

to REALIZE is to make *real*, namely, whatever has been aimed at. The application of these terms is evident from their explanations: the wishes, the expectations, the intentions, and promises of an individual are appropriately said to be *fulfilled*; national projects, or undertakings, prophecies, and whatever is of general interest, are said to be *accomplished*: the fortune, or the prospects of an individual, or whatever results successfully from specific efforts, is said to be *realized*: the *fulfilment* of our wishes may be as much the effect of good fortune as of design; the *accomplishment* of projects mostly results from extraordinary exertion, as the *accomplishment* of prophecies results from a miraculous exertion of power; the *realization* of hopes results more commonly from the slow process of moderate well-combined efforts than from anything extraordinary.

The palsied dotard looks around him, perceives himself to be alone; he has survived his friends, and he wishes to follow them; his wish is *fulfilled*; he drops torpid and insensible into that gulf which is deeper than the grave.

HAWKESWORTH.

God bless you, sweet boy! and *accomplish* the sweet hope I conceived of you.

SIR PHILIP SIDNEY.

After my fancy had been busied in attempting to *realize* the scenes that Shakspeare drew, I regretted that the labor was ineffectual.

HAWKESWORTH.

FULNESS, PLENITUDE.

ALTHOUGH PLENITUDE is no more than a derivative from the Latin for FULNESS, yet the latter is used either in the proper sense to express the state of objects that are *full*, or in the improper sense to express great quantity, which is the accompaniment of *fulness*; the former only in the higher style and in the improper sense: hence we say in the *fulness* of one's heart, in the *fulness* of one's joy, or the *fulness* of the Godhead bodily; but the *plenitude* of glory, the *plenitude* of power.

All mankind
Must have been lost, adjug'd to death and hell,
By doom severe, had not the Son of God,
In whom the *fulness* dwells of love divine,
His dearest mediation thus renew'd. MILTON.

The most beneficent Being is he who hath an absolute *fulness* of perfection in himself, who gave existence to the universe, and so cannot be supposed to want that which he communicated

without diminishing from the *plenitude* of his own power and happiness. GROVE.

FUNERAL, OBSEQUIES.

FUNERAL, in Latin *funus*, is derived from *funis*, a cord, because lighted cords or torches were carried before bodies which were interred by night; the term *funeral*, therefore, denotes the ordinary solemnity which attends the consignment of a body to the grave. OBSEQUIES, in Latin *exequia*, are both derived from *sequor*, which, in its compound sense, signifies to perform or execute; they comprehend, therefore, *funerals* attended with more than ordinary solemnity.

We speak of the *funeral* as the last sad office which we perform for a friend; it is accompanied by nothing but by mourning and sorrow: we speak of *obsequies* as the greatest tribute of respect which can be paid to the person of one who was high in station or public esteem: the *funeral*, by its frequency, becomes so familiar an object that it passes by unheeded; *obsequies* which are performed over the remains of the great attract our notice from the pomp and grandeur with which they are conducted.

That pluck'd my nerves, those tender strings of life,
Which, pluck'd a little more, will toll the bell
That calls my few friends to my *funeral*.

YOUNG.

Some in the flow'r-strewn grave the corpse have laid,
And annual *obsequies* around it paid. JENYNS.

G.

GAIN, PROFIT, EMOLUMENT, LUCRE.

GAIN signifies in general what is gained (*v. To acquire*). PROFIT, *v. Advantage*. EMOLUMENT, from *emolior*, signifies to work out or get by working. LUCRE is in Latin *lucrum*, gain, which probably comes from *lucro*, to pay, signifying that which comes to a man's purse.

Gain is here a general term, the other terms are specific: the *gain* is that which comes to a man; it is the fruit of his exertions, or agreeable to his wish: the *profit* is that which accrues from the thing.

Thus, when applied to riches, that which increases a man's estate are his *gains*; that which flows out of his trade or occupation are his *profits*; that is, they are his *gains* upon dealing. *Emolument* is a species of *gain* from labor, or a collateral *gain*; of this description are a man's *emoluments* from an office: a man estimates his *gains* by what he receives in the year; he estimates his *profits* by what he receives on every article; he estimates his *emoluments* according to the nature of the service which he has to perform: the merchant talks of his *gains*; the retail dealer of his *profits*; the placeman of his *emoluments*.

The *gains* of ordinary trades and vocations are honest, and furthered by two things, chiefly by diligence and by a good name. BACON.

The *profits* of my living, which amounted to about thirty-five pounds a year, I made over to the orphans and widows of the clergy of our diocese. GOLDSMITH.

Except the salary of the Laureate, to which King James added the office of historiographer, perhaps with some additional *emoluments*, Dryden's whole revenue seems to have been casual. JOHNSON.

Gain and *profit* are also taken in an abstract sense; *lucere* is never used otherwise; but the latter always conveys a bad meaning; it is, strictly speaking, unhallowed *gain*: an immoderate thirst for *gain* is the vice of men who are always calculating *profit* and loss; a thirst for *lucere* deadens every generous feeling of the mind.

No son of Mars descend for servile *gains*
To touch the booty, while the foe remains.

POPE.

Why may not a whole estate, thrown into a kind of garden, turn as much to the *profit* as the pleasure of the owner? ADDISON.

O sacred hunger of pernicious gold!
What bands of faith can impious *lucres* hold?

DRYDEN.

Gain and *profit* may be extended to other objects, and sometimes opposed to each other; for as that which we *gain* is what we wish only, it is often the reverse of *profitable*.

A few forsake the throng; with lifted eyes
Ask wealth of heaven, and *gain* a real prize,
Truth, wisdom, grace, and peace like that above,
Sealed with his signet, whom they serve and love. COWPER.

I think the *profit* and pleasure of that study are both so very obvious that a quick reader will

be beforehand with me, and imagine faster than I write. DRYDEN.

GALLANT, BEAU, SPARK.

THESE words convey nothing respectful of the person to whom they are applied; but the first, as is evident from its derivation, has something in it to recommend it to attention above the other: as true valor is ever associated with a regard for the fair sex, a GALLANT man will always be a *gallant* when he can render a female any service; sometimes, however, his *gallantries* may be such as to do them harm rather than good: insignificance and effeminacy characterize the BEAU or fine gentleman; he is the woman's man—the humble servant to supply the place of a lackey: the SPARK has but a *spark* of that fire which shows itself in impertinent puerilities; it is applicable to youth who are just broke loose from school or college, and eager to display their manhood.

The god of wit, and light, and arts,
With all acquir'd and natural parts,
Was an unfortunate *gallant*.

SWIFT.

His pride began to interpose,
Preferr'd before a crowd of *beaus*.

SWIFT.

Oft it has been my lot to mark

A proud, conceited, talking *spark*. MERRICK.

TO GAPE, STARE, GAZE.

To GAPE, in German *gaffen*, Saxon *geopmian*, to make open or wide, is to look with an open or wide mouth. STARE, from the German *starr*, fixed, signifies to look with a fixed eye. GAZE comes very probably from the Greek *αγαζομαι*, to admire, because it signifies to look steadily from a sentiment of admiration.

Gape and *stare* are taken in a bad sense; the former indicating the astonishment of gross ignorance; the latter not only ignorance but impertinence: *gaze* is taken always in a good sense, as indicating a laudable feeling of astonishment, pleasure, or curiosity: a clown *gapes* at the pictures of wild beasts which he sees at a fair; an impertinent fellow *stares* at every woman he looks at, and *stares* a modest woman out of countenance: a lover of the fine arts will *gaze* with admiration and delight at the productions of Raphael or Titian; when a person is stupefied by affright, he gives a

vacant *stare*: those who are filled with transport *gaze* on the object of their ecstasy.

It was now a miserable spectacle to see us nodding and *gaping* at one another, every man talking and no man heard. SIR JOHN MANDEVILLE.

Astonish'd Aunus just arrives by chance
To see his fall, nor farther dares advance;
But, fixing on the maid his horrid eye,
He *stares* and shakes, and finds it vain to fly.

DRYDEN.

For, while expecting there the queen, he rais'd
His wond'ring eyes, and round the temple *gas'd*,
Admir'd the fortune of the rising town,
The striving artists, and their art's renown.

DRYDEN.

TO GATHER, COLLECT.

To GATHER, in Saxon *gaderian*, low German *gadden*, from *gade*, a sort, that is to bring things of a sort together. To COLLECT (*v. To assemble, collect*) annexes also the idea of binding or forming into a whole; we *gather* that which is scattered in different parts: thus stones are *gathered* into a heap; vessels are *collected* so as to form a fleet. *Gathering* is a mere act of necessity or convenience; *collecting* is an act of design or choice: we *gather* apples from a tree, or a servant *gathers* books from off a table; the antiquarian *collects* coins, and the bibliomaniac *collects* rare books.

As the small ant (for she instructs the man,
And preaches labor) *gathers* all she can.

CREECH.

The royal bee, queen of the rosy bower,
Collects her precious sweets from every flower.

C. JOHNSON.

GENDER, SEX.

GENDER, in Latin *genus*, signifies properly a *genus*, or kind. SEX, in French *sexe*, Latin *sexus*, comes from the Greek *ἕξις*, signifying the habit or nature. The *gender* is that distinction in words which marks the distinction of *sex* in things; there are, therefore, three *genders*, but only two *sexes*. By the inflections of words are denoted whether things are of this or that *sex*, or of no *sex*. The *genders*, therefore, are divided in grammar into *masculine*, *feminine*, and *neuter*; and animals are divided into male and female *sex*.

GENERAL, UNIVERSAL.

THE GENERAL is to the UNIVERSAL what the part is to the whole. What is *general* includes the greater part or num-

ber; what is *universal* includes every individual or part. The *general* rule admits of many exceptions; the *universal* rule admits of none. Human government has the *general* good for its object: the government of Providence is directed to *universal* good. *General* is opposed to particular, and *universal* to individual. A scientific writer will not content himself with *general* remarks, when he has it in his power to enter into particulars; the *universal* complaint which we hear against men for their pride shows that in every individual it exists to a greater or less degree. It is a *general* opinion that women are not qualified for scientific pursuits, but many females have proved themselves honorable exceptions to this rule: it is a *universal* principle that children ought to honor their parents; the intention of the Creator in this respect is manifested in such a variety of forms as to admit of no question.

GENERATION, AGE.

GENERATION is said of the persons who live during any particular period; and AGE is said of the period itself.

Those who are born at the same time constitute the *generation*; that period of time which comprehends the age of man is the *age*: there may, therefore, be many *generations* spring up in the course of an *age*; a fresh *generation* is springing up every day, which in the course of an *age* pass away and are succeeded by fresh *generations*. We consider man in his *generation* as to the part which he has to perform. We consider the *age* in which we live as to the manners of men and the events of nations.

I often lamented that I was not one of that happy *generation* who demolished the convents.

JOHNSON.

Throughout every *age*, God hath pointed his peculiar displeasure against the confidence of presumption, and the arrogance of prosperity.

BLAIR.

GENTEEL, POLITE.

GENTEEL, in French *gentil*, Latin *gentilis*, signifies literally one belonging to the same family, or the next akin to whom the estate would fall, if there were no children; hence by an extended application it denoted to be of a good family. POLITE, *v. Civil*.

Gentility respects rank in life; *politeness* the refinement of the mind and outward behavior. A *genteel* education is suited to the station of a gentleman; a *polite* education fits for polished society and conversation, and raises the individual among his equals. There may be *gentility* without *politeness*; and *vice versa*. A person may have *genteel* manners, a *genteel* carriage, a *genteel* mode of living as far as respects his general relation with society; but a *polite* behavior and a *polite* address, which may qualify him for every relation in society, and enable him to shine in connection with all orders of men, is independent of either birth or wealth; it is in part a gift of nature, although it is to be acquired by art. His equipage, servants, house, and furniture may be such as to entitle a man to the name of *genteel*, although he is wanting in all the forms of real good-breeding; while fortune may sometimes frown upon the polished gentleman, whose *politeness* is a recommendation to him wherever he goes.

A lady of genius will give a *genteel* air to her whole dress by a well-fancied suit of knots, as a judicious writer gives a spirit to a whole sentence by a single expression.

GAY.

In this isle remote,
Our painted ancestors were slow to learn,
To arms devote, in the *politer* arts,
Nor skilled, nor studious.

SOMERVILLE.

GENTILE, HEATHEN, PAGAN.

THE Jews comprehended all strangers under the name of Goim, nations or GENTILES: among the Greeks and Romans they were designated by the name of barbarians. By the name *Gentile* was understood especially those who were not of the Jewish religion, including, in the end, even the Christians. Some learned men pretend that the *Gentiles* were so named from their having only a natural law, and such as they imposed on themselves, in opposition to the Jews and Christians, who have a positive revealed law to which they are obliged to submit. Frisch and others derive the word HEATHEN from the Greek *ἔθνη*, *ἔθνικος*, which is corroborated by the translation in the Anglo-Saxon law of the word *heathne* by the Greek *ἔθνη*. Adelung, however, thinks it to be more probably derived from the word *heide*, a field, for

the same reason as PAGAN is derived from *pagus*, a village, because when Constantine banished idolaters from the towns they repaired to the villages, and secretly adhered to their religious worship, whence they were termed by the Christians of the fourth century *Pagani*, which, as he supposes, was translated literally into the German *heidener*, a villager or worshipper in the field. Be this as it may, it is evident that the word *heathen* is in our language more applicable than *pagan* to the Greeks, the Romans, and the cultivated nations who practised idolatry; and, on the other hand, *pagan* is more properly employed for rude and uncivilized people who worship false gods.

The *Gentile* does not expressly believe in a Divine Revelation; but he either admits of the truth in part, or is ready to receive it: the *heathen* adopts a positively false system that is opposed to the true faith: the *pagan* is a species of *heathen*, who obstinately persists in a worship which is merely the fruit of his own imagination. The *heathens* or *pagans* are *Gentiles*; but the *Gentiles* are not all either *heathens* or *pagans*. Confucius and Socrates, who rejected the plurality of gods, and the followers of Mohammed, who adore the true God, are, properly speaking, *Gentiles*. The worshippers of Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, and all the deities of the ancients, are termed *heathens*. The worshippers of Fo, Brahma, Xaca, and all the deities of savage nations, are termed *pagans*.

The *Gentiles* were called to the true faith, and obeyed the call: many of the illustrious *heathens* would have doubtless done the same, had they enjoyed the same privilege: there are to this day many *pagans* who reject this advantage, to pursue their own blind imaginations.

There might be several among the *Gentiles* in the same condition that Cornelius was before he became a Christian.

TILLOTSON.

Not that I believe that all virtues of the *heathens* were counterfeit, and destitute of an inward principle of goodness. God forbid we should pass so hard a judgment upon those excellent men, Socrates, and Epictetus, and Antinous.

TILLOTSON.

And nations laid in blood; dread sacrifice
To Christian pride! which had with horror
shock'd
The darkest *pagans*, offered to their gods.

YOUNG.

GENTLE, TAME.

GENTLENESS lies rather in the natural disposition; TAMENESS is the effect either of art or circumstances. Any unbroken horse may be *gentle*, but not *tame*: a horse that is broken in will be *tame*, but not always *gentle*. *Gentle*, as before observed (*v. Gented*), signifies literally well-born, and is opposed either to the fierce or the rude: *tame*, in German *zahn*, from *zaum*, a bridle, signifies literally curbed or kept under, and is opposed either to the wild or the spirited. Animals are in general said to be *gentle* who show a disposition to associate with man, and conform to his will; they are said to be *tame* if, either by compulsion or habit, they are brought to mix with human society. Of the first description there are individuals in almost every species which are more or less entitled to the name of *gentle*; of the latter description are many species, as the dog, the sheep, the hen, and the like.

This said, the hoary king no longer staid,
But on his car the slaughter'd victims laid;
Then seiz'd the reins, his *gentle* steeds to guide,
And drove to Troy, Antenor at his side. POPE.
For Orpheus' lute could soften steel and stone,
Make tigers *tame*, and huge leviathans.

SHAKESPEARE.

In the moral application, *gentle* is always employed in the good, and *tame* in the bad, sense: a *gentle* spirit needs no control, it amalgamates freely with the will of another: a *tame* spirit is without any will of its own; it is alive to nothing but submission: it is perfectly consistent with our natural liberty to have *gentleness*, but *tameness* is the accompaniment of slavery. The same distinction marks the use of these words when applied to the outward conduct or the language: *gentle* bespeaks something positively good; *tame* bespeaks the want of an essential good: the former is allied to the kind, the latter to the abject and mean qualities which naturally flow from the compression or destruction of energy and will in the agent. A *gentle* expression is devoid of all acrimony, and serves to turn away wrath: a *tame* expression is devoid of all force or energy, and ill-calculated to inspire the mind with any feeling whatever. In giving counsel to an irritable and conceited temper, it is

necessary to be *gentle*: *tame* expressions are nowhere such striking deformities as in a poem or an oration.

Gentleness stands opposed, not to the most determined regard to virtue and truth, but to harshness and severity, to pride and arrogance.

BLAIR.

Though all wanton provocations and contemptuous insolence are to be diligently avoided, there is no less danger in timid compliance and *tame* resignation.

JOHNSON.

TO GET, GAIN, OBTAIN, PROCURE.

To GET signifies simply to cause to have or possess; it is generic, and the rest specific: to GAIN (*v. To acquire*) is to *get* the thing one wishes, or that is for one's advantage: to OBTAIN is to *get* the thing aimed at or striven after: to PROCURE, from *pro* and *curo*, to care for, is to *get* the thing wanted or sought for.

Get is not only the most general in its sense, but its application; it may be substituted in almost every case for the other terms, for we may say to *get* or *gain* a prize, to *get* or *obtain* a reward, to *get* or *procure* a book; and it is also employed in numberless familiar cases, where the other terms would be less suitable, for what this world gains in familiarity it loses in dignity: hence we may with propriety talk of a servant's *getting* some water, or a person *getting* a book off a shelf, or *getting* meat from the butcher, with numberless similar cases in which the other terms could not be employed without losing their dignity. Moreover, *get* is promiscuously used for whatever comes to the hand, whether good or bad, desirable or not desirable, sought for or not; but *gain*, *obtain*, and *procure* always include either the wishes or the instrumentality of the agent, or both together. Thus a person is said to *get* a cold, or a fever, a good or an ill name, without specifying any of the circumstances of the action; but he is said to *gain* that approbation which is gratifying to his feelings; to *obtain* a recompense which is the object of his exertions; to *procure* a situation which is the end of his endeavors.

The word *gain* is peculiarly applicable to whatever comes to us fortuitously; what we *gain* constitutes our good fortune; we *gain* a victory, or we *gain* a cause; the result in both cases may be

independent of our exertions. To *obtain* and *procure* exclude the idea of chance, and suppose exertions directed to a specific end; but the former may include the exertions of others; the latter is particularly employed for one's own personal exertions. A person *obtains* a situation through the recommendation of a friend: he *procures* a situation by applying for it. *Obtain* is likewise employed only in that which requires particular efforts, that which is not immediately within our reach; *procure* is applicable to that which is to be *got* with ease, by the simple exertion of a walk, or of asking for.

The miser is more industrious than the saint: the pains of *getting*, the fears of losing, and the inability of enjoying his wealth, have been the mark of satire in all ages.

SPECTATOR.

Neither Virgil nor Horace would have *gained* so great reputation in the world had they not been the friends and admirers of each other.

ADDISON.

All things are blended, changeable, and vain!
No hope, no wish, we perfectly *obtain*.

JENYNS.

Ambition pushes the soul to such actions as are apt to *procure* honor and reputation to the actor.

ADDISON.

GIFT, PRESENT, DONATION.

GIFT is derived from to *give*, in the sense of what is communicated to another gratuitously of one's property. PRESENT is derived from to *present*, signifying the thing *presented* to another. DONATION, in French *donation*, from the Latin *dono*, to *present* or *give*, is a species of *gift*.

The *gift* is an act of generosity or condescension; it contributes to the benefit of the receiver: the *present* is an act of kindness, courtesy, or respect; it contributes to the pleasure of the receiver. The *gift* passes from the rich to the poor, from the high to the low, and creates an obligation; the *present* passes either between equals, or from the inferior to the superior. Whatever we receive from God, through the bounty of his providence, we entitle a *gift*; whatever we receive from our friends, or whatever princes receive from their subjects, are entitled *presents*. We are told by all travellers that it is a custom in the East never to approach a great man without a *present*; the value of a *gift* is often

heightened by being given opportunely. The value of a *present* often depends upon the value we have for the giver; the smallest *present* from an esteemed friend is of more worth in our eyes than the costliest *presents* that monarchs receive.

The *gifts* of Heav'n my following song pursues,
Aërial honey and ambrosial dews.

DRYDEN.

Have what you ask, your *presents* I receive;
Land, where and when you please, with ample leave.

DRYDEN.

The *gift* is private, and benefits the individual: the *donation* is public, and serves some general purpose: what is given to relieve the necessities of any poor person is a *gift*; what is given to support an institution is a *donation*. The clergy are indebted to their patrons for the livings which are in their *gift*: it has been the custom of the pious and charitable in all ages to make *donations* for the support of almshouses, hospitals, infirmaries, and such institutions as serve to diminish the sum of human misery.

And she shall have them, if again she sues,
Since you the giver and the *gift* refuse.

DRYDEN.

Estates held by feudal tenure, being annually gratuitous *donations*, were at that time denominated *beneficia*.

BLACKSTONE.

GIFT, ENDOWMENT, TALENT.

GIFT, *v. Gift*. ENDOWMENT signifies the thing with which one is endowed. TALENT, *v. Ability*.

Gift and *endowment* both refer to the act of *giving* and *endowing*, and of course include the idea of something given, and something received: the word *talent* conveys no such collateral idea. When we speak of a *gift*, we refer in our minds to a *giver*; when we speak of an *endowment*, we refer in our minds to the receiver; when we speak of a *talent*, we only think of its intrinsic quality. A *gift* is either supernatural or natural; an *endowment* is only natural. The primitive Christians received various *gifts* through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, as the *gift* of tongues, the *gift* of healing, etc. There are some men who have a peculiar *gift* of utterance; beauty of person, and corporeal agility, are *endowments* with which some are peculiarly invested.

But Heav'n its *gifts* not all at once bestows,
These years with wisdom crowns, with action
those. POPE.

A brute arrives at a point of perfection that he
can never pass; in a few years he has all the *en-
dowments* he is capable of. ADDISON.

The word *gift* excludes the idea of anything acquired by exertion; it is that which is communicated to us altogether independently of ourselves, and enables us to arrive at that perfection in any art which could not be attained any other way. Speech is denominated a general *gift*, inasmuch as it is given to the whole human race, in distinction from the brutes; but the *gift* of eloquence is a peculiar *gift* granted to a few individuals, in distinction from others, and one which may be exerted for the benefit of mankind. *Endowments*, though inherent in us, are not independent of our exertions; they are qualities which admit of improvement by being used; they are, in fact, the *gifts* of nature, which serve to adorn and elevate the possessor, when employed for a good purpose. *Talents* are either natural or acquired, or in some measure of a mixed nature; they denote powers without specifying the source from which they proceed; a man may have a *talent* for music, for drawing, for mimicry, and the like; but this *talent* may be the fruit of practice and experience, as much as of nature. It is clear from the above that an *endowment* is a *gift*, but a *gift* is not always an *endowment*; and that a *talent* may also be either a *gift* or an *endowment*, but that it is frequently distinct from both. The terms *gift* and *talent* are applicable to corporeal as well as spiritual actions; *endowment* to corporeal or mental qualities. To write a superior hand is a *gift*, inasmuch as it is supposed to be unattainable by any force of application and instruction; it is a *talent*, inasmuch as it is a power or property worth our possession, but it is never an *endowment*. On the other hand, courage, discernment, a strong imagination, and the like, are both *gifts* and *endowments*; and when the intellectual *endowment* displays itself in any creative form, as in the case of poetry, music, or any art, so as to produce that which is valued and esteemed, it becomes a *talent* to the possessor.

Although he had the *gift* of seeing through a question at a glance, yet he never suffered his discernment to anticipate another's explanation. CUMBERLAND.

He was of a noble nature and generous disposition, and of such other *endowments* as made him very capable of being a great favorite to a great king. CLARENDON.

Mr. Locke has an admirable reflection upon the difference of wit and judgment, whereby he endeavors to show the reason why they are not always the *talents* of the same person. ADDISON.

TO GIVE, GRANT, BESTOW.

GIVE, in Saxon *gifan*, German *geben*, etc., is derived by Adelung from the old word *gaff*, the hollow of the hand. GRANT and BESTOW, *v. To allow*.

The idea of communicating to another what is our own, or in our power, is common to these terms; this is the whole signification of *give*; but *grant* and *bestow* include accessory ideas in their meaning. To *grant* is to *give* at one's pleasure; to *bestow* is to *give* from a certain degree of necessity. *Giving* is confined to no object; whatever property we transfer into the hands of another, that we *give*; we *give* money, clothes, food, or whatever is transferable; *granting* is confined to such objects as afford pleasure or convenience; they may consist of transferable property or not: *bestowing* is applied to such objects only as are necessary to supply wants, which always consist of that which is transferable. We *give* what is liked or not liked, asked for or unasked for: we *grant* that only which is wished for and requested. One may *give* poison or medicine; one may *give* to a beggar, or to a friend; one *grants* a sum of money by way of loan; we *give* what is wanted or not wanted; we *bestow* that only which is expressly wanted: we *give* with an idea of a return or otherwise: we *grant* voluntarily, without any prospect of a return: we *give* for a permanency or otherwise; we *bestow* only in particular cases which require immediate notice.

Milton afterward *gives* us a description of the morning, which is wonderfully suitable to a divine poem. ADDISON.

But there is yet a liberty, unseen
By poets, and by senators unpraised,
Which monarchs cannot *grant*, nor all the powers
Of earth and hell confederate take away. COWPER.

Charity, decent, modest, easy, kind,
Softens the high and rears the abject mind,
Each other gift which God on man *bestows*,
Its proper bounds and due restrictions knows. PRIOR.

To *give* has no respect to the circumstances of the action or the agent; it is applicable to persons of all conditions: to *grant* bespeaks not only the will, but the power and influence of the *grantor*: to *bestow* bespeaks the necessitous condition of the receiver. Children may *give* to their parents and parents to their children, kings to their subjects or subjects to their kings; but monarchs only *grant* to their subjects, or parents to their children; and superiors in general *bestow* upon their dependents that, which they cannot provide for themselves.

Such notes as, warbled to the string,
Drew iron tears down Pluto's cheek,
And made hell *grant* what love did seek. MILTON.

In an extended application of the terms to moral objects or circumstances, they strictly adhere to the same line of distinction. We *give* our consent; we *give* our promise; we *give* our word; we *give* credit; we *give* in all cases that which may be simply transferred from one to another. Liberties, rights, privileges, favors, indulgences, permissions, and all things are *granted*, which are in the hands only of a few, but are acceptable to many. Blessings, care, concern, and the like, are *bestowed* upon those who are dependent upon others for whatever they have.

Happy when both to the same centre move,
When kings *give* liberty, and subjects love. DENHAM.

The gods will *grant*
What their unerring wisdom sees they want. DRYDEN.

Give and *bestow* are likewise said of things as well as of persons; *grant* is said only of persons. *Give* is here equally general and indefinite; *bestow* conveys the idea of *giving* under circumstances of necessity and urgency. One *gives* a preference to a particular situation; one *gives* a thought to a subject that is proposed; one *gives* time and labor to any matter that engages one's attention: but one *bestows* pains on that which demands particular attention; one *bestows* a moment's thought on one particular subject, out of the number which engage attention.

He frankly offered to join them in his Majesty's service, and so *gave* some countenance to the reproach that was first most injuriously cast upon him. CLARENDON.

After having thus treated at large of Paradise Lost, I could not think it sufficient to have celebrated this poem, in the whole, without descending to particulars: I have therefore *bestowed* a paper on each book. ADDISON.

TO GIVE, AFFORD.

GIVE (*v. To give, grant*) and AFFORD (*v. To afford*) are allied to each other in the sense of sending forth: but the former denotes an unqualified and unconditional action, as in the preceding article; the latter bears a relation to the circumstances of the agent. A person is said to *give* money without any regard to the state of his finances: he is said to *afford* what he *gives*, when one wishes to define his pecuniary condition. The same idea runs through the application of these terms to all other cases, in which inanimate things are made the agents. When we say a thing *gives* satisfaction, we simply designate the action; when we say it *affords* pleasure, we refer to the nature and properties of the thing thus specified—that is to say, its capacity to give satisfaction; the former is employed only to declare the fact, the latter to characterize the object. Hence, in certain cases, we should say, this or that posture of the body *gives* ease to a sick person; but, as a moral sentiment, we should say, nothing *affords* such ease to the mind as a clear conscience. Upon the same grounds the use of these terms is justified in the following cases: to *give* rise; to *give* birth; or *give* occasion; to *afford* an opportunity; to *afford* a plea or a pretext; to *afford* ground, and the like.

Are these our great pursuits? Is this to live?
These all the hopes this much-lov'd world can
give? JENYNS.

Our paper manufacture takes into use several mean materials, which could be put to no other use, and *affords* work for several hands in the collection of them, which are incapable of any other employment. ADDISON.

TO GIVE, PRESENT, OFFER, EXHIBIT.

THESE terms have a common signification, inasmuch as they designate the manual act of transferring something from one's self to another. The first is here as elsewhere (*v. To give, grant*) the most

Indefinite and extensive in its meaning; it denotes the complete act: the two latter refer rather to the preliminaries of GIVING than to the act itself. What is *given* is actually transferred: what is PRESENTED, that is, made a *present* to any one; or OFFERED, that is, brought in his way, is put in the way of being transferred: we *present* in *giving*, and *offer* in order to *give*; but we may *give* without presenting or offering; and, on the other hand, we may *present* or *offer* without *giving*, if the thing *presented* or *offered* be not received.

To *give* is the familiar term which designates the ordinary transfer of property: to *present* is a term of respect; it includes in it the formality and ceremony of setting before another that which we wish to *give*: to *offer* is an act of humility or solemnity; it bespeaks the movement of the heart, which impels to the making a transfer or *gift*. We *give* to our domestics; we *present* to princes; we *offer* to God: we *give* to a person what we wish to be received; we *present* to a person what we think agreeable; we *offer* what we think acceptable: what is *given* is supposed to be ours; what we *offer* is supposed to be at our command; what we *present* need not be either our own or at our command: we *give* a person not only our external property, but our esteem, our confidence, our company, and the like: an ambassador *presents* his credentials at court; a subject *offers* his services to his king.

Of seven smooth joints a mellow pipe I have,
Which with his dying breath Damætas gave.

DRYDEN.

It fell out at the same time that a very fine colt, which promised great strength and speed, was *presented* to Octavius: Virgil assured them that he would prove a jade: upon trial, it was found as he had said.

WALSH.

Alexis will thy homely gifts disdain;
Nor, should'st thou *offer* all thy little store,
Will rich Iolas yield, but *offer* more.

DRYDEN.

They bear the same relation to each other when applied to words or actions, instead of property: we speak of *giving* a person an assurance, or a contradiction; of *presenting* an address, and *offering* an apology: of *giving* a reception, *presenting* a figure, or *offering* an insult. They may likewise be extended in their application, not only to personal and individual ac-

tions, but also to such as respect the public at large: we *give* a description in writing, as well as by word of mouth; one *presents* the public with the fruit of one's labors; we *offer* remarks on such things as attract notice, and call for animadversion.

Sacred interpreter of human thought,
How few respect or use thee as they ought;
But all shall *give* account of every wrong
Who dare dishonor or defile the tongue.

COWPER.

He carefully retained the secret, and did not communicate to any person living that he received any letter from the king, till the very minute he *presented* it to the House of Commons.

CLARENDON.

Socrates deterred Alcibiades from the prayers and sacrifices which he was going to *offer*.

ADDISON.

These terms may also be employed to designate the actions of unconscious agents, by which they are characterized: in this sense they come very near to the word EXHIBIT, which, from *exhibeo*, signifies to hold or put forth. Here the word *give* is equally indefinite and general, denoting simply to send from one's self, and applies mostly to what proceeds from another, by a natural cause: thus, a thing is said to *give* pain, or to *give* pleasure. Things are said to *present* or *offer*: thus, a town is said to *present* a fine view, or an idea *presents* itself to the mind; an opportunity *offers*, that is, *offers* itself to our notice. To *exhibit* is properly applied in this sense of setting forth to view; but expresses, likewise, the idea of attracting notice also: that which is *exhibited* is more striking than what is *presented* or *offered*; thus a poem is said to *exhibit* marks of genius.

The apprehension of the good
Gives but the greater feeling to the worse.

SHAKESPEARE.

Its pearl the rock *presents*, its gold the mine.

JENYNS.

True genuine dulness mov'd his pity,
Unless it *offer'd* to be witty.

SWIFT.

The recollection of the past becomes dreadful to a guilty man. It *exhibits* to him a life thrown away on vanities and follies.

BLAIR.

TO GIVE UP, DELIVER, SURRENDER,
YIELD, CEDE, CONCEDE.

WE GIVE UP (*v. To give, grant*) that which we wish to retain; we DELIVER that which we wish not to retain. *Deliver* does not include the idea of a transfer;

but *give up* implies both the *giving* from, and the *giving* to: we *give up* our house to the accommodation of our friends; we *deliver* property into the hands of the owner. To *give up* is a colloquial substitute for either SURRENDER or YIELD, as it designates no circumstance of the action; it may be employed in familiar discourse, in almost every case, for the other terms: where the action is compulsory, we may either say an officer *gives up* or *surrenders* his sword; when the action is discretionary, we may either say he *gives up* or *yields* a point of discussion: *give up* has, however, an extensiveness of application, which gives it an office distinct from either *surrender* or *yield*. When we speak of familiar and personal subjects, *give up* is more suitable than *surrender*, which is confined to matters of public interest or great moment: a man *gives up* his place, his right, his claim, and the like; he *surrenders* a fortress, a vessel, or his property to his creditors. When *give up* is compared with *yield*, they both respect personal matters; but the former expresses a much stronger action than the latter: a man *gives up* his whole judgment to another; he *yields* to the opinion of another in particular cases: he *gives himself up* to sensual indulgences; he *yields* to the force of temptation.

CEDE, from the Latin *cedo*, to *give*, is properly to *surrender* by virtue of a treaty: we may *surrender* a town as an act of necessity; but the *cession* of a country is purely a political transaction: thus, generals frequently *surrender* such towns as they are not able to defend; and governments *cede* such countries as they find it not convenient to retain. To CONCEDE, which is but a variation of *cede*, is a mode of *yielding* which may be either an act of discretion or courtesy; as when a government *concedes* to the demands of the people certain privileges, or when an individual *concedes* any point in dispute for the sake of peace.

The peaceable man will *give up* his favorite schemes: he will *yield* to an opponent rather than become the cause of violent embroilments.

BLAIR.

On my experience, Adam, freely taste,
And fear of death *deliver* to the winds.

MILTON.

The young, half-seduced by persuasion, and half-compelled by ridicule, *surrender* their

convictions, and consent to live as they see others around them living.

BLAIR.

As to the magic power which the devil imparts for these *concessions* of his votaries, theologians have different opinions.

CUMBERLAND.

TO GIVE UP, ABANDON, RESIGN,
FOREGO.

THESE terms differ from the preceding (*v. To give up*), inasmuch as they designate actions entirely free from foreign influence. A man GIVES UP, ABANDONS (*v. To abandon*), and RESIGNS (*v. To abandon*), from the dictates of his own mind, independently of all control from others. To *give up* and *abandon* both denote a positive decision of the mind; but the former may be the act of the understanding or the will, the latter is more commonly the act of the will and the passions: to *give up* is applied to familiar cases; *abandon* to matters of importance: one *gives up* an idea, an intention, a plan, and the like; one *abandons* a project, a scheme, a measure of government.

Upon his friend telling him he wondered he *gave up* the question, when he had visibly the better of the dispute; I am never ashamed, says he, to be confuted by one who is master of fifty legions.

ADDISON.

They have totally *abandoned* the shattered and old-fashioned fortress of prerogative.

BURKE.

To *give up* and *resign* are applied either to outward actions, or merely to inward movements; but the former is active, and determinately fixes the conduct; the latter seems to be rather passive, it is the leaning of the mind to the circumstances: a man *gives up* his situation by a positive act of his choice; he *resigns* his office when he feels it inconvenient to hold it: so, likewise, we *give up* expectations, and *resign* hopes. In this sense, FOREGO, which signifies to let go, is comparable with *resign*, inasmuch as it expresses a passive action; but we *resign* that which we have, and we *forego* that which we might have: thus, we *resign* the claims which we have already made; we *forego* the claims which we might make: the former may be a matter of prudence; the latter is always an act of virtue and forbearance.

He declares himself to be now satisfied to the contrary, in which he has *given up* the cause.

DRYDEN.

The praise of artful numbers I resign,
And hang my pipe upon the sacred pine.

DEYDEN.

Then, pilgrim, turn, thy cares forego;
All earth-born cares are wrong.

GOLDSMITH.

When applied to the state of a person's mind, or the actions flowing from that state, to *give up* is used either in a good, bad, or indifferent sense; *abandon* always in a bad sense; *resign* always in a good sense: a man may *give himself up* either to studious pursuits, to idle vagaries, or vicious indulgences; he *abandons* himself to gross vices; he *resigns* himself to the will of Providence, or to the circumstances of his condition: a man is said to be *given up* to his lusts who is without any principle to control him in their gratification; he is said to be *abandoned* when his outrageous conduct bespeaks an entire insensibility to every honest principle; he is said to be *resigned* when he discovers composure and tranquillity in the hour of affliction; so one is said to *resign* a thing to another when one is contented with what one has.

The mind, I say, might *give* itself up to that happiness which is at hand, considering that it is so very near, and that it would last so very long. But what words are sufficient to express that folly and want of consideration which in such a case makes a wrong choice.

ADDISON.

Her pinions ruffle, and low drooping scarce
Can bear the mourner to the poplar shade,
Where, all *abandoned* to despair, she sings
Her sorrows thro' the night.

THOMSON.

High from the summit of a craggy cliff
Hang o'er the deep, such as amazing frowns
On utmost Kilda's shore, whose lonely race
Resign the setting sun to Indian worlds.

THOMSON.

GLAD, PLEASED, JOYFUL, CHEERFUL.

GLAD is obviously a variation of *glee* and *glow* (*v. Fire*). PLEASED, from to *please*, marks the state of being *pleased*. JOYFUL bespeaks its own meaning either as full of *joy* or productive of great *joy*. CHEERFUL, *v. Cheerful*.

Glad denotes either a partial state, or a permanent and habitual sentiment: in the former sense it is most nearly allied to *pleased*; in the latter sense to *joyful* and *merry*. *Glad* and *pleased* are both applied to the ordinary occurrences of the day; but the former denotes rather a lively and momentary sentiment, the latter a gentle but rather more lasting feeling: we are *glad* to see a friend who

has been long absent; we are *glad* to have good intelligence from our friends and relatives; we are *glad* to get rid of a troublesome companion; we are *pleased* to have the approbation of those we esteem: we are *pleased* to hear our friends well spoken of; we are *pleased* with the company of an intelligent and communicative person.

O sole, in whom my thoughts find all repose,
My glory, my perfection! *glad* I see
Thy face, and morn return'd.

MILTON.

The soul has many different faculties, or, in other words, many different ways of acting, and can be intensely *pleased* or made happy by all these different faculties or ways of acting.

ADDISON.

Glad, *joyful*, and *cheerful*, all express more or less lively sentiments; but *glad* is less vivid than *joyful*, and more so than *cheerful*. *Gladness* seems to arise as much from physical as mental causes; wine is said to make the heart *glad*: *joy* has its source in the mind, as it is influenced by external circumstances; instances of good fortune, either for ourselves, our friends, or our country, excite *joy*: *cheerfulness* is an even tenor of the mind, which it may preserve of itself independently of all external circumstances; religious contemplation produces habitual *cheerfulness*. *Glad* is seldom employed as an epithet to qualify things, except in the scriptural or solemn style, as *glad* tidings of great *joy*: *joyful* is seldom used to qualify persons than things; hence we speak of *joyful* news, a *joyful* occurrence, *joyful* faces, *joyful* sounds, and the like: *cheerful* is employed either to designate the state of the mind or the property of the thing; we either speak of a *cheerful* disposition, a *cheerful* person, a *cheerful* society, or a *cheerful* face, a *cheerful* sound, a *cheerful* aspect, and the like.

Man superior walks
Amid the *glad* creation, musing praise.

THOMSON.

Thus *joyful* Troy maintain'd the watch of night,
While fear, pale comrade of inglorious flight,
And heaven-bred horror, on the Grecian part,
Sat on each face, and sadden'd every heart.

POPE.

No sun e'er gilds the gloomy horrors there,
No *cheerful* gales refresh the lazy air.

POPE.

When used to qualify one's actions, they all bespeak the temper of the mind:

gladly denotes a high degree of willingness as opposed to aversion: one who is suffering under excruciating pains *gladly* submits to anything which promises relief: *joyfully* denotes unqualified *pleasure*, unmixed with any alloy or restrictive consideration; a convert to Christianity *joyfully* goes through all the initiatory ceremonies which entitle him to all its privileges, spiritual and temporal: *cheerfully* denotes the absence of unwillingness, it is opposed to reluctantly; the zealous Christian *cheerfully* submits to every hardship to which he is exposed in the course of his religious profession.

For his particular I'll receive him *gladly*,
But not one follower.

SHAKESPEARE.

Never did men more *joyfully* obey,
Or sooner understand the sign to fly.

DRYDEN.

Doctrine is that which must prepare men for discipline, and men never go so *cheerfully* as when they see where they go.

SOUTH.

TO GLANCE AT, ALLUDE TO.

GLANCE, probably from the German *glänzen*, to shine, signifies to make appear to the eye. ALLUDE, *v. To allude*.

These terms are nearly allied in the sense of indirectly referring to any object, either in written or verbal discourse: but *glance* expresses a cursory and latent action; *allude*, simply an indirect but undisguised action: ill-natured satirists are perpetually *glancing* at the follies and infirmities of individuals; the Scriptures are full of *allusions* to the manners and customs of the Easterns: he who attempts to write an epitome of universal history must take but a hasty *glance* at the most important events.

Entering upon his discourse, Socrates says he does not believe any the most comic genius can censure him for talking upon such a subject (the immortality of the soul) at such a time (that of death). This passage, I think, evidently *glances* upon Aristophanes, who writ a comedy on purpose to ridicule the discourses of that divine philosopher.

ADDISON.

The author, in the whole course of his poem, has infinite *allusions* to places of Scripture.

ADDISON.

GLARING, BAREFACED.

GLARING is here used in the figurative sense, drawn from its natural signification of broad light, which strikes powerfully upon the senses. BAREFACED signifies literally having a *bare*

or *uncovered face*, which denotes the absence of all disguise or all shame.

Glaring designates the thing; *barefaced* characterizes the person: a *glaring* falsehood is that which strikes the observer in an instant to be falsehood; a *barefaced* lie or falsehood betrays the effrontery of him who utters it. A *glaring* absurdity will be seen instantly without the aid of reflection; a *barefaced* piece of impudence characterizes the agent as more than ordinarily lost to all sense of decorum.

The *glaring* side is that of enmity.

BURKE.

The animosities increased, and the parties appeared *barefaced* against each other.

CLARENDON.

GLEAM, GLIMMER, RAY, BEAM.

GLEAM is in Saxon *gleomen*, German *glimmen*, etc. GLIMMER is a variation of the same. RAY is connected with the word row. BEAM comes from the German *baum*, a tree.

Certain portions of light are designated by all these terms, but *gleam* and *glimmer* are indefinite; *ray* and *beam* are definite. A *gleam* is properly the commencement of light, or that portion of opening light which interrupts the darkness: a *glimmer* is an unsteady *gleam*: *ray* and *beam* are portions of light which emanate from some luminous body; the former from all luminous bodies in general, the latter more particularly from the sun: the former is, as its derivation denotes, a row of light issuing in a greater or less degree from any body; the latter is a great row of light, like a pole issuing from a body. There may be a *gleam* of light visible on the wall of a dark room, or a *glimmer* if it be movable; there may be *rays* of light visible at night on the back of a glow-worm, or *rays* of light may break through the shutters of a closed room; the sun in the height of its splendor sends forth its *beams*.

A dreadful *gleam* from his bright armor came,
And from his eyeballs flash'd the living flame.

POPE.

The *glimmering* light which shot into the chaos from the utmost verge of the creation, is wonderfully beautiful and poetic.

ADDISON.

A sudden *ray* shot beaming o'er the plain,
And show'd the shores, the navy, and the main.

POPE.

The stars shine smarter; and the moon adorns,
As with unborrow'd beams, her horns. DRYDEN.

GLIMPSE, GLANCE.

A GLIMPSE is the action of the object appearing to the eye; a GLANCE is the action of the eye seeking the object: one catches a *glimpse* of an object; one casts a *glance* at an object: the latter therefore is properly the means for obtaining the former, which is the end: we get a *glimpse* by means of a *glance*. The *glimpse* is the hasty, imperfect, and sudden view which we get of an object; the *glance* is the hasty and imperfect view which we take of an object: the former may depend upon a variety of circumstances; the latter depends upon the will of the agent. We can seldom do more than get a *glimpse* of objects in a carriage that is going with rapidity: when we do not wish to be observed to look, we take but a *glance* of an object.

Of the state with which practice has not acquainted us, we snatch a *glimpse*, we discern a point, and regulate the rest by passion and by fancy.

Here passion first I felt,
Commotion strange! in all enjoyments else
Superior, unmoved; here only weak
Against the charm of beauty's pow'ful *glance*.
MILTON.

GLOBE, BALL.

GLOBE, in Latin *globus*, comes probably from the Greek *γλοφος*, a hillock of earth. BALL, in Teutonic *ball*, is doubtless connected with the words *bowel*, *bow*, *bend*, and the like, signifying that which is turned or rounded.

Globe is to *ball* as the species to the genus; a *globe* is a *ball*, but every *ball* is not a *globe*. The *globe* does not in its strict sense require to be of an equal roundness in all its parts; it is properly an irregularly round body: a *ball*, on the other hand, is generally any round body, but particularly one that is entirely, regularly round; the earth itself is therefore properly denominated a *globe* from its unequal roundness: and for the same reason the mechanical body, which is made to represent the earth, is also denominated a *globe*: but in the higher style of writing the earth is frequently denominated a *ball*, and in familiar discourse every solid body which assumes a circular form is entitled a *ball*.

It is said by modern philosophers, that not only the great *globes* of matter are thinly scattered through the universe, but the hardest bodies are so porous, that if all matter were compressed to perfect solidity, it might be contained in a cube of a few feet.

What though in solemn silence all
Move round the dark terrestrial ball,
In reason's ear they all rejoice,
And utter forth a glorious voice. ADDISON.

GLOOM, HEAVINESS.

GLOOM has its source internally, and is often independent of outward circumstances; HEAVINESS is a weight upon the spirits, produced by a foreign cause: the former belongs to the constitution; the latter is occasional. People of a melancholy habit have a particular *gloom* hang over their minds which pervades all their thoughts; those who suffer under severe disappointments for the present, and have *gloomy* prospects for the future, may be expected to be *heavy* at heart; we may sometimes dispel the *gloom* of the mind by the force of reflection, particularly by the force of religious contemplation: *heaviness* of spirits is itself a temporary thing, and may be succeeded by vivacity or lightness of mind when the pressure of the moment has subsided.

If we consider the frequent reliefs we receive from laughter, and how often it breaks the *gloom* which is apt to depress the mind, one would take care not to grow too wise for so great a pleasure of life.

Worldly prosperity flattens as life descends.
He who lately overflowed with cheerful spirits
and high hopes, begins to look back with *heaviness*
on the days of former years. BLAIR.

GLOOMY, SULLEN, MOROSE, SPLENETIC.

ALL these terms denote a temper of mind the reverse of easy or happy: GLOOMY lies either in the general constitution or the particular frame of the mind; SULLEN lies in the temper: a man of a *gloomy* disposition is an involuntary agent; it is his misfortune, and renders him in some measure pitiable: the *sullen* man yields to his evil humors; *sullenness* is his fault, and renders him offensive. The *gloomy* man distresses himself most; his pains are all his own: the *sullen* man has a great share of discontent in his composition; he charges his sufferings upon others, and makes them suffer in common with himself. A

man may be rendered *gloomy* for a time by the influence of particular circumstances; but *sullenness* creates pains for itself when all external circumstances of a painful nature are wanting.

Th' unwilling heralds act their lord's commands,
Pensive they walk along the barren sands:
Arriv'd, the hero in his tent they find
With *gloomy* aspect, on his arm reclin'd. POPE.
At this they ceased; the stern debate expir'd;
The chiefs in *sullen* majesty retir'd. POPE.

Sullenness and MOROSENNESS are both the inherent properties of the temper; but the former discovers itself in those who have to submit, and the latter in those who have to command: *sullenness* therefore betrays itself mostly in early life; *moroseness* is the peculiar characteristic of age. The *sullen* person has many fancied hardships to endure from the control of others; the *morose* person causes others to endure many real hardships, by keeping them under too severe a control. *Sullenness* shows itself mostly by an unseemly reserve; *moroseness* shows itself by the hardness of the speech, and the roughness of the voice. *Sullenness* is altogether a sluggish principle, that leads more or less to inaction; *moroseness* is a harsh feeling, that is not contented with exacting obedience unless it inflicts pain.

The *morose* philosopher is so much affected by these and some other authorities that he becomes a convert to his friend, and desires he would take him with him when he went to his next ball.

BUDGELL.

Moroseness is a defect of the temper; but SPLEEN, from the Latin *splen*, is a defect in the heart: the one betrays itself in behavior, the other more in conduct. A *morose* man is an unpleasant companion; a *splenetic* man is a bad member of society; the former is ill-natured to those about him, the latter is ill-humored with all the world. *Moroseness* vents itself in temporary expressions, *spleen* indulges itself in perpetual bitterness of expression.

While in that *splenetic* mood we amused ourselves in a sour critical speculation of which we ourselves were the objects, a few months effected a total change in our variable minds. BURKE.

GLORY, HONOR.

GLORY is something dazzling and widely diffused. The Latin word *gloria*,

anciently written *glosia*, is in all probability connected with our words *gloss*, *glaze*, *glitter*, *glow*, and the Northern words *gleissen*, *glotzen*, *glänzen*, *glühen*, all which come from the Hebrew *gehel*, a live coal. That the moral idea of *glory* is best represented by light is evident from the *glory* which is painted round the head of our Saviour. HONOR is something less splendid, but more solid, and probably comes from the Hebrew *hon*, wealth or substance.

Glory impels to extraordinary efforts and to great undertakings. *Honor* induces to a discharge of one's duty. Excellence in the attainment, and success in the exploit, bring *glory*; a faithful exercise of one's talents reflects *honor*. *Glory* is connected with everything which has a peculiar public interest; *honor* is more properly obtained within a private circle. *Glory* is not confined to the nation or life of the individual by whom it is sought; it spreads over all the earth, and descends to the latest posterity: *honor* is limited to those who are connected with the subject of it, and eye-witnesses to his actions. *Glory* is attainable but by few, and may be an object of indifference to any one; *honor* is more or less within the reach of all, and must be disregarded by no one. A general at the head of an army goes in pursuit of *glory*; the humble citizen who acts his part in society so as to obtain the approbation of his fellow-citizens is in the road for *honor*. A nation acquires *glory* by the splendor of its victories, and its superiority in arts as well as arms; it obtains *honor* by its strict adherence to equity and good faith in all its dealings with other nations.

Hence is our love of fame; a love so strong,
We think no dangers great nor labors long,
By which we hope our beings to extend,
And to remotest times in *glory* to descend.

JENYNS.

As virtue is the most reasonable and genuine source of *honor*, we generally find in titles an intimation of some particular merit which should recommend men to the high stations which they possess.

ADDISON.

Glory is a sentiment selfish in its nature, but salutary or pernicious in its effect, according as it is directed; *honor* is a principle disinterested in its nature, and beneficial in its operations. A thirst

for *glory* is seldom indulged but at the expense of others, as it is not attainable in the plain path of duty; there are but few opportunities of acquiring it by elevated acts of goodness, and still fewer who have the virtue to embrace the opportunities that offer: a love of *honor* can never be indulged but to the advantage of others; it is restricted by fixed laws; it requires a sacrifice of every selfish consideration, and a due regard to the rights of others; it is associated with nothing but virtue.

If *glory* cannot move a mind so mean,
Nor future praise from fading pleasures wean,
Yet why should he defraud his son of fame,
And grudge the Romans the immortal name?
DRYDEN.

The sense of *honor* is of so fine and delicate a nature that it is only to be met with in minds which are naturally noble, or in such as have been cultivated by great examples or refined education.
GUARDIAN.

TO GLORY, BOAST, VAUNT.

To *GLORY* is to hold as one's *glory* (*v. Glory*). To *BOAST* is to set forth to one's advantage. To *VAUNT*, from the French *avant*, before, is to set one's self up before others. The first two terms denote the value which the individual sets upon that which belongs to himself, the last term may be employed in respect to others.

To *glory* is more particularly the act of the mind, the indulgence of the internal sentiment; to *boast* denotes rather the expression of the sentiment. To *glory* is applied only to matters of moment; *boast* is rather suitable to trifling points: the former is seldom used in a bad sense, the latter still seldomer in a good one. A Christian martyr *glories* in the cross of Christ; a soldier *boasts* of his courage, and his feats in battle. To *vaunt* is properly to proclaim praises aloud, and is taken either in an indifferent or bad sense.

All the laymen who have exerted a more than ordinary genius in their writings, and were the *glory* of their times, were men whose hopes were filled with immortality.
ADDISON.

If a man looks upon himself in an abstracted light, he has not much to *boast* of; but if he considers himself with regard to others, he may find occasion of *glorying*, if not in his own virtues, at least in the absence of another's imperfections.
ADDISON.

Not that great champion
Whom famous poets' verse so much doth *vaunt*,
And hath for twelve huge labors high extoll'd,
So many furies and sharp hits did haunt.
SPENSER.

TO GLOSS, VARNISH, PALLIATE.

GLOSS and VARNISH are figurative terms, which borrow their signification from the act of rendering the outer surface of any physical object shining. To *gloss*, which is connected with to glaze, is to give a *gloss* or brightness to anything by means of friction, as in the case of japan or mahogany: to *varnish* is to give an artificial *gloss*, by means of applying a foreign substance. Hence, in the figurative use of the terms, to *gloss* is to put the best face upon anything by various artifices; but to *varnish* is to do the same thing by means of direct falsehood; to *PALLIATE*, which likewise signifies to give the best possible outside to a thing (*v. To extenuate*), requires still less artifice than either. One *glosses* over that which is bad, by giving it a soft name; as when a man's vices are *glossed* over with the name of indiscretion, or a man's mistress is termed his friend: one *varnishes* a bad character by ascribing good motives to his bad actions, by withholding many facts that are to his discredit, and fabricating other circumstances in his favor; an *unvarnished* tale contains nothing but the simple truth; the *varnished* tale, on the other hand, contains a great mixture of falsehood: to *palliate* is to diminish the magnitude of an offence, by making an excuse in favor of the offender; as when an act of theft is *palliated* by considering the starving condition of the thief.

If a jealous man once finds a false *gloss* put upon any single action, he quickly suspects all the rest.
ADDISON.

The waiting tears stood ready for command,
And now they flow to *varnish* the false tale.
ROWE.

A man's bodily defects should give him occasion to exert a noble spirit, and to *palliate* those imperfections which are not in his power, by those perfections which are.
ADDISON.

GODLIKE, DIVINE, HEAVENLY.

GODLIKE bespeaks its own meaning, as like *God*, or after the manner of *God*. DIVINE, in Latin *divinus*, from *divus* or *Deus*, signifies appertaining to *God*.

HEAVENLY, or HEAVEN-LIKE, signifies like or appertaining to *heaven*.

Godlike is a more expressive, but less common term than *divine*: the former is used only as an epithet of peculiar praise for an individual; *divine* is generally employed for that which appertains to a superior being, in distinction from that which is human. Benevolence is a *godlike* property: the *Divine* image is stamped on the features of man, whence the face is called by Milton "the human face *divine*." As *divine* is opposed to human, so is *heavenly* to earthly; the term *Divine* Being distinguishes the Creator from all other beings; but a *heavenly* being denotes the angels or inhabitants of *heaven*, in distinction from earthly beings, or the inhabitants of earth. A *divine* influence is to be sought for only by prayer to the Giver of all good things; but a *heavenly* temper may be acquired by a steady contemplation of *heavenly* things, and an abstraction from those which are earthly: the *Divine* will is the foundation of all moral law and obligation; *heavenly* joys are the fruit of all our labors in this earthly course. These terms are applied to other objects with similar distinction.

Sure he that made us with such large discourse,
Looking before and after, gave us not
That capability and *godlike* reason.
To rust in us unus'd.
SHAKESPEARE.

Of all that see or read thy comedies,
Whoever in those glasses looks may find
The spots return'd, or graces of his mind;
And by the help of so *divine* an art,
At leisure view and dress his nobler part.
WALLER.

Reason, alas! It does not know itself;
But man, vain man! would with his short-lin'd
plummet
Fathom the vast abyss of *heavenly* justice.
DRYDEN.

GODLY, RIGHTEOUS.

GODLY is a contraction of *godlike* (*v. Godlike*). RIGHTEOUS signifies conformable to *right* or truth.

These epithets are both used in a spiritual sense, and cannot, without an indecorous affectation of religion, be introduced into any other discourse than that which is properly spiritual. *Godliness*, in the strict sense, is that outward deportment which characterizes a heavenly temper; prayer, reading of the Scriptures, public worship, and every religious act, enters into the signification of *godli-*

ness, which at the same time supposes a temper of mind, not only to delight in, but to profit by such exercises: *righteousness*, on the other hand, comprehends Christian morality; in distinction from that of the heathen or unbeliever; a *righteous* man does *right*, not only because it is *right*, but because it is agreeable to the will of his Maker, and the example of his Redeemer; *righteousness* is therefore to *godliness* as the effect to the cause. The *godly* man goes to the sanctuary, and by converse with his Maker assimilates all his affections to the character of that Being whom he worships; when he leaves the sanctuary he proves the efficacy of his *godliness* by his *righteous* converse with his fellow-creatures. It is easy, however, for men to mistake the means for the end, and to rest content with *godliness* without *righteousness*, as too many are apt to do who seem to make their whole duty to consist in an attention to religious observances, and in the indulgence of extravagant feelings.

It hath been the great design of the devil and his instruments in all ages to undermine religion, by making an unhappy separation and divorce between *godliness* and morality. But let us not deceive ourselves; this was always religion, and the condition of our acceptance with *God*, to endeavor to be like *God* in purity and holiness, in justice and *righteousness*.
TILLOTSON.

GOLD, GOLDEN.

THESE terms are both employed as epithets, but *GOLD* is the substantive used in composition, and *GOLDEN* the adjective, in ordinary use. The former is strictly applied to the metal of which the thing is made, as a *gold* cup, or a *gold* coin; but the latter to whatever appertains to *gold*, whether properly or figuratively: as the *golden* lion, the *golden* crown, the *golden* age, or a *golden* harvest.

GOOD, GOODNESS.

GOOD, which under different forms runs through all the Northern languages, and has a great affinity to the Greek *αγαθος*, is supposed by Adelung to be derived from the Latin *gaudeo*, Greek *γαθην*, and Hebrew *chada*, to rejoice.

Good and *GOODNESS* are abstract terms, drawn from the same word; the former to denote the thing that is *good*, the latter the inherent *good* property of