

tion; *distress* a particular state. *Distress* is properly the highest degree of *adversity*. When a man's affairs go altogether *adverse* to his wishes and hopes, when accidents deprive him of his possessions or blast his prospects, he is said to be in *adversity*; but when in addition to this he is reduced to a state of want, deprived of friends and all prospect of relief, his situation is that of real *distress*. *Adversity* is trying, *distress* is overwhelming. Every man is liable to *adversity*, although few are reduced to *distress* but by their own fault.

The other extreme which these considerations should arm the heart of a man against, is utter despondency of mind in a time of pressing *adversity*. SOUTH.

Most men who are at length delivered from any great *distress*, indeed find that they are so by ways they never thought of. SOUTH.

TO ADVERTISE, PUBLISH.

ADVERTISE, from the Latin *adverto*, compounded of *ad* and *verto*, to turn to, signifies to turn the attention to a thing. PUBLISH, in Latin *publico*, that is, *facere publicum*, signifies to make public.

Advertise denotes the means, and *publish* the end. To *advertise* is to direct the public attention to any event by means of a printed circular; *publish* is to make known either by oral or printed communication. We *publish* by *advertising*, but we do not always *advertise* when we *publish*. Mercantile and civil transactions are conducted by means of *advertisements*. Extraordinary circumstances are speedily *published* in a neighborhood by circulating from mouth to mouth.

Every man that *advertises* his own excellence should write with some consciousness of a character which dares to call the attention of the public. JOHNSON.

The criticisms which I have hitherto *published* have been made with an intention rather to discover beauties and excellences in the writers of my own time, than to *publish* any of their faults and imperfections. ADDISON.

ADVICE, COUNSEL, INSTRUCTION.

ADVICE, *v. To Admonish*. COUNSEL, in French *conseil*, Latin *consilium*, comes from *consilio*, compounded of *con* and *salio*, to leap together, signifying to run or act in accordance; and in an extended sense implies deliberation, or the thing deliberated upon, determined, and pre-

scribed. INSTRUCTION, in French *instruction*, Latin *instructio*, comes from *in* and *struo*, to dispose or regulate, signifying the thing laid down by way of regulating.

The end of all the actions implied by these words is the communication of knowledge, and all of them include the accessory idea of superiority, either of age, station, knowledge, or talent. *Advice* flows from superior professional knowledge, or an acquaintance with things in general; *counsel* regards superior wisdom, or a superior acquaintance with moral principles and practice; *instruction* respects superior local knowledge in particular transactions. A medical man gives *advice* to his patient; a father gives *counsel* to his children; a counsellor gives *advice* to his client in points of law; he receives *instructions* from him in matters of fact. *Advice* should be prudent and cautious; *counsel* sage and deliberative; *instructions* clear and positive. *Advice* is given on all the concerns of life, important or otherwise; *counsel* is employed for grave and weighty matters; *instruction* is used on official occasions. Men of business are best able to give *advice* in mercantile transactions. In all measures that involve our future happiness, it is prudent to take the *counsel* of those who are more experienced than ourselves. An ambassador must not act without *instructions* from his court.

In what manner can one give *advice* to a youth in the pursuit and possession of pleasure? STEELE.

Young persons are commonly inclined to slight the remarks and *counsels* of their elders. JOHNSON.

Some convey their *instructions* to us in the best chosen words. ADDISON.

AFFABLE, COURTEOUS.

AFFABLE, in Latin *affabilis*, from *af* or *ad*, to, and *for*, to speak, signifies ready to speak or be spoken with, and is particularly applied to persons in a higher condition; princes and nobles are commonly said to be *affable* when they converse freely with those not in the same condition.

Charles (II.), says Cibber, was often seen here (in St. James's Park) amidst crowds of spectators, feeding his ducks and playing with his dogs, and

passing his idle moments in *affability* even to the meanest of his subjects; which made him to be adored by the common people. PENNANT.

Affability is properly confined to verbal communication; but COURTEOUSNESS, from the word *court*, signifying after the manner of a court or courtier, refers to actions and manners; *affability* flows from the natural temper; *courteousness* from good-breeding, or the acquired temper.

She sighs and says, forsooth, and cries heigh-ho! She'll take ill words o' th' steward and the servants,

Yet answer *affably* and modestly.

BEAUMONT AND FLETCHER.

Whereat the Elfin knight with speeches went Him first saluted, who, well as he might, Him fair salutes again, as seemeth *courteous* knight. WEST.

AFFAIR, BUSINESS, CONCERN.

AFFAIR, in French *affaire*, is compounded of *af* or *ad* and *faire*, in Latin *facio*, to make or do, signifying the thing that is made, done, or that takes place for a person, or for a given purpose. BUSINESS, from *busy* (*v. Active*), signifies the thing that makes or interests a person, or with which he is busy or occupied. CONCERN, in French *concerner*, Latin *concerno*, compounded of *con* and *cerno*, to look, signifies the thing looked at, thought of, or taken part in.

An *affair* is what happens; a *business* is what busies; a *concern* is what is felt. An *affair* is general; it respects one, many, or all: every *business* and *concern* is an *affair*, though not *vice versa*. *Business* and *concern* are personal; *business* is that which engages the attention; *concern* is that which interests the feelings, prospects, and condition, advantageously or otherwise. An *affair* is important; a *business* is serious; a *concern* momentous. The usurpation of power is an *affair* which interests a nation; the adjusting a difference is a *business* most suited to the ministers of religion; to make one's peace with one's Maker is the *concern* of every individual. *Affairs* are administered; *business* is transacted; *concerns* are managed. The *affairs* of the world are administered by a Divine Providence. Those who are in the practice of the law require peculiar talents to fit them for transacting the complicated *business*,

which perpetually offers itself. Some men are so involved in the *affairs* of this world, as to forget the *concerns* of the next, which ought to be nearest and dearest to them.

I remember in Tully's epistle, in the recommendation of a man to an *affair* which had no manner of relation to money, it is said, you may trust him, for he is a frugal man. STEELE.

We may indeed say that our part does not suit us, and that we could perform another better; but this, says Epictetus, is not our *business*.

ADDISON.

The sense of other men ought to prevail over us in things of less consideration; but not in *concerns* where truth and honor are engaged. STEELE.

TO AFFECT, CONCERN.

AFFECT, in French *affecter*, Latin *affectum*, participle of *afficio*, compounded of *ad* and *facio*, to do or act, signifies to act upon. CONCERN (*v. Affair*).

Things *affect* us which produce any change in our outward circumstances; they *concern* us if connected with our circumstances in any shape. Whatever *affects* must *concern*; but all that *concerns* does not *affect*. The price of corn *affects* the interest of the seller; and therefore it *concerns* him to keep it up, without regard to the public good or injury. Things *affect* either persons or things; but they *concern* persons only. Rain *affects* the hay or corn; and these matters *concern* every one more or less.

We see that every different species of sensible creatures has its different notions of beauty, and that each of them is *affected* with the beauties of its own kind. ADDISON.

This gives all Europe, in my opinion, too close and connected a *concern* in what is done in France. BURKE.

Affect and *concern* have an analogous meaning likewise, when taken for the influence on the mind. We are *affected* by things when our *affections* only are awakened by them: we are *concerned* when our understanding and wishes are engaged. We may be *affected* either with joy or sorrow: we are *concerned* only in a painful manner. People of tender sensibility are easily *affected*: irritable people are *concerned* about trifles. It is natural for every one to be *affected* at the recital of misfortunes; but there are people of so cold and selfish a character as not to be *concerned* about anything which

does not immediately *affect* their own persons or property.

An ennobling property of it (religious pleasures) is, that it is such a nature that it never satiates; for it properly *affects* the spirit, and a spirit feels no weariness. SOUTH.

Without *concern* he hears, but hears from far,
Of tumults, and descents, and distant war. DRYDEN.

TO AFFECT, ASSUME.

AFFECT, in this sense, derives its origin immediately from the Latin *affecto*, to desire after eagerly, signifying to aim at or aspire after. ASSUME, in Latin *assumo*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *sumo*, to take, signifies to take to one's self.

To *affect* is to use forced efforts to appear to have that which one has not; to *assume* is to appropriate to one's self that which one has no right to have. One *affects* to have fine feelings, and *assumes* great importance. *Affectation* springs from the desire of appearing better than we really are; *assumption* from the thinking ourselves better than we really are. We *affect* the virtues which we have not; we *assume* the character which does not belong to us. An *affected* person is always thinking of others; an *assuming* person thinks only of himself. The *affected* man strives to gain applause by appearing to be what he is not; the *assuming* man demands respect upon the ground of what he supposes himself to be. Hypocrisy is often the companion of *affectation*, self-conceit always that of *assumption*.

In conversation the medium is neither to *affect* silence or eloquence. STERNE.

Laughs not the heart when giants big with pride
Assume the pompous port, the martial part? CHURCHILL.

To *affect* is always taken in a bad sense; but to *assume* may be sometimes an indifferent action at least, if not justifiable. Men always *affect* that which is supposed to please others, in order to gain their applause; but they sometimes *assume* a name or an authority, which is no more than their just right.

He had the spleen to a high degree, and *affect*-ed an extravagant behavior. BURNET.

This when the various gods had urg'd in vain,
He straight *assum'd* his native form again. POPE.

TO AFFECT, PRETEND TO.

AFFECT, *v.* To *affect*, *concern*. PRETEND, in Latin *pretendo*, that is, *præ* and *tendo*, signifies to hold or stretch one thing before another by way of a blind.

These terms are synonymous only in the bad sense of setting forth to others what is not real: we *affect* by putting on a false air; we *pretend* by making a false declaration. Art is employed in *affecting*; assurance and self-complacency in *pretending*. A person *affects* not to hear what it is convenient for him not to answer; he *pretends* to have forgotten what it is convenient for him not to recollect. One *affects* the manners of a gentleman, and *pretends* to gentility of birth. One *affects* the character and habits of a scholar; one *pretends* to learning. To *affect* the qualities which we have not spoils those which we have; to *pretend* to attainments which we have not made, obliges us to have recourse to falsehoods in order to escape detection.

Self quite put off, *affects* with too much art
To put on Woodward in each mangled part. CHURCHILL.

There is something so natively great and good in a person that is truly devout, that an awkward man may as well *pretend* to be genteel as a hypocrite to be pious. STEELE.

AFFECTED, DISPOSED.

AFFECTED (*v.* To *affect*, *concern*) signifies moved or acted upon by any particular circumstance, as to be *affected* at any spectacle. DISPOSED, from *dispose*, to settle or put in order, signifies settled or determined as to one's purpose; as *disposed* to do a good turn.

She (the prophetess) was not always *affected* in the same manner: for if the spirit was in a kind and gentle humor her rage was not very violent. POTTER.

When Jove, *disposed* to tempt Saturnia's spleen,
Thus wak'd the fury of his partial queen. POPE.

Affected likewise signifies to be *affected* with a particular sentiment, which brings it nearer to the sense of *disposed* in denoting a state of mind, but *disposed* in this case implies a settled if not an habitual temper, *affection* a temporary and partial state: subjects are either well or ill *affected* to their government; people are either well or ill *disposed* as regards their moral character or principles.

He being designed governor of the city of Dublin, landed there the last day of December, 1641, to the great joy and comfort of all his Majesty's Protestant and well *affected* subjects. TEMPLE.

Private life, which is the nursery of the Commonwealth, is yet in general pure and *disposed* to virtue. BURKE.

AFFECTION, LOVE.

AFFECTION, from the verb *affect* (*v.* To *affect*), denotes the state of being kindly *affected* toward a person. LOVE, in low German *leeve*, high German *liebe*, like the English *lieve*, low German *leef*, high German *lieb*, dear or pleasing, is connected with the Latin *libet*, it is pleasing, and by metathesis with the Greek *φίλος*, dear, signifying the state of holding a person dear.

These two words are comparable, inasmuch as they denote a sentiment toward any object: they differ both in the nature of the object and the nature of the sentiment. *Affection* is private or confined to one or more particular individuals; *love* is either general or particular: it either embraces all objects capable of awakening the sentiment, or it is confined to particular objects: in the former case *love* expresses the sentiment of the Divine Being toward all His creatures, and also that of man to the rest of his fellow-creatures.

Those who will not feel Him in his *love* will be sure to feel Him in his displeasure. ADDISON.

When applied to particular objects, *love* is a much warmer sentiment than *affection*. The latter subsists between persons of the same sex, the former in a particular manner between persons of a different sex. *Affection* is a tender and durable sentiment, a chastened feeling under the control of the understanding which promises no more pleasure than it gives; *love* is an ardent sentiment which, as between the sexes, has all the characteristics of a passion; being exclusive, restless, and fluctuating. *Love* may subsist before marriage, but it must terminate in *affection* in order to insure happiness after marriage.

But thou whose years are more to mine allied,
No fate my vow'd *affection* shall divide
From thee, heroic youth! DRYDEN.

The poets, the moralists, the painters, in all their descriptions, allegories, and pictures, have

represented *love* as a soft torment, a bitter sweet, a pleasing pain, or an agreeable distress. ADDISON.

Between the words *affection* and *love* there is this further distinction, that the former does not always imply a kindly or favorable sentiment; there may be an ill as well as a good *affection*: the *affections* of a people to a government may be various; the *affection* of a prince may change from favor to disfavor toward a subject.

Though every man might give his vote which way he pleased, yet, if he thwarted the Roman designs, he was looked upon with a jealous eye, as an ill *affected* person. POTTER.

AFFECTIONATE, KIND, FOND.

AFFECTIONATE, from *affection* (*v.* *Affection*), denotes the quality of having *affection*. KIND, from the word *kind*, kindred or family, denotes the quality or feeling engendered by the family tie. FOND, from the Saxon *fandian*, to gape, and the German *finden*, to find or seek, denotes a vehement attachment to a thing.

Affectionate characterizes the feeling; *kind* has mostly a reference to the action: *affectionate* is directed to a particular object; *kind* to objects generally. Relations are *affectionate* to each other, persons may be *kind* to any one, even to mere strangers.

Faithful remembrancer of one so dear!
Oh, welcome guest, though unexpected here;
Who biddest me honor with an artless song,
Affectionate, a mother lost so long.
COWPER: *On the Receipt of my Mother's Picture*.

Richard was particularly *kind* to his favorite city (Chester). PENNANT.

So toward animals generally we may be *kind*, and toward favorite animals *affectionate*.

They (the Arabs) never beat or correct their horses, but treat them with *kindness*, even with *affection*. GOLDSMITH.

As epithets, these words observe the same distinction; a mother or a child is *affectionate*, a master *kind*; looks, or whatever serve to express *affection*, are said most appropriately to be *affectionate*; offices, or any actions prompted by the general sentiment of *kindness*, are called *kind*.

Our salutations were very hearty on both sides, consisting of many *kind* shakes of the hand, and

affectionate looks which we cast upon one another.

ADDISON.

Affectionate and *kind* are always taken in the good sense for a proper sentiment; *fondness* is an excess of liking for any object, which, whether it be a person or a thing, is more or less reprehensible; children are always *fond* of whatever affords them pleasure, or of whoever gives them indulgences.

Riches expose a man to pride and luxury, a foolish elation of heart, and too great *fondness* for the present world.

ADDISON.

TO AFFIRM, ASSEVERATE, ASSURE, VOUCH, AVER, PROTEST.

AFFIRM, in French *affirmer*, Latin *affirmo*, compounded of *af* or *ad* and *firmo*, to strengthen, signifies to give strength to what has been said. ASSEVERATE, in Latin *asseveratus*, participle of *assevero*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *severus*, signifies to make strong and positive. ASSURE, in French *assurer*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *as* or *ad* and *sure*, signifying to make sure. VOUCH is probably changed from *vou*. AVER, in French *averer*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *a* or *ad* and *verus*, true, signifying to bear testimony to the truth. PROTEST, in French *protester*, Latin *pro-testo*, is compounded of *pro* and *testor*, to call to witness as to what we think about a thing. All these terms indicate an expression of a person's conviction.

In one sense, to *affirm* is to declare that a thing is, in opposition to denying or declaring that it is not; in the sense here chosen, it signifies to declare a thing as a fact on our credit. To *asseverate* is to declare it with confidence. To *vouch* is to rest the truth of another's declaration on our own responsibility. To *aver* is to express the truth of a declaration unequivocally. To *protest* is to declare a thing solemnly, and with strong marks of sincerity. *Affirmations* are made of the past and present; a person *affirms* what he has seen and what he sees. *Asseverations* are strong *affirmations*, made in cases of doubt to remove every impression disadvantageous to one's sincerity. *Assurances* are made of the past, present, and future; they mark the conviction of the speaker as to what has been, or is, and his intentions as to what shall be;

they are appeals to the estimation which another has in one's word. *Vouching* is an act for another; it is the supporting of another's *assurance* by our own. *Averring* is employed in matters of fact; we *aver* as to the accuracy of details; we *aver* on positive knowledge that sets aside all question. *Protestations* are stronger than either *asseverations* or *assurances*; they are accompanied with every act, look, or gesture, that can tend to impress conviction on another.

Affirmations are employed in giving evidence, whether accompanied with an oath or not; liars deal much in *asseverations* and *protestations*. People *asseverate* in order to produce a conviction of their veracity; they *protest* in order to obtain a belief of their innocence; they *aver* where they expect to be believed. *Assurances* are altogether personal; they are always made to satisfy some one of what they wish to know and believe. We ought to be sparing of our *assurances* of regard for another. Whenever we *affirm* anything on the authority of another, we ought to be particularly cautious not to *vouch* for its veracity if it be not unquestionable.

An infidel, and fear?

Fear what? a dream? a fable?—How thy dread, Unwilling evidence, and therefore strong, Affords my cause an undesign'd support! How disbelief *affirms* what it denies! YOUNG

I judge in this case as Charles the Second victualled his navy, with the bread which one of his dogs chose of several pieces thrown before him, rather than trust to the *asseverations* of the victuallers. STEELE.

My learned friend *assured* me that the earth had lately received a shock from a comet that crossed its vertex. STEELE.

All the great writers of the Augustan age, for whom singly we have so great an esteem, stand up together as *vouchers* for one another's reputation. ADDISON.

Among ladies, he positively *averred* that nonsense was the most prevailing part of eloquence, and had so little complaisance as to say, "a woman is never taken by her reason, but always by her passion." STEELE.

TO AFFIRM, ASSERT.

AFFIRM, *v.* To *affirm*, *asseverate*. ASSERT, in Latin *assertus*, participle of *as-sero*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *sero*, to connect, signifies to connect words into a proposition. To *affirm* is said of facts; to *assert*, of opinions; we *affirm* what we

know; we *assert* what we believe. Whoever *affirms* what he does not know to be true is guilty of falsehood; whoever *asserts* what he cannot prove to be true is guilty of folly. We contradict an *affirmation*; we confute an *assertion*.

That this man, wise and virtuous as he was, passed always unentangled through the snares of life, it would be prejudice and temerity to *affirm*.

JOHNSON'S LIFE OF COLLINS.

It is *asserted* by a tragic poet, that "est miser nemo nisi comparatus"—"no man is miserable, but as he is compared with others happier than himself." This position is not strictly and philosophically true. JOHNSON.

TO AFFIX, SUBJOIN, ATTACH, ANNEX.

AFFIX, in Latin *affixus*, participle of *affigo*, compounded of *af* or *ad* and *figo*, to fix, signifies to fix to a thing. SUBJOIN is compounded of *sub* and *join*, signifying to join to the lower or farther extremity of a body. ATTACH, *v.* To *adhere*. ANNEX, in Latin *annexus*, participle of *annecto*, compounded of *an* or *ad* and *necto*, to knit, signifies to knit or tie to a thing.

To *affix* is to put anything as an essential to any whole; to *subjoin* is to put anything as a subordinate part to a whole: in the former case, the part to which it is put is not specified; in the latter, the syllable *sub* specifies the extremity as the part: to *attach* is to make one person or thing *adhere* to another by a particular tie mostly in the moral sense; to *annex* is to bring things into a general connection with each other. A title is *affixed* to a book; a few lines are *subjoined* to a letter by way of postscript; we *attach* blame to a person; a certain territory is *annexed* to a kingdom. Letters are *affixed* to words in order to modify their sense, or names are *affixed* to ideas: it is necessary to *subjoin* remarks to what requires illustration: we are apt from prejudice or particular circumstances to *attach* disgrace to certain professions, which are not only useful but important; papers are *annexed* by way of appendix to some important transaction.

He that has settled in his mind determined ideas, with names *affixed* to them, will be able to discern their differences one from another.

LOCKE.

In justice to the opinion which I would wish to impress of the amiable character of Pisistratus,

I *subjoin* to this paper some explanation of the word tyrant. CUMBERLAND.

As our nature is at present constituted, *attached* by so many strong connections to the world of sense, and enjoying a communication so feeble and distant with the world of spirits, we need fear no danger from cultivating intercourse with the latter as much as possible. BLAIR.

The evils inseparably *annexed* to the present condition are numerous and afflictive. JOHNSON.

TO AFFLICT, DISTRESS, TROUBLE.

AFFLICT, in Latin *afflictus*, participle of *affligo*, compounded of *af* or *ad* and *figo*, in Greek *ἐπιβω*, to press hard, signifies to bear upon any one. DISTRESS, *v.* Adversity. TROUBLE signifies to cause a tumult, from the Latin *turba*, Greek *τὸρβη* or *θορβος*, a tumult.

When these terms relate to outward circumstances, the first expresses more than the second, and the second more than the third. People are *afflicted* with grievous maladies. The mariner is *distressed* for want of water in the midst of the wide ocean; or an embarrassed tradesman is *distressed* for money to maintain his credit. The mechanic is *troubled* for want of proper tools, or the head of a family for want of good domestics.

A melancholy tear *afflicts* my eye,
And my heart labors with a sudden sigh. PRIOR.
I often did beguile her of her tears
When I did speak of some *distressful* stroke
That my youth suffered. SHAKESPEARE.

The boy so *troubles* me
'Tis past enduring. SHAKESPEARE.

When they respect the inward feelings, *afflict* conveys the idea of deep sorrow; *distress* that of sorrow mixed with anxiety; *trouble* that of pain in a smaller degree. The death of a parent *afflicts*; the misfortunes of our family and friends *distress*; crosses in trade and domestic inconveniences *trouble*. In the season of *affliction* prayer affords the best consolation and surest support. The assistance and sympathy of friends serve to relieve *distress*. We may often help ourselves out of our *troubles*, and remove the evil by patience and perseverance. *Afflictions* may be turned to benefits if they lead a man to turn inwardly into himself, and examine the state of his heart and conscience in the sight of his Maker. The *distresses* of human life often serve only

to enhance the value of our pleasures when we regain them. Among the *troubles* with which we are daily assailed, many of them are too trifling for us to be *troubled* by them.

We last night received a piece of ill news at our club which very sensibly *afflicted* every one of us. I question not but my readers themselves will be *troubled* at the hearing of it. To keep them no longer in suspense, Sir Roger de Coverley is dead.

While the mind contemplates *distress*, it is acted upon and never acts, and by indulging in this contemplation it becomes more and more unfit for action.

AFFLICTION, GRIEF, SORROW.

AFFLICTION, *v.* To *afflict*. **GRIEF**, from *grieve*, in German *grämen*, Swedish *gramga*, etc. **SORROW**, in German *sorge*, etc., signifies care, as well as sorrow.

All these words mark a state of suffering which differs either in the degree or the cause, or in both. *Affliction* is much stronger than *grief*; it lies deeper in the soul, and arises from a more powerful cause; the loss of what is most dear, the continued sickness of our friends, or a reverse of fortune, will all cause *affliction*: the misfortunes of others, the failure of our favorite schemes, the troubles of our country, will occasion us *grief*. *Sorrow* is less than *grief*; it arises from the untoward circumstances which perpetually arise in life. A disappointment, the loss of a game, our own mistake, or the negligences of others, cause *sorrow*. *Affliction* lies too deep to be vehement; it discovers itself by no striking marks in the exterior; it is lasting, and does not cease when the external causes cease to act: *grief* may be violent, and discover itself by loud and indecorous signs; it is transitory, and ceases even before the cause which gave birth to it: *sorrow* discovers itself by a simple expression; it is still more transient than *grief*, not existing beyond the moment in which it is produced. A person of a tender mind is *afflicted* at the remembrance of his sins; he is *grieved* at the consciousness of his fallibility and proneness to error; he is *sorry* for the faults which he has committed. *Affliction* is allayed: *grief* subsides: *sorrow* is soothed.

I do remember now: henceforth I'll bear
Affliction, till it do cry out itself
Enough, enough, and die.

SHAKESPEARE.

The melancholy silence that follows hereupon, and continues until he has recovered himself enough to reveal his mind to his friend, raises in the spectators a *grief* that is inexpressible.

ADDISON.

The most agreeable objects recall the *sorrow* for her with whom he used to enjoy them.

ADDISON.

TO AFFORD, YIELD, PRODUCE.

AFFORD is probably changed from *afferred*, and comes from the Latin *affero*, compounded of *af* or *ad* and *fero*, signifying to bring to a person. **YIELD**, in Saxon *geldan*, German *gelten*, to pay, restore, or give the value, is probably connected with the Hebrew *ilad*, to breed, or bring forth. **PRODUCE**, in Latin *produco*, compounded of *pro*, forth, and *duco*, to bring, signifies to bring out or into existence.

With *afford* is associated the idea of communicating a part or property of some substance to a person, by way of supply to his wants: meat *affords* nourishment to those who make use of it; the sun *affords* light and heat to all living creatures.

The generous man in the ordinary acceptance, without respect of the demands of his family, will soon find upon the foot of his account that he has sacrificed to fools, knaves, flatterers, or the deservedly unhappy, all the opportunities of *affording* any future assistance where it ought to be.

STEELE.

To *yield* is the natural operation of any substance to give up or impart the parts or properties inherent in it; it is the natural surrender which an object makes of itself: trees *yield* fruit; the seed *yields* grain; some sorts of grain do not *yield* much in particular soils, and in an extended application trees may be said to *yield* a shade.

Their vines a shadow to their race shall *yield*,
And the same hand that sowed shall reap the field.

POPE.

Produce conveys the idea of one thing causing another to exist, or to spring out of it; it is a species of creation, the formation of a new substance: the earth *produces* a variety of fruits; confined air will *produce* an explosion.

Their sharpen'd ends in earth their footing place,
And the dry poles *produce* a living race.

DRYDEN.

In the moral application they are similarly distinguished: nothing *affords* so

great a scope for ridicule as the follies of fashion; nothing *yields* so much satisfaction as religion; nothing *produces* so much mischief as the vice of drunkenness.

This is the consolation of all good men unto whom his ubiquity *affordeth* continual comfort and security.

BROWN.

The mind of man desireth evermore to know the truth, according to the most infallible certainty which the nature of things can *yield*.

HOOKER.

In the times we are now surveying, the Christian religion showed its full force and efficacy on the minds of men, and many examples demonstrated what great and generous souls it was capable of *producing*.

ADDISON.

TO AFFORD, SPARE.

AFFORD, *v.* To *afford*, *yield*. **SPARE**, in German *sparen*, Latin *parco*, Hebrew *perek*, to preserve, signifies here to lay apart for any particular use.

The idea of deducting from one's property with convenience is common to these terms; but *afford* respects solely expenses which are no more than commensurate with our income; *spare* is said of things in general, which we may part with without any sensible diminution of our comfort. There are few so destitute that they cannot *afford* something for the relief of others who are more destitute. He who has two things of a kind may easily *spare* one.

Accept what'er *Aeneas* can *afford*,
Untouch'd thy arms, untaken be thy sword.

DRYDEN.

How many men, in the common concerns of life, lend sums of money which they are not able to *spare*!

ADDISON.

AFFRONT, INSULT, OUTRAGE.

AFFRONT, in French *affronte*, from the Latin *ad* and *frons*, the forehead, signifies flying in the face of a person. **INSULT**, in French *insulte*, comes from the Latin *insulto*, to dance or leap upon. The former of these actions marks defiance, the latter scorn and triumph. **OUTRAGE** is compounded of *out* or *utter*, and *rage* or *violence*, signifying an act of extreme violence.

An *affront* is a mark of reproach shown in the presence of others; it piques and mortifies: an *insult* is an attack made with insolence; it irritates

and provokes: an *outrage* combines all that is offensive; it wounds and injures. An intentional breach of politeness is an *affront*: if coupled with any external indication of hostility, it is an *insult*: if it break forth into personal violence, it is an *outrage*. Captious people construe every innocent freedom into an *affront*. When people are in a state of animosity, they seek opportunities of offering each other *insults*. Intoxication or violent passion impels men to the commission of *outrages*.

The person thus conducted, who was Hannibal, seemed much disturbed, and could not forbear complaining to the board of the *affronts* he had met with among the Roman historians.

ADDISON.

It may very reasonably be expected that the old draw upon themselves the greatest part of those *insults* which they so much lament, and that age is rarely despised but when it is contemptible.

JOHNSON.

This is the round of a passionate man's life; he contracts debts when he is furious, which his virtue, if he has virtue, obliges him to discharge at the return of reason. He spends his time in *outrage* and reparation.

JOHNSON.

AFRAID, FEARFUL, TIMOROUS, TIMID.

AFRAID is changed from *afeared*, signifying in a state of fear. **FEARFUL**, as the words of which it is compounded imply, signifies full of fear. **TIMOROUS** and **TIMID** come from the Latin *timidus*, fearful, *timor*, fear, and *timeo*, to fear.

The first of these epithets denotes a temporary state, the three last a habit of the mind. *Afraid* may be used either in a physical or moral application, either as it relates to ourselves only or to others; *fearful* and *timorous* are applied only physically and personally; *timid* is mostly used in a moral sense. It is the character of the *fearful* or *timorous* person to be *afraid* of what he imagines would hurt himself; it is not necessary for the prospect of danger to exist in order to awaken fear in such a disposition: it is the characteristic of the *timid* person to be *afraid* of offending or meeting with something painful from others; a person of such a disposition is prevented from following the dictates of his own mind. Between *fearful* and *timorous* there is little distinction, either in sense or application, except that we say *fearful* of a thing, not *timorous* of a thing.

To be always *afraid* of losing life is, indeed, scarcely to enjoy a life that can deserve the care of preservation.

JOHNSON.

By I know not what impatience of raillery, he is wonderfully *fearful* of being thought too great a believer.

STEELE.

Then birds in airy space might safely move,
And *tim'rous* hares on heaths securely rove.

DRYDEN.

He who brings with him into a clamorous multitude the *timidity* of recluse speculation, will suffer himself to be driven by a burst of laughter from the fortresses of demonstration.

JOHNSON.

AFTER, BEHIND.

AFTER respects order; BEHIND respects position. One runs *after* a person, or stands *behind* his chair. *After* is used either figuratively or literally; *behind* is used only literally. Men hunt *after* amusements; misfortunes come *after* one another; a garden lies *behind* a house; a thing is concealed *behind* a bush.

Good *after* ill, and *after* pain delight,
Alternate, like the scenes of day and night.

DRYDEN.

He first, and close *behind* him followed she,
For such was Proserpine's severe decree.

DRYDEN.

TO AGGRAVATE, IRRITATE, PROVOKE, EXASPERATE, TANTALIZE.

AGGRAVATE, in Latin *aggravatus*, participle of *aggravo*, compounded of the intensive syllable *ag* or *ad* and *gravo*, to make heavy, signifies to make very heavy. IRRITATE, in Latin *irritatus*, participle of *irrito*, which is a frequentative from *ira*, signifies to excite anger. PROVOKE, in French *provoquer*, Latin *provoco*, compounded of *pro*, forth, and *voco*, to call, signifies to challenge or defy. EXASPERATE, Latin *exasperatus*, participle of *exaspero*, is compounded of the intensive syllable *ex* and *asper*, rough, signifying to make things exceedingly rough. TANTALIZE, in French *tantaliser*, Greek *τὰνταλίζω*, comes from *Tantalus*, a king of Phrygia, who, having offended the gods, was destined, by way of punishment, to stand up to his chin in water, with a tree of fair fruit hanging over his head, both of which, as he attempted to allay his hunger and thirst, fled from his touch.

All these words, except the first, refer to the feelings of the mind, and in familiar discourse that also bears the same

signification, but otherwise respects the outward circumstances. The crime of robbery is *aggravated* by any circumstances of cruelty; whatever comes across the feelings *irritates*; whatever awakens anger *provokes*; whatever heightens this anger extraordinarily *exasperates*; whatever raises hopes in order to frustrate them *tantalizes*. An appearance of unconcern for the offence and its consequences *aggravates* the guilt of the offender; a grating, harsh sound *irritates*, if long continued and often repeated; angry words *provoke*, particularly when spoken with an air of defiance: when to this are added bitter taunts and multiplied provocations, they *exasperate*: the weather, by its frequent changes, *tantalizes* those who depend upon it for amusement. Wicked people *aggravate* their transgression by violence: susceptible and nervous people are most easily *irritated*; proud people are quickly *provoked*; hot and fiery people are soonest *exasperated*; those who wish for much, and wish for it eagerly, are oftenest *tantalized*.

As if nature had not sown evils enough in life, we are continually adding grief to grief, and *aggravating* the common calamity by our cruel treatment of one another.

ADDISON.

He *irritated* many of his friends in London so much by his letters, that they withdrew their contributions.

JOHNSON'S LIFE OF SAVAGE.

The animadversions of critics are commonly such as may easily *provoke* the sedatest writer to some quickness of resentment.

JOHNSON.

Opposition retards, censure *exasperates*, or neglect depresses.

JOHNSON.

Can we think that religion was designed only for a contradiction to nature; and with the greatest and most irrational tyranny in the world to *tantalize*?

SOUTH.

AGGRESSOR, ASSAILANT.

AGGRESSOR, from the Latin *aggressor*, participle of *aggredior*, compounded of *ag* or *ad*, and *gredior*, to step, signifies one stepping up to, falling upon, or attacking. ASSAILANT comes from *assail*, in French *assaillir*, compounded of *as* or *ad*, and the Latin *salio*, to leap upon, signifies one leaping upon or attacking any one vehemently.

The characteristic idea of *aggression* is that of one person going up to another in a hostile manner, and by a natural extension of the sense commencing an at-

tack: the characteristic idea of *assailing* is that of one committing an act of violence upon another. An *aggressor* offers to do some injury either by word or deed; an *assailant* actually commits some violence: the former commences a dispute, the latter carries it on with a vehement and direct attack. An *aggressor* is blamable for giving rise to quarrels: an *assailant* is culpable for the mischief he does. Were there no *aggressors*, there would be no disputes; were there no *assailants*, those disputes would not be serious. An *aggressor* may be an *assailant*, or an *assailant* may be an *aggressor*, but they are as frequently distinct.

Where one is the *aggressor*, and in pursuance of his first attack kills the other, the law supposes the action, however sudden, to be malicious.

JOHNSON'S LIFE OF SAVAGE.

What ear so fortified and barr'd
Against the tuneful force of vocal charms,
But would with transport to such sweet *assailants*
Surrender its attention?

MASON.

AGITATION, TREPIDATION, TREMOR, EMOTION.

AGITATION, in Latin *agitatio*, from *agito*, a frequentative of *ago*, to act, signifies the state of being agitated or put into action. TREPIDATION, in Latin *trepidatio*, from *trepido*, to tremble, compounded of *treno* and *pede*, to tremble with the feet, signifies the condition of trembling in all one's limbs from head to foot. TREMOR, from the Latin *tremor*, signifies originally the same state of trembling. EMOTION, in Latin *emotio*, from *emotus*, participle of *emoveo*, compounded of *e*, out of, and *moveo*, to move, signifies the state of being moved out of rest or put in motion.

Agitation is a violent action backward and forward and in different ways. It may be applied either to the body or the mind; the body may be *agitated* or thrown into violent and irregular motion, either by external action upon it, or by the operations of grief, terror, or any other passion; the mind is *agitated* when the thoughts or the feelings are put into any violent or irregular motion. *Trepidation*, like the former, is an irregular motion of the body, but differs both in the manner and cause of the motion; *trepidation* is the hurried trembling motion of the limbs

in performing their functions, whence we speak of doing a thing with *trepidation*, or that there is a *trepidation* in a person's manner: in all cases it arises from a sentiment of fear or alarm.

It is by the embarrassment from the clothes and the *agitation* that people are thrown into, from finding themselves in a situation they had never experienced before, that so many lives are lost in the water.

BRYDENE.

The sea is very high in the canal of Malta, and our Sicilian servant is in a sad *trepidation*.

BRYDENE.

Agitation and *trepidation* may be both applied to bodies of men as well as individuals with a similar distinction.

Amidst the *agitations* of popular government, occasions will sometimes be afforded for eminent abilities to break forth with peculiar lustre.

BLAIR.

His first action of note was in the battle of Lepanto, where the success of that great day, in such *trepidation* of the state, made every man meritorious.

WORTON.

Tremor is a trembling motion of the body, differing from the two former either in the force or the causes of the action: it is not violent nor confined to any particular part, like *trepidation*, and may, like *agitation*, arise either from physical or mental causes. There may be a *tremor* in the whole body, or a *tremor* in the voice, and the like.

He fell into such a universal *tremor* of all his joints, that when going his legs trembled under him.

HERVEY.

Emotion refers solely to the movements of the mind, and is therefore to be compared only with *agitation*. *Emotion* is the movement of a single feeling, varying with the object that awakens it; there may be *emotions* of pleasure as well as of pain; *agitation* may be the movement of one or many feelings, but those always of the painful kind. *Emotions* may be strong, but not violent: *agitations* will always be more or less violent.

The seventh book affects the imagination like the ocean in a calm, and fills the mind of the reader without producing in it anything like tumult or *agitation*.

ADDISON ON MILTON.

The description of Adam and Eve as they first appeared to Satan is exquisitely drawn, and sufficient to make the fallen angel gaze upon them with all those *emotions* of envy in which he is represented.

ADDISON ON MILTON.

TO AGREE, ACCEDE, CONSENT, COMPLY, ACQUIESCE.

AGREE, in French *agr  er*, from *gr  *, pleasure, Latin *gratia*, favor, liking; or from the Latin *gruo*, in *congruo*, to accord, signifies to be in accordance or agreeable with each other. ACCEDE, in Latin *accedo*, *ac* or *ad* and *cedo*, to go or come, signifies to come toward another. CONSENT, from *consentio*, or *con*, *cum*, with, together, and *sentio*, to think or feel, signifies to think or feel in unison. COMPLY, in French *complaire*, Latin *complaceo*, or *com* and *placeo*, to be pleased, signifies to be good-humored with. ACQUIESCE, in Latin *acquiesco*, or *ac*, *ad*, to or with, and *quiesco*, to be quiet, signifies to rest contented with.

All these terms denote the falling in of any one or more persons in any matter that comes before their notice. *Agree* expresses this general idea without any qualifications; all the other terms express different modes of agreeing. All may agree in the same thing, or one may agree to that which is proposed; *acceding*, *complying*, and *acquiescing*, are the acts of persons individually; *consenting* is properly the act of numbers, but it is also the act of individuals; one *accedes* to, *complies* with, or *acquiesces* in a thing; many *consent*, or one *consents*, to a thing. *Agreeing* is often a casual act not brought about by the parties themselves; the other terms denote positive acts, varying in the motives and circumstances. We *accede* by becoming a party to a thing: those who *accede* are on equal terms; one objects to that to which one does not *accede*; we *consent* to a thing by authorizing it, we *comply* with a thing by allowing it; those who *consent* or *comply* are not on equal terms with those in whose favor the *consent* is given or *compliance* made; *consenting* is an act of authority, *complying* an act of good-nature or weakness; one refuses that to which one does not *consent*, or with which one does not *comply*; to *acquiesce* is quietly to admit; it is a passive act, dictated by prudence or duty; one opposes that in which one does not *acquiesce*.

To *agree* is to be of the same mind in matters of opinion or feeling; it is well for those who act together to be able to *agree*.

I have been inquiring with regard to their winter season (in Sicily), and find all *agree* that it is much preferable to that of Naples.

BYRDON.

The term *agree* is, however, commonly used in regard to acting, as well as thinking, in the ordinary transactions of life.

We *agreed* to adopt the infant as the orphan son of a distant relation of our own name.

CUMBERLAND.

To *accede* and the other terms are with very few exceptions employed in practical matters, but sometimes otherwise: to *accede* is mostly said in regard to that which is in a special manner proposed, if not recommended; as a private individual *accedes* to a proposition; a plenipotentiary *accedes* to a treaty.

At last persuasion, menaces, and the impending pressure of necessity, conquered her virtue, and she *acceded* to the fraud.

CUMBERLAND.

To *consent*, as far as it is a universal act, is applied to moral objects; as customs are introduced by the *consent* of the community; but as the act of one or more individuals, it is applied to such practical matters as interest the parties for themselves or others; the parliament *consents* to the measures of the ministry; a parent *consents* to the marriage of a child.

My poverty, but not my will, *consents*.

SHAKESPEARE.

Equals *consent* to that in which they have a common interest.

Long they debate, at length by joint *consent*, Decree to sound the brother king's intent.

LEWIS.

Complying is used in the sense of yielding to the request, demands, or wishes of another for the sake of conformity.

Inclination will at length come over to reason, although we can never force reason to *comply* with inclination.

ADDISON.

Sometimes in the general sense of yielding to the wishes of the community.

There are seldom any public diversions here (in Sicily), the attending which, and *complying* with their bad hours, does often more than counteract all the benefit derived from the climate.

BYRDON.

To *acquiesce* is applied in the sense of yielding or agreeing to that which is decided upon by others.

The Swiss, fearing the consequences of further resistance, reluctantly *acquiesced* in the proposal.

GUTHRIE.

In this sense we *acquiesce* in the dispensations of Providence.

We conceive ourselves obliged to submit unto and *acquiesce* in all the dispensations of Providence, as most wise and most righteous.

BARROW.

TO AGREE, ACCORD, SUIT.

AGREE (*v. Agree, Accede*) is here used in application to things only. ACCORD, in French *accord*, from the Latin *chorda*, the string of a harp, signifies the same as to be in tune or join in tune. SUIT, from the Latin *secutus*, participle of *sequor*, to follow, signifies to be in a line, in the order a thing ought to be.

An agreement between two things requires an entire sameness; an *accordance* supposes a considerable resemblance; a *suitableness* implies an aptitude to coalesce. Opinions *agree*, feelings *accord*, and tempers *suit*. Two statements *agree* which are in all respects alike: that *accords* with our feelings which produces pleasurable sensations; that *suits* our taste which we wish to adopt, or, in adopting, gives us pleasure. Where there is no agreement in the essentials of any two accounts, their authenticity may be greatly questioned: if a representation of anything *accords* with what has been stated from other quarters, it serves to corroborate it: it is advisable that the ages and stations as well as tempers of the parties should be *suitable*, who look forward for happiness in a matrimonial connection.

The laurel and the myrtle sweets *agree*.

DRYDEN.

Metre aids, and is adapted to the memory; it *accords* to music, and is the vehicle of enthusiasm.

CUMBERLAND.

All the works of your doctors in religion and politics have been put into their hands, and you expect that they will apply to their own case just as much of your doctrines and examples as *suit* your pleasure.

BURKE.

TO AGREE, COINCIDE, CONCUR.

AGREE (*v. Agree, Accede*) is here taken in its application to both persons and things. It is as before the general term. COINCIDE, from the Latin *con*, together, and *incido*, to fall, implying a meeting in

a certain point, and CONCUR, from *con*, together, and *curro*, to run, implying a running in the same course, an acting together on the same principles, are modes of agreeing.

In respect to persons, they *agree* either in their general or particular opinions; they *coincide* and *concur* only in particular opinions. A person *coincides* in opinion with another in regard to speculative matters, but *concurs* with another in regard to practical matters; to *coincide* is only to meet at the same point, but to *concur* is to go together in the same road or in the same course of conduct.

Since all *agree*, who both with judgment read, 'Tis the same sun, and does himself succeed.

TATE.

There is not perhaps any couple whose dispositions and relish of life are so perfectly similar as that their wills constantly *coincide*.

HAWKESWORTH.

The plan being thus concerted, and my cousin's *concurrence* obtained, it was immediately put in execution.

HAWKESWORTH.

In respect to things, they *agree* in one, many, or every point, as the accounts of different persons, times, modes, and circumstances *agree*: things *coincide* or meet at one point, as where two circumstances fall out at the same time; this is a *coincidence*: things *concur* if they have the same tendency or lead to the same point; several circumstances must sometimes *concur* to bring about any particular event. The *coincidence* is mostly accidental, the *concurrence* depends upon the nature of things.

How does the slender stalk of the rose *agree* with the bulky head under which it bends? But the rose is a beautiful flower; and can we undertake to say that it does not owe a great deal of its beauty even to that disproportion?

BURKE.

A *coincidence* of sentiment may easily happen without any communication, since there are many occasions on which all reasonable men will think alike.

JOHNSON.

Eminence of station, greatness of effect, and all the favors of fortune, must *concur* to place excellence in public view.

JOHNSON.

AGREEABLE, PLEASANT, PLEASING.

The two first of these epithets approach so near in sense and application, that they can with propriety be used indifferently, the one for the other; yet there is an occasional difference which may be clearly defined. The AGREE-

ABLE is that which agrees with or suits the character, temper, and feelings of a person; the PLEASANT that which pleases; the PLEASING that which is adapted to please. *Agreeable* expresses a feeling less vivid than *pleasant*: people of the soberest and gravest character may talk of passing *agreeable* hours, or enjoying *agreeable* society, if those hours were passed *agreeably* to their turn of mind, or that society suited their taste; but the young and the gay will prefer *pleasant* society, where vivacity and mirth prevail, suitable to the tone of their spirits. A man is *agreeable* who by a soft and easy address contributes to the amusement of others; a man is *pleasant* who to this softness adds affability and communicativeness. *Pleasing* marks a sentiment less vivid and distinctive than either. A *pleasing* voice has something in it which we like; an *agreeable* voice strikes with positive pleasure upon the ear. A *pleasing* countenance denotes tranquillity and contentment; it satisfies us when we view it: a *pleasant* countenance bespeaks happiness; it gratifies the beholder, and invites him to look upon it.

To divert me, I took up a volume of Shakspeare, where I chanced to cast my eye upon a part in the tragedy of Richard the Third which filled my mind with an *agreeable* horror. STEELE.

Pleasant the sun
When first on this delightful land he spreads
His orient beams. MILTON.

Nor this alone t' indulge a vain delight,
And make a *pleasing* prospect for the sight.
DRYDEN.

AGREEMENT, CONTRACT, COVENANT,
COMPACT, BARGAIN.

AGREEMENT signifies what is agreed to (*v. To agree*). CONTRACT, in French *contrat*, from the Latin *contractus*, participle of *contraho*, to bring close together or bind, signifies the thing thus contracted or bound. COVENANT, in French *conventant*, Latin *conventus*, participle of *convenio*, to meet together at a point, signifies the point at which several meet, that is, the thing agreed upon by many. COMPACT, in Latin *compactus*, participle of *compingo*, to bind close, signifies the thing to which people bind themselves close. BARGAIN, from the Welsh *bargan*, to

contract or deal for, signifies the act of dealing, or the thing dealt for.

An *agreement* is general, and applies to transactions of every description, but particularly such as are made between single individuals, in cases where the other terms are not so applicable; a *contract* is a binding *agreement* between individuals; a simple *agreement* may be verbal, but a *contract* must be written and legally executed: *covenant*, in the technical sense, is an *agreement* by deed, but in the general sense a solemn *agreement*; a *compact* is an *agreement* among numbers; a *covenant* may be a national and public transaction; a *compact* respects individuals as members of a community, or communities with each other who are *compact* together: a *bargain*, in its proper sense, is an *agreement* solely in matters of trade, but applies figuratively in the same sense to other objects. The simple consent of parties constitutes an *agreement*; certain solemnities are necessary to make a *contract* or *covenant* valid; a tacit sense of mutual obligation in all the parties gives virtue to a *compact*; an assent to stipulated terms of sale may form a *bargain*.

Friends make an *agreement* to meet at a certain time; two tradesmen enter into a *contract* to carry on a joint trade; and if it be under hand and seal, the stipulations therein contained are technically called *covenants*: in the Society of Freemasons, every individual is bound to secrecy by a solemn *compact*: the trading part of the community are continually striking *bargains*.

Frog had given his word that he would meet the above-mentioned company at the Salutation, to talk of this *agreement*.

ARBUTHNOT'S HISTORY OF JOHN BULL.

It is impossible to see the long scrolls in which every *contract* is included, with all their appendages of seals and attestations, without wondering at the depravity of those beings who must be restrained from violation of promise by such formal and public evidences. JOHNSON.

These flashes of blue lightning gave the sign
Of *covenants* broke; three peals of thunder join.
DRYDEN.

In the beginnings and first establishment of speech, there was an implicit *compact* among men, founded upon common use and consent, that such and such words or voices, actions or gestures, should be means or signs whereby they would express or convey their thoughts one to another. SORRI.

We see men frequently dexterous and sharp enough in making a *bargain*, who, if you reason with them about matters of religion, appear perfectly stupid. LOCKE.

AIM, OBJECT, END, VIEW.

AIM is mostly derived from the old French *esmer* or *aesmer*, Latin *estimo*, Irish and Gaelic *amas*, hitting or marking, signifying the thing looked at with the eye or the mind, consequently the particular point to which one's efforts are directed, which is had always in view, and to the attainment of which everything is made to bend. OBJECT, from the Latin *objectus*, participle of *ob* and *jacio*, to lie in the way, is more vague; it signifies the thing that lies before us; we pursue it by taking the necessary means to obtain it; it becomes the fruit of our labor. END, in the improper sense of *end*, is still more general, signifying the thing that ends one's wishes and endeavors; it is the result not only of action, but of combined action; it is the consummation of a scheme; we must take the proper measures to arrive at it.

The *aim* is that which the person has in his own mind: it depends upon the character of the individual whether it be good or bad, attainable or otherwise; the *object* lies in the thing; it is a matter of choice, it depends upon accident as well as design, whether it be worthy or unworthy; the *end* is that which follows or terminates any course or proceeding; it depends upon the means taken, whether the *end* is arrived at or not. It is the *aim* of the Christian to live peaceably; it is a mark of dulness or folly to act without an *object*; it is sophistry to suppose that the *end* will justify the means.

Cunning has only private, selfish *aims*, and sticks at nothing which may make them succeed. ADDISON.

We should sufficiently weigh the *objects* of our hope, whether they be such as we may reasonably expect from them what we propose in their fruition. ADDISON.

Liberty and truth are not in themselves desirable, but only as they relate to a farther *end*. BERKELEY.

Aim and *VIEW*, from *video*, to see or look at, are both acts of the mind, but the *aim* is that which the mind particularly sets before itself as a thing to be obtained; the *view* is, generally speaking,

whatever the mind sets before itself, whether by way of opinion or motive; a person's *views* may be interested or disinterested, correct or false. The *aim* is practical in its operations; the *view* is a matter rather of contemplation than of practice.

Our *aim* is happiness; 'tis yours, 'tis mine,
Yet few attain it, if 'twas e'er attained. ARMSTRONG.

Not present good or ill, the joy or curse,
But future *views* of better or of worse. POPE.

TO AIM, POINT, LEVEL.

AIM, signifying to take aim (*v. Aim*), is to direct one's aim toward a point. POINT, from the noun *point*, signifies to direct the point to anything. LEVEL, from the adjective *level*, signifies to put one thing on a level or in a line with another.

Aim expresses more than the other two words, inasmuch as it denotes a direction toward some minute point in an object, and the others imply direction toward the whole objects themselves. We *aim* at a bird; we *point* a cannon against a wall; we *level* a cannon at a wall. *Pointing* is of course used with most propriety in reference to instruments that have points; it is likewise a less decisive action than either *aiming* or *levelling*. A stick or a finger may be *pointed* at a person, merely out of derision; but a blow is *levelled* or *aimed* with an express intent of committing an act of violence.

Their heads from *aiming* blows they bear afar,
With clashing gauntlets then provoke the war. DRYDEN.

If they persist in *pointing* their batteries to (at) particular persons, no laws of war forbid the making reprisals. ADDISON.

He calls on Bacchus, and propounds the prize:
The groom his fellow-groom at butts defies,
And bends his bow, and *levels* with his eyes. DRYDEN.

The same analogy is kept up in their figurative application. The shafts of ridicule are but too often *aimed* with little effect against the follies of fashion: remarks which seem merely to *point* at others, without being expressly addressed to them, have always a bad tendency; it has hitherto been the fate of infidels to *level* their battery of sneers, declamation, and sophistry against the Christian religion only to strengthen the conviction of

its sublime truths in the minds of mankind at large.

Another kind there is, which although we desire for itself, as health and virtue and knowledge, nevertheless they are not the last mark whereat we *aim*, but have their further end whereunto they are referred.

HOOKER.

The story slyly *points* at you. CUMBERLAND.

Which earnest wish he (St. Gregory Nazianzen) surely did not mean to *level* against the ordinance of God, but against that which lately began to be intruded by men.

BARROW.

TO AIM, ASPIRE.

AIM (*v. Aim*) includes efforts as well as views, in obtaining an object. ASPIRE, from *as* or *ad*, to or after, and *spiro*, to breathe, comprehends views, wishes, and hopes to obtain an object.

We *aim* at a certain proposed point by endeavoring to gain it; we *aspire* after that which we think ourselves entitled to, and flatter ourselves with gaining. Many men *aim* at riches and honor: it is the lot of but few to *aspire* to a throne. We *aim* at what is attainable by ordinary efforts; we *aspire* after what is great and unusual, and often improper.

Whether zeal or moderation be the point we *aim* at, let us keep fire out of the one, and frost out of the other.

ADDISON.

Aspiring to be gods, if angels fell,

Aspiring to be angels, men rebel.

POPE.

AIR, MANNER.

AIR, in Latin *aer*, Greek *anp*, comes from the Hebrew *aor*, because it is the vehicle of light; hence in the figurative sense, in which it is here taken, it denotes an appearance. MANNER, in French *manière*, comes probably from *mener*, to lead or direct, signifying the direction of one's movements.

Air lies in the whole person; *manner* is confined to the action or the movement of a single limb. A man has the *air* of a common person; it discovers itself in all his *manners*. An *air* strikes at the first glance, whether the person be in motion or at rest; the *manner* can only be seen when the person is in action: it develops itself on closer observation. Some people have an *air* about them which displeases; but their *manners* afterward win upon those who have a farther intercourse with them. An *air* is indicative of a state of mind; it may result either from a natural or habitual

mode of thinking: a *manner* is indicative of the education; it is produced by external circumstances. An *air* is noble or simple, it marks an elevation or simplicity of character: a *manner* is rude, rustic, or awkward, for want of culture, good society, and good example. We assume an *air*, and affect a *manner*.

The *air* she gave herself was that of a romping girl.

STEELE.

The boy is well fashioned, and will easily fall into a graceful *manner*.

STEELE.

AIR, MIEN, LOOK.

AIR, *v. Air*. MIEN, in German *mien*, comes, as Adelung supposes, from *mähen*, to move or draw, because the lines of the face which constitute the mien in the German sense are drawn together. LOOK signifies properly a mode of looking or appearing.

The exterior of a person is comprehended in the sense of all these words. *Air* depends not only on the countenance, but the stature, carriage, and action: *mien* respects the whole outward appearance, not excepting the dress: *look* depends altogether on the face and its changes. *Air* marks any settled state of the mind: *mien* denotes any state of the outward circumstances: *look* any individual movement of the mind. We may judge by a person's *air*, that he has a confident and fearless mind; we may judge by his sorrowful *mien*, that he has substantial cause for sorrow; and by sorrowful *looks*, that he has some partial or temporary cause for sorrow. We talk of doing anything with a particular *air*; of having a *mien*; of giving a *look*. An innocent man will answer his accusers with an *air* of composure; a person's whole *mien* sometimes bespeaks his wretched condition; a *look* is sometimes given to one who acts in concert by way of intimation.

The truth of it is, the *air* is generally nothing else but the inward disposition of the mind made visible.

ADDISON.

How sleek their *looks*, how goodly is their *mien*,
When big they strut behind a double chin!

DRYDEN.

What chief is this that visits us from far,
Whose gallant *mien* bespeaks him train'd to war?

STEELE.

How in the *looks* does conscious guilt appear!

ADDISON.

ALARM, TERROR, FRIGHT, CONSTERNATION.

ALARM is generally derived from the French *alarmer*, compounded of *al* or *ad* and *armes*, arms, signifying a cry to arms, a signal of danger, a call to defence; but it may with greater reason be derived from the German *lärm*, to sound or to give a sound by way of signal. TERROR, in Latin *terror*, comes from *terreo*, to produce fear. FRIGHT, from the German *furcht*, fear, signifies a state of fear. CONSTERNATION, in Latin *consternatus*, from *consterno*, to lay low or prostrate, expresses the mixed emotion of terror and amazement which confounds.

Alarm springs from any sudden signal that announces the approach of danger. *Terror* springs from any event or phenomenon that may serve as a prognostic of some catastrophe. It supposes a less distinct view of danger than *alarm*, and affords room to the imagination, which commonly magnifies objects. *Alarm* therefore makes us run to our defence, and *terror* disarms us. *Fright* is a less vivid emotion than either, as it arises from the simple appearance of danger. It is more personal than either *alarm* or *terror*; for we may be *alarmed* or *terrified* for others, but we are mostly *frightened* for ourselves. *Consternation* is stronger than either *terror* or *affright*; it springs from the view of some very serious evil, and commonly affects many. *Alarm* affects the feelings, *terror* the understanding, and *fright* the senses; *consternation* seizes the whole mind, and benumbs the faculties. Cries *alarm*; horrid spectacles *terrify*; a tumult *frightens*; a sudden calamity fills with *consternation*. One is filled with *alarm*, seized with *terror*, overwhelmed with *fright* or *consternation*. We are *alarmed* for what we apprehend; we are *terrified* by what we imagine; we are *frightened* by what we see; *consternation* may be produced by what we learn.

None so renown'd

With breathing brass to kindle fierce *alarms*.

DRYDEN.

I was once in a mixed assembly, that was full of noise and mirth, when on a sudden an old woman unluckily observed there were thirteen of us in company. The remark struck a panic *terror* into several of us.

ADDISON.

I have known a soldier that has entered a breach, *affrighted* at his own shadow.

ADDISON.

The son of Pelias ceased; the chiefs around,
In silence wrapped, in *consternation* drown'd.

POPE.

ALERTNESS, ALACRITY.

ALERTNESS, from *ales*, a wing, designates corporeal activity or readiness for action. ALACRITY, from *acer*, sharp, brisk, designates mental activity. We proceed with *alertness* when the body is in its full vigor; we proceed with *alacrity* when the mind is in full pursuit of an object.

The wings that waft our riches out of sight
Grow on the gamester's elbows; and the *alert*
And nimble motion of those restless joints
That never tire, soon fans them all away.

COWPER.

In dreams it is wonderful to observe with what
sprightliness and *alacrity* the soul exerts
herself.

ADDISON.

ALL, WHOLE.

ALL and WHOLE are derived from the same source, that is, in German *all* and *heil*, whole or sound, Dutch *al*, *hel*, or *heel*, Saxon *al*, *wal*, Danish *al*, *ald*, Greek *ολος*, Hebrew *chol* or *hol*.

All respects a number of individuals; *whole* respects a single body with its components: we have not *all*, if we have not the *whole* number; we have not the *whole*, if we have not *all* the parts of which it is composed. It is not within the limits of human capacity to take more than a partial survey of *all* the interesting objects which the *whole* globe contains. When applied to spiritual objects in a general sense, *all* is preferred to *whole*; but when the object is specific, *whole* is preferable: thus we say, *all* hope was lost; but, our *whole* hope rested in this.

It will be asked how the drama moves if it is not credited. It is credited with *all* the credit due to a drama.

JOHNSON.

The *whole* history of this celebrated republic (Athens) is but one tissue of rashness, folly, ingratitude, injustice, tumult, violence, and tyranny.

BURKE.

ALL, EVERY, EACH.

ALL is collective; EVERY single or individual; EACH distributive. *All* and *every* are universal in their signification; *each* is restrictive: the former are used in speaking of great numbers; the latter