

by the weak of the strong, grounded on no antagonism of interests, for each needs the other, but solely on a difference in race and colour.

Be these evils what they may — and serious as they seem to an observer from without, they are in most parts of the South not keenly felt—legislation and administration can do comparatively little to remove them. It is, indeed, to be wished that lynching should be sternly repressed, — some of the Southern State governors are doing what they can for that purpose, — and that the State statutes or local regulations enforcing separation of blacks from whites in travelling or in places of public resort should be repealed. But the real change to which the friends of the South and of the negro look forward is a change in the feelings of the white people, and especially of the ruder and less educated part of them. The political troubles I have described will probably pass away under altered political conditions — one can already see how this may happen within the next fifty years. For the social difficulty, rooted deep in the characters of the two races, none but moral remedies have any promise of potency, and the working of moral remedies, sure as we believe it to be, is always slow. Neither will compulsive measures quicken that working. In the United States, above all other countries, one must place one's hopes on the *vis medicatrix naturee*, and trust that the forces which make not only for equality, but also for peace and good-will among men, will in due time reduce these evils, as they have reduced many others. There is no ground for despondency to any one who remembers how hopeless the extinction of slavery seemed sixty or even forty years ago, and who marks the progress which the negroes have made since their sudden liberation. Still less is there reason for impatience, for questions like this have in some countries of the Old World required ages for their solution. The problem which confronts the South is one of the great secular problems of the world, presented here under a form of peculiar difficulty. And as the present differences between the African and the European are the product of thousands of years, during which one race was advancing in the temperate, and the other remaining stationary in the torrid zone, so centuries may pass before their relations as neighbours and fellow-citizens have been duly adjusted.

## CHAPTER XCIV

### FOREIGN POLICY AND TERRITORIAL EXTENSION

So far I have had to say nothing, and now I need say but little, of a subject which would have been constantly obtruding itself had we been dealing with any country in Europe. To every country in Europe foreign relations are a matter of primary importance. The six Great Powers of that continent are all in more or less danger from one another, obliged to protect themselves by armies, fleets, and alliances. Great Britain, seeking no extension of territory and comparatively safe from attack at home, has many colonies and one vast dependency to protect, and is drawn by them, far more than by her European position, into the tangled web of Old World diplomacy. To all these Powers, and not less to the minor ones, the friendly or hostile attitude of the others is matter of vital consequence. Not only, therefore, must immense sums be spent on warlike preparations, but a great establishment of officials must be maintained and no small part of the attention of the Administration and the legislature be given to the conduct of the international relations of the State. These relations, moreover, constantly affect the internal politics of the country; they sometimes cause the triumph or the defeat of a party; they influence financial policy; they make or mar the careers of statesmen.

In the United States, nothing of the kind. Since the Mexican war of 1845, external relations have very rarely, and then only to a slight extent, affected internal political strife. They do not lie within the sphere of party platforms or party action. They do not occupy the public mind. We have hitherto found no occasion to refer to them save in describing the functions of the Senate; and I mention them now as the traveller did the snakes in Iceland, only to note their absence, and to indicate some of the results ascribable thereto.



Though the chief and obvious cause of this striking contrast between the great Western Republic and the Powers of Europe is to be found in her geographical position on a continent where, since she bought out France and Spain, she has had only two neighbours, one hopelessly weak on the south and one naturally friendly on the north, much must also be set down to the temper and convictions of the people. They are, and have always been, pacific in their views, for the unjustifiable, because needless, war with Mexico was the work of the slave-holding oligarchy and opposed to the general sentiment of the people. They have no lust of conquest, possessing already as much land as they want. They have always been extremely jealous of a standing army, the necessary support of ambitious foreign policies. They have been so much absorbed by and interested in the development of their material resources as to care very little for what goes on in other countries. As there is no military class, so also there is no class which feels itself called on to be concerned with foreign affairs, and least of all is such a class to be found among the politicians. Even leading statesmen are often strangely ignorant of European diplomacy, much more the average senator or congressman. And into the mind of the whole people there has sunk deep the idea that all such matters belong to the bad order of the Old World; and that the true way for the model Republic to influence that world is to avoid its errors, and set an example of pacific industrialism.

This view of the facts may appear strange to those who remember that the area of the United States, which in 1783 was about one million square miles, is now something over three and a half millions. All this added territory, however, except the cessions made by Mexico in 1847, came peaceably by way of purchase or (in the case of Texas) voluntary union; and all (with the possible exception of Alaska) consists of regions which naturally cohere with the original Republic, and ought to be united with it. The limits of what may be called natural expansion have now (subject to what will be said presently) been reached; and the desire for annexation is probably feebler than at any preceding epoch, while the interest in foreign relations generally has not increased. For a time a sort of friendship was professed for Russia, more for the sake of teasing England than from any real sympathy with a despotic mon-

archy very alien to the American spirit. But at present absolute neutrality and impartiality as regards the Old World is observed; and a remarkable proof of the desire to abstain from engagements affecting it was recently given, when the United States Government declined to ratify the International Act of the Berlin Conference of 1885 regulating the Congo Free State, although its minister at Berlin had taken part in the deliberations of the Conference by which that Act was prepared. And it was after much delay and some hesitation that they ratified (in 1892) even the Brussels International Slave Trade Act.

Such abstinence from Old World affairs is the complement to that claim of a right to prevent any European power from attempting to obtain a controlling influence in New World affairs which goes by the name of the Monroe Doctrine, from the assertion of it by President Monroe in his Message of 1823.

The notion that the United States ought to include at least all the English and French speaking communities of North America is an old one. Repeated efforts were made before and during the War of Independence to induce Canada, Nova Scotia, and even the Bermuda Islands to join the revolted colonies. For many years afterwards the view continued to be expressed that no durable peace with Great Britain could exist so long as she retained possessions on the North American continent. When by degrees that belief died away, the eyes of ambitious statesmen turned to the South. The slave-holding party sought to acquire Cuba and Porto Rico, hoping to turn them into slave States; and President Polk even tried to buy Cuba from Spain. After the abolition of slavery, attempts were made under President Johnson in 1867 to acquire St. Thomas and St. John's from Denmark, and by President Grant (1869-73) to acquire San Domingo, — an independent republic, — but the Senate frustrated both.

None the less does the idea that the United States is entitled to forbid any new establishment by any European power on its own continent, still survive, and indeed constitute the one fixed principle of foreign policy which every party and indeed every statesman professes. It is less needed now than it was in Monroe's day, because the United States have grown so immensely in strength that no European power can constitute a danger to them. Nevertheless, it was asserted in 1865, and led



to Louis Napoleon's abandonment of his Mexican schemes. It would have been asserted had the Panama Canal been completed. It is at the basis of the claim occasionally put forward made to control the projected Nicaragua inter-oceanic canal, and is supported by the argument that a water-way between the Atlantic and the Pacific is of far more consequence, not only in a commercial but in a military sense, to the United States than to any other power. So the idea that the United States ought to lead the New World found expression in the Pan-American Congress of Republics convened at Washington in 1891, primarily with a view to the establishment of some general tariff system, though that Congress, as might have been expected, effected nothing, and ended, not without some derision, in a series of pleasure trips by the delegates from the so-called republics of South and Central America. The Monroe Doctrine, however, generally accepted as it is, can hardly be said practically to occupy the mind or influence the current politics of America. Though it would no doubt lead the Government to consider international questions arising even in South America as much more within the scope of their influence than any, not directly affecting their own citizens, which might arise in the Old World, still the occasions for its assertion are comparatively few, and are not likely to involve serious difficulties with any European power.

The results of this indifference to foreign politics are in so far unfortunate that they frequently induce carelessness in the choice of persons to represent the United States at European Courts, the Ambassador to Great Britain being usually the only one who has really important negotiations to conduct, and cause very inadequate appropriations to be voted for the support of such envoys. In other respects her detachment has been for the United States an unspeakable blessing. No army is needed, except for the repression of Indian troubles in the far West. The whole military force of the Republic now consists of about 25,000 privates (largely of foreign birth) and 2144 officers. The officers, admirably trained at West Point, the famous military academy which has maintained its high character and its absolute freedom from "political affiliations" since its first foundation, are largely occupied in scientific or engineering work. Only a small navy is needed, — a fortunate

circumstance, because the navy yards have sometimes given rise to administrative scandals, scandals, however, which have in no way affected the naval officers but only the civilian politicians who have had a hand in shipbuilding and the provision of armaments and stores. The cry which is sometimes raised for a large increase in the United States fleet seems to a European observer unwise; for the power of the United States to protect her citizens abroad is not to be measured by the number of vessels or guns she possesses, but by the fact that there is no power in the world which will not lose far more than it can possibly gain by quarrelling with a nation which could, in case of war, so vast are its resources, not only create an armoured fleet but speedily equip swift vessels which would destroy the commerce of its antagonist. The possession of powerful armaments is apt to inspire a wish to use them. For many years there has been no cloud on the external horizon, and one may indeed say that the likelihood of a war between the United States and any of the great naval powers is too slight to be worth considering.

The result of this smallness of an army and navy is not only the freedom of the country from militarism of spirit and the slightness of a branch of expenditure which European States find almost insupportable, but the exemption of this Republic from a source of danger which other republics have found so serious, — the ambition of successful generals, and the interference of the army in political strifes. Strong and deep-rooted as are the constitutional traditions of the United States, there have been moments, even in her history, when the existence of a great standing army might have menaced or led to civil war. Patriotism has not suffered, as Europeans sometimes fancy it must suffer, by long-continued peace. Manliness of spirit has not suffered because so few embrace the profession of arms; and the internal politics of the country, already complicated enough, are relieved from those further complications which the intrusion of issues of foreign policy bring with them. It need hardly be added that those issues are the very issues which a democracy, even so intelligent a democracy as that of the United States, is least fitted to comprehend, and which its organs of government are least fitted to handle with promptitude and success. Fortunately, the one



principle to which the people have learnt to cling in foreign policy is, that the less they have of it the better; and though aspiring politicians sometimes try to play upon national pride by using arrogant language to other powers, or by suggesting schemes of annexation, such language is generally reprobated, and such schemes are usually rejected.

To state this tendency of national opinion does not, however, dispose of the question of territorial expansion; for nations are sometimes forced to increase their dominions by causes outside their own desires or volitions. The possibilities that lie before America of such expansion deserve a brief discussion.

Occupying the whole width of their continent from ocean to ocean, the Americans have neighbours only on the north and on the south. It is only in these directions that they could extend themselves by land; and extension on land is much easier and more tempting than by sea. On the north they touch the great Canadian Confederation with its seven provinces, also extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and now bound together by a transcontinental railway. Its population, already about five millions, is rapidly increasing, especially in the North-west, and although legally subject to the British Crown and legislature, it is admittedly mistress of its own destinies. It was at one time deemed a matter of course that the United States would seek to annex Canada, peaceably if possible, but if not, then by force of arms. Even so late as 1864, Englishmen were constantly told that the first result of the triumph of the Federal armies in the War of Secession would be to launch a host flushed with victory against the Canadian Dominion, because when the passion for war has been once roused in a nation, it clamours for fresh conquests. Many were the arguments from history by which it was sought to convince Britain that for her own safety she ought to accede to the wily suggestions which Louis Napoleon addressed to her, deliver the Slave States from defeat and herself from a formidable rival. Since those days Canada has become a far more tempting prize, for part of her north-western territories between Lake Superior and the Rocky Mountains, then believed to be condemned to sterility by their climate, has proved to be one of the richest wheat-growing districts on the continent. The power of the United States is now far greater than in 1865, nor would it be easy for Britain and

Canada effectively to defend a frontier so long and so naturally weak as is that which separates the Dominion from its neighbours on the south. Yet to-day the absorption of Canada is little debated in the United States. If ever it comes about, it will come about at the wish and by the act of the Canadians themselves, rather than as the result of any external force.

There are several reasons for this. One is the growing friendliness of the Americans to Britain. Considering how much commoner than love is hatred, or at least jealousy, between nations, considering the proverbial bitterness of family quarrels, and considering how intense was the hatred felt in the United States towards England fifty years ago,<sup>1</sup> rekindled by the unhappy war of 1812, kept alive by the sensitiveness of the one people and the arrogance of the other, imprinted afresh on new generations in America by silly school-books and Fourth of July harangues, inflamed anew by the language of a large section of English society during the Civil War, it is one of the remarkable events of our time that a cordial feeling should now exist between the two chief branches of the English race. The settlement of the Alabama claims has contributed to it. The democratization of Britain and the growth of literature and science in America have contributed to it. The greater respect which Europeans have come to show to America has contributed to it. The occasional appearance of illustrious men who, like Dr. Phillips Brooks and Mr. J. R. Lowell, become dear to both countries, has counted for something. But the ocean steamers have done perhaps most of all, because they have enabled the two peoples to know one another. Such unfriendly language towards Britain as still appears in the American press is chiefly due to the wish to gratify a section of the Irish population, and will probably vanish when the secular hostility of Ireland and England has passed away. The old motives for an attack upon Canada have therefore vanished. But there is reason to think that even if Canada were separated from the British Empire, the Americans would not be eager to bring her into the Union. They would not try to do so by force, because

<sup>1</sup> Tocqueville, for instance, says (vol. ii. ch. 10): "On ne saurait voir de haine plus envenimée que celle qui existe entre les Américains des États Unis et les Anglais." And old men will tell you in America that their recollections are to the same effect.