

in a belief; to *continue* steadfast; to *remain* in doubt.

I *continued* resolute in pressing it. TEMPLE.
Experience next to thee I owe,
Best guide, not following thee I had *remain'd*
In ignorance. MILTON.

The same distinction exists between these words when things are the subjects: a war *continues*; a stone *remains* in the place where it is put.

The serpent in Homer's second Iliad devoured eight young sparrows with their dam, which was by Calchas interpreted to signify that the siege of Troy should *continue* nine whole years.

POTTER.
They are building an enormous engine which they call St. Rosalia's triumphal car. From the size of it, one would imagine it were forever to *remain* on the spot where it is erected.

Continue is frequently taken absolutely for continuing in action; *remain*, from the particle *re*, has a relative signification to something else: the sickness or the rain *continues*; I will use my utmost endeavors as long as health *remains*.

Down rush'd the rain
Impetuous, and *continued* till the earth
No more was seen. MILTON.

I will be true to thee, preserve thee ever,
The sad companion of this faithful breast,
While life and thought *remain*. ROWE.

Continue and *remain* are used in respect of place; *stay* is used in that of connection only. *Continue* is indefinite in its application and signification; as to *continue* in town or in the country: to *remain* is an involuntary act; as a soldier *remains* at his post, or a person *remains* in prison: *stay* is a voluntary act; as to *stay* at a friend's, or with a friend.

I have seen some Roman Catholic authors who tell us that vicious writers *continue* in purgatory so long as the influence of their writings *continues* upon posterity. ADDISON.

Mr. Pryn was sent to a castle in the island of Jersey, Dr. Bastwick to Scilly, and Mr. Burton to Guernsey, where they *remained* unconsidered, and truly I thought unpitied (for they were men of no virtue or merit), for the space of two years. CLARENDON.

Where'er I go, my soul shall *stay* with thee;
'Tis but my shadow that I take away. DRYDEN.

TO CONTINUE, PERSEVERE, PERSIST,
PURSUE, PROSECUTE.

CONTINUE, *v. Continual*. PERSEVERE, in French *persévérer*, Latin *perseverare*, compounded of *per* and *severus*,

strict and steady, signifies to be steady throughout or to the end. PERSIST, in French *persister*, Latin *persisto*, compounded of *per* and *sisto* or *sto*, signifies to stand by or to a thing. PURSUE and PROSECUTE, in French *poursuivre*, come from the Latin *prosequor* and its participle *prosecutus*, signifying to follow after or keep on with.

The idea of not setting aside is common to these terms, which is the sense of *continue* without any qualification; the other terms, which are all species of *continuing*, include likewise some collateral idea which distinguishes them from the first, as well as from each other. *Continue* is comparable with *persevere* and *persist* in the neuter sense; with *pursue* and *prosecute* in the active sense. To *continue* is simply to do as one has done hitherto; to *persevere* is to *continue* without wishing to change, or from a positive desire to attain an object; to *persist* is to *continue* from a determination or will not to cease. The act of *continuing*, therefore, specifies no characteristic of the agent; that of *persevering* or *persisting* marks a direct temper of mind; the former is always used in a good sense, the latter in an indifferent or bad sense. We *continue* from habit or casualty; we *persevere* from reflection and the exercise of our judgment; we *persist* from attachment. It is not the most exalted virtue to *continue* in a good course merely because we have been in the habit of so doing; what is done from habit merely, without any fixed principle, is always exposed to change from the influence of passion or evil counsel: there is real virtue in the act of *perseverance*, without which many of our best intentions would remain unfulfilled, and our best plans would be defeated: those who do not *persevere* can do no essential good; and those who do *persevere* often effect what has appeared to be impracticable; of this truth the discoverer of America is a remarkable proof, who, in spite of every mortification, rebuff, and disappointment, *persevered* in calling the attention of monarchs to his project, until he at length obtained the assistance requisite for effecting the discovery of a new world.

Abdallah *continuing* to extend his former improvements, beautified this whole prospect with groves and fountains. ADDISON.

If we *persevere* in studying to do our duty toward God and man, we shall meet with the esteem, love, and confidence of those who are around us. BLAIR.

If they *persist* in pointing their batteries to (at) particular persons, no laws of war forbid the making reprisals. ADDISON.

The Romans have not observed this distinction between *perseverare* and *persistere*; for they say, "In errore *perseverare*." CICERO. "Ad ultimum *perseverare*." LIVY. "In eadem impudentia *persistere*." LIVY. "In proposito *persistere*." CICERO. Probably in imitation of them, examples are to be found in English writers of the use of *persevere* in the bad sense, and of *persist* in the good sense; but the distinction is now invariably observed. *Persevere* is employed only in matters of some moment, in things of sufficient importance to demand a steady purpose of the mind; *persist* may be employed in that which is trifling, if not bad: a learner *perseveres* in his studies, in order to arrive at the necessary degree of improvement; a child *persists* in making a request until he has obtained the object of his desire: there is always wisdom in *perseverance*, even though unsuccessful; there is mostly folly, caprice, or obstinacy, in *persistence*: how different the man who *perseveres* in the cultivation of his talents, from him who only *persists* in maintaining falsehoods or supporting errors!

Patience and *perseverance* overcome the greatest difficulties. RICHARDSON.

The Arians themselves, who were present, subscribed also (to the Nicene creed), not that they meant sincerely and in deed to forsake their error, but only to escape deprivation and exile, which they saw they could not avoid, openly *persisting* in their former opinions, when the greater part had concluded against them, and that with the emperor's royal assent. HOOKER.

Continue, when compared with *persevere* or *persist*, is always coupled with modes of action: but in comparison with *pursue* or *prosecute*, it is always followed by some object: we *continue* to do, *persevere* or *persist* in doing something: but we *continue*, *pursue*, or *prosecute* some object which we wish to bring to perfection by additional labor. *Continue* is equally indefinite as in the former case; *pursue* and *prosecute* both comprehend collateral ideas respecting the disposition of the agent, and the nature of the object: to

continue is to go on with a thing as it has been begun; to *pursue* and *prosecute* is to *continue* by some prescribed rule, or in some particular manner: a work is *continued*; a plan, measure, or line of conduct is *pursued*; an undertaking or a design is *prosecuted*: we may *continue* the work of another in order to supply a deficiency: we may *pursue* a plan that emanates either from ourselves or another; we *prosecute* our own work only in order to obtain some peculiar object: *continue*, therefore, expresses less than *pursue*, and this less than *prosecute*: the history of England has been *continued* down to the present period by different writers; Smollett has *pursued* the same plan as Hume, in the *continuation* of his history; Captain Cook *prosecuted* his work of discovery in three several voyages. To *continue* is itself altogether an indifferent action; to *pursue* and *prosecute* are commendable actions; the latter still more than the former: it is a mark of great instability not to *continue* anything that we begin; it betrays a great want of prudence and discernment not to *pursue* some plan on every occasion which requires method; it is the characteristic of a *persevering* mind to *prosecute* whatever it has deemed worthy to enter upon.

After having petitioned for power to resist temptation, there is so great an incongruity in not *continuing* the struggle, that we blush at the thought, and *persevere*, lest we lose all reverence for ourselves. HAWKSWORTH.

Look round the habitable world, how few
Know their own good, or knowing it, *pursue*. DRYDEN.

Will ye not now the pair of sages praise,
Who the same end *pursued* by several ways? DRYDEN.

There will be some study which every man more zealously *prosecutes*, some darling subject on which he is principally pleased to converse. JOHNSON.

CONTRACTED, CONFINED, NARROW.

THESE words agree in denoting a limited space; but CONTRACTED, from *contraho*, to draw together, signifying drawn into a smaller compass than it might otherwise be in, and CONFINED (*v. Bound*), signifying brought within unusually small bounds, are said of that which is made or becomes so by circumstances. NARROW, which is a variation of *near*, denotes a quality belonging

naturally or otherwise to a material body. A limb is said to be *contracted* which is drawn up by disease; a situation is *confined* which has not the necessary or usual degree of open space; a road or a room is *narrow*.

And yon bright arch
Contracted, bends into a dusky vault.

THOMSON.

The presence of every created being is *confined* to a certain measure of space, and consequently his observation is stinted to a certain number of objects.

ADDISON.

Each in his *narrow* cell forever laid,
The rude forefathers of the hamlet sleep.

GRAY.

These terms are figuratively applied to moral objects with the same distinction: the mind is *contracted* by education or habit; a person's views are *confined* by reason of his ignorance; people have for the most part a temper *narrow* by nature.

Notwithstanding a *narrow*, *contracted* temper be that which obtains most in the world, we must not, therefore, conclude this to be the genuine characteristic of mankind.

GROVE.

In its present habitation, the soul is plainly *confined* in its operations.

BLAIR.

Resentments are not easily dislodged from *narrow* minds.

CUMBERLAND.

TO CONTRADICT, DENY, OPPOSE.

CONTRADICT, from the Latin *contra* and *dictum*, signifies a speech against a speech. DENY, in French *dénier*, Latin *denego*, is compounded of *de*, *ne*, and *ago* or *dico*, and signifies to say no. OPPOSE, in French *opposer*, Latin *opposui*, perfect of *oppono*, from *op* or *ob* and *pono*, signifies to throw in the way or against a thing.

To *contradict*, as the origin of the word sufficiently denotes, is to set up one assertion against another, but it does not necessarily imply an intentional act. The *contradiction* may lie in the force of the terms, whence logicians call those propositions *contradictory* which in all their terms are directly opposed to each other: as, "All men are liars;" "No men are liars." A person may *contradict* himself, or two witnesses may *contradict* each other who have had no communication.

The Jews hold that in case two rabbies should *contradict* one another, they were yet bound to believe the *contradictory* assertions of both.

SOUTH.

To *deny* is to assert the falsehood of another's assertion, and is therefore a

direct and personal act; as to *deny* any one's statement.

When the parties come to a fact which is affirmed on one side and *denied* on the other, then they are said to be at issue.

BLACKSTONE.

Contradictions may be given at the pleasure or for the convenience of the parties; *denials* are made in support either of truth or falsehood, in matters of fact or matters of opinion.

There are many who find a pleasure in *contradicting* the common reports of fame, and spreading abroad the weaknesses of an exalted character.

ADDISON.

None *deny* that there is a God but those for whom it maketh that there were no God.

BACON.

One *contradicts* in direct terms by asserting something contrary; one *denies* by advancing arguments, or suggesting doubts or difficulties. These terms may therefore both be used in reference to disputations. We may *deny* the truth of a position by *contradicting* the assertions that are advanced in its support.

In the Socratic way of dispute, you agree to everything your opponent advances; in the Aristotelic, you are still *denying* and *contradicting* some part or other of what he says.

ADDISON.

Contradiction and *denial* are commonly performed by words only; *opposition* by any kind of action or mode of expression. We may therefore sometimes *oppose* by *contradiction*, although not properly by *denial*; *contradicting* and *opposing* being both voluntary acts, *denying* frequently a matter of necessity or for self-defence.

Johnson considered Garrick to be as it were his property; he would allow no man either to blame or praise Garrick without *contradicting* him.

SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS.

One of the company began to rally him (an infidel) upon his devotion on shipboard, which the other *denied* in so high terms that it produced the lie on both sides, and ended in a duel.

ADDISON.

The introduction of the bill may be *opposed*, as the bill itself may at either of the readings.

BLACKSTONE.

TO CONTRIVE, DEVISE, INVENT.

CONTRIVE, in French *controuwer*, compounded of *con* and *trouwer*, signifies to find out by putting together. DEVISE, compounded of *de* and *visé*, in Latin *visus*, seen, signifies to show or present to the mind. INVENT, in Latin *in-*

ventus, participle of *invenio*, compounded of *in* and *venio*, signifies to come or bring into the mind.

Contriving requires less exercise of the thoughts than *devising*: we *contrive* on familiar and common occasions; we *devise* in seasons of difficulty and trial. A *contrivance* is simple and obvious to a plain understanding; a *device* is complex and far-fetched; it requires a ready conception and a degree of art. *Contrivances* serve to supply a deficiency, or increase a convenience; *devices* are employed to extricate from danger, to remove an evil, or forward a scheme: the history of Robinson Crusoe derives considerable interest from the relation of the various *contrivances* by which he provided himself with the first articles of necessity and comfort; the history of robbers and adventurers is full of the various *devices* by which they endeavor to carry on their projects of plunder, or elude the vigilance of their pursuers.

In a word, what was said of Cinna might well be applied to him. He had a head to *contrive*, and a tongue to persuade, and a hand to execute any mischief.

CLARENDON.

As I have long lived in Kent, and there often heard how the Kentish men evaded the conqueror by carrying green boughs over their heads, it put me in mind of practising this *device* against Mr. Simper.

STEELE.

To *contrive* and *devise* do not express so much as to *invent*: we *contrive* and *devise* in small matters; we *invent* in those of greater moment. *Contriving* and *devising* respect the manner of doing things; *inventing* comprehends the action and the thing itself; the former are but the new fashioning of things that already exist; the latter is, as it were, the creation of something new: to *contrive* and *devise* are intentional actions, the result of a specific effort; *invention* naturally arises from the exertion of an inherent power: we require thought and combination to *contrive* or *devise*; ingenuity is the faculty which is exerted in *inventing*. A *device* is often employed for bad and fraudulent purposes; *contrivances* mostly serve the innocent purposes of life; *inventions* are mostly good, unless they are stories *invented*, which are always false.

My sentence is for open war: of wiles

More unexpert I boast not; them let those

Contrive who need, or when they need, not now.

MILTON.

The briskest nectar

Shall be his drink, and all th' ambrosial cates

Art can *devise* for wanton appetite

Furnish his banquet.

NABB.

Architecture, painting, and statuary were *invented* with the design to lift up human nature.

ADDISON.

TO CONTROVERT, DISPUTE.

CONTROVERT, compounded of the Latin *contra* and *verto*, signifies to turn against another in discourse, or direct one's self against another. DISPUTE, *v. To argue, debate.*

To *controvert* has regard to speculative points; to *dispute* respects matters of fact: there is more of opposition in *controvert*; more of doubt in *disputing*: a *sophist controverts*; a *sceptic disputes*: the plainest and sublimest truths of the Gospel have been all *controverted* in their turn by the self-sufficient inquirer: the authenticity of the Bible itself has been *disputed* by some few individuals: the existence of a God by still fewer. *Controversy* is worse than an unprofitable task; instead of eliciting truth, it does but expose the failings of the parties engaged: *disputing* is not so personal, and consequently not so objectionable: we never *controvert* any point without seriously and decidedly intending to oppose the notions of another; we may sometimes *dispute* a point for the sake of friendly argument, or the desire of information: theologians and politicians are the greatest *controversialists*: it is the business of men in general to *dispute* whatever ought not to be taken for granted.

The demolishing of Dunkirk was so eagerly insisted on, and so warmly *controverted*, as had like to have produced a challenge.

BUDGE.

Avoid *disputes* as much as possible.

BUDGE.

CONTUMACY, REBELLION.

CONTUMACY, from the Latin *contumax*, compounded of *contra* and *tumeo*, to swell, signifies the swelling one's self up by way of resistance. REBELLION, in Latin *rebellio*, from *rebellio* or *re* and *bello*, to war in return, signifies carrying on war against those to whom we owe, and have before paid, a lawful subjection.

Resistance to lawful authority is the

common idea included in the signification of both these terms, but *contumacy* does not express so much as *rebellion*: the *contumacious* resist only occasionally; the *rebel* resists systematically: the *contumacious* stand only on certain points, and oppose the individual; the *rebel* sets himself up against the authority itself: the *contumacious* thwart and contradict, they never resort to open violence; the *rebel* acts only by main force; *contumacy* shelters itself under the plea of equity and justice; *rebellion* sets all law and order at defiance.

The censor told the criminal that he spoke in contempt of the court, and that he should be proceeded against for *contumacy*. ADDISON.

The mother of Waller was the daughter of John Hampden, of Hampden, in the same county, and sister to Hampden, the zealot of *rebellion*. JOHNSON.

CONVENIENT, SUITABLE.

CONVENIENT, *v. Commodious*. SUITABLE, *v. Conformable*.

Convenient regards the circumstances of the individual; *suitable* respects the established opinions of mankind, and is closely connected with moral propriety: nothing is *convenient* which does not favor one's purpose: nothing is *suitable* which does not suit the person, place, and thing: whoever has anything to ask of another must take a *convenient* opportunity in order to insure success; his address on such an occasion would be very *unsuitable* if he affected to claim as a right what he ought to solicit as a favor.

If any man think it *convenient* to seem good, let him be so indeed, and then his goodness will appear to everybody's satisfaction. TILLOTSON.

Pleasure in general is the consequent apprehension of a *suitable* object, *suitably* applied to a rightly disposed faculty. SOUTH.

CONVERSANT, FAMILIAR.

CONVERSANT, from *converse*, signifies turning over and over, consequently becoming acquainted. FAMILIAR, from the Latin *familiaris*, to be of the same family, signifies the closest connection.

An acquaintance with things is implied in both these terms, but the latter expresses something more particular than the former. A person is *conversant* in matters that come frequently before his notice; he is *familiar* with such as form

the daily routine of his business: one who is not a professed lawyer may be *conversant* with the questions of law which occur on ordinary occasions; but one who is skilled in his profession will be *familiar* with all cases which may possibly be employed in support of a cause: it is advisable to be *conversant* with the ways of the world; but to be *familiar* with the greater part of them would not redound to one's credit or advantage.

The waking man is *conversant* with the world of nature: when he sleeps, he retires to a private world that is particular to himself. ADDISON.

Groves, fields, and meadows are at any season of the year pleasant to look upon, but never so much as in the opening of the spring, when they are all new and fresh with the first gloss of them, and not yet too *familiar* to the eye. ADDISON.

CONVERSATION, DIALOGUE, CONFERENCE, COLLOQUY.

CONVERSATION denotes the act of holding *converse* (*v. Communion*). DIALOGUE, in French *dialogue*, Latin *dialogus*, Greek *διαλογος*, compounded of *δις* and *λογος*, signifies a speech between two. CONFERENCE, from the Latin *con* and *fero*, to put together, signifies consulting together on subjects. COLLOQUY, in Latin *colloquium*, from *col* or *con* and *loquor*, to speak, signifies the art of talking together.

A *conversation* is always something actually held between two or more persons; a *dialogue* is mostly fictitious, and written as if spoken: any number of persons may take part in a *conversation*, but a *dialogue* always refers to the two persons who are expressly engaged: a *conversation* may be desultory, in which each takes his part at pleasure; a *dialogue* is formal, in which there will always be reply and rejoinder: a *conversation* may be carried on by any signs besides words, which are addressed personally to the individual present; a *dialogue* must always consist of express words: a prince holds frequent *conversations* with his ministers on affairs of state; Cicero wrote *dialogues* on the nature of the gods, and many later writers have adopted the *dialogue* form as a vehicle for conveying their sentiments: a *conference* is a species of *conversation*; a *colloquy* is a species of *dialogue*: a *conversation* is indefinite as to the subject, or the parties engaged in it; a *conference* is confined to

particular subjects and descriptions of persons: a *conversation* is mostly occasional; a *conference* is always specifically appointed: a *conversation* is mostly on indifferent matters; a *conference* is mostly on national or public concerns: we have a *conversation* as friends; we have a *conference* as ministers of state. The *dialogue* naturally limits the number to two; the *colloquy* is indefinite as to number: there may be *dialogues*, therefore, which are not *colloquies*; but every *colloquy* may be denominated a *dialogue*.

I find so much Arabic and Persian to read, that all my leisure in a morning is hardly sufficient for a thousandth part of the reading that would be agreeable and useful, as I wish to be a match in *conversation* with the learned natives whom I happen to meet. SIR W. JONES.

Aurengzebe is written in rhyme, and has the appearance of being the most elaborate of all Dryden's plays. The personages are imperial, but the *dialogue* is often domestic, and therefore susceptible of sentiments accommodated to familiar incidents. JOHNSON.

The *conference* between Gabriel and Satan abounds with sentiments proper for the occasion, and suitable to the persons of the two speakers. ADDISON.

The close of this divine *colloquy* (between the Father and the Son), with the hymn of Angels that follows, are wonderfully beautiful and poetical. ADDISON.

CONVERT, PROSELYTE.

CONVERT, from the Latin *convertio*, signifies changed to something in conformity with the views of another. PROSELYTE, from the Greek *προσηλυτος* and *προσερχομαι*, signifies come over to the side of another.

Convert is more extensive in its sense and application than *proselyte*: *convert* in its full sense includes every change of opinion, without respect to the subject; *proselyte*, in its original application, denoted changes only from one religious belief to another: there are many *converts* to particular doctrines of Christianity, and *proselytes* from the Pagan, Jewish, or Mohammedan, to the Christian faith; but the word *proselyte* has since acquired an application which distinguishes it from *convert*. *Conversion* is a more voluntary act than *proselytism*; it emanates entirely from the mind of the agent, independently of foreign influence; it extends not merely to the abstract or speculative opinions of the individual, but to the

whole current of his feelings and spring of his actions; it is the *conversion* of the heart and soul. *Proselytism* is an outward act, which need not extend beyond the conformity of one's words and actions to a certain rule: *convert* is therefore always taken in a good sense; it bears on the face of it the stamp of sincerity: *proselyte* is a term of more ambiguous meaning; the *proselyte* is often the creature and tool of a party: there may be many *proselytes* where there are no *converts*. The *conversion* of a sinner is the work of God's grace, either by his special interposition, or by the ordinary influence of his Holy Word on the heart; partisans are always anxious to make *proselytes* to their own party.

A believer may be excused by the most hardened atheist for endeavoring to make him a *convert*, because he does it with an eye to both their interests. ADDISON.

False teachers commonly make use of base, and low, and temporal considerations, of little tricks and devices, to make disciples and gain *proselytes*. TILLOTSON.

TO CONVICT, DETECT.

CONVICT, from the Latin *convictus*, participle of *convincio*, to make manifest, signifies to make guilt clear. DETECT, from the Latin *detectus*, participle of *detego*, compounded of the privative *de* and *tego*, to cover, signifies to uncover or lay open guilt.

A person is *convicted* by means of evidence; he is *detected* by means of ocular demonstration. One is *convicted* of having been the perpetrator of some evil deed; one is *detected* in the very act of committing the deed. Whatever serves to prove the guilt of another is said to *convict*, whether the *conviction* be by others or by one's self: a man may be *convicted* in his own mind, as well as in the opinion of others, before a public tribunal or by private individuals; *detection* is confined to the act of the individual, which is laid open to others.

Advice is offensive, not because it lays us open to unexpected regret, or *convicts* us of any fault which had escaped our notice, but because it shows us that we are known to others as well as ourselves. JOHNSON.

Every member of society feels and acknowledges the necessity of *detecting* crimes. JOHNSON.

TO CONVICT, CONVINC, PERSUADE.

To CONVICT (*v. To convict*) is to satisfy a person of another's guilt or error. To CONVINC is to satisfy the person himself of the truth or falsehood of a thing.

A person may be *convicted* of heresy, if it be proved to the satisfaction of others; he may be *convinced* that the opinion which he has held is heretical. So a person may be *convicted* who is involuntarily *convinced* of his error, but he is *convinced* if he is made sensible of his error without any force on his own mind. One is *convicted* only of that which is false or bad, but one is *convinced* of that which is true as well as that which is false. The noun *conviction* is used in both the senses of *convict* and *convince*.

When the Apostle, therefore, requireth ability to *convict* heretics, can we think he judgeth it unlawful and not rather needful to use the principal instrument of their *conviction*, the light of reason?

HOOKER.

All my evasions vain,
And reasonings, though through mazes, lead me still
But to my own *conviction*.

MILTON.

What *convince*s binds; what *persuades* attracts. We are *convinced* by arguments; it is the understanding which determines: we are *persuaded* by entreaties and personal influence; it is the imagination or will which decides. Our *conviction* respects solely matters of belief or faith; our *persuasion* respects matters of belief or practice: we are *convinced* that a thing is true or false; we are *persuaded* that it is either right or wrong, advantageous or the contrary. A person will have half effected a thing who is *convinced* that it is in his power to effect it; he will be easily *persuaded* to do that which favors his own interests.

He (the critic) must endeavor to *convince* the world that their favorite authors have more faults than they are aware of, and such as they have never suspected.

COWPER.

I should be glad if I could *persuade* him to write such another critique on anything of mine; for when he condemns any of my poems, he makes the world have a better opinion of them.

DRYDEN.

Conviction respects our most important duties; *persuasion* is applied to matters of indifference, or of temporary personal interest. The first step to true re-

pentance is a thorough *conviction* of the enormity of sin. The cure of people's maladies is sometimes promoted to a surprising degree by their *persuasion* of the efficacy of the remedy.

Their wisdom is only of this world, to put false colors upon things, to call good evil and evil good, against the *conviction* of their own consciences.

SWIFT.

From this period he considered his case as without cure, feeling those symptoms of internal decay which he was satisfied were beyond the reach of medicine: in this *persuasion* he even apologized to his physician for the fruitless trouble he was giving him.

CUMBERLAND.

As *conviction* is the effect of substantial evidence, it is solid and permanent in its nature; it cannot be so easily changed and deceived: *persuasion*, depending on our feelings, is influenced by external objects, and exposed to various changes; it may vary both in the degree and in the object. *Conviction* answers in our minds to positive certainty; *persuasion* answers to probability. We ought to be *convinced* of the propriety of avoiding everything which can interfere with the good order of society; we may be *persuaded* of the truth of a person's narrative or not, according to the representation made to us; we may be *persuaded* to pursue any study or lay it aside.

When men have settled in themselves a *conviction* that there is nothing honorable which is not accompanied with innocence; nothing mean but what has guilt in it; riches, pleasures, and honors will easily lose their charms, if they stand between us and our integrity.

STEELE.

Let the mind be possessed with the *persuasion* of immortal happiness annexed to the act, and there will be no want of candidates to struggle for the glorious prerogative.

CUMBERLAND.

CONVIVIAL, SOCIAL.

CONVIVIAL, in Latin *convivialis*, from *convivo*, to live together, signifies being entertained together. SOCIAL, from *socius*, a companion, signifies pertaining to company.

The prominent idea in *convivial* is that of sensual indulgence; the prominent idea in *social* is that of enjoyment from an intercourse with society. *Convivial* is a species of the *social*; it is the *social* in matters of festivity. What is *convivial* is *social*, but what is *social* is something more; the former is excelled by the latter as much as the body is excelled by

the mind. We speak of *convivial* meetings, *convivial* enjoyments, or the *convivial* board; but *social* intercourse, *social* pleasure, *social* amusements, and the like.

It is related by Carte, of the Duke of Ormond, that he used often to pass a night with Dryden, and those with whom Dryden consorted: who they were Carte has not told, but certainly the *convivial* table at which Ormond sat was not surrounded with a plebeian society.

JOHNSON.

Plato and Socrates shared many *social* hours with Aristophanes.

CUMBERLAND.

COOL, COLD, FRIGID.

IN the natural sense, COOL is simply the absence of warmth; COLD and FRIGID are positively contrary to warmth; the former in regard to objects in general, the latter to moral objects: in the figurative sense the analogy is strictly preserved. *Cool* is used as it respects the passions and the affections; *cool* only with regard to the affections; *frigid* only in regard to the inclinations. With regard to the passions, *cool* designates a freedom from agitation, which is a desirable quality. *Coolness* in a time of danger, and *coolness* in an argument, are alike commendable. As *cool* and *cold* respect the affections, the *cool* is opposed to the friendly, the *cold* to the warm-hearted, the *frigid* to the animated; the former is but a degree of the latter. A reception is said to be *cool*; an embrace to be *cold*; a sentiment *frigid*. *Coolness* is an enemy to social enjoyments; *coldness* is an enemy to affection; *frigidity* destroys all force of character. *Coolness* is engendered by circumstances; it supposes the previous existence of warmth; *coldness* lies often in the temperament, or is engendered by habit; it is always something vicious; *frigidity* is occasional, and is always a defect. Trifling differences produce *coolness* sometimes between the best friends: trade sometimes engenders a *cold* calculating temper in some minds: those who are remarkable for apathy will often express themselves with *frigid* indifference on the most important subjects.

The jealous man's disease is of so malignant a nature that it converts all it takes into its own nourishment. A *cool* behavior is interpreted as an instance of aversion; a fond one raises his suspicions.

ADDISON.

It is wondrous that a man can get over the natural existence and possession of his own mind,

so far as to take delight either in paying or receiving *cold* and repeated civilities.

STEELE.

The religion of the moderns abounds in topics so incomparably noble and exalted, as might kindle the flames of genuine oratory in the most *frigid* and barren genius.

WHARTON.

TO COPY, TRANSCRIBE.

COPY, like the Latin *capio*, is probably derived from *capio*, to take, in the sense of taking one thing from another, or taking the likeness of a thing. TRANSCRIBE, in Latin *transcribo*, that is, *trans*, over, and *scribo*, to write, signifies literally to write over from something else, to make to pass over in writing from one paper or substance to the other.

To *copy* respects the matter; to *transcribe* respects simply the act of writing. What is *copied* must be taken immediately from the original, with which it must exactly correspond; what is *transcribed* may be taken from the *copy*, but not necessarily in an entire state. Things are *copied* for the sake of getting the contents; they are often *transcribed* for the sake of clearness and fair writing. A *copier* should be very exact; a *transcriber* should be a good writer. Lawyers *copy* deeds, and have them afterward frequently *transcribed* as occasion requires.

Aristotle tells us that the world is a *copy* or *transcript* of those ideas which are in the mind of the First Being, and that those ideas which are in the mind of man are a *transcript* of the world. To this we may add that words are the *transcript* of those ideas which are in the mind of man, and that writing or printing is the *transcript* of words.

ADDISON.

COPY, MODEL, PATTERN, SPECIMEN.

COPY, from the verb to *copy* (*v. To copy*), marks either the thing from which we *copy* or the thing *copied*. MODEL, in French *modèle*, Latin *modulus*, a little mode or measure, signifies the thing that serves as a measure, or that is made after a measure. PATTERN, which is a variation of *patron*, from the Latin *patronus*, signifies the thing that directs. SPECIMEN, in Latin *specimen*, from *specio*, to behold, signifies what is looked at for the purpose of forming one's judgment by it.

A *copy* and a *model* imply either that which is *copied* or taken from something, as when we speak of a *copy* in distine

tion from an original, and of making a *model* of anything:

When he first asked the elector's leave for students to *copy* the pictures in the gallery, the prince refused; and the reason he assigned was, that those *copies* would be sold for originals.

SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS.

The general officer received us immediately with his usual civility, and showed us his topographical representation of the most mountainous part of Switzerland, which well deserves the accurate attention of the curious traveller. It is a *model* in relief.

COXE.

Or they imply that from which anything is *copied* or taken, as to follow a *copy*, to choose a *model*.

I shall desire, as I send it in, two guineas for a sheet of *copy*.

JOHNSON.

Of these he chose five for his *models*, and moulding all the perfections of these beauties into one, he composed the picture of his goddess.

BRYDENE.

The term *copy* is applied to that which is delineated, as writings or pictures, which must be taken faithfully and literally; the *model* to that which may be represented in wood or stone, and which serves as a guide.

Let him first learn to write, after a *copy*, all the letters in the vulgar alphabet.

HOLDER.

A fault it should be if some king should build his mansion-house by the *model* of Solomon's temple.

HOOKE.

In application to other objects, a *copy* may be either that which is made or done in imitation, or it may be that which is imitated.

Longinus has observed that the description of love in Sappho is an exact *copy* of nature, and that all the circumstances which follow one another in such a hurry of sentiments, notwithstanding they appear repugnant to each other, are really such as happen in the frenzies of love.

ADDISON.

Be *copy* now to men of grosser blood,
And teach them how to war.

SHAKESPEARE.

A *model* is that which may be used as a guide or rule.

Socrates recommends to Alcibiades, as the *model* of his devotions, a short prayer which a Greek poet composed for the use of his friends.

ADDISON.

Pattern and *specimen* serve, like the *model*, to guide or regulate, but differ in the nature of the objects; the *pattern* regards solely the outward form or color of anything that is made or manufact-

ured, as the *pattern* of a carpet; a person fixes on having a thing according to a certain *pattern*; the *specimen* is any portion of a material which serves to show the quality of that of which it forms a part, as the *specimen* of a printed work; the value of things is estimated by the *specimen*.

A gentleman sends to my shop for a *pattern* of stuff, he compares the *pattern* with the piece, and probably we bargain.

SWIFT.

Several persons have exhibited *specimens* of this art before multitudes of beholders.

ADDISON.

In the moral application *pattern* respects the whole conduct or behavior which may deserve imitation; *specimen* only the detached parts by which a judgment may be formed of the whole: the female who devotes her whole time and attention to the management of her family, and the education of her offspring, is a *pattern* to those of her sex who depute the whole concern to others. A person gives but an unfortunate *specimen* of his boasted sincerity who is found guilty of an evasion.

Xenophon, in the life of his imaginary prince, whom he describes as a *pattern* for real ones, is always celebrating the philanthropy or good-nature of his hero.

ADDISON.

We know nothing of the scanty jargon of our barbarous ancestors; but we have *specimens* of our language when it began to be adapted to civil and religious purposes, and find it such as might naturally be expected, artless and simple.

JOHNSON.

COQUET, JILT.

THERE are many JILTS who become so from COQUETS, but one may be a *coquet* without being a *jilt*. *Coquetry* is contented with employing little arts to excite notice; *jilting* extends to the violation of truth and honor, in order to awaken a passion which it afterward disappoints. Vanity is the main spring by which *coquets* and *jilts* are impelled to action; but the former indulges her propensity mostly at her own expense only, while the latter does no less injury to the peace of others than she does to her own reputation. The *coquet* makes a traffic of her own charms by seeking a multitude of admirers; the *jilt* sports with the sacred passion of love, and barter it for the gratification of any selfish propensity. *Coquetry* is a fault which

should be guarded against by every female as a snare to her own happiness; *jilting* is a vice which cannot be practised without some depravity of the heart.

The *coquet* is indeed one degree toward the *jilt*; but the heart of the former is bent upon admiring herself, and giving false hopes to her lovers: the latter is not contented to be extremely amiable, but she must add to that advantage a certain delight in being a torment to others.

STEELE.

CORNER, ANGLE.

CORNER answers to the French *coin* and Greek *γωνία*, which signifies either a *corner* or a hidden place. ANGLE, in Latin *angulus*, comes in all probability from *αγκων*, the elbow.

Corner properly implies the outer extreme point of any solid body; *angle*, on the contrary, the inner extremity produced by the meeting of two right lines, or plane surfaces. When speaking, therefore, of solid bodies, *corner* and *angle* may be both employed; but in regard to simple right lines, or plane surfaces, the word *angle* only is applicable: in the former case a *corner* is produced by the meeting of the different parts of a body, whether inwardly or outwardly; but an *angle* is produced by the meeting of two bodies; inwardly one house has many *corners*; two houses, or two walls at least, are requisite to make an *angle*.

A bed was prepared for them in the *corner* of the room.

GOLDSMITH.

Jewellers grind their diamonds with many sides and *angles*, that their lustre may appear many ways.

DERHAM.

We likewise speak of a body making an *angle* by the direction which it takes, because such a course is equivalent to a right line; in that case the word *corner* could not be substituted.

The arms of the cross, taking a new direction, make a right *angle* with the beam.

BURKE.

On the other hand, the word *corner* is often used for a place of secrecy or obscurity, agreeably to the derivation of the term.

Some men, like pictures, are fitter for a *corner* than for a full light.

POPE.

CORPORAL, CORPOREAL, BODILY.

CORPORAL, CORPOREAL, and BODILY, as their origin bespeaks, have all

relation to the same object, the *body*; but the two former are employed to signify relating or appertaining to the *body*, the latter to denote containing or forming part of the *body*. Hence we say *corporal* punishment, *bodily* vigor or strength, *corporeal* substances; the God-head *bodily*, the *corporeal* frame, *bodily* exertion. *Corporal* is only employed for the animal frame in its proper sense; *corporeal* is used for animal substance in an extended sense; hence we speak of *corporal* sufferance and *corporeal* agents. *Corporeal* is distinguished from spiritual; *bodily* from mental. It is impossible to represent spiritual beings any other way than under a *corporeal* form; *bodily* pains, however severe, are frequently overpowered by mental pleasures.

Bettesworth was so little satisfied with this account, that he publicly professed his resolution of a violent and *corporeal* revenge, but the inhabitants of St. Patrick's district embodied themselves in the Dean's (Swift's) defence.

JOHNSON.

When the soul is freed from all *corporeal* alliance, then it truly exists.

HUGHES.

The soul is beset with a numerous train of temptations to evil, which arise from *bodily* appetites.

BLAIR.

CORPOREAL, MATERIAL.

CORPOREAL is properly a species of MATERIAL; whatever is *corporeal* is *material*, but not *vice versa*. *Corporeal* respects animate bodies; *material* is used for everything which can act on the senses, animate or inanimate. The world contains *corporeal* beings, and consists of *material* substances.

Grant that *corporeal* is the human mind,
It must have parts in infinitum join'd;
And each of these must will, perceive, design,
And draw confus'dly in a diff'rent line.

JENYNS.

In the present *material* system in which we live, and where the objects that surround us are continually exposed to the examination of our senses, how many things occur that are mysterious and unaccountable!

BLAIR.

CORPULENT, STOUT, LUSTY.

CORPULENT, from *corpus*, the body, signifies having fullness of body. STOUT, in Dutch *stott*, is no doubt a variation of the German *stättig*, steady, signifying able to stand, solid, firm. LUSTY, in German, etc., *lustig*, merry, cheerful, implies here a vigorous state of body.

Corpulent respects the fleshy state of

the body; *stout* respects also the state of the muscles and bones: *corpulence* is therefore an incidental property; *stoutness* is a natural property: *corpulence* may come upon us according to circumstances; *stoutness* is the natural make of the body which is born with us. *Corpulence* and *lustiness* are both occasioned by the state of the health; but the former may arise from disease, the latter is always the consequence of good health: *corpulence* consists of an undue proportion of fat; *lustiness* consists of a due and full proportion of all the solids in the body.

Mallet's stature was diminutive, but he was regularly formed; his appearance, till he grew *corpulent*, was agreeable, and he suffered it to want no recommendation that dress could give it.

Though I look old, yet I am strong and *lusty*,
For in my youth I never did apply
Hot and rebellious liquors to my blood.

Hence rose the Marsian and Sabellian race,
Strong limb'd and *stout*, and to the wars inclin'd.

TO CORRECT, RECTIFY, REFORM.

CORRECT (*v. To amend*) is more definite in its meaning, and more general in its application, than **RECTIFY**, which, from *rectus* and *facio*, signifies simply to make right, or as it should be.

To *correct* is an act of necessity or discretion; to *rectify*, an act of discretion only. What is *corrected* is substantially faulty; what is *rectified* may be faulty by accident or from inadvertence. Faults in the execution are *corrected*; mistakes are *rectified*.

I would not be thought to oppose the use of a painter's being readily able to express his ideas by sketching. The further he can carry such designs the better. The evil to be apprehended is his resting there, and not *correcting* them afterwards.

Some had read the manuscript, and *rectified* the inaccuracies.

They may likewise be applied to moral objects with a like distinction.

I last winter erected a court of justice for the *correcting* several enormities in dress and behavior.

A man has frequent opportunities of mitigating the fierceness of a party, of softening the envious, quieting the angry, and *rectifying* the prejudiced.

To **REFORM**, from *re*, again, and *form*, signifies to form again, or put into a new form; it expresses, therefore, more than *correct*, which removes that which is faulty in a thing without altering the thing itself. *Correction* may produce only a partial change, but what is *reformed* assumes a new form and becomes a new thing.

Desire is *corrected* when there is a tenderness or admiration expressed which partakes of the passion. Licentious language has something brutal in it which disgraces humanity.

Indolence is one of those vices from which those whom it infects are seldom *reformed*.

They are employed also in respect to public matters with a like distinction: abuses are *corrected*, the state is *reformed*.

As *abuses* might be corrected, as every crime of persons does not infer a forfeiture with regard to communities, and as property, in that dark age, was not discovered to be a creature of prejudice, all those *abuses* were hardly thought sufficient ground for such a confiscation.

Edward and Henry, now the boast of fame,
And virtuous Alfred, a more sacred name,
After a life of generous toils endur'd,
The Gaius subdued or property secur'd,
Ambition humbled, mighty cities storm'd,
Or laws establish'd and the world *reform'd*.

CORRECT, ACCURATE.

CORRECT is equivalent to *corrected* (*v. To amend*), or set to rights. **ACCURATE** (*v. Accurate*) signifies done with care, or by the application of care. *Correct* applies to that which is done according to rules which either a man prescribes to himself or are prescribed for him; *accurate* to that which is done by the application of the mind or attention to an object: the result in both cases will be nearly the same; namely, that the thing will be as it ought or is intended to be, but there is a shade of difference in the meaning and application. What is done by the exercise of the judgment is said to be *correct*, as a *correct* style, a *correct* writer, a *correct* way of thinking; what is done by the effort of the individual is more properly *accurate*, as *accurate* observations, an *accurate* survey, and the like.

Sallust, the most elegant and *correct* of all the Latin historians, observes that in his time, when the most formidable states of the world were subdued by the Romans, the republic sunk into those two opposite vices of a quite different nature, luxury and avarice.

Those ancients who were the most *accurate* in their remarks on the genius and temper of mankind, have with great exactness allotted inclinations and objects of desire to every stage of life.

When applied to the same objects, *correct* is negative, it is opposed to *incorrect* or faulty; *accurate* is positive, it is opposed to *inaccurate* or loose: it is sufficient to be free from fault to be *correct*; it must contain every minute particular to be *accurate*: information is *correct* which contains nothing but facts; it is *accurate* when it contains all the details of dates, persons, and circumstances given *accurately*.

Exact disposition, just thought, *correct* elocution, polished numbers, may have been found in a thousand, but this poetical fire (in Homer), this *eivida vis animi*, in a very few.

Ingenious curiosity, and perhaps, too, the necessary investigation of her claims to the baronies of the family, led her to compile their history, an industrious and diffuse, although not always an *accurate* work.

CORRECTION, DISCIPLINE, PUNISHMENT.

As **CORRECTION** and **DISCIPLINE** have commonly required **PUNISHMENT** to render them efficacious, custom has affixed to them a strong resemblance in their application, although they are distinguished from each other by obvious marks of difference. The prominent idea in *correction* (*v. To correct*) is that of making right what has been wrong. In *discipline*, from the Latin *disciplina* and *disco*, to learn, the leading idea is that of instructing or regulating. In *punishment*, from the Latin *punio*, and the Greek *πεινη*, pain, the leading idea is that of inflicting pain.

We remove an evil by *correction*; we prevent it by *discipline*. *Correction* extends no further than to the *correcting* of particular faults; but *discipline* serves to train, guide, and instruct generally.

Yet what can satire, grave or gay?
It may *correct* a foible, may chastise
The freaks of fashion, regulate the dress.

The imaginations of young men are of a roving nature, and their passions under no *discipline* or restraint.

When *correction* and *discipline* are taken in the sense of *punishment*, they mean

punishment for the purpose of *correction* and *discipline*: *punishment*, on the other hand, means the infliction of pain as the consequence of any particular conduct. *Correction* and *discipline* are personal acts, and mostly acts of authority. A parent inflicts *correction*, a master exercises *discipline*: *punishment* may either be inflicted by persons or result from things: the want of proper *discipline* may be *punished* by insubordination.

There was once that virtue in this commonwealth, that a bad citizen was thought to deserve a severer *correction* than the bitterest enemy.

All evils natural are moral goods,
All *discipline* indulgence on the whole.

When by just vengeance implous mortals perish,
The gods behold their *punishment* with pleasure.

CORRESPONDENT, ANSWERABLE, SUITABLE.

CORRESPONDENT, in French *correspondant*, from the Latin *cum* and *respondeo*, to answer in unison or in uniformity. **ANSWERABLE** and **SUITABLE**, from *answer* and *suit*, mark the quality or capacity of *answering* or *suiting*. *Correspondent* supposes a greater agreement than *answerable*, and *answerable* requires a greater agreement than *suitable*. Things that *correspond* must be alike in size, shape, color, and every minute particular; those that *answer* must be fitted for the same purpose; those that *suit* must have nothing disproportionate or discordant. In the artificial dispositions of furniture, or all matters of art and ornament, it is of considerable importance to have some things made to *correspond*, so that they be placed in *suitable* directions to *answer* to each other.

In the moral application, actions are said not to *correspond* with professions; the success of an undertaking does not *answer* the expectation; particular measures do not *suit* the purpose of individuals. It ill *corresponds* with a profession of friendship to refuse assistance to a friend in the time of need; wild schemes undertaken without thought will never *answer* the expectations of the projectors; it never *suits* the purpose of the selfish and greedy to contribute to the relief of the necessitous.

As the attractive power in bodies is the most universal principle which produceth innumerable effects, so the *corresponding* social appetite in human souls is the great spring and source of moral actions.

BERKELEY.

All the features of the face and tones of the voice *answer* like strings upon musical instruments to the impressions made on them by the mind.

HUGHES.

When we consider the infinite power and wisdom of the Maker, we have reason to think that it is *suitable* to the magnificent harmony of the universe that the species of creatures should also by gentle degrees ascend upward from us.

ADDISON.

COST, EXPENSE, PRICE, CHARGE.

COST, in German, etc., *kost* or *kosten*, signifies originally support, and, in an extended sense, what is given for support. EXPENSE is compounded of *ex* and *pense*, in Latin *pensus*, participle of *pendo*, to pay, signifying the thing paid or given out. PRICE, from the Latin *pretium*, and the Greek *πρωτιον*, from *πρασσω*, to sell, signifies the thing given for what is bought. CHARGE, from *charge* (*v. To accuse*), signifies the thing laid on as a charge.

The *cost* is what a thing *costs*, or what is to be laid out for it; the *expense* is that which a person actually lays out; the *price* is that which a thing may fetch or which it may be worth; the *charge* is that which a person or thing is *charged* with. As a *cost* commonly comprehends an *expense*, the terms are on various occasions used indifferently for each other: we speak of counting the *cost* or counting the *expense* of doing anything; at a great *cost* or at a great *expense*: on the other hand, of doing a thing to one's *cost*, of growing wise at other people's *expense*. The *cost* and the *price* have respect to the thing and its supposed value; the *expense* and the *charge* depend on the option of the persons. The *cost* of a thing must precede the *price*, and the *expense* must succeed the *charge*: we can never set a *price* on anything until we have ascertained what it has *cost* us; nor can we know or defray the *expense* until the *charge* be made. There may, however, frequently be a *price* where there is no *cost*, and *vice versa*: there may also be an *expense* where there is no *charge*; but there cannot be a *charge* without an *expense*: what *costs* nothing sometimes fetches a high *price*; and other things cannot obtain a price equal to the first *cost*. *Expenses*

vary with modes of living and men's desires; whoever wants much, or wants that which is not easily obtained, will have many *expenses* to defray; when the *charges* are exorbitant, the *expenses* must necessarily bear a proportion.

The real patriot bears his private wrongs, Rather than right them at the public *cost*.

BELLER.

What else do we learn from this note? That the more *expense* is incurred by a nation, the more money will be required to defray it.

BURKE.

He that saw His patrimonial timber cast its leaf, Sells the last scantling, and transfers the *price* To some shrewd sharper, ere it buds again.

COWPER.

The lands of the noblesse are still under the load of the greater part of the old feudal *charges*.

BURKE.

Between the epithets *costly* and *expensive* there is the same distinction. Whatever is *costly* is naturally *expensive*, but not *vice versa*. Articles of furniture, of luxury, or indulgence are *costly*, either from their variety or their intrinsic value; everything is *expensive* which is attended with much *expense*, whether of little or great value. Jewels are *costly*; travelling is *expensive*. The *costly* treasures of the East are imported into Europe for the gratification of those who cannot be contented with the produce of their native soil: those who indulge themselves in such *expensive* pleasures often lay up in store for themselves much sorrow and repentance in the time to come.

Menalcas ordered him to be stripped of his *costly* robes, and to be clad in a russet weed.

ADDISON.

Who ever doubted that war is *expensive* and peace desirable?

BURKE.

In the moral acceptation, the attainment of an object is said to *cost* much pains; a thing is persisted in at the *expense* of health, of honor, or of life. The sacrifice of a man's quiet is the *price* which he must pay for the gratification of his ambition.

And she, once mistress of the realms around, Now scattered wide, and nowhere to be found, As soon shall rise and reascend the throne By native power and energy her own, As Nature, at her own peculiar *cost*, Restore to man the glories he has lost.

COWPER.

If ease and politeness be only attainable at the *expense* of sincerity in the men, and chastity in the women, I flatter myself there are few of my

readers who would not think the purchase made at too high a *price*.

ABERCROMBY.

Duration gives importance—swells the *price*.

An angel, if a creature of a day,

What would he be? A trifle of no weight.

YOUNG.

Would a man build for eternity, that is, in other words, would he be saved, let him consider with himself what *charges* he is willing to be at, that he may be so.

SOUTH.

TO COVER, HIDE.

COVER, in French *couvrir*, Italian *coprire*, Latin *cooperto*, compounded of *co*, *con*, or *cum*, and *operio*, to conceal thoroughly or by covering. HIDE, *v. To conceal*.

Cover is to *hide* as the means to the end: we commonly *hide* by *covering*; but we may easily *cover* without *hiding*, as also *hide* without *covering*. The ruling idea in the word *cover* is that of throwing or putting something over a body: in the word *hide* is that of keeping carefully to one's self, from the observation of others. In most civilized countries it is common to *cover* the head: in the Eastern countries females commonly wear veils to *hide* the face.

Darkness profound

Covered the abyss.

MILTON.

Hide me from the face

Of God, whom to behold was then my height Of happiness.

MILTON.

Cover sometimes, particularly in the moral application, signifies to conceal; but in that case it denotes the manner of concealing, namely, by overspreading; but *hide* denotes either the intention or desire to conceal, or the concealing what ought not to be seen.

Specious names are lent to *cover* vice.

SPECTATOR.

He that has light within his own clear breast May sit 't the centre, and enjoy bright day; But he that *hides* a dark soul and foul thoughts Benighted walks under the mid-day sun.

MILTON.

COVER, SHELTER, SCREEN.

COVER properly denotes what serves as a *cover*, and in the literal sense of the verb from which it is derived (*v. To cover*). SHELTER, like the word shield, in German *schild*, comes from the old German *schelten*, to cover. SCREEN, from the Latin *secerno*, signifies to keep off or apart.

Cover is literally applied to many particular things which are employed in *covering*; but in the general sense which makes it analogous to the other terms, it includes the idea of concealing: *shelter* comprehends that of protecting from some immediate or impending evil: *screen* includes that of warding off some trouble. A *cover* always supposes something which can extend over the whole surface of a body; a *shelter* or a *screen* may merely interpose to a sufficient extent to serve the intended purpose. Military operations are sometimes carried on under *cover* of the night; a bay is a convenient *shelter* for vessels against the violence of the winds; a chair may be used as a *screen* to prevent the violent action of the heat or the external air.

Like princes unconfess'd in foreign courts, Who travel under *cover*, death assumes

The name and look of life, and dwells among us.

YOUNG.

A cave was his only *shelter* from the inclemency of the weather.

GOLDSMITH.

Were moon and stars for villains only made, To guide yet *screen* them with tenebrious light?

YOUNG.

In the moral sense, a fair reputation is sometimes made the *cover* for the commission of gross irregularities in secret. When a person feels himself unable to withstand the attacks of his enemies, he seeks a *shelter* under the sanction and authority of a great name. Bad men sometimes use wealth and power to *screen* them from the punishment which is due to their offences.

There are persons who *cover* their own rudeness by calling their conduct honest bluntness.

RICHARDSON.

When on a bed of straw we sink together, And the bleak winds shall whistle round our heads,

Wilt thou then talk to me thus? Thus hush my cares, and *shelter* me with love?

OTWAY.

It is frequent for men to adjudge that in an art impossible, which they find that art does not effect; by which means they *screen* indolence and ignorance from the reproach they merit.

BACON.

COVETOUSNESS, CUPIDITY, AVARICE.

COVETOUSNESS, from *covet*, and *cupido*, to desire, signifies having a desire. CUPIDITY is a more immediate derivative from the Latin, signifying the same thing. AVARICE, *v. Avaricious*.

All these terms are employed to express an illicit desire after objects of gratification; but *covetousness* is applied to property in general, or to whatever is valuable; *cupidity* and *avarice* only to money or possessions. A child may display its *covetousness* in regard to the playthings which fall in its way; a man shows his *cupidity* in regard to the gains that fall in his way; we should, therefore, be careful to check a *covetous* disposition in early life, lest it show itself in the more hateful character of *cupidity* in advanced years. *Covetousness* is the natural disposition for having or getting; *cupidity* is the acquired disposition. As the love of appropriation is an innate characteristic in man, that of accumulating or wanting to accumulate, which constitutes *covetousness*, will show itself, in some persons, among the first indications of character: where the prospect of amassing great wealth is set before a man, as in the case of a governor of a distant province, it will evince great virtue in him if his *cupidity* be not excited. The *covetous* man seeks to add to what he has; the *avaricious* man only strives to retain what he has: the *covetous* man sacrifices others to indulge himself; the *avaricious* man will sometimes sacrifice himself to indulge others; for generosity, which is opposed to *covetousness*, is sometimes associated with *avarice*.

Nothing lies on our hands with such uneasiness as time. Wretched and thoughtless creatures! In the only place where *covetousness* were a virtue, we turn prodigals. ADDISON.

At last Swift's *avarice* grew too powerful for his kindness: he would refuse (his friends) a bottle of wine. JOHNSON.

If prescription be once shaken, no species of property is secure, when it once becomes an object large enough to tempt the *cupidity* of indigent power. BURKE.

TO COUNTENANCE, SANCTION, SUPPORT.

COUNTENANCE signifies to keep in countenance. SANCTION, in French *sanction*, Latin *sanctio*, from *sanctus*, sacred, signifies to ratify a decree or ordinance; in an extended sense to make anything binding. SUPPORT, in French *supporter*, Latin *supporto*, compounded of *sup* or *sub* and *porto*, to bear, signifies to bear from underneath, to bear up.

Persons are *countenanced*; things are *sanctioned*; persons or things are *supported*: persons are *countenanced* in their proceedings by the apparent approbation of others; measures are *sanctioned* by the consent or approbation of others who have due authority; measures or persons are *supported* by every means which may forward the object. There is most of encouragement in *countenancing*; it consists of some outward demonstration of regard or good-will toward the person; there is most of authority in *sanctioning*; it is the lending of a name, an authority, or an influence, in order to strengthen and confirm the thing: there is most of assistance and co-operation in *support*; it is the employment of means to an end. Superiors only can *countenance* or *sanction*; persons in all conditions may *support*: those who *countenance* evil-doers give a *sanction* to their evil deeds; those who *support* either an individual or a cause ought to be satisfied that they are entitled to *support*.

A good man acts with a vigor, and suffers with a patience more than human, when he believes himself *countenanced* by the Almighty. BLAIR.

Men of the greatest sense are always diffident of their private judgment, until it receives a *sanction* from the public. ADDISON.

The apparent insufficiency of every individual to his own happiness or safety compels us to seek from one another assistance and *support*. JOHNSON.

COUNTRYMAN, PEASANT, SWAIN, HIND, RUSTIC, CLOWN.

COUNTRYMAN, that is, a man of the *country*, or one belonging to the *country*, is the general term applicable to all inhabiting the *country*, in distinction from a townsman. PEASANT, in French *paysan*, from *pays*, is employed in the same sense for any *countryman* among the inhabitants of the Continent, and is in consequence used in poetry or the grave style for a *countryman*. SWAIN in the Saxon signified a laborer, but it has acquired, from its use in poetry, the higher signification of a shepherd, or husbandman. HIND may, in all probability, signify one who is in the background, an inferior. RUSTIC, from *rus*, the *country*, signifies one born and bred in the *country*. CLOWN, contracted

from *colonus*, a husbandman, signifies, of course, a menial in the *country*.

All these terms are employed as epithets to persons, and principally to such as live in the *country*: the terms *countryman* and *peasant* are taken in an indifferent sense, and may comprehend persons of different descriptions; they designate nothing more than habitual residence in the *country*: the other terms are employed for the lower orders of *countrymen*, but with collateral ideas favorable or unfavorable annexed to them: *swain*, *hind*, both convey the idea of innocence in a humble station, and are therefore always employed in poetry in a good sense: the *rustic* and *clown* both convey the idea of that uncouth rudeness and ignorance which is in reality found among the lowest orders of *countrymen*.

Though, considering my former condition, I may now be called a *countryman*, yet you cannot call me a *rustic* (as you would imply in your letter) as long as I live in so civil and noble a family. HOWELL.

If by the poor measures and proportions of a man we may take an estimate of this great action (our Saviour's coming in the flesh), we shall quickly find how irksome it is to flesh and blood "to have been happy," to descend some steps lower, to exchange the estate of a prince for that of a *peasant*. SOUTH.

As thus the snows arise, and foul and fierce All winter drives along the darken'd air, In his own loose revolving fields the *swain* Disastered stands. THOMSON.

The lab'ring *hind* his oxen shall disjoin. DRYDEN.

In arguing too the parson own'd his skill, For e'en though vanquish'd he could argue still; While words of learned length and thundering sound Amaz'd the gazing *rustics* rang'd around. GOLDSMITH.

Th' astonish'd mother finds a vacant nest, By the hard hand of unrelenting *clowns* Robb'd. THOMSON.

COUPLE, PAIR, BRACE.

COUPLE, in French *couple*, comes from the Latin *copulo*, to join or tie together, *copula*, in Hebrew *cabel*, a rope or a shackle, signifying things tied together; and as two things are with most convenience bound together, it has by custom been confined to this number. PAIR, in French *paire*, Latin *par*, equal, signifies things that are equal, which can with propriety be said only of two things with regard to each other. BRACE, from the

French *bras*, arm, signifies things locked together after the manner of the folded arms, which on that account are confined to the number of two.

From the above illustration of these terms, it is clear that the number of two, which is included in all of them, is, with regard to the first, entirely arbitrary; that with regard to the second, it arises from the nature of the junction; and with regard to the third, it arises altogether from the nature of the objects: *couples* and *braces* are made by *coupling* and *bracing*; *pairs* are either so of themselves, or are made so by others: *couples* and *braces* always require a junction in order to make them complete; *pairs* require similarity only to make them what they are: *couples* are joined by a foreign tie; even the being in company is sufficient to make a *couple*; *braces* are produced by a close junction, or what is supposed to be so, which requires them to go together. *Couple* is applied to objects generally.

In the midst of these sorrows which I had in my heart, methought there passed by me a *couple* of coaches with purple liveries. ADDISON.

Pair is applied to things that naturally go in *pairs*.

Six wings he wore, to shade His lineaments divine; the *pair* that clad Each shoulder broad, came mantling o'er his breast With regal ornament. MILTON.

Brace is applied to particular things, either themselves joined together or serving to join others together; as birds that are shot and are usually linked together are termed a *brace*; whence in poetry the term is applied to animals or other objects in a close state of junction.

First hunter then, pursued a gentle *brace*, Goodliest of all the forest, hart and hind. MILTON.

Couple is applied to persons of different sex who are bound to each other by the ties of affection or by the marriage tie.

Scarce any *couple* comes together, but their nuptials are declared in the newspaper with encomiums on each party. JOHNSON.

Pair is also applied to persons similarly situated, but refers more to the moral tie from similarity of feeling;