

may be *offended* with his playfellow for an act of incivility or unkindness.

Meantime imperial Neptune heard the sound
Of raging billows breaking on the ground;
Displeas'd and fearing for his wat'ry reign,
He rear'd his awful head above the main.

DRYDEN.

The emperor himself came running to the place
in his armor, severely reprov'ing them of cowardice who had forsaken the place, and grievously *offended* with those who had kept such negligent watch.

KNOLLES.

Displease respects mostly the inward state of feeling; *offend* and *vex* have most regard to the outward cause which provokes the feeling; a humorsome person may be *displeas'd* without any apparent cause; but a captious person will at least have some avowed trifle for which he is *offended*. *Vex* expresses more than *offend*, it marks, in fact, frequent efforts to *offend*, or the act of *offending* under aggravated circumstances: we often unintentionally *displease* or *offend*; but he who *vexes* has mostly that object in view in so doing: any instance of neglect *displeases*; any marked instance of neglect *offends*; any aggravated instance of neglect *vexes*. The feeling of *displeasure* is more perceptible and vivid than that of *offence*; but it is less durable: the feeling of *vexation* is as transitory as that of *displeasure*, but stronger than either. *Displeasure* and *vexation* betray themselves by an angry word or look; *offence* discovers itself in the whole conduct: our *displeasure* is unjustifiable when it exceeds the measure of another's fault; it is a mark of great weakness to take *offence* at trifles; persons of the greatest irritability are exposed to the most frequent *vexations*.

That fear of *displeasing* those who ought to be pleas'd, betrayed him sometimes into the other extreme.

CLARENDON.

Nathan's fable of the poor man and his lamb had so good an effect as to convey instruction to the ear of a king without *offending* it.

ADDISON.

These terms may all be applied to the acts of unconscious agents on the mind.

Foul sights do rather *displease*, in that they accite the memory of foul things than in the immediate objects.

BACON.

Gross sins are plainly seen and easily avoided by persons that profess religion. But the indiscreet and dangerous use of innocent and lawful

things, as it does not shock and *offend* our consciences, so it is difficult to make people at all sensible of the danger of it.

LAW.

These and a thousand mix'd emotions more,
From ever-changing views of good and ill,
Form'd infinitely various, vex the mind
With endless storm.

THOMSON.

As epithets they admit of a similar distinction: it is very *displeasing* to parents not to meet with the most respectful attentions from children when they give them counsel; and such conduct on the part of children is highly *offensive* to God: when we meet with an *offensive* object, we do most wisely to turn away from it: when we are troubled with *vexatious* affairs, our best and only remedy is patience.

The course of life was not *displeasing* to a young person; for here was fishing, billiards, hunting, visiting, and all country amusements.

NORTH.

The religious man fears, the man of honor scorns to do an ill action. The latter considers vice as something that is beneath him, the other as something that is *offensive* to God.

GUARDIAN.

DISPLEASURE, ANGER, DISAPPROBATION.

DISPLEASURE, *v. Dislike*. ANGER, *v. Anger*. DISAPPROBATION is the reverse of *approbation* (*v. Assent*).

Between *displeasure* and *anger* there is a difference both in the degree, the cause, and the consequence of the feeling: *displeasure* is always a softened and gentle feeling; *anger* is always a harsh feeling, and sometimes rises to vehemence and madness. *Displeasure* is always produced by some adequate cause, real or supposed; but *anger* may be provoked by every or any cause, according to the temper of the individual: *displeasure* is mostly satisfied with a simple verbal expression; but *anger*, unless kept down with great force, always seeks to return evil for evil. *Displeasure* and *disapprobation* are to be compared inasmuch as they respect the conduct of those who are under the direction of others: *displeasure* is an act of the will, it is an angry sentiment; *disapprobation* is an act of the judgment, it is an opposite opinion: any mark of self-will in a child is calculated to excite *displeasure*; a mistaken choice in matrimony may produce *disapprobation* in the parent.

Man is the merriest species of the creation; all above or below him are serious; he sees things in a different light from other beings, and finds his mirth arising from objects that perhaps cause something like pity or *displeasure* in a higher nature.

ADDISON.

From *anger* in its full import, protracted into malevolence and exerted in revenge, arise many of the evils to which the life of man is exposed.

JOHNSON.

The Queen-Regent's brothers knew her secret *disapprobation* of the violent measures they were driving on.

ROBERTSON.

Displeasure is always produced by that which is already come to pass; *disapprobation* may be felt upon that which is to take place: a master feels *displeasure* at the carelessness of his servant; a parent expresses his *disapprobation* of his son's proposal to leave his situation: it is sometimes prudent to check our *displeasure*; and mostly prudent to express our *disapprobation*: the former cannot be expressed without inflicting pain; the latter cannot be withheld when required without the danger of misleading.

They put him to death in a town of his own, against which he had expressed severe *displeasure* for their obstinate rebellion against the king.

CLARENDON.

His firm *disapprobation* of the many unprincipled men and measures of those days, and a surly integrity that unfitted him for the looseness of the court, contributed to render his situation unhappy.

NORTH.

DISPOSAL, DISPOSITION.

THESE words derive their different meanings from the verb to *dispose* (*v. To dispose*), to which they owe their common origin. DISPOSAL is a personal act; it depends upon the will of the individual: DISPOSITION is an act of the judgment; it depends upon the nature of the things. The removal of a thing from one's self is involved in a *disposal*; the good order of the things is comprehended in their *disposition*. The *disposal* of property is in the hands of the rightful owner; the success of a battle often depends upon the right *disposition* of an army.

In the reign of Henry the Second, if a man died without wife or issue, the whole of his property was at his own *disposal*.

BLACKSTONE.

Any difference, whether it be in the *disposition*, or in the figure, or even in the color of the parts, is highly prejudicial to the idea of infinity.

BURKE.

TO DISPOSE, ARRANGE, DIGEST.

DISPOSE, in French *disposer*, Latin *disposui*, preterite of *dispono*, or *dis* and *pono*, signifies to place apart. ARRANGE, *v. To class*. DIGEST, in Latin *digestus*, participle of *digero*, or *dis* and *gero*, signifies to gather apart with design.

The idea of a systematic laying apart is common to all, and proper to the word *dispose*. We *dispose* when we *arrange* and *digest*; but we do not always *arrange* and *digest* when we *dispose*: they differ in the circumstances and object of the action. There is less thought employed in *disposing* than in *arranging* and *digesting*; we may *dispose* ordinary matters by simply assigning a place to each; in this manner trees are *disposed* in a row, but we *arrange* and *digest* by an intellectual effort; in the first case by putting those together which ought to go together; and in the latter case by both separating that which is dissimilar, and bringing together that which is similar; in this manner books are *arranged* in a library according to their size or their subject; the materials for a literary production are *digested*; or the laws of the land are *digested*. What is not wanted should be neatly *disposed* in a suitable place: nothing contributes so much to beauty and convenience as the *arrangement* of everything according to the way and manner in which they should follow: when writings are involved in great intricacy and confusion, it is difficult to *digest* them.

Then near the altar of the darting king,
Dispos'd in rank their hecatomb they bring.

POPE.

There is a proper *arrangement* of the parts of elastic bodies, which may be facilitated by use.

CHEYNE.

The marks and impressions of diseases, and the changes and devastations they bring upon the internal parts, should be very carefully examined and orderly *digested* in the comparative anatomy we speak of.

BACON.

In an extended and moral application of these words, we speak of a person's time, talent, and the like, being *disposed* to a good purpose; of a man's ideas being properly *arranged*, and of being *digested* into form. On the *disposition* of a man's time and property will depend in a great measure his success in life;

on the *arrangement* of accounts greatly depends his facility in conducting business; on the habit of *digesting* our thoughts depends in a great measure correctness of thinking.

Thus while she did her various power *dispose*,
The world was free from tyrants, wars, and
woes. PRIOR.

When a number of distinct images are collected by these erratic and hasty surveys, the fancy is busied in *arranging* them. JOHNSON.

Chosen friends, with sense refin'd,
Learning *digested* well. THOMSON.

DISPOSITION, TEMPER.

DISPOSITION, from *dispose* (*v. To dispose*), signifies here the state of being *disposed*. TEMPER, like *temperament*, from the Latin *temperamentum* and *tempero*, to temper or manage, signifies the thing modelled or formed.

These terms are both applied to the mind and its bias; but *disposition* respects the whole frame and texture of the mind; *temper* respects only the bias or tone of the feelings.

My friend has his eye more upon the virtue and *disposition* of his children than their advancement or wealth. STEELE.

The man who lives under a habitual sense of the Divine presence keeps up a perpetual cheerfulness of *temper*. ADDISON.

Disposition is permanent and settled; *temper* may be transitory and fluctuating. The *disposition* comprehends the springs and motives of actions; the *temper* influences the action of the moment; it is possible and not infrequent to have a good *disposition* with a bad *temper*, and *vice versa*.

Akenside was a young man warm with every notion that by nature or accident had been connected with the sound of liberty, and by an eccentricity which such *dispositions* do not easily avoid, a lover of contradiction, and no friend to anything established. JOHNSON.

He gave much matter in few words; and as he seldom, if ever, betrayed a heat of *temper*, a false conclusion might be drawn, that because he controlled his passions he disguised his heart. CUMBERLAND.

A good *disposition* makes a man a useful member of society, but not always a good companion; a good *temper* renders him acceptable to all and peaceable with all, but essentially useful to none: a good *disposition* will go far toward cor-

recting the errors of *temper*; but where there is a bad *disposition* there are no hopes of amendment. The *disposition* is properly said to be natural, the *temper* is rather acquired or formed by circumstances.

I lamented that any man possessing such a fund of information, with a benevolence of soul that comprehended all mankind, a *temper* most placid, and a heart most social, should suffer in the world's opinion by that obscurity to which his ill-fortune, not his natural *disposition*, had reduced him. CUMBERLAND.

If the *temper* be taken for what is natural, it implies either the physical temperament or that frame of mind which results from or is influenced by it.

In coffee-houses a man of my *temper* is in his element; for if he cannot talk he can be still more agreeable to his company, as well as pleased in himself in being a hearer. STEELE.

DISPOSITION, INCLINATION.

DISPOSITION in the former section is taken for the general frame of the mind; in the present case for its particular frame. INCLINATION, *v. Attachment*.

Disposition is more positive than *inclination*. We may always expect a man to do that which he is *disposed* to do; but we cannot always calculate upon his executing that to which he is merely *inclined*. We indulge a *disposition*; we yield to an *inclination*. The *disposition* comprehends the whole state of the mind at the time; an *inclination* is particular, referring always to a particular object. After the performance of a serious duty, no one is expected to be in a *disposition* for laughter or merriment: it is becoming to suppress our *inclination* to laughter in the presence of those who wish to be serious; we should be careful not to enter into controversy with one who shows a *disposition* to be unfriendly. When a young person discovers any *inclination* to study, there are hopes of his improvement.

It is the duty of every man who would be true to himself, to obtain if possible a *disposition* to be pleased. STEELE.

There never was a time, believe me, when I wanted an *inclination* to cultivate your esteem and promote your interest.

MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

TO DISREGARD, NEGLECT, SLIGHT.

DISREGARD signifies properly not to regard. NEGLECT, in Latin *neglectus*, participle of *negligo*, compounded of *neg* and *lego*, not to choose. SLIGHT, from *light*, signifies to make light of or set light by.

We *disregard* the warnings, the words, or opinions of others; we *neglect* their injunctions or their precepts. To *disregard* results from the settled purpose of the mind; to *neglect* from a temporary forgetfulness or oversight. What is *disregarded* is seen and passed over; what is *neglected* is generally not thought of at the time required. What is *disregarded* does not strike the mind at all; what is *neglected* enters the mind only when it is before the eye: what we *disregard* is not esteemed; what we *neglect* is often esteemed, but not sufficiently to be remembered or practised: a child *disregards* the prudent counsels of a parent; he *neglects* to use the remedies which have been prescribed to him.

The new notion that has prevailed of late years that the Christian religion is little more than a good system of morality, must in course draw on a *disregard* to spiritual exercises. GIBSON.
Beauty's a charm, but soon the charm will pass,
While lilies lie *neglected* on the plain;
While dusky hyacinths for use remain.

DRYDEN.

Disregard and *neglect* are frequently not personal acts; they respect the thing more than the person; *slight* is altogether an intentional act toward an individual.

You cannot expect your son should have any regard for one whom he sees you *slight*. LOCKE.

Or toward any object which one has heretofore esteemed or ought to esteem.

When once devotion fancies herself under the influence of a divine impulse, it is no wonder she *slights* human ordinances. ADDISON.

DISSENSION, CONTENTION, DISCORD.

DISSENSION marks either the act or the state of *dissenting*. CONTENTION marks the act of *contending* (*v. To contend*). DISCORD, *v. Contention*.

A collision of opinions produces *dissension*; a collision of interests produces *contention*; a collision of humors produces *discord*. A love of one's own opin-

ion, combined with a disregard for the opinions of others, gives rise to *dissension*; selfishness is the main cause of *contention*; and an ungoverned temper that of *discord*.

At the time the poem we are now treating of was written, the *dissensions* of the barons, who were then so many petty princes, ran very high. ADDISON.

Because it is apprehended there may be great *contention* about precedence, the proposer humbly desires the assistance of the learned. SWIFT.
But shall celestial *discord* never cease?
'Tis better ended in a lasting peace. DRYDEN.

Dissension is peculiar to bodies or communities of men; *contention* is applicable mostly, and *discord* always, to individuals. A Christian temper of conformity to the general will of those with whom one is in connection would do away *dissension*; a limitation of one's desire to that which is attainable by legitimate means would put a stop to *contention*; a correction of one's impatient and irritable humor would check the progress of *discord*. *Dissension* tends not only to alienate the minds of men from each other, but to dissolve the bonds of society; *contention* is accompanied by anger, ill-will, envy, and many evil passions; *discord* interrupts the progress of the kind affections, and bars all tender intercourse.

Civil *dissension* is a viperous worm
That gnaws the bowels of the commonwealth. SHAKESPEARE.

The ancients made *contention* the principle that reigned in the chaos at first and then love, the one to express the divisions and the other the union of all parties in the middle and common bond. BURNET.

See what a scourge is laid upon your hate
That Heav'n finds means to kill your joy with
love!

And I, for winking at your *discords* too,
Have lost a brace of kinsmen. SHAKESPEARE.

DISTANT, FAR, REMOTE.

DISTANT is employed as an adjunct or otherwise; FAR is used only as an adverb. We speak of *distant* objects, or objects being *distant*; but we speak of things only as being *far*. *Distant*, in Latin *distans*, compounded of *di* and *stans*, standing asunder, is employed only for bodies at rest; *far*, in German *fern*, most probably from *gefahren*, participle of *fahren*, to go, signifies gone or removed away,

and is employed for bodies either stationary or otherwise; hence we say that a thing is *distant*, or it goes, runs, or flies *far*. *Distant* is used to designate great space; *far* only that which is ordinary; astronomers estimate that the sun is ninety-four millions of miles *distant* from the earth; a person lives not very *far* off, or a person is *far* from the spot. *Distant* is used absolutely to express an intervening space. REMOTE, in Latin *remotus*, participle of *removeo*, to remove, rather expresses the relative idea of being gone out of sight. A person is said to live in a *distant* country, or in a *remote* corner of any country.

There is nothing he has made that is either so *distant*, so little, or so inconsiderable, which he does not essentially inhabit. ADDISON.
O might a parent's careful wish prevail,
Far, far from Ilium should thy vessels sail,
And thou from camps *remote* the danger shun,
Which now, alas! too nearly threatens my son. POPE.

They bear a similar analogy in the figurative application; when we speak of a *remote* idea it designates that which is less liable to strike the mind than a *distant* idea. A *distant* relationship between individuals is never altogether lost sight of; when the connection between objects is very *remote* it easily escapes observation.

It is a pretty saying of Thales, "Falsehood is just as *far distant* from the truth as the ears from the eyes," by which he would intimate that a wise man would not easily give credit to the reports of actions which he has not seen. SPECTATOR.

Equally *remote* from the undistinguishing profusion of ancient, and the parsimonious elegance of modern habits, her house was a school for the young, and a retreat for the aged. WHITAKER.

TO DISTINGUISH, DISCRIMINATE.

To DISTINGUISH (*v. To abstract*) is the general, to DISCRIMINATE (*v. Discrimination*) is the particular term: the former is an indefinite, the latter a definite action. To *discriminate* is in fact to *distinguish* specifically; hence we speak of a *distinction* as true or false, but of a *discrimination* as nice. We *distinguish* things as to their divisibility or unity; we *discriminate* them as to their inherent properties; we *distinguish* things that are alike or unlike, in order to separate or collect them; we *discriminate* those that are dif-

ferent, for the purpose of separating one from the other: we *distinguish* by means of the senses as well as the understanding; we *discriminate* by the understanding only: we *distinguish* things by their color, or we *distinguish* moral objects by their truth or falsehood; we *discriminate* the characters of men, or we *discriminate* their merits according to circumstances.

'Tis easy to *distinguish* by the sight
The color of the soil, and black from white. DRYDEN.

A satire should expose nothing but what is corrigible; and make a due *discrimination* between those who are and those who are not the proper objects of it. ADDISON.

DISTINGUISHED, CONSPICUOUS, NOTED, EMINENT, ILLUSTRIOUS.

DISTINGUISHED signifies having a mark of *distinction* by which a thing is to be *distinguished* (*v. To abstract*). CONSPICUOUS, in Latin *conspicuous*, from *conspicio*, signifies easily to be seen. NOTED, from *notus*, known, well known. EMINENT, in Latin *eminens*, from *emineo*, or *e* and *maneo*, remaining or standing out above the rest. ILLUSTRIOUS, in Latin *illustris*, from *lustro*, to shine, shone upon.

The idea of an object having something attached to it to excite notice is common to all these terms. *Distinguished* in its general sense expresses little more than this idea; the rest are but modes of the *distinguished*. A thing is *distinguished* in proportion as it is distinct or separate from others; it is *conspicuous* in proportion as it is easily seen; it is *noted* in proportion as it is widely known. In this sense a rank is *distinguished*; a situation is *conspicuous*; a place is *noted*. Persons are *distinguished* by external marks or by characteristic qualities; persons or things are *conspicuous* mostly from some external mark; persons or things are *noted* mostly by collateral circumstances. A man may be *distinguished* by his decorations, or he may be *distinguished* by his manly air, or by his abilities: a person is *conspicuous* by the gaudiness of his dress; a house is *conspicuous* that stands on a hill; a person is *noted* for having performed a wonderful cure; a place is *noted* for its fine waters.

It has been observed by some writers that man is more *distinguished* from the animal world by devotion than by reason. ADDISON.

The traces of these dreadful conflagrations are still *conspicuous* in every corner. BRYDENE.

Upon my calling in lately at one of the most noted Temple coffee-houses, I found the whole room, which was full of young students, divided into several parties, each of which was deeply engaged in some controversy. BUDGELE.

We may be *distinguished* for things good, bad, or indifferent: we may be *conspicuous* for our singularities or that which only attracts vulgar notice: we may be *noted* for that which is bad, and mostly for that which is the subject of vulgar discourse: we can be *eminent* and *illustrious* only for that which is really good and praiseworthy; the former applies, however, mostly to those things which set a man high in the circle of his acquaintance; the latter to that which makes him shine before the world. A man of *distinguished* talent will be apt to excite envy if he be not also *distinguished* for his private virtue: affectation is never better pleased than when it can place itself in such a *conspicuous* situation as to draw all eyes upon itself: lovers of fame are sometimes contented to render themselves *noted* for their vices or absurdities: nothing is more gratifying to a man than to render himself *eminent* for his professional skill: it is the lot of but few to be *illustrious*, and those few are very seldom to be envied.

While public agitations allow a few individuals to be uncommonly *distinguished*, the general condition of the public remains calamitous and wretched. BLAIR.

Before the gate stood Pyrrhus, threat'ning loud,
With glittering arms *conspicuous* in the crowd. DRYDEN.

Of Prior, *eminent* as he was both by his abilities and station, very few memorials have been left by his contemporaries. JOHNSON.

Hail, sweet Saturnian soil! of fruitful grain
Great parent, greater of *illustrious* men. DRYDEN.

In an extended and moral application, these terms may be employed as epithets to heighten the character of an object: valor may be said to be *distinguished*, piety *eminent*, and a name *illustrious*.

Let your behavior toward superiors in dignity, age, learning, or any *distinguished* excellence, be full of respect, deference, and modesty. EARL OF CHATHAM.

It is more than probable that the prince above mentioned possessed both these qualifications (modesty and assurance) in an *eminent* degree. ADDISON.

Next add our cities of *illustrious* name,
Their costly labor and stupendous frame. DRYDEN.

DISTRESS, ANXIETY, ANGUISH, AGONY.

DISTRESS, *v. Adversity*. ANXIETY, in French *anxiété*, and ANGUISH, in French *angoisse*, both come from the Latin *ango*, *anxi*, to strangle. AGONY, in French *agonie*, Latin *agonia*, Greek *αγωνα*, from *αγωνίζω*, to contend or strive, signifies a severe struggle with pain and suffering.

Distress is the pain felt when in a strait from which we see no means of extricating ourselves; *anxiety* is that pain which one feels on the prospect of an evil. *Distress* always depends upon some outward cause; *anxiety* often lies in the imagination. *Distress* is produced by the present, but not always immediate evil; *anxiety* respects that which is future; *anguish* arises from the reflection on the evil that is past; *agony* springs from witnessing that which is immediate or before the eye.

Distress is not peculiar to any age; where there is a consciousness of good and evil, pain and pleasure, *distress* will inevitably exist from some circumstance or another. *Anxiety*, *anguish*, and *agony* belong to riper years: infancy and childhood are deemed the happy periods of human existence, because they are exempt from the *anxieties* attendant on every one who has a station to fill and duties to discharge. *Anguish* and *agony* are species of *distress*, of the severer kind, which spring altogether from the maturity of reflection, and the full consciousness of evil. A child is in *distress* when it loses its mother, and the mother is also in *distress* when she misses her child. The station of a parent is, indeed, that which is most productive, not only of *distress*, but of *anxiety*, *anguish*, and *agony*: the mother has her peculiar *anxieties* for her child, while rearing it in its infant state: the father has his *anxiety* for its welfare on its entrance into the world: they both suffer the deepest *anguish* when their child disappoints their dearest hopes by running a career of vice; not unfortunately they are doomed to suffer the *agony* of seeing a child encircled in flames from which he cannot be snatched, or

sinking into a watery grave from which he cannot be rescued.

How many, rack'd with honest passions, droop
In deep retir'd distress! How many stand
Around the death-bed of their dearest friends,
And point the parting anguish! THOMSON.

If you have any affection for me, let not your
anxiety, on my account, injure your health.

MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

In the anguish of his heart Adam expostulates with his Creator for having given him an unasked existence. ADDISON.

These are the charming agonies of love,
Whose misery delights. But through the heart
Should jealousy its venom once diffuse,
'Tis then delightful misery no more,
But agony unmix'd. THOMSON.

TO DISTRESS, HARASS, PERPLEX.

DISTRESS, *v. Distress*. HARASS, in French *harasser*, probably from the Greek *αρασσω*, to beat. PERPLEX, in Latin *perplexus*, participle of *perplexor*, compounded of *per* and *plexor*, to wind round and entangle.

A person is *distressed* either in his outward circumstances or his feelings; he is *harassed* mentally or corporeally; he is *perplexed* in his understanding, more than in his feelings: a deprivation *distresses*; provocations and hostile measures *harass*; stratagems and ambiguous measures *perplex*: a besieged town is *distressed* by the cutting off its resources of water and provisions; the besieged are *harassed* by perpetual attacks; the besiegers are *perplexed* in all their manœuvres and plans, by the counter-manœuvres and contrivances of their opponents: a tale of woe *distresses*; continual alarms and incessant labor *harass*; unexpected obstacles and inextricable difficulties *perplex*.

O friend! Ulysses' shouts invade my ear;
Distress'd he seems, and no assistance near.

POPE.

Persons who have been long *harassed* with business and care sometimes imagine that when life declines, they cannot make their retirement from the world too complete. BLAIR.

Would being end with our expiring breath,
How soon misfortunes would be puff'd away.
A trifling shock can shiver us to the dust,
But th' existence of the immortal soul,
Futurity's dark road *perplexes* still.

GENTLEMAN.

DISTRIBUTE, ALLOT, ASSIGN, APPORTION.

DISTRIBUTE, in Latin *distributus*, participle of *distribuo*, *dis*, apart, and *tri-*

buo, to bestow, signifies to portion out to several. ALLOT, *v. Allot*. ASSIGN, in French *assigner*, Latin *assigno*, *i. e.*, as or *ad* and *signo*, to sign, signifies by signing or marking, to set out for a particular purpose. APPORTION, from *ap* or *ad* and *portio*, signifies to give by way of portion for a particular purpose.

The idea of giving to several is common to these terms; this is the proper signification of *distribute*; but to that of the other terms is annexed some qualification. *Distributing* is always applied to a number of individuals, but *allotting*, *assigning*, and *apportioning* is the giving either to one or several: a sum of money is *distributed* among a number of poor people; it is *allotted*, *assigned*, or *apportioned* to a particular individual, or to each individual out of a number. *Distribute* is said properly of that which is divided, or divisible into any number of parts, as bread is *distributed* in loaves, or money is *distributed* in the way of shillings; *allotted* is applied to that which is divisible into lots, and *apportion* to that which is formed into certain proportional parts or portions, as to *allot* land, to give a lot of land; to *apportion* a sum of money, *i. e.*, to give it in certain proportions. *Assign* is applied to any distinct whole, not considered either as divided or divisible, as to *assign* a house, place, etc. To *distribute* is to give promiscuously, without reference to the nature of objects or the purpose for which they are given; things may be *distributed* to the worthy or the unworthy, to those who want it or those who do not, at the will of the *distributor* or otherwise. To *allot* is to give according to the lots into which the thing is divided for a given purpose, as to *allot* land to each cottager; to *assign* is to set apart something that is suited to the person or adapted for the object proposed, as a prize is *assigned* to the most meritorious; a house is *assigned* for the reception of the houseless wanderer; to *apportion* is to give in a certain proportion according to a certain rule, as to *apportion* rent to different houses according to their size and value.

Of great riches there is no real use except in the *distribution*. BACON.

If they found the children lusty and well-favored, they gave order for their education, and

allotted a certain proportion of land for their maintenance. POTTER.

The reverend Nestor ranks his Pylean bands.
The horse and chariots to the front *assign'd*.

POPE.

The underwriter may afterward recover from each of the rest a ratable satisfaction or *apportionment* of the sum which he has been obliged to pay to the assured. PARK.

So in the figurative or moral application, the goods or ills of life are *distributed* by a wise Providence, but often in ways or for purposes that are hidden from our view.

From thence the cup of mortal man he fills,
Blessings to these, to those *distributes* ills.

POPE.

Particular portions of that which is desirable, or the contrary, is *allotted* to each according to the circumstances of the case.

Every one that has been long dead has a due proportion of praise *allotted* him, in which while he lived his friends were too profuse, and his enemies too sparing. ADDISON.

Offices, duties, properties, and the like, are *assigned* according as they really are or are supposed to be suitable.

You may *assign* any proportions you please to every part of the human body, and I undertake that a painter shall religiously observe them all, and notwithstanding produce, if he pleases, a very ugly figure. BURKE.

Labor, happiness, misery, or anything of which only parts can be had, may be *apportioned*.

Of the happiness and misery of our present condition, part is *distributed* by nature, and part is in a great measure *apportioned* by ourselves. JOHNSON.

DISTRICT, REGION, TRACT, QUARTER.

DISTRICT, in Latin *districtus*, from *distingo*, to bind separately, signifies a certain part marked off specifically. REGION, in Latin *regio*, from *rego*, to rule, signifies a portion that is within rule. TRACT, in Latin *tractus*, from *traho*, to draw, signifies a part drawn out. QUARTER signifies literally a fourth part.

These terms are all applied to portions of country, the former two comprehending divisions marked out on political grounds; the latter a geographical or an indefinite division: *district* is smaller than a *region*; the former refers only to

part of a country, the latter frequently applies to a whole country: a *quarter* is indefinite, and may be applied either to a *quarter* of the world or a particular neighborhood: a *tract* is the smallest portion of all, and comprehends frequently no more than what may fall within the compass of the eye. We consider a *district* only with relation to government; every magistrate acts within a certain *district*: we speak of a *region* when considering the circumstances of climate, or the natural properties which distinguish different parts of the earth; as the *regions* of heat and cold: we speak of the *quarter* simply to designate a point of the compass; as a person lives in a certain *quarter* of the town that is north or south, east or west, etc.; and so also in an extended application, we say, to meet with opposition in an unexpected *quarter*: we speak of a *tract* to designate the land that runs on in a line; as a mountainous *tract*.

The very inequality of representation, which is so foolishly complained of, is perhaps the very thing which prevents us from thinking or acting as members for *districts*. BURKE.

Between those *regions* and our upper light
Deep forests and impenetrable night
Possess the middle space. DRYDEN.

My timorous muse
Unambitious *tracts* pursues. COWLEY.

There is no man in any rank who is always at liberty to act as he would incline. In some *quarter* or other he is limited by circumstances. BLAIR.

DISTRUST, SUSPICION, DIFFIDENCE.

DISTRUST signifies not putting trust in (*v. Belief*). SUSPICION, from the Latin *suspicio*, or *sub* and *specio*, signifies looking at askance, or with a wry mind. DIFFIDENCE, from the Latin *diffido* or *disfido*, signifies having no faith.

Distrust is said either of ourselves or others; *suspicion* is said only of others; *diffidence* only of ourselves: to be *distrustful* of a person is to impute no good to him; to be *suspicious* of a person is to impute positive evil to him: he who is *distrustful* of another's honor or prudence will abstain from giving him his confidence; he who is *suspicious* of another's honesty will be cautious to have no dealings with him.

The dissolution of two parliaments in so short a time, and of the last in so abrupt a manner

raised up a general spirit of discontent and *disturb* throughout the kingdom. TEMPLE.

Nature itself after it has done an injury will be *suspicious*, and no man can love the person he suspects. SOUTH.

Distrust is a particular state of feeling having a specific object; *suspicion* is a habitual state of feeling, and has indefinite objects.

All parties had an opinion of his abilities; few had any *distrust* of his virtues. GUTHRIE.

And oft, though wisdom wake, *suspicion* sleeps
At wisdom's gate, and to simplicity
Resigns his charge. MILTON.

As regards one's self, a person may *distrust* his own powers for the execution of a particular office, or a *distrust* of himself in company; he has a general *diffidence*, or he is naturally *diffident*.

Before strangers, Pitt had something of the scholar's timidity and *distrust*. JOHNSON.

As an actor, Mr. Cunningham obtained little reputation, for his *diffidence* was too great to be overcome. JOHNSON.

TO DISTURB, INTERRUPT.

DISTURB (*v. Commotion*). **INTERRUPT**, from the Latin *inter* and *rumpo*, signifies to break in between so as to stop the progress.

We may be *disturbed* either inwardly or outwardly; we are *interrupted* only outwardly: our minds may be *disturbed* by disquieting reflections, or we may be *disturbed* in our rest or in our business by unseemly noises; but we can be *interrupted* only in our business or pursuits: the *disturbance*, therefore, depends upon the character of the person; what *disturbs* one man will not *disturb* another: an *interruption* is, however, something positive; what *interrupts* one person will *interrupt* another: the smallest noises may *disturb* one who is in bad health; illness or the visits of friends will *interrupt* a person in any of his business.

If aught *disturb* the tenor of his breast,
'Tis but the wish to strike before the rest. POPE.

A single word or even an offer at *interruption* stopped him in a moment, though in the middle of a sentence. CUMBERLAND.

The same distinction exists between these words when applied to things as to persons: whatever is put out of its order or proper condition is *disturbed*; thus water which is put into motion

from a state of rest is *disturbed*: whatever is stopped in the evenness or regularity of its course is *interrupted*; thus water which is turned out of its ordinary channel is *interrupted*.

Some short confused speeches show an imagination *disturbed* with guilt. ADDISON.

The foresight of the hour of death would continually *interrupt* the course of human affairs. BLAIR.

TO DIVIDE, SEPARATE, PART.

DIVIDE, in Latin *divideo*, compounded of *di* and the Etruscan *duo*, from *ei* and *duo*, two, signifies to make into two. **SEPARATE**, *v. Abstract*. **PART** signifies to make into parts.

That is said to be *divided* which has been or is conceived to be a whole, that is *separated* which might be joined: an army may be *divided* into two or three divisions or portions: the *divisions* are frequently *separated* in their march. Things may be *divided* by anything which distinguishes the parts from one another; they are *separated* by disjunction of space only.

Nor cease your sowing till midwinter ends,
For this through twelve bright signs Apollo
guides

The year, and earth in several climes *divides*. DRYDEN.

Things may be mentally divided, but they are separated only corporeally: the minds of men are often most *divided* when in person they are least *separated*.

If we *divide* the life of most men into twenty parts, we shall find at least nineteen of them filled with gaps and chasms, which are neither filled up with pleasure or business. ADDISON.

Where there is the greatest and most honorable love, it is sometimes better to be joined in death than *separated* in life. STEELE.

To *part* has an intermediate sense between *divide* and *separate*; to *divide* is properly to make any whole into two parts; to *part* is to destroy the cohesion of two or more wholes when joined together: a loaf is *divided* when it is cut into two or more pieces; two loaves are *parted*. Sometimes things are both *divided* and *parted* in order to be distributed; in this case the distinction is the same; solid things, or what is in a mass, is *divided*; but things which do not lose their integrity are *parted*: an estate is *divided*; goods or effects are *parted*.

The whole army was *divided* into regiments. POTTER.
From the signed victim crops the curling hair,
The heralds *part* it and the princes share. POPE.

As disjunction is the common idea attached to both *separate* and *part*, they are frequently used in relation to the same objects; things are mostly said to be *parted* which are made to be apart for any temporary purpose, or by any means, however slight or trivial; thus rooms may be *parted* by a partition; that is said to be *separated* which is intended to be kept permanently separate, or which ought not to be joined; thus fields are *separated* by hedges.

Most of the ancient writers are of opinion that Sicily was formerly joined to the continent in this spot, and that the *separation* must have been made by some violent convulsion of the earth. BRYDENE.

Learn from this hint, let this instruct our art,
Thin taper sticks must from one centre *part*. GAY.

With regard to persons, *part* designates the actual leaving of the person; *separate* is used in general for that which lessens the society; the former is often casual, temporary, or partial; the latter is positive and serious; the *parting* is momentary; the *separation* may be longer or shorter: two friends *part* in the streets after a casual meeting; two persons *separate* on the road who had set out to travel together: men and their wives often *part* without coming to a positive *separation*: some couples are *separated* from each other in every respect but that of being directly *parted*; the moment of *parting* between friends is often more painful than the *separation* which afterward ensues.

I pray let me retain some room, though never so little, in your thoughts, during the time of this our *separation*. HOWELL.

The prince pursu'd the *parting* deity
With words like these, "Ah, whither do you fly?"
Unkind and cruel to deceive your son. DRYDEN.

TO DIVIDE, DISTRIBUTE, SHARE.

DIVIDE, *v. To divide, separate*. **DISTRIBUTE**, in Latin *distributus*, from *distribuo*, or *dis* and *tribuo*, signifies to bestow apart. **SHARE**, from the word *shear*, and the German *scheeren*, signifies simply to cut.

The act of *dividing* does not extend

beyond the thing *divided*; that of *distributing* and *sharing* comprehends also the purpose of the action: we *divide* the thing; we *distribute* to the person: we may *divide*, therefore, without *distributing*; or we may *divide* in order to *distribute*: thus we *divide* our land into distinct fields for our private convenience; or we *divide* a sum of money into so many parts, in order to *distribute* it among a given number of persons: on the other hand, we may *distribute* without *dividing*; for money, books, fruit, and many other things may be *distributed*, which require no *division*.

Let old Timotheus yield the prize,
Or both *divide* the crown;
He raised a mortal to the skies,
She drew an angel down. DRYDEN.

Two urns by Jove's high throne have ever stood,
The source of evil one, and one of good;
From thence the cup of mortal man he fills
Blessings to these, to those *distributes* ill. POPE.

To *share* is to make into parts, the same as *divide*, and it is to give those parts to some persons, the same as *distribute*; but the person who *shares* takes a part himself; he who *distributes* gives it all to others: a loaf is *divided* in order to be eaten; bread is *distributed* in loaves among the poor; the loaf is *shared* by a poor man with his poorer neighbor, or the profits of a business are *shared* by the partners.

Providence has made an equal *distribution* of natural gifts, whereof each creature severally has a share. L'ESTRANGE.

Why grieves my son? Thy anguish let me *share*,
Reveal the cause, and trust a parent's care. POPE.

To *share* may imply either to give or receive; to *distribute* implies giving only: we *share* our own with another, or another *shares* what we have; but we *distribute* our own to others.

We render you the tenth to be ta'en forth
Before the common *distribution*, at your choice. SHAKESPEARE.

They will be so much the more careful to determine properly, as they shall (will) be obliged to *share* the expenses of maintaining the masters. MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF PLINY.

DOCILE, TRACTABLE, DUCTILE.

DOCILE, in Latin *docilis*, from *doceo*, to teach, is the Latin term for ready to

be taught. TRACTABLE, from *traho*, denotes the readiness to be drawn. One is *docile* as a scholar; one is *tractable* as a child or a servant. Where anything is to be learned, *docility* is necessary; where anything is to be done at the call of another, *tractability* is required. DUCTILITY, from *duco*, to lead, signifies aptness to be led, and is applied to the mind or its powers, which yield readily to impressions.

The Persians are not wholly void of martial spirit; and if they are not naturally brave, they are at least extremely *docile*, and might, with proper discipline, be made excellent soldiers.

The people, without being servile, must be *tractable*.

The will was then (before the fall) *ductile* and pliant to all the motions of right reason. SOUTH.

Animals may be said to be *docile* and *tractable* with a like distinction; inanimate objects, as metals, etc., may be *ductile*.

Their reindeer form their riches; these their tents, Their robes, their beds, and all their homely wealth.

Supply their wholesome fare and cheerful cups; Obscure at their call, the *docile* tribe Yield to the sledge their necks. THOMSON.

They (the Arabian horses) are so *tractable* and familiar that they will run from the fields to the call of their masters. GOLDSMITH.

The *ductile* wax with busy hands I mould. POPE.

DOCTRINE, PRECEPT, PRINCIPLE.

DOCTRINE, in French *doctrine*, Latin *doctrina*, from *docco*, to teach, signifies the thing taught; PRECEPT, from the Latin *præcipio*, the thing laid down; PRINCIPLE, in French *principe*, Latin *principium*, the beginning of things, that is, their first or original component parts.

A *doctrine* requires a teacher; a *precept* requires a superior with authority; a *principle* requires only a maintainer or holder. A *doctrine* is always framed by some one; a *precept* is enjoined or laid down by some one; a *principle* lies in the thing itself. A *doctrine* is composed of *principles*; a *precept* rests upon *principles* or *doctrines*. Pythagoras taught the *doctrine* of the metempsychosis, and enjoined many *precepts* on his disciples for the regulation of their conduct, particularly that they should abstain from eating animal

food, and be only silent hearers for the first five years of their scholarship: the former of these rules depended upon the preceding *doctrine* of the soul's transmigration to the bodies of animals; the latter rested on that simple *principle* of education, the entire devotion of the scholar to the master. We are said to believe in *doctrines*; to obey *precepts*; to imbibe or hold *principles*. *Doctrine* is that which constitutes our faith; *precepts* are that which directs the practice: both are the subjects of rational assent, and suited only to the matured understanding: *principles* are often admitted without examination; and imbibed as frequently from observation and circumstances, as from any direct personal efforts; children as well as men acquire *principles*.

This seditious, unconstitutional *doctrine* of electing kings is now publicly taught, avowed, and printed. BURKE.

Pythagoras's first rule directs us to worship the gods, as is ordained by law, for that is the most natural interpretation of the *precept*. ADDISON.

If the *principles* of the revolution of 1688 are anywhere to be found, it is in the Statute called the "Declaration of Rights." BURKE.

DOCTRINE, DOGMA, TENET.

A DOCTRINE originates with an individual. DOGMA, from the Greek *δογμα* and *δοκω*, to think, signifies something thought, admitted, or taken for granted; this lies with a body or number of individuals. TENET, from the Latin *teneo*, to hold or maintain, signifies the thing held or maintained, and is a species of principle (*v. Doctrine*) specifically maintained in matters of opinion by persons in general. A *doctrine* rests on the authority of the individual by whom it is framed; the *dogma* on the authority of the body by whom it is maintained; a *tenet* rests on its own intrinsic merits. Many of the *doctrines* of our blessed Saviour are held by faith in him; they are subjects of persuasion by the exercise of our rational powers; the *dogmas* of the Romish Church are admitted by none but such as admit its authority: every *sect* has its peculiar *tenets*.

Unpractis'd he to fawn or seek for pow'r By *doctrines* fashion'd to the varying hour; Far other aims his heart had learn'd to prize, More skill'd to raise the wretched than to rise. GOLDSMITH.

There are in England abundance of men who tolerate in the true spirit of toleration. They think the *dogmas* of religion, though in different degrees, are all of moment, and that among them there is, as among all things of value, a just ground of preference. BURKE.

One of the puritanical *tenets* was the illegality of all games of chance. JOHNSON.

TO DOUBT, QUESTION.

DOUBT, in French *douter*, Latin *dubito*, from *dubius* and *duo*, two, signifies to have two opinions. QUESTION, in Latin *questio*, from *quero*, to inquire, signifies to make a question.

Both these terms express the act of the mind in staying its decision. *Doubt* lies altogether in the mind; it is a less active feeling than *question*: by the former we merely suspend decision; by the latter we actually demand proofs in order to assist us in deciding. We may *doubt* in silence: we cannot *question* without expressing it, directly or indirectly. He who suggests *doubts* does it with caution: he who makes a *question* throws in difficulties with a degree of confidence. *Doubts* insinuate themselves into the mind often times involuntarily on the part of the *doubter*; *questions* are always made with an express design. We *doubt* in matters of general interest, on abstruse as well as common subjects: we *question* mostly in ordinary matters that are of a personal interest: we *doubt* the truth of a position; we *question* the veracity of an author. The existence of mermaids was *doubted* for a great length of time; but the testimony of creditable persons who have lately seen them ought now to put it out of all *doubt*. When the practicability of any plan is *questioned*, it is unnecessary to enter any farther into its merits.

For my part, I think the being of a God is so little to be *doubted*, that I think it is almost the only truth we are sure of. ADDISON.

Our business in the field of fight Is not to *question*, but to prove our might. POPE.

The *doubt* is frequently confined to the individual; the *question* frequently respects others. We *doubt* whether we shall be able to succeed; we *question* another's right to interfere: we *doubt* whether a thing will answer the end proposed; we *question* the utility of any one making the attempt. There are many

doubtful cases in medicine, where the physician is at a loss to decide; there are many *questionable* measures proposed by those who are in or out of power which demand consideration. A disposition to *doubt* everything is more inimical to the cause of truth than the readiness to believe everything; a disposition to *question* whatever is said or done by others is much more calculated to give offence than to prevent deception.

Vile shrubs are shorn for browse; tow'ring height

Of unctuous trees are torches for the night; And shall we *doubt* (indulging easy sloth) To sow, to set, and to reform their growth? DRYDEN.

You know me well, and herein spend but time To wind about my love with circumstance, And out of *doubt* you do me now more wrong, In making *question* of my uttermost, Than if you had made waste of all I have. SHAKESPEARE.

DOUBT, SUSPENSE.

DOUBT respects that which we should believe; SUSPENSE that which we wish to know or ascertain. We are in *doubt* for the want of evidence; we are in *suspense* for the want of certainty. *Doubt* interrupts our progress in the attainment of truth; *suspense* impedes us in the attainment of our objects: the former is connected principally with the understanding; the latter acts altogether upon the hopes. We have our *doubts* about things that have no regard to time; we are in *suspense* about what is to happen in future. Those are the least inclined to *doubt* who have the most thorough knowledge of a subject; those are the least exposed to the unpleasant feeling of *suspense* who confine their wishes to the present.

Gold is a wonderful clearer of the understanding; it dissipates every *doubt* and scruple in an instant. ADDISON.

The bundle of hay on either side striking his (the ass's) sight and smell in the same proportion, would keep him in perpetual *suspense*. ADDISON.

DOUBTFUL, DUBIOUS, UNCERTAIN, PRECARIOUS.

THE DOUBTFUL admits of *doubt* (*v. Doubt, suspense*); the DUBIOUS creates *doubt* or *suspense*. The *doubtful* is said of things in which we are required to have an opinion; the *dubious* respects

events and things that must speak for themselves. In *doubtful* cases it is advisable for a judge to lean to the side of mercy; while the issue of a contest is *dubious*, all judgment of the parties, or of the case, must be carefully avoided.

The Greeks with slain Teipolemus retir'd,
Whose fall Ulysses view'd with fury fir'd:
Doubtful if Jove's great son he should pursue,
Or pour his vengeance on the Lician crew.

POPE.

At the lower end of the room is to be a side-table for persons of great fame, but *dubious* existence, such as Hercules, Theseus, Æneas, Achilles, Hector, and others.

SWIFT.

Doubtful and *dubious* have always a relation to the person forming the opinion on the subject in question; UNCERTAIN and PRECARIOUS are epithets which designate the qualities of the things themselves. Whatever is *uncertain* may from that very circumstance be *doubtful* or *dubious* to those who attempt to determine upon them; but they may be designated for their *uncertainty* without any regard to the opinions which they may give rise to. A person's coming may be *doubtful* or *uncertain*; the length of his stay is oftener described as *uncertain* than as *doubtful*. The *doubtful* is opposed to that on which we form a positive conclusion, the *uncertain* to that which is definite or prescribed. The efficacy of any medicine is *doubtful*; the manner of its operation may be *uncertain*. While our knowledge is limited, we must expect to meet with many things that are *doubtful*; as everything in the world is exposed to change, and all that is future is entirely above our control, we must naturally expect to find everything *uncertain* but what we see passing before us.

I am pleased with a frame of four lights, *doubtful* whether the few pines it contains will ever be worth a farthing.

COWPER.

Near old Antandros, and at Ida's foot,
The timber of the sacred grove we cut;
And build our fleet, *uncertain* yet to find
What place the gods for our repose assign'd.

DRYDEN.

PRECARIOUS, from the Latin *precarious* and *precor*, to pray, signifies granted to entreaty, depending on the will or humor of another, whence it is applicable to whatever is obtained from others. *Precarious* is the highest species of *uncertainty*, applied to such things as de-

pend on future casualties in opposition to that which is fixed and determined by design. The weather is *uncertain*; the subsistence of a person who has no stated income or source of living must be *precarious*. It is *uncertain* what day a thing may take place, until it is determined; there is nothing more *precarious* than what depends upon the favors of princes.

The frequent disappointments incident to hunting induced men to establish a permanent property in their flocks and herds, in order to sustain themselves in a less *precarious* manner.

BLACKSTONE.

TO DRAW, DRAG, HAUL, OR HALE,
PULL, PLUCK, TUG.

DRAW comes from the Latin *traho*, to draw, and the Greek *τρασσω*, to lay hold of. DRAG is a variation of draw. HAUL or HALE answers to the Greek *αλω*, to draw. PULL is, in all probability, connected with *pello*, to drive or thrust. PLUCK is in the German *plücken*, etc.; and TUG answers to the German *ziehen*, to pull or draw.

Draw expresses here the idea common to the three first terms, namely, of putting a body in motion from behind one's self or toward one's self; to *drag* is to *draw* a thing with violence, or to *draw* that which makes resistance; to *haul* is to *drag* it with still greater violence. We *draw* a cart; we *drag* a body along the ground; or *haul* a vessel to the shore. To *pull* signifies only an effort to *draw* without the idea of motion: horses *pull* very long sometimes before they can *draw* a heavily laden cart uphill. To *pluck* is to *pull* with a sudden twitch, in order to separate; thus feathers are *plucked* from animals. To *tug* is to *pull* with violence; thus men *tug* at the oar.

Furious he said, and tow'rd the Grecian crew
(Seiz'd by the crest) the unhappy warrior *draw*;
Struggling he follow'd, while th' embroider'd
thong

That ty'd his helmet *drag*'d the chief along.

POPE.

Some hoisting levers, some the wheels prepare,
And fasten to the horse's feet; the rest
With cables *haul* along the unwieldy beast.

DRYDEN.

Two magnets are placed, one of them in the roof and the other in the floor of Mohammed's burying-place at Mecca, and *pull* the impostor's iron coffin with such an equal attraction, that it hangs in the air between both of them.

ADDISON.

Even children follow'd with endearing wile,
And *pluck'd* his gown to share the good man's
smile.

GOLDSMITH.

Clear'd as I thought, and fully fix'd at length
To learn the cause, I *tugg'd* with all my strength.

DRYDEN.

In the moral application of the words we may be said to be *drawn* by anything which can act on the mind to bring us near to an object; we are *dragged* only by means of force; we *pull* a thing toward us by a direct effort. To *haul*, *pluck*, and *tug* are seldom used but in the physical application.

Hither we sail'd, a voluntary throng,
To avenge a private, not a public wrong;
What else to Troy the assembled nations *draves*,
But thine—ungrateful! and thy brother's cause.

POPE.

'Tis long since I for my celestial wife,
Loath'd by the gods, have *drag*'d a lingering
life.

POPE.

Hear this, remember, and our fury dread,
Nor *pull* th' unwilling vengeance on thy head.

POPE.

DREAM, REVERIE.

DREAM, in Dutch *drom*, etc., in the Celtic *drem*, a sight, is connected with the Greek *δραμα*, a fable, and the word *rom*, signifying to wander, in Hebrew *rom*, to be agitated. REVERIE, in French *reverie*, like the English *rave*, and the Latin *rabies*, madness, signifies that which is wandering or incoherent.

Dreams and *reveries* are alike opposed to the reality, and have their origin in the imagination; but the former commonly passes in sleep, and the latter when awake: the *dream* may and does commonly arise when the imagination is in a sound state; the *reverie* is the fruit of a heated imagination: *dreams* come in the course of nature; *reveries* are the consequence of a peculiar ferment.

When the term *dream* is applied to the act of one that is awake, it admits of another distinction from *reverie*. They both designate what is confounded, but the *dream* is less extravagant than the *reverie*. Ambitious men please themselves with *dreams* of future greatness; enthusiasts debase the purity of the Christian religion by blending their own wild *reveries* with the doctrines of the Gospel. He who indulges himself in idle *dreams* lays up a store of disappointment for himself when he recovers his recollection, and finds that it is nothing but a

dream: a love of singularity operating on an ardent mind will too often lead men to indulge in strange *reveries*.

Gay's friends persuaded him to sell his share of South-sea stock, but he *dreamed* of dignity and splendor, and could not bear to obstruct his own fortune.

JOHNSON.

I continued to sit motionless with my eyes fixed upon the curtain some moments after it fell. When I was roused from my *reverie* I found myself almost alone.

HAWKSWORTH.

DREGS, SEDIMENT, DROSS, SCUM,
REFUSE.

DREGS, like the German *dreck*, dirt, signifies the dirty part which separates from a liquor. SEDIMENT, from *sedeo*, to sit, signifies that which settles at the bottom. DROSS is probably but a variation of *dregs*. SCUM, in the German *schaum*, signifies the same as foam or froth. REFUSE literally that which is refused or thrown away.

All these terms designate the worthless part of any body; but *dregs* is taken in a worse sense than *sediment*: for the *dregs* is that which is altogether of no value; but the *sediment* may sometimes form a necessary part of the body. The *dregs* are mostly a *sediment* in liquors, but many things are a *sediment* which are not *dregs*. After the *dregs* are taken away, there will frequently remain a *sediment*; the *dregs* are commonly the corrupt part which separates from compound liquids, as wine or beer; the *sediment* consists of the heavy particles which belong to all simple liquids, not excepting water itself. The *dregs* and *sediment* separate of themselves, but the *scum* and *dross* are forced out by a process; the former from liquids, and the latter from solid bodies rendered liquid or otherwise. *Dross* is applied to solid bodies in the same sense as *scum*, being that which remains after the purifying; as the *dross* of corn after threshing and cleaning. *Refuse*, as its derivation implies, is always said of that which is intentionally separated to be thrown away, and agrees with the former terms only inasmuch as they express what is worthless. With this distinction they are figuratively applied to moral objects.

Epitomes of history are the corruptions and moths that have fretted and corroded many

sound and excellent bodies of history and reduced them to base and unprofitable *dregs*.

BACON.

For it is not bare agitation, but the *sediment* at the bottom that troubles and defiles the water.

SOUTH.

For the composition, too, I admit the Algerine community resemble that of France, being formed out of the very *scum*, scandal, disgrace, and pest of the Turkish Asia.

BURKE.

Now cast your eyes around, while I dissolve
The mist and film that mortal eyes involve:
Purge from your sight the *dross*, and make you see

The shape of each avenging deity.

DRYDEN.

Next of his men and ships he makes review,
Draws out the best and ablest of the crew;
Down with the falling stream the *refuse* run
To raise with joyful news his drooping son.

DRYDEN.

DULL, GLOOMY, SAD, DISMAL.

DULL, in the low German *dull*, high German *toll*, mad, Welsh *dol*, *dwl*, foolish, etc., denotes properly a defect in the intellect. GLOOMY is connected with the German *glomm*, signifying the same as tarnished. SAD is probably connected with *sedate* and settled, signifying as much as *sedate* sorrow. DISMAL, compounded of *dis* and *mal* or *malus*, signifies very evil.

When applied to natural objects, *dull* and *gloomy* denote the want of necessary light or life: in this sense metals are more or less *dull* according as they are stained with dirt: the weather is either *dull* or *gloomy* in different degrees; that is, *dull* when the sun is obscured by clouds, and *gloomy* when the atmosphere is darkened by fogs or thick clouds. *Dismal* denotes not merely the want of that which is necessary, but also the presence of that which is repugnant to the senses; as a glare of light or a sound may be *dismal*. A room is *dull*, *gloomy*, or *dismal*, according to circumstances: it is *dull* if the usual quantity of light and sound be wanting; it is *gloomy* if the darkness and stillness be very considerable; it is *dismal* if it have only light enough to show its wretchedness; in this sense a dungeon is a *dismal* abode. *Sad* is not applied so much to sensible as moral objects, in which sense the distressing events of human life, as the loss of a parent or a child, is justly denominated *sad*.

While man is a retainer to the elements and a sojourner in the body, it must be content to sub-

mit its own quickness and spirituality to the *dulness* of its vehicle.

SOUTH.

Achilles' wrath, to Greece the direful spring
Of woes unnumber'd, heav'nly goddess; sing!
That wrath which hurl'd to Pluto's gloomy
reign

The souls of mighty chiefs untimely slain.

POPE.

For nine long nights, through all the dusky air
The pyre's thick flaming shot a *dismal* glare.

POPE.

Henry II. of France, by a splinter unhappily
thrust into his eye at a solemn justing, was sent
out of the world by a *sad* but very accidental
death.

SOUTH.

In regard to the frame of mind which is designated by these terms, it will be easily perceived from the above explanation. As slight circumstances produce *dulness*, any change, however small, in the usual flow of spirits may be termed *dull*. *Gloom* weighs heavy on the mind, and gives a turn to the reflections and the imagination: desponding thoughts of futurity will spread a *gloom* over every other object. *Sad* indicates a wounded state of the heart, feelings of unmixed pain.

A man

So *dull*, so dead in look, so woe-begone.

SHAKESPEARE.

Neglect spreads *gloominess* upon their humor,
and makes them grow sullen and unconvertible.

COLLIER.

Six brave companions from each ship we lost;
With sails outspread we fly the unequal strife,
Sad for their loss, but joyful of our life.

PRIOR.

DURABLE, LASTING, PERMANENT.

DURABLE is said of things that are intended to remain a shorter time than that which is LASTING; and PERMANENT expresses less than *durable*. *Durable*, from the Latin *durus*, hard, respects the texture of bodies, and marks their capacity to hold out; *lasting*, from the verb to *last* or the adjective *last*, signifies to remain the *last* or longest, and is applicable only to that which is supposed of the longest *duration*. *Permanent*, from the Latin *permaneo*, signifies remaining to the end.

Durable is naturally said of material substances; and *lasting* of those which are spiritual; although in ordinary discourse sometimes they exchange offices: *permanent* applies more to the affairs of men. That which perishes quickly is not *durable*; that which ceases quickly

is not *lasting*; that which is only for a time is not *permanent*. Stone is more *durable* than iron, and iron than wood: in the feudal times animosities between families used to be *lasting*; a clerk has not a *permanent* situation in an office.

If writings be thus *durable*, and may pass from age to age, through the whole course of time, how careful should an author be of not committing anything to print that may corrupt posterity.

ADDISON.

I must desire my fair readers to give a proper direction to their being admired; in order to which they must endeavor to make themselves the objects of a reasonable and *lasting* admiration.

ADDISON.

Land comprehends all things in law of a *permanent*, substantial nature.

BLACKSTONE.

DURABLE, CONSTANT.

DURABILITY (*v. Durable*) lies in the thing. CONSTANCY (*v. Constancy*) lies in the person. What is *durable* is so from its inherent property; what is *constant* is so by the power of the mind. No *durable* connections can be formed where avarice or lust prevails.

Some states have suddenly emerged, and even in the depths of their calamity have laid the foundation of a towering and *durable* greatness.

BURKE.

Since we cannot promise ourselves *constant* health, let us endeavor at such a temper as may be our best support in the decay of it.

STEELE.

DURATION, TIME.

In the philosophical sense, according to Mr. Locke, TIME is that mode of DURATION which is formed in the mind by its own power of observing and measuring the passing objects. In the vulgar sense, in which *duration* is synonymous with time, it stands for the time of *duration*, and is more particularly applicable to the objects which are said to last; *time* being employed in general for whatever passes in the world.

Duration comprehends the beginning and end of any portion of *time*, that is, the how long of a thing; *time* is employed more frequently for the particular portion itself, namely, the *time* when: we mark the *duration* of a sound from the *time* of its commencement to the *time* that it ceases; the *duration* of a prince's reign is an object of particular concern to his subjects if he be either very good or the reverse; the *time* in which he reigns is marked by extraordinary

events: the historian computes the *duration* of reigns and of events in order to determine the antiquity of a nation; he fixes the exact *time* when each person begins to reign and when he dies, in order to determine the number of years that each reigned.

I think another probable conjecture (respecting the soul's immortality) may be raised from our appetite to *duration* itself.

STEELE.

The *time* of the fool is long because he does not know what to do with it; that of the wise man, because he distinguishes every moment of it with useful or amusing thoughts.

ADDISON.

DUTIFUL, OBEDIENT, RESPECTFUL.

DUTIFUL signifies full of a sense of duty or full of what belongs to duty. OBEDIENT signifies ready to obey. RESPECTFUL signifies literally full of respect.

The *obedient* and *respectful* are but modes of the *dutiful*: we may be *dutiful* without being either *obedient* or *respectful*; but we are so far *dutiful* as we are either *obedient* or *respectful*. *Duty* denotes what is due from one being to another: it is independent of all circumstances: *obedience* and *respect* are relative *duties* depending upon the character and station of individuals: as we owe to no one so much as to our parents, we are said to be *dutiful* to no earthly being besides; and in order to deserve the name of *dutiful*, a child, during the period of his childhood, ought to make a parent's will to be his law, and at no future period ought that will ever to be an object of indifference: we may be *obedient* and *respectful* to others besides our parents, although to them *obedience* and *respect* are in the highest degree and in the first case due; yet servants are enjoined to be *obedient* to their masters, wives to their husbands, and subjects to their king. *Respectful* is a term of still greater latitude than either; for as the characters of men as much as their stations demand *respect*, there is a *respectful* deportment due toward every superior.

For one cruel parent we meet with a thousand *undutiful* children.

ADDISON.

The *obedience* of children to their parents is the basis of all government, and set forth as the measure of that *obedience* which we owe to those whom Providence has placed over us.

ADDISON.

Let your behavior toward your superiors in