

Custom is applicable to bodies of men; *habit* is confined to the individual: every nation has *customs* peculiar to itself; and every individual has *habits* peculiar to his age, station, and circumstances.

I dare not shock my reader with the description of the *customs* and manners of these barbarians (the Hottentots). HUGHES.

The force of education is so great, that we may mould the minds and manners of the young into what shape we please, and give the impressions of such *habits* as shall ever afterward remain. ATTERBURY.

Customary and *habitual*, the epithets derived from these words, admit of a similar distinction: the *customary* action is that which is repeated after the manner of a *custom*; the *habitual* action is that which is done by the force of *habit*.

This *customary* superiority grew too delicate for truth, and Swift, with all his penetration, allowed himself to be delighted with low flattery. JOHNSTON.

We have all reason to believe that, amidst numberless infirmities which attend humanity, what the great Judge will chiefly regard is the *habitual* prevailing turn of our heart and life. BLAIR.

CUSTOM, FASHION, MANNER, PRACTICE.

CUSTOMS, FASHIONS, and MANNERS are all employed for communities of men: *custom* (*v. Custom, habit*) respects established and general modes of action: *fashion*, in French *façon*, from *facio*, to do or make, regards partial and transitory modes of making or doing things: *manner*, in the limited sense in which it is here taken, signifies the *manner* or mode of men's living or behaving in their social intercourse.

Custom is authoritative; it stands in the place of law, and regulates the conduct of men in the most important concerns of life: *fashion* is arbitrary and capricious, it decides in matters of trifling import: *manners* are rational; they are the expressions of moral feelings. *Customs* have most force in a simple state of society; *fashions* rule most where luxury has made the greatest progress; *manners* are most distinguishable in a civilized state of society. *Customs* are in their nature as unchangeable as *fashions* are variable; *manners* depend on cultivation and collateral circumstances; *customs* die away or are abolished; *fashions*

pass away, and new ones take their place; *manners* are altered either for the better or the worse.

The *custom* of representing the grief we have for the loss of the dead by our habits, certainly had its rise from the real sorrow of such as were too much distressed to take the care they ought of their dress. STEELE.

Of beasts, it is confess'd, the ape Comes nearest us in human shape; Like man, he imitates each *fashion*, And malice is his ruling passion. SWIFT.

Their arms, their arts, their *manners* I disclose, And how they war, and whence the people rose. DRYDEN.

PRACTICE, in Latin *practica*, Greek *πρακτικη*, from *πρασσω*, to do, signifies actual doing or the thing done, that is, by distinction, the regularly doing, or the thing regularly done, in which sense it is most analogous to *custom*; but the former simply conveys the idea of actual performance; the latter includes also the accessory idea of repetition at stated periods: a *practice* may be defined as frequent or unfrequent, regular or irregular; but a *custom* does not require to be qualified by any such epithets: it may be the *practice* of a person to do acts of charity, as the occasion requires; but, when he uniformly does a particular act of charity at any given period of the year, it is properly denominated his *custom*.

Savage was so touched with the discovery of his real mother, that it was his frequent *practice* to walk in the dark evenings for several hours before her door, with hopes of seeing her as she might cross her apartments with a candle in her hand. JOHNSTON.

Both *practice* and *custom* are general or particular, but the former is absolute, the latter relative: a *practice* may be adopted by a number of persons without reference to each other; but a *custom* is always followed either by imitation or prescription: the *practice* of gaming has always been followed by the vicious part of society; but it is to be hoped for the honor of man that it will never become a *custom*.

His answer was that he could say no more to us than that it was his *custom* so to do; if he knew a better *custom* he would observe that. NICHOLLS.

The *practice* having occasioned much scandal, it was decreed that the litanies should for the future be only used within the walls of the church. WHEATLY.

D.

DAILY, DIURNAL.

DAILY, from *day* and *like*, signifies after the manner or in the time of the day. DIURNAL, from *dies*, day, signifies belonging to the day.

Daily is the colloquial term which is applicable to whatever passes in the day-time; *diurnal* is the scientific term, which applies to what passes within or belongs to the astronomical day: the physician makes *daily* visits to his patients; the earth is said by astronomers to have a *diurnal* motion on its own axis.

All creatures else forget their *daily* care, And sleep, the common gift of nature, share. DRYDEN.

Half yet remains unsung, but narrow bound Within the visible *diurnal* sphere. MILTON.

DAINTY, DELICACY.

THESE TERMS, which are in vogue among epicures; have some shades of difference in their signification not altogether undeserving of notice. DAINY, from *dain*, *deign*, in Latin *dignus*, worthy, is applied to that which is of worth or value—of course only to such things as have a superior value in the estimation of epicures; and consequently conveys a more positive meaning than DELICACY, inasmuch as a *dainty* may be that which is extremely delicate, a *delicacy* is sometimes a species of *dainty*; but there are many *delicacies* which are altogether suited to the most delicate appetite, that are neither costly nor rare, two qualities which are almost inseparable from a *dainty*: those who indulge themselves freely in *dainties* and *delicacies* scarcely know what it is to eat with an appetite; but those who are temperate in their use of the enjoyments of life will be enabled to derive pleasure from ordinary food.

My landlord's cellar, stock'd with beer and ale, Instantly brings the choicest liquors out, Whether we ask'd for home-brew'd or for stout, For mead or cider; or, with *dainties* fed, King for a flask or two of white or red. SWIFT. She turns, on hospitable thoughts intent, What choice to choose for *delicacy* best. MILTON.

DANGER, PERIL, HAZARD.

DANGER, in French *danger*, from the Latin *damnum*, a loss or damage, signi-

fies the chance of a loss. PERIL, in French *peril*, comes from *perco*, which signifies either to go over or to perish; and *periculum*, which signifies literally that which is undergone; designating a critical situation, a rude trial, which may terminate in one's ruin. HAZARD, *v. Chance, hazard*.

The idea of chance or uncertainty is common to all these terms; but the two former may sometimes be foreseen and calculated upon; the latter is purely contingent. *Dangers* are far and near, ordinary and extraordinary: they meet us if we do not go in search of them; *perils* are always distant and extraordinary: we must go out of our course to expose ourselves to them; in the quiet walk of life, as in the most busy and tumultuous, it is the lot of man to be surrounded by *danger*; the mariner and the traveller who goes in search of unknown countries put themselves in the way of undergoing *perils* both by sea and land.

Proud of the favors mighty Jove has shown, On certain *dangers* we too rashly run. POPE. From that dire deluge through the watery waste, Such length of years, such various *perils* past, At last escap'd, to Latium we repair. DRYDEN.

Danger and *peril* are applied to positive evils; *hazard* respects the possibility of good as well as of evil. When we are involved in *danger* we are in a situation to lose what we wish to retain; when we run the *hazard* of a battle we may either win or lose.

Ten thousand *dangers* lie in wait to thwart The process. COWPER. One was their care, and their delight was one; One common *hazard* in the war they shared. DRYDEN.

The same distinction exists between the epithets that are derived from these terms.

It is *dangerous* for a youth to act without the advice of his friends; it is *perilous* for a traveller to explore the wilds of Africa; it is *hazardous* for a merchant to speculate in time of war: experiments in matters of policy or government are always *dangerous*; a journey through deserts that are infested with beasts of prey is *perilous*; a military expedition, conducted with inadequate means, is *hazardous*.

Hear this, and tremble! all who would be great,
Yet know not what attends that *dangerous*,
wretched state. JENYNS.

The grisly boar is singled from his herd,
A match for Hercules; round him they fly
In circles wide, and each in passing sends
His feather'd death into his brawny sides;
But *perilous* th' attempt. SOMERVILLE.

The previous steps being taken, and the time
fixed for this *hazardous* attempt, Admiral
Holmes moved with his squadron farther up the
river about three leagues above the place ap-
pointed for the disembarkation, that he might
deceive the enemy. SMOLLETT.

DARING, BOLD.

DARING signifies having the spirit to
dare. BOLD, *v. Audacity*.

These terms may be both taken in a
bad sense; but *daring* much oftener than
bold; in either case *daring* expresses
much more than *bold*: he who is *daring*
provokes resistance and courts *danger*;
but the *bold* man is contented to over-
come the resistance that is offered to
him: a man may be *bold* in the use of
words only; he must be *daring* in ac-
tions: he is *bold* in the defence of truth;
he is *daring* in military enterprise.

Too *daring* prince! ah! whither dost thou run?
Ah! too forgetful of thy wife and son. POPE.
Thus cursed steel, and more accursed gold,
Gave mischief birth, and made that mischief
bold. DRYDEN.

DARK, OBSCURE, DIM, MYSTERIOUS.

DARK, in Saxon *deorc*, is doubtless
connected with the German *dunkel*, dark,
and *dunst*, a vapor, which is a cause of
darkness. OBSCURE, in Latin *obscurus*,
compounded of *ob* and *scurus*, Greek
σκυρος and *σκια*, a shadow, signifies lit-
erally interrupted by a shadow. DIM is
but a variation of *dark*, *dunkel*, etc.

Darkness expresses more than *obscuri-
ty*: the former denotes the total priva-
tion of light; the latter only the dimini-
ution of light. *Dark* is opposed to light;
obscure to bright: what is *dark* is al-
together hidden; what is *obscure* is not to
be seen distinctly, or without an effort.

Darkness may be used either in a nat-
ural or moral sense; *obscurity* only in
the latter; in which case the former con-
veys a more unfavorable idea: *darkness*
serves to cover that which ought not to
be hidden; *obscurity* intercepts our view
of that which we would wish to see: the
former is the consequence of design; the

latter of neglect or accident: the letter
sent by the conspirator in the gunpowder
plot to his friend was *dark*; all passages
in ancient writers which allude to cir-
cumstances no longer known must neces-
sarily be *obscure*: a corner may be said
to be *dark* or *obscure*, but the former is
used literally and the latter figuratively;
the owl is obliged, from the weakness of
its visual organs, to seek the *darkest* cor-
ners in the daytime; men of distorted
minds often seek *obscure* corners, only
from disappointed ambition.

Why are thy speeches *dark* and troubled
As Cretan seas, when vex'd by warring winds?
SMITH.

He that reads and grows no wiser seldom sus-
pects his own deficiency, but complains of hard
words and *obscure* sentences. JOHNSON.

Dim expresses a degree of *darkness*,
but it is employed more in relation to
the person seeing than to the object seen.
The eyes are said to grow *dim*, or the
sight *dim*. The light is said to be *dim*,
by which things are but *dimly* seen.

The stars shall fade away, the sun himself
Grow *dim* with age, and nature sink in years;
But thou shalt flourish in immortal youth.
ADDISON.

MYSTERIOUS denotes a species of
the *dark*, in relation to the actions of
men; where a veil is intentionally thrown
over any object so as to render it as in-
comprehensible as that which is sacred.
Dark is an epithet taken always in the
bad sense, but *mysterious* is always in an
indifferent sense. We are told in the
Sacred Writings that men love *darkness*
rather than light, because their deeds are
evil. Whatever, therefore, is *dark* in the
ways of men is naturally presumed to be
evil; but things may be *mysterious* in the
events of human life without the express
intention of an individual to render them
so. The speeches of an assassin and
conspirator will be *dark*: any intricate
affair, which involves the characters and
conduct of men, may be *mysterious*. The
same distinction exists between these
terms when applied to the ways of Prov-
idence, which are said to be sometimes
dark, inasmuch as they present a cloudy
aspect; and mostly *mysterious*, inasmuch
as they are past finding out.

Randolph, an agent extremely proper for con-
ducting any *dark* intrigue, was dispatched into

Scotland, and, residing secretly among the lords
of the congregation, observed and quickened
their motions. ROBERTSON.

The affection which Mary in her letter ex-
presses for Bothwell fully accounts for every
subsequent part of her conduct, which, without
admitting this circumstance, appears altogether
mysterious and inconsistent. ROBERTSON.

DEADLY, MORTAL, FATAL.

DEADLY or DEAD-LIKE signifies
like death itself in its effects. MOR-
TAL, in Latin *mortalis*, signifies belong-
ing to death. FATAL, in Latin *fatalis*,
signifies according to fate.

Deadly is applied to what is produc-
tive of death; *mortal* to what terminates
in or is liable to death; *fatal* applies not
only to death, but everything which may
be of great mischief. A poison is *dead-
ly*; a wound or a wounded part is *mor-
tal*; a step in walking, or a step in one's
conduct, may be *fatal*. Things only are
deadly: creatures are *mortal*. Hatred
is *deadly*; whatever has life is *mortal*.
There may be remedies sometimes to
counteract that which is *deadly*; but that
which is *mortal* is past all cure; and that
which is *fatal* cannot be retrieved.

On him, amidst the flying numbers found,
Euryпилus inflicts a *deadly* wound. POPE.

For my own part, I never could think that the
soul, while in a *mortal* body, lives.
HUGHES, AFTER XENOPHON.

O *fatal* change! become in one sad day
A senseless corse! inanimated clay. POPE.

DEAL, QUANTITY, PORTION.

DEAL, in Saxon *deal*, Dutch *deel*, and
German *theil*, from *daelen*, *theilen*, etc., to
divide, signifies literally the thing divided
or taken off. QUANTITY, in Latin
quantitas, comes from *quantus*, signify-
ing how much. PORTION, through the
Latin *pars* and *portio*, comes from the
Hebrew *parish*, to divide, signifying, like
the word *deal*, the thing taken off.

Deal always denotes something great,
and cannot be coupled with any epithet
that does not express much: *quantity* is
a term of relative import; it either marks
indefinitely the how, or so much of a
thing, or may be defined by some epithet
to express much or little: *portion* is of
itself altogether indefinite, and admits of
being qualified by any epithet to express
much or little: *deal* is a term confined to
familiar use, and sometimes substituted

for *quantity*, and sometimes for *portion*.
It is common to speak of a *deal* or a
quantity of paper, a great *deal* or a great
quantity of money; likewise of a great
deal or a great *portion* of pleasure, a
great *deal* or a great *portion* of wealth:
and in some cases *deal* is more usual than
either *quantity* or *portion*, as a *deal* of
heat, a *deal* of rain, a *deal* of frost, a *deal*
of noise, and the like; but it is admissi-
ble only in the familiar style.

This, my inquisitive temper, or rather impertinent
humor, of prying into all sorts of writing,
with my natural aversion to loquacity, gives me
a good *deal* of employment when I enter any
house in the country. ADDISON.

There is never room in the world for more
than a certain *quantity* or measure of renown.
JOHNSON.

Portion is employed only for part of
that which is detached from the whole;
quantity may sometimes be employed for
a number of wholes. We may speak of
a large or a small *quantity* of books;
a large or a small *quantity* of plants or
herbs; but a large or small *portion* of
food, a large or small *portion* of color.

The jars of gen'rous wine, Aecetes' gift,
He set abroad, and for the feast prepar'd,
In equal *portion* with the ven'son shar'd.

DRYDEN.

There be of them, that will themselves laugh,
to set on some *quantity* of barren spectators to
laugh too. SHAKESPEARE.

DEATH, DEPARTURE, DECEASE, DE-
MISE.

DEATH signifies the act of *dying*.
DEPARTURE signifies the act of *depart-
ing*. DECEASE, from the Latin *decedo*,
to fall off, signifies the act of falling
away. DEMISE, from *demitto*, to lay
down, signifies literally resigning pos-
session.

Death is a general or a particular
term; it marks, in the abstract sense,
the extinction of life, and is applicable
to men or animals; to one or many.
Departure, *decease*, and *demise* are par-
ticular expressions suited only to the
condition of human beings. We speak
of *death* in reference to what happens
before or at the time; we speak of the
death of men generally, or of the *death*
of individuals; we speak of the circum-
stances of *death*, its causes and effects.
Departure is a Christian term, which car-

ries with it an idea of a passage from one life to another. *Death* of itself has always something terrific in it; but the Gospel has divested it of its terrors: the hour of *departure*, therefore, for a Christian, is often the happiest period of his mortal existence.

How quickly would the honors of illustrious men perish after *death*, if their souls performed nothing to preserve their fame!

HUGHES, AFTER XENOPHON.

The loss of our friends impresses upon us hourly the necessity of our own *departure*.

JOHNSON.

Decease presents only the idea of leaving life to the survivors. It is either a technical term in law for death, or it is used in common discourse for the falling off from the number of the living. Property is in perpetual occupancy; at the *decease* of one possessor it passes into the hands of another.

Though men see every day people go to their long home, they are not so apt to be alarmed at that, as at the *decease* of those who have lived longer in their sight.

STEELE.

Demise signifies properly a putting off, and in this acceptation the putting off mortality; it is therefore appropriately used for princes, to denote that they at the same time put off or resign an earthly crown.

So tender is the law of supposing even a possibility of the King's *death*, that his natural dissolution is generally called his *demise*.

BLACKSTONE.

As an epithet, *dead* is used collectively; *departed* is used with a noun only; *deceased* generally without a noun, to denote one or more, according to the connection. There is a respect due to the *dead*, which cannot be violated without offence to the living. It is a pleasant reflection to conceive of *departed* spirits, as taking an interest in the concerns of those whom they have left. All the marks on the body of the *deceased* indicated that he had met with his death by some violence.

The living and the *dead*, at his command,
Were coupled face to face, and hand to hand.

DRYDEN.

The sophistic tyrants of Paris are loud in their declamations against the *departed* regal tyrants, who in former ages have vexed the world.

BURKE.

It was enacted in the reign of Edward I. that the ordinary shall be bound to pay the debts of the intestate, in the same manner that executors were bound in case the *deceased* left a will.

BLACKSTONE.

TO DEBATE, DELIBERATE.

THESE terms equally mark the acts of pausing or withholding the decision, whether applicable to one or many. To *DEBATE* (*v. To argue, dispute*) supposes always a contrariety of opinion; to *DELIBERATE* (*v. To consult, deliberate*) supposes simply the weighing or estimating the value of the opinion that is offered. Where many persons have the liberty of offering their opinions, it is natural to expect that there will be *debating*; when any subject offers that is complicated and questionable, it calls for mature *deliberation*. It is lamentable when passion gets such an ascendancy in the mind of any one, as to make him *debate* which course of conduct he shall pursue between virtue and vice; the want of *deliberation*, whether in private or public transactions, is a more fruitful source of mischief than almost any other.

To seek sage Nestor now, the chief resolves;
With him in wholesome counsel to *debate*
What yet remains to save the sinking state.

POPE.

—When man's life is in *debate*,
The judge can ne'er too long *deliberate*.

DRYDEN.

DEBILITY, INFIRMITY, IMBECILITY.

DEBILITY, in Latin *debilitas*, from *debilis*, or *de* privative and *habilis*, signifies a deficiency, or not having. *INFIRMITY*, in Latin *infirmitas*, from *infirmus*, or *in* privative and *firmus*, strong, signifies the absence of strength. *IMBECILITY*, in Latin *imbecillitas*, from *imbecillus*, or *in* privative and *becillus*, *bacillum*, or *baculus*, a staff, signifies not having a staff.

All these terms denote a species of weakness, but the two former, particularly the first, respect that which is physical, and the latter that which is either physical or mental. *Debility* is constitutional, or otherwise; *infirmity* is always constitutional; *infirmity* is accidental, and results from sickness, or a decay of the frame. *Debility* may be either general or local; *infirmity* is always local; *imbecility* always general.

Debility prevents the active performance of the ordinary functions of nature; it is a deficiency in the muscular power of the body: *infirmity* is a partial want of power, which interferes with, but does not necessarily destroy, the activity: *imbecility* lies in the whole frame, and renders it almost entirely powerless. Young people are frequently troubled with *debilities* in their ankles or legs, of which they are never cured. Old age is most exposed to *infirmities*; but there is no age at which human beings are exempt from *infirmity* of some kind or another. The *imbecility* natural to youth, both in body and mind, would make them willing to rest on the strength of their elders, if they were not too often misled by a mischievous confidence in their own strength.

As increasing years *debilitate* the body, so they weaken the force and diminish the warmth of the affections.

BLAIR.

This is weakness, not wisdom, I own, and on that account fitter to be trusted to the bosom of a friend, where I may safely lodge all my *infirmities*.

ATTERBURY.

It is seldom that we are otherwise than by affliction awakened to a sense of our *imbecility*.

JOHNSON.

DEBT, DUE.

DEBT and *DUE*, in French *dû*, are both derived from the Latin *debitum*, participle of *debeo*, to owe. *Debt* is used only as a substantive; *due* either as a substantive or an adjective. As a substantive, *debt* is commonly applied to that which is owing from the person spoken of; *due* is always applied to that which is owing to the person: to pay one's *debts*, and receive one's *due*. So in the moral application, to pay the *debt* of nature, that is, what is due or owing to nature; to give every man his *due*.

Though Christ was as pure and undefiled, without the least spot of sin, as purity and innocence itself, yet he was pleased to make himself the greatest sinner in the world by imputation, and render himself a surety responsible for our *debts*.

SOUTH.

The ghosts rejected are th' unhappy crew,
Depriv'd of sepulchres and fun'ral *due*.

DRYDEN.

DECAY, DECLINE, CONSUMPTION.

DECAY, in French *déchoir*, from the Latin *decado*, signifies literally to fall off or away. *DECLINE*, from the Latin *de-*

clino, or *de* and *clino*, signifies to turn away or lean aside. The direction expressed by both these actions is very similar; it is a downward movement, but *decay* expresses more than *decline*. What is *decayed* is fallen or gone; what *declines* leads toward a fall, or is going; when applied, therefore, to the same objects, a *decline* is properly the commencement of a *decay*. The health may experience a *decline* at any period of life from a variety of causes, but it naturally experiences a *decay* in old age.

Some have the art of converting even the signs of national prosperity into symptoms of *decay* and ruin.

BURKE.

Forget not thy helpless infancy nor the forwardness of thy youth: and bear with the infirmities of thy aged parents, assist and support them in the *decline* of life.

ECONOMY OF HUMAN LIFE.

CONSUMPTION (*v. To consume*) implies a rapid decay. By *decay* things lose their perfection, their greatness, and their consistency; by *decline* they lose their strength, their vigor, and their lustre; by *consumption* they lose their existence. *Decay* brings to ruin; *decline* leads to an end or expiration. There are some things to which *decay* is peculiar, and some things to which *decline* is peculiar, and other things to which both *decay* and *decline* belong. The corruption to which material substances are particularly exposed is termed *decay*: the close of life, when health and strength begin to fall away, is termed the *decline*: the *decay* of states in the moral world takes place by the same process as the *decay* of fabrics in the natural world; the *decline* of empires, from their state of elevation and splendor, is a natural figure drawn from the *decline* of the setting sun. *Consumption* is seldom applied to anything but animal bodies except figuratively.

The seas shall waste, the skies in smoke *decay*,
Rocks fall to dust, and mountains melt away;
But fix'd his word, his saving power remains,
Thy realm forever lasts, thy own Messiah reigns.

POPE.

After the death of Julius and Augustus Caesar the Roman Empire *declined* every day.

SOUTH.

By degrees the empire shrivelled and pined away; and from such a surfeit of immoderate prosperity passed at length into a final *consumption*.

SOUTH.

DECEIT, DECEPTION.

DECEIT and DECEPTION are both derived from the verb *deceive* (*v. To deceive*), and both imply the act of deceiving; with this difference, that the *deceit* is practised from an expressly bad motive, but *deception* may be from either bad or indifferent motives. A person is therefore said to be guilty of *deceit* who has sought to deceive another for his own purposes; but *deceptions* may be practised in a diversity of ways, and from a diversity of motives.

I mean to plunge the boy in pleasing sleep,
And ravish'd in Idalian bow'rs to keep,
Or high Cythera, that the sweet *deceit*
May pass unseen, and none prevent the cheat.

DRYDEN.

And now, with nerves new braced and spirits
cheered,
We tread the wilderness, whose well-rolled walks,
With curvature of slow and easy sweep,
Deception innocent—give ample space
To narrow bounds.

COWPER.

Deceit is always a personal act, and if there be an habitual propensity to deceiving, the *deceit* is then a characteristic of the person; a deceiver is full of *deceit*. *Deception* frequently denotes the state of being deceived; it is the effect of any agency, whether from accident or design. *Deceit* is applied to cases where the understanding is intentionally deceived; but there may be a *deception* on the senses as well as on the understanding.

He often made use of dissimulation, seldom
of *deceit*, for he knew how to conceal without
counterfeiting virtues.

GUTHRIE.

All the joy or sorrow for the happiness or calamities of others is produced by an act of the imagination that realizes the event, however fictitious, so that we feel, while the *deception* lasts, whatever emotions would be excited by the same good or evil happening to ourselves.

JOHNSON.

Deceitful and *deceptive* are employed with this distinction: a person is said to be *deceitful*, and a thing *deceptive*.

There is one case in which it would be madness not to give credit to the most *deceitful* of men, that is when they make declarations of hostility against us.

BURKE.

It is to be feared that the sciences are above the comprehension of children, and that this mode of education to the exclusion of the classics is ultimately *deceptive*.

VICES, KNOX.

DECEIT, DUPLICITY, DOUBLE-DEALING.

DECEIT (*v. Deceit, deception*). DUPLICITY signifies *doubleness* in dealing, the same as DOUBLE-DEALING. The two former may be applied either to habitual or particular actions, the latter only to particular actions. There may be much *deceit* or *duplicity* in a person's character or in his proceedings; there is *double-dealing* only where dealing goes forward. The *deceit* may be more or less veiled; the *duplicity* lies very deep, and is always studied whenever it is put into practice. *Duplicity*, in reference to actions, is mostly employed for a course of conduct; *double-dealing* is but another term for *duplicity* on particular occasions. Children of reserved characters are frequently prone to *deceit*, which grows into consummate *duplicity* in riper years: the wealthy are often exposed to much *duplicity* when they choose their favorites among the low and ignorant.

The arts of *deceit* do continually grow weaker and less serviceable to them that use them.

TILLOTSON.

Necessity drove Dryden into a *duplicity* of character that is painful to reflect upon.

CUMBERLAND.

Maskwell (in the *Double-Dealer*) discloses by soliloquy that his motive for *double-dealing* was founded in his passion for Cynthia.

CUMBERLAND.

DECEIT, FRAUD, GUILLE.

DECEIT (*v. Deceit, deception*) is allied to FRAUD in reference to actions; to GUILLE in reference to the character.

Deceit is here, as in the preceding article, indeterminate when compared with *fraud*, which is a specific mode of deceiving; *deceit* is practised only in private transactions; *fraud* is practised toward bodies as well as individuals, in public as well as private: a child practises *deceit* toward its parents; *frauds* are practised upon government, on the public at large, or on tradesmen: *deceit* involves the violation of moral law, *fraud* that of the criminal law. A servant may *deceive* his master as to the time of his coming or going, but he *defrauds* him of his property if he obtains it by any false means.

With such *deceits* he gain'd their easy hearts,
Too prone to credit his perfidious arts.

DRYDEN.

The story of the three books of the Sibyls sold to Tarquin was all a *fraud* devised for the convenience of state.

PRIDEAUX.

Deceit as a characteristic is indefinite in magnitude; *guile* marks a strong degree of moral turpitude in the individual. The former is displayed in petty concerns: the latter, which contaminates the whole character, displays itself in inextricable windings and turnings that are suggested in a peculiar manner by the author of all evil. *Deceitful* is an epithet commonly and lightly applied to persons in general; but *guileless* is applied to characters which are the most diametrically opposed to, and at the greatest possible distance from, that which is false.

Was it for force or *guile*,
Or some religious end, you rais'd this pile?

DRYDEN.

TO DECEIVE, DELUDE, IMPOSE UPON.

DECEIVE, in French *décevoir*, Latin *decipio*, compounded of *de* privative and *capio*, to take, signifies to take wrong. DELUDE, in Latin *deludo*, compounded of *de* and *ludo*, signifies to play upon or to mislead by a trick. IMPOSE, in Latin *imposui*, perfect of *impono*, signifies literally to lay or put upon.

Falsehood is the leading feature in all these terms; they vary, however, in the circumstances of the action. To *deceive* is the most general of the three; it signifies simply to produce a false conviction; the other terms are properly species of *deceiving*, including accessory ideas. *Deception* may be practised in various degrees; *deluding* is always something positive, and considerable in degree. Every false impression produced by external objects, whether in trifles or important matters, is a *deception*; but *delusion* is confined to errors in matters of opinion. We may be *deceived* in the color or the distance of an object; we are *deluded* in what regards our principles or moral conduct.

I would have all my readers take care how they mistake themselves for uncommon geniuses and men above rule, since it is very easy for them to be *deceived* in this particular.

BUDGELL.

Deluded by a seeming excellence. ROSCOMMON.

A *deception* does not always suppose a fault on the part of the person *deceived*,

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but a *delusion* does. A person is sometimes *deceived* in cases where *deception* is unavoidable; he is *deluded* through a voluntary blindness of the understanding: artful people are sometimes capable of *deceiving* so as not even to excite suspicion; their plausible tales justify the credit that is given to them: when the ignorant enter into nice questions of politics or religion, it is their ordinary fate to be *deluded*.

I now believ'd

The happy day approach'd, nor are my hopes *deceiv'd*.

DRYDEN.

Who therefore seeks in these
True wisdom, finds her not, or, by *delusion*,
Far worse, her false resemblance only meets.

YOUNG.

Deception is practised by an individual on himself or others; a *delusion* is commonly practised on one's self; an *imposition* is always practised on another. Men *deceive* others from a variety of motives; they always *impose upon* them for purposes of gain, or the gratification of ambition. Men *deceive* themselves with false pretexts and false confidence; they *delude* themselves with vain hopes and wishes.

Wanton women, in their eyes,
Men's *deceivings* do comprise.

GREENE.

I, waking, view'd with grief the rising sun,
And fondly mourn'd the dear *delusion* gone.

PRIOR.

As there seem to be in this manuscript some anachronisms and deviations from the ancient orthography, I am not satisfied myself that it is authentic, and not rather the production of one of those Grecian sophisters who have *imposed upon* the world several spurious works of this nature.

ADDISON.

DECEIVER, IMPOSTOR.

BETWEEN the words DECEIVER and IMPOSTOR (*v. To deceive*) there is a similar distinction. A *deceiver* is any one who practises any sort of deception; but an *impostor* is a *deceiver* who studiously deceives by putting on a false appearance. The *deceiver* practises *deception* on individuals or the public; the *impostor* most commonly on the public at large. The false friend and the faithless lover are *deceivers*; the assumed nobleman who practises *frauds* under his disguise, and the pretended prince who lays claim to a crown to which he was never born, are *impostors*.

That tradition of the Jews, that Christ was stolen out of the grave, is ancient: it was the invention of the Jews, and denies the integrity of the witnesses of his resurrection, making them *deceivers*. TILLOTSON.

Our Saviour wrought his miracles frequently, and for a long time together: a time sufficient to have detected any *impostor* in. TILLOTSON.

DECENCY, DECORUM.

THOUGH DECENCY and DECORUM are both derived from the same word (*v. Becoming*), they have acquired a distinction in their sense and application. *Decency* respects a man's conduct; *decorum* his behavior: a person conducts himself with *decency*: he behaves with *decorum*. *Indecency* is a vice; it is the violation of public or private morals: *indecorum* is a fault; it offends the feelings of those who witness it. Nothing but a depraved mind can lead to *indecent* practices; indiscretion and thoughtlessness may sometimes give rise to that which is *indecorous*. *Decency* enjoins upon all relatives, according to the proximity of their relationship, to show certain marks of respect to the memory of the dead; regard for the feelings of others enjoins a certain outward *decorum* upon every one who attends a funeral.

Even religion itself, unless *decency* be the handmaid which waits upon her, is apt to make people appear guilty of sourness and ill-humor. SPECTATOR.

I will admit that a fine woman of a certain rank cannot have too many real vices; but at the same time I do insist upon it that it is essentially her interest not to have the appearance of any one. This *decorum*, I confess, will conceal her conquests; but, on the other hand, if she will be pleased to reflect that those conquests are known sooner or later, she will not upon an average find herself a loser. CHESTERFIELD.

TO DECIDE, DETERMINE, CONCLUDE UPON.

DECIDE, from the Latin *decido*, compounded of *de* and *caedo*, signifies to cut off or cut short a business. DETERMINE, from the Latin *determino*, compounded of *de* and *terminus*, a term or boundary, signifies to fix the boundary. CONCLUDE, *v. To close, finish*.

The idea of bringing a thing to an end is common in the signification of all these words; but to *decide* expresses more promptitude than to *determine*: we may *decide* instantaneously, but we must take more or less time to *determine*; we may

decide any single point either by an act of external force or by a sudden act of the mind; but, in *determining* any question, its extent, limits, and every circumstance must be taken into consideration; *determining* is therefore an act of deliberation. To *decide* is an act of greater authority: a parent *decides* for a child, but subordinates sometimes *determine* in the absence of their employers. Points of law are *decided* by the judge, points of fact are *determined* by the jury. To *decide* is therefore properly applied to all matters of dispute where more or less power or force is required to bring it to an end; to *determine* to all matters of conduct which may more easily be brought to an end.

With mutual blood th' Ausonian soil is dyed,
While on its borders each their claims *decide*.
DRYDEN.

These circumstances, with the lateness of the hour and the necessity of securing the prizes, *determined* the conquering admiral to bring to. CLARKE.

To *determine* and *decide* are applied to practical matters; to *conclude upon* to speculative as well as practical matters; as to *decide* the fate of persons, to *determine* anything that interests one, to *conclude* that a thing is right or wrong, just or unjust, and the like.

Ere! now expect great tidings, which perhaps
Of us will soon *determine*, or impose
New laws to be observed. MILTON.

But no frail man, however great or high,
Can be *concluded* blest before he die. ADDISON.

In respect to practical matters, to *determine* is either said of that which is subordinate, or it is a partial act of the mind; to *conclude* is said of the grand result; it is a complete act of the mind. Many things may be *determined* on which are either never put into execution, or remain long unexecuted; but that which is *concluded on* is mostly followed by immediate action. To *conclude on* is properly to come to a final *determination*.

Is it *concluded* he shall be protector?
It is *determined*, not *concluded* yet,
But so it must be, if the king miscarry.
SHAKESPEARE.

DECIDED, DETERMINED, RESOLUTE.

A MAN who is DECIDED (*v. To decide*) remains in no doubt: he who is DETER-

MINED is uninfluenced by the doubts or questions of others: he who is RESOLUTE (*v. To determine, resolve*) is uninfluenced by the consequences of his actions. A *decided* character is at all times essential for a prince or a minister, but particularly so in an unsettled period; a *determined* character is essential for a commander or any one who has to exercise authority; a *resolute* character is essential for one who is engaged in dangerous enterprises. Pericles was a man of a *decided* temper, which was well fitted to direct the affairs of government in a season of turbulence and disquietude: Titus Manlius Torquatus displayed himself to be a man of a *determined* character when he put to death his victorious son for a breach of military discipline: Brutus, the murderer of Caesar, was a man of a *resolute* temper.

Almost all the high-bred republicans of my time have, after a short space, become the most *decided* thorough-paced courtiers. BURKE.

A race *determined*, that to death contend;
So fierce these Greeks their last retreats defend.
POPE.

Most of the propositions we think, reason, discourse, may act upon, are such as we cannot have undoubted knowledge of their truth: yet some of them border so near upon certainty that we make no doubt at all about them; but assent to them as firmly, and act according to that assent as *resolutely*, as if they were infallibly demonstrated. LOCKE.

DECIDED, DECISIVE.

DECIDED marks that which is actually *decided*: DECISIVE that which appertains to *decision*. *Decided* is employed for persons or things; *decisive* only for things. A person's aversion or attachment is *decided*; a sentence, a judgment, or a victory, is *decisive*. A man of a *decided* character always adopts *decisive* measures. It is right to be *decidedly* averse to everything which is immoral: we should be cautious not to pronounce *decisively* on any point where we are not perfectly clear and well grounded in our opinion. In every popular commotion it is the duty of a good subject to take a *decided* part in favor of law and order: such is the nature of law, that if it were not *decisive* it would be of no value.

A politic caution, a guarded circumspection, were among the ruling principles of our forefathers in their most *decided* conduct. BURKE.

The sentence of superior judges is final, *decisive*, and irrevocable. BLACKSTONE.

DECISION, JUDGMENT, SENTENCE.

DECISION signifies literally the act of *deciding*, or the thing *decided* upon (*v. To decide*). JUDGMENT signifies the act of *judging* or *determining* in general (*v. To decide*). SENTENCE, in Latin *sententia*, signifies the opinion held or maintained.

These terms, though very different in their original meaning, are now employed so that the two latter are species of the former: a final conclusion of any business is comprehended in them all; but *decision* conveys none of the collateral ideas which is expressed by *judgment* and *sentence*: a *decision* has no respect to the agent; it may be said of one or many; it may be the *decision* of the court, of the nation, of the public, of a particular body of men, or of a private individual; but a *judgment* is given in a public court, or among private individuals: a *sentence* is passed in a court of law, or at the bar of the public. A *decision* specifies none of the circumstances of the action: it may be a legal or an arbitrary *decision*; it may be a *decision* according to one's caprice, or after mature deliberation: a *judgment* is always passed either in a court of law, and consequently by virtue of authority, or it is passed by an individual by the authority of his own *judgment*: a *sentence* is passed either by the authority of law, or at the discretion of an individual or of the public.

The *decisions* of the judges, in the several courts of justice, are the principal and most authoritative evidence that can be given of the existence of such a custom as shall form a part of the common law. BLACKSTONE.

It is the greatest folly to seek the praise or approbation of any being besides the Supreme Being; because no other being can make a right *judgment* of us. ADDISON.

The guilty man has an honor for the judge who with justice pronounces against him the *sentence* of death itself. STEELE.

A *decision* is given, it is that which decides, and, by putting an end to all dispute and doubt, enables a person to act. A *judgment* is formed, it respects the guilt or innocence, the moral excellence or defects, of a person or thing; it enables a person to think. A *sentence* is pronounced or passed; it respects all matters gener-

ally, and determines what are the sentiments of those by whom it is pronounced. Some points are of so complicated a nature that no *decision* can be given upon them; some are of so high a nature that they can be *decided* only by the highest authority; men are forbidden by the Christian religion to be severe in their judgments upon one another; the works of an author must sometimes await the *sentence* of impartial posterity before their value can be duly appreciated.

For pleasure and revenge
Have ears more deaf than adders to the voice
Of any true *decision*.
SHAKESPEARE.

Do you judge, from comparing the present state of the world with your natural notions of God, that there must needs be another state in which justice shall take place? You reason right, and the Gospel confirms the *judgment*.
SHERLOCK.

By inuring himself to examine all things, whether they be of consequence or not, the critic never looks upon anything but with a design of passing *sentence* upon it.
TATLEE.

DECLAIM, INVEIGH.

DECLAIM, in Latin *declamo*, that is, *de* and *clamo*, signifies literally to cry aloud in a set form of words. INVEIGH, *v. Abuse, invective*.

The sense in which these words agree is that of using the language of displeasure against any person or thing: *declaim* is used generally, *inveigh* particularly: public men and public measures are subjects for the *declaimer*; private individuals afford subjects for *inveighing* against: the former is under the influence of particular opinions or prejudices; the latter is the fruit of personal resentment or displeasure: politicians *declaim* against the conduct of those in power, or the state of the nation; they *inveigh* against individuals who have offended them. A *declaimer* is noisy: he is a man of words; he makes long and loud speeches: an *inveigher* is virulent and personal; he enters into private details, and often indulges his malignant feelings under an affected regard for morality.

The grave and the merry have equally thought themselves at liberty to conclude, either with *declamatory* complaints or satirical censures of female folly.
JOHNSON.

Scarce were the flocks refresh'd with morning dew,
When Damon, stretch'd beneath an olive shade,

And wildly starting upward, thus *inveigh'd*
Against the conscious gods.
DRYDEN.

TO DECLARE, PUBLISH, PROCLAIM.

DECLARE, in Latin *declaro*, compounded of *de* and *claro*, to clear, signifies literally to make clear or show plainly to a person. PUBLISH, *v. To announce*. PROCLAIM, in Latin *proclamo*, compounded of *pro* and *clamo*, signifies to cry before or in the ears of others.

The idea of making known is common to all these terms: this is simply the signification of *declare*, but the other two include accessory ideas. The word *declare* does not express any particular mode or circumstance of making known, as is implied by the others: we may *declare* publicly or privately; we *publish* and *proclaim* only in a public manner: we may *declare* by word of mouth, or by writing; we *publish* or *proclaim* by any means that will render the thing most generally known. In *declaring*, the leading idea is that of speaking out that which passes in the mind; in *publishing*, the leading idea is that of making public or common; in *proclaiming*, the leading idea is that of crying aloud: we may, therefore, often *declare* by *publishing* and *proclaiming*: a *declaration* is a personal act, it concerns the person *declaring*, or him to whom it is *declared*; its truth or falsehood depends upon the veracity of the speaker: a *publication* is of general interest; the truth or falsehood of it does not always rest with the *publisher*: a *proclamation* is altogether a public act, in which no one's veracity is implicated. Facts and opinions are *declared*; events and circumstances are *published*; the measures of government are *proclaimed*: it is folly for a man to *declare* anything to be true which he is not certain to be so, and wickedness in him to *declare* that to be true which he knows to be false: whoever *publishes* all he hears will be in great danger of *publishing* many falsehoods; whatever is *proclaimed* is supposed to be of sufficient importance to deserve the notice of all who may hear or read.

The Greeks in shouts their joint assent *declare*,
The priest to rev'rence and release the fair.
POPE.

I am surprised that none of the fortune-tell-

ers, or, as the French call them, the *Diseurs de bonne aventure*, who *publish* their bills in every quarter of the town, have not turned our lotteries to their advantage.
ADDISON.

Nine sacred heralds now, *proclaiming* loud
The monarch's will, suspend the list'ning crowd.
POPE.

A *declaration* is always a personal act, whether relating to public or private matters: a *publication* and a *proclamation* may be both indirect actions made by any channel the fittest to make a wide communication. In cases of war or peace, princes are expected to *declare* themselves on one side or the other; in the political world intelligence is quickly *published* through the medium of the public papers; in private life domestic occurrences are *published* with equal celerity through the medium of tale-bearers; *proclaiming* is not confined to political matters: whatever is made known after the manner of a *proclamation* is said to be *proclaimed*: joyful news is *proclaimed*, and where private matters which ought not to be known are *published* to the world people are said to *proclaim* their own shame.

There is one case in which it would be madness not to give credit to the most deceitful of men; that is, when they make *declarations* of hostility against us.
BURKE.

Soon, I believe,
His second marriage shall be *published*.
SHAKESPEARE.

Those who attempt by outrage and violence to deprive men of any advantage which they hold under the laws, and to destroy the natural order of life, *proclaim* war against them.
BURKE.

DECREE, EDICT, PROCLAMATION.

DECREE, in French *décret*, Latin *decretus*, from *decerno*, to give judgment or pass sentence, signifies the sentence or resolution that is passed. EDICT, in Latin *edictus*, from *edico*, to say out, signifies the thing spoken out or sent forth. PROCLAMATION, *v. To declare*.

A *decree* is a more solemn and deliberative act than an *edict*; on the other hand, an *edict* is more authoritative than a *decree*. A *decree* is the decision of one or many; an *edict* speaks the will of an individual: councils and senates, as well as princes, make *decrees*, despotic rulers issue *edicts*. *Decrees* are passed for the regulation of public and private matters; they are made known as occasion re-

quires, but are not always public; *edicts* and *proclamations* contain the commands of the sovereign authority, and are directly addressed by the prince to his people. An *edict* is peculiar to a despotic government; a *proclamation* is common to a monarchical and aristocratic form of government: the ukase in Russia is a species of *edict*, by which the emperor makes known his will to his people; the king of England communicates to his subjects the determinations of himself and his council by means of a *proclamation*.

There is no power in Venice
Can alter a *decree* establish'd;
'Twill be recorded for a precedent. SHAKESPEARE.

This statute or act of parliament is placed among the records of the kingdom, there needing no formal promulgation to give it the force of a law, as was necessary by the civil law with regard to the emperor's *edicts*. BLACKSTONE.

From the same original of the king's being the fountain of justice, we may also deduce the prerogative of issuing *proclamations*, which is vested in the king alone. BLACKSTONE.

The term *decree* is applied figuratively; the other terms are used, for the most part, in their proper sense only.

Are we condemn'd, by fate's unjust *decree*,
No more our houses and our homes to see?
DRYDEN.

TO DEDICATE, DEVOTE, CONSECRATE, HALLOW.

DEDICATE, in Latin *dedicatus*, participle from *de* and *dico*, signifies to set apart by a promise. DEVOTE, in Latin *devotus*, participle from *devoceo*, signifies to vow for an express purpose. CONSECRATE, in Latin *consecratus*, from *consecro* or *con* and *sacro*, signifies to make sacred by a special act. HALLOW, from *holy*, in German *heilig*, signifies to make holy.

There is something more solemn in the act of *dedicating* than in that of *devoting*; but less so than in that of *consecrating*. To *dedicate* and *devote* may be employed in both temporal and spiritual matters; to *consecrate* and *hallow* only in the spiritual sense: we may *dedicate* or *devote* anything that is at our disposal to the service of some object; but the former is employed mostly in regard to superiors, and the latter to persons without distinction of rank: we *dedicate* a house to the ser-

vice of God; or we *devote* our time to the benefit of our friends, or the relief of the poor: we may *dedicate* or *devote* ourselves to an object; but the former always implies a solemn setting apart springing from a sense of duty; the latter an entire application of one's self from zeal and affection; in this manner he who *dedicates* himself to God abstracts himself from every object which is not immediately connected with the service of God; he who *devotes* himself to the ministry pursues it as the first object of his attention and regard. To *consecrate* is a species of formal *dedication* by virtue of a religious observance; it is applicable mostly to places and things connected with religious works: *hallow* is a species of informal *consecration* applied to the same objects: the church is *consecrated*; particular days are *hallowed*.

Warn'd by the seer, to her offended name
We rais'd and *dedicated* this wond'rous frame.
DRYDEN.

Gilbert West settled himself in a very pleasant house at Wickham, in Kent, where he *devoted* himself to piety.
JOHNSON.

The greatest conqueror in this holy nation did not only compose the words of his divine odes, but generally set them to music himself; after which his works, though they were *consecrated* to the tabernacle, became the national entertainment.
ADDISON.

Without the walls a ruin'd temple stands,
To Ceres *hallowed* once.
DRYDEN.

TO DEDUCT, SUBTRACT.

DEDUCT, from the Latin *deductus*, participle of *deduco*, and SUBTRACT, from *subtractum*, participle of *subtraho*, have both the sense of taking from, but the former is used in a general, and the latter in a technical sense. He who makes an estimate is obliged to *deduct*; he who makes a calculation is obliged to *subtract*. The tradesman *deducts* what has been paid from what remains due; the accountant *subtracts* small sums from the gross amount.

The popish clergy took to themselves the whole residue of the intestate's estate, after the two-thirds of the wife and children were *deducted*.
BLACKSTONE.

A codicil is a supplement to a will, being for its explanation or alteration, or to make some addition to or else some *subtraction* from the former dispositions of the testator. BLACKSTONE.

DEDUCTION, ABATEMENT.

BOTH these words imply a taking off from something, but the *deduction* is made at the discretion of the person deducting; while the *abatement* is made for the convenience or at the desire of the person for whom it is made. A person may make a *deduction* in an account for various reasons, but he makes an *abatement* in a demand when it is objected to as excessive; so an *abatement* may be made in a calculation when it is supposed to be higher than it ought to be.

If I am correctly informed, the rise in the last year (in the produce of the taxes), after every *deduction* that can be made, affords the most consoling and encouraging prospect. BURKE.

Will come a day (hear this and quake, ye potent great ones!)

When you yourselves shall stand before a Judge
Who in a pair of scales will weigh your actions
Without *abatement* of one grain.

BEAUMONT AND FLETCHER.

DEED, EXPLOIT, ACHIEVEMENT, FEAT.

DEED, from *do*, expresses the thing done. EXPLOIT, in French *exploit*, most probably changed from *explicatus*, signifying the thing unfolded or displayed. ACHIEVEMENT, from *achieve*, French *achever*, to finish, signifies what is accomplished or completed. FEAT, in French *fait*, Latin *factum*, from *facio*, signifies the thing done.

The three first words rise progressively on each other: *deeds*, compared with the others, is employed for that which is ordinary or extraordinary; *exploit* and *achievement* are used only for the extraordinary; the latter in a higher sense than the former. *Deeds* must always be characterized as good or bad, magnanimous or atrocious, and the like, except in poetry, when the term becomes elevated.

Great Pollio! thou for whom thy Rome prepares
The ready triumph of thy finish'd wars;
Is there in fate an hour reserv'd for me
To sing thy *deeds* in numbers worthy thee?
DRYDEN.

Exploit and *achievement* do not necessarily require such epithets; they are always taken in the proper sense for something great. *Exploit*, when compared with *achievement*, is a term used in plain prose; it designates not so much what is great as what is real: *achievement* is

most adapted to poetry and romance; an *exploit* is properly a single act, and refers to the efforts of the individual performing it; an *achievement* may involve many acts and circumstances; in the execution it refers us to the point gained, as also to the difficulties of gaining it. An *exploit* marks only personal bravery in action; an *achievement* denotes elevation of character in every respect, grandeur of design, promptitude in execution, and valor in action. An *exploit* may be executed by the design and at the will of another; a common soldier or an army may perform *exploits*. An *achievement* is designed and executed by the *achiever*: Hercules is distinguished for his *achievements*; and in the same manner we speak of the *achievements* of knight-errants or of great commanders.

High matter thou enjoin'st me, O prime of men!
Sad task and hard: for how shall I relate
To human sense th' invisible *exploits*
Of warring spirits?
MILTON.

Great spoils and trophies, gain'd by thee, they
bear,
Then let thy own *achievements* be thy share.
DRYDEN.

Feat approaches nearest to *exploit* in signification; the former marks skill, and the latter resolution. The *feats* of chivalry displayed in jousts and tournaments were in former times as much esteemed as warlike *exploits*.

Much I have heard
Of thy prodigious might, and *feats* perform'd.
MILTON.

Exploit and *feat* are often used in derision, to mark the absence of skill or bravery in the actions of individuals. The soldier who affects to be foremost in situations where there is no danger cannot be more properly derided than by terming his action an *exploit*; he who prides himself on the display of skill in the performance of a paltry trick may be laughed at for having performed a *feat*. The same words may also be applied in an indifferent sense to familiar objects, as the *exploits* of a freebooter, or *feats* of horsemanship.

After this *exploit*, I walked gently to and fro
on the bed to recover my breath and loss of
spirits.
SWIFT.

Even his surliness was matter of mirth, and in
his play he preserved such an air of gravity, and

performed his *feats* with such a solemnity of manner, that in him too I had an agreeable companion.
COWPER.

TO DEFACE, DISFIGURE, DEFORM.

DEFACE, DISFIGURE, and DEFORM signify literally to spoil the *face*, *figure*, and *form*. *Deface* expresses more than either *deform* and *disfigure*. To *deface* is an act of destruction; it is the actual destruction of that which has before existed: to *disfigure* is either an act of destruction or an erroneous execution, which takes away the figure: to *deform* is altogether an imperfect execution, which renders the *form* what it should not be. A thing is *defaced* by design; it is *disfigured* either by design or accident; it is *deformed* either by an error or by the nature of the thing. Persons only *deface*; persons or things *disfigure*; things are most commonly *deformed* of themselves. That may be *defaced*, the face or external surface of which may be injured or destroyed; that may be *disfigured* or *deformed*, the figure or form of which is imperfect or may be rendered imperfect. A fine painting or piece of writing is *defaced* which is torn or besmeared with dirt: a fine building is *disfigured* by any want of symmetry in its parts: a building is *deformed* that is made contrary to all form. A statue may be *defaced*, *disfigured*, and *deformed*: it is *defaced* when any violence is done to the face or any outward part of the body; it is *disfigured* by the loss of a limb; it is *deformed* if made contrary to the perfect form of a person or thing to be represented. Inanimate objects are mostly *defaced* or *disfigured*, but seldom *deformed*; animate objects are either *disfigured* or *deformed*, but seldom *defaced*. A person may *disfigure* himself by his dress; he is *deformed* by the hand of nature.

Yet she had heard an ancient rumor fly
(Long cited by the people of the sky),
That times to come should see the Trojan race
Her Carthage ruin and her tow'rs *deface*.
DRYDEN.

It is but too obvious that errors are committed in this part of religion (devotion). These frequently *disfigure* its appearance before the world, and subject it to unjust reproach. BLAIR.

A beauteous maid above; but magic art,
With barking dogs, *deform'd* her nether part.
DRYDEN.