

of noble use, particularly adapted to poetry and the high style: CAROUSAL, in French *carrouse*, in German *geräusch* or *rausch*, intoxication, from *rauschen*, to intoxicate, is a drunken *feast*: ENTERTAINMENT and TREAT convey the idea of hospitality.

New purple hangings clothe the palace walls,
And sumptuous *feasts* are made in splendid
halls. DRYDEN.

With hymns divine the joyous *banquet* ends,
The pæans lengthen'd till the sun descends.
POPE.

This game, these *carousals*, Ascanius taught,
And, building Alba, to the Latins brought.
DRYDEN.

I could not but smile at the account that was
yesterday given me of a modest young gentle-
man, who, being invited to an *entertainment*,
though he was not used to drink, had not the
confidence to refuse his glass in his turn.
ADDISON.

I do not insist that you spread your table with
so unbounded a profusion as to furnish out a
splendid *treat* with the remains.
MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

Feast, entertainment, and treat are taken in a more extended sense, to express other pleasures besides those of the table: *feast* retains its signification of a vivid pleasure, such as voluptuaries derive from delicious viands; *entertainment* and *treat* retain the idea of being granted by way of courtesy: we speak of a thing as being a *feast* or high delight; and of a person contributing to one's *entertainment*, or giving one a *treat*. To a benevolent mind the spectacle of an afflicted man relieved and comforted is a *feast*; to a mind ardent in the pursuit of knowledge, an easy access to a well-stocked library is a continual *feast*: men of a happy temper give and receive *entertainment* with equal facility; they afford *entertainment* to their guests by the easy cheerfulness which they impart to everything around them; they in like manner derive *entertainment* from everything they see, or hear, or observe: a *treat* is given or received only on particular occasions; it depends on the relative circumstances and tastes of the giver and receiver; to one of a musical turn one may give a *treat* by inviting him to a musical party; and to one of an intelligent turn it will be equally a *treat* to be of the party which consists of the enlightened and conversable.

Beattie is the only author I know whose critical and philosophical researches are diversified and embellished by a poetical imagination, that makes even the driest subject and the leanest a *feast* for an epicure in books. COWPER.

Let us consider to whom we are indebted for all these *entertainments* of sense. ADDISON.
Sing my praise in strain sublime,
Treat not me with dogg'rel rhyme. SWIFT.

FEAST, FESTIVAL, HOLIDAY.

FEAST, in Latin *festum*, or *festus*, changed most probably from *fesiv* and *feria*, which latter, in all probability, comes from the Greek *εσπαι*, sacred, because these days were kept sacred or vacant from all secular labor: FESTIVAL and HOLIDAY, as the words themselves denote, have precisely the same meaning in their original sense, with this difference, that the former derives its origin from heathenish superstition, the latter owes its rise to the establishment of Christianity in its reformed state.

A *feast*, in the Christian sense of the word, is applied to every day which is regarded as sacred, and observed with particular solemnity, except Sundays; a *holyday*, or, according to its modern orthography, a *holiday*, is simply a day on which ordinary business is suspended: among the Roman Catholics, there are many days which are kept holy, and consequently by them denominated *feasts*, which in the English reformed church are only observed as *holidays*, or days of exemption from public business; of this description are the saints' days, on which the public offices are shut: on the other hand, Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide are regarded in both churches more as *feasts* than as *holidays*. There are, therefore, many *feasts* where there are no *holidays*, and many *holidays* where there are no *feasts*.

First, I provide myself a nimble thing,
To be my page, a varlet of crafts;
Next, two new suits for *feasts* and gala-days.
CUMBERLAND.

It happen'd on a summer's *holiday*,
That to the green-wood shade he took his way.
DRYDEN.

A *feast* is altogether sacred; a *holiday* has frequently nothing sacred in it, not even in its cause; it may be a simple, ordinary transaction, the act of an individual: a *festival* has always either a sacred or a serious object. A *feast* is kept

by religious worship; a *holiday* is kept by idleness; a *festival* is kept by mirth and festivity: some *feasts* are *festivals*, as in the case of the carnival at Rome; some *festivals* are *holidays*, as in the case of weddings and public thanksgivings.

Many worthy persons urged how great the harmony was between the *holidays* and their attributes (if I may call them so), and what a confusion would follow if Michaelmas-day, for instance, was not to be celebrated when stubble-geese are in their highest perfection. WALPOLE.

In so enlightened an age as the present, I shall perhaps be ridiculed if I hint, as my opinion, that the observation of certain *festivals* is something more than a mere political institution. WALPOLE.

TO FEEL, BE SENSIBLE, CONSCIOUS.

FROM the simple idea of a sense, the word FEEL has acquired the most extensive signification and application in our language, and may be employed indifferently for all the other terms, but not in all cases: to *feel* is said of the whole frame, inwardly and outwardly; it is the accompaniment of existence: to BE SENSIBLE, from the Latin *sentio*, is said only of the senses. It is the property of all living creatures to *feel* pleasure and pain in a greater or less degree: those creatures which have not the sense of hearing will not be *sensible* of sounds. In the moral application, to *feel* is peculiarly the property or act of the heart; to be *sensible* is that of the understanding: an ingenuous mind *feels* pain when it is *sensible* of having committed an error: one may, however, *feel* as well as be *sensible* by means of the understanding: a person *feels* the value of another's service; is *sensible* of his kindness: one *feels* or is *sensible* of what passes outwardly; one is CONSCIOUS only of what passes inwardly, from *con* or *cum* and *scio*, to know to one's self: we *feel* the force of another's remark; we are *sensible* of the evil which must spring from the practice of vice; we are *conscious* of having fallen short of our duty.

The devout man does not only believe, but *feels* there is a Deity. ADDISON.

There is, doubtless, a faculty in spirits by which they apprehend one another, as our senses do material objects; and there is no question but our souls, when they are disembodied, will, by this faculty, be always *sensible* of the Divine presence. ADDISON.

A creature of a more exalted kind
Was wanting yet, and then was man design'd:
Conscious of thought, of more capacious breast,
For empire form'd and fit to rule the rest.
DRYDEN.

FEELING, SENSE, SENSATION.

FEELING, in Saxon *felen*, low German *foelen*, Dutch *welen*, and SENSE (*v. To feel*), are taken in a general or particular sense: SENSATION is taken only in a particular sense. *Feeling* and *sense* are either physical or moral properties; *sensation* is a particular act of physical or moral feeling.

Feeling, physically considered, is but a mode of *sense*; anatomists reckon five *senses*, of which *feeling* is one: *sense* is the abstract faculty of perceiving through the medium of the sense, as to be deprived of *sense* when stunned by a blow; to be without *sense* when divested of the ordinary faculties. As all creatures which have life have *feeling*, the expression creatures without *feeling*, may be applied to inanimate objects; but in general the term *feeling* is taken for the sense of *feeling*.

Is this a dagger, which I see before me,
The handle toward my hand? come let me clutch
thee—

I have thee not, and yet I see thee still.
Art thou not, fatal vision, sensible
To *feeling* as to sight? SHAKESPEARE.

In distances of things, their shapes, and size,
Our reason judges better than our eyes;
Declares not this the soul's pre-eminence,
Superior to, and quite distinct from *sense*?
JENYNS.

Feeling, in its limited acceptation, is either a state of *feeling* or an act of *feeling*: *sense* is a mode of sense, *i. e.*, a mode of perceiving through the medium of any particular organ of sense, or a state of perceiving particular objects. In this acceptation *feeling* is applied to moral as well as physical objects; *sense* to intellectual as well as sensible objects: *feeling* has its seat in the heart, *sense* in the understanding; *feeling* is transitory and fluctuating, *sense* is permanent and regular. There are *feelings* of love, charity, compassion, etc.; there is a *sense* of justice, rectitude, propriety, etc.

Their king, out of a princely *feeling*, was sparing and compassionate toward his subjects.

This Basilus, having the quick *sense* of a lover, took, as though his mistress had given him, a secret reprehension. SIDNEY.

As the *sensation* denotes a particular act of *feeling*, it differs from *feeling* only in application: the term *feeling* is most adapted to ordinary discourse on familiar matters; *sensation* to the grave and scientific style: a child may talk of an unpleasant or pleasant *feeling*, a *feeling* of cold or hunger; the professional man talks of the *sensation* of giddiness, a gnawing *sensation*, and the like.

Those ideas to which any agreeable *sensation* is annexed are easily excited, as leaving behind them the most strong and permanent impressions. SOMERVILLE.

FEELING, SENSIBILITY, SUSCEPTIBILITY.

FEELING, in the present case, is taken for a positive characteristic, namely, the property of *feeling* (*v. To feel*) in a strong degree; in this sense *feeling* expresses either a particular act, or a habitual property of the mind. SENSIBILITY is always taken in the sense of a habit. Traits of *feeling* in young people are happy omens in the estimation of the preceptor: an exquisite *sensibility* is not a desirable gift; it creates an infinite disproportion of pain. *Feeling* and *sensibility* are here taken as moral properties, which are awakened as much by the operations of the mind within itself as by external objects: SUSCEPTIBILITY, from the Latin *suscipio*, to take or receive, designates that property of the body or the mind which consists in being ready to take an affection from external objects; hence we speak of a person's *susceptibility* to take cold, or his *susceptibility* to be affected with grief, joy, or any other passion: if an excess of *sensibility* be an evil, an excess of *susceptibility* is a still greater evil; it makes us slaves to every circumstance, however trivial, which comes under our notice.

Gentleness is native *feeling* improved by principle. BLAIR.

By long habit in carrying a burden we lose in great part our *sensibility* of its weight. JOHNSON.

It pleases me to think that it was from a principle of gratitude in me that my mind was *susceptible* of such generous transport (in my dreams) when I thought myself repaying the kindness of my friend. BYRON.

TO FEIGN, PRETEND.

FEIGN, in Latin *finco* or *figo*, comes from the Greek *πιγω*, to fix or stamp.

PRETEND, in Latin *pretendo*, signifies properly to stretch before, that is, to put on the outside.

These words may be used either for doing or saying; they are both opposed to what is true, but they differ from the motives of the agent: to *feign* is taken either in a bad or an indifferent sense; to *pretend* always in a bad sense: one *feigns* in order to gain some future end; a person *feigns* sickness in order to be excused from paying a disagreeable visit: one *pretends* in order to serve a present purpose; a child *pretends* to have lost his book who wishes to excuse himself for his idleness. To *feign* consists often of a line of conduct; to *pretend* consists mostly of words, sometimes coupled with assumed looks and manners: Ulysses *feigned* madness in order to escape from going to the Trojan war: according to Virgil, the Grecian Sinon *pretended* to be a deserter come over to the Trojan camp.

To win me from his tender arms,
Unnumber'd suitors came,
Who prais'd me for imputed charms,
And felt or *feign'd* a flame. GOLDSMITH.

An affected delicacy is the common improvement in those who *pretend* to be refined above others. STEELE.

In matters of speculation, to *feign* is to invent by force of the imagination; to *pretend* is to set up by force of self-conceit or false opinion: it is *feigned* by the poets that Orpheus went down into hell and brought back Eurydice, his wife; infidel philosophers *pretend* to account for the most mysterious things in nature upon natural, or, as they please to term it, rational principles.

In the dark recesses of antiquity a great poet may and ought to *feign* such things as be not then, if they can be brought to embellish that subject which he treats. DRYDEN.

The Hans towns not only complained, but clamored loudly for breach of their ancient privileges confirmed unto them time out of mind, by thirteen successive kings of England, which they *pretended* to have purchased with their money. HOWELL.

TO FELICITATE, CONGRATULATE.

FELICITATE, from the Latin *felix*, happy, signifies to make happy, and is applicable only to ourselves; CONGRATULATE, from *gratus*, pleasant or agreeable, is to make agreeable, and is applicable either to ourselves or others: we *fe*

licitate ourselves on having escaped the danger; we *congratulate* others on their good-fortune.

The astronomers, indeed, expect her (night) with impatience, and *felicitate* themselves upon her arrival. JOHNSON.

The fierce young hero who had overcome the Curatii, instead of being *congratulated* by his sister for his victory, was upbraided by her for having slain her lover. ADDISON.

FELLOWSHIP, SOCIETY.

BOTH these terms are employed to denote a close intercourse; but FELLOWSHIP is said of men as individuals, SOCIETY of them collectively: we should be careful not to hold *fellowship* with any one of bad character, or to join the *society* of those who profess bad principles.

Ill becomes it me
To wear at once thy garter and thy chains,
Though by my former dignity I swear,
That, were I reinstated in my throne,
Thus to be join'd in *fellowship* with thee
Would be the first ambition of my soul. GILBERT WEST.

Unhappy he! who from the first of joys,
Society, cut off, is left alone,
Amid this world of death. THOMSON.

FEMALE, FEMININE, EFFEMINATE.

FEMALE is said of the sex itself, and FEMININE of the characteristics of the sex. *Female* is opposed to male, *feminine* to masculine.

In the *female* character we expect to find that which is *feminine*. The *female* dress, manners, and habits, have engaged the attention of all essayists, from the time of Addison to the present period. The *feminine* is natural to the *female*; the *effeminate* is unnatural to the male. A *feminine* air and voice, which is truly grateful to the observer in the one sex, is an odious mark of *effeminacy* in the other. Beauty and delicacy are *feminine* properties; robustness and vigor are masculine properties; the former, therefore, when discovered in a man, entitle him to the epithet of *effeminate*.

Once more her haughty soul the tyrant bends,
To prayers and mean submissions she descends;
No *female* arts or aids she left untried,
Nor counsels unexplor'd, before she died. DRYDEN.

Her heav'nly form
Angelic; but more soft and *feminine*
Her graceful innocence. MILTON.

Our martial ancestors, like some of their modern successors, had no other amusement (but hunting) to entertain their vacant hours; despising all arts as *effeminate*. BLACKSTONE.

FENCE, GUARD, SECURITY.

FENCE, from the Latin *fendo*, to fend or keep off, denotes that which serves to prevent the attack of an external enemy. GUARD, which is but a variety of *ward*, from the German *wahren*, to see, and *wachen*, to watch, signifies that which keeps from any danger. SECURITY implies that which secures or prevents injury, mischief, and loss. A *fence*, in the proper sense, is an inanimate object; a *guard* is a living agent; the former is of permanent utility, the latter acts to a partial extent: in the figurative sense they retain the same distinction. Modesty is a *fence* to a woman's virtue; the love of the subject is the monarch's greatest *safeguard*. There are prejudices which favor religion and subordination, and act as *fences* against the introduction of licentious principles into the juvenile or unenlightened mind; a proper sense of an overruling Providence will serve as a *guard* to prevent the admission of improper thoughts. The *guard* only stands at the entrance, to prevent the ingress of evil: the *security* stops up all the avenues, it locks up with firmness. A *guard* serves to prevent the ingress of everything that may have an evil intention or tendency: the *security* rather secures the possession of what one has, and prevents a loss. A king has a *guard* about his person to keep off all violence.

Whatever disregard certain modern refiners of morality may attempt to throw on all the instituted means of public religion, they must in their lowest view be considered as the out-guards and *fences* of virtuous conduct. BLAIR.

Let the heart be either wounded by sore distress, or agitated by violent emotions; and you shall presently see that virtue without religion is inadequate to the government of life. It is destitute of its proper *guard*, of its firmest support, of its chief encouragement. BLAIR.

Goodness from its own nature hath this *security*, that it brings men under the danger of no law. TILLOTSON.

FEROCIOUS, FIERCE, SAVAGE.

FEROCIOUS and FIERCE are both derived from the Latin *ferox*, which comes from *fera*, a wild beast. SAVAGE, *v. Cruel*.

Ferocity marks the untamed character of a cruel disposition: *fierceness* has a greater mixture of pride and anger in it, the word *fiers* in French being taken for haughtiness: *savageness* marks a more permanent, but not so violent a sentiment of either cruelty or anger as the two former. *Ferocity* and *fierceness* are in common applied to the brutes, to designate their natural tempers: *savage* is mostly employed to designate the natural tempers of man, when uncontrolled by the force of reason and a sense of religion. *Ferocity* is the natural characteristic of wild beasts; it is a delight in blood that needs no outward stimulus to call it into action; but it displays itself most strikingly in the moment when the animal is going to grasp, or when in the act of devouring, its prey: *fierceness* may be provoked in many creatures, but it does not discover itself unless roused by some circumstance of aggravation; many animals become *fierce* by being shut up in cages, and exposed to the view of spectators: *savageness* is as natural a temper in the uncivilized man as *ferocity* or *fierceness* in the brute; it does not wait for an enemy to attack, but is restless in search of some one whom it may make an enemy, and have an opportunity of destroying. It is an easy transition for the savage to become the *ferocious* cannibal, glutting himself in the blood of his enemies, or the *fierce* antagonist to one who sets himself up in opposition to him.

In an extended application of these terms, they bear the same relation to each other: the countenance may be either *ferocious*, *fierce*, or *savage*, according to circumstances. A robber who spends his life in the act of unlawfully shedding blood acquires a *ferocity* of countenance: a soldier who follows a predatory and desultory mode of warfare betrays the licentiousness of his calling, and his undisciplined temper, in the *fierceness* of his countenance; the tyrant whose enjoyment consists in inflicting misery on his dependants or subjects evinces the *savageness* of his temper by the *savage* joy with which he witnesses their groans and tortures.

The *ferocious* character of Moloch appears both in the battle and the council with exact consistency. JOHNSON.

The tempest falls,
The weary winds sink, breathless. But who
knows
What *fiercer* tempest yet may shake this night.
THOMSON.

Nay, the dire monsters that infest the flood,
By nature dreadful, and athirst for blood,
His will can calm, their *savage* tempers bind,
And turn to mild protectors of mankind.
YOUNG.

FERTILE, FRUITFUL, PROLIFIC.

FERTILE, in Latin *fertilis*, from *fero*, to bear, signifies capable of bearing or bringing to light. FRUITFUL signifies full of fruit, or containing within itself much fruit. PROLIFIC is compounded of *proles* and *facio*, to make a progeny.

Fertile expresses in its proper sense the faculty of sending forth from itself that which is not of its own nature, and is peculiarly applicable to the ground which causes everything within itself to grow up. *Fruitful* expresses a state containing or possessing abundantly that which is of the same nature; it is, therefore, peculiarly applicable to trees, plants, vegetables, and whatever is said to bear fruit. *Prolific* expresses the faculty of generating; it conveys, therefore, the idea of what is creative, and is peculiarly applicable to animals. We may say that the ground is either *fertile* or *fruitful*, but not so properly *prolific*: we may speak of a female of any species being *fruitful* and *prolific*, but not *fertile*; we may speak of nature as being *fruitful*, but neither *fertile* nor *prolific*. A country is *fertile* as it respects the quality of the soil; it is *fruitful* as it respects the abundance of its produce: it is possible, therefore, for a country to be *fruitful* by the industry of its inhabitants, which was not *fertile* by nature. An animal is said to be *fruitful* as it respects the number of young which it has; it is said to be *prolific* as it respects its generative power. Some women are more *fruitful* than others; but there are many animals more *prolific* than human creatures.

Why should I mention those whose oozy soil
Is render'd fertile by the o'erflowing Nile?
JENYNS.

When first the soil receives the fruitful seed,
Make no delay, but cover it with speed.
DRYDEN.

And where in pomp the sunburned people ride
On painted barges o'er the teeming tide,

Which pouring down from Ethiopian lands,
Makes green the soil, with slime and black *pro-*
lific sands.
DRYDEN.

In the figurative application they admit of a similar distinction. A man is *fertile* in expedients who readily contrives upon the spur of the occasion; he is *fruitful* in resources who has them ready at his hand; his brain is *prolific* if it generates an abundance of new conceptions. A mind is *fertile* which has powers that admit of cultivation and expansion: an imagination is *fruitful* that is rich in stores of imagery; a genius is *prolific* that is rich in invention. Females are *fertile* in expedients and devices; ambition and avarice are the most *fruitful* sources of discord and misery in public and private life; novel-writers are the most *prolific* class of authors.

To every work Warburton brought a memory
Full fraught, together with a fancy fertile of
combinations.
JOHNSON.

The philosophy received from the Greeks has
been fruitful in controversies, but barren of
works.
BACON.

Parent of light! all-seeing sun,
Prolific beam, whose rays dispense
The various gifts of Providence.
GAY.

FERVOR, ARDOR.

FERVOR, from *ferveo*, to boil, is not so violent a heat as ARDOR, from *ardeo*, to burn. The affections are properly *fervent*; the passions are *ardent*: we are *fervent* in feeling, and *ardent* in acting; the *fervor* of devotion may be rational, but the *ardor* of zeal is mostly intemperate. The first martyr, Stephen, was filled with a holy *fervor*; St. Peter, in the *ardor* of his zeal, promised his Master to do more than he was able to perform.

The joy of the Lord is not to be understood of
high raptures and transports of religious *fervor*.
BLAIR.

Do men hasten to their devotions with that
ardor that they would to a lewd play? SOUTH.

FESTIVITY, MIRTH.

THERE is commonly MIRTH with FESTIVITY, but there may be frequently *mirth* without *festivity*. The *festivity* lies in the outward circumstances; *mirth* in the temper of the mind. *Festivity* is rather the producer of *mirth* than the *mirth* itself. *Festivity* includes the social enjoyments of eating, drinking, dan-

cing, cards, and other pleasures: *mirth* includes in it the buoyancy of spirits which is engendered by a participation in such pleasures.

Pisistratus, fearing that the *festivity* of his guests would be interrupted by the misconduct of Thrasippus, rose from his seat, and entreated him to stay.
CUMBERLAND.

Low lies that house where nut-brown draughts
inspir'd,
Where graybeard *mirth* and smiling toil retir'd.
GOLDSMITH.

FICTION, FABRICATION, FALSEHOOD.

FICTION is opposed to what is real; FABRICATION and FALSEHOOD to what is true. *Fiction* relates what may be, though not what is: *fabrication* and *falsehood* relate what is not as what is, and *vice versa*. *Fiction* serves for amusement and instruction: *fabrication* and *falsehood* serve to mislead and deceive. *Fiction* and *fabrication* both require invention: *falsehood* consists of simple contradiction. The fables of *Æsop* are *fictions* of the simplest kind, but yet such as require a peculiarly lively fancy and inventive genius to produce: the *fabrication* of a play, as the production of Shakspeare's pen, was once executed with sufficient skill to impose for a time upon the public credulity: a good memory is all that is necessary in order to avoid uttering *falsehoods* that can be easily contradicted and confuted. In an extended sense of the word *fiction*, it approaches still nearer to the sense of *fabricate*, when said of the *fictions* of the ancients, which were delivered as truth, although admitted now to be false: the motive of the narrator is what here constitutes the difference; namely, that in the former case he believes what he relates to be true, in the latter he knows it to be false. The heathen mythology consists principally of the *fictions* of the poets: newspapers commonly abound in *fabrication*.

All that the Jews tell us of their twofold Messiah is a mere *fiction*, framed without as much as a pretence to any foundation in Scripture for it.
PRIDEAUX.

The translator or *fabricator* of Ossian's poems.
MASON.

When speech is employed only as the vehicle of *falsehood*, every man must disunite himself from others.
JOHNSON.

Fabrication may sometimes be used in a good sense: in this case it denotes not

the thing *fabricated*, but the act of *fabricating*.

With reason has Shakspeare's superiority been asserted in the *fabrication* of his preternatural machines. CUMBERLAND.

As epithets, *fictitious* and *false* are very closely allied; for what is *fictitious* is *false*, though all that is *false* is not *fictitious*: the *fictitious* is that which has been feigned, or *falsely* made by some one; the *false* is simply that which is *false* by the nature of the thing; the *fictitious* account is therefore the invention of an individual, whose veracity is thereby impeached; but there may be many *false* accounts unintentionally circulated.

A man who has taken his ideas of mankind from study alone generally comes into the world with a heart melting at every *fictitious* tale of distress. GOLDSMITH.

It is on this principle that true religion has and must have so large a mixture of fear, and that *false* religions have nothing else but fear to support them. BURKE.

FIGURE, METAPHOR, ALLEGORY, EMBLEM, SYMBOL, TYPE.

FIGURE, in Latin *figura*, from *fungo*, to feign, signifies anything painted or feigned by the mind. METAPHOR, in Greek *μεταφορα*, from *μεταφερω*, to transfer, signifies a transfer of one object to another. ALLEGORY, in Greek *αλληγορια*, from *αλλος*, another, and *αγορευω*, to relate, signifies the relation of something under a borrowed term. EMBLEM, in Greek *εμβλημα*, from *εμβαλλω*, to impress, signifies the thing stamped on as a mark. SYMBOL, from the Greek *συμβαλλω*, to consider attentively, signifies the thing cast or conceived in the mind, from its analogy to represent something else. TYPE, in Greek *τυπος*, from *τυπτω*, to strike or stamp, signifies an image of something that is stamped on something else.

Likeness between two objects, by which one is made to represent the other, is the common idea in the signification of these terms. *Figure* is the most general of these terms, comprehending everything which is *figured* by means of the imagination; the rest are but modes of the *figure*. The *figure* consists either in words or in things generally: we may have a *figure* in expression, a *figure* on paper, a *figure* on wood or stone, and the

like. It is the business of the imagination to draw *figures* out of anything; the *metaphor* and *allegory* consist of a representation by means of words only: the *figure*, in this case, is any representation which the mind makes to itself of a resemblance between objects, which is properly a *figure* of thought, which when clothed in words is a *figure* of speech: the *metaphor* is a *figure* of speech of the simplest kind, by which a word acquires other meanings besides that which is originally affixed to it; as when the term head, which properly signifies a part of the body, is applied to the leader of an army. The *allegory* is a continued *metaphor*, where attributes, modes, and actions are applied to the objects thus *figured*, as in the *allegory* of sin and death in Milton.

The spring bears the same *figure* among the seasons of the year, that the morning does among the divisions of the day, or youth among the stages of life. ADDISON.

No man had a happier manner of expressing the affections of one sense by *metaphors* taken from another than Milton. BURKE.

Virgil has cast the whole system of Platonic philosophy, so far as regards the soul of man, into beautiful *allegories*. ADDISON.

The *emblem* is that sort of *figure* of thought by which we make corporeal objects to stand for moral properties; thus the dove is represented as the *emblem* of meekness, or the beehive is made the *emblem* of industry: the *symbol* is that species of *emblem* which is converted into a constituted sign among men; thus the olive and laurel are the *symbols* of peace, and have been recognized as such among barbarous as well as enlightened nations. The *type* is that species of *emblem* by which one object is made to represent another mystically; it is, therefore, only employed in religious matters, particularly in relation to the coming, the office, and the death of our Saviour; in this manner the offering of Isaac is considered as a *type* of our Saviour's offering himself as an atoning sacrifice.

The stork's the *emblem* of true piety. BEAUMONT.

I need not mention the justness of thought which is observed in the generation of these *symbolical* persons (in Milton's *allegory* of sin and death). ADDISON.

All the remarkable events under the law were *types* of Christ. BLAIR.

FINAL, CONCLUSIVE.

FINAL, in French *final*, Latin *finalis*, from *finis*, the end, signifies having an end. CONCLUSIVE (*v. Conclusive*) signifies shutting up, or coming to a conclusion.

Final designates simply the circumstance of being the last; *conclusive* the mode of finishing or coming to the last: a determination is *final* which is to be succeeded by no other; a reasoning is *conclusive* that puts a stop to farther question. The *final* is arbitrary; it depends upon the will to make it so or not: the *conclusive* is relative; it depends upon the circumstances and the understanding: a person gives a *final* answer at option; but in order to make an answer *conclusive* it must be satisfactory to all parties.

Neither with us in England hath there been (till very lately) any *final* determination upon the right of authors at the common-law. BLACKSTONE.

I hardly think the example of Abraham's complaining, that unless he had some children of his body, his steward, Eliezer of Damascus, would be his heir, is quite *conclusive* to show that he made him so by will. BLACKSTONE.

TO FIND, FIND OUT, DISCOVER, ESPY, DESCRY.

FIND, in German *finden*, etc., is most probably connected with the Latin *venio*, signifying to come in the way. DISCOVER, *v. To detect*. ESPY, in French *espier*, comes from the Latin *espicio*, signifying to see a thing out, or in distinction from others. DESCRY, from the Latin *discerno*, signifies to distinguish a thing from others.

To *find* signifies simply to come within sight of a thing, which is the general idea attached to all these terms: they vary, however, either in the mode of the action or in the object. What we *find* may become visible to us by accident, but what we *find out* is the result of an effort. We may *find* anything as we pass along in the streets; but we *find out* mistakes in an account by carefully going over it, or we *find out* the difficulties which we meet with in learning, by redoubling our diligence. What is *found* may have been lost to ourselves, but visible to others. What is *discovered* is always remote and unknown, and when *discovered* is some-

thing new. A piece of money may be *found* lying on the ground; but a mine is *discovered* underground. When Captain Cook *discovered* the islands in the South Sea, many plants and animals were *found*. What is not *discoverable* may be presumed not to exist; but that which is *found* may be only what has been lost. What has once been *discovered* cannot be *discovered* again; but what is *found* may be many times *found*. *Find out* and *discover* differ principally in the application; the former being applied to familiar, and the latter to scientific objects: scholars *find out* what they have to learn; men of research *discover* what escapes the notice of others.

He *finds* the fraud, and with a smile demands,
On what design the boy had bound his hands. DRYDEN.

Socrates, who was a great admirer of Cretan institutions, set his excellent wit to *find out* some good cause and use of this evil inclination (the love of boys). WALSH.

Cunning is a kind of short-sightedness that *discovers* the minutest objects which are near at hand, but is not able to discern things at a distance. ADDISON.

To *espy* is a species of *finding out*, namely, to *find out* what is very secluded or retired; and *descry* is a species of *discovering*, or observing at a distance, or among a number of objects. An astronomer *discovers* fresh stars or planets; he *finds out* those on particular occasions which have been already *discovered*. A person *finds out* by continued inquiry any place to which he had been wrong directed; he *espies* an object which lies concealed in a corner or secret place; he *descries* a horseman coming down a hill. *Find* and *discover* may be employed with regard to objects, either of a corporeal or intellectual kind; *espy* and *descry* only with regard to sensible objects of corporeal vision: *find*, either for those that are external or internal; *discover*, only for those that are external. The distinction between them is the same as before; we *find* by simple inquiry; we *discover* by reflection and study: we *find* or *find out* the motives which influence a person's conduct; we *discover* the reasons or causes of things: the *finding* serves the particular purpose of the *finder*; the *discovery* serves the purpose of science, by adding to the stock of general knowledge.

When it is said taste cannot be disputed, it can only mean that no one can strictly say what pleasure or pain some particular men may find from the taste of some particular thing. BURKE.

Aristotle had reason to say that Homer was the only poet who had found out living words. POPE.

He wished to-day our enterprise might thrive;
I fear our purpose is discovered. SHAKESPEARE.
There Agamemnon, Priam here he spies,
And fierce Achilles, who both kings defies.

Through this we pass, and mount the tower from whence,
With unavailing arms, the Trojans make defence;
From this the trembling king had oft descried
The Grecian camp, and saw their navy ride.

When *find* is used as a purely intellectual operation, it admits of a new view, in relation both to *discover* and to *invent*, as may be seen in the following article.

TO FIND, FIND OUT, DISCOVER, INVENT.

To FIND or FIND OUT (*v. To find*) is said of things which do not exist in the forms in which a person finds them: to DISCOVER (*v. To discover*) is said of that which exists in an entire state: INVENT, from *invenio*, signifying literally to come at, is said of that which is new made or modelled. The merit of *finding* or *inventing* consists in newly applying or modifying the materials, which exist separately; the merit of *discovering* consists in removing the obstacles which prevent us from knowing the real nature of the thing: imagination and industry are requisite for *finding* or *inventing*; acuteness and penetration for *discovering*. *Find* is applicable to the operative arts; *invent* to the mechanical; *discover* to the speculative. We speak of *finding* modes for performing actions and effecting purposes; of *inventing* machines, instruments, and various matters of use or elegance; of *discovering* the operations and laws of nature. Many fruitless attempts have been made to find the longitude: men have not been so unsuccessful in *finding* out various arts, for communicating their thoughts, commemorating the exploits of their nations, and supplying themselves with luxuries. Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood: the geometrician finds by reasoning the solution of any problem; or by investigating, he finds out a clearer method of solving the same

problems; or he *invents* an instrument by which the proof can be deduced from ocular demonstration.

Long practice has a sure improvement found,
With kindled fires to burn the barren ground.

Since the harmonic principles were discovered,
music has been a great independent science.

The sire of gods and men, with hard decrees,
Forbids our plenty to be bought with ease;
Himself invented first the shining share,
And whetted human industry by care.

TO FIND FAULT WITH, BLAME, OBJECT TO.

ALL these terms denote not simply feeling, but also expressing dissatisfaction with some person or thing. To FIND FAULT WITH signifies here to point out a fault, either in some person or thing; to BLAME is said only of the person; OBJECT is applied to the thing only: we find fault with a person for his behavior; we find fault with our seat, our conveyance, and the like; we blame a person for his temerity or his imprudence; we object to a measure that is proposed. We find fault with or blame that which has been done; we object to that which has been or is to be done. *Finding fault* is a familiar action applied to matters of personal convenience or taste; *blame* and *object to*, particularly the latter, are applied to serious objects. *Finding fault* is often the fruit of a discontented temper; there are some whom nothing will please, and who are ever ready to find fault with whatever comes in their way: *blame* is a matter of discretion; we blame frequently in order to correct: *objecting to* is an affair either of caprice or discretion; some capriciously object to that which is proposed to them merely from a spirit of opposition; others object to a thing from substantial reasons.

Tragi-comedy you have yourself found fault with very justly. BUDGELL.

It is a most certain rule in reason and moral philosophy, that where there is no choice there can be no blame. SOUTH.

Men in all deliberations find ease to be of the negative side, to object and foretell difficulties. BACON.

FINE, DELICATE, NICE.

It is remarkable of the word FINE (*v. Beautiful*) that it is equally applicable to

large and small objects: DELICATE, in Latin *delicatus*, from *deliciae*, delights, and *delicio*, to allure, is applied only to small objects. *Fine*, in the natural sense, denotes smallness in general. *Delicate* denotes a degree of fineness that is agreeable to the taste. Thread is said to be fine, as opposed to the coarse and thick; silk is said to be delicate, when to fineness of texture it adds softness. The texture of a spider's web is remarkable for its fineness; that of the ermine's fur is remarkable for its delicacy. In writing, all up-strokes must be fine; but in superior writing they will be delicately fine. When applied to colors, the fine is coupled with the bold and strong; delicate with what is faint, soft, and fair: black and red may be fine colors; white and pink delicate colors. The tulip is reckoned one of the finest flowers; the white moss-rose is a delicate flower. A fine painter delineates with boldness; but the artist who has a delicate taste throws delicate touches into the grandest delineations.

Everything that results from nature alone lies out of the province of instruction; and no rules that I know of will serve to give a fine form, a fine voice, or even those fine feelings, which are among the first properties of an actor.

Under this head of elegance I reckon those delicate and regular works of art, as elegant buildings or pieces of furniture.

In their moral application these terms admit of the same distinction: the fine approaches either to the strong or to the weak; the delicate is a high degree of the fine; as a fine thought, which may be lofty; or fine feeling, which is acute and tender; and delicate feeling, which exceeds the former in fineness. The French use their word *fin* only in the latter sense, of acuteness, and apply it merely to the thoughts and designs of men, answering either to our word *subtle*, as *un homme fin*, or *neat*, as *une satire fine*.

Chief, lovely Spring! in thee and thy soft scenes
The smiling God is seen: while water, earth,
And air attest his bounty, which exalts
The brute creation to this finer thought.

And such, I exclaimed, is the pitiless part
Some act by the delicate mind,
Regardless of wringing and breaking a heart
Already to sorrow resigned.

Delicate is said of that which is agreeable to the sense and the taste; NICE

to what is agreeable to the appetite: the former is a term of refinement; the latter of epicurism and sensual indulgence. The delicate affords pleasure only to those whose thoughts and desires are purified from what is gross; the nice affords pleasure to the young, the ignorant, and the sensual: thus delicate food, delicate colors, delicate shapes and form, are always acceptable to the cultivated; a meal, a show, a color, and the like, which suits its appetite or meets its fancy, will be nice to a child.

It is the delicate myrtle, it is the orange, it is the almond, it is the jasmine, it is the vine, which we look on as vegetable beauties. BURKE.
Look! how nice he makes it! BARRETT.

When used in a moral application, nice, which is taken in a good sense, approaches nearer to the signification of delicate. A person may be said to have a delicate ear in music whose ear is offended with the smallest discordance; he may be said to have a nice taste or judgment in music who scientifically discriminates the beauties and defects of different pieces. A person is delicate in his choice who is guided by taste and feeling; he is nice in his choice who adheres to a strict rule. A point in question may be either delicate or nice; it is delicate, as it is likely to touch the tender feelings of any party; it is nice, as it involves contrary interests, and becomes difficult of determination. There are delicacies of behavior which are learned by good-breeding, but which minds of a refined cast are naturally alive to, without any particular learning; there are niceties in the law which none but men of superior intellect can properly enter into and discriminate.

The commerce in the conjugal state is so delicate, that it is impossible to prescribe rules for it.

The highest point of good-breeding, if any one can hit it, is to show a very nice regard to your own dignity, and, with that in your heart, to express your value for the man above you.

FINE, MULCT, PENALTY, FORFEITURE.

FINE, from the Latin *finis*, the end or purpose, signifies, by an extended application, satisfaction by way of amends for an offence. MULCT, in Latin *multa*,

comes from *mulgeo*, to draw or wipe, because an offence is wiped off by money. PENALTY, in Latin *penalitas*, from *pena*, a pain, signifies what gives pain by way of punishment. FORFEITURE, from *forfeit*, in French *forfait*, from *forfaire*, signifies to do away or lose by doing wrong.

The *fine* and *mulct* are always pecuniary; a *penalty* may be pecuniary; a *forfeiture* consists of the deprivation of any right or property: the *fine* and *mulct* are imposed; the *penalty* is inflicted or incurred; the *forfeiture* is incurred. The violation of a rule or law is attended with a *fine* or *mulct*, but the former is a term of general use; the latter is rather a technical term in law: a criminal offence incurs a *penalty*; negligence of duty occasions the *forfeiture*. A *fine* or *mulct* serves either as punishment to the offender or as an amends for the offence: a *penalty* always inflicts some kind of pain as a punishment on the offender: a *forfeiture* is attended with loss as a punishment to the delinquent. Among the Chinese all offences are punished with *finis* or flogging: the Roman Catholics were formerly subject to *penalties* if detected in the performance of their religious worship: societies subject their members to *forfeitures* for the violation of their laws.

Too dear a *fine*, ah, much lamented maid!
For warring with the Trojans thou hast paid.
DRYDEN.

For to prohibit and dispense,
To find out or to make offence,
To set what characters they please,
And *mulcts* on sin, or godliness,
Must prove a pretty thriving trade.
BUTLER.

It must be confessed that, as for the laws of men, gratitude is not enjoined by the sanction of *penalties*.
SOUTH.

The Earl of Hereford, being tried secundum leges Normannorum, could only be punished by a *forfeiture* of his inheritance.
TYRWHITT.

In the Roman law, if a lord manumits his slave, gross ingratitude in the person so made free *forfeits* his freedom.
SOUTH.

FINICAL, SPRUCE, FOPPISH.

THESE epithets are applied to such as attempt at finery by improper means. The FINICAL is insignificantly fine; the SPRUCE is laboriously and artfully fine; the FOPPISH is fantastically and affectedly fine. The *finical* is said mostly of

manners and speech; the *spruce* is said of the dress; the *foppish*, of dress and manners.

A *finical* gentleman clips his words and screws his body into as small a compass as possible, to give himself the air of a delicate person: a *spruce* gentleman strives not to have a fold wrong in his frill or cravat, nor a hair of his head to lie amiss: a *foppish* gentleman seeks by extravagance in the cut of his clothes, and by the tawdriness in their ornaments, to render himself distinguished for finery. A little mind, full of conceit of itself, will lead a man to be *finical*: a vacant mind that is anxious to be pleasing will not object to the employment of rendering the person *spruce*: a giddy, vain mind, eager after applause, impels a man to every kind of *foppery*.

At the top of the building (Blenheim House) are several cupolas and little turrets that have but an ill effect, and make the building look at once *finical* and heavy.
POPE.

Methinks I see thee *spruce* and fine,
With coat embroider'd richly shine.
SWIFT.
The learned, full of inward pride,
The *fops* of outward show deride.
GAY.

FINITE, LIMITED.

FINITE, from *finis*, an end, is the natural property of things; and LIMITED, from *lines*, a boundary, is the artificial property: the former is opposite only to the *infinite*; but the latter, which lies within the *finite*, is opposed to the *unlimited* or the *infinite*. This world is *finite*, and space *infinite*; the power of a prince is *limited*. It is not in our power to extend the bounds of the *finite*, but the *limited* is mostly under our control. We are *finite* beings, and our capacities are variously *limited*, either by nature or circumstances.

Methinks this single consideration of the progress of a *finite* spirit to perfection will be sufficient to extinguish all envy in inferior natures, and all contempt in superior.
ADDISON.

Those complaints which we are apt to make of our *limited* capacity and narrow view, are just as unreasonable as the childish complaints of our not being formed with a microscopic eye.
BLAIR.

FIRE, HEAT, WARMTH, GLOW.

In the proper sense these words are easily distinguished, but not so easily in

the improper sense; and as the latter depends principally upon the former, it is not altogether useless to enter into some explanation of their physical meaning.

FIRE is with regard to HEAT as the cause to the effect; it is itself an inherent property in some material bodies, and when in action communicates *heat*: *fire* is perceptible to us by the eye, as well as the touch; *heat* is perceptible only by the touch: we distinguish *fire* by means of the flame it sends forth, or by the changes which it produces upon other bodies; but we discover *heat* only by the sensations which it produces in ourselves.

Heat and WARMTH differ principally in degree, the latter being a gentle degree of the former. The term *heat* is, however, in its most extensive sense, applicable to that universal principle which pervades all nature, animate and inanimate, and seems to vivify the whole; it is this principle which appears either under the form of *fire*, or under the more commonly conceived form of *heat*, as it is generally understood, and as I have here considered it. *Heat* in this limited sense is less active than *fire*, and more active than *warmth*: the former is produced in bodies, either by the violent action of *fire*, as in the boiling of water, the melting of lead, or the violent friction of two hard bodies; the latter is produced by the simple expulsion of cold, as in the case of feathers, wool, and other substances, which produce and retain *warmth*. GLOW is a partial *heat* or *warmth* which exists, or is known to exist, mostly in the human frame; it is commonly produced in the body when it is in its most vigorous state, and its nerves are firmly braced by the cold.

From the above analysis the figurative application of these terms, and the grounds upon which they are so employed, will be easily discerned. As *fire* is the strongest and most active principle in nature, which seizes everything within its reach with the greatest possible rapidity, genius is said to be possessed of *fire*, which flies with rapidity through all the regions of thought, and forms the most lively images and combinations; but when *fire* is applied to the eye or the looks, it borrows its meaning from the

external property of the flame, which is very aptly depicted in the eye or the looks of lively people. As *heat* is always excessive and mostly violent, those commotions and fermentations of the mind which flow from the agitation of the passions, particularly of the angry passions, are termed *heat*. As *warmth* is a gentle and grateful property, it has with most propriety been ascribed to the affections. As *glow* is a partial but vivid feeling of the body, so is friendship a strong but particular affection of the mind: hence the propriety of ascribing a *glow* to friendship. Age damps the *fire* of the poet. Disputants in the *heat* of the contest are apt to forget all the forms of good-breeding. A man of tender moral feelings speaks with *warmth* of a noble action, or takes a *warm* interest in the concerns of the innocent and the distressed. A youth in the full *glow* of friendship feels himself prepared to make any sacrifices in supporting the cause of his friend.

That modern love is no such thing,
As what those ancient poets sing,
A *fire* celestial, chaste, refin'd.
SWIFT.

The *heat* of Milton's mind might be said to sublimate his learning.
JOHNSON.

I fear I have pressed you further upon this occasion than was necessary: however, I know you will excuse my *warmth* in the cause of a friend.
MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO TO CÆSAR.

The frost-concocted glebe
Draws in abundant vegetable soul,
And gathers vigor for the coming year:
A stronger *glow* sits on the lively cheek
Of ruddy fire.
THOMSON.

FIRM, FIXED, SOLID, STABLE.

FIRM, *v. Constancy*. FIXED denotes the state of being *fixed*. SOLID, in Latin *solidus*, comes from *solum*, the ground, which is the most solid thing existing. STABLE, *v. Constancy*.

That is *firm* which is not easily shaken; that is *fixed* which is fastened to something else, and not easily torn; that is *solid* which is able to bear, and does not easily give way; that is *stable* which is able to make a stand against resistance, or the effects of time. A pillar which is *firm* on its base, *fixed* to a wall made of *solid* oak, is likely to be *stable*. A man stands *firm* in battle who does not flinch from the attack: he is *fixed* to a spot by the order of his commander.

In one *firm* orb the bands were rang'd around,
A cloud of heroes blacken'd all the ground.

POPE.

Unmov'd and silent, the whole war they wait,
Serenely dreadful, and as *fix'd* as fate.

POPE.

At thy *firmest* age,
Thou hadst within thy bole *solid* contents
That might have ribbed the sides and plank'd
the deck

COWPER.

Even the oak
Thrives by the rude concussion of the storm,
Frowning as if in his unconscious arm
He held the thunder: but the monarch owes
His *firm stability* to what he scorns.

COWPER.

In the moral sense, *firmness* is used only for the purpose, or such actions as depend on the purpose; *fixed* is used either for the mind, or for outward circumstances; *solid* is applicable to things in general, in an absolute sense; *stable* is applicable to things in a relative sense. Decrees are more or less *firm*, according to the source from which they spring; none are *firm*, compared with those which arise from the will of the Almighty: laws are *fixed* in proportion as they are connected with a constitution in which it is difficult to innovate. That which is *solid* is so of its own nature, but does not admit of degrees: a *solid* reason has within itself an independent property, which cannot be increased or diminished. That which is *stable* is so by comparison with that which is of less duration: the characters of some men are more *stable* than those of others; youth will not have so *stable* a character as manhood. A friendship is *firm* when it does not depend upon the opinion of others; it is *fixed* when the choice is made and grounded in the mind; it is *solid* when it rests on the only *solid* basis of accordancy in virtue and religion; it is *stable* when it is not liable to decrease or die away with time.

The man that's resolute and just,
Firm to his principles and trust,
Nor hopes nor fears can blind.

WALSH.

One loves *fixed* laws, and the other arbitrary
power.

TEMPLE.

The older an author is, commonly the more
solid he is and the greater teller of truth.

HOWELL.

The prosperity of no man on earth is *stable*
and assured.

BLAIR.

FIT, APT, MEET.

FIT (*v. Becoming*) is either an acquired or a natural property; *APT*, in Latin *ap-*

tus, from the Greek *arros*, to connect, is a natural property; *MEET*, from to mete or measure, signifying measured, is a moral quality. A house is *fit* for the accommodation of the family according to the plan of the builder; the young mind is *apt* to receive either good or bad impressions. *Meet* is a term of rare use, except in spiritual matters or in poetry: it is *meet* to offer our prayers to the Supreme Disposer of all things.

Nor holy rapture wanted they to praise
Their Maker in *fit* strains pronounc'd or sung.

MILTON.

If you hear a wise sentence or an *apt* phrase
commit it to your memory. SIR HENRY SIDNEY.
My image, not imparted to the brute,
Whose fellowship therefore not *unmeet* for thee,
Good reason was thou freely shouldst dislike.

MILTON.

TO FIT, EQUIP, PREPARE, QUALIFY.

To *FIT* (*v. Fit, becoming*) signifies to adopt means in order to make *fit*, and conveys the general sense of all the other terms; they differ principally in the means and circumstances of *fitting*: to *EQUIP* is to *fit* out by furnishing the necessary materials: to *PREPARE*, from the Latin *præparo*, compounded of *præ* and *paro*, to get beforehand, is to take steps for the purpose of *fitting* in future: to *QUALIFY*, from the Latin *qualifico*, or *qualis* and *facio*, to make a thing as it should be, is to *fit* or furnish with any requisites.

To *fit* is employed for ordinary cases: to *equip* is employed only for expeditions: a house is *fitted* up for the residence of a family; a vessel is *equipped* with everything requisite for a voyage; to *fit* may be for an immediate or a remote purpose; to *prepare* is for a remote purpose; to *fit* does not define the means; to *prepare* requires for the most part labor, time, and expense. A person *fits* himself for taking orders when he is at the university: he *prepares* for an examination by going over what he has already learned.

With long resounding cries they urge the train,
To *fit* the ships and launch into the main.

POPE.

The religious man is *equipped* for the storm
as well as the calm in this dubious navigation
of life.

BLAIR.

Antomedon and Alcinous *prepare*
Th' immortal coursers and the radiant car.

POPE.

To *fit* is said of everything, both in a natural and a moral sense: to *qualify* is used only in a moral sense. *Fit* is employed mostly for acquirements which are gained by physical exertions; *qualify* for those which are gained by intellectual exertion: a youth *fits* himself for a mechanical business by working at it; a youth *qualifies* himself for a profession by following a particular course of studies.

The next morning I perceived his sisters mighty
busy in *fitting* out Moses for the fair.

GOLDSMITH.

"He that cannot live well to-day," says Mar-
tial, "will be less *qualified* to live well to-mor-
row."

JOHNSON.

TO FIT, SUIT, ADAPT, ACCOMMODATE,
ADJUST.

FIT signifies to make or be *fit* (*v. Becoming*). *SUIT* signifies to make or be *suitable* (*v. To agree*). *ADAPT*, from *ap-
tus*, *fit*, signifies to make *fit* for a specific
purpose. *ACCOMMODATE* signifies to
make commodious (*v. Commodious*). *AD-
JUST* signifies to make a thing just as it
is desired to be.

To *fit*, in the transitive sense, is to make
of like proportions, so that one thing may
join with another as it ought: as to *fit*
one board to another; to *fit* clothes to
the body: to *suit* is to make things agree-
able to each other, and is mostly applied
to moral objects: as to *suit* one's actions
or language to the occasion.

Then meditates the mark; and coaching low,
Fits the sharp arrow to the well-strung bow.

POPE.

Suit the word to the action, and the action to
the word, with this special observance, that you
overstep not the modesty of nature.

SHAKESPEARE.

Fit may likewise be figuratively ap-
plied to moral objects, in the sense of
making one object fit for another: as to
fit a person by his education for a par-
ticular walk of life; to *fit* the mind for
the reception of truth.

The next difficulty was in *fitting* me with
parts, as almost every character was in keep-
ing.

GOLDSMITH.

In the intransitive sense, these words
have precisely the same distinction: as
the shoe *fits*, or *fits* the foot, which is
made to the same size; things *suit*

which agree in essential qualities, or
produce an agreeable effect when placed
together; as furniture is made to *suit*.

If *fitness* of parts was what constituted the
loveliness of form, the actual employment of
them would undoubtedly greatly augment it.

BURKE.

Her purple habit sits with such a grace
On her smooth shoulder, and so *suits* her face.

DRYDEN.

In the moral sense, the *fitness* of things
is what we term just, right, or decent:
that which *suits* falls in with our ideas
and feelings.

Nor *fits* it to prolong the feast
Timeless, indecent, but retire to rest.

POPE.

Ill *suits* it now the joys of love to know,
Too deep my anguish, and too wild my woe.

POPE.

To *adapt* is a species of *fitting*; to *ac-
commodate* is a species of *suiting*; both
applied to the moral actions of conscious
beings. *Adaptation* is an act of the
judgment; *accommodation* is an act of
the will: we *adapt* by an exercise of dis-
cretion; we *accommodate* by a manage-
ment of the humors: an *adaptation* does
not interfere with our interests; but an
accommodation always supposes a sacri-
fice: we *adapt* our language to the un-
derstandings of our hearers; we *accom-
modate* ourselves to the humors of oth-
ers. The mind of an infinitely wise Cre-
ator is clearly evinced in the world by
the universal *adaptation* of means to
their ends: a spirit of *accommodation* is
not merely a characteristic of politeness:
it is of sufficient importance to be rank-
ed among the Christian duties.

It is in his power so to *adapt* one thing to
another, as to fulfil his promise of making all
things work together for good to those who love
him.

BLAIR.

It is an old observation which has been made
of politicians, who would rather ingratiate them-
selves with their sovereign than promote his
real service, that they *accommodate* their coun-
sels to his inclinations.

ADDISON.

Accommodate and *adjust* are both ap-
plied to the affairs of men which require
to be kept, or put, in right order: but
the former implies the keeping as well
as putting in order; the latter simply
the putting in order. Men *accommodate*
each other, that is, make things commo-
dious for each other; but they *adjust*
things either for themselves or for oth-

ers. Thus they *accommodate* each other in pecuniary matters; or they *adjust* the ceremonial of a visit. *Accommodate* likewise always supposes a certain sacrifice or yielding on the part of the person *accommodating* for the convenience of the person *accommodated*. On this ground we may say that a difference is either *accommodated* or *adjusted*: for it is *accommodated*, inasmuch as the parties yield to each other so as to make it commodious to both; it is *adjusted*, inasmuch as that which was wrong is set right.

When things were thus far *adjusted* toward a peace, all other differences were soon *accommodated*.
ADDISON.

TO FIX, FASTEN, STICK.

FIX (*v. To fix, settle*) is a generic term; FASTEN, *i. e.*, to make fast, and STICK, *i. e.*, to make to stick, are but modes of *fixing*: we *fix* whatever we make to remain in a given situation; we *fasten* if we *fix* it firmly; we *stick* when we *fix* a thing by means of *sticking*. A post is *fixed* in the ground; it is *fastened* to a wall by a nail; it is *stuck* to another board by means of glue. Shelves are *fixed*: a horse is *fastened* to a gate: bills are *stuck*. What is *fixed* may be removed in various ways: what is *fastened* is removed by main force: what is *stuck* must be separated by contrivance.

On mules and dogs the infection first began,
And last the vengeful arrows *fix'd* in man.
POPE.

As the bold hound that gives the lion chase,
With beating bosom, and with eager pace,
Hangs on his haunch, or *fastens* on his heels,
Guards as he turns, and circles as he wheels.
POPE.

Some lines more moving than the rest,
Stuck to the point that pierc'd her breast.
SWIFT.

TO FIX, SETTLE, ESTABLISH.

FIX, in Latin *fixi*, perfect of *figo*, and in Greek *πηγω*, signifies simply to make to keep its place. SETTLE, which is a frequentative of *set*, signifies to make to sit or be at rest. ESTABLISH, from the Latin *stabilis*, signifies to make stable or keep its ground.

Fix is the general and indefinite term: to *settle* and *establish* are to *fix* strongly. *Fix* and *settle* are applied either to material or spiritual objects, *establish* only to moral objects. A post may be *fixed* in

the ground in any manner, but it requires time for it to *settle*. A person may either *fix* himself, *settle* himself, or *establish* himself: the first case refers simply to his taking up his abode, or choosing a certain spot; the second refers to his permanency of stay; and the third to the business which he raises or renders permanent.

Hell heard the insufferable noise, hell saw
Heav'n running from heav'n, and would have fled
Affrighted; but that fate had *fix'd* too deep
Her dark foundations.
MILTON.

Warm'd in the brain the brazen weapon lies,
And shades eternal *settle* o'er his eyes.
POPE.

The same distinction exists between these words in their further application to the conduct of men. We may *fix* one or many points, important or unimportant—it is a mere act of the will; we *settle* many points of importance; it is an act of deliberation; thus we *fix* the day and hour of doing a thing; we *settle* the affairs of our family: so likewise to *fix* is properly the act of one; to *settle* may be the joint act of many; thus a parent *fixes* on a business for his child, or he *settles* the marriage contract with another parent.

While wavering councils thus his mind engage,
Fluctuates in doubtful thought the Pylian sage,
To join the host or to the gen'ral haste,
Debating long, he *fixes* on the last.
POPE.

Justice submitted to what Abra pleas'd;
Her will alone could *settle* or revoke,
And law was *fixed* by what she latest spoke.
PATER.

To *fix* and *settle* are personal acts, and the objects are mostly of a private nature: but *establish* is an indirect action, and the object mostly of a public nature: thus we *fix* our opinions; we *settle* our minds; or we are instrumental in *establishing* laws, institutions, and the like. It is much to be lamented that any one should remain *unsettled* in his faith; and still more so, that the best form of faith is not universally *established*.

A pamphlet that talks of slavery, France, and the Pretender; they desire no more; it will *settle* the wavering and confirm the doubtful.
BURKE.

I would *establish* but one general rule to be observed in all conversation, which is this, that "men should not talk to please themselves, but those that hear them."
STEELE.

TO FIX, DETERMINE, SETTLE, LIMIT.

To FIX (*v. to fix, settle*) is here the general term; to DETERMINE (*v. To decide*); to SETTLE (*v. To fix*); to LIMIT (*v. To bound*), are here modes of *fixing*. They all denote the acts of conscious agents, but differ in the object and circumstances of the action; we may *fix* any object by any means, and to any point, we may *fix* material objects or spiritual objects; we may *fix* either by means of our senses or our thoughts; but we can *determine* only by means of our thoughts. To *fix*, in distinction from the rest, is said in regard to a single point or a line; but to *determine* is always said of one or more points, or a whole: we *fix* where a thing shall begin; but we *determine* where it shall begin, and where it shall end, which way, and how far it shall go, and the like: thus, we may *fix* our eye upon a star, or we *fix* our minds upon a particular branch of astronomy; but we *determine* the distance of the heavenly bodies, or the specific gravity of bodies, and the like, upon philosophical principles.

In a rotund, whether it be a building or a plantation, you can nowhere *fix* a boundary.

BURKE.
God, who did *determine* the time and place for the Jewish tabernacle and temple worship, hath not prescribed the same circumstances for the Christian service.
FALKNER.

So in respect to other objects, to *fix* is a positive and immediate act; as to *fix* the day, hour, or minute, etc.: to *determine* requires consideration; as to *determine* times and seasons, or modes of doing things, and the like.

Your first care must be to acquire the power of *fixing* your thoughts.
BLAIR.

More particularly to *determine* the proper season for grammar; I do not see how it can be made a study, but as an introduction to rhetoric.
LOCKE.

Determine is to *settle* as a means to the end; we commonly *determine* all subordinate matters, in order to *settle* a matter finally: thus, the *determination* of a single cause will serve to *settle* all other differences. The *determination* repeats the act of the individual who *fixes* certain points and brings them to a term; the *settlement* respects simply the conclusion of the affair, or the termination of all dispute and question.

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One had better *settle* on a way of life that is not the very best we might have chosen, than grow old without *determining* our choice.

ADDISON.
Religion *settles* the pretensions and otherwise interfering interests of mortal men.
ADDISON.

To *determine* and *limit* both signify to *fix* boundaries; but to *determine* or *fix* a term to a thing, respects such boundaries or terms as are formed by the nature of things: to *limit* is the act of a conscious agent; a question is *determined* by removing the doubt; the price is *limited* by law, or the command of the magistrate, or the agreement of the parties.

No sooner have they climbed that hill which thus *determines* their view at a distance, but a new prospect is opened.
ATTERBURY.

How can we bind or *limit* his decree
By what our ear has heard or eye may see?
PRIOR.

TO FLAG, DROOP, LANGUIISH, PINE.

To FLAG is to hang down loose like a *flag*. DROOP, *v. To fall*. To LANGUIISH is to become or continue languid (*v. Faint*). To PINE, from the German *pein*, pain, is to be or continue in pain.

In the proper application, nothing *flags* but that which can be distended and made to flutter by the wind, as the leaves of plants when they are in want of water or in a weakly condition; hence figuratively the spirits are said to *flag*: nothing is said to *droop* but that the head of which *flags* or *droops*; the snow-drop *droops*, and flowers will generally *droop* from excess of drought or heat: the spirits in the same manner are said to *droop*, which expresses more than to *flag*; the human body also *droops* when the strength fails; *languish* is a still stronger expression than *droop*, and is applicable principally to persons; some *languish* in sickness, some in prison, and some in a state of distress: to *pine* is to be in a state of wearing pain which is mostly of a mental nature; a child may *pine* when absent from all its friends, and supposing itself deserted.

It is variety which keeps alive desire, which would otherwise *flag*.
SOUTH.
Shrank with dry famine, and with toils declin'd,
The *drooping* body will desert the mind.
POPE.

How finely has the poet told us that the sick persons *languished* under lingering and incurable distempers.
ADDISON.

From beds of raging fire to starve in ice
Their soft ethereal warmth, there to *pine*,
Immovably infix'd.
MILTON.