

persons or things. All *good* comes from God, whose *goodness* toward his creatures is unbounded. The *good* we do is determined by the tendency of the action; but our *goodness* in doing it is determined by the motive of our actions. *Good* is of a twofold nature, physical and moral, and is opposed to evil; *goodness* is applicable either to the disposition of moral agents or the qualities of inanimate objects; it is opposed to badness. By the order of Providence the most horrible convulsions are made to bring about *good*; the *goodness* or badness of any fruit depends upon its fitness to be enjoyed.

Each form'd for all, promotes through private care
The public *good*, and justly takes its share.

JENYNS.

The reigning error of his life was, that Savage
mistook the love for the practice of virtue, and
was indeed not so much a *good* man as the friend
of *goodness*.

JOHNSON.

GOOD, BENEFIT, ADVANTAGE.

GOOD (*v. Good*) is an abstract universal term, which in its unlimited sense comprehends everything that can be conceived of, as suited in all its parts to the end proposed. In this sense BENEFIT and ADVANTAGE (*v. Benefit and Advantage*) are modifications of *good*; but the term *good* has likewise a limited application, which brings it to a just point of comparison with the other terms here chosen: the common idea which allies these words to each other is that of *good* as it respects a particular object. *Good* is here employed indefinitely; *benefit* and *advantage* are specified by some collateral circumstances. *Good* is done without regard to the person who does it, or him to whom it is done; but *benefit* has always respect to the relative condition of the giver and receiver, who must be both specified. Hence we say of a charitable man that he does much *good*, or that he bestows *benefits* upon this or that individual. In like manner, when speaking of particular communities or society at large, we may say that it is for the *good* of society or for the *good* of mankind that every one submits to the sacrifice of some portion of his natural liberty; but it is for the *benefit* of the poorer orders that the charitably disposed employ their money in charity.

Good is limited to no mode or manner, no condition of the person or the thing; it is applied indiscriminately: *benefit* is more particularly applicable to the external circumstances of a person, as to his health, his improvement, his pecuniary condition, and the like; it is also confined in its application to persons only: we may counsel another for his *good*, although we do not counsel him for his *benefit*; but we labor for the *benefit* of another when we set apart for him the fruits of our labor: exercise is always attended with some *good* to all persons; it is of particular *benefit* to those who are of a lethargic habit: an indiscreet zeal does more harm than *good* to the cause of religion; a patient cannot expect to derive *benefit* from a medicine when he counteracts its effects.

Our present *good* the easy task is made,
To earn superior bliss when this shall fade.

JENYNS.

Unless men were endowed by nature with some
sense of duty or moral obligation, they could reap
no *benefit* from revelation.

BLAIR.

A *benefit* is a positive and direct *good*, an *advantage* is an adventitious and indirect *good*: the *benefit* serves to supply some want, to remove some evil, and afford some sort of relief: an *advantage* serves to promote some ulterior object. An *advantage*, therefore, will not be a *benefit* unless it be turned to a *good* use. Education may be a *benefit* to a person, if it enable him to procure a competence; a polite education is of *advantage* to one who associates with the great.

It was late before this country found out the
benefits of inland navigation.

HISTORY OF INLAND NAVIGATION.

The true art of memory is the art of attention.
No man will read with much *advantage* who is
not able at pleasure to evacuate his mind.

JOHNSON.

GOOD-NATURE, GOOD-HUMOR.

GOOD-NATURE and GOOD-HUMOR both imply the disposition to please and be pleased; but the former is habitual and permanent, the latter is temporary and partial: the former lies in the nature and frame of the mind, the latter in the state of the humors or spirits. A *good-natured* man recommends himself at all times for his *good-nature*; a *good-humored* man recommends himself particu-

larly as a companion: *good-nature* displays itself by a readiness in doing kind offices; *good-humor* is confined mostly to the ease and cheerfulness of one's outward deportment in social converse: *good-nature* is apt to be guilty of weak compliances; *good-humor* is apt to be succeeded by fits of peevishness and depression. *Good-nature* is applicable only to the character of the individual; *good-humor* may be said of a whole company: it is a mark of *good-nature* in a man not to disturb the *good-humor* of the company he is in, by resenting the affront that is offered him by another.

I concluded, however unaccountable the assertion
might appear at first sight, that *good-nature*
was an essential quality in a satirist.

ADDISON.

When Virgil said "He that did not hate Bavius
might love Mævius," he was in perfect *good-humor*.

ADDISON.

GOODS, FURNITURE, CHATTELS, MOVABLES, EFFECTS.

ALL these terms are applied to such things as belong to an individual: the first term is the most general, both in sense and application; all the rest are species.

FURNITURE comprehends all household goods; wherefore in regard to an individual, supposing the house to contain all he has, the general is put for the specific term, as when one speaks of a person's moving his GOODS for his *furniture*: but in the strict sense *goods* comprehends more than *furniture*, including not only that which is adapted for the domestic purposes of a family, but also everything which is of value to a person: the chairs and tables are a part of *furniture*; papers, books, and money are included among his *goods*: it is obvious, therefore, that *goods*, even in its most limited sense, is of wider import than *furniture*.

Now I give up my shop and dispose of all my
poetical *goods* at once; I must therefore desire
that the public would please to take them in the
gross, and that everybody would turn over what
he does not like.

PRIOR.

Considering that your houses, your place and
furniture, are not suitable to your quality, I
conceive that your expense ought to be reduced
to two-thirds of your estate.

WENTWORTH.

CHATTELS, which is probably changed
from *cattle*, is a technical term in law, and

therefore not so frequent in ordinary use, but still sufficiently employed to deserve notice. It comprehends that species of *goods* which is in a special manner separated from one's person and house; a man's cattle, his implements of husbandry, the partial rights which he has in land or buildings, are all comprehended under *chattels*: hence the propriety of the expression to seize a man's *goods* and *chattels*, as denoting the disposable property which he has about his person or at a distance. MOVABLES comprehends all the other terms in the limited application to property, as far as it admits of being removed from one place to the other; it is opposed either to fixtures, when speaking of *furniture*, or to land as contrasted with *goods* and *chattels*.

Honor's a lease for lives to come,
And cannot be extended from
The legal tenant; 'tis a *chattel*
Not to be forfeited in battle.

HUDIBRAS.

EFFECTS is a term of nearly as extensive a signification as *goods*, but not so extensive in its application: whatever a man has that is of any supposed value, or convertible into money, is entitled his *goods*; whatever a man has that can effect, produce, or bring forth money by sale, is entitled his *effects*; *goods*, therefore, is applied only to that which a man has at his own disposal; *effects* more properly to that which is left at the disposal of others. A man makes a sale of his *goods* on his removal from any place; his creditors or executors take care of his *effects* either on his bankruptcy or decease: *goods*, in this case, is seldom employed but in the limited sense of what is removable; but *effects* includes everything real as well as personal.

There can be no doubt but that *movables* of
every kind become sooner appropriated than the
permanent substantial soil.

BLACKSTONE.

The laws of bankruptcy compel the bankrupt
to give up all his *effects* to the use of the credit-
ors without any concealment.

BLACKSTONE.

GOODS, POSSESSIONS, PROPERTY.

ALL these terms are applicable to such things as are the means of enjoyment; but the former term respects the direct quality of producing enjoyment, the two latter have regard to the subject of the enjoyment; we consider GOODS as they

are real or imaginary, adapted or not adapted for the producing of real happiness; those who abound in the goods of this world are not always the happiest: POSSESSIONS must be regarded as they are lasting or temporary; he who is anxious for earthly possessions forgets that they are but transitory, and dependent upon a thousand contingencies: PROPERTY is to be considered as it is legal or illegal, just or unjust; those who are anxious for great property are not always scrupulous about the means by which it is to be obtained. The purity of a man's Christian character is in danger from an overweighing attachment to earthly goods; no wise man will boast the multitude of his possessions, when he reflects that if they do not leave him, the time is not far distant when he must leave them; the validity of one's claim to property which comes by inheritance is better founded than any other.

The worldling attaches himself wholly to what he reckons the only solid goods, the possession of riches and influence. BLAIR.

While worldly men enlarge their possessions, and extend their connections, they imagine they are strengthening themselves. BLAIR.

For numerous blessings yearly shower'd,
And property with plenty crown'd,
Accept our pious praise. DRYDEN.

TO GOVERN, RULE, REGULATE.

GOVERN is in French *gouverner*, Latin *gubernare*, Greek *κυβερνᾶω*. RULE and REGULATE signify to bring under a rule, or make by rule.

The exercise of authority enters more or less into the signification of these terms; but to govern implies the exercise likewise of judgment and knowledge. To rule implies rather the unqualified exercise of power, the making the will the rule; a king governs his people by means of wise laws and an upright administration: a despot rules over a nation according to his arbitrary decision; if he have no principle, his rule becomes an oppressive tyranny. These terms are applied either to persons or things: persons govern or rule others; or they govern, rule, or regulate things.

In regard to persons, govern is always in a good sense, but rule is sometimes taken in a bad sense; it is frequently associated with an abuse of power: to gov-

ern is so perfectly discretionary, that we speak of governing ourselves; but we speak only of ruling others: nothing can be more lamentable than to be ruled by one who does not know how to govern himself: it is the business of a man to rule his house by keeping all its members in due subjection to his authority: it is the duty of a person to rule those who are under him in all matters wherein they are incompetent to govern themselves.

Slaves to our passions we become, and then it becomes impossible to govern men. WALLER.
Marg'ret shall now be queen, and rule the king,
But I will rule both her, the king, and realm. SHAKESPEARE.

In application to things, govern and rule admit of a similar distinction: a minister governs the state, and a pilot governs the vessel: the movements of the machine are in both cases directed by the exercise of the judgment; a person rules the times, seasons, fashions, and the like; it is an act of the individual will. Regulate is a species of governing simply by judgment; the word is applicable to things of minor moment, where the force of authority is not so requisite: one governs the affairs of a nation, or a large body where great interests are involved; we regulate the concerns of an individual, or we regulate in cases where good order or convenience only is consulted: so likewise in regard to ourselves, we govern our passions, but we regulate our affections.

Whence can this very motion take its birth?
Not sure from matter, from dull clouds of earth?
But from a living spirit lodg'd within,
Which governs all the bodily machine. JENYNS.

When I behold a factious band agree
To call it freedom when themselves are free;
Each wanton judge new penal statutes draw;
Laws grind the poor, and rich men rule the law;
I fly from petty tyrants to the throne. GOLDSMITH.

Regulate the patient in his manner of living. WISEMAN.

These terms are all properly used to denote the acts of conscious agents, but by a figure of personification they may be applied to inanimate or moral objects: the price of one market governs the price of another, or governs the seller in his demand; fashion and caprice rule the majority, or particular fashions rule

them: the time of one clock regulates that of many others.

The gross of men are governed more by appearances than realities. TAILER.

Distracting thoughts by turns his bosom rul'd,
Now fir'd by wrath, and now by reason cool'd. POPE.

Though a sense of moral good and evil be deeply impressed on the heart of man, it is not of sufficient power to regulate his life. BLAIR.

GOVERNMENT, ADMINISTRATION.

Both these terms may be employed either to designate the act of GOVERNING and ADMINISTERING, or the persons governing and administering. In both cases government has a more extensive meaning than administration: the former includes every exercise of authority; while administration implies only that exercise of authority which consists in putting the laws or will of another in force.

Government is an art above the attainment of an ordinary genius. SOUTH.

In treating of an invisible world, and the administration of government there carried on by the Father of spirits, particulars occur which appear incomprehensible. BLAIR.

When we speak of the government, as it respects the persons, it implies the whole body of constituted authorities; and the administration, only that part which puts in execution the intentions of the whole: the government of a country, therefore, may remain unaltered, while the administration undergoes many changes: it is the business of the government to make treaties of peace and war; and without a government it is impossible for any people to negotiate: it is the business of the administration to administer justice, to regulate the finances, and to direct all the complicated concerns of a nation; without an administration all public business would be at a stand.

What are we to do if the government and the whole community is of the same description? BURKE.

GOVERNMENT, CONSTITUTION.

GOVERNMENT is here, as in the former article (*v. Government*), the generic term; CONSTITUTION the specific. Government implies generally the act of governing, or exercising authority under

any form whatever; constitution implies any constituted or fixed form of government: we may have a government without a constitution; we cannot have a constitution without a government. In the first formation of society, government was placed in the hands of individuals who exercised authority according to discretion rather than any positive rule or law: here then was government without a constitution: as time and experience proved the necessity of some established form, and the wisdom of enlightened men discovered the advantages and disadvantages of different forms, government in every country assumed a more definite shape, and became the constitution of the country; hence then the union of government and constitution. Governments are divided by political writers into three classes, monarchical, aristocratic, and republican; but these three general forms have been adopted with such variations and modifications as to impart to the constitution of every country something peculiar. The term constitution is now particularly applied to any popular form of government, or any government formed at the pleasure of the people, and in a still more restricted sense to the government of England.

Free governments have committed more flagrant acts of tyranny than the most perfect despotic governments which we have ever known. BURKE.

The physician of the state who, not satisfied with the cure of distempers, undertakes to regenerate constitutions, ought to show uncommon powers. BURKE.

GRACE, FAVOR.

GRACE, in French *grace*, Latin *gratia*, comes from *gratus*, kind, because a grace results from pure kindness, independently of the merit of the receiver; but FAVOR is that which is granted voluntarily and without hope of recompense, independently of all obligation.

Grace is never used but in regard to those who have offended and made themselves liable to punishment; favor is employed for actual good. An act of grace, in the spiritual sense, is that merciful influence which God exerts over his most unworthy creatures from the infinite goodness of his Divine nature; it is to his special grace that we attribute every good

feeling by which we are prevented from committing sin: the term *favor* is employed indiscriminately with regard to man or his Maker; those who are in power have the greatest opportunity of conferring *favours*; but all we receive at the hands of our Maker must be acknowledged as a *favor*.

But say I could repent and could obtain,
By act of *grace*, my former state, how soon
Would height recall high thoughts! MILTON.

A bad man is wholly the creature of the world.
He hangs upon its *favor*. BLAIR.

GRACE, CHARM.

GRACE is altogether corporeal; CHARM is either corporeal or mental; the *grace* qualifies the action of the body; the *charm* is an inherent quality in the body itself. A lady moves, dances, and walks with *grace*; the *charms* of her person are equal to those of her mind.

Savage's method of life particularly qualified him for conversation, of which he knew how to practise all the *graces*. JOHNSON.
Music has *charms* to soothe the savage breast. CONGREVE.

GRACEFUL, COMELY, ELEGANT.

A GRACEFUL figure is rendered so by the deportment of the body. A COMELY figure has that in itself which pleases the eye. *Gracefulness* results from nature improved by art; *comeliness* is mostly the work of nature. It is possible to acquire *gracefulness* by the aid of the dancing-master, but for a *comely* form we are indebted to nature aided by circumstances. *Grace* is a quality pleasing to the eye; but ELEGANCE, from the Latin *eligo, electus*, select and choice, is a quality of a higher nature, that inspires admiration; *delegant* is applicable, like *graceful*, to the motion of the body, or like *comely* to the person, and is extended in its meaning also to language, and even to dress. A person's step is *graceful*; his air or his movements are *elegant*; the *grace* of an action lies chiefly in its adaptation to the occasion.

The first who approached her was a youth of *graceful* presence and courtly air, but dressed in a richer habit than had ever been seen in Arcadia. STEELE.

Isidas, the son of Phœbidas, was at this time in the bloom of his youth, and very remarkable for the *comeliness* of his person. ADDISON.

The natural progress of the works of men is

from rudeness to convenience, from convenience to *elegance*, and from *elegance* to nicety.

JOHNSON.

GRACIOUS, MERCIFUL, KIND.

GRACIOUS, when compared with MERCIFUL, is used only in the spiritual sense; the latter is applicable to the conduct of man as well as of the Deity. *Grace* is exerted in doing good to an object that has merited the contrary; *mercy* is exerted in withholding the evil which has been merited. God is *gracious* to his creatures in affording them not only an opportunity to address him, but every encouragement to lay open their wants to him; their unworthiness and sinfulness are not made impediments of access to him. God is *merciful* to the vilest of sinners, and lends an ear to the smallest breath of repentance; in the moment of executing vengeance, he stops his arm at the voice of supplication: he expects the same *mercy* to be extended by man toward his offending brother. An act of *grace* in the largest sense, as not only independent of, but opposite to, the merits of the person, is properly ascribable to God alone, but by analogy it has also been considered as the prerogative of earthly princes: thus we speak of acts of *grace*, by which insolvent debtors are released: in like manner, the *grace* of the sovereign may be exerted in various ways.

So *gracious* hath God been to us, that he hath made those things to be our duty which naturally tend to our felicity. TILLOTSON.

He that's *merciful*

Unto the bad is cruel to the good. RANDOLPH.

Gracious, when compared with KIND, differs principally as to the station of the persons to whom it is applied. *Gracious* is altogether confined to superiors; *kind* is indiscriminately employed for superiors and equals: a king gives a *gracious* reception to the nobles who are presented to him; one friend gives a *kind* reception to another by whom he is visited. *Gracious* is a term in peculiar use at court, and among princes. *Kindness* is a domestic virtue; it is found mostly among those who have not so much ceremonial to dispense with.

He heard my vows, and *graciously* decreed
My bounds to be restor'd, my former flocks to feed. DRYDEN.

Love that would all men just and temperate
make,
Kind to themselves and others for his sake. WALLER.

GRANDEUR, MAGNIFICENCE.

GRANDEUR, from *grand*, in French *grand*, great, Latin *grandis*, low German *grant*, grand, which is the same as *groot*, great. MAGNIFICENCE, in Latin *magnificentia*, from *magnus* and *facio*, signifies making or acting on a large scale.

An extensive assemblage of striking qualities in the exterior constitutes the common signification of these terms, of which *grandeur* is the genus, and *magnificence* the species. *Magnificence* cannot exist without *grandeur*, but *grandeur* exists without *magnificence*: the former is distinguished from the latter both in degree and in application. When applied to the same objects, they differ in degree; *magnificence* being the highest degree of *grandeur*. As it respects the style of living, *grandeur* is within the reach of subjects; *magnificence* is mostly confined to princes.

There is a kind of *grandeur* and respect, which the meanest and most insignificant part of mankind endeavor to procure in the little circle of their friends and acquaintance. ADDISON.

The wall of China is one of those Eastern pieces of *magnificence* which makes a figure even in the map of the world, although an account of it would have been thought fabulous, were not the wall itself extant. ADDISON.

TO GRATIFY, INDULGE, HUMOR.

TO GRATIFY, make *grateful* or *pleasant* (*v. Acceptable*), is a positive act of the choice. To INDULGE, from the Latin *indulgeo* and *dulcis*, to sweeten or make palatable, is a negative act of the will, a yielding of the mind to circumstances. One *gratifies* his desires or appetites; and *indulges* his humors, or *indulges* in pleasures: by the former, one seeks to get the pleasure which the desire promises; by the latter, one yields to the influence which the humor or passion exercises. *Gratifying* as a habit becomes a vice, and *indulging* as a habit is a weakness. In this sense of the words, *gratification* is mostly applied to mental objects, as to *gratify* one's curiosity; *indulgence* to matters of sense or partial feeling, as to *indulge* one's palate. A person who is in search of pleasure

gratifies his desires as they rise; he lives for the *gratification*, and depends upon it for his happiness. He who has higher objects in view than the momentary *gratification*, will be careful not to *indulge* himself too much in such things as will wean him from his purpose.

It is certainly a very important lesson to learn how to enjoy ordinary things, and to be able to relish your being, without the transport of some passion, or *gratification* of some appetite. STEELE.

No man could have fewer avocations, whether natural or artificial, for he was slave to no passion or excess, and *indulged* no humor. CUMBERLAND.

As occasional acts, *gratify* and *indulge* may be both innocent.

Titles, estates, and fantastical pleasures are more ardently sought after by most men than the natural *gratifications* of a reasonable mind. ADDISON.

Still in short intervals of pleasing woe,
Regardful of the friendly dues I owe;
I to the glorious dead forever dear,
Indulge the tribute of a grateful tear. POPE.

We *gratify* and *indulge* others as well as ourselves, and mostly in the good sense: to *gratify* is for the most part in return for services; it is an act of generosity: to *indulge* is to yield to the wishes or be lenient to the infirmities of others; it is an act of kindness or good-nature.

Good-humor is a state between gayety and unconcern; the act or emanation of a mind at leisure to regard the *gratification* of another. JOHNSON.

A little more *indulgence* for common understandings, and somewhat less of austerity of temper, might have preserved this illustrious man to the councils of his country. BISSSETT.

To HUMOR is mostly taken in a bad sense.

A skilful manager of the rabble, with two or three popular empty words, such as "right of the subject and liberty of conscience," well tuned and *humored*, may whistle them backward and forward till he is weary. SOUTH.

GRATUITOUS, VOLUNTARY.

GRATUITOUS is opposed to that which is obligatory. VOLUNTARY is opposed to that which is compulsory or involuntary. A gift is *gratuitous* when it flows entirely from the free will of the giver, independently of right: an offer is *voluntary* which flows from the free

will, independently of all external constraint. *Gratuitous* is therefore to *voluntary* as a species to the genus. What is *gratuitous* is *voluntary*, although what is *voluntary* is not always *gratuitous*. The *gratuitous* is properly the *voluntary* in regard to the disposal of one's property; and the *voluntary* is applicable to all other actions.

The heroic band of cashierers of monarchs were in haste to make a generous diffusion of the knowledge which they had thus *gratuitously* received. BURKE.

Their privileges relative to contribution were *voluntarily* surrendered. BURKE.

GRATUITY, RECOMPENSE.

THE distinction between these terms is very similar to the above (*v. Gratuitous*). They both imply a gift, and a gift by way of return for some supposed service; but the *gratuity* is independent of all expectation as well as right: the *recompense* is founded upon some admissible claim. Those who wish to confer a favor in a delicate manner, will sometimes do it under the shape of a *gratuity*: those who overrate their services, will in all probability be disappointed in the *recompense* they receive.

If there be one or two scholars more, that will be no great addition to his trouble, considering that, perhaps, their parents may recompense him by their *gratuities*. MOLYNEUX.

What could be less than to afford him praise, The easiest *recompense*. MILTON.

GRAVE, SERIOUS, SOLEMN.

GRAVE, in Latin *gravis*, heavy, denotes the weight which keeps the mind or person down, and prevents buoyancy; it is opposed to the light. SERIOUS, in Latin *serus*, late or slow, marks the quality of slowness or considerateness, either in the mind or that which occupies the mind: it is opposed to the jocose.

Grave expresses more than *serious*; it does not merely bespeak the absence of mirth, but that heaviness of mind which is displayed in all the movements of the body; *seriousness*, on the other hand, bespeaks no depression, but simply steadiness of action, and a restraint from all that is jocular. A man may be *grave* in his walk, in his tone, in his gesture, in his looks, and all his exterior; he is *se-*

rious only in his general air, his countenance, and demeanor. *Gravity* is produced by some external circumstance; *seriousness* springs from the operation of the mind itself, or from circumstances. Misfortunes or age will produce *gravity*: *seriousness* is the fruit of reflection. *Gravity* is, in the proper sense, confined to the person, as a characteristic of his temper; *serious*, on the other hand, is a characteristic either of persons or things: hence we should speak of a *grave* assembly, not a *serious* assembly, of old men; *grave* senators, not *serious* senators; of a *grave* speaker, not a *serious* speaker: but a *serious*, not a *grave* sermon; a *serious*, not a *grave* writer; but *grave* is sometimes extended to things in the sense of weighty, as when we speak of *grave* matters of deliberation, a *grave* objection, sentiment. *Gravity* is peculiarly ascribed to a judge, from the double cause that much depends upon his deportment, in which there ought to be *gravity*, and that the weighty concerns which press on his mind are most apt to produce *gravity*: on the other hand, both *gravity* and *seriousness* may be applied to the preacher; the former only as it respects the manner of delivery; the latter as it respects especially the matter of his discourse: the person may be *grave* or *serious*; the discourse only is *serious*.

If then some *grave* and pious man appear, They hush their noise, and lend a listening ear. DRYDEN.

In our retirements everything disposes us to be *serious*. ADDISON.

SOLEMN expresses more than either *grave* or *serious*, from the Latin *solennis*, yearly; as applied to the stated religious festivals of the Romans, it has acquired the collateral meaning of religious *gravity*: like *serious*, it is employed not so much to characterize either the person or the thing: a judge pronounces the *solemn* sentence of condemnation in a *solemn* manner; a preacher delivers many *solemn* warnings to his hearers. *Gravity* may be the effect of corporeal habit, and *seriousness* of mental habit; but *solemnity* is something occasional and extraordinary. Some children discover a remarkable *gravity* as soon as they begin to observe; a regular attention to religious worship will induce a habit of *se-*

riousness; the admonitions of a parent on his death-bed will have peculiar *solemnity*.

In most of our long words which are derived from the Latin we contract the length of the syllables, that gives them a *grave* and *solemn* air in their own language. ADDISON.

GRAVE, TOMB, SEPULCHRE.

ALL these terms denote the place where bodies are deposited. GRAVE, from the German *graben*, etc., has a reference to the hollow made in the earth. TOMB, from *tumulus* and *tumeo*, to swell, has a reference to the rising that is made above it. SEPULCHRE, from *sepelio*, to bury, has a reference to the use for which it is employed. From this explanation it is evident that these terms have a certain propriety of application: "to sink into the *grave*," is an expression that carries the thoughts where the body must rest in death, consequently to death itself: "to inscribe on the *tomb*, or to encircle the *tomb* with flowers," carries our thoughts to the external of that place in which the body is interred. To inter in a *sepulchre*, or to visit or enter a *sepulchre*, reminds us of a place in which bodies are deposited, or, by a figure, where anything may be buried.

The path of glory leads but to the *grave*. GRAY.
Nor you, ye proud, impute to these the fault,
If merr'y o'er their *tombs* no trophies raise. GRAY.

The Lay itself is either lost or buried, perhaps forever, in one of those *sepulchres* of MSS. which by courtesy are called libraries. TYRWHITT.

GREAT, LARGE, BIG.

GREAT, in Saxon *great*, Dutch and low German *groot*, comes from *grow*, as the Latin *crassus*, thick, from *cresco*, to grow, is applied to all kinds of dimensions in which things can grow or increase. LARGE, in Latin *largus*, wide, is probably derived from the Greek *λα* and *ρᾶν*, to flow plentifully; for *largus* signifies to give freely, and *large* has in English a similar sense: it is properly applied to space, extent, and quantity. BIG, from the German *bauch*, belly, and the English *bulk*, denotes *great* as to expansion or capacity. A house, a room, a heap, a pile, an army, etc., is *great* or *large*; an animal or a mountain is *great*

or *big*: a road, a city, a street, and the like, is termed rather *great* than *large*.

At one's first entrance into the Pantheon at Rome, how the imagination is filled with something *great* and amazing! and at the same time how little in proportion one is affected with the inside of a Gothic cathedral, although it be five times *larger* than the other! ADDISON.

We are not a little pleased to find every green leaf swarm with millions of animals, that at their *largest* growth are not visible to the naked eye. ADDISON.

An animal no *bigger* than a mite cannot appear perfect to the eye, because the sight takes it in at once. ADDISON.

Great is used generally in the improper sense; *large* and *big* are used only occasionally: a noise, a distance, a multitude, a number, a power, and the like, is termed *great*, but not *large*: we may, however, speak of a *large* portion, a *large* share, a *large* quantity; or of a mind *big* with conception, or of an event *big* with the fate of nations.

Among all the figures of architecture, there are none that have a *greater* air than the concave and the convex. ADDISON.

Sure he that made us with such *large* discourse,
Looking before and after, gave us not
That capability and godlike reason
To rust in us unus'd. SHAKESPEARE.

Amazing clouds on clouds continual heap'd,
Or whirl'd tempestuous by the gusty wind,
Or silent borne along heavy and slow,
With the *big* stores of streaming oceans charg'd. THOMSON.

GREAT, GRAND, SUBLIME.

THESE terms are synonymous only in their moral application. GREAT simply designates extent; GRAND includes likewise the idea of excellence and superiority. A *great* undertaking characterizes only the extent of the undertaking; a *grand* undertaking bespeaks its superior excellence: *great* objects are seen with facility; *grand* objects are viewed with admiration. It is a *great* point to make a person sensible of his faults; it should be the *grand* aim of all to aspire after moral and religious improvement.

Grand and SUBLIME are both superior to *great*; but the former marks the dimension of *greatness*; the latter, from the Latin *sublimis*, designates that of height. A scene may be either *grand* or *sublime*: it is *grand* as it fills the imagination with its immensity; it is *sublime* as it elevates the imagination beyond the

surrounding and less important objects. There is something *grand* in the sight of a vast army moving forward, as it were, by one impulse; there is something peculiarly *sublime* in the sight of huge mountains and craggy cliffs of ice, shaped into various fantastic forms. *Grand* may be said either of the works of art or nature; *sublime* is peculiarly applicable to the works of nature. The Egyptian pyramids and the ocean are both *grand* objects; a tempestuous ocean is a *sublime* object. *Grand* is sometimes applied to the mind; *sublime* is applied both to the thoughts and the expressions.

There is nothing in this whole art of architecture which pleases the imagination, but as it is great, uncommon, or beautiful.

There is generally in nature something more *grand* and august than what we meet with in the curiosities of art.

Homer fills his readers with *sublime* ideas.

GRIEVANCE, HARDSHIP.

GRIEVANCE, from the Latin *gravis*, heavy or burdensome, implies that which lies heavy at heart. HARDSHIP, from the adjective *hard*, denotes that which presses or bears violently on the person.

Grievance is in general taken for that which is done by another to *grieve* or distress: *hardship* is a particular kind of *grievance* that presses upon individuals. There are national *grievances*, though not national *hardships*. An infraction of one's rights, an act of violence or oppression, are *grievances* to those who are exposed to them, whether as individuals or bodies of men: an unequal distribution of labor, a partial indulgence of one to the detriment of another, constitute the *hardship*. A weight of taxes, levied in order to support an unjust war, will be esteemed a *grievance*: the partiality and caprice of the collector in making it fall with unequal weight upon particular persons will be regarded as a peculiar *hardship*. Men seek a redress of their *grievances* from some higher power than that by which they are inflicted: they endure their *hardships* until an opportunity offers of getting them removed.

It is better private men should have some injustice done them, than a public *grievance* should not be redressed. This is usually pleaded in defence of all those *hardships* which fall

on particular persons, in particular occasions which could not be foreseen when the law was made.

TO GRIEVE, MOURN, LAMENT.

To GRIEVE (*v. Affliction*) is the general term; MOURN, like *moan* and *murmur*, being an imitation of the sound produced by pain, is a particular term. To *grieve*, in its limited sense, is an inward act; to *mourn* is an outward act: the *grief* lies altogether in the mind; the *mourning* displays itself by some outward mark. A man *grieves* for his sins; he *mourns* for the loss of his friends. One *grieves* for that which immediately concerns one's self, or that which concerns others; one *mourns* for that which concerns others; one *grieves* over the loss of property; one *mourns* the fate of a deceased relative.

Achates, the companion of his breast,
Goes *grieving* by his side, with equal cares oppress'd.

My brother's friends and daughter left behind,
False to them all, to Paris only kind:
For this I *mourn*, till grief or dire disease
Shall waste the form, whose crime it was to please.

Grieve is the act of an individual; *mourn* may be the common act of many: a nation *mourns*, though it does not *grieve*, for a public calamity. To *grieve* is applicable to domestic troubles; *mourn* may refer to public or private ills. The distractions of a state will cause many to *grieve* for their own losses, and *mourn* the misfortunes of their country.

Who fails to *grieve* when just occasion calls,
Or *grieves* too much, deserves not to be blessed.

Ye banks that oft my weary limbs have borne,
Ye murmuring brooks that learn'd of me to *mourn*.

Ye birds that tune me with your plaintive lay,
Ye groves, where love once taught my steps to stray,
You, ever sweet, and ever fair, renew
Your strains melodious.

Grieve and *mourn* are permanent sentiments; LAMENT (*v. To bewail*) is a transitory feeling: the former are produced by substantial causes, which come home to the feelings; the latter respects things of a more partial, oftentimes of a more remote and indifferent, nature. A real widow *mourns* all the remainder of her days for the loss of her husband; we *lament* a thing to-day which we may

forget to-morrow. *Mourn* and *lament* are both expressed by some outward sign; but the former is composed and free from all noise; the latter displays itself either in cries or simple words. In the moment of trouble, when the distress of the mind is at its height, it may break out into loud *lamentation*, but commonly *grieving* and *mourning* commence when *lamentation* ceases.

So close in poplar shades, her children gone,
The mother nightingale *laments* alone.

As epithets, *grievous*, *mournful*, and *lamentable* have a similar distinction. What presses hard or unjustly on persons, their property, connections, and circumstances, is *grievous*; what touches the tender feelings, and tears asunder the ties of kindred and friendship, is *mournful*; whatever excites a painful sensation in our mind is *lamentable*. Famine is a *grievous* calamity for a nation; the violent separation of friends by death is a *mournful* event at all times, but particularly so for those who are in the prime of life and the fulness of expectation; the ignorance which some persons discover even in the present cultivated state of society is truly *lamentable*.

To a mother *grievous*, this
Grievous to high-born Laius, this disgrace
To be allied to strangers.

Ye friendless orphans, and ye dowerless maids,
With eager haste your *mournful* mansions leave.

What dost thou mean by shaking of thy head?
Why dost thou look so sadly on my son?
What means that head upon that breast of thine?
Why holds thine eye that *lamentable* rheum,
Like a proud river peering o'er his bounds?

TO GROAN, MOAN.

GROAN and MOAN are both onomatopœias, from the sounds which they express. *Groan* is a deep sound produced by hard breathing: *moan* is a plaintive, long-drawn sound produced by the organs of utterance. The *groan* proceeds involuntarily as an expression of severe pain, either of body or mind: the *moan* proceeds often from the desire of awakening attention or exciting compassion. Dying *groans* are uttered in the agonies of death: the *moans* of a wounded sufferer are sometimes the only resource he has left to make his destitute case known.

The plain ox, whose toil,
Patient and ever ready, clothes the land
With all the pomp of harvest, shall he bleed,
And struggling *groan* beneath the cruel hands
E'en of the clown he feeds?

The fair Alexis lov'd, but lov'd in vain,
And underneath the beechen shade, alone,
Thus to the woods and mountains made his
moan.

GROSS, COARSE.

GROSS derives its meaning in this application from the Latin *crassus*, thick from fat, or that which is of common materials. COARSE, *v. Coarse*.

These terms are synonymous in the moral application. *Grossness* of habit is opposed to delicacy; *coarseness* to softness and refinement. A person becomes *gross* by an unrestrained indulgence of his sensual appetites, particularly in eating and drinking; he is *coarse* from the want of polish either as to his mind or manners. A *gross* sensualist approximates very nearly to the brute; he sets aside all moral considerations; he indulges himself in the open face of day in defiance of all decency: a *coarse* person approaches nearest to the savage, whose roughness of humor and inclination have not been refined down by habits of restraining his own will, and complying with the will of another. A *gross* expression conveys the idea of that which should be kept from the view of the mind, which shocks the moral feeling; a *coarse* expression conveys the idea of an unseemly sentiment in the mind of the speaker. The representations of the Deity by any sensible image is *gross*, because it gives us a low and grovelling idea of a superior being; the doing a kindness, and making the receiver at the same time sensible of your superiority and his dependence, indicates great *coarseness* in the character of the favorer.

A certain preparation is requisite for the enjoyment of devotion in its whole extent: not only must the life be reformed from *gross* enormities, but the heart must have undergone that change which the Gospel demands.

The refined pleasures of a pious mind are, in many respects, superior to the *coarse* gratifications of sense.

GROSS, TOTAL.

GROSS is connected with the word great: from the idea of size which enters into the original meaning of this

term is derived that of quantity: TOTAL, from the Latin *totus*, signifies literally the whole; the *gross* implies that from which nothing has been taken: the *total* signifies that to which nothing need be added; the *gross* sum includes everything without regard to what it may be; the *total* includes everything which one wishes to include; we may, therefore, deduct from the *gross* that which does not immediately belong to it; but the *total* is that which admits of no deduction. The *gross* weight in trade is applicable to any article, the whole of which, good or bad, pure or dross, is included in opposition to the neat weight; the *total* amount supposes all to be included which ought to form a part, in opposition to any smaller amount or subdivisions; when employed in the improper sense, they preserve the same distinction: things are said to be taken or considered in the *gross*, that is, in the large and comprehensive way, one with another; things are said to undergo a *total* change.

I have more than once found fault with those general reflections which strike at kingdoms or commonwealths in the *gross*. ADDISON.

Nature is either collected into one *total*, or diffused and distributed. BACON.

TO GUARANTEE, BE SECURITY, BE RESPONSIBLE, WARRANT.

GUARANTEE and WARRANT are both derived from the Teutonic *währen*, to defend or make safe and binding; SECURITY, from *secure* (*v. Certain*), has the same original meaning; RESPONSIBLE, *v. Amenable*.

To *guarantee* and *be security* have respect to what is done for others; to *be responsible* respects what is done by one's self or others; to *warrant*, what is done by one's self only. To *guarantee* is applied to matters of public or private interest; to *be security*, to private matters only. The larger governments frequently *guarantee* for the performance of stipulations entered into by minor powers; one man becomes *security* to another for the payment of a sum of money by a third person. *Guarantee* may be taken for the person or thing that guarantees.

The people of England, then, are willing to trust to the sympathy of regicides the *guarantee* of the British monarchy. BURKE.

One is *security* for another in pecuniary concerns, but he is *responsible* for his own conduct or that of others; he becomes a *security* by virtue of his contract, as one tradesman becomes *security* for another, he is *responsible* by virtue of his relative office or situation; masters are *responsible* for the conduct of their servants; a jailer is *responsible* for the safe custody of the prisoner; every man is *responsible* for that which is placed under his charge. To *warrant* is applied to commercial transactions: one *warrants* the goodness of any commodity that is sold.

What a dreadful thing is a standing army, for the conduct of the whole, or any part of which, no one is *responsible*. BURKE.

Richard Cromwell desired only *security* for the debts he had contracted. BURNET.

The *warrant* serves to indemnify against loss, or, in a moral sense, to protect against censure, to give a sanction to.

No man's mistake will be able to *warrant* an unjust surmise, much less justify a false censure. SOUTH.

TO GUARD, DEFEND, WATCH.

GUARD is but a variation of *ward*, which is connected with the German *währen*, to look to. DEFEND, *v. Apology*, and to *defend*. WATCH and WAKE are in the German, etc., *wachen*, to watch, Latin *vigil*, watchful, *vigeco*, to flourish, and Greek *αγαλλω*, to exult or be in spirits.

To *guard*, in its largest sense, comprehends both *watching* and *defending*, that is, both the preventing the attack and the resisting it when it is made. In the restricted sense, to *guard* is properly to keep off an enemy; to *defend* is to drive him away when he makes the attack. The soldier *guards* the palace of the king in time of peace, and *defends* his country in time of war.

Fixed on defence, the Trojans are not slow To *guard* their shore from an expected foe. DRYDEN.

Forthwith on all sides to his aid was run, By angels many and strong, who interpos'd Defence. MILTON.

Watch, like *guard*, consists in looking to the danger, but it does not necessarily imply the use of any means to prevent

the danger: he who *watches* may only give an alarm.

But in his duty prompt at every call He *watch'd* and wept, he pray'd, and felt for all. GOLDSMITH.

In the improper application they have a similar sense: modesty *guards* female honor; clothing *defends* against the inclemency of the weather: a person who wants to escape *watches* his opportunity to slip out unobserved.

One of the principal charges which Stanhope had received from his friends in England, was to be on his *guard* against the intrigues of Sunderland. COXE.

And here th' access a gloomy grove *defends*, And here th' unnavigable lake extends. DRYDEN.

But see the well-plum'd hearse comes nodding on, Stately and slow, and properly attended By the whole sable tribe, that painful *watch* The sick man's door, and live upon the dead. BLAIR.

GUARD, SENTINEL.

THESE terms are employed to designate those who are employed for the protection of either persons or things. GUARD has been explained above (*v. To guard*); SENTINEL, in French *sentinelle*, is properly a species of *guard*, namely, a military *guard* in the time of a campaign; any one may be set as *guard* over property, who is empowered to keep off every intruder by force; but the *sentinel* acts in the army as the watch (*v. To guard*) in the police, rather to observe the motions of the enemy than to repel any force.

Fast as he could, he sighing quits the walls, And thus descending, on the *guards* he calls. POPE.

One of the *sentinels* who stood on the stage to prevent disorder burst into tears. STEELE.

They are figuratively applied to other objects; the *guard* in this case acts on ordinary occasions, the *sentinel* in the moments of danger.

Modesty is not only an ornament but a *guard* to virtue. ADDISON.

Conscience is the *sentinel* of virtue. JOHNSON.

GUARD, GUARDIAN.

THESE words are derived from the verb *guard* (*v. To guard*); but they have acquired a distinct office. GUARD is used

either in the literal or figurative sense; GUARDIAN only in the improper sense. *Guard* is applied either to persons or things; *guardian* only to persons. In application to persons, the *guard* is temporary; the *guardian* is fixed and permanent: the *guard* only *guards* against external evils; the *guardian* takes upon him the office of parent, counsellor, and director: when a house is in danger of being attacked, a person may sit up as a *guard*; when a parent is dead, a *guardian* supplies his place: we expect from a *guard* nothing but human assistance; but from our *guardian* angel we may expect supernatural assistance.

Him Hermes to Achilles shall convey, *Guard* of his life, and partner of his way. POPE. Ye guides and *guardians* of our Argive race! Come all! let gen'rous rage your arms employ, And save Patroclus from the dogs of Troy. POPE.

TO GUARD AGAINST, TAKE HEED.

BOTH these terms imply express care on the part of the agent; but the former is used with regard to external or internal evils, the latter only with regard to internal or mental evils: in an enemy's country it is essential to be particularly on one's *guard*, for fear of a surprise; in difficult matters, where we are liable to err, it is of importance to TAKE HEED lest we run from one extreme to another: young men, on their entrance into life, cannot be too much on their GUARD AGAINST associating with those who would lead them into expensive pleasures; in slippery paths, whether physically or morally understood, it is necessary to *take heed* how we go.

One would take more than ordinary care to *guard* one's self *against* this particular imperfection (changeableness), because it is that which our nature very strongly inclines us to. ADDISON.

Take heed of that dreadful tribunal where it will not be enough to say that I thought this or I heard that. SOUTH.

TO GUESS, CONJECTURE, DIVINE.

GUESS, in Saxon and low German *gissen*, is connected with the word *ghost*, and the German *geist*, etc., spirit, signifying the action of a spirit. CONJECTURE, *v. Conjecture*. DIVINE, from the Latin *divinus* and *deus*, a god, signifies to think and know as a god.

We *guess* that a thing actually is; we *conjecture* that which may be: we *guess* that it is a certain hour; we *conjecture* as to the meaning of a person's actions. *Guessing* is opposed to the certain knowledge of a thing; *conjecturing* is opposed to the full conviction of a thing: a child *guesses* at that portion of his lesson which he has not properly learned; a fanciful person employs *conjecture* where he cannot draw any positive conclusion.

And these discoveries make us all confess
That sublunary science is but *guess*. DENHAM.
Now hear the Grecian fraud, and from this one
Conjecture all the rest. DENHAM.

To *guess* and to *conjecture* are natural acts of the mind: to *divine*, in its proper sense, is a supernatural act; in this sense the heathens affected to *divine* that which was known only to an Omniscent Being; and impostors in our time presume to *divine* in matters that are set above the reach of human comprehension. The term is, however, employed to denote a species of *guessing* in different matters, as to *divine* the meaning of a mystery.

Walking they talk'd, and fruitlessly *divin'd*
What friend the priestess by those words design'd.
DRYDEN.

GUEST, VISITOR, OR VISITANT.

GUEST, from the Northern languages, signifies one who is entertained; VISITOR or VISITANT is the one who pays the visit. The *guest* is to the *visitor* as the species to the genus: every *guest* is a *visitor*, but every *visitor* is not a *guest*; the *visitor* simply comes to see the person, and enjoy social intercourse; but the *guest* also partakes of hospitality: we are *visitors* at the tea-table, at the card-table, and round the fire; we are *guests* at the festive board.

Some great behest from heav'n
To us perhaps he brings, and will vouchsafe
This day to be our *guest*. MILTON.
No palace with a lofty gate he wants,
T' admit the tides of early *visitors*. DRYDEN.

GUIDE, RULE.

GUIDE is to RULE as the genus to the species: every *rule* is a *guide* to a certain extent; but the *guide* is often that which exceeds the *rule*. The *guide*, in the moral sense, as in the proper sense, goes with us, and points out the exact path; it does

not permit us to err either to the right or left: the *rule* marks out a line, beyond which we may not go; but it leaves us to trace the line, and consequently to fail either on the one side or other. The Bible is our best *guide* for moral practice; its doctrines, as interpreted in the articles of the Christian Church, are the best *rule* of faith.

You must first apply to religion as the *guide* of life, before you can have recourse to it as the refuge of sorrow. BLAIR.

There is something so wild, and yet so solemn,
In Shakspeare's speeches of his ghosts and fairies,
And the like imaginary persons, that we cannot
forbear thinking them natural, though we have
no *rule* by which to judge them. ADDISON.

GUILTLESS, INNOCENT, HARMLESS.

GUILTLESS, without *guilt*, is more than INNOCENT: *innocence*, from *nocere*, to hurt, extends no farther than the quality of not hurting by any direct act; *guiltless* comprehends the quality of not intending to hurt: it is possible, therefore, to be *innocent* without being *guiltless*, though not *vice versa*; he who wishes for the death of another is not *guiltless*, though he may be *innocent* of the crime of murder. *Guiltless* seems to regard a man's general condition; *innocent* his particular condition: no man is *guiltless* in the sight of God, for no man is exempt from the guilt of sin; but he may be *innocent* in the sight of men, or *innocent* of all such intentional offences as render him obnoxious to his fellow-creatures. *Guiltlessness* was that happy state of perfection which men lost at the fall; *innocence* is that relative or comparative state of perfection which is attainable here on earth: the highest state of *innocence* is an ignorance of evil.

Ah! why should all mankind
For one man's fault thus *guiltless* be condemn'd,
If *guiltless*? But from me what can proceed
But all corrupt? MILTON.

When Adam sees the several changes of nature
about him, he appears in a disorder of mind suitable to one who had forfeited both his *innocence* and his happiness. ADDISON.

Guiltless is in the proper sense applicable only to the condition of man; and, when applied to things, it still has a reference to the person: *innocent* is equally applicable to persons or things; a person is *innocent* who has not committed any injury, or has not any direct purpose to

commit any injury; or a conversation is *innocent* which is free from what is hurtful. *Innocent* and HARMLESS both recommend themselves as qualities negatively good; they designate a freedom either in the person or thing from injuring, and differ only in regard to the nature of the injury: *innocence* respects moral injury, and *harmless* physical injury: a person is *innocent* who is free from moral impurity and wicked purposes; he is *harmless* if he have not the power or disposition to commit any violence; a diversion is *innocent* which has nothing in it likely to corrupt the morals; a game is *harmless* which is not likely to inflict any wound, or endanger the health.

But from the mountain's grassy side
A *guiltless* feast I bring;
A scrip with fruits and herbs supplied,
And water from the spring. GOLDSMITH.
A man should endeavor to make the sphere of
his *innocent* pleasures as wide as possible, that
he may retire into them with safety. ADDISON.
Full on his breast the Trojan arrow fell,
But *harmless* bounded from the plated steel.
ADDISON.

GUISE, HABIT.

GUISE and *wise* are both derived from the Northern languages, and denote the manner; but the former is employed for a particular or distinguished manner of dress. HABIT, from the Latin *habitus*, a habit, fashion, or form, is taken for a settled or permanent mode of dress.

The *guise* is that which is unusual, and often only occasional; the *habit* is that which is usual among particular classes: a person sometimes assumes the *guise* of a peasant, in order the better to conceal himself; he who devotes himself to the clerical profession puts on the *habit* of a clergyman.

Anubis, Sphinx,
Idols of antique *guise*, and horned Pan,
Terrific monstrous shapes! DYER.
For 'tis the mind that makes the body rich,
And as the sun breaks through the darkest cloud
So honor appeareth in the meanest *habit*. SHAKSPEARE.

GULF, ABYSS.

GULF, in Greek *κολπος*, from *κοιλος*, hollow, is applied literally in the sense of a deep concave receptacle for water, as the *gulf* of Venice. ABYSS, in Greek *αβυσσος*, compounded of *α*, privative, and *βυσσος*, a bottom, signifies literally a bottomless pit.

One is overwhelmed in a *gulf*; it carries with it the idea of liquidity and profundity, into which one inevitably sinks never to rise: one is lost in an *abyss*; it carries with it the idea of immense profundity, into which he who is cast never reaches a bottom, nor is able to return to the top; an insatiable voracity is the characteristic idea in the signification of this term.

A *gulf* is a capacious bosom, which holds within itself and buries all objects that suffer themselves to sink into it, without allowing them the possibility of escape; hell is represented as a fiery *gulf*, into which evil spirits are plunged, and remain perpetually overwhelmed: a guilty mind may be said, figuratively, to be plunged into a *gulf* of woe or despair when filled with the horrid sense of its enormities. An *abyss* presents nothing but an interminable space which has neither beginning nor end; he does wisely who does not venture in, or who retreats before he has plunged too deep to retrace his footsteps; as the ocean, in the natural sense, is a great *abyss*; so are metaphysics an immense *abyss*, into which the human mind precipitates itself only to be bewildered.

Sin and death amain
Following his track, such was the will of heav'n,
Pav'd after him a broad and beaten way
Over the dark *abyss*, whose boiling *gulf*
Tamely endur'd a bridge of wond'rous length,
From hell continu'd. MILTON.
His broad-wing'd vessel drinks the whelming tide,
Hid in the bosom of the black *abyss*. THOMSON.

H.

TO HAPPEN, CHANCE.

To HAPPEN, that is, to fall out by a *hap*, is to CHANCE (*v. Chance, fortune*) as the genus to the species; whatever *chances happens*, but not *vice versa*. *Happen* respects all events, without including any collateral idea; *chance* comprehends likewise the idea of the cause and order of events: whatever comes to pass *happens*, whether regularly in the course of things, or particularly and out of the order; whatever *chances happens*, altogether without concert, intention, and often with-