

despotism and barbarity, and how the making one person more than man makes the rest less.  
ADDISON.

If considered in any *relation* to the crown, to the national assembly, to the public tribunals, or to the army, or considered in a view to any coherence or *connection* between its parts, it seems a monster.  
BURKE.

The word *relation* is sometimes taken in a limited sense for one *connected* by family ties, which denotes something nearer in that case than *connection*; as when speaking of a man's *relations*, or of a person being *related* to another, to leave one's property to one's *relations*.

With them, as *relations*, they most commonly keep a close *connection* through life.  
BURKE.

TO CONQUER, VANQUISH, SUBDUE, OVERCOME, SURMOUNT.

CONQUER, in French *conquérir*, Lat. in *conquiro*, compounded of *con* and *quero*, to search after diligently, signifies in an extended sense to obtain by searching. VANQUISH is in French *vainere*, Latin *vinco*, Greek (*per metathesin*) *vukaw*, Hebrew *natzach*. SUBDUE, Latin *subdo*, signifies to give or put under. OVERCOME, compounded of *over* and *come*, signifies to come over or get the mastery over one. SURMOUNT, in French *surmonter*, compounded of *sur*, over, and *monter*, to mount, signifies to rise above any one.

The leading idea in the word *conquer* is that of getting; the leading idea in *vanquish* and *subdue* is that of getting the better of, the former partially, the latter thoroughly, so as to prevent any future resistance: a country is *conquered*; an enemy is *vanquished*; in the field of battle a people is *subdued*.

While these two rivals were thus contending for empire, their *conquests* were various. Luxury got possession of one heart, and Avarice of another.  
SPECTATOR.

Now flies the monarch of the sable shield,  
His legions *vanquish'd*, o'er the lonely field.  
SIR W. JONES.

You pretend to be the punisher of robbers, and are yourself the general robber of mankind. You have taken Lydia; you have seized Syria; you are master of Persia; you have *subdued* the Bactrians, and attacked India.  
QUINTUS CURTIUS.

*Conquer* may sometimes also signify to get the better, but in that case it does not define the mode or extent of the ac-

tion; we may *conquer* another in any contest, and in any manner; but we *vanquish* and *subdue* persons only by force, and mostly by force of arms.

When we attack a man upon that weak quarter which his misfortunes have left undefended, it is aiming our blows when we cannot *conquer* by fair fighting.  
TATLER.

When *overcome* is applied to persons, it has precisely the same indefinite and general meaning as *conquer*.

To work in close design by fraud or guile  
What force effected not, that he no less  
At length from us may find, who *overcomes*  
By force hath *overcome* but half his foe.  
MILTON.

But *overcome*, as well as *conquer*, *subdue*, and *vanquish*, are applied also to moral objects, and *surmount* has for the most part no other application. To *conquer* is said of the person himself, his likes, dislikes, and feelings generally; *subdue* of what relates either to the person himself or some other person, as to *subdue* the will or the passions. What is *conquered* makes less resistance and requires less force than what is *subdued*. It is likewise not so thoroughly subjugated or destroyed. We may *conquer* an aversion at one time which may return at another time; if the will be *subdued* in childhood, it will not prevail in riper years.

Real glory  
Springs from the silent *conquest* of ourselves.  
THOMSON.

Socrates and Marcus Aurelius are instances of men who, by the strength of philosophy having *subdued* their passions, are celebrated for good husbands.  
SPECTATOR.

To *vanquish* is applied figuratively to particular objects as in the proper sense.

There are two parts in our nature. The inferior part is generally much stronger, and has always the start of reason; which, if it were not aided by religion, would almost universally be *vanquished*.  
BERKELEY.

To *overcome* is applied to objections, scruples, prejudices, difficulties, and the like; *surmount* to difficulties, obstacles, impediments, etc. What is *overcome* requires less exertion than that which is *surmounted*. We may *overcome* by patience or forbearance; but determination, or the application of more or less force, is necessary in *surmounting* obstacles.

The patient mind by yielding *overcomes*.  
PHILIPS.

Actuated by some high passion, a man conceives great designs, and *surmounts* all difficulties in the execution.  
BLAIR.

CONQUEROR, VICTOR.

THESE terms, though derived from the preceding verbs (*v. To conquer, vanquish*), have, notwithstanding, characteristics peculiar to themselves. A CONQUEROR is always supposed to add something to his possessions; a VICTOR gains nothing but the superiority: there is no *conquest* where there is not something gotten; there is no *victory* where there is no contest: all *conquerors* are not *victors*, nor all *victors conquerors*: those who take possession of other men's lands by force of arms make a *conquest*; those who excel in any trial of skill are the *victors*. Monarchs when they wage a successful war are mostly *conquerors*; combatants who compel their adversaries to yield are *victors*.

God assists us in the virtuous conflict, and will crown the *conqueror* with eternal rewards.  
BLAIR.

Proud Gyas, and his train,  
In triumph rode the *victors* of the main.  
DRYDEN.

CONSCIENTIOUS, SCRUPULOUS.

CONSCIENTIOUS, from *conscience*, marks the quality of having a nice conscience. SCRUPULOUS, from *scruple*, signifies the quality of having scruples. *Scruple*, in Latin *scrupulus*, signifies a little hard stone, which in walking gives pain.

*Conscientious* is to *scrupulous* as a whole to a part. A *conscientious* man is so altogether; a *scrupulous* man may have only particular *scruples*: the one is therefore always taken in a good sense; and the other at least in an indifferent, if not a bad sense. A *conscientious* man does nothing to offend his *conscience*; but a *scrupulous* man has often his *scruples* on trifling or minor points: the Pharisees were *scrupulous* without being *conscientious*: we must therefore strive to be *conscientious* without being over-*scrupulous*.

A *conscientious* person would rather distrust his own judgment than condemn his species. He would say, I have observed without attention, or

judged upon erroneous maxims; I have trusted to profession when I ought to have attended to conduct.  
BURKE.

I have been so very *scrupulous*, in this particular, of not hurting any man's reputation, that I have forborne mentioning even such authors as I could not name with honor.  
ADDISON.

TO CONSENT, PERMIT, ALLOW.

CONSENT, *v. To agree*. PERMIT and ALLOW, *v. To admit*.

The idea of determining the conduct of others by some authorized act of one's own is common to these terms, but under various circumstances. They express either the act of an equal or a superior. As the act of an equal we *consent* to that in which we have a common interest with others; we *permit* or *allow* what is for the accommodation of others: we *allow* by abstaining to oppose; we *permit* by a direct expression of our will; contracts are formed by the *consent* of the parties who are interested. The proprietor of an estate *permits* his friends to sport on his grounds; he *allows* of a passage through his premises. It is sometimes prudent to *consent*; complaisant to *permit*; good-natured or weak to *allow*.

Do not consent

That Antony speak in his funeral;  
Know ye how much the people may be woo'd  
By that which he will utter.  
SHAKESPEARE.

You have given your *permission* for this address, and encouraged me by your perusal and approbation.  
DRYDEN.

I was, by the freedom *allowable* among friends, tempted to vent my thoughts with negligence.  
BOYLE.

*Consent* respects matters of serious importance; *permit* and *allow* regard those of an indifferent nature: a parent *consents* to the establishment of his children; he *permits* them to read certain books; he *allows* them to converse with him familiarly. We must pause before we give our *consent*; it is an express sanction to the conduct of others; it involves our own judgment, and the future interests of those who are under our control. This is not always so necessary in *permitting* and *allowing*; they are partial actions, which require no more than the bare exercise of authority, and involve no other consequence than the temporary pleasure of the parties concerned. Public measures are *permitted* and *allowed*, but never *consented* to. The law *permits*

or *allows*; or the person who is authorized *permits* or *allows*. *Permit* in this case retains its positive sense; *allow* its negative sense, as before. Government *permits* individuals to fit out privateers in time of war: when magistrates are not vigilant, many things will be done which are not *allowed*. A judge is not *permitted* to pass any sentence but what is strictly conformable to law: every man who is accused is *allowed* to plead his own cause, or intrust it to another, as he thinks fit.

Though what thou tell'st some doubt within me  
move,  
But more desire to hear, if thou *consent*.  
The full relation. MILTON.

After men have acquired as much as the law  
*permits* them, they have nothing to do but to  
take care of the public. SWIFT.

They referred all laws that were to be passed  
in Ireland to be considered, corrected, and *al-*  
*lowed* by the state of England. SPENSER.

These terms are similarly distinguish-  
ed in the moral application.

O no! our reason was not vainly lent!  
Nor is a slave but by its own *consent*. DRYDEN.

Shame, and his conscience,  
Will not *permit* him to deny it. RANDOLPH.

I think the strictest moralists *allow* forms of  
address to be used, without much regard to their  
literal acceptation. JOHNSON.

CONSEQUENCE, EFFECT, RESULT, IS-  
SUE, EVENT.

CONSEQUENCE, in French *consé-*  
*quence*, Latin *consequentia*, from *con-*  
*sequor*, to follow, signifies that which fol-  
lows in connection with something else.  
EFFECT is the thing effected (*v. To ac-*  
*complish*). RESULT, in French *résulte*,  
Latin *resulto*, or *resultus* and *resilio*, to  
rebound, signifies that which springs or  
bounds back from another thing. IS-  
SUE is that which issues or flows out  
(*v. To arise*). EVENT, in Latin *eventus*,  
participle of *evenio*, from *e*, forth, and  
*venio*, to come, is that which comes forth.

All these terms are employed to de-  
note that which follows something else;  
they vary according to the different cir-  
cumstances under which they follow, or  
the manner of their following. A *con-*  
*sequence* is that which follows of itself,  
without any qualification or restriction;  
an *effect* is that which is effected or pro-

duced, or which follows from the con-  
nection between the thing effecting, as  
a cause, and the thing effected. In the  
nature of things causes will have *effects*,  
and for every *effect* there will be a cause,  
although it may not be visible. *Con-*  
*sequences*, on the other hand, are either cas-  
ual or natural; they are not always to  
be calculated upon. *Effect* applies to  
physical or moral objects; *consequences*  
to moral objects only; diseases are the  
*effects* of intemperance; the loss of char-  
acter is the general *consequence* of an ir-  
regular life.

Jealousy often draws after it a fatal train of  
*consequences*. ADDISON.

A passion for praise produces very good *effects*.  
ADDISON.

*Consequences* follow either from the ac-  
tions of men, or from things where there  
is no direct agency or design; *results* fol-  
low from the actions or efforts of men:  
*consequences* are good or bad; *results* are  
favorable or unfavorable. We endeavor  
to avert *consequences* and to produce *re-*  
*sults*. Not to foresee the *consequences*  
which are foreseen by others evinces a  
more than ordinary share of indiscretion  
and infatuation. To calculate on a favor-  
able *result* from an ill-judged or ill-exe-  
cuted enterprise only proves a consistent  
blindness in the projector.

Were it possible for anything in the Christian  
faith to be erroneous, I can find no ill *conse-*  
*quence* in adhering to it. ADDISON.

Were all these dreadful things necessary?  
Were they the inevitable *results* of the desperate  
struggle of patriots? BURKE.

A *consequence* may be particular or fol-  
low from a part; a *result* is general, fol-  
lowing from a whole: there may be many  
*consequences* from the same thing, and but  
one *result* only.

The state of the world is continually changing,  
and none can tell the *result* of the next vicissi-  
tude. JOHNSON.

As *results* follow from actions or ef-  
forts, there is this further distinction;  
that in regard to intellectual operations  
*results* may be drawn by the act of the  
mind; as the *results* of reasoning or cal-  
culation.

This policy appears to me to be the *result* of  
profound reflection. BURKE.

*Consequences* may be intermediate or  
final; *issue* and *event* are always final:  
the former is that which flows from par-  
ticular efforts; the latter from complicat-  
ed undertakings where chance may inter-  
pose to bring about that which happens;  
hence we speak of the *issue* of a negotia-  
tion or a battle, and the *event* of a war.  
The fate of a nation sometimes hangs on  
the *issue* of a battle. The measures of  
government are often unjustly praised or  
blamed according to the *event*.

Henley in one of his advertisements had men-  
tioned Pope's treatment of Savage; this was sup-  
posed by Pope to be the *consequence* of a com-  
plaint made by Savage to Henley, and was there-  
fore mentioned by him with much resentment.  
JOHNSON.

A mild, unruffled, self-possessing mind is a  
blessing more important to real felicity than all  
that can be gained by the triumphant *issue* of  
some violent contest. BLAIR.

It has always been the practice of mankind to  
judge of actions by the *event*. JOHNSON.

TO CONSIDER, TO REFLECT.

CONSIDER, in French *considérer*, Lat-  
in *considero*, a factitive verb, from *consido*,  
to sit down, signifies to make to settle.  
REFLECT, in Latin *reflecto*, compounded  
of *re* and *flecto*, signifies to turn back or  
upon itself.

The operation of thought is expressed  
by these two words, but it varies in the  
circumstances of the action. *Considera-*  
*tion* is employed for practical purposes;  
*reflection* for matters of speculation or  
moral improvement. Common objects  
call for *consideration*; the workings of  
the mind itself, or objects purely spiri-  
tual, occupy *reflection*. It is necessary to  
*consider* what is proper to be done before  
we take any step; it is consistent with  
our natures, as rational beings, to *reflect*  
on what we are, what we ought to be, and  
what we shall be. Without *consideration*  
we shall naturally commit the most fla-  
grant errors; without *reflection* we shall  
never understand our duty to our Maker,  
our neighbor, and ourselves.

It seems necessary, in the choice of persons for  
great employments, to *consider* their bodies as  
well as their minds, and ages and health as well  
as their abilities. TEMPLE.

Whoever *reflects* frequently on the uncertain-  
ty of his own duration, will find out that the  
state of others is not more permanent than his  
own. JOHNSON.

TO CONSIDER, REGARD.

To CONSIDER (*v. To consider, reflect*)  
signifies to take a view of a thing in the  
mind which is the result of thought. To  
REGARD (*v. Care, concern*) is properly to  
look back upon or to look at with con-  
cern. There is more caution or thought  
in *considering*, more personal interest in  
*regarding*. To *consider* is to bear in mind  
all that prudence or propriety suggests;  
to *regard* is to bear in mind all that our  
wishes or interests suggest. It is most  
usual to *consider* the means or matters in  
detail, and to *regard* the end or object at  
large: a man will *consider* whether a thing  
is good or bad, proper or improper, out  
of the *regard* which he has for his repu-  
tation, his honor, his conscience, and the  
like. Where he has no *consideration* he  
cannot possibly have a *regard*, but he may  
have a *regard* where *considerations* are not  
necessary. A want of *consideration* as to  
the circumstances and capacity of another  
may lead one to form a wrong judg-  
ment of his conduct. A want of *regard*  
for the person himself may lead one to  
be regardless of his comfort and conven-  
ience.

The king had not at that time one person about  
him of his council who had the least *considera-*  
*tion* of his own honor, or friendship for those who  
sat at the helm of affairs, the Duke of Lennox  
excepted. CLARENDON.

If much you note him,  
You offend him; feed and *regard* him not.  
SHAKESPEARE.

So, in application to things not express-  
ly connected with one's interests or in-  
clinations, to *consider* is to look at things  
simply as they are; to *regard* is to look  
at them with a certain degree of interest.

I *consider* the soul of man as the ruin of a  
glorious pile of buildings. STEELE.

I *regard* trade not only as highly advanta-  
geous to the commonwealth in general, but as  
the most natural and likely method of making a  
man's fortune. BUDGELL.

CONSIDERATION, REASON.

CONSIDERATION, or that which en-  
ters into a person's *consideration* (*v. To*  
*consider*), has a reference to the person  
considering. REASON (*v. Cause*), or that  
which influences the reason, is taken ab-  
solutely. *Considerations* are therefore, for  
the most part, partial, as affecting partic-

ular interests, or dependent on particular circumstances. *Reasons*, on the contrary, may be general, and vary according to the subject.

He had been made general upon very partial and not enough deliberated *considerations*.  
CLARENDON.

The *reasons* assigned in a law of the 36th year of Edward III. for having pleas and judgments in the English tongue might have been urged for having the laws themselves in that language.  
TYRWHITT.

The *consideration* influences particular actions; the *reason* determines a line of conduct: no *consideration* of profit should induce a person to forfeit his word; the *reasons* which men assign for their conduct are often as absurd as they are false.

He was obliged, antecedent to all *considerations*, to search an asylum.  
DRYDEN.

I mask the business from the common eye  
For sundry weighty *reasons*.  
SHAKESPEARE.

In matters of argument, the *consideration* is that which one offers to the *consideration* of another; the *reason* is that which lies in the nature of the thing.

The folly of ascribing temporal punishments to any particular crimes may appear from several *considerations*.  
ADDISON.

If it be natural, ought we not rather to conclude that there is some ground or *reason* for those fears, and that nature hath not planted them in us to no purpose?  
TILLOTSON.

#### TO CONSIGN, COMMIT, INTRUST.

CONSIGN, in French *consigner*, Latin, *consigno*, compounded of *con* and *signo*, signifies to seal for a specific purpose, also to deposit. COMMIT, in French *commettre*, Latin *committo*, compounded of *com* and *mitto*, to put together, signifies to put into a person's hands. INTRUST, compounded of *in* and *trust*, signifies to put in trust.

The idea of transferring from one's self to the care of another is common to these terms, differing in the nature and object of the action. To *consign* is a more formal act, a more absolute giving from ourselves to another, than to *commit*: a merchant *consigns* his goods to another to dispose of them for his advantage; he *commits* the management of his business to his clerk: a child is *consigned* to another, for him to take the whole charge

of his education, maintenance, and the like; but when he is *committed* to the charge of another, it is mostly with limitations.

Atrides, parting for the Trojan war,  
*Consign'd* the youthful consort to his care.  
POPE.

In a very short time Lady Macclesfield removed her son from her sight, by *committing* him to the care of a poor woman.  
JOHNSON'S LIFE OF SAVAGE.

To *intrust* refers to the degree of trust or confidence which is reposed in the individual; a child may be *intrusted* to the care of a servant for a short time; a person may be *intrusted* with the property or secrets of another; or individuals may be *intrusted* with power.

Supposing both equal in their natural integrity, I ought in common prudence to fear foul play from an indigent person rather than from one whose circumstances seem to have placed him above the base temptation of money. This reason makes the commonwealth regard her richest subjects as the fittest to be *intrusted* with her highest employments.  
ADDISON.

In the figurative application, to *consign* is to deliver over so as to become the property of another thing; to *commit* is to give over for the purpose of taking charge of. Death *consigns* many to an untimely grave; a writer *commits* his thoughts to the press.

At the day of general account, good men are then to be *consigned* over to another state, a state of everlasting love and charity.  
ATTERBURY.

Is my muse controll'd  
By servile awe? Born free, and not be bold!  
At least I'll dig a hole within the ground,  
And to the trusty earth *commit* the sound.  
DRYDEN.

*Consign* may thus be used in the sense of assign, and *commit* in the sense of trusting at all hazards.

And oft I wish, amidst the scene, to find  
Some spot to real happiness *consign'd*.  
GOLDSMITH.

Acastus was soon prevailed upon by his curiosity to set rocks and hardships at defiance, and *commit* his life to the winds.  
JOHNSON.

#### TO CONSÔLE, SOLACE, COMFORT.

CONSOLE and SOLACE are derived from the same source, in French *consoler*, Latin *consolor* and *solatium*, possibly from *solum*, the ground, which nourishes all things. COMFORT, *v. Comfort*.

*Console* and *solace* denote the relieving of pain; *comfort* marks the communication of positive pleasure. We *console* others with words; we *console* or *solace* ourselves with reflections; we *comfort* by words or deeds. *Console* is used on more important occasions than *solace*. We *console* our friends when they meet with afflictions; we *solace* ourselves when we meet with disasters; we *comfort* those who stand in need of comfort. The greatest *consolation* which we can enjoy on the death of our friends is derived from the hope that they have exchanged a state of imperfection and sorrow for one that is full of pure and unmixed felicity. It is no small *solace* to us, in the midst of all our troubles, to consider that they are not so bad that they might not have been worse. The *comforts* which a person enjoys may be considerably enhanced by the comparison with what he has formerly suffered.

In afflictions men generally draw their *consolation* out of books of morality, which indeed are of great use to fortify and strengthen the mind against the impressions of sorrow.  
ADDISON.

He that undergoes the fatigue of labor must *solace* his weariness with the contemplation of its reward.  
JOHNSON.

If our afflictions are light, we shall be *comforted* by the comparison we make between ourselves and our fellow-sufferers.  
ADDISON.

#### CONSONANT, ACCORDANT, CONSISTENT.

CONSONANT, from the Latin *consonans*, participle of *con* and *sono*, to sound together, signifies to sound, or be, in unison or harmony. ACCORDANT, from *accord* (*v. To agree*), signifies the quality of according. CONSISTENT, from the Latin *consistens*, participle of *consisto*, or *con* and *sisto*, to place together, signifies the quality of being able to stand in unison together.

*Consonant* is employed in matters of representation; *accordant* in matters of opinion or sentiment; *consistent* in matters of conduct. A particular passage is *consonant* with the whole tenor of the Scriptures; a particular account is *accordant* with all one hears and sees on a subject; a person's conduct is not always *consistent* with his station. *Consonant* is opposed to *dissonant*; *accordant* to *discordant*; *consistent* to *inconsistent*.

*Consonance* is not so positive a thing as either *accordance* or *consistency*, which respect real events, circumstances, and actions. *Consonance* may serve to prove the truth of a thing, but *dissonance* does not prove its falsehood until it amounts to direct *discordance* or *inconsistency*. There is a *dissonance* in the accounts given by the four Evangelists of our Saviour, which serves to prove the absence of all collusion and imposture, since there is neither *discordance* nor *inconsistency* in what they have related or omitted.

Our faith in the discoveries of the Gospel will receive confirmation from discerning their *consonance* with the natural sentiments of the human heart.  
BLAIR.

The difference of good and evil in actions is not founded on arbitrary opinions or institutions, but in the nature of things and the nature of man; it *accords* with the universal sense of the human mind.  
BLAIR.

Keep one *consistent* plan from end to end.  
ADDISON.

#### CONSTANCY, STABILITY, STEADINESS, FIRMNESS.

CONSTANCY, in French *constance*, Latin *constantia*, from *constans* and *consto*, compounded of *con* and *sto*, to stand by or close to a thing, signifies the quality of adhering to the thing that has been once chosen. STABILITY, in French *stabilité*, Latin *stabilitas*, from *stabilis* and *sto*, to stand, signifies the quality of being able to stand. STEADINESS, from *steady* or *stead*, Saxon *stetig*, high German *stättig*, Greek *σταδός*, *σταθεύς*, and *ιστημι*, to stand, signifies a capacity for standing. FIRMNESS, from *ferme*, in French *ferme*, Latin *firmus*, comes from *fero*, to bear, signifying the quality of bearing, upholding, or keeping.

*Constancy* respects the affections; *stability* the opinions; *steadiness* the action or the motives of action; *firmness* the purpose or resolution. *Constancy* prevents from changing, and furnishes the mind with resources against weariness or disgust of the same object; it preserves and supports an attachment under every change of circumstances; *stability* prevents from varying, it bears up the mind against the movements of levity or curiosity, which a diversity of objects might produce; *steadiness* prevents from deviating; it enables the mind to bear

up against the influence of humor, which temperament or outward circumstances might produce: it fixes on one course, and keeps to it: *firmness* prevents from yielding; it gives the mind strength against all the attacks to which it may be exposed; it makes a resistance, and comes off triumphant. *Constancy*, among lovers and friends, is the favorite theme of poets; the word has, however, afforded but few originals from which they could copy their pictures: they have mostly described what is desirable rather than what is real. *Stability* of character is essential for those who are to command, for how can they govern others who cannot govern their own thoughts? *Steadiness* of deportment is a great recommendation to those who have to obey: how can any one perform his part well who suffers himself to be perpetually interrupted? *Firmness* of character is indispensable in the support of principles: there are many occasions in which this part of a man's character is likely to be put to a severe test. *Constancy* is opposed to fickleness; *stability* to changeableness; *steadiness* to flightiness; *firmness* to pliancy.

Without *constancy* there is neither love, friendship, nor virtue in the world. ADDISON.

With God there is no variability, with man there is no *stability*. Virtue and vice divide the empire of his mind, and wisdom and folly alternately rule him. BLAIR.

A manly *steadiness* of conduct is the object we are always to keep in view. BLAIR.

A corrupted and guilty man can possess no true *firmness* of heart. BLAIR.

#### TO CONSTITUTE, APPOINT, DEPUTE.

CONSTITUTE, in Latin *constitutus*, participle of *constituo*, that is, *con* and *statuo*, to place together, signifies here to put or place for a specific purpose. APPOINT, *v. To appoint*. DEPUTE, in French *députer*, Latin *deputo*, compounded of *de* and *puto*, to esteem or assign, signifies to assign a certain office to a person.

The act of choosing some person or persons for an office is comprehended under all these terms: *constitute* is a more solemn act than *appoint*, and this than *depute*: to *constitute* is the act of a body; to *appoint* and *depute*, either of a

body or an individual: a community *constitutes* any one their leader; a monarch *appoints* his ministers; an assembly *deputes* some of its members. To *constitute* implies the act of making as well as choosing; the office as well as the person is new: in *appointing*, the person, but not the office, is new. A person may be *constituted* arbiter or judge as circumstances may require; a successor is *appointed*, but not *constituted*.

Where there is no *constituted* judge, as between independent states there is not, the vicinage itself is the natural judge. BURKE.

The accusations against Columbus gained such credit in a jealous court, that a commissioner was *appointed* to repair to Hispaniola, and to inspect into his conduct. ROBERTSON.

Whoever is *constituted* is invested with supreme authority derived from the highest sources of power; whoever is *appointed* derives his authority from the authority of others, and has consequently but limited power: no individual can *appoint* another with authority equal to his own: whoever is *deputed* has private and not public authority; his office is partial, often confined to the particular transaction of an individual, or a body of individuals. According to the Romish religion, the Pope is *constituted* supreme head of the Christian Church throughout the whole world; governors are *appointed* to distant provinces; persons are *deputed* to present petitions or make representations to government.

They held for life. Indeed they may be said to have held by inheritance. *Appointed* by the monarch, they were considered as nearly out of his power. BURKE.

They composed permanent bodies politic, *constituted* to resist arbitrary innovation. BURKE.

If the Commons disagree to the amendments, a conference usually follows between members *deputed* from each house. BLACKSTONE.

#### CONSTRAINT, COMPULSION.

CONSTRAINT, from *constrain*, Latin *constringo*, compounded of *con* and *stringo*, signifies the act of straining or tying together. COMPULSION signifies the act of compelling (*v. To compel*).

There is much of binding in *constraint*; of violence in *compulsion*: *constraint* prevents from acting agreeably to the will; *compulsion* forces to act contrary to the will: a soldier in the ranks moves with

much *constraint*, and is often subject to much *compulsion* to make him move as is desired. *Constraint* may arise from outward circumstances; *compulsion* is always produced by some active agent: the forms of civil society lay a proper *constraint* upon the behavior of men, so as to render them agreeable to each other; the arm of the civil power must ever be ready to *compel* those who will not submit without *compulsion*: in the moments of relaxation, the actions of children should be as free from *constraint* as possible; those who know and wish to do what is right will always be ready to discharge their duty without *compulsion*.

Commands are no *constraints*. If I obey them, I do it freely. MILTON.

Savage declared that it was not his design to fly from justice; that he intended to have appeared (to appear) at the bar without *compulsion*. JOHNSON.

#### CONSTRAINT, RESTRAINT.

CONSTRAINT, *v. Constraint, compulsion*. RESTRAINT, *v. To coerce, restrain*.

*Constraint* respects the movements of the body only; *restraint* those of the mind, and the outward actions: when they both refer to the outward actions, we say a person's behavior is *constrained*; his feelings are *restrained*: he is *constrained* to act or not to act, or to act in a certain manner; he is *restrained* from acting at all, or he may be *restrained* from feeling: the conduct is *constrained* by certain prescribed rules, by discipline and order; it is *restrained* by particular motives: whoever learns a mechanical exercise is *constrained* to move his body in a certain direction; the fear of detection often *restrains* persons from the commission of vices more than any sense of their enormity.

When from *constraint* only the offices of seeming kindness are performed, little dependence can be placed on them. BLAIR.

What *restraints* do they lie under who have no regards beyond the grave? BERKELEY.

#### TO CONSULT, DELIBERATE.

CONSULT, in French *consulter*, Latin *consulto*, is a frequentative of *consulo*, signifying to counsel together (*v. Advice, counsel*). DELIBERATE, in French *délibérer*, Latin *delibero*, compounded of *de*

and *libro*, or *libra*, a balance, signifies to weigh as in a balance.

*Consultations* always require two persons at least; *deliberations* may be carried on either with a man's self or with numbers: an individual may *consult* with one or many; assemblies commonly *deliberate*: advice and information are given and received in *consultations*; doubts, difficulties, and objections are started and removed in *deliberations*. We communicate and hear when we *consult*; we pause and hesitate when we *deliberate*: those who have to co-operate must frequently *consult* together; those who have serious measures to decide upon must coolly *deliberate*.

Ulysses (as Homer tells us) made a voyage to the regions of the dead, to *consult* Tiresias how he should return to his country. ADDISON.

Moloch declares himself abruptly for war, and appears incensed at his companions for losing so much time as even to *deliberate* upon it. ADDISON.

#### CONSUMMATION, COMPLETION.

CONSUMMATION, Latin *consummatio*, compounded of *con* and *summa*, the sum, signifies the summing or winding up of the whole—the putting a final period to any concern. COMPLETION signifies either the act of completing, or the state of being completed (*v. To complete*).

The arrival at a conclusion is comprehended in both these terms, but they differ principally in application; wishes are *consummated*; plans are *completed*: we often flatter ourselves that the *completion* of all our plans will be the *consummation* of all our wishes, and thus expose ourselves to grievous disappointments.

It is not to be doubted but it was a constant practice of all that is praiseworthy which made her capable of beholding death, not as the dissolution but the *consummation* of life. STEELE.

He makes it the *completion* of an ill character to bear a malevolence to the best of men. POPE.

As epithets, *consummate* and *complete* admit of a similar distinction. *Consummate* is said of that which rises absolutely to the highest possible degree, as *consummate* wisdom, or *consummate* felicity; *complete* is said of that which is so relatively; a thing may be *complete* which fully answers the purpose.

O thou whose wisdom, solid yet refined,  
Whose patriot virtues and consummate skill  
Give thee, with pleasing dignity, to shine  
At once the guardian, ornament, and joy  
Of polish'd life!

THOMSON.

To add now (in order to make this second fruit  
of friendship *complete*) that other point which  
lieth more open, which is faithful counsel from a  
friend.

BACON.

## CONTACT, TOUCH.

CONTACT, in Latin *contactus*, participle of *contingo*, compounded of *con* and *tango*, to touch together, is distinguished from the simple word TOUCH, not so much in sense as in grammatical construction; the former expressing a state, and referring to two bodies actually in that state; the latter, on the other hand, implying the abstract act of *touching*: we speak of things coming or being in *contact*, but not of the *contact* instead of the *touch* of a thing: the poison which comes from the poison-tree is so powerful in its nature, that it is not necessary to come in *contact* with it in order to feel its baneful influence; some insects are armed with stings so inconceivably sharp, that the smallest *touch* possible is sufficient to produce a puncture in the flesh.

We are attracted toward each other by general sympathy, but kept back from *contact* by private interest.

JOHNSON.

O death! where is now thy sting? O grave!  
where is thy victory? Where are the terrors  
with which thou hast so long affrighted the nations?  
At the *touch* of the Divine rod thy visionary horrors are fled.

BLAIR.

## CONTAGION, INFECTION.

BOTH these terms imply the power of communicating something bad, but CONTAGION, from the Latin verb *contingo*, to come in contact, proceeds from a simple touch; and INFECTION, from the Latin *inficio*, or *in* and *facio*, to put in, proceeds by receiving something inwardly or having it infused. We consider *contagion* as to the manner of spreading from one body to another; we consider *infection* as to the act of its working itself into the system. Whatever acts by *contagion* acts immediately by direct personal contact; whatever acts by *infection* acts gradually and indirectly, or through the medium of a third body, as clothes, or the air when *infected*. The word *contagion* is, therefore, properly applied only to particular diseases, but *infection* may

be applied to every disease which is communicable from one subject to another. Whatever, therefore, is *contagious* is also *infectious*, but not *vice versa*.

I am particularly careful to destroy the clothes of the sick, because they harbor the very quintessence of *contagion*.

MEAD.

Whatever cotton is imported from that part of the world should at all times be kept in quarantine, because it may have imbibed *infection* at the time of its packing up.

MEAD.

So, in application to other things besides diseases, *contagion* is employed to denote that species of communication which is effected by a direct action on the senses.

From look to look, *contagious*, through the crowd  
The panic runs.

THOMSON.

The mischief spread by the *contagion* of phrensy.

JOHNSON.

*Infection* is employed to denote the communication which takes place by the gradual process of being *infected* with anything.

It is a disease in a state like to *infection*, for, as *infection* spreadeth upon that which is sound, and tainteth, so, when envy is gotten once into a state, it traduceth even the best actions thereof.

BACON.

So, in the moral application, whatever is outward acts by *contagion*, as to shun the *contagion* of bad example or bad manners. Whatever acts inwardly acts by *infection*, as to shun the *infection* of bad principles.

If I send my son abroad, it is scarcely possible to keep him from the reigning *contagion* of rudeness.

LOCKE.

But we who only do infuse  
The rage in them like *bouté-feus*,

'Tis our example that instills

In them the *infection* of our ills.

BUTLER.

## CONTAGIOUS, EPIDEMICAL, PESTILENTIAL.

CONTAGIOUS signifies having or causing *contagion* (*v. Contagion*). EPIDEMICAL, in Latin *epidemicus*, Greek *ἐπιδημικός*, that is, *ἐπι* and *δημος*, among the people, signifies universally spread. PESTILENTIAL, from the Latin *pestis*, the plague, signifies having the plague, or a similar disorder.

The *contagious* applies to that which is capable of being caught, and ought not, therefore, to be touched; the *epidemic*

to that which is already caught or circulated, and requires, therefore, to be stopped; the *pestilential* to that which may breed an evil, and is, therefore, to be removed: diseases are *contagious* or *epidemic*; the air or breath is *pestilential*.

No foreign food the teeming ewes shall fear,  
No touch *contagious* spread its influence here.

WARTON.

The siroc has never been known to produce any *epidemic* distemper, nor indeed bad consequences of any kind to the health of the people.

BRYDENE.

Capricious, wanton, bold, and brutal lust  
Is meanly selfish; when resisted, cruel;  
And, like the blast of *pestilential* winds,  
Taints the sweet bloom of nature's fairest forms.

MILTON.

They may all be applied morally or figuratively in the same sense. We endeavor to shun a *contagious* disorder, that it may not come near us; we endeavor to purify a *pestilential* air, that it may not be inhaled to our injury; we endeavor to provide against *epidemic* disorders, that they may not spread any farther. Vicious example is *contagious*; certain follies or vices of fashion are *epidemic* in almost every age; the breath of infidelity is *pestilential*.

But first by ardent prayer and clear lustration  
Purge the *contagious* spots of human weakness.

PRIOR.

Among all the diseases of the mind, there is not one more *epidemic* or more pernicious than the love of flattery.

STEELE.

So *pestilential*, so infectious a thing is sin,  
that it scatters one poison of its breath to all the neighborhood.

JEREMY TAYLOR.

## TO CONTAIN, HOLD.

CONTAIN, *v. To comprise*. HOLD, in Saxon *healdan*, low German *holden*, *holle*, Danish *holde*, German *halten*, which is most probably connected with *haben*, to have.

These terms agree in sense, but differ in application; the former is by comparison noble, the latter is ignoble in its use: *hold* is employed only for the material contents of hollow bodies; *contain* is employed for moral or spiritual contents: in familiar discourse a cask is said to *hold*, but in more polished language it is said to *contain* a certain number of gallons. A coach *holds* or *contains* a given number of persons; a room *holds* a given quantity

of furniture; a house or city *contains* its inhabitants.

But man, th' abstract  
Of all perfection, which the workmanship  
Of heav'n hath modell'd, in himself *contains*  
Passions of several qualities.

FORD.

Death only this mysterious truth unfolds,  
The mighty soul how small a body *holds*.

DRYDEN.

## TO CONTAMINATE, DEFILE, POLLUTE, TAIN, CORRUPT.

CONTAMINATE, in Latin *contaminatus*, participle of *contamino*, comes from the Hebrew *tamah*, to pollute. DEFILE, compounded of *de* and *file* or *vile*, signifies to make vile. POLLUTE, in Latin *pollutus*, participle of *polluo*, compounded of *per* and *lavo* or *lavo*, to wash or dye, signifies to infuse thoroughly. TAIN, in French *teint*, participle of *teindre*, in Latin *tingo*, to dye or stain. CORRUPT, in Latin *corruptus*, participle of *corrumpo*, compounded of *con* and *rumpo*, signifies to break to pieces.

*Contaminate* is not so strong an expression as *defile* or *pollute*; but it is stronger than *taint*: these terms are used in the sense of injuring purity: *corrupt* has the idea of destroying it. Whatever is impure *contaminates*; what is gross and vile in the natural sense *defiles*, and in the moral sense *pollutes*; what is contagious or infectious *corrupts*; and what is *corrupted* may *taint* other things. Improper conversation or reading *contaminates* the mind of youth; lewdness and obscenity *defile* the body and *pollute* the mind; loose company *corrupts* the morals; the coming in contact with a *corrupted* body is sufficient to give a *taint*. If young people be admitted to a promiscuous intercourse with society, they must unavoidably witness objects that are calculated to *contaminate* their thoughts, if not their inclinations. They are thrown in the way of seeing the lips of females *defiled* with the grossest indecencies, and hearing or seeing things which cannot be heard or seen without *polluting* the soul: it cannot be surprising if after this their principles are found to be *corrupted* before they have reached the age of maturity.

The drop of water, after its progress through all the channels of the street, is not more *contaminated* with filth and dirt than a simple story

after it has passed through the mouths of a few modern tale-bearers. HAWKSWORTH.

When from the mountain tops with hideous cry  
And clatt'ring wings the hungry harpies fly,  
They snatch the meat, *defiling* all they find,  
And parting leave a loathsome stench behind.

DRYDEN.

Her virgin statue with their bloody hands  
Polluted, and profan'd her holy bands.

DRYDEN.

All men agree that licentious poems do, of all  
writings, soonest *corrupt* the heart. STEELE.

Your teeming ewes shall no strange meadows try,  
Nor fear a rot from *tainted* company.

DRYDEN.

TO CONTEMN, DESPISE, SCORN, DIS-  
DAIN.

CONTEMN, in Latin *contemno*, compounded of *con* and *temno*, is probably changed from *tamino*, and the Hebrew *tamah*, to pollute or render worthless, which is the cause of *contempt*. DESPISE, in Latin *despicio*, compounded of *de* and *specio*, signifies to look down upon, which is a strong mark of *contempt*. SCORN, varied from our word *shorn*, signifies stripped of all honors and exposed to derision, which situation is the cause of *scorn*. DISDAIN, compounded of *dis*, privative, and *dain* or *deign*, to think worthy, signifies to hold altogether unworthy.

The above elucidations sufficiently evince the feeling toward others which gives birth to all these actions. But the feeling of *contempt* is not quite so strong as that of *despising*, nor that of *despising* so strong as those of *scorning* and *disdaining*, the latter of which expresses the strongest sentiment of all. Persons are *contemned* for their moral qualities; they are *despised* on account of their outward circumstances, their characters, or their endowments. Superiors may be *contemned*; inferiors only, or those who degrade themselves, are *despised*. *Contempt*, as applied to persons, is not incompatible with a Christian temper when justly provoked by their character; but *despising* is distinctly forbidden, and seldom warranted. Yet it is not so much our business to *contemn* others as to *contemn* that which is *contemptible*; but we are not equally at liberty to *despise* the person, or anything belonging to the person, of another. Whatever springs from the free-will of another may be a sub-

ject of *contempt*; but the casualties of fortune or the gifts of Providence, which are alike independent of personal merit, should never expose a person to be *despised*. We may, however, *contemn* a person for his impotent malice, or *despise* him for his meanness.

*Contempt* and *derision* are hard words; but in what manner can one give advice to a youth in the pursuit and possession of sensual pleasures, or afford pity to an old man in the impotence and desire of enjoying them? STEELE.

It is seldom that the great or the wise suspect that they are cheated and *despised*. JOHNSON.

Persons are not *scorned* or *disdained*, but they may be treated with *scorn* or *disdain*; they are both improper expressions of *contempt* or *despise*: *scorn* marks the sentiment of a little, vain mind; *disdain* of a haughty and perverted one. A beautiful woman looks with *scorn* on her whom she *despises* for the want of this natural gift. The wealthy man treats with *disdain* him whom he *despises* for his poverty.

Infamous wretch!  
So much below my *scorn*, I dare not kill thee.

DRYDEN.

Yet not for those,  
For what the potent victor in his rage  
Can else inflict, do I repent or change,  
Though chang'd in outward lustre, that fix'd  
mind  
And high *disdain* from sense of injur'd merit.

MILTON.

In speaking of things independently of others, or as immediately connected with ourselves, all these terms may be sometimes employed in a good or an indifferent sense. When we *contemn* a mean action, and *scorn* to conceal by falsehood what we are called upon to acknowledge, we act the part of the gentleman as well as the Christian; but it is inconsistent with our infirm and dependent condition that we should feel inclined to *despise* anything that falls in our way; much less are we at liberty to *disdain* to do anything which our station requires; we ought to think nothing unworthy of us, nothing degrading to us, but that which is inconsistent with the will of God: there are, however, too many who affect to *despise* small favors as not reaching their fancied deserts, and others who *disdain* to receive any favor at all, from mistaken notions about dependence and obligation.

A man of spirit should *contemn* the praise of the ignorant. STEELE.

Thrice happy they, beneath their Northern skies,  
Who that worst fear, the fear of death, *despise*;  
Provoke approaching fate, and bravely *scorn*  
To spare that life which must so soon return.

ROWE.

It is in some sort owing to the bounty of Providence that, *disdaining* a cheap and vulgar happiness, they frame to themselves imaginary goods, in which there is nothing can raise desire but the difficulty of obtaining them. BERKELEY.

Virtue *disdains* to lend an ear  
To the mad people's sense of right. FRANCIS.

TO CONTEMPLATE, MEDITATE, MUSE.

CONTEMPLATE, in Latin *contemplatus*, participle of *contemplor*, probably comes from *templum*, a temple, as a place most fitted for *contemplation*. MEDITATE, in Latin *meditatus*, participle of *meditor*, is probably changed from *melitor*, in Greek *μελιταω*, to modulate or attune the thoughts, as sounds are harmonized. MUSE is derived from *musa*, owing to the connection between the harmony of a song and the harmony of the thoughts in *musings*.

Different species of reflection are marked by these terms. We *contemplate* what is present or before our eyes; we *meditate* on what is past or absent. The heavens and all the works of the Creator are objects of *contemplation*; the ways of Providence are fit subjects for *meditation*. One *muses* on events or circumstances which have been just passing.

I sincerely wish myself with you to *contemplate* the wonders of God in the firmament, rather than the madness of man on the earth. POPE.

But a very small part of the moments spent in *meditation* on the past produce any reasonable caution or salutary sorrow. JOHNSON.

We may *contemplate* and *meditate* for the future, but never  *muse*. In this case the two former terms have the sense of contriving or purposing: what is *contemplated* to be done is thought of more indistinctly than when it is *meditated* to be done: many things are had in *contemplation* which are never seriously *meditated* upon: between *contemplating* and *meditating* there is oftener a greater distance than between *meditating* and *executing*.

The work which he had in *contemplation* may have been a history of that monarch.

MALONE.

Thus plung'd in ills and *meditating* more,  
The people's patience, tried, no longer bore  
The raging monster. DRYDEN.

*Meditating* is a permanent and serious action; *musings* is partial and unimportant; *meditation* is a religious duty, it cannot be neglected without injury to a person's spiritual improvement; *musings* is a temporary employment of the mind on the ordinary concerns of life, as they happen to excite an interest for the time. *Contemplative* and *musings*, as epithets, have a strong analogy to each other. *Contemplative* is a habit of the mind; *musings* is a particular state of the mind. A person may have a *contemplative* turn, or be in a *musings* mood.

There is not any property or circumstance of my being that I *contemplate* with more joy than my immortality. BERKELEY.

There is nothing so forced and constrained as what we frequently meet with in tragedies; to make a man under the weight of great sorrow, or full of *meditation* upon what he is going to execute, cast about for a simile to what he himself is, or the thing which he is going to act. STEELE.

*Musings* as went on this and that,  
Such trifles as I know not what. FRANCIS.

CONTEMPTIBLE, CONTEMPTUOUS.

THESE terms are very frequently, though very erroneously, confounded in common discourse. CONTEMPTIBLE is applied to the thing deserving *contempt*; CONTEMPTUOUS to that which is expressive of *contempt*. Persons, or what is done by persons, may be either *contemptible* or *contemptuous*; but a thing is only *contemptible*. A production is *contemptible*; a sneer or look is *contemptuous*.

Silence, or a negligent indifference, proceeds from anger mixed with scorn, that shows another to be thought by you too *contemptible* to be regarded. ADDISON.

My sister's principles in many particulars differ; but there has been always such a harmony between us, that she seldom smiles upon those who have suffered me to pass with a *contemptuous* negligence. HAWKSWORTH.

CONTEMPTIBLE, DESPICABLE, PITIFUL.

CONTEMPTIBLE is not so strong as DESPICABLE or PITIFUL. A person may be *contemptible* for his vanity or weakness; but he is *despicable* for his servility and baseness of character; he is *pitiful* for his want of manliness and

becoming spirit. A lie is at all times *contemptible*; it is *despicable* when it is told for purposes of gain or private interest; it is *pitiful* when accompanied with indications of unmanly fear. It is *contemptible* to take credit to one's self for the good action one has not performed; it is *despicable* to charge another with the faults which we ourselves have committed; it is *pitiful* to offend others, and then attempt to screen ourselves from their resentment under any shelter which offers. It is *contemptible* for a man in a superior station to borrow of his inferiors; it is *despicable* in him to forfeit his word; it is *pitiful* in him to attempt to conceal anything by artifice.

Were every man persuaded from how mean and low a principle this passion (for flattery) is derived, there can be no doubt but the person who should attempt to gratify it would then be as *contemptible* as he is now successful.

To put on an artful part to obtain no other but an unjust praise from the undiscerning is of all endeavors the most *despicable*.

There is something *pitifully* mean in the inverted ambition of that man who can hope for annihilation, and please himself to think that his whole fabric shall crumble into dust.

#### CONTEMPTUOUS, SCORNFUL, DISDAINFUL.

THESE epithets rise in sense by a regular gradation. CONTEMPTUOUS is general, and applied to whatever can express *contempt*: SCORNFUL and DISDAINFUL are particular; they apply only to outward marks: one is *contemptuous* who is *scornful* or *disdainful*, but not *vice versa*. Words, actions, and looks are *contemptuous*; looks, sneers, and gestures are *scornful* and *disdainful*. *Contemptuous* expressions are always unjustifiable; whatever may be the *contempt* which a person's conduct deserves, it is unbecoming in another to give him any indications of the sentiment he feels. *Scornful* and *disdainful* smiles are resorted to by the weakest or the worst of mankind.

Prior never sacrifices accuracy to haste, nor indulges himself in *contemptuous* negligence or impatient idleness.

As soon as Mavia began to look round, and saw the vagabond Mirtillo who had so long absented himself from her circle, she looked upon him with that glance which in the language of ogles is called the *scornful*.

In vain he thus attempts her mind to move  
With tears and prayers and late repenting love;  
*Disdainfully* she looked, then turning round,  
She fix'd her eyes unmov'd upon the ground.

DRYDEN.

#### TO CONTEND, CONTEST, DISPUTE.

CONTEND, from *tendo*, to stretch one's course, and *contra*, against, signifies to strive against. CONTEST, from *contra* and *testor*, signifying to call to witness against; and DISPUTE, from *dis* and *puto*, signifying to think diversely, are modes of contending.

To *contend* is simply to exert a force against a force; to *contest* is to straggle together for an object.

'Tis madness to *contend* with strength divine.

DRYDEN.

But fortune's gifts, if each alike possess'd,  
And each were equal, must not all *contest*!

POPE.

To *contend* and *contest* may be both applied to that which is claimed and striven for; but *contending* is the act of the individual without reference to others, where success depends upon personal efforts or prowess, as when one *contends* at games. To *contest* is to set up rival pretensions to be determined by the suffrages of others, as to *contest* an election, to *contest* a prize.

At first the wrestlers *contended* only with strength of body, but Theseus invented the art of wrestling.

POTTER.

Homer is universally allowed to have had the greatest invention of any writer whatever. The praise of judgment Virgil has justly *contested* with him.

POPE.

Opinions may likewise be both *contended* and *contested*, with this distinction, that to *contend* is to maintain any opinion; to *contest* is to maintain different opinions: the person is said to *contend*, and the thing to be *contested*.

Lawyers, I know, cannot make the distinction for which I *contend*, because they have their strict rules to go by.

BERKE.

As to this matter, which has been much *contested*, I myself am of opinion that more influence has been ascribed to the "Beggar's Opera" than it, in reality, has ever had.

JOHNSON.

To *dispute*, according to its original meaning, applies to opinions only, and is distinguished from *contend* in this, that the latter signifies to maintain one's own opinion, and the former to call in question the opinion of another.

'Tis thus the spring of youth, the morn of life,  
Rears in our minds the rival seeds of strife;  
Then passion riots, reason then *contends*,  
And on the conquest every bliss depends.

SHENSTONE.

I believe there is no one will *dispute* the author's great impartiality in setting down the accounts of these different religions.

ADDISON.

In respect to matters of personal interest, *contend* and *dispute* are employed with a like distinction, the former to denote striving for something desired by one's self, the latter to call in question something relating to others, as to *contend* for a victory, to *dispute* a person's right; and when the idea of striving for a thing in *dispute* is to be expressed, this word may be employed indifferently with *contend* for, as to *dispute* or *contend* for a prize.

Besides the exercises already described, there were others of a quite different nature; such were those wherein musicians, poets, and other artists *contended* for victory.

POTTER.

Permit me not to languish out my days,  
But make the best exchange of life for praise.  
This arm, this lance, can well *dispute* the prize.

DRYDEN.

*Contention*, *contest*, and *dispute*, as nouns, admit of a further distinction. *Contention* is always of a personal nature, whether as regards interests or opinions, and is always accompanied with more or less ill feeling.

As subordination is very necessary for society, and *contentions* for superiority are very dangerous, mankind, that is, all civilized society, have settled it upon a plain invariable principle.

JOHNSON.

*Contests* may be as personal as *contentions*, but the objects in a *contest* being higher, and the *contesting* parties coming less into direct collision, there is less ill feeling produced.

The poor worm  
Shall prove her *contest* vain. Life's little day  
Shall pass, and she is gone—while I appear  
Flush'd with the bloom of youth through heav'n's  
eternal year.

MASON ON TRUTH.

As differences of opinion have a tendency to create ill feeling, *disputes* are rarely conducted without acrimony; but sometimes there may be *disputes* for that which is honorable, where there is no personal animosity.

There has been a long *dispute* for precedence between the tragic and heroic poets.

ADDISON.

#### CONTENTMENT, SATISFACTION.

CONTENTMENT, in French *contentement*, from *content*, in Latin *contentus*, participle of *contineo*, to contain or hold, signifies the keeping one's self to a thing. SATISFACTION, in Latin *satisfactio*, compounded of *satis* and *facio*, signifies the making or having enough.

*Contentment* lies in ourselves: *satisfaction* is derived from external objects. One is *contented* when one wishes for no more: one is *satisfied* when one has obtained all one wishes. The *contented* man has always enough; the *satisfied* man has only enough for the time being. The *contented* man will not be *dissatisfied*; but he who looks for *satisfaction* will never be *contented*. *Contentment* is the absence of pain; *satisfaction* is positive pleasure. *Contentment* is accompanied with the enjoyment of what one has; *satisfaction* is often quickly followed with the alloy of wanting more. A *contented* man can never be miserable; a *satisfied* man can scarcely be long happy. *Contentment* is a permanent and habitual state of mind; it is the restriction of all our thoughts, views, and desires within the compass of present possession and enjoyment: *satisfaction* is a partial and turbulent state of the feelings, which awakens rather than deadens desire. *Contentment* is suited to our present condition; it accommodates itself to the vicissitudes of human life: *satisfaction* belongs to no created being; one *satisfied* desire engenders another that demands *satisfaction*. *Contentment* is within the reach of the poor man, to whom it is a continual feast; but *satisfaction* has never been procured by wealth, however enormous, or ambition, however boundless and successful. We should therefore look for the *contented* man where there are the fewest means of being *satisfied*. Our duty bids us be *contented*; our desires ask to be *satisfied*: but our duty is associated with our happiness; our desires are the sources of our misery.

True happiness is to no place confin'd,  
But still is found in a *contented* mind.

ANONYMOUS.

Women who have been married some time, not having it in their heads to draw after them a numerous train of followers, find their *satisfaction* in the possession of one man's heart.

SPECTATOR.

When taken in a partial application to particular objects, there are cases in which we ought not to be *contented*, and where we may with propriety look for permanent *satisfaction*. We cannot be *contented* to do less than our duty requires; we may justly be *satisfied* with the consciousness of having done our duty.

No man should be *contented* with himself that he barely does well, but he should perform everything in the best manner he is able.

STEELE.

It is necessary to an easy and happy life to possess our minds in such a manner as to be well *satisfied* with our own reflections. STEELE.

#### CONTINUAL, PERPETUAL, CONSTANT.

CONTINUAL, in French *continuel*, Latin *continuus*, from *contineo*, to hold or keep together, signifies keeping together without intermission. PERPETUAL, in French *perpétuel*, Latin *perpetualis*, from *perpetuo*, compounded of *per* and *peto*, to seek thoroughly, signifies going on everywhere and at all times. CONSTANT, *v. Constancy*.

What is *continual* admits of no interruption: what is *perpetual* admits of no termination. There may be an end to that which is *continual*, and there may be intervals in that which is *perpetual*. Rains are *continual* in the tropical climates at certain seasons; complaints among the lower orders are *perpetual*, but they are frequently without foundation. There is a *continual* passing and repassing in the streets of the metropolis during the day; the world, and all that it contains, are subject to *perpetual* change.

Open your ears, for which of you will stop  
The vent of hearing when loud rumor speaks?  
Upon my tongue *continual* slanders ride,  
The which in every language I pronounce.

SHAKESPEARE.

If affluence of fortune unhappily concur to favor the inclinations of the youthful, amusements and diversions succeed in a *perpetual* round.

BLAIR.

*Constant*, like *continual*, admits of no interruption, and it also admits of no change; what is *continual* may not always *continue* in the same state; but what is *constant* remains in the same state: *continual* is therefore applied to that which is expected to cease; and *constant* to that which ought to last. A

nervous person may fancy he hears *continual* noises. It will be the *constant* endeavor of a peaceable man to live peaceably.

'Tis all blank sadness or *continual* tears. POPE.  
The world's a scene of changes, and to be  
*Constant* in nature were inconstancy. COWLEY.

*Continual* may sometimes have a moral application; as when we say, contentment is a *continual* feast; to have a *continual* enjoyment in anything: *constant* is properly applied to moral objects.

Where shall we find the man who looks out for one who places her chief happiness in the practice of virtue, and makes her duty her *continual* pleasure?

SPECTATOR.

And there cut off  
From social life, I felt a *constant* death.

THOMSON.

#### CONTINUAL, CONTINUED.

CONTINUAL, CONTINUED (*v. Continual*), both mark length of duration, but the former admits of a certain degree of interruption, which the latter does not. What is *continual* may have frequent pauses; what is *continued* ceases only to terminate. Rains are *continual* which are frequently repeated; so noises in a tumultuous street are *continual*: the bass in music is said to be *continued*; the mirth of a drunken party is one *continued* noise. *Continual* interruptions abate the vigor of application and create disgust: in countries situated near the poles, there is one *continued* darkness for the space of five or six months, during which time the inhabitants are obliged to leave the place.

And gulfy Simois rolling to the main  
Helmets and shields and godlike heroes slain:  
These, turn'd by Phœbus from their wonted  
ways,  
Delug'd the rampire nine *continual* days.

POPE.

Our life is one *continued* toil for fame.

MARTYN.

*Continual* respects the duration of actions only; *continued* is likewise applied to the extent or course of things: rumors are *continual*; talking, walking, running, and the like, are *continued*; but a line, a series, a scene, or a stream of water, is *continued*.

To THEE my thoughts

*Continual* climb.

THOMSON.

By too intense and *continued* application, our feeble powers would soon be worn out. BLAIR.

#### CONTINUANCE, CONTINUATION, DURATION.

CONTINUANCE, from the intransitive verb *to continue*, denotes the state of continuing or being carried on further. CONTINUATION, from the transitive verb *continue*, denotes the act of continuing or carrying on further. The *continuance* is said of that which itself *continues*; the *continuation* of that which is *continued* by some other agency: as the *continuance* of the rain; the *continuation* of a history, work, line, etc.

That pleasure is not of greater *continuance* which arises from the prejudice or malice of the hearers.

ADDISON.

The Pythagorean transmiration, the sensual habitation of the Mohammedan, and the shady realms of Pluto, do all agree in the main point, the *continuation* of our existence. BERKELEY.

As the species is said to be *continued*, the word *continuation* is most properly applied in this case.

These things must be works of Providence for the *continuation* of the species.

RAY.

And the use of the word *continuance*, as in the following example, is irregular:

Providence seems to have equally divided the whole mass of mankind into different sexes, that every woman may have her husband, and that both may equally contribute to the *continuance* of the species.

ADDISON.

*Continuance* and DURATION are both employed for the time of *continuing*; things may be of long *continuance* or of long *duration*: but *continuance* is used only with regard to the action; *duration* with regard to the thing and its existence. Whatever is occasionally done, and soon to be ended, is not for a *continuance*; whatever is made, and soon destroyed, is not of long *duration*: there are many excellent institutions in England which promise to be of no less *continuance* than utility. *Duration* is with us a relative term; things are of long or short *duration* by comparison: the *duration* of the world, and all sublunary objects, is nothing in regard to eternity.

We see the anger of Achilles in its birth, *continuance*, and effects.

POPE.

Mr. Locke observes, "that we get the idea of time and *duration*, by reflecting on that train of ideas which succeed one another in our minds."

ADDISON.

#### CONTINUATION, CONTINUITY.

CONTINUATION (*v. Continuance*) signifies either the act of continuing, as to undertake the *continuation* or *continuing* of a history:

The sun ascending into the northern signs begetteth first a temperate heat, which by his approach unto the solstice he intendeth; and by *continuation* the same even upon declination.

BROWNE: *Vulgar Errors*.

Or the thing *continued*; as to read the *continuation* of a history, that is, the history *continued*.

The rich country from thence to Portici covered with noble houses and gardens, and appearing only a *continuation* of the city. BRYDENE.

CONTINUITY denotes the quality of bodies holding together without interruption; there are bodies of so little *continuity* that they will crumble to pieces on the slightest touch.

A body always perceives the passages by which it insinuates; feels the impulse of another body where it yields thereto; perceives the separation of its *continuity*, and for a time resists it: in fine, perception is diffused through all nature.

BACON.

So likewise in the moral application.

The sprightly breast demands  
Incessant rapture; life, a tedious load,  
Denied its *continuity* of joy.

SHENSTONE.

#### TO CONTINUE, REMAIN, STAY.

CONTINUE, *v. Continual, perpetual*. REMAIN, in Latin *remaneo*, is compounded of *re* and *maneo*, Greek *μενω*, Hebrew *omad*, to tarry. STAY is but a variation of the word stand.

The idea of keeping to an object is common to these terms. To *continue* is associated with a state of action; to *remain* with a state of rest: we are said to *continue* to speak, walk, or do anything, to *continue* in action or motion; to *remain* stationary, or in a position.

Whatever you can do, *continue* to do.

JOHNSON.

Fesce made two attempts, and astonished the spectators by the time he *remained* under water.

BRYDENE.

So likewise in application to the outward condition or the state of mind, *continue* denotes that which is active and positive; *remain*, that which is quiescent and tranquil; to *continue* in a course, or