulars coming up at this time, he detached Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel C. F. Smith, with his light battalion, to support the assault, but not in time. The general, reaching the tower a few minutes before me, and observing a white flag displayed from the nearest portion of the enemy towards the batteries below, sent out Colonels Harney and Childs to hold a parley. The surrender followed in an hour or two.

Major-General Patterson left a sick bed to share in the dangers and fatigues of the day; and after the surrender went forward to command the advanced forces towards Jalapa.

Brigadier-General Pillow and his brigade twice assaulted with great daring the enemy's line of batteries on our left; and though without success, they contributed much to distract and dismay their immediate opponents.

President Santa Anna, with Generals Canalizo and Almonte, and some six or eight thousand men, escaped towards Jalapa just before Cerro Gordo was carried, and before Twiggs's division reached the National Road above.

I have determined to parole the prisoners—officers and men—as I have not the means of feeding them here, beyond to-day, and cannot afford to detach a heavy body of horse and foot, with wagons, to accompany them to Vera Cruz. Our baggage train, though increasing, is not half large enough to give an assured progress to this army. Besides, a greater number of prisoners would, probably, escape from the escort in the long and deep sandy road, without subsistence—ten to one—that we shall find again, out of the same body of

men, in the ranks opposed to us. Not one of the Vera Cruz prisoners is believed to have been in the lines of Cerro Gordo. Some six of the officers, highest in rank, refuse to give their paroles, except to go to Vera Cruz, and thence, perhaps, to the United States.

The small arms and their accoutrements, being of no value to our army here or at home, I have ordered to be destroyed, for we have not the means of transporting them. I am, also, somewhat embarrassed with the—pieces of artillery—all bronze—which we have captured. It will take a brigade, and half the mules of this army to transport them fifty miles. A field-battery I shall take for service with the army; but the heavy metal must be collected, and left here for the present. We have our own siege train and the proper carriages with us.

Being much occupied with the prisoners, and all the details of a forward movement, besides looking to the supplies which are to follow from Vera Cruz, I have time to add no more—intending to be at Jalapa early to-morrow. We shall not, probably, again meet with serious opposition this side of Perote—certainly not, unless delayed by the want of transportation.

I have the honor to remain, sir, with high respect, your most obedient servant,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

P. S. I invite attention to the accompanying letter to President Santa Anna, taken in his carriage yesterday; also to his proclamation, issued on hearing we had captured Vera Cruz, &c., in which he says:—"If the enemy advance one step more, the national independence will be buried in the abyss of the past." We have taken that step.

W. S.

I make a second postscript, to say that there is some

hope, I am happy to learn, that General Shields may survive his wounds.

One of the principal motives for paroling the prisoners of war is, to diminish the resistance of other garrisons in our march.

HON. WM. L. MARCY, Secretary of War.

The consequences of this victory were felt at Mexico more immediately than any of the preceding triumphs, and caused Santa Anna to put forth, over the signature of one of his adherents, Manuel Maria Jimen, the following vindication of his tactics and conduct, which appeared immediately afterwards in the government organ, *el Diario del Gobierno*:

"The internal enemies of the country, the secret agents of our external enemies, those who are laboring to open to them the gates of the capital, neglect no means, however criminal, of fomenting dissensions and distrust among us, as more favorable to the designs of the invader is our own disunion than all the disasters we can suffer in combat. Hence the zeal and the bad faith with which they present to the public their accounts of the events of the war, disfiguring them in such a manner that the disasters of our army, as well in the north as in the east, may be attributed not to involuntary errors, but to treason.

"With a like motive do they endeavor to depreciate General Santa Anna, knowing, as they do, that he is the enemy whom the North Americans most fear, and that he once out of the way, they will have removed the principal obstacle that they have met with up to the present time, in their career of destruction and conquest.

"This idea predominating, these internal enemies of

the country have published various pamphlets, representing the triumph obtained by our arms at the Angostura as a loss. At the present moment they are doing the same thing in relation to the actions of the Telegrafo and Cerro Gordo, in both of which they censure the general-in-chief in terms so severe, that it only remains to accuse him clearly and expressly of treason.

"The editorial of the 38th number of the *Bulletin of Democracy* (whose authors are well known), is full of this kind of charges against Santa Anna, who is there accused of the loss of Cerro Gordo; the article saying that all the bad fortune proceeded from a want of foresight in the preparations, and from a like want of judgment at the time of the attack, and from bad arrangements. We are given to understand that he sacrificed uselessly a large portion of this force. And he is even blamed for not performing a miracle by raising, in a moment, a new army, just as if he were in France in the time of the National Convention. We need only read, with a little attention, the said editorial, to penetrate the depth and the wickedness of the design of its authors. Unjust men! your calumnies suffice to detect your partiality and your insane intentions.

"Without calling the attention of our readers to the documents published in the *Diario del Gobierno*, and in other papers, the *Republicano*, (which certainly cannot be taxed with partiality to Santa Anna), in its number of the 23d inst., gives a clear idea of what took place in this action—dissipates the rash imputations of our enemies—and depicting the conduct of the invader, his tactics, his numerical superiority, the advantages of his artillery, and all that contributed to facilitate his triumphs, demonstrates most completely, that our loss was the result of inevitable misfortune.

"In fact, our position was well chosen; it was fortified as well as circumstances permitted; its flanks were covered, and all was foreseen that was to have been foreseen in regular order, and in the usual tactics of war. True it is, that no expectation was entertained of the rare, bold, and desperate operation of the enemy, who, in the night between the 17th and 18th, broke through the woods, crossed a ravine up to that time never crossed, and taking in reverse the position which the main body of our army occupied, surprised it in the time of action, made a general attack on all parts at once, and cut off the retreat of the infantry, the artillery, and even a part of the cavalry. It is pretended that even the general ought to have foreseen this risk. But to this argument two sufficient replies may be made: First—that notwithstanding the old opinion, confirmed by the experience of the whole war from 1810 to 1821, that the road by which the enemy flanked us was impracticable, the general did not neglect it, since he stationed, in order to cover it, the greater part of his cavalry in the mouth of the gorge; and if this force did not fulfil the object of its mission, the fault should not be imputed to the general-in-chief. We do not intend here to examine and qualify the conduct of the chief or chiefs of the cavalry; the fact is, that the point which this force should have guarded was left uncovered, and that is more than sufficient to justify General Santa Anna.

"Secondly—a recent historical fact may serve for the second solution of the question. We refer to the passage of Bonaparte over the great St. Bernard, executed likewise at night, with such silence and despatch, that the Austrian general, deceived by the dexterity of the operation, said, on the following day, before he learned

the result, 'that he answered with his life, that the French artillery had not passed that way.' And if this happened in Europe, in the midst of a war that had formed so many expert commanders, it need not astonish us that like events transpire among ourselves! Men are not gods!" * * * *

After enlarging upon the particular instances of patriotism displayed by Santa Anna, from the beginning of his career down to the present time, his apologist concludes by the following peroration:—

"Mexicans, be just! Do not suffer yourselves to be deceived by perverse and evil-intentioned men! Reflect that some of those writers, who to-day are so eager to lead astray your opinions, to the prejudice of our well-deserving president, have sold themselves to him for friends—have flattered him in the season of his prosperity, and now declare themselves his enemies when fortune is against him. Examine well the facts—compare, judge with attention and impartiality; and it is sure that your conclusion must be, that gratitude is due to Santa Anna, as one of the best servants of the republic, both before and since its independence.

(Signed)

MANUEL MARIA JIMEN."

Not satisfied with this explanation, Santa Anna attributed the failure to the misconduct of one of his officers, who replied; and General Minon, who had commanded his cavalry at Buena Vista, and on that occasion been similarly censured, also took occasion to reply, and charged the president with cowardice, and a catalogue of faults, the least of which was sufficient to cause his removal. That strife of words yet continues, and is not the least of the difficulties which oppress Santa Anna.

From the letter of Minon, the following extracts may not be uninteresting, and will serve to show the tenor of the whole document:

"In every battle which he has lost, and they are all those in which he has attempted to command in person, there was always some one who had caused the defeat, to blame; at Jalapa, in 1822, Sr. Leno, who was shot through the body and abandoned, failed in the combination; at Tolome, Landero and Andonaegui were culpable; at San Jacinto, Castrillon; and to-day, it is I. It is certainly sorrowful to see so celebrated a general always defeated and overcome, always and everywhere, by the faults of those he has with him. My astonishment arose from beholding the perfidy with which General Santa Anna had acted in regard to me, in seeking a pretext, and nothing but a pretext, to palliate the precipitation of which he had been guilty, and to liberate himself at the same time from the indestructible charges which had been made against him, for leaving San Luis in search of the enemy, without providing for anything—for having given battle to Taylor where he did—for the errors which he committed in the attack—for the absence of all directions during the battle, which might turn it to profit—for his retirement from the field without necessity—for his want of foresight—in fine, in providing for attention to the wounded, subsistence for the troops, and for their orderly retirement.

"The nation will know one day what that was which was called, without shame, the victory of Angostura. It will know that it had brave soldiers, worthy to rival, in ardor and enthusiasm, the best of any army whatever; that it had intrepid officers, who led them gallantly to the combat; but that it had no general who knew how to make use of these excellent materials. The nation

will know that if, on those memorable fields, a true and splendid victory was not achieved, no one was to blame but him who was charged with leading the forces, because he did not know how to do it. According to the order of the attack, and with a knowledge of the positions occupied by the enemy, speaking in accordance with the rules of art, we ought to have been defeated. We were not, because the valor of our troops overcame all the disadvantages with which we had to struggle. The battle of Angostura was nothing but a disconnexion of sublime individual deeds, partial attacks of the several corps who entered the action. Their chiefs led them according to the divers positions taken by the enemy, in consequence of the partial defeats which he suffered; but there was no methodical direction, no general regulated attack, no plan in which the efforts of the troops, according to their class, were combined, that did or could produce a victory. General Santa Anna believes that war is reduced to the fighting of the troops of one and the other party, wherever they meet and however they choose. General Santa Anna believes that a battle is no more than the shock of men, with much noise, shouts, and shots, to see who can do the most, each in his own way. General Santa Anna cannot conceive how it happens that a victory may be gained over an enemy by wise and well-calculated manœuvres. Thus it is that he has everywhere been routed; and he always will be, unless he should have the fortune to meet with one who has the same ideas with himself in relation to war."

This opinion of Minon's is perhaps justified by facts; Santa Anna at the head of the men of the tierra caliente, would be one of the most formidable enemies imaginable, but it may be doubted if, like his *Teniente*

Arista, he is *not* altogether incompetent to lead masses of troops. This is not an unusual failing, though the opinion of persons ignorant of tactics contravenes it; for more than mere courage is required by the soldier, the minutiae of whose profession embrace details depending upon algebraic calculations and synthetical combinations, not easily intelligible to those who are not initiated by *practice* or theoretical instruction.

The internal condition of Mexico since the war became certain, has not been harmonious. Many revolutions have occurred, one of which has deposed Herrera, and a second substituted Santa Anna for Paredes, who has been driven into exile. While the president has been at the head of the army, contests have occurred in the streets of Mexico, where Gomez Farias, Valencia, Salas, and minor men have controlled the city, seemingly reckless of the fact that the best portion of their country was in possession of an enemy.

How Santa Anna was permitted to return to Mexico has been much discussed. It is not, however, denied that it was by the authority of the president of the United States; whether wisely or not, history will show.

Whether Santa Anna wishes to make peace or not, no one can tell, for he is so harassed with priests and *politicos* that he dares not now act openly.

The conduct of the clergy in all the political events has been below contempt. Fostered for ages by the Mexican people, they have refused to pay one dollar towards the expenses of the war, and have had power enough to cause the purest and most honest man in Mexico, Farias, to be stripped of his power as provisional vice-president, to which office he had been elected since the return of Santa Anna, and seem disposed to see the

government crumble above them without being willing to sustain it.

A new constitution has, within the last few weeks, been *inaugurated*, and an election has been held, the result of which has not reached us as yet. So far the elections seem to involve no principle or policy, and it does not seem to make to Mexico or the world the least difference, whether Santa Anna, Eloriaga, Bravo, or Valencia be elected. In the mean time General Scott is marching on Mexico from the east, the western coast is controlled by the naval forces of the United States, General Taylor is master of the *provincias internas*, and General Kearney has no opponent in California. The lesson of the past is, however, utterly lost on Mexico, in which all patriotism seems to be extinct.

The Mexican forces have been uniformly defeated in every battle; and horse, foot, and dragoons have given way before the charge of the American army. In the stirring events which have occurred, hundreds of men, previously unknown in the United States, have acquired fame and honor; while in Mexico, no star has arisen to penetrate the gloom which obscures her prospects. In this hour of distress, the country turns from her army, which long has weighed on her like an incubus, to find salvation in the right arms of her people. She has appealed to that feeling, which in the United States made Marion triumphant; which enabled La Vendée to set at defiance, for a series of years, the best armies of republican France, and enabled the Switzers, after winning their freedom from Austria, to maintain it against the attacks of Burgundy.

To triumph in this manner, a people must be virtuous;

and the success of the Spanish guerillas, under Espoz y Mina, Empecinado, and other chiefs, must be attributed to the fact, that while the rulers of the kingdom were corrupt and degraded as possible, the people and peasantry remained virtuous and brave, as they had been in the days when they beat back the Moors, and conquered Mexico and South America. Whether the people of Mexico can dare such a strife, history will show. It is, however, a hazardous experiment; and one which, if it fail, subjects the conquered to the woful condition of dependence on the mercy of the conquerors.

This book is now finished, and such as it is, is presented to the reader. The author has sought no eclat or praise, other than that of offering a fair view of men and things in a country of which the most erroneous opinions are now entertained by the mass of his countrymen.

THE END.

