

He again took some time to consider, and civilly replied "I do."—"If you do agree with me," rejoined I, "in acknowledging the complaint, tell me if you will concur in promoting the cure."

CUMBERLAND.

All the people anciently were allowed to join in psalmody and prayers, and make their proper responses.

BINGHAM: *Ecclesiastical Antiquities*.

An answer may be either spoken or written, or delivered in any manner; reply and rejoinder are used in personal discourse only: a response may be said or sung, or delivered in a formal manner.

He seems

A melancholy messenger—for when I ask'd  
What news? his answer was a far-fetch'd sigh.

SHAKESPEARE.

Lacedæmon, always disposed to control the growing consequence of her neighbors, and sensible of the bad policy of her late measures, had opened her eyes to the folly of expelling Hippas on the forged responses of the Pythia.

CUMBERLAND.

Animals as well as men may give answers or make responses, though not replies or rejoinders.

The blackbird whistles from the thorny brake,  
The mellow bullfinch answers from the grove.

THOMSON.

Loose fly his forelock and his ample mane,  
Responsive to the distant neigh he neighs.

COWPER.

#### ANSWERABLE, RESPONSIBLE, ACCOUNTABLE, AMENABLE.

ANSWERABLE, from *answer*, signifies ready or able to answer for. RESPONSIBLE, from *respondeo*, to answer, has a similar meaning in its original sense. ACCOUNTABLE, from *account*, signifies able or ready to give an account. AMENABLE, from the French *amener*, to lead, signifies liable to be led or bound.

Between answerable and responsible there is a close alliance in the sense, but some difference in the application. A person is answerable generally in respect to what he undertakes to pay or take charge of; he is answerable for his own debts, or for the debts of others, to which he has made himself liable; he may also be answerable for things left in his charge: responsible is applied to higher matters of trust or duty; as an officer is responsible for the conduct of the men who are under him; so to hold a responsible situation under government; and in an extended

sense, to be morally responsible, that is, responsible to society as a moral agent.

He replied that he would give orders for guards to attend us who should be answerable for everything.

BYDONE.

It was Lord Sackville's fate to act for several years in a responsible office during an unpopular and unprosperous war.

CUMBERLAND.

Answerable and responsible convey the idea of a pledge given for the performance of some act, or the fulfilment of some engagement, a breach of which subjects the defaulter to loss, punishment, or disgrace: accountable implies simply giving an account or explanation of one's proceedings. The two former have respect to the obligations of others as well as our own, but the latter respects properly one's own obligations only: the accountability results from the relation of the parties; a person is accountable to his employer for the manner in which he has conducted any business intrusted to him; a child is accountable to his parents for all his actions while he is under their control; and we are all accountable to the Great Judge of all. To be amenable is to be accountable as far as laws and regulations bind a person; one is amenable to the laws of society, or he is amenable to the rules of the house in which he is only an inmate.

By our ancient laws, whoever harbored any stranger for more than two nights was answerable to the public for any offence that such his inmate might commit.

BLACKSTONE.

As a person's responsibility bears respect to his reason, so do human punishments bear respect to his responsibility: infants and boys are chastised by the hand of the parent or the master; rational adults are amenable to the laws.

CUMBERLAND.

We know that we are the subjects of a Supreme Righteous Governor, to whom we are accountable for our conduct.

BLAIR.

#### ANTECEDENT, PRECEDING, FOREGOING, PREVIOUS, ANTERIOR, PRIOR, FORMER.

ANTECEDENT, in Latin *antecedens*, that is, *ante* and *cedens*, going before. PRECEDING, in Latin *precedens*, going before. FOREGOING, literally going before. PREVIOUS, in Latin *prævious*, that is, *præ* and *via*, making a way before. ANTERIOR, the comparative of the Latin *ante*, before. PRIOR, in Latin *prior*,

comparative of *primus*, first. FORMER, in English the comparative of first.

Antecedent, preceding, foregoing, previous, are employed for what goes or happens before: anterior, prior, former, for what is, or exists before. Antecedent marks priority of order, place, and position, with this peculiar circumstance, that it denotes the relation of influence, dependence, and connection established between two objects: thus, in logic the premises are called the antecedent, and the conclusion the consequent; in theology or politics, the antecedent is simply decree or resolution which influences another decree or action; in mathematics, it is that term from which any induction can be drawn to another; in grammar, the antecedent is that which requires a particular regimen from its subsequent. Antecedent and preceding both denote priority of time, or the order of events; but the former in a more vague and indeterminate manner than the latter. A preceding event is that which happens immediately before the one of which we are speaking; whereas antecedent may have events or circumstances intervening. An antecedent proposition may be separated from its consequent by other propositions; but a preceding proposition is closely followed by another. In this sense antecedent is opposed to posterior; preceding to succeeding.

The seventeen centuries since the birth of Christ are antecedent to the eighteenth, or the one we live in; but it is the seventeenth only which we call the preceding one.

TRUSLER.

Preceding respects simply the succession of times and things; but previous denotes the succession of actions and events, with the collateral idea of their connection with and influence upon each other: we speak of the preceding day, or the preceding chapter, merely as the day or chapter that goes before; but when we speak of a previous engagement or a previous inquiry, it supposes an engagement preparatory to something that is to follow: previous is opposed to subsequent: foregoing is employed to mark the order of things narrated or stated; as when we speak of the foregoing statement, the foregoing objections, or the foregoing calculation, etc.: foregoing is opposed to following.

Little attention was paid to literature by the Romans in the early and more martial ages. I read of no collection of books antecedent to those made by Æmilius Paulus and Lucullus.

CUMBERLAND.

Letters from Rome, dated the 13th instant, say that on the preceding Sunday his Holiness was carried in an open chair from St. Peter's to St. Mary's.

STEELE.

A boding silence reigns

Dead through the dun expanse, save the dull sound

That from the mountain, precious to the storm,  
Rolls o'er the muttering earth.

THOMSON.

Consistently with the foregoing principles, we may define original and native poetry to be the language of the violent passions, expressed in exact measures.

SIR W. JONES.

Anterior, prior, and former, have all a relative sense, and are used for things that are more before than others: anterior is a technical term to denote forwardness in place or time, but more commonly the former, as in anatomy; the anterior or fore part of the skull, in contradistinction to the posterior part; so likewise the anterior or fore front of a building, in opposition to the back front: prior is used in the sense of previous when speaking comparatively of two or more things, when it implies anticipation; a prior claim invalidates the one that is set up; a prior engagement prevents the forming of any other that is proposed: former is employed either with regard to times, as former times, in contradistinction to later periods, or with regard to propositions, when the former or first thing mentioned is opposed to the latter or last mentioned.

If that be the anterior or upper part wherein the senses are placed, and that the posterior or lower part is that which is opposite thereunto, there is no inferior or lower part in this animal; for the senses being placed at both extremes makes both ends anterior, which is impossible.

BROWNE: *Vulgar Errors*.

Some accounts make Thamyris the eighth epic poet prior to Homer, an authority to which no credit seems due.

CUMBERLAND.

Former follies pass away and are forgotten. Those which are present strike observation and sharpen censure.

BLAIR.

#### TO APOLOGIZE, DEFEND, JUSTIFY, EXCULPATE, EXCUSE, PLEAD.

APOLOGIZE, from the Greek *απολογία*, and *απολογεομαι*, compounded of *απο*, from or away, and *λεγω*, to speak, signifies to do away by speaking. DE-

FEND, in French *défendre*, Latin *defensus*, participle of *defendo*, is compounded of *de* and *fendo*, signifying to keep or ward off. JUSTIFY, in French *justifier*, Latin *justifico*, is compounded of *justus* and *facio*, signifying to do justice, or to put right. EXCULPATE, in Latin *exculpatus*, participle of *exculpo*, compounded of *ex* and *culpa*, signifies to get out of a fault. EXCUSE, in French *excuser*, Latin *excuso*, compounded of *ex* and *causa*, signifies to get out of any cause or affair. PLEAD, in French *plaider*, may either come from *placitum* or *placendum*, or be contracted from *appellatum*.

There is always some imperfection supposed or real which gives rise to an *apology*; with regard to persons it presupposes a consciousness of impropriety, if not of guilt; we *apologize* for an error by acknowledging ourselves guilty of it: a *defence* presupposes a consciousness of innocence more or less; we *defend* ourselves against a charge by proving its fallacy: a *justification* is founded on the conviction not only of entire innocence, but of strict propriety; we *justify* our conduct against any imputation by proving that it was blameless; *exculpation* rests on the conviction of innocence with regard to the fact; we *exculpate* ourselves from all blame by proving that we took no part in the transaction: *excuse* and *plea* are not grounded on any idea of innocence; they are rather appeals for favor resting on some collateral circumstance which serves to extenuate; a *plea* is frequently an idle or unfounded *excuse*, a frivolous attempt to lessen displeasure; we *excuse* ourselves for a neglect by alleging indisposition; we *plead* for forgiveness by solicitation and entreaty.

An *apology* mostly respects the conduct of individuals with regard to each other as equals; it is a voluntary act, springing out of a regard to decorum, or the good opinion of others. To avoid misunderstandings it is necessary to *apologize* for any omission that wears the appearance of neglect. A *defence* respects matters of higher importance; the violation of laws or public morals; judicial questions decided in a court, or matters of opinion which are offered to the decision of the public: no one *defends* himself but he whose conduct or opinions are

called in question. A *justification* is applicable to all moral cases in common life, whether of a serious nature or otherwise: it is the act of individuals toward each other according to their different stations: no one can demand a *justification* from another without a sufficient authority, and no one will attempt to *justify* himself to another whose authority he does not acknowledge: men *justify* themselves either on principles of honor, or from the less creditable motive of concealing their imperfections from the observation and censure of others. An *exculpation* is the act of an inferior; it respects the violations of duty toward the superior; it is dictated by necessity, and seldom the offspring of any higher motive than the desire to screen one's self from punishment: *exculpation* regards offences only of commission; *excuse* is employed for those of omission as well as commission; we *excuse* ourselves often for what we have not done, than for what we have done: it is the act of persons in all stations, and arises from various motives, dishonorable or otherwise: a person may often have substantial reasons to *excuse* himself from doing a thing, or for not having done it; an *excuse* may likewise sometimes be the refuge of idleness and selfishness. To *plead* is properly a judicial act, and extended in its sense to the ordinary concerns of life; it is mostly employed for the benefit of others, rather than ourselves.

*Excuse* and *plea*, which are mostly employed in an unfavorable sense, are to *apology*, *defence*, and *exculpation*—as the means to an end: an *apology* is lame when, instead of an honest confession of an unintentional error, an idle attempt is made at *justification*: a *defence* is poor when it does not contain sufficient to invalidate the charge: a *justification* is nugatory when it applies to conduct altogether wrong: an *excuse* or a *plea* is frivolous or idle, which turns upon some falsehood, misrepresentation, or irrelevant point.

But for this practice (detraction), however vile, some have dared to *apologize* by contending that the report by which they injured an absent character was true. HAWKESWORTH.

Attacked by great injuries, the man of mild and gentle spirit will feel what human nature feels,

and will *defend* and resent as his duty allows him. BLAIR.

Whatever private views and passions *plead*, No cause can *justify* so black a deed.

THOMSON.

A good child will not seek to *exculpate* herself at the expense of the most revered characters. RICHARDSON.

The strength of the passions will never be accepted as an *excuse* for complying with them. SPECTATOR.

Poverty on this occasion *pleads* her cause very notably, and represents to her old landlord that should she be driven out of the country, all their trades, arts, and sciences would be driven out with her. ADDISON.

#### APPAREL, ATTIRE, ARRAY.

APPAREL, in French *appareil*, like the word *apparatus*, comes from the Latin *apparatus* or *adparatus*, signifying the thing fitted or adapted for another. ATTIRE, compounded of *at* or *ad* and *tire*, in French *tirer*, Latin *traho*, to draw, signifies the thing drawn or put on. ARRAY is compounded of *ar* or *ad* and *ray* or *rov*, signifying the state of being in a row, or being in order.

These terms are all applicable to dress or exterior decoration. *Apparel* is the dress of every one; *attire* is the dress of the great; *array* is the dress of particular persons on particular occasions: it is the first object of every man to provide himself with *apparel* suitable to his station; but the desire of shining forth in gaudy *attire* is the property of little minds: on festivals and solemn occasions it may be proper for those who are to be conspicuous to set themselves out with a comely *array*. *Apparel* and *attire* respect the quality and fashion of the thing; but *array* has regard to the disposition of the things with their neatness and decorum: *apparel* may be costly or mean; *attire* may be gay or shabby; but *array* will never be otherwise than neat or comely.

It is much, that this depraved custom of painting the face should so long escape the penal laws, both of the church and state, which have been very severe against luxury in *apparel*.

BACON.

A robe of tissue, stiff with golden wire,  
An upper vest, once Helen's rich *attire*.

DRYDEN.

She seem'd a virgin of the Spartan blood,  
With such *array* Harpalycce bestrode  
Her Thracian courser.

DRYDEN.

APPARENT, VISIBLE, CLEAR, PLAIN, OBVIOUS, EVIDENT, MANIFEST.

APPARENT, in Latin *apparens*, participle of *appareo*, to appear, signifies the quality of appearing. VISIBLE, in Latin *visibilis*, from *visus*, participle of *video*, to see, signifies capable of being seen. CLEAR, in French *clair*, German, Swedish, etc., *klar*, Latin *clarus*, Greek *γλαυρός*, comes from *γλαύσσω*, to shine. PLAIN, in Latin *planus*, even, signifies what is so smooth and unencumbered that it can be seen. OBVIOUS, in Latin *obvius*, compounded of *ob* and *via*, signifies the quality of lying in one's way, or before one's eyes. EVIDENT, in French *évident*, Latin *evidens*, from *video*, Greek *εἶδω*, Hebrew *ido*, to know, signifies as good as certain or known. MANIFEST, in French *manifeste*, Latin *manifestus*, compounded of *manus*, the hand, and *festus*, participle of *fendo*, to fall in, signifies the quality of being so near that it can be laid hold of by the hand.

These words agree in expressing various degrees in the capability of seeing; but *visible* is the only one used purely in a physical sense; *apparent*, *clear*, *plain*, and *obvious*, are used physically and morally; *evident* and *manifest* solely in a moral acceptation. That which is simply an object of sight is *visible*; that which presents itself to our view in any form, real or otherwise, is *apparent*: the stars themselves are *visible* to us; but their size is *apparent*.

The perception intellectual often corrects the report of phantasy, as in the *apparent* bigness of the sun, and the *apparent* crookedness of the staff in air and water. HALE.

The *visible* and present are for brutes: A slender portion and a narrow bound. YOUNG.

*Visible* is applied to that which merely admits of being seen; *apparent* and the other terms denote not only what is to be seen, but what is easily to be seen: they are all applied as epithets to objects of mental discernment; what is *apparent* strikes the view; what is *clear* is to be seen in all its parts and in its proper colors: it is opposed to that which is obscure: what is *plain* is seen by a plain understanding; it requires no deep reflection nor severe study; it is opposed to what is intricate: what is *obvious* pre-

sents itself readily to the mind of every one; it is seen at the first glance, and is opposed to that which is abstruse: what is *evident* is seen forcibly, and leaves no hesitation on the mind; it is opposed to that which is dubious: *manifest* is a greater degree of the *evident*; it strikes on the understanding and forces conviction; it is opposed to that which is dark. A thing is *apparent* upon the face of it: a case is *clear*; it is decided on immediately: a truth is *plain*; it is involved in no perplexity; it is not multifarious in its bearings: a falsehood is *plain*; it admits of no question: a reason is *obvious*; it flows out of the nature of the case: a proof is *evident*; it requires no discussion, there is nothing in it that clashes or contradicts; the guilt or innocence of a person is *evident* when everything serves to strengthen the conclusion: a contradiction or absurdity is *manifest* which is felt by all as soon as it is perceived.

The business men are chiefly conversant in does not only give a certain cast or turn to their minds, but is very *apparent* in their outward behavior. BUDGELE.

It is *plain* that our skill in literature is owing to the knowledge of Greek and Latin, which that they are still preserved among us can be ascribed only to a religious regard. BERKELEY.

We pretend to give a *clear* account how thunder and lightning are produced. TEMPLE.

It is *obvious* to remark that we follow nothing heartily unless carried to it by inclination. GROVE.

It is *evident* that fame, considered merely as the immortality of a name, is not less likely to be the reward of bad actions than of good. JOHNSON.

Among the many inconsistencies which folly produces in the human mind, there has often been observed a *manifest* and striking contrariety between the life of an author and his writings. JOHNSON.

#### APPEARANCE, AIR, ASPECT.

APPEARANCE signifies the thing that appears; of the manner of appearing. AIR, *v. Air, manner*. ASPECT, in Latin *aspectus*, from *aspicio*, to look upon, signifies the thing that is looked upon or seen.

*Appearance* is the generic, the rest are specific terms. The whole external form, figure, or colors, whatever is visible to the eye, is its *appearance*: *air* is a particular *appearance* of any object as far as it is indicative of its quality or condition; an

*air* of wretchedness or poverty: *aspect* is the partial *appearance* of a body as it presents one of its sides to view; a gloomy or cheerful *aspect*. It is not safe to judge of either persons or things altogether by *appearances*: the *appearance* and reality are often at variance: the *appearance* of the sun is that of a moving body, but astronomers assert that it has no motion round the earth: there are particular towns, habitations, or rooms which have always an *air* of comfort, or the contrary: this is a sort of *appearance* the most to be relied on: politicians of a certain stamp are always busy in judging for the future from the *aspect* of affairs; but their predictions, like those of astrologers who judge from the *aspect* of the heavens, frequently turn out to the discredit of the prophet.

The hero answers with the respect due to the beautiful *appearance* she made. STEELE.

Some who had the most assuming *air* went directly of themselves to error without expecting a conductor. PARNELL.

Her motions were steady and composed, and her *aspect* serious but cheerful; her name was Patience. ADDISON.

#### APPEASE, CALM, PACIFY, QUIET, STILL.

APPEASE, *v. To allay*. CALM, in French *calmer*, from *almus*, bright, signifies to make bright. PACIFY, in Latin *pacifico*, compounded of *pax* and *facio*, signifies to make peace or peaceable. QUIET, in French *quiet*, Latin *quietus*, from *quies*, rest, signifies to put to rest. STILL signifies to make *still*.

To *appease* is to remove great agitation; to *calm* is to bring into a tranquil state. The wind is *appeased*; the sea is *calmed*. With regard to persons, it is necessary to *appease* those who are in transports of passion, and to *calm* those who are in trouble, anxiety, or apprehension. *Appease* respects matters of force or violence, *calm* those of inquietude and distress: one is *appeased* by a submissive behavior, and *calmed* by the removal of danger. *Pacify* corresponds to *appease*, and *quiet* to *calm*: in sense they are the same, but in application they differ; *appease* and *calm* are used only in reference to objects of importance; *pacify* and *quiet* to those of a more familiar nature: the

uneasy humors of a child are *pacified*, or its groundless fears are *quieted*. *Still* is a loftier expression than any of the former terms; serving mostly for the grave or poetic style: it is an onomatopœia for restraining or putting to silence that which is noisy and boisterous.

A lofty city by my hand is rais'd,  
Pygmalion punish'd, and my lord *appeased*.  
DRYDEN.

All powerful harmony, that can assuage  
And *calm* the sorrows of the frenzied wretch.  
MARSH.

My breath can *still* the winds,  
Uncloud the sun, charm down the swelling sea,  
And stop the floods of heaven. BEAUMONT.

#### APPLAUSE, ACCLAMATION.

APPLAUSE, from the Latin *applaudo*, signifies literally to clap or stamp the feet to a thing. ACCLAMATION, from *acclamo*, signifies a crying out to a thing.

These terms express a public demonstration; the former by means of a noise with the hands or feet; the latter by means of shouts and cries: the former being employed as a testimony of approbation; the latter as a sanction, or an indication of respect. An actor looks for *applause*; a speaker looks for *acclamation*. What a man does calls forth *applause*, but the person himself is mostly received with *acclamations*. At the hustings popular speeches meet with *applause*, and favorite members are greeted with loud *acclamations*.

Amidst the loud *applauses* of the shore,  
Gyas outstripp'd the rest and sprung before.  
DRYDEN.

When this illustrious person (the Duke of Marlbro') touched on the shore, he was received by the *acclamations* of the people. STEELE.

#### TO APPOINT, ORDER, PRESCRIBE, ORDAIN.

APPOINT, *v. To allot*. ORDER, in French *ordre*, Latin *ordino*, to arrange, dispose, *ordo*, order, Greek *ορδος*, a row of trees, which is the symbol of order. PRESCRIBE, in Latin *prescribo*, compounded of *præ*, before, and *scribo*, to write, signifies to draw a line for a person. ORDAIN is a variation of *order*.

To *appoint* is either the act of an equal or superior: we *appoint* a meeting with any one at a given time and place; a king *appoints* his ministers. To *order* is the act of one invested with a partial au-

thority: a customer *orders* a commodity from his tradesman: a master gives his *orders* to his servant. To *prescribe* is the act of one who is superior by virtue of his knowledge: a physician *prescribes* to his patient. To *ordain* is an act emanating from the highest authority: kings and councils *ordain*; but their *ordinances* must be conformable to what is *ordained* by the Divine Being. *Appointments* are made for the convenience of individuals or communities; but they may be altered or annulled at the pleasure of the contracting parties. *Orders* are dictated by the superior only, but they presuppose a discretionary obligation on the part of the individual to whom they are given. *Prescriptions* are binding on none but such as voluntarily admit their authority; but *ordinances* leave no choice to those on whom they are imposed to accept or reject them: the *ordinances* of man are not less binding than those of God, so long as they do not expressly contradict the divine law.

*Appointments* are kept, *orders* executed or obeyed, *prescriptions* followed, *ordinances* submitted to. It is a point of politeness or honor, if not of direct moral obligation, to keep the *appointments* which we have made. Interest will lead men to execute the *orders* which they receive in the course of business: duty obliges them to obey the *orders* of their superiors. It is a nice matter to *prescribe* to another without hurting his pride; this principle leads men often to regard the counsels of their best friends as *prescriptions*: with children it is an unquestionable duty to follow the *prescriptions* of those whose age, station, or experience authorize them to *prescribe*. God has *ordained* all things for our good; it rests with ourselves to submit to his *ordinances* and be happy.

Majestic months  
Set out with him to their *appointed* race.  
DRYDEN.

The whole course of things is so *ordered* that we neither by an irregular and precipitate education become men too soon, nor by a fond and trifling indulgence be suffered to continue children forever. BLAIR.

Sir Francis Bacon, in his Essay upon Health, has not thought it improper to *prescribe* to his reader a poem or a prospect, where he particularly dissuades him from knotty and subtle disquisitions. ADDISON.

It was perhaps *ordained* by Providence to hinder us from tyrannizing over one another, that no individual should be of such importance as to chasm by his retirement or death any chasm in the world. JOHNSON.

TO APPRAISE, OR APPRECIATE, ESTIMATE, ESTEEM.

APPRAISE, APPRECIATE, from *ap-precio* and *appreciatus*, participle of *ap-precio*, compounded of *ap* or *ad* and *pre-tium*, a price, signifies to set a price or value on a thing. ESTIMATE comes from *estimatus*, participle of *estimo*, to value. To ESTEEM is a variation of *estimate*.

*Appraise* and *appreciate* are used in precisely the same sense, for setting a value on anything according to relative circumstances; but the one is used in the proper, and the other in the figurative sense: a sworn *appraiser* appraises goods according to the condition of the articles, and their salable property; the characters of men are *appreciated* by others when their good and bad qualities are justly put in a balance.

The things are not sold, they are only *appraised*. BLACKSTONE.

To the finishing of his course, let every one direct his eye: and let him now *appreciate* life according to the value it will be found to have when summed up at the close. BLAIR.

To *estimate* a thing is to get the sum of its value by calculation; to *esteem* anything is to judge its actual and intrinsic value. *Estimate* is used either in a proper or a figurative acceptance; *esteem* only in a moral sense: the expense of an undertaking, losses by fire, gains by trade, are *estimated* at a certain sum; the *estimate* may be too high or too low: the moral worth of men is often *estimated* above or below the reality, according to the particular bias of the *estimator*; but there are individuals of such an unquestionable worth that they need only to be known in order to be *esteemed*.

The extent of the trade of the Greeks, how highly soever it may have been *estimated* in ancient times, was in proportion to the low condition of their marine. ROBERTSON.

If a lawyer were to be *esteemed* only as he uses his parts in contending for justice, and were immediately despicable when he appeared in a cause which he could not but know was an unjust one, how honorable would his character be! STEELE.

TO APPREHEND, CONCEIVE, SUPPOSE, IMAGINE.

To APPREHEND, from the Latin *ad* and *prehendo*, signifies to take into the mind. CONCEIVE, from the Latin *con* and *capio*, to take together, that is, to put together in the mind. SUPPOSE, from the Latin *suppono*, to put one thing in the place of another. IMAGINE, from *imago*, to have an image or figure of anything in the mind.

To *apprehend* is simply to take an idea into the mind; thus we may *apprehend* any object that we hear or see: to *conceive* is to form an idea in the mind, as to *conceive* the idea of doing anything, to *conceive* a design.

Brutes and men have their sensoria, or little sensoriums, by which they *apprehend* the presence, and perceive the actions, of a few objects that lie contiguous to them. ADDISON.  
He first *conceives*, then perfects his design. As a mere instrument in hands divine. COWPER.

*Apprehending* is the first effort of the thinking faculty: *conceiving* is the act of a more matured understanding; the former belongs to children as well as grown persons, the latter more properly to grown persons. *Apprehending* is performed by the help of the senses; we may be quick or dull of *apprehension*. *Conceiving* is performed by reflection and combination; we may *conceive* properly or improperly.

Dark night, that from the eye his function takes, The ear more quick of *apprehension* makes. SHAKESPEARE.

A state of innocence and happiness is so remote from all we have ever seen, that although we can easily *conceive* it as possible, yet our speculations upon it must be general and confused. JOHNSON.

That of which we can have no sensible impression is not to be *apprehended*, that which is above the reach of our thought is not to be *conceived*.

We must be content to know that the Spirit of God is present with us, by the effects which he produceth in us. Our outward senses are too gross to *apprehend* him. ADDISON.

It is not in the power of imagination to *conceive* the fearful effects of Omnipotence incensed. ADDISON.

To *apprehend* and to *conceive* are applied only to reality, to suppose and *imagine* are applied to things which may exist only in the imagination; but the

former being drawn from that which is real may be probable or improbable according to circumstances; the latter being the peculiar act of the imagination, more commonly exists in the imagination only.

It can scarce be *supposed* that the mind is more vigorous when we sleep than when we wake. HAWKSWORTH.

It is a mistake to *imagine* that creeds were at first intended to teach in full and explicit terms all that should be believed by Christians. WATERLAND.

These terms are all employed to denote one's opinion or belief in regard to ordinary matters with a like distinction. *Apprehend* expresses the weakest kind of belief, the having the least idea of the presence of a thing.

Nothing is a misery Unless our weakness *apprehend* it so. SHAKESPEARE.

A man is said to *conceive* that on which he forms a direct opinion.

This great fundamental truth, unestablished or unawakened in the minds of men, is, I *conceive*, the real source and support of all our infidelity. YOUNG.

What one *supposes* may admit of a doubt, it is frequently only conjectural.

It is there *supposed* that all our infidels, whatever scheme, for argument's sake and to keep themselves in countenance, they patronize, are betrayed into their deplorable error by some doubt of their immortality at the bottom. YOUNG.

What one *imagines* may be altogether improbable or impossible, and that which cannot be *imagined* may be too improbable to admit of being believed.

The Earl of Rivers did not *imagine* there could exist, in a human form, a mother that would ruin her own son without enriching herself. JOHNSON.

TO APPREHEND, FEAR, DREAD.

To APPREHEND (*v.* To *apprehend*, *conceive*) signifies to have an idea of danger in one's mind, without necessarily implying any sentiment of fear. FEAR, in Saxon *fihrt*, Latin *pavor*, and Greek *φοβος*, to shudder, expresses the sentiment in a greater or less degree. DREAD, in Latin *territio*, and Greek *ταραχος*, to trouble, expresses the highest degree of fear.

What is possible may be *apprehended*;

we may *apprehend* a change in the weather, or that an accident will take place by the way. What is probable may be *feared*: we may fear the consequences of a person's resentment. Not only the evil which is nigh, but that which is exceeding great, produces *dread*.

Our natural sense of right and wrong produces an *apprehension* of merited punishment when we have committed a crime. BLAIR.

That which is *feared* may sometimes be avoided; but that which is regretted to-day may be regretted again to-morrow. JOHNSON.

All men think all men mortal but themselves, Themselves, when some alarming shock of fate Strikes through their wounded hearts the sudden *dread*. YOUNG.

*Apprehend* is said only of things. *Fear* and *dread* are also applied to persons with the like distinction: *fear* is a salutary sentiment; it is the sentiment of a child toward a parent or instructor: *dread*, as toward a fellow-creature, is produced by harshness and oppression, but in regard to our Maker is produced by the consciousness of guilt.

They are universally *feared* and respected. BRYDSON.

Intomb'd my *fear* of death! and every *fear*, The *dread* of every evil, but thy frown. YOUNG.

APPROACH, ACCESS, ADMITTANCE.

APPROACH, compounded of *ap* or *ad* and *proach*, in French *proche*, near, Latin *proximus*, nearest, signifies near to, that is, coming near to. ACCESS, in Latin *accessus*, from *ac* or *ad* and *cedo*, to go, is, properly, going to. ADMITTANCE, *v.* *Admittance*.

*Approach* signifies the coming near or toward an object, and consequently is an unfinished act, but *access* and *admittance* are finished acts; *access* is the coming to, that is, as close to an object as is needful; and *admittance* is the coming into any place, or into the presence or society of any person. *Approach* expresses simply the act of drawing near, but *access* and *admittance* comprehend, in their signification, the liberty and power of coming to or into: an *approach* may be quick or slow, an *access* easy or difficult, an *admittance* free or exclusive.

His service in the eighty-eighth is notoriously known, when, at the first news of the Spaniards'

*approach*, he towed at a cable with his own hands to draw out the harbor-bound ships into the sea. FULLER.  
When we are wrong'd, and would unfold our griefs,  
We are denied *access* unto his person. SHAKESPEARE.

As my pleasures are almost wholly confined to those of the sight, I take it for a peculiar happiness that I have always had an easy and familiar *admittance* to the fair sex. TATLER.

*Approach* may sometimes be taken for a road or way of *approach*, which brings it nearer in sense to the other terms, as the *approaches* to a bridge or a town.

The *approach* to Messina is the finest that can be imagined.

*Access* is used only in its proper sense for the act of persons; *approach* and *admittance* are employed figuratively, as the *approach* of winter, age, etc., or the *approach* to immorality, in the sense of coming near to it in similitude, the *admittance* of thoughts into the mind.

There is no *approach* to an invasion of the divine attributes in the invocation of saints, but I think it is will-worship and presumption. JOHNSON.

In the difficulties of business and great affairs, such an unintermitted and unshaken perseverance, as if he never tasted what it was to indulge in his own ease, or the pleasures of conversation; and yet in the entertainments of conversation such an open-taking agreeableness, as if no thoughts of business could ever find *admittance*.

PREAMBLE TO LORD CADOGAN'S PATENT OF PEERAGE.

#### TO APPROACH, APPROXIMATE.

APPROACH, *v.* *Approach*. APPROXIMATE, compounded of *ap* and *proximus*, to come nearest or next, signifies either to draw near or bring near. To *approach* is intransitive only; a person *approaches* an object. To *approximate* is both transitive and intransitive; a person *approximates* two objects to each other.

Lambs push at those that *approach* them with their horns before the first budding of a horn appears. ADDISON.

Shakespeare *approximates* the remote and far. JOHNSON.

To *approach* denotes simply the moving of an object toward another, but to *approximate* denotes the gradual moving of two objects toward each other: that which *approaches* may come into immediate conjunction; but bodies may *ap-*

*proximate* for some time before they form a junction, or may never form a junction. An equivocation *approaches* to a lie. Minds *approximate* by long intercourse.

Comets, in their *approaches* toward the earth, are imagined to cause diseases, famines, and other such like judgments of God. DERHAM.

The *approximations* and recesses of some of the little stars I speak of, suit not with the observations of some very ancient astronomers. DERHAM.

#### TO APPROPRIATE, USURP, ARROGATE, ASSUME, ASCRIBE.

APPROPRIATE, in French *approprier*, compounded of *ap* or *ad* and *propriatus*, participle of *proprio*, an old verb, and *proprius*, proper or own, signifies to make one's own. USURP, in French *usurper*, Latin *usurpo*, from *usus*, use, is a frequentative of *utor*, signifying to make use of as if it were one's own. ARROGATE, in Latin *arrogatus*, participle of *arrogare*, signifies to ask or claim for one's self. ASSUME, in French *assumer*, Latin *assumo*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *sumo*, to take, signifies to take to one's self. ASCRIBE, in Latin *ascribo*, compounded of *as* or *ad* and *scribo*, to write, signifies here to write down to one's own account.

The idea of taking something to one's self by an act of one's own is common to all these terms. To *appropriate* is to take to one's self with or without right; to *usurp* is to take to one's self by violence or in violation of right. *Appropriating* is applied in its proper sense to goods in possession; *usurping* is properly applied to power, titles, rights. Individuals *appropriate* whatever comes to their hands which they use as their own; they *usurp* power when they exercise the functions of government without a legitimate sanction.

Natural reason suggested that he who could first declare his intention of *appropriating* anything to his own use, and actually took it into possession, should thereby gain the absolute property of it. BLACKSTONE.

The *usurpation* which, in order to subvert ancient institutions, has destroyed ancient principles, will hold power by arts similar to those by which it has acquired it. BURKE.

These words may be applied in the same sense to moral or spiritual objects.

To themselves *appropriating*  
The spirit of God, promis'd alike and giv'n  
To all believers. MILTON.

If any passion has so much *usurped* our understanding as not to suffer us to enjoy advantages with the moderation prescribed by reason, it is not too late to apply this remedy: when we find ourselves sinking under sorrow, we may then usefully revolve the uncertainty of our condition, and the folly of lamenting that from which, if it had stayed a little longer, we should ourselves have been taken away. JOHNSON.

*Arrogate*, *assume*, and *ascribe*, denote the taking to one's self, but do not, like *appropriate* and *usurp*, imply taking from another. *Arrogate* is a more violent action than *assume*, and *assume* than *ascribe*. *Arrogate* and *assume* are employed either in the proper or figurative sense, *ascribe* only in the figurative sense. We *arrogate* distinctions, honors, and titles; we *assume* names, rights, and privileges. In the moral sense we *arrogate* pre-eminence, *assume* importance, *ascribe* merit. To *arrogate* is a species of moral *usurpation*; it is always accompanied with haughtiness and contempt for others: that is *arrogated* to one's self to which one has not the smallest title: an *arrogant* temper is one of the most odious features in the human character; it is a compound of folly and insolence. To *assume* is a species of moral *appropriation*; its objects are of a less serious nature than those of *arrogating*, and it does less violence to moral propriety: we may *assume* in trifles, we *arrogate* only in important matters. To *ascribe* is oftener an act of vanity than of injustice: many men may be entitled to the merit which they *ascribe* to themselves; but by this very act they lessen the merit of their best actions.

It very seldom happens that a man is slow enough in *assuming* the character of a husband, or a woman quick enough in condescending to that of a wife. STEELE.

After having thus *ascribed* due honor to birth and parentage, I must, however, take notice of those who *arrogate* to themselves more honors than are due to them on this account. ADDISON.

Sometimes we *ascribe* to ourselves the merit of good qualities, which, if justly considered, should cover us with shame. CRAIG.

*Arrogating* as an action, or *arrogance* as a disposition, is always taken in a bad sense: the former is always dictated by the most preposterous pride; the latter is associated with every unworthy quality. *Assumption* as an action varies in its

character according to circumstances; it may be either good, bad, or indifferent: it is justifiable in certain exigencies to *assume* a command where there is no one else able to direct; it is often a matter of indifference what name a person *assumes* who does so only in conformity to the will of another; but it is always bad to *assume* a name as a mask to impose upon others. As a disposition *assumption* is always bad, but still not to the same degree as *arrogance*. An arrogant man renders himself intolerable to society: an *assuming* man makes himself offensive: *arrogance* is the characteristic of men; *assumption* is peculiar to youths: an *arrogant* man can be humbled only by silent contempt; an *assuming* youth must be checked by the voice of authority.

Humility is expressed by the stooping and bending of the head, *arrogance* when it is lifted up, or as we say tossed up. DRYDEN.

This makes him over-forward in business, *assuming* in conversation, and peremptory in answers. COLLIER.

#### ARCHITECT, BUILDER.

ARCHITECT, from architecture, in Latin *architectus*, from *architectura*, Greek *αρχιτεκτονικη*, compounded of *αρχος*, the chief, and *τεχνη*, art or contrivance, signifies the chief of contrivers. BUILDER, from the verb to *build*, denotes the person concerned in buildings, who causes the structure of houses, either by his money or his personal service.

An *architect* is an artist, employed only to form the plans for large buildings; a *builder* is a simple tradesman, or even workman, who *builds* common dwelling-houses.

Rome will bear witness that the English artists are as superior in talents as they are in numbers to those of all nations besides. I reserve the mention of her *architects* as a separate class. CUMBERLAND.

With his ready money, the *builder*, mason, and carpenter are enabled to make their market of gentlemen in his neighborhood who inconsiderately employ them. STEELE.

#### TO ARGUE, DISPUTE, DEBATE.

ARGUE, in Latin *arguo*, from the Greek *αργος*, clear, manifest, signifies to make clear, that is, by adducing reasons or proofs. DISPUTE, in French *dispu-*

ter, Latin *disputo*, compounded of *dis* and *puto*, signifies to think differently; in an extended sense, to assert a different opinion. DEBATE, in French *débattre*, compounded of the intensive syllable *de* and *battre*, to beat or fight, signifies to contend for and against.

To *argue* is to defend one's self; to *dispute*, to oppose another; to *debate*, to dispute in a formal manner. To *argue* on a subject is to explain the reasons or proofs in support of an assertion; to *argue* with a person is to defend a position against him; to *dispute* a thing is to advance objections against a position; to *dispute* with a person is to start objections against his positions, to attempt to refute them: a *debate* is a disputation held by many. To *argue* does not necessarily suppose a conviction on the part of the *arguer* that what he defends is true, nor a real difference of opinion in his opponent; for some men have such an itching propensity for an *argument*, that they will attempt to prove what nobody denies: to *dispute* always supposes an opposition to some person, but not a sincere opposition to the thing; for we may *dispute* that which we do not deny, for the sake of holding a *dispute* with one who is of different sentiments: to *debate* presupposes a multitude of clashing or opposing opinions. Men of many words *argue* for the sake of talking: men of ready tongues *dispute* for the sake of victory: in parliament men often *debate* for the sake of opposing the ruling party, or from any other motive than the love of truth.

Of good and evil much they *argued* then.

MILTON.

Thus Rodmond, train'd by this unhallow'd crew,  
The sacred social passions never knew:  
Unskill'd to *argue*, in *dispute* yet loud,  
Bold without caution, without honors proud.

FALCONER.

The murmur ceased: then from his lofty throne  
The king invok'd the gods, and thus began:  
I wish, ye Latins, what ye now *debate*  
Had been resolv'd before it was too late.

DRYDEN.

TO ARGUE, EVINCE, PROVE.

ARGUE, *v.* To *argue*, *dispute*. EVINCE, in Latin *evinco*, compounded of *vinco*, to *prove*, or make out, and *e*, forth, signifies to bring to light, to make to appear clear.

PROVE, in French *prouver*, in Latin *probo*, from *probus*, good, signifies to make good, or make to appear good.

These terms in general convey the idea of *evidence*, but with gradations: *argue* denotes the smallest, and *prove* the highest degree. To *argue* is to serve as an indication amounting to probability; to *evince* denotes an indication so clear as to remove doubt; to *prove* marks an *evidence* so positive as to produce conviction. It *argues* a want of candor in any man to conceal circumstances in his statement which are anywise calculated to affect the subject in question: the tenor of a person's conversation may *evince* the refinement of his mind and the purity of his taste: when we see men sacrificing their peace of mind and even their integrity of character to ambition, it *proves* to us how important it is even in early life to check this natural and in some measure laudable, but still insinuating and dangerous passion.

It is not the being singular, but being singular for something, that *argues* either extraordinary endowments of nature or benevolent intentions to mankind, which draws the admiration and esteem of the world.

BERKELEY.

The nature of the soul itself, and particularly its immateriality, has, I think, been *evinced* almost to a demonstration.

ADDISON.

What object, what event the moon beneath,  
But *argues* or endears an after-scene?  
To reason *proves*, or weds it to desire? YOUNG.

ARGUMENT, REASON, PROOF.

ARGUMENT, from *argue* (*v.* To *argue*), signifies either the thing that *argues*, or that which is brought forward in *arguing*. REASON, in French *raison*, Latin *ratio*, from *ratus*, participle of *reor*, to think, signifies the thing thought or believed in support of some other thing. PROOF, from *prove* (*v.* To *argue*), signifies the thing that *proves*.

An *argument* serves for defence; a *reason* for justification; a *proof* for conviction. *Arguments* are adduced in support of an hypothesis or proposition; *reasons* are assigned in matters of belief and practice; *proofs* are collected to ascertain a fact.

When the *arguments* press equally on both sides in matters that are indifferent to us, the safest method is to give up ourselves to neither.

ADDISON.

The *reasons* with his friend's experience join'd,  
Encourag'd much, but more disturb'd his mind.

DRYDEN.

One soul in both, whereof good *proof*  
This day affords.

MILTON.

*Arguments* are either strong or weak; *reasons* solid or futile; *proofs* clear and positive, or vague and indefinite. We confute an *argument*, overpower a *reason*, and invalidate a *proof*. Whoever wishes to defend Christianity will be in no want of *arguments*: the believer need never be at a loss to give a *reason* for the hope that is in him; but throughout the whole of Divine Revelation there is no circumstance that is substantiated with such irrefragable *proofs* as the resurrection of our Saviour.

This, before revelation had enlightened the world, was the very best *argument* for a future state.

ATTERBURY.

Virtue and vice are not arbitrary things, but there is a natural and eternal *reason* for that goodness and virtue, and against vice and wickedness.

TILLOTSON.

Are there (still more amazing!) who resist  
The rising thought, who smother in its birth  
The glorious truth, who struggle to be brutes?  
Who fight the *proofs* of immortality? YOUNG.

TO ARISE, OR RISE, MOUNT, ASCEND,  
CLIMB, SCALE.

ARISE, or RISE, in Saxon *arisan*, Gothic *reisen*, etc., to travel, signifying to move in any direction, is here taken for an upward motion. ASCEND, in Latin *ascendo*, compounded of *ad* and *scando*, signifies to climb up toward a point. CLIMB, in German *klimmen*, which is probably connected with *klammern*, a hook, signifies to rise by a hook. SCALE, in French *escalader*, Italian *scalare*, Latin *scala*, a ladder, signifies to rise by a ladder.

The idea of going upward is common to all these terms; *arise* is used only in the sense of simply getting up, but *rise* is employed to express a continued motion upward: a person *arises* from his seat or his bed; a bird *rises* in the air; the silver of the barometer *rises*: the three first of these terms convey a gradation in their sense; to *arise* or *rise* denotes a motion to a less elevated height than to *mount*, and to *mount* that which is less elevated than *ascend*: a person *rises* from his seat, *mounts* a hill, and *as-*

*cends* a mountain. *Arise* and *rise* are intransitive only; the rest are likewise transitive: we *rise* from a point, we *mount* and *ascend* to a point, or we *mount* and *ascend* something: an air-balloon *rises* when it first leaves the ground; it *mounts* higher and higher until it is out of sight; but if it *ascends* too high, it endangers the life of the aerial adventurer. *Climb* and *scale* express a species of rising: to *climb* is to *rise* step by step, by clinging to a certain body; to *scale* is to rise by an escalade, or species of ladder, employed in *mounting* the walls of fortified towns: trees and mountains are *climbed*; walls are *scaled*.

Th' inspected entrails could no fates foretell,  
Nor, laid on altars, did pure flames *arise*.

DRYDEN.

To contradict them, see all nature *rise*!  
What object, what event the moon beneath,  
But *argues* or endears an after-scene? YOUNG.  
At length the fatal fabric *mounts* the walls,  
Big with destruction.

DRYDEN.

We view a *rising* land like distant clouds;  
The mountain-tops confirm the pleasing sight,  
And curling smoke *ascending* from their height.

DRYDEN.

While you (alas! that I should find it so),  
To shun my sight, your native soil forego,  
And *climb* the frozen Alps, and tread the eternal snow.

DRYDEN.

But brave Messapus, Neptune's warlike son,  
Broke down the palisades, the trenches won,  
And loud for ladders calls, to *scale* the town.

DRYDEN.

TO ARISE, OR RISE, PROCEED, ISSUE,  
SPRING, FLOW, EMANATE.

To ARISE, *v.* To *arise*. PROCEED, in Latin *procedo*, that is, *pro* and *cedo*, to go, signifies to go forth. ISSUE, in French *issue*, comes from the Latin *isse* or *irisse*, infinitive of *eo*, to go, and the Hebrew *itza*, to go out. SPRING, in German *springen*, comes from *rinnen*, to run like water, and is connected with the Greek *ῥοιεν*, to pour out. FLOW, in Saxon *fleovan*, low German *flogan*, high German *fließen*, Latin *fluo*, etc., all connected with the Greek *ῥαυω* or *ῥαυζω*, which is an onomatopœia expressing the murmur of waters. EMANATE, in Latin *emanatus*, participle of *emano*, compounded of *mano*, to flow, from the Hebrew *mim* and Chaldee *min*, waters, expressing the motion of waters.

The idea of one object coming out of

another is expressed by all these terms, but they differ in the circumstances of the action. What comes up out of a body and rises into existence is said to *arise*, as the mist which *arises* out of the sea: what comes forth as an effect, or comes forth in a particular manner, is said to *proceed*; thus the light *proceeds* from a certain quarter of the heavens, or from a certain part of a house: what comes out from a small aperture is said to *issue*; thus perspiration *issues* through the pores of the skin; water *issues* sometimes from the sides of rocks: what comes out in a sudden or quick manner, or comes from some remote source, is said to *spring*; thus blood *springs* from an artery which is pricked; water *springs* up out of the earth: what comes out in quantities or in a stream is said to *flow*; thus blood *flows* from a wound: to *emanate* is a species of *flowing* by a natural operation, when bodies send forth, or seem to send forth, particles of their own composition from themselves; thus light *emanates* from the sun.

From roots hard hazels, and from scions *rise*  
Tall ash, and taller oak that mates the skies.  
DRYDEN.

Teach me the various labors of the moon,  
And whence *proceed* the eclipses of the sun.  
DRYDEN.

As when some huntsman with a flying spear  
From the blind thicket wounds a stately deer,  
Down his cleft side while fresh the blood distils,  
He bounds aloft and scuds from hills to hills,  
Till, life's warm vapor *issuing* through the  
wound,  
Wild mountain wolves the fainting beast sur-  
round.  
POPE.

Great floods have *flown*  
From simple sources.  
SHAKESPEARE.

So from the root  
*Springs* lighter the green stalk, from thence the  
leaves.  
MILTON.

The sun is the eye of the world, and he is in-  
different to the Negro or the cold Russian; but  
the flexures of the heaven and the earth, the  
convenience of abode, and the approaches to the  
north or south, respectively change the *emana-  
tions* of his beams.  
JEREMY TAYLOR.

This distinction in the signification of these terms is kept up in their moral ac-  
ceptation, where the idea of one thing  
originating from another is common to  
them all; but in this case *arise* is a gen-  
eral term, which simply implies the com-  
ing into existence; *proceed* conveys also  
the idea of a progressive movement into

existence. Every object, therefore, may  
be said to *arise* out of whatever produces  
it; but it *proceeds* from it only when it is  
gradually produced: evils are continually  
*arising* in human society for which there  
is no specific remedy: in complicated dis-  
orders it is not always possible to say  
precisely from what the complaint of the  
patient *proceeds*. *Issue* is seldom used  
but in application to sensible objects;  
yet we may say, in conformity to the orig-  
inal meaning, that words *issue* from the  
mouth: the idea of the distant source or  
origin is kept up in the moral application  
of the term *spring*, when we say that ac-  
tions *spring* from a generous or corrupt  
principle: the idea of a quantity and a  
stream is preserved in the moral use of  
the terms *flow* and *emanate*; but the for-  
mer may be said of that which is not in-  
herent in the body; the latter respects  
that only which forms a component part  
of the body: God is the *spring* whence  
all our blessings *flow*; all authority *em-  
anates* from God, who is the supreme  
source of all things: theologians, when  
speaking of God, say that the Son *em-  
anates* from the Father, and the Holy  
Ghost from the Father and the Son,  
and that grace *flows* upon us incessantly  
from the inexhaustible treasures of Di-  
vine mercy.

The greatest misfortunes men fall into *arise*  
from themselves.  
STEELE.

But whence *proceed* these hopes, or whence this  
dread,  
If nothing really can affect the dead? JENYNS.

As light and heat *flow* from the sun as their  
centre, so bliss and joy *flow* from the Deity.  
BLAIR.

Providence is the great sanctuary to the afflicted  
who maintain their integrity; and often there  
has *issued* from this sanctuary the most season-  
able relief.  
BLAIR.

All from utility this law approve,  
As every private bliss must *spring* from social  
love.  
JENYNS.

As in the next world so in this, the only solid  
blessings are owing to the goodness of the mind,  
not the extent of the capacity; friendship here is  
an *emanation* from the same source as beatitude  
there.  
POPE.

## ARMS, WEAPONS.

ARMS, from the Latin *arma*, is now  
properly used for instruments of offence,  
and never otherwise except by a poetic  
license of *arms* for armor; but *weapon*,

from the German *waffen*, may be used  
either for an instrument of offence or  
defence. We say *fire-arms*, but not *fire-  
weapons*; and *weapons* offensive or de-  
fensive, not *arms* offensive or defensive.  
*Arms* likewise, agreeably to its origin, is  
employed for that only which is purpose-  
ly made to be an instrument of offence;  
*weapon*, according to its extended and in-  
definite application, is employed for what-  
ever may be accidentally used for this  
purpose: guns and swords are always  
*arms*; stones, brick-bats, and pitchforks,  
and also the tongue or words, may be oc-  
casionally *weapons*.

Louder, and yet more loud, I hear th' alarms,  
Of human cries, distinct and clashing *arms*.  
DRYDEN.

The cry of Talbot serves me for a sword,  
For I have loaded me with many spoils,  
Using no other *weapon* than his name.  
SHAKESPEARE.

## ARMY, HOST.

AN ARMY is an organized body of  
*armed* men; a HOST, from *hostis*, an en-  
emy, is properly a body of *hostile* men.  
An *army* is a limited body; a *host* may  
be unlimited, and is therefore generally  
considered a very large body.

No more applause would on ambition wait,  
And, laying waste the world, be counted great;  
But one good-natured act more pra'ises gain  
Than *armies* o'ertrown and thousands slain.  
JENYNS.

He it was whose guile,  
Stirr'd up with envy and revenge, deceiv'd  
The mother of mankind, what time his pride  
Had cast him out of heav'n, with all his *host*  
Of rebel angels.  
MILTON.

The word *army* applies only to that  
which has been formed by the rules of  
art for purposes of war: *host* has been  
extended in its application not only to  
bodies, whether of men or angels, that  
were assembled for purposes of offence,  
but also in the figurative sense to what-  
ever rises up to assail.

Yet true it is, survey we life around,  
Whole *hosts* of ills on every side are found.  
JENYNS.

## ARROGANCE, PRESUMPTION.

ARROGANCE, in French *arrogance*,  
Latin *arrogantia*, signifies the disposition  
to *arrogate* (v. *To appropriate*). PRE-  
SUMPTION, from *presume*, Latin *presu-*

*mo*, compounded of *prae*, before, and *sumo*,  
to take or put, signifies the disposition to  
put one's self forward.

*Arrogance* is the act of the great;  
*presumption* that of the little: the *ar-  
rogant* man takes upon himself to be  
above others; the *presumptuous* man  
strives to be on a level with those who  
are above him. *Arrogance* is commonly  
coupled with haughtiness; *presumption*  
with meanness: men *arrogantly* demand  
as a right the homage which has per-  
haps before been voluntarily granted;  
the creature *presumptuously* arraigns the  
conduct of the Creator, and murmurs  
against the dispensations of His provi-  
dence.

I must confess I was very much surprised to  
see so great a body of editors, critics, commenta-  
tors, and grammarians meet with so very ill a  
reception.

They had formed themselves into a body, and,  
with a great deal of *arrogance*, demanded the  
first station in the column of knowledge; but  
the goddess, instead of complying with their re-  
quest, clapped them into liveries. ADDISON.

In the vanity and *presumption* of youth, it is  
common to allege the consciousness of innocence  
as a reason for the contempt of censure.

HAWKSWORTH.

## ART, CUNNING, DECEIT.

ART, in Latin *ars*, probably comes from  
the Greek *αρω*, to fit or dispose, Hebrew  
*haresh*, to contrive, in which action the  
mental exercise of *art* principally con-  
sists. CUNNING is in Saxon *cuning*,  
German *kennend*, knowing, in which sense  
the English word was formerly used.  
DECEIT, in Latin *deceptum*, participle of  
*decipio*, or *de* and *capio*, signifies to take  
by surprise or unawares.

*Art* implies a disposition of the mind  
to use circumvention or artificial means  
to attain an end: *cunning* marks the dis-  
position to practise disguise in the prose-  
cution of a plan: *deceit* leads to the prac-  
tice of dissimulation and gross falsehood,  
for the sake of gratifying a desire. *Art*  
is the property of a lively mind; *cunning*  
of a thoughtful and knowing mind; *de-  
ceit* of an ignorant, low, and weak mind.  
*Art* is practised often in self-defence; as  
a practice, therefore, it is even sometimes  
justifiable, although not as a disposition:  
*cunning* has always self in view; the  
*cunning* man seeks his gratification with-  
out regard to others; *deceit* is often prac-

tised to the express injury of another: the *deceitful* man adopts base means for base ends. Animals practise *art* when opposed to their superiors in strength; but they are not *artful*, as they have not that versatility of power which they can habitually exercise to their own advantage like human beings; animals may be *cunning*, inasmuch as they can by contrivance and concealment seek to obtain the object of their desire, but no animal is *deceitful* except man: the wickedest and stupidest of men have the power and the will of *deceiving* and practising falsehood upon others, which is unknown to the brutes.

It has been a sort of maxim that the greatest *art* is to conceal *art*; but I know not how, among some people we meet with, their greatest *cunning* is to appear *cunning*. STEELE.

*Cunning* can in no circumstance imaginable be a quality worthy a man except in his own defence, and merely to conceal himself from such as are so, and in such cases it is wisdom. STEELE.

Though the living man can wear a mask and carry on *deceit*, the dying Christian cannot counterfeit. CUMBERLAND.

## ARTFUL, ARTIFICIAL, FICTITIOUS.

ARTFUL, compounded of *art* and *full*, marks the quality of being full of *art* (*v. Art*). ARTIFICIAL, in Latin *artificialis*, from *ars* and *facio*, to do, signifies done with *art*. FICTITIOUS, in Latin *factitious*, from *finjo*, to feign, signifies the quality of being *feigned*.

*Artful* respects what is done with art or design; *artificial* what is done by the exercise of workmanship; *fictitious* what is made out of the mind. *Artful* and *artificial* are used either for natural or moral objects; *fictitious* always for those that are moral: *artful* is opposed to what is *artless*, *artificial* to what is natural, *fictitious* to what is real: the ringlets of a lady's hair are disposed in an *artful* manner; the hair itself may be *artificial*: a tale is *artful* which is told in a way to gain credit; manners are *artificial* which do not seem to suit the person adopting them: a story is *fictitious* which has no foundation whatever in truth, and is the invention of the narrator. Children sometimes tell their stories so *artfully* as to impose on the most penetrating and experienced. Those who have no character of their own are induced to take an

*artificial* character in order to put themselves on a level with their associates. Beggars deal in *fictitious* tales of distress in order to excite compassion.

I was much surprised to see the ants' nest which I had destroyed, very *artfully* repaired. ADDISON.

If we compare two nations in an equal state of civilization, we may remark that where the greater freedom obtains, there the greater variety of *artificial* wants will obtain also. CUMBERLAND.

Among the numerous stratagems by which pride endeavors to recommend folly to regard, there is scarcely one that meets with less success than affectation, or a perpetual disguise of the real character by *fictitious* appearances. JOHNSON.

## ARTICLE, CONDITION, TERM.

ARTICLE, in French *article*, Latin *articulus*, a joint or a part of a member. CONDITION, in French *condition*, Latin *conditio*, from *condo*, to build or form, signifies properly the thing framed. TERM, in French *terme*, Latin *terminus*, a boundary, signifies the point to which one is fixed.

These words agree in their application to matters of compact, or understanding between man and man. *Article* and *condition* are used in both numbers; *terms* only in the plural in this sense: the former may be used for any point individually; the latter for all the points collectively: *article* is employed for all matters which are drawn out in specific *articles* or *points*; as the *articles* of an indenture, of a capitulation, or an agreement. *Condition* respects any point that is admitted as a ground of obligation or engagement: it is used for the general transactions of men, in which they reciprocally bind themselves to return certain equivalents. The word *terms* is employed in regard to mercantile transactions; as the *terms* of any bargain, the *terms* of any agreement, the *terms* on which anything is bought or sold. *Articles* are mostly voluntary; they are admitted by mutual agreement: *conditions* are frequently compulsory, sometimes hard; they are submitted to from policy or necessity; *terms* are dictated by interest or equity; they are fair, or unfair, according to the temper of the parties; they are submitted or agreed to.

In the mean time they have ordered the preliminary treaty to be published, with observa-

tions on each *article*, in order to quiet the minds of the people. STEELE.

The Trojan by his word is bound to take The same *conditions* which himself did make. DRYDEN.

Those mountains fill'd with firs, that lower land, If you consent, the Trojans shall command; Call'd into part of what is ours, and there, On *terms* agreed, the common country share. DRYDEN.

## ARTIFICE, TRICK, FINESSE, STRATAGEM.

ARTIFICE, in French *artifice*, Latin *artifex*, an artificer, and *artem facio*, to execute an art, signifies the performance of an art. TRICK, in French *tricher*, German *triegen*, to deceive. FINESSE, a word directly imported from France with all the meaning attached to it, which is characteristic of the nation itself, means properly fineness; the word *fin*, fine, signifying in French, as well as in the Northern languages from which it is taken, subtlety or mental acumen. STRATAGEM, in French *stratagème*, from the Greek *στρατηγημα* and *στρατηγειν*, to lead an army, signifies by distinction to head them in carrying on any scheme.

All these terms denote the exercise of an art calculated to mislead others. *Artifice* is the generic term, the rest are specific: the former has likewise a particular use and acceptance distinct from the others; it expresses a ready display of art for the purpose of extricating one's self from a difficulty, or securing to one's self an advantage. *Trick* includes in it more of design to gain something for one's self, or to act secretly to the inconvenience of others: it is rather a cheat on the senses than the understanding. *Finesse* is a species of *artifice* in which art and cunning are combined in the management of a cause: it is a mixture of invention, falsehood, and concealment. *Stratagem* is a display of art in plotting and contriving, a disguised mode of obtaining an end. Females who are not guarded by fixed principles of virtue and uprightness are apt to practise *artifices* upon their husbands. Men without honor, or an honorable means of living, are apt to practise various *tricks* to impose upon others to their own advantage: every trade, therefore, is said to have its *tricks*; and professions are not entirely

clear from this stigma, which has been brought upon them by unworthy members. Diplomatic persons have most frequent recourse to *finesse*. Military operations are sometimes considerably forwarded by well-concerted and well-timed *stratagems* to surprise the enemy.

Mortals, whose pleasures are their only care, First wish to be impos'd on, and then are; And, lest the fulsome *artifice* should fail, Themselves will hide its coarseness with a veil. COWPER.

Where men practise falsehood and show *tricks* with one another, there will be perpetual suspicions, evil surmisings, doubts, and jealousies. SOUTH.

Another can't forgive the paltry arts By which he makes his way to shallow hearts— Mere pieces of *finesse*, traps for applause. CHURCHILL.

One of the most successful *stratagems* whereby Mohammed became formidable was the assurance that impostor gave his votaries, that whoever was slain in battle should be immediately conveyed to that luxurious paradise his wanton fancy had invented. STEELE.

An *artifice* may be perfectly innocent when it serves to afford a friend an unexpected pleasure. A *trick* is childish which only serves to deceive or amuse children. *Stratagems* are allowable not in war only; the writer of a novel or a play may sometimes adopt a successful *stratagem* to cause the reader a surprise. *Finesse* is never justifiable; it carries with it too much of concealment and disingenuousness to be practised but for selfish and unworthy purposes.

Among the several *artifices* which are put in practice by the poets to fill the minds of an audience with terror, the first place is due to thunder and lightning. ADDISON.

On others practise thy Ligurian arts; The *stratagems* and *tricks* of little hearts Are lost on me. DRYDEN.

The king easily perceived a person of that plainness could not be guilty of those *finesses* and intrigues which were objected against him. COXE.

## ARTIST, ARTISAN, ARTIFICER, MECHANIC.

ARTIST is the practiser of the fine arts. ARTISAN the practiser of the vulgar arts. ARTIFICER, from *ars* and *facio*, one who does or makes according to art. MECHANIC, an artisan in a mechanic art.

The *artist* ranks higher than the *arti-*



san; the former requires intellectual refinement, the latter nothing but to know the common practice of art. The musician, painter, and sculptor are *artists*; the carpenter, the sign-painter, and the blacksmith are *artisans*. The *artificer* is an intermediate term between the *artist* and the *artisan*: manufacturers are *artificers*; and, in an extended sense, any one who makes a thing by his contrivance is an *artificer*. The *mechanic* is that species of artisan who works at arts purely *mechanical*, in distinction from those which contribute to the completion and embellishment of any objects; on this ground a shoemaker is a *mechanic*, but a common painter is a simple *artisan*.

If ever this country saw an age of *artists*, it is the present; her painters, sculptors, and engravers are now the only schools properly so called.

CUMBERLAND.

The merchant, tradesman, and *artisan* will have their profit upon all the multiplied wants, comforts, and indulgences of civilized life.

CUMBERLAND.

Man must be in a certain degree the *artificer* of his own happiness; the tools and materials may be put into his hands by the bounty of Providence, but the workmanship must be his own.

CUMBERLAND.

The concurring assent of the world in preferring gentlemen to *mechanics* seems founded in that preference which the rational part of our nature is entitled to above the animal.

BARTELETT.

TO ASCRIBE, IMPUTE, ATTRIBUTE.

To ASCRIBE signifies here generally to write or set down in one's own mind to a person (*v. To appropriate*), that is, to assign anything in one's estimate as the possession or the property of another, as to *ascribe* honor or power. To IMPUTE, from *im* or *in* and *puto*, to think, is to form an estimate of a person; as to *impute* motives to a person, to *impute* a thing to a person's folly. To ATTRIBUTE, from *at* or *ad* and *tribuo*, to bestow, is to assign a thing as a cause; as to *attribute* the loss of a vessel to the violence of the storm.

Holliness is *ascribed* to the pope; majesty to kings; serenity or mildness to princes; excellence or perfection to ambassadors; grace to archbishops; honor to peers.

ADDISON.

Men, in their innovations, should follow the example of time, which innovateth, but quietly and by degrees scarce to be perceived, for otherwise what is new, and unlooked for, ever mends

some, and impairs others, and he that is hurt for a wrong *imputeth* it to the author.

BACON.

What is *ascribed* and *imputed* is mostly of a personal nature, either to honor or dishonor; *ascribe* more frequently for the former, *impute* for the latter. In the doxology of the church ritual, all honor, might, majesty, dominion, and power are *ascribed* to the three persons in the Holy Trinity; men of right minds cannot bear the slightest *imputation* on their honor, nor virtuous women the slightest *imputation* on their chastity.

It is a great presumption to *ascribe* our successes to our own management, and not to esteem ourselves upon any blessing, rather as it is the bounty of heaven, than the acquisition of our own prudence.

ADDISON.

He must also do them the justice to declare that most of the descriptions are his own, and their faults must be *imputed* to him only.

SIR W. JONES.

*Ascribe* may, however, sometimes be employed in an unfavorable sense, and *impute* in a favorable sense. We may *ascribe* imperfection as well as perfection, and *impute* good as well as bad motives.

When we reflect on the divine nature, we are so used and accustomed to imperfection in ourselves that we cannot forbear in some measure *ascribing* it to Him in whom there is no shadow of imperfection.

ADDISON.

He performed always as good offices toward his old friends and all other persons, as the inquiry of the time and the nature of the employment he was in would permit him to do; which kind of humanity could be *imputed* to very few.

CLARENDON.

To *ascribe* may also denote to assign a cause, which brings it nearer in sense to *attribute*; but the former always refers to some characteristic of the person, and the latter, although applied to personal qualities, conveys no personal reflection.

Wherever this expedient has failed, it is always *ascribed* to the want of faith in the person, not to any want of efficacy in the veil.

BYRDONE.

This was, in some measure, owing to the changes in the times in which he lived; but is more to be *attributed* to the instability of his character, which ever varied with the interests of his ambition.

GRANGER.

To *ascribe* is always to assign to some individual person; but to *attribute* may either refer to no persons, or to none individually. Milton *ascribes* the first use of artillery to the devil: the Letters of Junius have been *ascribed* successively to

many as the author; the death of many persons may be *attributed* to intemperance.

The characters in the poem are no less imaginary than those in the episode, in which the invention is poetically *ascribed* to Mars, though it is certain the game was originally brought from India.

SIR W. JONES.

Perhaps it may appear upon examination that the most polite ages are the least virtuous. This may be *attributed* to the folly of admitting wit and learning as merit in themselves, without considering the application of them.

STEELE.

TO ASK, BEG, REQUEST.

ASK is in Saxon *ascian*, low German *esken*, *eschen*, German *heischen*, Danish *adske*, Swedish *aeska*; these in general signify to wish for, and are connected with the Greek *αἰεω*, to think worthy. BEG is contracted from the word *beggar*, and the German *begehren*, to desire vehemently. REQUEST, in Latin *requisitus*, participle of *requiro*, is compounded of *re* and *quero*, to seek or look after with indications of desire to possess.

The expression of a wish to some one to have something is the common idea comprehended in these terms. As this is the simple signification of *ask*, it is the generic term; the other two are specific: we *ask* in *begging* and *requesting*, but not *vice versa*. *Asking* is peculiar to no rank or station; in consequence of our mutual dependence on each other, it is requisite for every man to *ask* something of another: the master *asks* of the servant, the servant *asks* of the master; the parent *asks* of the child; the child *asks* of the parent. *Begging* marks a degree of dependence which is peculiar to inferiors in station: we *ask* for matters of indifference; we *beg* that which we think is of importance: a child *asks* a favor of his parent; a poor man *begs* the assistance of one who is able to afford it: that is *asked* for which is easily granted; that is *begged* which is with difficulty obtained. To *ask*, therefore, requires no effort; but to *beg* is to *ask* with importunity: those who by merely *asking* find themselves unable to obtain what they wish, will have recourse to *begging*. As *ask* sometimes implies a demand, and *beg* a vehemence of desire, or strong degree of necessity, politeness has adopted another phrase, which conveys neither the impe-

riousness of the one, nor the urgency of the other; this is the word *request*. *Asking* carries with it an air of superiority; *begging* that of submission; *requesting* has the air of independence and equality. *Asking* borders too nearly on an infringement of personal liberty; *begging* imposes a constraint by making an appeal to the feelings; *requests* leave the liberty of granting or refusing unencumbered. It is the character of impertinent people to *ask* without considering the circumstances and situation of the person *asked*; they seem ready to take without permission that which is *asked*, if it be not granted: selfish and greedy people *beg* with importunity, and in a tone that admits of no refusal; men of good-breeding tender their *requests* with moderation and discretion; they *request* nothing but what they are certain can be conveniently complied with.

Let him pursue the promis'd Latian shore,  
A short delay is all I *ask* him now,  
A pause of grief, an interval from woe. DRYDEN.  
But we must *beg* our bread in climes unknown,  
Beneath the scorching or the frozen zone. DRYDEN.

But do not you my last *request* deny,  
With you perfidious man your int'rest try. DRYDEN.

*Ask* is altogether exploded from polite life, although *beg* is not. We may *beg* a person's acceptance of anything; we may *beg* him to favor or honor us with his company; but we can never talk of *asking* a person's acceptance, or *asking* him to do us an honor. *Beg* in such cases indicates a condescension which is sometimes not unbecoming, but on ordinary occasions *request* is with more propriety substituted in its place.

TO ASK, OR ASK FOR, CLAIM, DEMAND.

ASK, *v. To ask, beg*. CLAIM, in French *claimer*, Latin *clamo*, to cry after, signifies to express an imperious wish for. DEMAND, in French *demande*, Latin *demande*, compounded of *de* and *mando*, to order, signifies to call for imperatively.

*Ask*, in the sense of *beg*, is confined to the expression of wishes on the part of the *asker*, without involving any obligation on the part of the person *asked*; all granted in this case is voluntary, or complied with as a favor; but *ask for*, in