

evacuation of all the North followed upon the victories of Escobedo and his generals. The order for the retreat southward of the French and Austrian troops, in early August, 1866, was the signal for the union of all the Liberal forces in a renewed attempt to expel the armies of the empire. The campaign of retreat and pursuit was brief; and with skirmishes and engagements, many in number and desperate in character, the invaders were put on the defensive, driven into the valley of Mexico, and the contest culminated at Queretaro in the siege that resulted in its capitulation May 19, 1867.

Grant scarcely waited for the surrender at Appomattox before he hastened to carry to a practical end his personal opinion, that the French intervention was so closely allied to the rebellion as to be a part of it. He had declared at City Point, in 1864, to members of his staff, that, as soon as we had disposed of the Confederates, we must begin with the Imperialists; and his order to Sheridan, in May, 1865, was the opening of the campaign. Sheridan, with Wright and Canby, and Custer and Reynolds, McKenzie and Steele, as commanders, and fifty thousand veterans, were charged

with the ostensible duty of restoring Texas and part of Louisiana to the Union, "in the shortest possible time, in a way most effectual for securing permanent peace." Grant issued the order upon his own responsibility, but its real purpose was to drive the French and Austrians out of Mexico. His policy was one of action, of invasion if need be, and union with the Mexican Liberal forces in their campaign against the empire.

Even then Seward's policy was one of negotiation. The French minister wrote the authorities at Washington that our forces on the Rio Grande were acting in opposition to the cordial assurances of good-will toward his government; and Sheridan was at once charged to observe a strict neutrality; and the feeling with which he received this instruction he bluntly expresses in his recent memoirs: "After this it required the patience of Job to abide the slow and poky methods of our state department." But the gallant commander's methods were neither slow nor poky. He made demonstrations on the lower Rio Grande; demanded the return of war materials turned over to the Imperialists by ex-Confederates; opened communications with Juarez; massed

troops at San Antonio, creating the belief that he would at once invade Mexico; stopped the exodus of Confederates across the frontier to join the Imperialists, and the transportation of arms and supplies; prohibited emigration from all the seaports within his command; checked the schemes of Magruder, Price, Maury, and other rebels of distinction, who had joined Maximilian, induced by grants of lands and peons to till them, as in the good old slavery days, by patents and titles of nobility and high military rank; arrested the old conspirator, Ortega, at Brazos, Texas, and handed him over to Escobedo, Juarez's representative; and, acting under Grant's instructions, he secretly supplied the Liberal forces with materials and arms, sending thirty thousand muskets from the Baton Rouge arsenal alone. Sheridan's diplomacy needed no interpreter. His code was battle; his logic, a cavalry charge; his peace was born of victory; and it was understood from El Paso to Vera Cruz, that, if occasion offered, he would make the same answer to any challenge that he made to Lincoln's message at Five Forks, and "press things."

But the military operations were given a deeper significance to the watchful Imperialists

by an opportune act of our government. In November, 1866, the United States changed its diplomatic tactics, and appointed a minister "accredited to the republican government of Mexico, of which Mr. Juarez was President." Our minister was advised, among other matters, that:

"There are some principles which may be safely laid down in regard to the policy which the government will expect you to pursue. The first of these is, that, as a representative of the United States, you are accredited to the republican government of Mexico, of which Mr. Juarez is President. Your communications, as such representative, will be made to him, wheresoever he may be; and, in no event, will you officially recognize either the Prince Maximilian, who claims to be Emperor, or any other person, chief, or combination, as exercising the executive authority in Mexico, without having first reported to this department. . . . It may possibly happen that the President of the Republic of Mexico may desire the good offices of the United States, or even some effective proceedings on our part, to favor and advance the pacification of a country so long distracted by foreign combined with civil war, and thus gain time for the re-establishment of national authority upon principles consistent with a republican and domestic system of government. It is possible, moreover, that some disposition might be made of the land and naval forces of the United States, without interfering within the jurisdiction of Mexico, or violating the laws of neutrality, which

would be useful in favoring the restoration of law, order, and republican government in that country. The Lieutenant-General of the United States Army possesses already discretionary authority as to the location of the forces of the United States in the vicinity of Mexico. His military experience will enable him to advise you concerning such questions as may arise during the transition stage of Mexico from a state of military siege by a foreign enemy to a condition of practical self-government. At the same time it will be in his power, being near the scene of action, to issue any orders which may be expedient or necessary for maintaining the obligations resting upon the United States in regard to proceedings upon the borders of Mexico. For these reasons he has been requested and instructed by the President to proceed with you to your destination, and act with you as an adviser, recognized by this department, in regard to the matters which have been herein discussed."

The commissioners, Mr. Campbell and General Sherman, sailed from New York about the 10th of November, 1866, and after spending a few days at Havana, to learn, if possible, some reliable news of the real condition of affairs in Mexico, arrived off Vera Cruz on the evening of the 29th. Mr. Campbell was not a trained diplomatist, and found the state of affairs such that he could not carry out his instructions and open negotiations with the Liberal government. General

Sherman ridiculed the peaceful intentions of his associate, was impatient of all tentative methods, and gave free expression to his opinions in a characteristic letter to his brother, Senator Sherman: "We have nearly completed the circle without finding Juarez, who is about as far away as ever, up in Chihuahua, for no other possible purpose than to be where the devil himself cannot get at him."

"Sherman and Campbell," says a correspondent of the time, "pulled together from the start like a baulky team. Each had separate instructions, and each claimed to rank the other. On the arrival of the *Susquehanna* at Vera Cruz, Sherman, it seems, was for accepting Bazaine's invitation and going straight to Mexico City. Campbell strongly opposed the suggestion, on the ground that he was accredited to Juarez only, and had nothing to do with Bazaine, Castelnau, or any one outside the republic of Mexico. This argument at last prevailed; but not till after a somewhat stormy discussion, in the course of which personal allusions to kid-gloved aides-de-camp and legation secretaries had been pretty freely interchanged."

The mission failed of its practical purpose, but served a higher one in its moral effect upon the situation. The proclamation of the President, declaring void Maximilian's decree closing the ports of Matamoras, the mission of General Schofield, the emphatic declarations

of our government, the appointment of a minister accredited to the Mexican republic, with Sherman at Vera Cruz, and Sheridan and his army on the Rio Grande, brought to bear the pressure our authorities resolved to evince, without the necessity of actual interference by force of arms. American diplomacy, read in the light of the history of our army and navy, at the close of the civil war commanded profound respect, even in the mind of as good a hater of the liberty of the people as Louis Napoleon.

## CHAPTER VII.

The crisis—Napoleon's envoy—Guaranties broken—France to withdraw—Carlotta's ambition—Her mission to Europe—Appeal to Napoleon—Its refusal—At Miramar—Visit to Rome—Interviews with the Pope—Failure of her mission—Insanity—Maximilian's efforts to save the empire—National army—Coalition with Church party—Former relations—Overtures of Clerical leaders—News of Carlotta's fate—Maximilian's illness—At Orizaba—Arrival of Miramon and Marquez—Their characteristics—Abdication—Vacillation—Council opinions—Resolution to remain—Congress of Notables—Imperial proclamation—Gift of the Bishops—Popular support—Government and Church party.

WHEN Napoleon could no longer evade the issues so pointedly defined at Washington, and emphasized by the military demonstrations, and, through his special envoy, Saillard, he notified Maximilian of his purpose to withdraw the French troops, it was Carlotta who first realized the peril of the empire, and its inability to stand alone.

Early in January, 1866, she returned from her visit to the distant provinces, bearing their pledges of loyalty and good-will. She had scarcely reached the capital when she received