

CHAPTER III.

EXPOSITION.

EXPOSITION may be briefly defined as explanation. It does not address the imagination, the feelings, or the will. It addresses the understanding exclusively, and it may deal with any subject-matter with which the understanding has to do. In the fact that exposition does not appeal to the emotions lies the essential difference between exposition and description or narration. The writer of a description or of a narrative may, without injury to his readers, look at his subject through the medium of his own personality and color it with his individual feelings: the writer of an exposition should, as far as possible, keep his individuality out of his work and present his subject to his readers exactly as it is.

Theoretically, exposition treats the matter in hand with absolute impartiality, setting forth the pure truth, — the truth unalloyed by prejudice, pride of opinion, exaggeration of rhetoric, or glamour of sentiment. Except in works of a technical character, exposition in this strict sense is comparatively rare; but it is now and then found even in political writings.

“He [Mr. Robert Giffen] belongs to a limited class from whom the community receive an inestimable benefit, — namely, white light upon every subject upon which they require information. He will use months in ascertaining for them the truth, say, as to an

Irish Land question, and in a report will never betray the political opinion to which his researches have led him. We have watched Mr. Giffen's work for thirty years, have never known it less than complete, and do not know now, with any approach to accuracy, what his political opinions are. That is the true attitude of a devoted servant of the whole nation.”¹

Exposition is sometimes made to include personal essays, like many of those of Montaigne or of Lamb; but such essays, though they may be expository here and there, as they may now and then fall into description or narration, address, in the main, not the understanding, but the sympathies and the imagination. For the most part, they convey information so far only as they reveal the personality of the author; and this they do, not through the medium of formal composition, but after the manner of an intimate friend who takes us into his inner life. To class such essays with expository writings is to miss what constitutes their real charm, — the personal quality, the quality that makes Montaigne, or Lamb, or Emerson *sui generis*, a class by himself.

The function of exposition is to simplify the complex or the abstruse, to make the obscure clear, the confused distinct, — to help the reader, in short, The function of exposition. thoroughly to understand the subject before him. The man of science is expounding when he sets forth the results of observation, or of reflection on observed facts; the teacher, when he unravels knotty questions or clears up doubtful points; the preacher, when he unfolds the meaning of his text; the lawyer, when he elucidates the principles on which his argument is to rest; the physician, when he makes clear the peculiarities of a case in his practice; the journalist, when he gives the bearings

¹ The [London] Spectator, Nov. 24, 1894, p. 715.

of a piece of news; the critic, when he analyzes a book of essays or a play; the man of affairs, when he instructs his correspondent concerning the advantages and the disadvantages of an investment: any one is expounding when he explains anything said or done.

The simplest form of exposition is the definition of a term. Many so-called definitions in dictionaries are not definitions at all; for they are nothing but more or less successful attempts to translate words into their exact or approximate synonyms. A real definition is an explanation expressed in language simpler than the term defined, or in words that have already been defined; the simpler the term to be defined, the greater the difficulty in making a satisfactory definition. In every branch of science are many terms that must be explained before the subject to which they belong can be understood, and of these terms an exposition is the only useful definition. Such a definition is given in the following passage from Dr. Asa Gray's "Botanical Text-Book":—

Definition, the simplest form of exposition.

THE EMBRYO.

"The embryo is the initial plant, originated in the seed. In some seeds it is so simple and rudimentary as to have no visible distinction of parts: in others, these parts may have assumed forms which disguise their proper character. But every well-developed embryo essentially consists of a nascent axis, or stem, bearing at one end a nascent leaf or leaves, or what answers to these, while from the other and naked end a root is normally to be produced. This stem is the primitive internode of the plant: its leaf or pair of leaves is that of the first node. The plant therefore begins as a single phytomer. Some embryos are no more than this, even when they have completed their proper germination: others have taken a further development in the seed itself, and exhibit the rudiments of one or more following phytomera."¹

¹ Asa Gray: Botanical Text-Book, vol. i. chap. ii.

An exposition like that just cited resembles a scientific description in that it aims at conveying information by means of analysis. There is, however, a slight difference between the two. The account of the barn-swallow, quoted as an example of scientific description,¹ is descriptive so far as it deals with specific barn-swallows, expository so far as it deals with the abstract idea, or general notion, designated by the term "barn-swallow;" the passage from Dr. Gray is altogether expository, for it deals with nothing but the general notion designated by the term "embryo." The fact that it is possible to illustrate the description of the barn-swallow by a representation of a real bird and not possible to illustrate the exposition of the embryo by a representation of the embryo in general, shows the distinction between the two. Whenever description ceases to represent individual persons or things, it ceases to be description and partakes of the nature of exposition.

Other examples of definitions that are expositions are given in the following passages:—

WORK AND PLAY.

"You will discover, at once, that work and play, taken as modes of mere outward, muscular activity, cannot be distinguished. There is motion in both, there is an exercise of force in both, both are under the will as acting on the muscular system; so that, taken outwardly, they both fall into the same category. Indeed, they cannot be discriminated till we pass within, to view them metaphysically, considering their springs of action, their impulse, aim, and object.

"Here the distinction becomes evident at once; namely, that work is activity *for* an end; play, activity *as* an end. One prepares the fund or resources of enjoyment, the other is enjoyment itself. Thus, when a man goes into agriculture, trade, or

¹ See pages 252, 253.

the shop, he consents to undergo a certain expenditure of care and labor, which is the only form of painstaking rightly named, in order to obtain some ulterior good which is to be his reward. But when the child goes to his play, it is no painstaking, no means to an end; it is itself rather both end and joy. Accordingly, it is a part of the distinction I state, that work suffers a feeling of aversion, and play excludes aversion. For the moment any play becomes wearisome or distasteful, then it is work; an activity that is kept up, not as being its own joy, but for some ulterior end, or under some kind of constraint."¹

PREACHING.

"What, then, is preaching, of which we are to speak? It is not hard to find a definition. Preaching is the communication of truth by man to men. It has in it two essential elements, truth and personality. Neither of those can it spare and still be preaching. The truest truth, the most authoritative statement of God's will, communicated in any other way than through the personality of brother man to men, is not preached truth. Suppose it written on the sky, suppose it embodied in a book which has been so long held in reverence as the direct utterance of God that the vivid personality of the men who wrote its pages has well-nigh faded out of it; in neither of these cases is there any preaching. And on the other hand, if men speak to other men that which they do not claim for truth, if they use their powers of persuasion or of entertainment to make other men listen to their speculations, or do their will, or applaud their cleverness, that is not preaching either. The first lacks personality. The second lacks truth. And preaching is the bringing of truth through personality. It must have both elements. It is in the different proportion in which the two are mingled that the difference between two great classes of sermons and preaching lies. It is in the defect of one or the other element that every sermon and preacher falls short of the perfect standard. It is in the absence of one or the other element that a discourse ceases to be a sermon, and a man ceases to be a preacher altogether."²

¹ Horace Bushnell: *Work and Play*.

² Phillips Brooks: *Lectures on Preaching; The Two Elements in Preaching*.

In subjects like psychology and political economy, so much depends on the meaning attached to important terms that we naturally expect to find in the best writers on these subjects definitions that are models of exposition. Such are the following passages from Taine and John Stuart Mill:—

VAGUE IMAGES AND ABSTRACT IDEAS.

"Some years ago I saw in England, in Kew Gardens, for the first time, araucarias, and I walked along the beds looking at these strange plants, with their rigid bark and compact, short, scaly leaves, of a sombre green, whose abrupt, rough, bristling form cut in upon the fine softly-lighted turf of the fresh grass-plat. If I now inquire what this experience has left in me, I find, first, the sensible representation of an araucaria; in fact, I have been able to describe almost exactly the form and color of the plant. But there is a difference between this representation and the former sensations, of which it is the present echo. The internal semblance, from which I have just made my description, is vague, and my past sensations were precise. For, assuredly, each of the araucarias I saw then excited in me a distinct visual sensation; there are no two absolutely similar plants in nature; I observed perhaps twenty or thirty araucarias; without a doubt each one of them differed from the others in size, in girth, by the more or less obtuse angles of its branches, by the more or less abrupt jutting out of its scales, by the style of its texture; consequently, my twenty or thirty visual sensations were different. But no one of these sensations has completely survived in its echo; the twenty or thirty revivals have blunted one another; thus upset and agglutinated by their resemblance they are confounded together, and my present representation is their residue only. This is the product, or rather the fragment, which is deposited in us, when we have gone through a series of similar facts or individuals. Of our numerous experiences there remain on the following day four or five more or less distinct recollections, which, obliterated themselves, leave behind in us a simple colorless, vague representation, into which enter as components various reviving sensations, in an utterly feeble, incomplete, and abortive state. *But this representation is not the general*

*and abstract idea. It is but its accompaniment, and, if I may say so, the ore from which it is extracted. For the representation, though badly sketched, is a sketch, the sensible sketch of a distinct individual. . . . But my abstract idea corresponds to the whole class; it differs, then, from the representation of an individual. Moreover, my abstract idea is perfectly clear and determinate; now that I possess it, I never fail to recognize an araucaria among the various plants which may be shown me; it differs then from the confused and floating representation I have of some particular araucaria."*¹

CAPITAL.

"It has been seen in the preceding chapters that besides the primary and universal requisites of production, labour and natural agents, there is another requisite without which no productive operations beyond the rude and scanty beginnings of primitive industry, are possible: namely, a stock, previously accumulated, of the products of former labour. This accumulated stock of the produce of labour is termed Capital. The function of Capital in production, it is of the utmost importance thoroughly to understand, since a number of the erroneous notions with which our subject is invested, originate in an imperfect and confused apprehension on this point.

"Capital, by persons wholly unused to reflect on the subject, is supposed to be synonymous with money. To expose this misapprehension, would be to repeat what has been said in the introductory chapter. Money is no more synonymous with capital than it is with wealth. Money cannot in itself perform any part of the office of capital, since it can afford no assistance to production. To do this, it must be exchanged for other things; and anything, which is susceptible of being exchanged for other things, is capable of contributing to production in the same degree. What capital does for production, is to afford the shelter, protection, tools and materials which the work requires, and to feed and otherwise maintain the labourers during the process. These are the services which present labour requires from past, and from the produce of past, labour. Whatever things are destined for this use — destined to supply productive labour with these various prerequisites — are Capital.

¹ H. Taine: *On Intelligence*, vol. ii. p. 139. Quoted by William James: *The Principles of Psychology*, chap. xviii.

"To familiarize ourselves with the conception, let us consider what is done with the capital invested in any of the branches of business which compose the productive industry of a country. A manufacturer, for example, has one part of his capital in the form of buildings, fitted and destined for carrying on this branch of manufacture. Another part he has in the form of machinery. A third consists, if he be a spinner, of raw cotton, flax, or wool; if a weaver, of flaxen, woollen, silk, or cotton, thread; and the like, according to the nature of the manufacture. Food and clothing for his operatives, it is not the custom of the present age that he should directly provide; and few capitalists, except the producers of food or clothing, have any portion worth mentioning of their capital in that shape. Instead of this, each capitalist has money, which he pays to his workpeople, and so enables them to supply themselves: he has also finished goods in his warehouses, by the sale of which he obtains more money, to employ in the same manner, as well as to replenish his stock of materials, to keep his buildings and machinery in repair, and to replace them when worn out. His money and finished goods, however, are not wholly capital, for he does not wholly devote them to these purposes: he employs a part of the one, and of the proceeds of the other, in supplying his personal consumption and that of his family, or in hiring grooms or valets, or maintaining hunters and hounds, or in educating his children, or in paying taxes, or in charity. What then is his capital? Precisely that part of his possessions, whatever it be, which he designs to employ in carrying on fresh production. It is of no consequence that a part, or even the whole of it, is in a form in which it cannot directly supply the wants of labourers."¹

Exposition often deals with general notions, as in the preceding examples; but to say, as some writers do, that it deals exclusively with the general, never with the concrete, is to go altogether too far. Exposition not confined to the general. Mr. Bryce's book on "The American Commonwealth" is as truly an exposition as Guizot's book on "Representative Government;" Professor Huxley's paper on "A Piece

¹ J. S. Mill: *Principles of Political Economy*, book i. chap. iv.

of Chalk" is as truly an exposition as Mr. Tyndall's book on "Heat as a Mode of Motion." An analysis of an individual character in real life or in a work of the imagination, a criticism of a book or of a piece of acting, may be and usually is in the nature of an exposition. So is a scientific paper in which the writer takes his readers step by step through processes of investigation which he has himself gone through. So is the following passage, in which Daniel Webster uses a hypothetical case to show the consequences of carrying his opponent's views into action:—

THE NULLIFYING ACT.

"And now, Mr. President, let me run the honorable gentleman's [Senator Hayne's] doctrine a little into its practical application. Let us look at his probable *modus operandi*. If a thing can be done, an ingenious man can tell *how* it is to be done, and I wish to be informed *how* this State interference is to be put in practice, without violence, bloodshed, and rebellion. We will take the existing case of the tariff law. South Carolina is said to have made up her opinion upon it. If we do not repeal it (as we probably shall not), she will then apply to the case the remedy of her doctrine. She will, we must suppose, pass a law of her legislature, declaring the several acts of Congress, usually called the tariff laws, null and void, so far as they respect South Carolina, or the citizens thereof. So far, all is a paper transaction, and easy enough. But the collector at Charleston is collecting the duties imposed by these tariff laws. He, therefore, must be stopped. The collector will seize the goods if the tariff duties are not paid. The State authorities will undertake their rescue, the marshal, with his posse, will come to the collector's aid, and here the contest begins. The militia of the State will be called out to sustain the nullifying act. They will march, Sir, under a very gallant leader; for I believe the honorable member himself commands the militia of that part of the State. He will raise the NULLIFYING ACT on his standard, and spread it out as his banner! It will have a preamble, setting forth, that the tariff laws are palpable, deliberate, and dangerous

violations of the Constitution! He will proceed, with this banner flying, to the custom-house in Charleston,

'All the while,
Sonorous metal blowing martial sounds.'

Arrived at the custom-house, he will tell the collector that he must collect no more duties under any of the tariff laws. This he will be somewhat puzzled to say, by the way, with a grave countenance, considering what hand South Carolina herself had in that of 1816. But, Sir, the collector would not, probably, desist, at his bidding. He would show him the law of Congress, the treasury instruction, and his own oath of office. He would say, he should perform his duty, come what come might.

"Here would ensue a pause; for they say that a certain stillness precedes the tempest. The trumpeter would hold his breath awhile, and before all this military array should fall on the custom-house, collector, clerks, and all, it is very probable some of those composing it would request of their gallant commander-in-chief to be informed a little upon the point of law; for they have, doubtless, a just respect for his opinions as a lawyer, as well as for his bravery as a soldier. They know he has read Blackstone and the Constitution, as well as Turenne and Vauban. They would ask him, therefore, something concerning their rights in this matter. They would inquire, whether it was not somewhat dangerous to resist a law of the United States. What would be the nature of their offence, they would wish to learn, if they, by military force and array, resisted the execution in Carolina of a law of the United States, and it should turn out, after all, that the law *was constitutional*? He would answer, of course, Treason. No lawyer could give any other answer. John Fries, he would tell them, had learned that, some years ago. How, then, they would ask, do you propose to defend us? We are not afraid of bullets, but treason has a way of taking people off that we do not much relish. How do you propose to defend us? 'Look at my floating banner,' he would reply; 'see there the *nullifying law*!' Is it your opinion, gallant commander, they would then say, that, if we should be indicted for treason, that same floating banner of yours would make a good plea in bar? 'South Carolina is a sovereign State,' he would reply. That is true; but would the judge admit our plea? 'These tariff laws,' he would repeat, 'are unconstitutional, palpably,

deliberately, dangerously.' That may all be so; but if the tribunal should not happen to be of that opinion, shall we swing for it? We are ready to die for our country, but it is rather an awkward business, this dying without touching the ground! After all, that is a sort of hemp tax worse than any part of the tariff. Mr. President, the honorable gentleman would be in a dilemma, like that of another great general. He would have a knot before him which he could not untie. He must cut it with his sword. He must say to his followers, 'Defend yourselves with your bayonets;' and this is war, — civil war."¹

Nothing could better show the exact nature of Mr. Hayne's proposition to nullify the laws of the United States peaceably than this exposition of the practical effects of nullification.

Since the aim of all expository writing is to enable the reader to understand the subject expounded, the paramount quality in all such writing should be clearness. "An obscure explanation is," as Dr. Phelps says, "a self-contradiction."² To secure clearness in an exposition as a whole, it is necessary to choose a subject which can be adequately treated within the prescribed limits, to frame the title in words that express or at least suggest the exact subject, and to make (either on paper or in the mind) a general plan of the whole. If all this is done at the outset, the foundations are laid for a successful piece of work; if it is not done, the chances are that even valuable materials will come to naught. To secure clearness in detail, it is necessary to present each part distinctly. To this end precision in the use of language should be studied: terms that are obscure or ambiguous should be defined,³ the meaning of every sentence susceptible of more than one construc-

¹ Daniel Webster: Second Speech on Foot's Resolution, Jan. 26, 1830.

² Austin Phelps: The Theory of Preaching, lect. xii.

³ See page 95.

tion should be fixed, and the relation between sentence and sentence should be made perfectly plain.

The following passage is taken from a writer whose expositions of abstruse questions are unusually clear: —

THE SENSE IN WHICH THE LAWS OF NATURE ARE EXACT.

"I suppose there is hardly a physical student (unless he has specially considered the matter) who would not at once assent to the statement I have just made; that if we knew all about it, Nature would be found universally subject to exact numerical laws. But let us just consider for another moment what this means.

"The word 'exact' has a practical and a theoretical meaning. When a grocer weighs you out a certain quantity of sugar very carefully, and says it is exactly a pound, he means that the difference between the mass of the sugar and that of the pound weight he employs is too small to be detected by his scales. If a chemist had made a special investigation, wishing to be as accurate as he could, and told you this was exactly a pound of sugar, he would mean that the mass of the sugar differed from that of a certain standard piece of platinum by a quantity too small to be detected by *his* means of weighing, which are a thousandfold more accurate than the grocer's. But what would a mathematician mean, if he made the same statement? He would mean this: Suppose the mass of the standard pound to be represented by a length, say a foot, measured on a certain line; so that half a pound would be represented by six inches, and so on. And let the difference between the mass of the sugar and that of the standard pound be drawn upon the same line to the same scale. Then, if that difference were magnified an infinite number of times, it would still be invisible. This is the theoretical meaning of exactness; the practical meaning is only very close approximation; *how* close, depends upon the circumstances. The knowledge then of an exact law in the theoretical sense would be equivalent to an infinite observation. I do not say that such knowledge is impossible to man; but I do say that it would be absolutely different in kind from any knowledge that we possess at present."¹

¹ William Kingdon Clifford: Lectures and Essays; On the Aims and Instruments of Scientific Thought.

In exposition more than in any other species of composition a writer should avoid excessive conciseness. He should omit nothing that is necessary to a full explanation of the subject; for an exposition that is clear as far as it goes may fail because it is not adequate. In order to make an exposition adequate, a writer should dwell on the most difficult questions, presenting them, if necessary, in different lights and from different points of view; and he should not hesitate to repeat himself whenever repetition is desirable, either for the sake of presenting a novel thought in more ways than one, or for the sake of summing up each part or the whole of a complicated essay. The difference between judicious and injudicious repetition is not so much in the amount of repetition as in the selection of the place for it, and in the skill or the want of skill with which it is managed.

Of judicious repetition in expository writing Burke was a master.¹ So was Cardinal Newman, as the following passage will show:—

TRUE EDUCATION.

“Nor indeed am I supposing that there is any great danger, at least in this day, of over-education; the danger is on the other side. I will tell you, Gentlemen, what has been the practical error of the last twenty years, — not to load the memory of the student with a mass of undigested knowledge, but to force upon him so much that he has rejected all. It has been the error of distracting and enfeebling the mind by an unmeaning profusion of subjects; of implying that a smattering in a dozen branches of study is not shallowness, which it really is, but enlargement, which it is not; of considering an acquaintance with the learned names of things and persons, and the possession of clever duodecimos, and attendance on eloquent lectures, and membership with scientific institutions, and the sight of the experiments of a platform and the

¹ See pages 150, 151.

specimens of a museum, that all this was not dissipation of mind, but progress. All things now are to be learned at once, not first one thing, then another, not one well, but many badly. Learning is to be without exertion, without attention, without toil; without grounding, without advance, without finishing. There is to be nothing individual in it; and this, forsooth, is the wonder of the age. What the steam engine does with matter, the printing press is to do with mind; it is to act mechanically, and the population is to be passively, almost unconsciously enlightened, by the mere multiplication and dissemination of volumes. Whether it be the school boy, or the school girl, or the youth at college, or the mechanic in the town, or the politician in the senate, all have been the victims in one way or other of this most preposterous and pernicious of delusions. . . .

. . . “A thorough knowledge of one science and a superficial acquaintance with many, are not the same thing; a smattering of a hundred things or a memory for detail, is not a philosophical or comprehensive view. Recreations are not education; accomplishments are not education. Do not say, the people must be educated, when, after all, you only mean, amused, refreshed, soothed, put into good spirits and good humour, or kept from vicious excesses. I do not say that such amusements, such occupations of mind, are not a great gain; but they are not education. You may as well call drawing and fencing education, as a general knowledge of botany or conchology. Stuffing birds or playing stringed instruments is an elegant pastime, and a resource to the idle, but it is not education; it does not form or cultivate the intellect. Education is a high word; it is the preparation for knowledge, and it is the imparting of knowledge in proportion to that preparation. We require intellectual eyes to know withal, as bodily eyes for sight. We need both objects and organs intellectual; we cannot gain them without setting about it; we cannot gain them in our sleep, or by hap-hazard. The best telescope does not dispense with eyes; the printing press or the lecture room will assist us greatly, but we must be true to ourselves, we must be parties in the work. A University is, according to the usual designation, an Alma Mater, knowing her children one by one, not a foundry or a mint, or a treadmill.”¹

¹ Cardinal Newman: The Idea of a University; University Teaching, Knowledge viewed in Relation to Learning.

In this passage there is only one leading thought; but that thought is presented in so many distinct ways, with such force of language, such fertility of illustration, that the reader, far from being bored, gains something by each new presentation.

To secure clearness in exposition a writer should pay special attention to orderly arrangement. "Good arrangement is at least one half of sound exposition. Clearness secured by method. Order is often equivalent to explanation." In the matter of arrangement no one method can be prescribed as the best in all cases; but in each case one method should be pursued throughout. As a rule, an exposition should begin with what needs least explanation, and should go on to the more and more difficult; but there may be reasons in the nature of the subject or in the capacity of the persons addressed for pursuing the opposite course. Sometimes it may be expedient to begin by setting forth in a compendious form the central idea of the exposition, and then gradually to develop that idea till the reader sees all that it contains; or it may be expedient to begin with details and move from them to the whole: that is, the method may be either analytic or synthetic.

Whatever method is adopted should be plain and straightforward from beginning to end. Every part of the subject, small or large, should lead from what precedes to what follows; the misplacement of a single part may make an exposition obscure. The value of method in exposition is shown in the following passage from Addison:—

CHEERFULNESS.

"I have always preferred cheerfulness to mirth. The latter I consider as an act, the former as a habit of the mind. Mirth is short and transient, cheerfulness fixed and permanent. Those are

often raised into the greatest transports of mirth who are subject to the greatest depressions of melancholy. On the contrary, cheerfulness, though it does not give the mind such an exquisite gladness, prevents us from falling into any depths of sorrow. Mirth is like a flash of lightning, that breaks through a gloom of clouds, and glitters for a moment; cheerfulness keeps up a kind of daylight in the mind, and fills it with a steady and perpetual serenity.

"Men of austere principles look upon mirth as too wanton and dissolute for a state of probation, and as filled with a certain triumph and insolence of heart that is inconsistent with a life which is every moment obnoxious to the greatest dangers. Writers of this complexion have observed, that the Sacred Person who was the great pattern of perfection was never seen to laugh.

"Cheerfulness of mind is not liable to any of these exceptions; it is of a serious and composed nature; it does not throw the mind into a condition improper for the present state of humanity, and is very conspicuous in the characters of those who are looked upon as the greatest philosophers among the heathens, as well as among those who have been deservedly esteemed as saints and holy men among Christians.

"If we consider cheerfulness in three lights, with regard to ourselves, to those we converse with, and to the great Author of our being, it will not a little recommend itself on each of these accounts. The man who is possessed of this excellent frame of mind, is not only easy in his thoughts, but a perfect master of all the powers and faculties of the soul. His imagination is always clear, and his judgment undisturbed; his temper is even and unruffled, whether in action or in solitude. He comes with a relish to all those goods which nature has provided for him, tastes all the pleasures of the creation which are poured about him, and does not feel the full weight of those accidental evils which may befall him.

"If we consider him in relation to the persons whom he converses with, it naturally produces love and good-will towards him. A cheerful mind is not only disposed to be affable and obliging, but raises the same good-humour in those who come within its influence. A man finds himself pleased, he does not know why, with the cheerfulness of his companion. It is like a sudden sunshine that awakens a secret delight in the mind, without her attending to it. The heart rejoices of its own accord, and naturally flows