

person's moral proceedings: we speak of a person's *behavior* at table, or in company, in a ball-room, in the street, or in public; of his *conduct* in the management of his private concerns, in the direction of his family, or in his different relations with his fellow-creatures. *Behavior* applies to the minor morals of society; *conduct* to those of the first moment: in our intercourse with others we may adopt a civil or polite, a rude or boisterous *behavior*; in our serious transactions we may adopt a peaceable, discreet, or prudent, a rash, dangerous, or mischievous *conduct*. The *behavior* of young people in society is of particular importance; it should, above all things, be marked with propriety in the presence of superiors and elders: the youth who does not learn betimes a seemly *behavior* in company, will scarcely know how to *conduct* himself judiciously on any future occasion.

The circumstance of life is not that which gives us place, but our *behavior* in that circumstance is what should be our solid distinction. STEELE.

Wisdom is no less necessary in religious and moral than in civil *conduct*. BLAIR.

Carriage respects simply the manner of *carrying* the body; *deportment* includes both the action and the *carriage* of the body in performing the action; *demeanor* respects only the moral character or tendency of the action; *deportment* is said only of those exterior actions that have an immediate reference to others; *demeanor*, of the general *behavior* as it relates to the circumstances and situation of the individual: the *carriage* is that part of *behavior* which is of the first importance to attend to in young persons. A *carriage* should neither be haughty nor servile; to be graceful, it ought to have a due mixture of dignity and condescension: the *deportment* of a man should be suited to his station; a humble *deportment* is becoming in inferiors; a stately and forbidding *deportment* is very unbecoming in superiors: the *demeanor* of a man should be suited to his situation; the suitable *demeanor* of a judge on the bench, or of a clergyman in the pulpit, or when performing his clerical functions, adds much to the dignity and solemnity of the office itself. The *carriage* marks the birth and education: an awkward *carriage* stamps a man as vulgar; a graceful

carriage evinces refinement and culture. The *deportment* marks either the habitual or the existing temper of the mind: who ever is really impressed with the solemnity and importance of public worship will evince his impressions by a gravity of *deportment*: the *demeanor* is most commonly used to denote the present temper of the mind; as a modest *demeanor* is particularly suitable for one who is in the presence of the person whom he has offended.

He that will look back upon all the acquaintances he has had in his whole life, will find he has seen more men capable of the greatest employments and performances, than such as could in the general bent of their *carriage* act otherwise than according to their own complexion and humor. STEELE.

His *deportment* in this expedition was noble throughout: to the gentleman a fair respect, bountiful to the soldier, of unquestionable courage in himself, and rather fearful of fame than danger. WOTTON.

I have been told the same even of Mohammedans, with relation to the propriety of their *demeanor* in the conventions of their erroneous worship. TATLER.

BELIEF, CREDIT, TRUST, FAITH.

BELIEF, from *believe*, in Saxon *gelyfan*, *geleavan*, in German *glauben*, comes, in all probability, from *lief*, as in German, *belieben*, to please, and Latin *libet*, it pleases, signifying the pleasure or assent of the mind. CREDIT, in French *crédit*, Latin *creditus*, participle of *credo*, compounded of *cor*, the heart, and *do*, to give, signifies also giving the heart. TRUST is connected with the old word *trou*, in Saxon *treowian*, German *trauen*, old German *thrawân*, *thruwen*, etc., to hold true, connected with the Greek *thaptein*, to have confidence, signifying to depend upon as true. FAITH, in Latin *fides*, from *fido*, to confide, signifies also dependence upon as true.

Belief is the generic term, the others are specific; we *believe* when we *credit* and *trust*, but not always *vice versa*. *Belief* rests on no particular person or thing; but *credit* and *trust* rest on the authority of one or more individuals. Everything is the subject of *belief* which produces one's assent: the events of human life are *credited* upon the authority of the narrator: the words, promises, or the integrity of individuals are *trusted*:

the power of persons and the virtue of things are objects of *faith*. *Belief* and *credit* are particular actions or sentiments: *trust* and *faith* are permanent dispositions of the mind. Things are entitled to our *belief*; persons are entitled to our *credit*: but people repose a *trust* in others; or have a *faith* in others. Our *belief* or *unbelief* is not always regulated by our reasoning faculties or the truth of things: we often *believe* from presumption, ignorance, or passion, things to be true which are very false. With the bulk of mankind, assurance goes farther than anything else in obtaining *credit*: gross falsehoods, pronounced with confidence, will be *credited* sooner than plain truths told in an unvarnished style. There are no disappointments more severe than those which we feel on finding that we have *trusted* to men of base principles. Ignorant people have commonly a more implicit *faith* in any nostrum recommended to them by persons of their own class, than in the prescriptions of professional men regularly educated.

Oh! I've heard him talk
Like the first-born child of love, when every
word
Spoke in his eyes, and wept to be *believ'd*,
And all to ruin me. SOUTHERN.

Oh! I will *credit* my Scamandra's tears!
Nor think them drops of chance like other women's. LEE.

Capricious man! To good or ill inconstant.
Too much to fear or *trust* is equal weakness. JOHNSON.

For *faith* repos'd on seas and on the flatt'ring
sky,
Thy naked corpse is doom'd on shores unknown
to lie. DRYDEN.

Belief, *trust*, and *faith* have a religious application, which *credit* has not. *Belief* is simply an act of the understanding; *trust* and *faith* are active moving principles of the mind. *Belief* does not extend beyond an assent of the mind to any given proposition; *trust* and *faith* impel to action. *Belief* is to *trust* and *faith* as cause to effect: there may be *belief* without either *trust* or *faith*; but there can be no *trust* or *faith* without *belief*: we *believe* that there is a God, who is the creator and preserver of all his creatures; we therefore *trust* in him for his protection of ourselves: we *believe* that Jesus Christ died for the sins of men; we have

therefore *faith* in his redeeming grace to save us from our sins. *Belief* is common to all religions: *trust* is peculiar to the *believers* in Divine revelation: *faith* is employed by distinction for the Christian *faith*. *Belief* is purely speculative; and *trust* and *faith* are operative: the former operates on the mind; the latter on the outward conduct. *Trust* in God serves to dispel all anxious concern about the future. Theorists substitute *belief* for *faith*; enthusiasts mistake passion for *faith*. True *faith* must be grounded on a right *belief*, and accompanied with a right practice.

The Epicureans contented themselves with the denial of a Providence, asserting at the same time the existence of gods in general; because they would not shock the common *belief* of mankind. ADDISON.

What can be a stronger motive to a firm *trust* and reliance on the mercies of our Maker, than the giving us his Son to suffer for us? ADDISON.

The *faith* or persuasion of a Divine revelation is a divine faith, not only with respect to the object of it, but likewise in respect of the author of it, which is the Divine Spirit. TILLOTSON.

BEND, BENT.

BOTH abstract nouns from the verb *to bend*; the one to express its proper, and the other its moral application: a stick has a BEND; the mind has a BENT. A *bend* in anything that should be straight is a defect; a *bent* of the inclination that is not sanctioned by religion is detrimental to a person's moral character and peace of mind. For a vicious *bend* in a natural body there are various remedies; but nothing will cure a corrupt *bent* of the will except religion.

His coward lips did from their color fly,
And that same eye whose *bend* does awe the
world,
Did lose its lustre. SHAKESPEARE.

The soul does not always care to be in the same *bent*. The faculties relieve one another by turns, and receive an additional pleasure from the novelty of those objects about which they are conversant. ADDISON.

BENEFACTION, DONATION.

BENEFACTION, from the Latin *benefacio*, signifies the thing well done, or done for the good of others. DONATION, from *dono*, to give or present, signifies the sum presented.

Both these terms denote an act of charity, but the former comprehends

more than the latter: a *benefaction* comprehends acts of personal service in general toward the indigent; *donation* respects simply the act of giving and the thing given. *Benefactions* are for private use; *donations* are for public service. A *benefactor* to the poor does not confine himself to the distribution of money; he enters into all their necessities, consults their individual cases, and suits his *benefactions* to their exigencies; his influence, his counsel, his purse, and his property are employed for their good; his *donations* form the smallest part of the good which he does.

The light and influence that the heavens bestow upon this lower world, though the lower world cannot equal their *benefaction*, yet, with a kind of grateful return, it reflects those rays that it cannot recompense.

Titles and lands given to God are never, and plates, vestments, and other sacred utensils, are seldom consecrated: yet certain it is that after the *donation* of them to the church, it is as really a sacrilege to steal them as it is to pull down a church.

BENEFICENT, BOUNTIFUL OR BOUNTIFUL, MUNIFICENT, GENEROUS, LIBERAL.

BENEFICENT, from *benefacio* (*v. Benefaction*). BOUNTIFUL signifies full of bounty or goodness, from the French *bonté*, Latin *bonitas*. MUNIFICENT, in Latin *munificus*, from *munus* and *facio*, signifies the quality of making presents. GENEROUS, in French *généreux*, Latin *generosus*, of high blood, noble extraction, and consequently of a noble character. LIBERAL, in French *libéral*, Latin *liberalis*, from *liber*, free, signifies the quality of being like a freeman in distinction from a bondman, and by a natural association, being of a free disposition, ready to communicate.

Beneficent respects everything done for the good of others: *bounty*, *munificence*, and *generosity* are species of *beneficence*: *liberality* is a qualification of all. The two first denote modes of action: the three latter either modes of action or modes of sentiment. The sincere well-wisher to his fellow-creatures is *beneficent* according to his means; he is *bountiful* in providing for the comfort and happiness of others; he is *munificent* in dispensing favors; he is *generous* in impart-

ing his property; he is liberal in all he does. *Beneficence* and *bounty* are characteristics of the Deity as well as of his creatures: *munificence*, *generosity*, and *liberality* are mere human qualities. *Beneficence* and *bounty* are the peculiar characteristics of the Deity: with him the will and the act of doing good are commensurate only with the power; he was *beneficent* to us as our Creator, and continues his *beneficence* to us by his daily preservation and protection; to some, however, he has been more *bountiful* than to others, by providing them with an unequal share of the good things of this life. The *beneficence* of man is regulated by the *bounty* of Providence: to whom much is given, from him much will be required. Instructed by his word, and illumined by that spark of benevolence which was infused into their souls with the breath of life, good men are ready to believe that they are but stewards of all God's gifts, holden for the use of such as are less *bountifully* provided. They will desire, as far as their powers extend, to imitate this feature of the Deity by bettering with their *beneficent* counsel and assistance the condition of all who require it, and by gladdening the hearts of many with their *bountiful* provisions.

The most *beneficent* of all beings is he who hath an absolute fulness of perfection in himself, who gave existence to the universe, and so cannot be supposed to want that which he communicated.

Hail! Universal Lord, be bounteous still
To give us only good.

Princes are *munificent*, friends are *generous*, patrons *liberal*. *Munificence* is measured by the quality and quantity of the thing bestowed; *generosity* by the extent of the sacrifice made; *liberality* by the warmth and freedom of the spirit discovered. A monarch displays his *munificence* in the presents which he sends by his ambassadors to another monarch. A *generous* man will waive his claims, however powerful they may be, when the accommodation or relief of another is in question. A *liberal* spirit does not stop to inquire the reason for giving, but gives when the occasion offers. *Munificence* may spring either from ostentation or a becoming sense of dignity; *generosity* may spring either from a generous tem-

per or an easy unconcern about property; *liberality* of conduct is dictated by nothing but a warm heart and an expanded mind. *Munificence* is confined simply to giving, but we may be *generous* in assisting, and *liberal* in rewarding.

I esteem a habit of benignity greatly preferable to *munificence*.

STEELE AFTER CICERO.

We may with great confidence and equal truth affirm, that since there was such a thing as mankind in the world, there never was any heart truly great and *generous* that was not also tender and compassionate.

SOUTH.

The citizen, above all other men, has opportunities of arriving at the highest fruit of wealth, to be *liberal* without the least expense of a man's own fortune.

STEELE.

BENEFIT, FAVOR, KINDNESS, CIVILITY.

BENEFIT signifies here that which is done to benefit (*v. Advantage, benefit*). FAVOR, in French *faveur*, Latin *favor* and *faveo*, to bear good-will, signifies the act flowing from good-will. KINDNESS signifies an action that is kind (*v. Affectionate*). CIVILITY signifies that which is *civil* (*v. Civil*).

The idea of an action gratuitously performed for the advantage of another is common to these terms. *Benefits* and *favors* are granted by superiors; *kindnesses* and *civilities* pass between equals. *Benefits* serve to relieve actual wants: the power of conferring and the necessity of receiving them constitute the relative difference in station between the giver and the receiver: *favors* tend to promote the interest or convenience; the power of giving and the advantage of receiving are dependent on local circumstances, more than on difference of station. *Kindnesses* and *civilities* serve to afford mutual accommodation by a reciprocity of kind offices on the many and various occasions which offer in human life: they are not so important as either *benefits* or *favors*, but they carry a charm with them which is not possessed by the former. *Kindnesses* are more endearing than *civilities*, and pass mostly between those who are known to each other: *civilities* may pass between strangers. *Benefits* tend to draw those closer to each other who by station of life are set at the greatest distance from each other: affection is engendered in him who *benefits*, and devoted attachment in him who is *benefited*: *favors* in-

crease obligation beyond its due limits; if they are not asked and granted with discretion, they may produce servility on the one hand, and haughtiness on the other. *Kindnesses* are the offspring and parent of affection; they convert our multiplied wants into so many enjoyments: *civilities* are the sweets which we gather in the way as we pass along the journey of life.

I think I have a right to conclude that there is such a thing as *generosity* in the world. Though, if I were under a mistake in this, I should say as Cicero in relation to the immortality of the soul, I willingly err; for the contrary notion naturally teaches people to be ungrateful by possessing them with a persuasion concerning their benefactors, that they have no regard to them in the *benefits* they bestow.

GROVE.

A *favor* well bestowed is almost as great an honor to him who confers it as to him who receives it. What, indeed, makes for the superior reputation of the patron in this case is, that he is always surrounded with specious pretences of unworthy candidates.

TATLER.

Ingratitude is too base to return a *kindness*, and too proud to regard it.

SOUTH.

A common *civility* to an impertinent fellow often draws upon one a great many unforeseen troubles.

TATLER.

BENEFIT, SERVICE, GOOD OFFICE.

BENEFIT, *v. Benefit, favor*. SERVICE, *v. Advantage, benefit*. OFFICE, in French *office*, Latin *officium*, duty, from *officio*, or *ob* and *facio*, signifies the thing done on another's account.

These terms, like the former (*v. Benefit, favor*), agree in denoting some action performed for the good of another, but they differ in the principle on which the action is performed. A *benefit* is perfectly gratuitous, it produces an obligation: a *service* is not altogether gratuitous; it is that at least which may be expected, though it cannot be demanded: a *good office* is between the two; it is in part gratuitous, and in part such as one may reasonably expect. *Benefits* flow from superiors, or those who are in a situation to do good, and *services* from inferiors or equals; but *good offices* are performed by equals only. Princes confer *benefits* on their subjects; subjects perform *services* for their princes; neighbors do *good offices* for each other. *Benefits* are sometimes the reward of services: *good offices* produce a return from the receiver. *Ben-*

fits consist of such things as serve to relieve the difficulties, or advance the interests, of the receiver: *services* consist in those acts which tend to lessen the trouble, or increase the ease and convenience, of the person served: *good offices* consist in the employ of one's credit, influence, and mediation for the advantage of another; it is a species of voluntary service. It is a great *benefit* to assist an embarrassed tradesman out of his difficulty: it is a great *service* for a soldier to save the life of his commander, or for a friend to open the eyes of another to see his danger: it is a *good office* for any one to interpose his mediation to settle disputes and heal divisions. It is possible to be loaded with *benefits* so as to affect one's independence of character. *Services* are sometimes a source of dissatisfaction and disappointment when they do not meet with the remuneration or return which they are supposed to deserve. *Good offices* tend to nothing but the increase of good-will. Those who perform them are too independent to expect a return, and those who receive them are too sensible of their value not to seek an opportunity for making a return.

I have often pleased myself with considering the two kinds of *benefits* which accrue to the public from these my speculations, and which, were I to speak after the manner of logicians, I should distinguish into the material and formal.

ADDISON.

Cicero, whose learning and *services* to his country are so well known, was inflamed by a passion for glory to an extravagant degree.

HUGHES.

There are several persons who have many pleasures and entertainments in their possession which they do not enjoy. It is therefore a kind and *good office* to acquaint them with their own happiness.

TATLER.

BENEVOLENCE, BENEFICENCE.

BENEVOLENCE is literally well willing. BENEFICENCE is literally well doing. The former consists of intention, the latter of action: the former is the cause, the latter the result. *Benevolence* may exist without *beneficence*; but *beneficence* always supposes *benevolence*; a man is not said to be *beneficent* who does good from sinister views. The *benevolent* man enjoys but half his happiness if he cannot be *beneficent*; yet there will still remain to him an ample store of enjoyment

in the contemplation of others' happiness: that man who is gratified only with that happiness which he himself is the instrument of producing, is not entitled to the name of *benevolent*. As *benevolence* is an affair of the heart, and *beneficence* of the outward conduct, the former is confined to no station, no rank, no degree of education or power: the poor may be *benevolent* as well as the rich, the unlearned as the learned, the weak as well as the strong: the latter, on the contrary, is controlled by outward circumstances, and is therefore principally confined to the rich, the powerful, the wise, and the learned.

The pity which arises on sight of persons in distress, and the satisfaction of mind which is the consequence of having removed them into a happier state, are instead of a thousand arguments to prove such a thing as a disinterested *benevolence*.

GROVE.

He that banishes gratitude from among men, by so doing stops up the stream of *beneficence*: for though, in conferring kindness, a truly generous man doth not aim at a return, yet he looks to the qualities of the person obliged.

GROVE.

BENEVOLENCE, BENIGNITY, HUMANITY, KINDNESS, TENDERNESS.

BENEVOLENCE, *v. Benevolence*. BENIGNITY, in Latin *benignitas*, from *bene* and *gigno*, signifies the quality or disposition for producing good. HUMANITY, in French *humanité*, Latin *humanitas*, from *humanus* and *homo*, signifies the quality of belonging to a man, or having what is common to man. KINDNESS, from *kind* (*v. Affectionate*). TENDERNESS, from *tender*, is in Latin *tener*, Greek *τερον*.

Benevolence lies in the will, *benignity* in the disposition or frame of mind; *humanity* lies in the heart; *kindness* and *tenderness* in the affections: *benevolence* indicates a general good-will to all mankind; *benignity* particular goodness or *kindness* of disposition; *humanity* is a general tone of feeling; *kindness* and *tenderness* are particular modes of feeling. *Benevolence* consists in the wish or intention to do good; it is confined to no station or object: the *benevolent* man may be rich or poor, and his *benevolence* will be exerted wherever there is an opportunity of doing good; *benignity* is mostly associated with the power of doing good, and is actually exerted or displayed in

the actions or looks. *Benevolence* in its fullest sense is the sum of moral excellence, and comprehends every other virtue; when taken in this acceptation, *benignity*, *humanity*, *kindness*, and *tenderness* are but modes of *benevolence*. *Benevolence* and *benignity* tend to the communicating of happiness; *humanity* is concerned in the removal of evil. *Benevolence* is common to the Creator and his creatures; it differs only in degree; the former has the knowledge and power as well as the will to do good; man often has the will to do good, without having the power to carry it into effect. *Benignity* is ascribed to the stars, to heaven, or to princes; ignorant and superstitious people are apt to ascribe their good fortune to the *benign* influence of the stars rather than to the gracious dispensations of Providence. *Humanity* belongs to man only; it is his peculiar characteristic, and ought at all times to be his boast; when he throws off this his distinguishing badge, he loses everything valuable in him; it is a virtue that is indispensable in his present suffering condition: *humanity* is as universal in its application as *benevolence*; wherever there is distress, *humanity* flies to its relief. *Kindness* and *tenderness* are partial modes of affection, confined to those who know or are related to each other: we are kind to friends and acquaintances, *tender* toward those who are near and dear: *kindness* is a mode of affection most fitted for social beings; it is what every one can show, and every one is pleased to receive: *tenderness* is a state of feeling that is occasionally acceptable: the young and the weak demand *tenderness* from those who stand in the closest connection with them, but this feeling may be carried to an excess, so as to injure the object on which it is fixed.

I have heard say, that Pope Clement XI. never passes through the people, who always kneel in crowds and ask his benediction, but the tears are seen to flow from his eyes. This must proceed from an imagination that he is the father of all these people, and that he is touched with so extensive a *benevolence*, that it breaks out into a passion of tears.

TATLER.

A constant *benignity* in commerce with the rest of the world, which ought to run through all a man's actions, has effects more useful to those whom you oblige, and is less ostentatious in yourself.

TATLER.

The greatest wits I have conversed with are men eminent for their *humanity*.

ADDISON.

Beneficence, would the followers of Epicurus say, is all founded on weakness; and whatever be pretended, the *kindness* that passeth between men and men is by every man directed to himself. This, it must be confessed, is of a piece with that hopeful philosophy which, having patched man up out of the four elements, attributes his being to chance.

GROVE.

Dependence is a perpetual call upon *humanity*, and a greater incitement to *tenderness* and pity than any other motive whatsoever.

ADDISON.

BENT, CURVED, CROOKED, AWRY.

BENT, from *bend*, in Saxon *bendan*, is a variation of *wind*, in the sea phraseology *wend*, in German *winden*, etc., from the Hebrew *onad*, to wind or turn. CURVED is in Latin *curvus*, in Greek *κορπος*, *ἄλιε* *κυρος*. CROOKED, *v. Awkward*. AWRY is a variation of writhed: *v. To turn*.

Bent is here the generic term, all the rest are but modes of the *bent*: that which is *bent* is opposed to that which is straight; things may therefore be *bent* to any degree, but when *curved* they are *bent* only to a small degree; when *crooked* they are *bent* to a great degree: a stick is *bent* any way; it is *curved* by being *bent* one specific way; it is *crooked* by being *bent* different ways. Things may be *bent* by accident or design; they are *curved* by design, or according to some rule; they are *crooked* by accident or in violation of some rule: a stick is *bent* by the force of the hand; a line is *curved* so as to make a mathematical figure; it is *crooked* so as to lose all figure: *awry* marks a species of *crookedness*, but *crooked* is applied as an epithet, and *awry* is employed to characterize the action; hence we speak of a *crooked* thing, and of sitting or standing *awry*.

And when, too closely press'd, she quits the ground,

From her *bent* bow she sends a backward wound.

DRYDEN.

Another thing observable in and from the spots is, that they describe various paths or lines over the sun, sometimes straight, sometimes *curved* toward one pole of the sun.

DERHAM.

It is the ennobling office of the understanding to correct the fallacious and mistaken reports of the senses, and to assure us that the staff in the water is straight, though our eye would tell us it is *crooked*.

SOUTH.

Preventing fate directs the lance *awry*,
Which, glancing, only mark'd Achates' thigh.

DRYDEN.

BENT, BIAS, INCLINATION, PREPOSESSION.

BENT, *v. Bend, bent*. BIAS, in French *biais*, signifies a weight fixed on one side of a bowl in order to turn its course that way toward which the *bias* leans, from the Greek *βια*, force. INCLINATION, in French *inclination*, Latin *inclinatio*, from *inclino*, Greek *κλίνω*, signifies a leaning toward. PREPOSESSION, compounded of *pre* and *possession*, signifies the taking *possession* of the mind previously, or beforehand.

All these terms denote a preponderating influence on the mind. *Bent* is applied to the will, affection, and power in general; *bias* solely to the judgment; *inclination* and *prepossession* to the state of the feelings. The *bent* includes the general state of the mind, and the object on which it fixes a regard: *bias*, the particular influential power which sways the judging faculty: the one is absolutely considered with regard to itself; the other relatively to its results and the object it acts upon. *Bent* is sometimes with regard to *bias*, as cause is to effect; we may frequently trace in the particular *bent* of a person's likes and dislikes the principal *bias* which determines his opinions. *Inclination* is a faint kind of *bent*; *prepossession* is a weak species of *bias*: an *inclination* is a state of something, namely, a state of the feelings: *prepossession* is an actual something, namely, the thing that *prepossesses*.

We may discover the *bent* of a person's mind in his gay or serious moments; in his occupations, and in his pleasures; in some persons it is so strong, that scarcely an action passes which is not more or less influenced by it, and even the exterior of a man will be under its control: in all disputed matters the support of a party will operate more or less to *bias* the minds of men for or against particular men, or particular measures: when we are attached to the party that espouses the cause of religion and good order, this *bias* is in some measure commendable and salutary: a mind without *inclination* would be a blank, and where *inclination* is, there is the groundwork for *prepossession*. Strong minds will be strongly *bent*, and labor under a strong *bias*; but

there is no mind so weak and powerless as not to have its *inclinations*, and none so perfect as to be without its *prepossessions*: the mind that has virtuous *inclinations* will be *prepossessed* in favor of everything that leans to virtue's side: it were well for mankind were this the only *prepossession*; but in the present mixture of truth and error, it is necessary to guard against *prepossessions* as dangerous anticipations of the judgment: if their object be not perfectly pure, or their force be not qualified by the restrictive powers of the judgment, much evil springs from their abuse.

Servile *inclinations*, and gross love,
The guilty *bent* of vicious appetite. HAVARD.

The choice of man's will is indeed uncertain, because in many things free; but yet there are certain habits and principles in the soul that have some kind of sway upon it, apt to *bias* it more one way than another. SOUTH.

'Tis not indulging private *inclination*,
The selfish passions, that sustains the world,
And lends its ruler grace. THOMSON.

I take it for a rule, that in marriage the chief business is to acquire a *prepossession* in favor of each other. STEELE.

TO BEREAVE, DEPRIVE, STRIP.

BEREAVE, in Saxon *beræfian*, German *berauben*, etc., is compounded of *be* and *raave* or *rob*, Saxon *raefian*, German *rauben*, low German *roofen*, etc., Latin *rapina* and *rapio*, to catch or seize, signifying to take away contrary to one's wishes. DEPRIVE, compounded of *de* and *prive*, French *priver*, Latin *privo*, from *privus*, private, signifies to cause a thing to be no longer a man's own. STRIP is in German *streifen*, low German *streipen*, *stroepen*, Swedish *ströfva*, probably connected with the Latin *surripio*.

To *bereave* expresses more than *deprive*, but less than *strip*, which denotes a total and violent *bereavement*: one is *bereaved* of children, *deprived* of pleasures, and *stripped* of property: we are *bereaved* of that on which we set most value; the act of *bereaving* does violence to our inclination: we are *deprived* of the ordinary comforts and conveniences of life; they cease to be ours: we are *stripped* of the things which we most want; we are thereby rendered, as it were, naked. *Deprivations* are preparatory to *bereave*.

BESIDES, EXCEPT.

BESIDES (*v. Moreover*), which is here taken as a preposition, expresses the idea of addition. EXCEPT expresses that of exclusion. There were many there *besides* ourselves; no one *except* ourselves will be admitted.

Besides impiety, discontent carries along with it, as its inseparable concomitants, several other sinful passions. BLAIR.

Neither jealousy nor envy can dwell with the Supreme Being. He is a rival to none, he is an enemy to none, *except* to such as, by rebellion against his laws, seek enmity with him. BLAIR.

TO BEWAIL, BEMOAN, LAMENT.

BEWAIL is compounded of *be* and *wail*, which is probably connected with the word *woe*, signifying to express sorrow. BEMOAN, compounded of *be* and *moan*, signifies to indicate grief with *moans*. LAMENT, in French *lamentar*, Latin *lamentor* or *lamentum*, probably from the Greek *κλαύμα* and *κλαίω*, to cry out with grief.

All these terms mark an expression of pain by some external sign. *Bewail* is not so strong as *bemoan*, but stronger than *lament*; *bewail* and *bemoan* are expressions of unrestrained grief or anguish: a wretched mother *bewails* the loss of her child; a person in deep distress *bemoans* his hard fate: *lamentation* may arise from simple sorrow or even imaginary grievances: a sensualist *laments* the disappointment of some expected gratification. *Bewail* and *bemoan* are always indecorous if not sinful expressions of grief, which are inconsistent with the profession of a Christian; they are common among the uncultivated, who have not a proper principle to restrain the intemperance of their feelings. There is nothing temporal which is so dear to any one that he ought to *bewail* its loss; nor any condition of things so distressing or desperate as to make a man *bemoan* his lot. *Lamentations* are sometimes allowable; the miseries of others, or our own infirmities and sins, may justly be *lamented*.

Canace in Ovid *bewails* her misfortune because she was debarred from performing this (funeral) ceremony to her beloved Macareus. POTTER.

First I *bemoan'd* a noble husband's death,
Yet liv'd with looking on his images;
But now my last support is gone. SHAKESPEARE.

ments: if we cannot bear the one patiently, we may expect to sink under the other: common prudence should teach us to look with unconcern on our *deprivations*: Christian faith should enable us to consider every *bereavement* as a step to perfection; that when *stripped* of all worldly goods, we may be invested with those more exalted and lasting honors which await the faithful disciple of Christ.

O first-created Being, and thou great Word,
Let there be light, and light was over all!
Why am I thus *bereav'd* thy prime decree?
MILTON.

Too daring bard! whose unsuccessful pride
Th' immortal Muses in their art defied;
Th' avenging Muses of the light of day
Depriv'd his eyes, and snatch'd his voice away.
POPE.

After the publication of her sentence, she (Queen Mary) was *stripped* of every remaining mark of royalty. ROBERTSON.

Bereave and *deprive* are applied only to persons, *strip* may be figuratively applied to things.

From the uncertainty of life, moralists have endeavored to sink the estimation of its pleasures, and if they could not *strip* the seductions of vice of their present enjoyment, at least to load them with the fear of their end. MACKENZIE.

BESIDES, MOREOVER.

BESIDES, that is, by the *side*, next to, marks simply the connection which subsists between what goes before and what follows. MOREOVER, that is, more than all else, marks the addition of something particular to what has already been said. Thus, in enumerating the good qualities of an individual, we may say "he is *besides* of a peaceable disposition." On concluding any subject of question, we may introduce a farther clause by a *moreover*. "*Moreover* we must not forget the claims of those who will suffer by such a change."

Now, the best way in the world for a man to seem to be anything, is really to be what he would seem to be. *Besides*, that it is many times as troublesome to make good the pretence of a good quality as to have it. TILLOTSON.

It being granted that God governs the world, it will follow also that he does it by means suitable to the natures of the things that he governs; and *moreover*, man being by nature a free, moral agent, and so capable of deviating from his duty, as well as performing it, it is necessary that he should be governed by laws. SOUTH.

When men describe in what manner they are affected by pain and danger, they do not dwell on the pleasure of health and the comfort of security, and then lament the loss of these satisfactions; the whole turns upon the actual pains which they endure.

BURKE.

BIAS, PREPOSSESSION, PREJUDICE.

BIAS, *v. Bent, bias*. PREPOSSESSION, *v. Bent, bias*. PREJUDICE, in French *préjudice*, Latin *præjudicium*, compounded of *præ*, before, and *judicium*, judgment, signifies a judgment beforehand, that is, before examination.

Bias marks the state of the mind, as leaning to this or that side, so as to determine one's feelings or opinions generally; *prepossession* denotes the previous occupation of the mind with some particular idea or feeling, so as to preclude the admission of any other; *prejudice* is a prejudging or predetermining a matter without knowing its merits. We may be *biased* for or against: we are always *prepossessed* in favor and mostly *prejudiced* against; the feelings have mostly to do with the *bias* and *prepossession*, and the understanding or judgment with the *prejudice*. *Bias* and *prepossession* suppose a something real, whether good or otherwise, which determines the inclination of the mind, but *prejudice* supposes a something unreal or false, which misleads the judgment: *bias* and *prepossession* may therefore be taken in an indifferent, if not a good sense; *prejudice* always in a bad sense: interest or personal affection may *bias*, but not so as to pervert either the integrity or judgment; *prepossessions* may be formed of persons at first sight, but they may be harmless, even although they may not be perfectly correct; *prejudices* prevent the right exercise of the understanding, and consequently favor the cause of falsehood, as when a person has a *prejudice* against another, which leads him to misinterpret his actions.

It should be the principal labor of moral writers to remove the *bias* which inclines the mind rather to prefer natural than moral endowments.

HAWKESWORTH.

A man in power, who can, without the ordinary *prepossessions* which stop the way to the true knowledge and service of mankind, overlook the little distinctions of fortune, raise obscure merit, and discountenance successful indolence, has, in the minds of knowing men, the figure of an angel rather than a man.

STEELE.

It is the work of a philosopher to be every day subduing his passions, and laying aside his *prejudices*. I endeavor at least to look upon men and their actions only as an impartial spectator.

SPECTATOR.

TO BIND, TIE.

BIND, in Saxon, etc., *binden*, is connected with the word *wind*, to denote the manner of fastening, namely, by winding round. TIE, in Saxon *tian*, low German *tehen*, to draw, denotes a mode of fastening by drawing or pulling.

The species of fastening denoted by these two words differ both in manner and degree. *Binding* is performed by circumvolution round a body; *tying*, by involution within itself. Some bodies are *bound* without being *tied*; others are *tied* without being *bound*: a wounded leg is *bound*, but not *tied*; a string is *tied*, but not *bound*; a ribbon may sometimes be *bound* round the head, and *tied* under the chin. *Binding*, therefore, serves to keep several things in a compact form together; *tying* may serve to prevent one single body separating from another: a criminal is *bound* hand and foot; he is *tied* to a stake. *Binding* and *tying* likewise differ in degree; *binding* serves to produce adhesion in all the parts of a body; *tying* only to produce contact in a single part: thus, when the hair is *bound*, it is almost enclosed in an envelope: when it is *tied* with a string, the ends are left to hang loose.

Now are our brows *bound* with victorious wreaths,

Our stern alarms are chang'd to merry meetings.

SHAKESPEARE.

A fluttering dove upon the top they tie,
The living mark at which their arrows fly.

DRYDEN.

A similar distinction is preserved in the figurative use of the terms. A *bond* of union is applicable to a large body with many component parts; a *tie* of affection marks an adhesion between individual minds.

As nature's ties decay;
As duty, love, and honor fail to sway:
Fictitious bonds, the bonds of wealth and law,
Still gather strength, and force unwilling awe.

GOLDSMITH.

TO BIND, OBLIGE, ENGAGE.

BIND, *v. To bind, tie*. OBLIGE, in French *obliger*, Latin *obligo*, compounded of *ob* and *ligo*, signifies to tie up. EN-

GAGE, in French *engager*, compounded of *en* or *in* and *gage*, a pledge, signifies to *bind* by means of a pledge.

Bind is more forcible and coercive than *oblige*; *oblige* than *engage*. We are *bound* by an oath, *obliged* by circumstances, and *engaged* by promises.

Conscience *binds*, prudence or necessity *obliges*, honor and principle *engage*. A parent is *bound* no less by the law of his conscience, than by those of the community to which he belongs, to provide for his helpless offspring. Politeness *obliges* men of the world to preserve a friendly exterior toward those for whom they have no regard. When we are *engaged* in the service of our king and country, we cannot shrink from our duty without exposing ourselves to the infamy of all the world. We *bind* a man by a fear of what may befall him; we *oblige* him by some immediate urgent motive; we *engage* him by alluring offers and the prospect of gain. A debtor is *bound* to pay by virtue of a written instrument in law; he is *obliged* to pay in consequence of the importunate demands of the creditor; he is *engaged* to pay in consequence of a promise given. A *bond* is the strictest deed in law; an *obligation* binds under pain of a pecuniary loss; an *engagement* is mostly verbal, and rests entirely on the rectitude of the parties.

Who can be *bound* by any solemn vow
To do a murderous deed?

SHAKESPEARE.

No man is commanded or *obliged* to obey beyond his power.

SOUTH.

While the Israelites were appearing in God's house, God himself *engages* to keep and defend theirs.

SOUTH.

BISHOPRIC, DIOCESE.

BISHOPRIC, compounded of *bishop* and *rick* or *reich*, empire, signifies the empire or government of a bishop. DIOCESE, in Greek *διοκησης*, compounded of *δια* and *δικωω*, to administer throughout, signifies the district within which a government is administered.

Both these words describe the extent of an episcopal jurisdiction; the first with relation to the person who officiates, the second with relation to the charge. There may, therefore, be a *bishopric* either where there are many *dioceses* or no *diocese*; but according to the import of the term, there is properly no *diocese* where there is no

bishopric. When the jurisdiction is merely titular, as in countries where the Catholic religion is not recognized, it is a *bishopric*, but not a *diocese*. On the other hand, the *bishopric* of Rome, or that of an archbishop, comprehends all the *dioceses* of the subordinate bishops. Hence it arises that when we speak of the ecclesiastical distribution of a country, we term the divisions *bishoprics*; but when we speak of the actual office, we term it a *diocese*. England is divided into a certain number of *bishoprics*, not *dioceses*. Every bishop visits his *diocese*, not his *bishopric*, at stated intervals.

TO BLAME, CENSURE, CONDEMN, REPROVE, REPROACH, UPBRAID.

BLAME, in French *blâmer*, is connected with *blemir*, to blemish, signifying to find a fault or blemish. CENSURE (*v. To accuse, censure*). CONDEMN, in Latin *condemno*, from *con* and *dammum*, loss or damage, signifies literally to inflict a penalty or to punish by a sentence. REPROVE, from the Latin *reprobo*, signifies the contrary of *probo*, to approve. REPROACH, from *re* and *proche*, near, signifies to cast back upon or against another; and UPBRAID, from *up* and *bruid* or *breed*, to breed or hatch against one.

The expression of an unfavorable opinion of a person or thing is the common idea in the signification of these terms. To *blame* is simply to ascribe a fault to; to *censure* is to express disapprobation: the former is less personal than the latter. The thing more than the person is *blamed*; the person more than the thing is *censured*. The action or conduct of a person in any particular may be *blamed*, without reflecting on the individual; but the person is directly *censured* for that which is faulty in himself.

Blame not thy clime, nor chide the distant sun;
The sun is innocent, thy clime absolved. YOUNG.

He hopes he shall not be *censured* for unnecessary warmth upon such a subject. COWPER.

Venial or unquestionable faults, or even things that are in themselves amiable, may be the subject of *blame*, but positive faults are the subject of *censure*. A person may be *blamed* for his good nature, and *censured* for his negligence.

But I'm much to *blame*;
I humbly do beseech you of your pardon
For too much loving you.

SHAKESPEARE.

He would be sorry to stand suspected of hav-
ing aimed his *censures* at any particular school.
His objections are such as naturally apply them-
selves to schools in general.

COWPER.

Persons are *blamed* in general or qual-
ified terms, but are *censured* in terms
more or less harsh.

Now *blame* we most the nurselings or the nurse?
The children crooked, twisted and deformed,
Through want of care, or her whose winking eye
And slumbering oscitancy mar the brood.

COWPER.

Though ten times worse themselves, you'll fre-
quent view
Those who with keenest rage will *censure* you.

PITT.

Condemn, like *blame*, though said of
personal matters, has more reference to
the thing than the person; but that
which is *condemned* is of a more serious
nature, and produces a stronger and
more unfavorable expression of displeas-
ure or disapprobation, than that which
is *blamed*.

Glen. And with
A risen sigh he wisheth you in heav'n.
Hot. And you in hell, as often as he hears
Owen Glendower spoken of.
Glen. I *blame* him not; at my nativity
The front of heav'n was full of fiery shapes.

SHAKESPEARE.

For her the judgment, umpire in the strife,
Condemns, approves, and, with a faithful voice,
Guides the decision of a doubtful choice.

COWPER.

Blame and *condemn* do not necessarily
require to be expressed in words, but
censure must always be conveyed in di-
rect terms.

He *blamed* and protested, but joined in the plan;
He shared in the plunder, but pitied the man.

COWPER.

Would you have me applaud to the world what
my heart must internally *condemn*?

GOLDSMITH.

'Twere pity to offend
By useless *censure* whom we cannot mend.

COWPER.

Reprove is even more personal than
censure. A *reproof* passes from one in-
dividual to another, or to a certain num-
ber of individuals; *censure* may be pub-
lic or general.

I again find, sir, proceeded he, that you are
guilty of the same offence for which you once
had my *reproof*.

GOLDSMITH.

Censure is the tax which a man pays to the
public for being eminent.

ADDISON.

Censure is frequently provoked by ill-
nature or some worse feeling, or dictated
by ignorance, as the *censures* of the vul-
gar.

And as a bird each fond endearment tries
To tempt its new-fledged offspring to the skies;
He tried each art, *reprov'd* each dull delay,
Allur'd to brighter worlds, and led the way.

GOLDSMITH.

A man thus armed (with assurance), if his
words or actions are at any time misinterpreted,
retires within himself, and from a consciousness
of his own integrity, assumes force enough to de-
spise the little *censures* of ignorance or malice.

SPECTATOR.

Reproaching and *upbraiding* are as
much the acts of individuals as *reprov-
ing*, but the former denote the expres-
sion of personal feelings, and may be just
or unjust; the latter is presumed to be
divested of all personal feelings.

In all terms of *reproof*, when the sentence ap-
pears to arise from personal hatred or passion,
it is not then made the cause of mankind, but a
misunderstanding between two persons. STEELE.
The prince replies: "Ah! cease, divinely fair,
Nor add *reproaches* to the wounds I bear."

POPE.

Have we not known thee slave! Of all the host,
The man who acts the least *upbraids* the most.

POPE.

Reproaches are frequently dictated by
resentment or self-interest, *upbraidings*
by contempt or wounded feelings.

I soon perceived, by the loudness of her voice
and the bitterness of her *reproaches*, that no
money was to be had from her lodger.

GOLDSMITH.

He came with less attendance and show than
if he had been an ordinary messenger from a
governor of a province; hence it is that we so
often find Him *upbraided* with the meanness
of his origin.

SHERLOCK.

Blame, *condemn*, *reproach*, and *upbraid*
are applied to ourselves with the same
distinction.

I never receive a letter from you without great
pleasure and a very strong sense of your gener-
osity and friendship, which I heartily *blame* my-
self for not cultivating with more care.

JOHNSON.

Thus they in mutual accusation spent
The fruitless hours, but neither self-*condemning*.

MILTON.

The very regret of being surpassed in any val-
uable quality by a person with the same abilities
as ourselves, will *reproach* our own laziness,
and even shame us into imitation.

ROGERS.

I was beginning to grow tender and to *upbraid*
myself; especially after having dreamed two
nights ago that I was with you.

BOSWELL.

Reproof and *censure* are most properly
addressed to others: in the following ex-
ample, *censure*, as applied to one's self,
is not so suitable as *blame* or *condemn*.

If I was put to define modesty, I should call it
the reflection of an ingenuous mind either when
it has committed an action for which he *censures*
(blames or condemns) himself, or fancies he is ex-
posed to the *censure* of others.

SPECTATOR.

BLAMELESS, IRREPROACHABLE, UN-
BLEMISHED, UNSPOTTED, OR SPOT-
LESS.

BLAMELESS signifies literally void of
blame (v. *To blame*). IRREPROACHA-
BLE, that is, not able to be *reproached*
(v. *To blame*). UNBLEMISHED, that is,
without *blemish* (v. *Blemish*). UNSPOT-
TED, that is, without *spot* (v. *Blemish*).

Blameless is less than *irreproachable*;
what is *blameless* is simply free from
blame, but that which is *irreproachable*
cannot be *blamed*, or have any *reproach*
attached to it. It is good to say of a
man that he leads a *blameless* life, but it
is a high encomium to say that he leads
an *irreproachable* life: the former is but
the negative praise of one who is known
only for his harmlessness; the latter is
the positive commendation of a man who
is well known for his integrity in the dif-
ferent relations of society.

The sire of gods, and all th' ethereal train,
On the warm limits of the farthest main,
Now mix with mortals, nor disdain to grace
The feasts of Ethiopia's *blameless* race.

POPE.

Take particular care that your amusements be
of an *irreproachable* kind.

BLAIR.

Unblemished and *unspotted* are applica-
ble to many objects besides that of per-
sonal conduct; and when applied to this,
their original meaning sufficiently points
out their use in distinction from the two
former. We may say of a man that he
has an *irreproachable* or an *unblemished*
reputation, and *unspotted* or *spotless* puri-
ty of life.

But now those white *unblemish'd* manners,
whence
The fabled poets took their golden age,
Are found no more amid these iron times.

THOMSON.

But the good man, whose soul is pure,
Unspotted, regular, and free

From all the ugly stains of lust and villany,
Of mercy and of pardon sure,
Looks through the darkness of the gloomy night,
And sees the dawning of a glorious day.

POMFRET.

Hail, rev'rend priest! To Phœbus' awful dome
A suppliant I from great Atrides come.
Unransom'd here, receive the *spotless* fair,
Accept the hecatomb the Greeks prepare.

POPE.

BLEMISH, STAIN, SPOT, SPECK, FLAW.

BLEMISH is connected with the
French *blémir*, to grow pale. STAIN, in
French *teindre*, old French *desteindre*, Lat-
in *tingo*, to dye. SPOT, not improbably
connected with the word *spit*, Latin *spu-
tum*, and the Hebrew *spad*, to adhere as
something extraneous. SPECK, in Saxon
specce, Hebrew *sapach*, to unite, or to ad-
here as a tetter on the skin. FLAW, in
Saxon *floh*, *flicce*, German *fleck*, low Ger-
man *flak* or *plakke*, a spot or a fragment,
a piece, which is connected with the Latin
plaga, Greek *πληγή*, a strip of land, or a
stripe, a wound in the body.

In the proper sense *blemish* is the ge-
neric, the rest specific: a *stain*, a *spot*,
speck, and *flaw*, are *blemishes*, but there
are likewise many *blemishes* which are
neither *stains*, *spots*, *specks*, nor *flaws*.
Whatever takes off from the seamliness
of appearance is a *blemish*. In works of
art the slightest dimness of color, or
want of proportion, is a *blemish*. A *stain*
or *spot* sufficiently characterizes itself,
as that which is superfluous and out of
its place. A *speck* is a small *spot*; and
a *flaw*, which is confined to hard sub-
stances, mostly consists of a faulty in-
denture on the outer surface. A *blemish*
tarnishes; a *stain* spoils; a *spot*, *speck*, or
flaw disfigures. A *blemish* is rectified, a
stain wiped out, a *spot* or *speck* removed.

All these terms are employed figura-
tively. Even an imputation of what is
improper in our moral conduct is a *blemish*
in our reputation: the failings of a
good man are so many *spots* or *specks* in
the bright hemisphere of his virtue: there
are some vices which affix a *stain* on the
character of nations, as well as of the
individuals who are guilty of them. In
proportion to the excellence or purity of
a thing, so is any *flaw* the more easily
to be discerned.

It is impossible for authors to discover beauties
in one another's works: they have eyes only for
spots and *blemishes*.

ADDISON.

The scurf is worn away of each committed crime; No speck is left of their habitual stains, But the pure ether of the soul remains.

By length of time

There are many who applaud themselves for the singularity of their judgment, which has searched deeper than others, and found a *flaw* in what the generality of mankind have admired.

ADDISON.

BLEMISH, DEFECT, FAULT.

BLEMISH, *v. Blemish, stain.* DEFECT, in Latin *defectus*, participle of *deficio*, to fall short, signifies the thing falling short. FAULT, from *fail*, in French *faute*, from *faillir*, in German *gefällt*, participle of *fallen*, Latin *fallo*, to deceive or be wanting, and Hebrew *repal*, to fall or decay, signifies what is wanting to truth or propriety.

Blemish respects the exterior of an object: *defect* consists in the want of some specific propriety in an object; *fault* conveys the idea not only of something wrong, but also of its relation to the author. There is a *blemish* in fine china; a *defect* in the springs of a clock; and a *fault* in the contrivance. An accident may cause a *blemish* in a fine painting; the course of nature may occasion a *defect* in a person's speech; but the carelessness of the workman is evinced by the *faults* in the workmanship. A *blemish* may be easier remedied than a *defect* is corrected, or a *fault* repaired.

There is another particular which may be reckoned among the *blemishes*, or rather the false beauties, of our English tragedy: I mean those particular speeches which are commonly known by the name of *rants*.

ADDISON.

It has been often remarked, though not without wonder, that a man is more jealous of his natural than of his moral qualities; perhaps it will no longer appear strange if it be considered that natural defects are of necessity, and moral of choice.

HAWKSWORTH.

The resentment which the discovery of a *fault* or folly produces must bear a certain proportion to our pride.

JOHNSON.

TO BLOT OUT, EXPUNGE, RASE OR ERASE, EFFACE, CANCEL, OBLITERATE.

BLOT is in all probability a variation of *spot*, signifying to cover over with a *blot*. EXPUNGE, in Latin *expungo*, compounded of *ex* and *pungo*, to prick, signifies to put out by pricking with any sharp

instrument. ERASE, in Latin *erasus*, participle of *erado*, that is, *e* and *rado*, to scratch out. EFFACE, in French *effacer*, compounded of the Latin *e* and *facio*, to make, signifies literally to make or put out. CANCEL, in French *canceler*, Latin *cancello*, from *cancelli*, lattice-work, signifies to strike out with cross-lines. OBLITERATE, in Latin *obliteratus*, participle of *oblitero*, compounded of *ob* and *littera*, signifies to cover over letters.

All these terms obviously refer to characters that are impressed on bodies; the three first apply in the proper sense only to that which is written with the hand, and bespeak the manner in which the action is performed. Letters are *blotted out*, so that they cannot be seen again; they are *expunged*, so as to signify that they cannot stand for anything; they are *erased*, so that the space may be reoccupied with writing. The three last are extended in their application to other characters formed on other substances: *efface* is general, and does not designate either the manner or the object: inscriptions on stone may be *effaced*, which are rubbed off so as not to be visible: *cancel* is principally confined to written or printed characters; they are *cancelled* by striking through them with the pen; in this manner leaves or pages of a book are *cancelled* which are no longer to be reckoned: *obliterate* is said of all characters, but without defining the mode in which they are put out; letters are *obliterated* which are in any way made illegible. *Efface* applies to images, or the representations of things; in this manner the likeness of a person may be *effaced* from a statue; *cancel* respects the subject which is written or printed; *obliterate* respects the single letters which constitute words. *Efface* is the consequence of some direct action on the thing which is *effaced*; in this manner writing may be *effaced* from a wall by the action of the elements: *cancel* is the act of a person, and always the fruit of design: *obliterate* is the fruit of accident and circumstances in general; time itself may *obliterate* characters on a wall or on paper.

The metaphorical use of these terms is easily deducible from the preceding explanation: what is figuratively described as written in a book may be said to be

blotted; thus our sins are *blotted out* of the book by the atoning blood of Christ: when the contents of a book are in part rejected, they are aptly described as being *expunged*; in this manner the freethinking sects *expunge* everything from the Bible which does not suit their purpose, or they *expunge* from their creed what does not humor their passions. When the memory is represented as having characters impressed, they are said to be *erased* when they are, as it were, directly taken out and occupied by others; in this manner, the recollection of what a child has learned is easily *erased* by play; and with equal propriety sorrows may be said to *efface* the recollection of a person's image from the mind. From the idea of striking out or *canceling* a debt in an account-book, a debt of gratitude, or an obligation, is said to be *cancelled*. As the lineaments of the face corresponded to written characters, we may say that all traces of his former greatness are *obliterated*.

If virtue is of this amiable nature, what can we think of those who can look upon it with an eye of hatred and ill-will, and can suffer themselves, from their aversion for a party, to *blot out* all the merit of the person who is engaged in it?

ADDISON.

I believe that any person who was of age to take a part in public concerns forty years ago (if the intermediate space were *expunged* from his memory) would hardly credit his senses when he should hear that an army of two hundred thousand men was kept up in this island.

BURKE.

Mr. Waller used to say he would *rase* any line out of his poem which did not imply some motive to virtue.

WALSH.

Yet the best blood by learning is refin'd,
And virtue arms the solid mind:
While vice will stain the noblest race,
And the paternal stamp *efface*.

OLDISWORTH.

Yet these are they the world pronounces wise;
The world, which *cancel*s nature's right and wrong,
And casts new wisdom.

YOUNG.

The transferring of the scene from Sicily to the court of King Arthur must have had a very pleasing effect, before the fabulous majesty of that court was quite *obliterated*.

TYRWHITT.

BLOW, STROKE.

BLOW probably derives the meaning in which it is here taken from the action of the wind, which it resembles when it is violent. STROKE, from the word *strike*, denotes the act of striking.

Blow is used abstractedly to denote the

effect of violence; *stroke* is employed relatively to the person producing that effect. A *blow* may be received by the carelessness of the receiver, or by a pure accident; but *strokes* are dealt out according to the design of the giver. Children are always in the way of getting *blows* in the course of their play, and of receiving *strokes* by way of chastisement. A *blow* may be given with the hand, or with any flat substance; a *stroke* is rather a long drawn *blow* given with a long instrument, like a stick. *Blows* may be given with the flat part of a sword, and *strokes* with a stick.

The advance of the human mind toward any object of laudable pursuit may be compared to the progress of a body driven by a *blow*.

JOHNSON.

Penetrated to the heart with the recollection of his behavior, and the unmerited pardon he had met with, Thrasippus was proceeding to execute vengeance on himself, by rushing on his sword, when Pisistratus again interposed, and, seizing his hand, stopped the *stroke*.

CUMBERLAND.

Blow is seldom used but in the proper sense; *stroke* sometimes figuratively, as a *stroke* of death, or a *stroke* of fortune.

This declaration was a *stroke* which Evander had neither skill to elude nor force to resist.

HAWKSWORTH.

BODY, CORPSE, CARCASS.

BODY is here taken in the improper sense for a dead *body*. CORPSE, from the Latin *corpus*, a body, has also been turned, from its derivation, to signify a dead body. CARCASS, in French *carcasse*, is compounded of *caro* and *cassa* *vita*, signifying flesh without life.

Body is applicable to either men or brutes, *corpse* to men only, and *carcass* to brutes only, unless when taken in a contemptuous sense. When speaking of any particular person who is deceased, we should use the simple term *body*; the *body* was suffered to lie too long unburied: when designating its condition as lifeless, the term *corpse* is preferable; he was taken up as a *corpse*; when designating the body as a lifeless lump separated from the soul, it may be characterized (though contemptuously) as a *carcass*; the fowls devour the *carcass*.

A groan, as of a troubled ghost, renew'd
My fright, and then these dreadful words ensued:

Why dost thou thus my buried *body* rend?
O! spare the *corpse* of thy unhappy friend.
DRYDEN.

On the bleak shore now lies th' abandon'd king,
A headless *carcass*, and a nameless thing.
DRYDEN.

BOLD, FEARLESS, INTREPID, UNDAUNTED.

BOLD, *v. Audacity*. **FEARLESS** signifies without fear: *v. To apprehend*. **INTREPID**, compounded of *in*, privative, and *trepidus*, trembling, marks the total absence of fear. **UNDAUNTED**, compounded of *un*, privative, and *daunted*, from the Latin *domitatus*, participle of *domitare*, to subdue or tame with fear, signifies unimpressed or unmoved at the prospect of danger.

Boldness is a positive characteristic of the spirit; *fearlessness* is a negative state of the mind, that is, simply an absence of fear. A person may be *bold* through *fearlessness*, but he may be *fearless* without being *bold*; he may be *fearless* where there is no apprehension of danger or no cause for apprehension, but he is *bold* only when he is conscious or apprehensive of danger, and prepared to encounter it. A man may be *fearless* in a state of inaction; he is *bold* only in action, or when in a frame of mind for action.

Such unheard of prodigies hang o'er us
As make the *boldest* tremble.
YOUNG.

The careful hen
Calls all her chirping family around,
Fed and defended by the *fearless* cock.
THOMSON.

Intrepidity is properly a mode of *fearlessness*, *undauntedness* a mode of *boldness* in the highest degree, displayed only on extraordinary occasions; he is *intrepid* who has no fear where the most fearless might tremble; he is *undaunted* whose spirit is unabated by that which would make the stoutest heart yield. *Intrepidity* may be shown either in the bare contemplation of dangers—

A man who talks with *intrepidity* of the monsters of the wilderness, while they are out of sight, will readily confess his antipathy to a mole, a weasel, or a frog. Thus he goes on without any reproach from his own reflections.
JOHNSON.

or in the actual encountering of dangers in opposing resistance to force.

They behaved with the greatest *intrepidity*,
and gave proofs of a true British spirit.
LORD HAWKE.

Undauntedness is the opposing actual resistance to a force which is calculated to strike with awe.

His party, press'd with numbers, soon grew faint,
And would have left their charge an easy prey;
While he alone, *undaunted* at the odds,
Though hopeless to escape, fought well and bravely.
ROWE.

BOOTY, SPOIL, PREY.

THESE words mark a species of capture. **BOOTY**, in French *butin*, Danish *bytte*, Dutch *buyl*, Teutonic *beute*, probably comes from the Teutonic *bat*, a useful thing, denoting the thing taken for its use. **SPOIL**, in French *dépoille*, Latin *spolium*, in Greek *σπολον*, signifying the things stripped off from the dead, from *σπλω*, Hebrew *salal*, to *spoil*. **PREY**, in French *proie*, Latin *præda*, is not probably changed from *prædo*, *prædo*, or *præhendo*, to lay hold of, signifying the thing seized.

Booty and *spoil* are used as military terms in attacks on an enemy, *prey* in cases of particular violence. The soldier gets his *booty*; the combatant his *spoils*; the carnivorous animal his *prey*. *Booty* respects what is of personal service to the captor; *spoils* whatever serves to designate his triumph; *prey* includes whatever gratifies the appetite and is to be consumed. When a town is taken, soldiers are too busy in the work of destruction and mischief to carry away much *booty*; in every battle the arms and personal property of the slain enemy are the lawful *spoils* of the victor; the hawk pounces on his *prey*, and carries it up to his nest. Greediness stimulates to take *booty*; ambition produces an eagerness for *spoils*; a ferocious appetite impels to a search for *prey*. Among the ancients the prisoners of war who were made slaves constituted a part of their *booty*; and even in later periods such a capture was good *booty*, when ransom was paid for those who could liberate themselves. Among some savages the head or limb of an enemy constituted part of their *spoils*. Among cannibals the prisoners of war are the *prey* of the conquerors.

One way a band select for forage drives
A herd of beeves, fair oxen and fair kine

From a fat meadow ground, or fleecy flock,
Ewes and their bleating lambs,
Their *booty*.
MILTON.

'Twas in the dead of night, when sleep repairs
Our bodies worn with toils, our minds with cares,
When Hector's ghost before my sight appears,
A bloody shroud he seem'd, and bath'd in tears,
Unlike that Hector who return'd from toils
Of war, triumphant in Eacian *spoils*.
DRYDEN.

The wolf, who from the nightly fold
Forth drags the bleating *prey*, ne'er drank her
milk,
Nor wore her warming fleece.
THOMSON.

Booty and *prey* are often used in an extended and figurative sense. Plunderers obtain a rich *booty*; the diligent bee returns loaded with his *booty*. It is necessary that animals should become a *prey* to man, in order that man may not become a *prey* to them; everything in nature becomes a *prey* to another thing, which in its turn falls a *prey* to something else. All is change but order. Man is a *prey* to the diseases of his body or his mind, and after death to the worms.

When they had finally determined on a state
resource from church *booty*, they came, on the
14th of April, 1790, to a solemn resolution on the
subject.
BURKE.

Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a *prey*,
Where wealth accumulates and men decay.
GOLDSMITH.

BORDER, EDGE, RIM OR BRIM, BRINK, MARGIN, VERGE.

BORDER, in French *bord* or *bordure*, Teutonic *bord*, is probably connected with *bret*, board, signifying a stripe in shape like a board. **EDGE**, in Saxon *ege*, low German *egge*, high German *ecke*, a point, Latin *acies*, Greek *ακη*, sharpness, signifies a sharp point or line. **RIM**, in Saxon *rima*, high German *rahmen*, a frame, *riemen*, a thong, Greek *ρυμα*, a tract, from *ρω*, to draw, signifies a line drawn round. **BRIM, BRINK**, are but variations of *rim*. **MARGIN**, in French *marge*, Latin *margo*, probably comes from *mare*, the sea, as it is mostly connected with water. **VERGE**, from the Latin *virga*, signifies a rod, but is here used in the improper sense for the extremity of an object.

Of these terms, *border* is the least definite point; *edge* the most so; *rim* and *brink* are species of *edge*; *margin* and *verge* are species of *border*. A *border* is a stripe, an *edge* is a *line*. The *border* lies at a certain distance from the *edge*;

the *edge* is the exterior termination of the surface of any substance. Whatever is wide enough to admit of any space round its circumference may have a *border*; whatever comes to a narrow extended surface has an *edge*. Many things may have both a *border* and an *edge*; of this description are caps, gowns, carpets, and the like; others have a *border*, but no *edge*, as lands; and others have an *edge*, but no *border*, as a knife or a table. A *rim* is the *edge* of any vessel; the *brim* is the exterior edge of a cup; a *brink* is the *edge* of any precipice or deep place; a *margin* is the *border* of a book or a piece of water; a *verge* is the extreme *border* of a place.

So the pure limpid stream, when foul with stain
Of rushing torrents and descending rains,
Works itself clear, and as it runs refines,
Till by degrees the crystal mirror shines,
Reflects each flower that on its *border* grows.
ADDISON.

Methought the shilling that lay upon the table
reared itself upon its *edge*, and turning its face
toward me, opened its mouth.
ADDISON.

But Merion's spear o'ertook him as he flew,
Deep in the belly's *rim* an entrance found
Where sharp the pang, and mortal is the wound.
POPE.

As I approach the precipice's *brink*,
So steep, so terrible, appears the depth.
LANSDOWNE.

By the sea's *margin*, on the watery strand,
Thy monument, Themistocles, shall stand.
CUMBERLAND.

To the earth's utmost *verge* I will pursue him;
No place, though e'er so holy, shall protect him.
ROWE.

BORDER, BOUNDARY, FRONTIER, CONFINE, PRECINCT.

BORDER, *v. Border, edge*. **BOUNDARY**, from *bound* (*v. To bound*), expresses what *bounds, binds, or confines*. **FRONTIER**, French *frontière*, from the Latin *frons*, a forehead, signifies the fore part, or the commencement of anything. **CONFINE**, in Latin *confinis*, compounded of *con* or *cum* and *finis*, an end, signifies an end next to an end. **PRECINCT**, in Latin *præcinctum*, participle of *præcingo*, that is, *præ* and *cingo*, to enclose, signifies any enclosed place.

Border, boundary, frontier, and confines are all applied to countries or tracts of land: the *border* is the outer edge or tract of land that runs along a country; it is mostly applied to countries running