We *guess* that a thing actually is; we *conjecture* that which may be: we *guess* that it is a certain hour; we *conjecture* as to the meaning of a person's actions. *Guessing* is opposed to the certain knowledge of a thing; *conjecturing* is opposed to the full conviction of a thing: a child *guesses* at that portion of his lesson which he has not properly learned; a fanciful person employs *conjecture* where he cannot draw any positive conclusion.

And these discoveries make us all confess
That sublunary science is but *guess*. DENHAM.

Now hear the Grecian fraud, and from this one
Conjecture all the rest. DENHAM.

To *guess* and to *conjecture* are natural acts of the mind: to *divine*, in its proper sense, is a supernatural act; in this sense the heathens affected to *divine* that which was known only to an Omniscient Being; and impostors in our time presume to *divine* in matters that are set above the reach of human comprehension. The term is, however, employed to denote a species of *guessing* in different matters, as to *divine* the meaning of a mystery.

Walking they talk'd, and fruitlessly *divin'd*
What friend the priestess by those words design'd.
DRYDEN.

GUEST, VISITOR, OR VISITANT.

GUEST, from the Northern languages, signifies one who is entertained; VISITOR or VISITANT is the one who pays the visit. The *guest* is to the *visitor* as the species to the genus: every *guest* is a *visitor*, but every *visitor* is not a *guest;* the *visitor* simply comes to see the person, and enjoy social intercourse; but the *guest* also partakes of hospitality: we are *visitors* at the tea-table, at the card-table, and round the fire; we are *guests* at the festive board.

Some great behest from heav'n
To us perhaps he brings, and will vouchsafe
This day to be our *guest*. MILTON.

No palace with a lofty gate he wants,
T' admit the tides of early *visitants*. DRYDEN.

GUIDE, RULE.

GUIDE is to RULE as the genus to the species: every *rule* is a *guide* to a certain extent; but the *guide* is often that which exceeds the *rule*. The *guide*, in the moral sense, as in the proper sense, goes with us, and points out the exact path; it does not permit us to err either to the right or left: the *rule* marks out a line, beyond which we may not go; but it leaves us to trace the line, and consequently to fail either on the one side or other. The Bible is our best *guide* for moral practice; its doctrines, as interpreted in the articles of the Christian Church, are the best *rule* of faith.

You must first apply to religion as the *guide* of life, before you can have recourse to it as the refuge of sorrow. BLAIR.

There is something so wild, and yet so solemn, in Shakspeare's speeches of his ghosts and fairies, and the like imaginary persons, that we cannot forbear thinking them natural, though we have no *rule* by which to judge them. ADDISON.

GUILTLESS, INNOCENT, HARMLESS.

GUILTLESS, without *guilt*, is more than INNOCENT: *innocence*, from *noceo*, to hurt, extends no farther than the quality of not hurting by any direct act; *guiltless* comprehends the quality of not intending to hurt: it is possible, therefore, to be *innocent* without being *guiltless*, though not *vice versa;* he who wishes for the death of another is not *guiltless*, though he may be *innocent* of the crime of murder. *Guiltless* seems to regard a man's general condition; *innocent* his particular condition: no man is *guiltless* in the sight of God, for no man is exempt from the guilt of sin; but he may be *innocent* in the sight of men, or *innocent* of all such intentional offences as render him obnoxious to his fellow-creatures. *Guiltlessness* was that happy state of perfection which men lost at the fall; *innocence* is that relative or comparative state of perfection which is attainable here on earth: the highest state of *innocence* is an ignorance of evil.

Ah! why should all mankind
For one man's fault thus *guiltless* be condemn'd,
If *guiltless?* But from me what can proceed
But all corrupt? MILTON.

When Adam sees the several changes of nature about him, he appears in a disorder of mind suitable to one who had forfeited both his *innocence* and his happiness. ADDISON.

Guiltless is in the proper sense applicable only to the condition of man; and, when applied to things, it still has a reference to the person: *innocent* is equally applicable to persons or things; a person is *innocent* who has not committed any injury, or has not any direct purpose to commit any injury; or a conversation is *innocent* which is free from what is hurtful. *Innocent* and HARMLESS both recommend themselves as qualities negatively good; they designate a freedom either in the person or thing from injuring, and differ only in regard to the nature of the injury: *innocence* respects moral injury, and *harmless* physical injury: a person is *innocent* who is free from moral impurity and wicked purposes; he is *harmless* if he have not the power or disposition to commit any violence; a diversion is *innocent* which has nothing in it likely to corrupt the morals; a game is *harmless* which is not likely to inflict any wound, or endanger the health.

But from the mountain's grassy side
A *guiltless* feast I bring;
A scrip with fruits and herbs supplied,
And water from the spring. GOLDSMITH.

A man should endeavor to make the sphere of his *innocent* pleasures as wide as possible, that he may retire into them with safety. ADDISON.

Full on his breast the Trojan arrow fell,
But *harmless* bounded from the plated steel.
ADDISON.

GUISE, HABIT.

GUISE and *wise* are both derived from the Northern languages, and denote the manner; but the former is employed for a particular or distinguished manner of dress. HABIT, from the Latin *habitus*, a habit, fashion, or form, is taken for a settled or permanent mode of dress.

The *guise* is that which is unusual, and often only occasional; the *habit* is that which is usual among particular classes: a person sometimes assumes the *guise* of a peasant, in order the better to conceal himself; he who devotes himself to the clerical profession puts on the *habit* of a clergyman.

Anubis, Sphinx,
Idols of antique *guise*, and horned Pan,
Terrific monstrous shapes! DYER.

For 'tis the mind that makes the body rich,
And as the sun breaks through the darkest cloud
So honor appeareth in the meanest *habit*.
SHAKSPEARE.

GULF, ABYSS.

GULF, in Greek κολπος, from κοιλος, hollow, is applied literally in the sense of a deep concave receptacle for water, as the *gulf* of Venice. ABYSS, in Greek αβυσσος, compounded of α, privative, and βυσσος, a bottom, signifies literally a bottomless pit.

One is overwhelmed in a *gulf;* it carries with it the idea of liquidity and profundity, into which one inevitably sinks never to rise: one is lost in an *abyss;* it carries with it the idea of immense profundity, into which he who is cast never reaches a bottom, nor is able to return to the top; an insatiable voracity is the characteristic idea in the signification of this term.

A *gulf* is a capacious bosom, which holds within itself and buries all objects that suffer themselves to sink into it, without allowing them the possibility of escape; hell is represented as a fiery *gulf*, into which evil spirits are plunged, and remain perpetually overwhelmed: a guilty mind may be said, figuratively, to be plunged into a *gulf* of woe or despair when filled with the horrid sense of its enormities. An *abyss* presents nothing but an interminable space which has neither beginning nor end; he does wisely who does not venture in, or who retreats before he has plunged too deep to retrace his footsteps; as the ocean, in the natural sense, is a great *abyss;* so are metaphysics an immense *abyss*, into which the human mind precipitates itself only to be bewildered.

Sin and death amain
Following his track, such was the will of heav'n,
Pav'd after him a broad and beaten way
Over the dark *abyss*, whose boiling *gulf*
Tamely endur'd a bridge of wond'rous length,
From hell continu'd. MILTON.

His broad-wing'd vessel drinks the whelming tide,
Hid in the bosom of the black *abyss*. THOMSON.

H.

TO HAPPEN, CHANCE.

To HAPPEN, that is, to fall out by a *hap*, is to CHANCE (*v. Chance, fortune*) as the genus to the species; whatever *chances happens*, but not *vice versa*. *Happen* respects all events, without including any collateral idea; *chance* comprehends likewise the idea of the cause and order of events: whatever comes to pass *happens*, whether regularly in the course of things, or particularly and out of the order; whatever *chances happens*, altogether without concert, intention, and often with-

out relation to any other thing. Accidents *happen* daily which no human foresight could prevent; the newspapers contain an account of all that *happens* in the course of the day or week: listeners and busybodies are ready to catch every word that *chances* to fall in their hearing.

With equal mind what *happens* let us bear,
Nor joy, nor grieve too much for things beyond our care. DRYDEN.

An idiot, *chancing* to live within the sound of a clock, always amused himself with counting the hour of the day whenever the clock struck: but the clock being spoiled by accident, the idiot continued to count the hour without the help of it. ADDISON.

HAPPINESS, FELICITY, BLISS, BLESSEDNESS, BEATITUDE.

HAPPINESS signifies the state of being *happy*. FELICITY, in Latin *felicitas*, from *felix*, happy, most probably comes from the Greek ηλιξ, youthful, youth being the age of purest enjoyment. BLISS, BLESSEDNESS, signify the state or property of being *blessed*. BEATITUDE, from the Latin *beatus*, signifies the property of being *happy* in a superior degree.

Happiness comprehends that aggregate of pleasurable sensations which we derive from external objects. It is the ordinary term which is employed alike in the colloquial or the philosophical style: *felicity* is a higher expression, comprehending inward enjoyment, or an aggregate of inward pleasure, without regard to the source whence they are derived: *bliss* is a still higher term, expressing more than either *happiness* or *felicity*, both as to the degree and nature of the enjoyment. *Happiness* is the thing adapted to our present condition, and to the nature of our being, as a compound of body and soul; it is impure in its nature, and variable in degree; it is sought for by various means and with great eagerness; but it often lies much more within our reach than we are apt to imagine: it is not to be found in the possession of great wealth, of great power, of great dominions, of great splendor, or the unbounded indulgence of any one appetite or desire; but in moderate possessions, with a heart tempered by religion and virtue for the enjoyment of that which God has bestowed upon us: it is, therefore, not so unequally distributed as some have been led to conclude.

Ah! whither now are fled
Those dreams of greatness? those unsolid hopes
Of *happiness*? THOMSON.

No greater *felicity* can genius attain than that of having purified intellectual pleasure, separated mirth from indecency, and wit from licentiousness. JOHNSON.

The fond soul,
Wrapt in gay visions of unreal *bliss*,
Still paints th' illusive form. THOMSON.

Happiness admits of degrees, since every individual is placed in different circumstances, either of body or mind, which fit him to be more or less *happy*. *Felicity* is not regarded in the same light; it is that which is positive and independent of all circumstances: domestic *felicity* and conjugal *felicity* are regarded as moral enjoyments, abstracted from everything which can serve as an alloy. *Bliss* is that which is purely spiritual; it has its source in the imagination, and rises above the ordinary level of human enjoyments: of earthly *bliss* little is known but in poetry; of heavenly *bliss* we form but an imperfect conception from the utmost stretch of our powers. *Blessedness* is a term of spiritual import, which refers to the *happy* condition of those who enjoy the Divine favor, and are permitted to have a foretaste of heavenly *bliss* by the exaltation of their minds above earthly *happiness*. *Beatitude* denotes the quality of *happiness* only which is most exalted; namely, heavenly *happiness*.

In the description of heaven and hell we are surely interested, as we are all to reside hereafter either in the regions of horror or of *bliss*. JOHNSON.

So solid a comfort to men, under all the troubles and afflictions of this world, is that firm assurance which the Christian religion gives us of a future *happiness*, as to bring even the greatest miseries which in this life we are liable to, in some sense, under the notion of *blessedness*. TILLOTSON.

As in the next world, so in this, the only solid blessings are owing to the goodness of the mind, not the extent of the capacity; friendship here is an emanation from the same source as *beatitude* there. POPE.

HAPPY, FORTUNATE.

HAPPY and FORTUNATE are both applied to the external circumstances of a man; but the former conveys the idea of that which is abstractedly good, the latter implies rather what is agreeable to one's wishes. A man is *happy* in his marriage, in his children, in his connections, and the like: he is *fortunate* in his trading concerns. *Happy* excludes the idea of chance; *fortunate* excludes the idea of personal effort: a man is *happy* in the possession of what he gets; he is *fortunate* in getting it.

O *happy*, if he knew his *happy* state,
The swain, who, free from business and debate,
Receives his easy food from nature's hand,
And just returns of cultivated land. DRYDEN.

Visit the gayest and most *fortunate* on earth only with sleepless nights, disorder any single organ of the senses, and you shall (will) presently see his gayety vanish. BLAIR.

In the improper sense, they bear a similar analogy. A *happy* thought, a *happy* expression, a *happy* turn, a *happy* event, and the like, denote a degree of positive excellence; a *fortunate* idea, a *fortunate* circumstance, a *fortunate* event, are all relatively considered, with regard to the wishes and views of the individual.

'Tis manifest that some particular ages have been more *happy* than others in the production of great men. DRYDEN.

Homer is less *fortunate* in his subject than Virgil. BLAIR.

HARBOR, HAVEN, PORT.

THE idea of a resting-place for vessels is common to these terms, of which HARBOR is general, and the two others specific in their signification. *Harbor*, from the Teutonic *herbergen*, to shelter, carries with it little more than the common idea of affording a resting or anchoring place. HAVEN, from the Teutonic *haben*, to have or hold, conveys the idea of security. PORT, from the Latin *portus* and *porta*, a gate, conveys the idea of an enclosure. A *haven* is a natural *harbor*; a *port* is an artificial *harbor*. We characterize a *harbor* as commodious; a *haven* as snug and secure; a *port* as safe and easy of access. A commercial country profits by the excellence and number of its *harbors*; it values itself on the security of its *havens*, and increases the number of its *ports* accordingly. A vessel goes into a *harbor* only for a season; it remains in a *haven* for a permanency; it seeks a *port* as the destination of its voyage. Merchantmen are perpetually going in and out of a *harbor*; a distressed vessel, at a distance from home, seeks some *haven* in which it may winter; the weary mariner looks to the *port*, not as the termination of his labor, but as the commencement of all his enjoyments.

But here she comes,
In the calm *harbor* of whose gentle breast
My tempest-beaten soul may safely rest. DRYDEN.

Safe thro' the war her course the vessel steers,
The *haven* gain'd, the pilot drops his fears. SHIRLEY.

What though our passage through this world be never so stormy and tempestuous, we shall arrive at a safe *port*. TILLOTSON.

TO HARBOR, SHELTER, LODGE.

THE idea of giving a resting-place is common to these terms: but HARBOR (*v. To foster*) is used mostly in a bad sense: SHELTER (*v. Asylum*) in an indefinite sense: LODGE, in French *loge*, is connected with the German *liegen*, to lie, in an indifferent sense. One *harbors* that which ought not to find room anywhere; one *shelters* that which cannot find security elsewhere; one *lodges* that which wants a resting-place. Thieves, traitors, conspirators, are *harbored* by those who have an interest in securing them from detection: either the wicked or the unfortunate may be *sheltered* from the evil with which they are threatened: travellers are *lodged* as occasion may require.

My lady bids me tell you that, though she *harbors* you as her uncle, she's nothing allied to your disorders. SHAKSPEARE.

The hen *shelters* her first brood of chickens with all the prudence that she ever attains. JOHNSON.

My lord was *lodged* in the duke's castle. HOWELL.

As the word *harbor* does not, in its original sense, mean anything more than affording a temporary entertainment, it may be taken in a good sense for an act of hospitality.

We owe this old house the same kind of gratitude that we do to an old friend who *harbors* us in his declining condition, nay, even in his last extremity. POPE.

Harbor and *shelter* are said of things in the sense of giving a harbor or shelter; *lodge* in the sense of being a resting-place: furniture *harbors* vermin, trees *shelter* from the rain, a ball *lodges* in the breast; so in the moral sense, a man *harbors* resentment, ill-will, evil thoughts, and the like; he *shelters* himself from a

charge by retorting it upon his adversary; or a particular passion may be *lodged* in the breast, or ideas *lodged* in the mind.

She *harbors* in her breast a furious hate
(And thou shalt find the dire effects too late);
Fix'd on revenge, and obstinate to die. DRYDEN.

In vain I strove to check my growing flame,
Or *shelter* passion under friendship's name:
You saw my heart. PRIOR.

They too are tempered high,
With hunger stung, and wild necessity,
Nor *lodges* pity in their shaggy breast.
THOMSON.

HARD, FIRM, SOLID.

THE close adherence of the component parts of a body constitutes HARDNESS. The close adherence of different bodies to each other constitutes FIRMNESS (*v. Fixed*). That is *hard* which will not yield to a closer compression; that is *firm* which will not yield so as to produce a separation. Ice is *hard*, as far as it respects itself, when it resists every pressure; it is *firm*, with regard to the water which it covers, when it is so closely bound as to resist every weight without breaking.

I see you laboring through all your inconveniences of the rough roads, the *hard* saddle, the trotting horse, and what not. POPE.

The loosen'd ice
Rustles no more; but to the sedgy bank
Fast grows, or gathers round the pointed stone,
A crystal pavement, by the breath of heaven
Cemented *firm*. THOMSON.

Hard and SOLID respect the internal constitution of bodies, and the adherence of the component parts; but *hard* denotes a much closer degree of adherence than *solid:* the *hard* is opposed to the soft; the *solid* to the fluid; every *hard* body is by nature *solid;* although every *solid* body is not *hard.* Wood is always a *solid* body, but it is sometimes *hard*, and sometimes soft; water, when congealed, is a *solid* body, and admits of different degrees of *hardness.*

It is said by modern philosophers, that the *hardest* bodies are so porous that if all matter were compressed to perfect *solidity* it might be contained in a cube of a few feet. JOHNSON.

In the improper application, *hardness* is allied to insensibility; *firmness* to fixedness; *solidity* to substantiality; a *hard* man is not to be acted upon by any tender motives; a *firm* man is not to be turned from his purpose; a *solid* man holds no purposes that are not well-founded. A man is *hardened* in that which is bad, by being made insensible to that which is good; a man is *confirmed* in anything good or bad, by being rendered less disposed to lay it aside; his mind is *consolidated* by acquiring fresh motives for action.

Plenty and peace breed cowards; *hardness* ever
Of *hardiness* is mother. SHAKSPEARE.

In your friendships and connections this rule is particularly useful; let your *firmness* and vigor preserve and invite attachments to you.
CHESTERFIELD.

This subject of mineral waters would afford an ocean of matter were one to compile a *solid* discourse of it. HOWELL.

A copious manner of expression gives strength and weight to our ideas, which frequently makes impressions upon the mind, as iron does upon *solid* bodies, rather by repeated strokes than a single blow. MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF PLINY.

HARD, CALLOUS, HARDENED, OBDURATE.

HARD is here, as in the former case (*v. Hard*), the general term, and the rest particular: *hard*, in its most extensive physical sense, denotes the property of resisting the action of external force, so as not to undergo any change in its form, or separation in its parts: CALLOUS is that species of the *hard*, in application to the skin, which arises from its dryness, and the absence of all nervous susceptibility. *Hard* and *callous* are likewise applied in the moral sense: but *hard* denotes the absence of tender feeling, or the property of resisting any impression which tender objects are apt to produce; *callous* denotes the property of not yielding to the force of motives to action. A *hard* heart cannot be moved by the sight of misery, let it be presented in ever so affecting a form: a *callous* mind is not to be touched by any persuasions, however powerful. *Hard* does not designate any circumstance of its existence or origin: we may be *hard* from a variety of causes; but *callousness* arises from the indulgence of vices, passions, and the pursuit of vicious practices. When we speak of a person as *hard*, it simply determines what he is: if we speak of him as *callous*, it refers also to what he was, and from what he is become so.

Such woes
Not e'en the *hardest* of our foes could hear,
Nor stern Ulysses tell without a tear. DRYDEN.

By degrees the sense grows *callous*, and loses that exquisite relish of trifles. BERKELEY.

Callous, HARDENED, and OBDURATE are all employed to designate a morally depraved character; but *callousness* belongs properly to the heart and conscience; *hardened* to both the heart and the understanding; *obdurate* more particularly to the will. *Callousness* is the first stage of *hardness* in moral depravity; it may exist in the infant mind, on its first tasting the poisonous pleasures of vice, without being acquainted with its remote consequences. A *hardened* state is the work of time; it arises from a continued course of vice, which becomes, as it were, habitual, and wholly unfits a person for admitting of any other impressions: *obduracy* is the last stage of moral *hardness*, which supposes the whole mind to be obstinately bent on vice. A child discovers himself to be *callous* when the entreaties, threats, or punishments of a parent cannot awaken in him a single sentiment of contrition; a youth discovers himself to be *hardened* when he begins to take a pride and a pleasure in a vicious career; a man shows himself to be *obdurate* when he betrays a settled and confirmed purpose to pursue his abandoned course, without regard to consequences.

Licentiousness had so long passed for sharpness of wit and greatness of mind, that the conscience is grown *callous*. L'ESTRANGE.

His *harden'd* heart, nor prayers, nor threatenings move:
Fate and the gods had stopp'd his ears to love.
DRYDEN.

Round he throws his baleful eyes,
That witness'd huge affliction and dismay,
Mix'd with *obdurate* pride and steadfast hate.
MILTON.

HARD, HARDY, INSENSIBLE, UNFEELING.

HARD (*v. Hard*) may either be applied to that which makes resistance to external impressions, or that which presses with a force upon other objects. HARDY, which is only a variation of *hard*, is applicable only in the first case: thus, a person's skin may be *hard* which is not easily acted upon; but the person is said to be *hardy* who can withstand the elements: on the other hand, *hard*, when employed as an active principle, is only applied to the moral character; hence the difference between a *hardy* man who endures everything, and a *hard* man who makes others endure.

To be inaccessible, contemptuous, and *hard* of heart, is to revolt against our own nature.
BLAIR

Ocnus was next, who led his native train
Of *hardy* warriors through the watery plain.
DRYDEN.

INSENSIBLE and UNFEELING are but modes of the *hard;* that is, they designate the negative quality of *hardness*, or its incapacity to receive impression: *hard*, therefore, is always the strongest term of the three; and, of the two others, *unfeeling* is stronger than *insensible. Hard* and *insensible* are applied physically and morally; *unfeeling* is employed only as a moral characteristic. A horse's mouth is *hard* when it is insensible to the action of the bit; a man's heart is *hard* which is insensible to the miseries of others; a man is *unfeeling* who does not regard the feelings of others. The heart may be *hard* by nature, or rendered so by the influence of some passion; but a person is commonly *unfeeling* from circumstances. Shylock is depicted by Shakspeare as *hard*, from his strong antipathy to the Christians: people who enjoy an uninterrupted state of good health are often *unfeeling* in cases of sickness. As that which is *hard* mostly hurts or pains when it comes in contact with the soft, the term *hard* is peculiarly applicable to superiors, or such as have power to inflict pain: a creditor may be *hard* toward a debtor. As *insensible* signifies a want of sense, it may be sometimes necessary: a surgeon, when performing an operation, must be *insensible* to the present pain which he inflicts. As *unfeeling* signifies a want of feeling, it is always taken for a want of good feeling: where the removal of pain is required, the surgeon shows himself to be *unfeeling* who does not do everything in his power to lessen the pain of the sufferer.

Begone! the whip and bell in that *hard* hand
Are hateful ensigns of usurp'd command.
COWPER.

It is both reproachful and criminal to have an *insensible* heart. BLAIR.

The father too, a sordid man,
Who love nor pity knew,
Was all *unfeeling* as the rock
From whence his riches grew. MALLET.

HARD, DIFFICULT, ARDUOUS.

HARD is here taken in the improper sense of causing trouble, and requiring pains, in which sense it is a much stronger term than DIFFICULT, which, from the Latin *difficilis*, compounded of the privative *dis* and *facilis*, signifies merely not easy. *Hard* is therefore positive, and *difficult* negative. A *difficult* task cannot be got through without exertion, but a *hard* task requires great exertion. *Difficult* is applicable to all trivial matters which call for a more than usual portion either of labor or thought; *hard* is applicable to those which are of the highest importance, and accompanied with circumstances that call for the utmost stretch of every power. It is a *difficult* matter to get admittance into some circles of society; it is a *hard* matter to find societies that are select: it is *difficult* to decide between two fine paintings which is the finest; it is a *hard* matter to come at any conclusion on metaphysical subjects. A child mostly finds it *difficult* to learn his letters: there are many passages in classical writers which are *hard* to be understood by the learned.

Antigones, with kisses, often tried
To beg this present in his beauty's pride,
When youth and love are *hard* to be denied.
DRYDEN.

As Swift's years increased, his fits of giddiness and deafness grew more frequent, and his deafness made conversation *difficult*. JOHNSON.

ARDUOUS, from the Latin *arduus*, lofty, signifying set at a distance or out of reach, expresses more than either *hard* or *difficult*. What is *difficult* may be conquered by labor and perseverance, without any particular degree of talent; but what is *arduous* cannot be effected without great mental powers and accomplishments. What is *difficult* is so in various degrees, according to circumstances; that which is *difficult* to one person may be less so to another; but that which is *arduous* is difficult in a high degree, and positively *difficult* under every circumstance.

The translation of Homer was an *arduous* undertaking, and the translator entered upon it with a candid confession that he was utterly incapable of doing justice to Homer.
CUMBERLAND.

Whatever melting metals can conspire,
Or breathing bellows, or the forming fire,
Is freely yours; your anxious fears remove,
And think no task is *difficult* to love. DRYDEN.

HARD-HEARTED, CRUEL, UNMERCIFUL, MERCILESS.

HARD-HEARTED signifies having a hard heart, or a heart not to be moved by the pains of others (*v. Hard*). CRUEL, in Latin *crudelis*, from *crudus*, raw flesh, and *cruor*, blood, that is, delighting in blood like beasts of prey, signifies ready to inflict pain: as a temper of mind, therefore, *cruel* expresses much more than *hard-hearted;* the latter denotes the want of that sensibility toward others which ought to be the property of every human heart; the former the positive inclination to inflict pain, and the pleasure from so doing. *Hard-hearted* is employed as an epithet of the person; *cruel* as an epithet to things as well as persons; as a *cruel* man, a *cruel* action. *Hard-hearted* respects solely the moral affections; *cruelty*, in its proper sense, respects the infliction of corporeal pains, but is extended in its application to whatever creates moral pains: a person may be *cruel*, too, in his treatment of children or brutes by beating or starving them; or he may be *cruel* toward those who look up to him for kindness.

Single men, though they be many times more charitable, on the other side, are more *cruel* and *hard-hearted*, because their tenderness is not so oft called upon. BACON.

Relentless love the *cruel* mother led
The blood of her unhappy babes to shed.
DRYDEN.

The UNMERCIFUL and MERCILESS are both modes of characteristics of the *hard-hearted*. An *unmerciful* man is *hard-hearted*, inasmuch as he is unwilling to extend his compassion or mercy to one who is in his power; a *merciless* man, which is more than an *unmerciful* man, is *hard-hearted*, inasmuch as he is restrained by no compunctious feelings from inflicting pain on those who are in his power. Avarice makes a man *hard-hearted* even to those who are bound to him by the closest ties; it makes him *unmerciful* to those who are in his debt.

There are many *merciless* tyrants in domestic life, who show their disposition by their *merciless* treatment of their poor brutes.

I saw how *unmerciful* you were to your eyes in your last letter to me. TILLOTSON.

To crush a *merciless* and *cruel* victor.
DRYDEN.

HARDLY, SCARCELY.

WHAT is HARD is not common, and in that respect SCARCE: hence the idea of unfrequency assimilates these terms both in signification and application. In many cases they may be used indifferently; but, where the idea of practicability predominates, *hardly* seems most proper; and, where the idea of frequency predominates, *scarcely* seems preferable. One can *hardly* judge of a person's features by a single and partial glance; we *scarcely* ever see men lay aside their vices from a thorough conviction of their enormity: but it may with equal propriety be said in general sentences, *hardly* one in a thousand, or *scarcely* one in a thousand, would form such a conclusion.

I do not expect, as long as I stay in India, to be free from a bad digestion, the "morbus literatorum," for which there is *hardly* any remedy but abstinence from food, literary and culinary.
SIR W. JONES.

In this assembly of princes and nobles (the Congress at the Hague), to which Europe has perhaps *scarcely* seen anything equal, was formed the grand alliance against Lewis. JOHNSON.

HARSH, ROUGH, SEVERE, RIGOROUS.

HARSH (*v. Acrimony*) and ROUGH (*v. Abrupt*) borrow their moral signification from the physical properties of the bodies to which they belong. The *harsh* and the *rough* both act painfully upon the taste, but the former with much more violence than the latter. An excess of the sour mingled with other unpleasant properties constitutes *harshness:* an excess of astringency constitutes *roughness.* Cheese is said to be *harsh* when it is dry and biting: *roughness* is the peculiar quality of the damascene. From this physical distinction between these terms we discover the ground of their moral application. *Harshness* in a person's conduct acts upon the feelings, and does violence to the affections: *roughness* acts only externally on the senses: we may be *rough* in the tone of the voice, in the mode of address, or in the manner of handling or touching an object: but we are *harsh* in the sentiment we convey, and according to the persons to whom it is conveyed: a stranger may be *rough* when he has it in his power to be so: only a friend, or one in the tenderest relation, can be *harsh.*

No complaint is more feelingly made than that of the *harsh* and rugged manners of persons with whom we have an intercourse. BLAIR.

Know, gentle youth, in Libyan lands there are
A people rude in peace, and *rough* in war.
DRYDEN.

SEVERE, *v. Austere.* RIGOROUS, from the Latin *rigor* and *rigeo*, to stiffen, designates unbending, inflexible. These terms mark different modes of treating those that are in one's power, all of which are the reverse of the kind. *Harsh* and *rough* are epithets of that which is unamiable: they indicate the *harshness* and *roughness* of the humor: *severity* and *rigor* are not always to be condemned; they spring from principle, and are often resorted to by necessity. *Harshness* is always mingled with anger and personal feeling: *severity* and *rigor* characterize things more than the temper of persons. A *harsh* master renders every burden which he imposes doubly *severe*, by the grating manner in which he communicates his will: a *severe* master simply imposes the burden in a manner to enforce obedience. The one seems to indulge himself in inflicting pain: the other seems to act from a motive that is independent of the pain inflicted. A *harsh* man is therefore always *severe*, but with injustice: a *severe* man, however, is not always *harsh. Rigor* is a high degree of *severity.* One is *severe* in the punishment of offences: one is *rigorous* in exacting compliance and obedience. *Severity* is always more or less necessary in the army, or in a school, for the preservation of good order: *rigor* is essential in dealing with the stubborn will and unruly passions of men.

It is pride which fills the world with so much *harshness* and *severity*. We are *rigorous* to offences, as if we had never offended. BLAIR.

TO HASTEN, ACCELERATE, SPEED, EXPEDITE, DESPATCH.

HASTEN, in French *hâtir*, and in the Northern languages *hasten*, etc., is most

probably connected with the German *heiss*, hot, expressing what is vivid and active. ACCELERATE, from *celer*, quick, signifies literally to quicken for a specific purpose. SPEED, from the Greek σπουδή, signifies to carry on diligently. EXPEDITE, *v. Diligent.* DESPATCH, in French *dépêcher*, from *pes*, a foot, signifies putting off or clearing.

Quickness in movement and action is the common idea of all these terms, which vary in the nature of the movement and the action. To *hasten* expresses little more than the general idea of quickness in moving toward a point; thus, he *hastens* who runs to get to the end of his journey: *accelerate* expresses, moreover, the idea of bringing something to a point; thus, every mechanical business is *accelerated* by the order and distribution of its several parts. It may be employed, like the word *hasten*, for corporeal and familiar actions: a tailor *accelerates* any particular work that he has in hand by putting on additional hands; or a compositor *accelerates* the printing of a work by doing his part with correctness. The word *speed* includes not only quick but forward movement. He who goes with *speed* goes effectually forward, and comes to his journey's end the soonest. This idea is excluded from the term *haste*, which may often be a planless, unsuitable quickness. Hence the proverb, "The more *haste*, the worse *speed*."

Where with like *haste*, though several ways they run,
Some to undo, and some to be undone. DENHAM.

Let the aged consider well, that by every intemperate indulgence they *accelerate* decay.
BLAIR.

When matters are fully resolved upon, I believe then nothing is so advantageous as *speed*.
HOWELL.

Expedite and *despatch* are terms of higher import, in application to the most serious concerns in life; but to *expedite* expresses a process, a bringing forward toward an end: *despatch* implies a putting an end to, a making a clearance. We do everything in our power to *expedite* a business: we *despatch* a great deal of business within a given time. *Expedition* is requisite for one who executes; *despatch* is most important for one who determines and directs. An inferior officer must proceed with *expedition* to fulfil the orders or execute the purposes of his commander; a general or minister of state *despatches* the concerns of planning, directing, and instructing. Hence it is we speak only of *expediting* a thing; but we may speak of *despatching* a person as well as a thing.

The coachman was ordered to drive, and they hurried with the utmost *expedition* to Hyde Park Corner.
JOHNSON.

And as, in races, it is not the large stride, or high lift, that makes the *speed*; so, in business, the keeping close to the matter, and not taking of it too much at once, procureth *despatch*.
BACON.

TO HASTEN, HURRY.

HASTEN, *v. To hasten.* HURRY, in French *harier*, probably comes from the Hebrew *charrer* or *harrer*, to be inflamed, or be in a hurry.

To *hasten* and *hurry* both imply to move forward with quickness in any matter; but the former may proceed with some design and good order, but the latter always supposes perturbation and irregularity. We *hasten* in the communication of good news, when we make efforts to convey it in the shortest time possible; we *hurry* to get to an end, when we impatiently and inconsiderately press forward without making choice of our means. To *hasten* is opposed to delay, or a dilatory mode of proceeding; it is frequently indispensable to *hasten* in the affairs of human life: to *hurry* is opposed to deliberate and cautious proceeding: it must always be prejudicial and unwise to *hurry*; men may *hasten*; children *hurry*.

Homer, to preserve the unity of action, *hastens* into the midst of things, as Horace has observed.
ADDISON.

Now 'tis naught
But restless *hurry* through the busy air,
Beat by unnumber'd wings. THOMSON.

As epithets, *hasty* and *hurried* are both employed in the bad sense; but *hasty* implies merely an overquickness of motion which outstrips consideration; *hurried* implies a disorderly motion which springs from a distempered state of mind. Irritable people use *hasty* expressions; they speak before they think: deranged people walk with *hurried* steps; they follow the blind impulse of undirected feeling.

If you find you have a *hastiness* of temper, which unguardedly breaks out into indiscreet sallies, watch it narrowly.
CHESTERFIELD.

The mind is *hurried* out of itself by a crowd of great and confused images.
BURKE.

TO HATE, DETEST.

THE alliance between these terms in signification is sufficiently illustrated in the articles referred to. Their difference consists more in sense than application. To HATE (*v. Antipathy*) is a personal feeling directed toward the object independently of its qualities; to DETEST (*v. To abhor*) is a feeling independent of the person, and altogether dependent upon the nature of the thing. What one *hates*, one *hates* commonly on one's own account; what one *detests*, one *detests* on account of the object: hence it is that one *hates*, but not *detests*, the person who has done an injury to one's self; and that one *detests*, rather than *hates*, the person who has done injuries to others. Joseph's brethen *hated* him because he was more beloved than they; we *detest* a traitor to his country because of the enormity of his offence.

Spleen to mankind his envious heart possess'd,
And much he *hated* all, but most the best.
POPE.

Who dares think one thing, and another tell,
My heart *detests* him as the gates of hell. POPE.

In this connection, to *hate* is always a bad passion: to *detest* always laudable; but, when both are applied to inanimate objects, to *hate* is bad or good according to circumstances; to *detest* always retains its good meaning. When men *hate* things because they interfere with their indulgences, as the wicked *hate* the light, it is a bad personal feeling, as in the former case; but, when good men are said to *hate* that which is bad, it is a laudable feeling, justified by the nature of the object. As this feeling is, however, so closely allied to *detest*, it is necessary further to observe that *hate*, whether rightly or wrongly applied, seeks the injury or destruction of the object: but *detest* is confined simply to the shunning of the object, or thinking of it with very great pain. God *hates* sin, and on that account punishes sinners; conscientious men *detest* all fraud, and therefore cautiously avoid being concerned in it.

Vain pomp and glory of the world, I *hate* ye.
SHAKSPEARE.

I must be pardoned for this short tribute to the memory of a man who, while living, would as much *detest* to receive anything that wore the appearance of flattery as I should be to offer it.
GOLDSMITH.

HATEFUL, ODIOUS.

HATEFUL signifies literally full of that which is apt to excite *hatred*. ODIOUS, from the Latin *odi*, to *hate*, has the same sense originally.

These epithets are employed in regard to such objects as produce strong aversion in the mind; but when employed, as they commonly are, upon familiar subjects, they indicate an unbecoming vehemence in the speaker. *Hateful* is properly applied to whatever violates general principles of morality; lying and swearing are *hateful* vices: *odious* is more commonly applied to such things as affect the interests of others, and bring *odium* upon the individual; a tax that bears particularly hard and unequally is termed *odious*, or a measure of government that is oppressive is denominated *odious*.

Let me be deemed the *hateful* cause of all,
And suffer, rather than my people fall. POPE.

Oh! restless fate of pride,
That strives to learn what Heav'n resolved to hide:
Vain is the search, presumptuous and abhorr'd,
Anxious to thee, and *odious* to thy lord. POPE.

HATRED, ENMITY, ILL-WILL, RANCOR.

THESE terms agree in this particular, that those who are under the influence of such feelings derive a pleasure from the misfortune of others; but HATRED (*v. Aversion*) expresses more than ENMITY (*v. Enemy*), and this more than ILL-WILL, which signifies either an evil will or a willing of evil. *Hatred* is not contented with merely wishing *ill* to others, but derives its whole happiness from their misery or destruction; *enmity*, on the contrary, is limited in its operations to particular circumstances: *hatred*, on the other hand, is frequently confined to the feeling of the individual; but *enmity* consists as much in the action as the feeling. He who is possessed with *hatred* is happy when the object of his passion is miserable, and is miserable when he is happy; but the *hater* is not always in-

strumental in causing his misery or destroying his happiness: he who is inflamed with *enmity* is more active in disturbing the peace of his *enemy;* but oftener displays his temper in trifling than in important matters. *Ill-will*, as the word denotes, lies only in the mind, and is so indefinite in its signification that it admits of every conceivable degree. When the will is evilly directed toward another in ever so small a degree it constitutes *ill-will*. RANCOR is in Latin *rancor*, from *ranceo*, to grow stale, signifying staleness, a species of bitter, deep-rooted *enmity*.

Phœnician Dido rules the growing state,
Who fled from Tyre to shun her brother's *hate*.
DRYDEN.

That space the evil one abstracted stood
From his own evil, and for the time remain'd
Stupidly good, of *enmity* disarm'd. MILTON.

For your servants, neither use them so familiarly as to lose your reverence at their hands, nor so disdainfully as to purchase yourself their *ill-will*. WENTWORTH.

Oh lasting *rancor!* oh insatiate *hate*,
To Phrygia's monarch, and the Phrygian state.
POPE.

HAUGHTINESS, DISDAIN, ARROGANCE.

HAUGHTINESS denotes the abstract quality of *haughty*, which, contracted from *high-hearty*, in Dutch and low German *hoogharty*, signifies literally high-spirited. DISDAIN, *v. To contemn.* ARROGANCE, *v. Arrogance.*

Haughtiness is founded on the high opinion we entertain of ourselves; *disdain*, on the low opinion we have of others; *arrogance* is the result of both, but if anything, more of the former than the latter. *Haughtiness* and *disdain* are properly sentiments of the mind, and *arrogance* a mode of acting resulting from a state of mind: there may therefore be *haughtiness* and *disdain* which have not betrayed themselves by any visible action; but *arrogance* is always accompanied with its corresponding action: the *haughty* man is known by the air of superiority which he assumes; the *disdainful* man by the contempt which he shows to others; the *arrogant* man by his lofty pretensions. *Haughtiness* and *arrogance* are both vicious; they are built upon a false idea of ourselves; but *disdain* may be justifiable when provoked by what is infamous: a lady must treat with *disdain* the person who insults her honor.

The same *haughtiness* that prompts the act of injustice will more strongly incite its justification. JOHNSON.

Didst thou not think such vengeance must await
The wretch that, with his crimes all fresh about him,
Rushes, irreverent, unprepar'd, uncall'd,
Into his Maker's presence, throwing back
With insolent *disdain* his choicest gift?
PORTEUS.

Turbulent, discontented men of quality, in proportion as they are puffed up with personal pride and *arrogance*, generally despise their own order. BURKE.

HAUGHTY, HIGH, HIGH-MINDED.

HAUGHTY (*v. Haughtiness*) and HIGH, derived from the same source as *haughty*, characterize both the external behavior and the internal sentiment; HIGH-MINDED marks the sentiment only, or the state of the mind. With regard to the outward behavior, *haughty* is a stronger term than *high;* a *haughty* carriage bespeaks not only a *high* opinion of one's self, but a strong mixture of contempt for others: a *high* carriage denotes simply a *high* opinion of one's self: *haughtiness* is therefore always offensive, as it is burdensome to others; but *height* may sometimes be laudable, inasmuch as it is justice to one's self: one can never give a command in a *haughty* tone without making others feel their inferiority in a painful degree; we may sometimes assume a *high* tone in order to shelter ourselves from insult.

He deserved and earned dislike by his *haughty* deportment. BISSETT.

Master Endymion Porter brought lately my Lord of Bristol a despatch from England of a *high* nature, wherein this earl is commanded to represent unto this king how much his Majesty of Great Britain hath labored to merit well of the crown. HOWELL.

With regard to the sentiment of the mind, *haughty*, whether it shows itself in the outward behavior, or rests in the mind, is always bad; *height* as an habitual temper, and still more *high-mindedness*, which more strongly marks the personal quality, are expressly inconsistent with Christian humility; but a man may with reason be too *high* or too *high-minded* to condescend to a mean action.

Let gifts be to the mighty queen design'd,
And mollify with prayers her *haughty* mind.
DRYDEN.

Who knows whether indignation may not succeed to terror, and the revival of a *high* sentiment, spurning away the illusion of safety purchased at the expense of glory, may not drive us to a generous despair. BURKE.

The wise will determine from the gravity of the case; the irritable, from sensibility to oppression; the *high-minded*, from disdain and indignation at abusive power in unworthy hands. BURKE.

TO HAVE, POSSESS.

HAVE, in Danish *haver*, Swedish *hafna*, Saxon, etc., *haebben*, Latin *habeo*, comes from the Hebrew *caph*, the hollow of the hand, *i.e.*, being in the hand, which is literally having. POSSESS, in Latin *possessus*, participle of *possideo*, compounded of *pos* or *potis* and *sedeo*, signifies to have the power of resting upon or keeping.

Have is the general, *possess* is the particular term: *have* designates no circumstance of the action; *possess* expresses a particular species of having. To *have* is sometimes to have in one's hand or within one's reach; but to *possess* is to *have* as one's own: a clerk *has* the money which he has fetched for his employer; the latter *possesses* the money, which he *has* the power of turning to his use. To *have* is sometimes to *have* the right to, to belong; to *possess* is to *have* by one and at one's command: a debtor *has* the property which he has surrendered to his creditor; but he cannot be said to *possess* it, because he *has* it not within his reach and at his disposal: we are not necessarily masters of that which we *have;* although we always are of that which we *possess:* to *have* is sometimes only temporary; to *possess* is mostly permanent: we *have* money which we are perpetually disposing of: we *possess* lands which we keep for a permanency: a person *has* the good graces of those whom he pleases; he *possesses* the confidence of those who put everything in his power.

That I spent, that I *had;*
That I gave, that I *have;*
That I left, that I lost.
EPITAPH ON A CHARITABLE MAN.

The various objects that compose the world were by nature formed to delight our senses; and as it is this alone that makes them desirable to an uncorrupted taste, a man may be said naturally to *possess* them when he *possesseth* those enjoyments which they are fitted by nature to yield. BERKELEY.

TO HAZARD, RISK, VENTURE.

ALL these terms denote actions performed under an uncertainty of the event: but HAZARD (*v. Chance*) bespeaks a want of design and choice on the part of the agent; to RISK (*v. Danger*) implies a choice of alternatives; to VENTURE, which is the same as *adventure* (*v. Event*), signifies a calculation and balance of probabilities: one *hazards* and *risks* under the fear of an evil; one *ventures* with the hope of a good. He who *hazards* an opinion or an assertion does it from presumptuous feelings and upon slight grounds; chances are rather against him than for him that it may prove erroneous: he who *risks* a battle does it often from necessity; he chooses the least of two evils; although the event is dubious, yet he fears less from a failure than from inaction: he who *ventures* on a mercantile speculation does it from a love of gain; he flatters himself with a favorable event, and acquires boldness from the prospect. There are but very few circumstances to justify us in *hazarding;* there may be several occasions which render it necessary to *risk*, and very many cases in which it may be advantageous to *venture*.

They list with women each degen'rate name
Who dares not *hazard* life for future fame.
DRYDEN.

If the adventurer *risks* honor, he *risks* more than the knight. HAWKESWORTH.

Socrates, in his discourse before his death, says he did not know whether his soul would remain after death, but he thought so, and had such hopes of it that he was very willing to *venture* his life upon these hopes. TILLOTSON.

HEALTHY, WHOLESOME, SALUBRIOUS, SALUTARY.

HEALTHY signifies not only having *health*, but also causing *health*. WHOLESOME, like the German *heilsam*, signifies making whole, keeping whole or sound. SALUBRIOUS and SALUTARY, from the Latin *salus*, safety or *health*, signify likewise contributive to *health* or good in general.

These epithets are all applicable to such objects as have a kindly influence on the bodily constitution: *healthy* is the most general and indefinite; it is applied to exercise, to air, situation, climate, and most other things but food, for which *whole-*

some is commonly substituted: the life of a farmer is reckoned the most *healthy;* and the simplest diet is the most *wholesome. Healthy* and *wholesome* are rather negative in their sense; *salubrious* and *salutary* are positive: that is *healthy* and *wholesome* which does no injury to the *health;* that is *salubrious* which serves to improve the *health;* and that is *salutary* which serves to remove a disorder: climates are *healthy* or *unhealthy*, according to the constitution of the person; water is a *wholesome* beverage for those who are not dropsical; bread is a *wholesome* diet for man; the air and climate of southern France has been long famed for its *salubrity*, and has induced many invalids to repair thither for the benefit of their *health;* the effects have not been equally *salutary* in all cases.

You are relaxing yourself with the *healthy* and manly exercise of the field. SIR W. JONES.

Here laid his scrip with *wholesome* viands fill'd; There, listening every noise, his watchful dog. THOMSON.

If that fountain be once poisoned, you can never expect that *salubrious* streams will flow from it. BLAIR.

Wholesome and *salutary* have likewise an extended and moral application; *healthy* and *salubrious* are employed only in the proper sense: *wholesome* in this case seems to convey the idea of making whole again what has been unsound; but *salutary* retains the idea of improving the condition of those who stand in need of improvement: correction is *wholesome* which serves the purpose of amendment without doing any injury to the body; instruction or admonition is *salutary* when it serves the purpose of strengthening good principles, and awakening a sense of guilt or impropriety: laws and punishments are *wholesome* to the body politic, as diet is to the physical body; restrictions are *salutary* in checking irregularities.

False decorations, fucuses, and pigments, deserve the imperfections that constantly attend them, being neither commodious in application, nor *wholesome* in their use. BACON.

A sense of the Divine presence exerts this *salutary* influence of promoting temperance and restraining the disorders incident to a prosperous state. BLAIR.

TO HEAP, PILE, ACCUMULATE, AMASS.

To HEAP signifies to form into a *heap.* To PILE is to form into a *pile*, which, being a variation of pole, signifies a high-raised *heap.* To ACCUMULATE, from the Latin *cumulus*, a *heap*, signifies to put *heap* upon *heap.* To AMASS is literally to form into a *mass.*

To *heap* is an indefinite action; it may be performed with or without order: to *pile* is a definite action done with design and order; thus we *heap* stones, or *pile* wood: to *heap* may be to make into large or small *heaps:* to *pile* is always to make something considerable in height: children may *heap* sticks together; men *pile* loads of wood together.

Within the circles arms and tripods lie,
Ingots of gold and silver *heap'd* on high.
DRYDEN.

This would I celebrate with annual games,
With gifts on altars *pil'd*, and holy flames.
DRYDEN.

To *pile* is used always, to *heap* mostly in the physical, *accumulate* and *amass* in the physical or moral acceptation. To *accumulate* is properly to bring or add *heap* to *heap*, which is a gradual and unfinished act; to *amass* is to form into a mass, which is a single complete act: a man may *accumulate* guineas or anything else in small quantities, but he properly *amasses* wealth, and in a figurative sense he *amasses* knowledge. To *accumulate* and to *amass* are not always the acts of conscious agents: things may *accumulate* or *amass;* water or snow *accumulates* by the continual accession of fresh quantities; ice *amasses* in rivers until they are frozen over: so in the moral acceptation, evils, abuses, and the like, *accumulate:* corruption *amasses.*

These odes are marked by glittering *accumulations* of ungraceful ornaments. JOHNSON.

Misers are generally characterized as men without honor or without humanity, who live only to *accumulate.* GOLDSMITH.

Sir Francis Bacon, by an extraordinary force of nature, compass of thought, and indefatigable study, has *amassed* to himself such stores of knowledge as we cannot look upon without amazement. HUGHES.

TO HEAR, HEARKEN, OVERHEAR.

To HEAR is properly the act of the ear; it is sometimes totally abstracted from the mind, when we *hear* and do not understand: to HEARKEN is an act of the ear and the mind in conjunction; it implies an effort to *hear*, a tendency of the ear: to OVERHEAR is to *hear* clandestinely, or unknown to the person who is heard, whether designedly or not. We *hear* sounds: we *hearken* for the sense; we *overhear* the words: a quick ear *hears* the smallest sound; a willing mind *hearkens* to what is said; a prying curiosity leads to *overhearing.*

I look'd, I listen'd, dreadful sounds I *hear*,
And the dire forms of hostile gods appear.
DRYDEN.

But aged Nereus *hearkens* to his love.
DRYDEN.

If he fail of that,
He will have other means to cut you off;
I *overheard* him and his practices.
SHAKSPEARE.

HEARTY, WARM, SINCERE, CORDIAL.

HEARTY, *i. e.*, having the heart in a thing, and WARM (*v. Fire*) express a stronger feeling than SINCERE (*v. Candid*); CORDIAL, from *cor*, the heart, *i. e.*, according to the heart, is a mixture of the *warm* and *sincere.* There are cases in which it may be peculiarly proper to be *hearty*, as when we are supporting the cause of religion and virtue; there are other cases in which it is peculiarly proper to be *warm*, as when our affections ought to be roused in favor of our friends; in all cases we ought to be *sincere*, when we express either a sentiment or a feeling; it is peculiarly happy to be on terms of *cordial* regard with those who stand in any close relation to us. The man himself should be *hearty;* his heart should be *warm;* professions should be *sincere;* a reception *cordial.*

Yet should some neighbor feel a pain
Just in the part where I complain,
How many a message would he send!
What *hearty* prayers that I should mend!
SWIFT.

Youth is the season of *warm* and generous emotions. BLAIR.

We meet at last in one *sincere* desire;
His wish and mine both prompt me to retire.
COWPER.

With a gratitude the most *cordial*, a good man looks up to that Almighty Benefactor who aims at no end but the happiness of those whom he blesses. BLAIR.

TO HEAVE, SWELL.

HEAVE is used either transitively or intransitively, as a reflective or a neuter verb; SWELL is used only as a neuter verb. *Heave* implies raising, and *swell* implies distension: they differ therefore very widely in sense, but they sometimes agrēe in application. The bosom is said both to *heave* and to *swell;* because it happens that the bosom *swells* by *heaving;* the waves are likewise said to *heave* themselves or to *swell*, in which there is a similar correspondence between the actions: otherwise most things which *heave* do not *swell*, and those which *swell* do not *heave.*

He *heaves* for breath, he staggers to and fro,
And clouds of issuing smoke his nostrils loudly blow.
DRYDEN.

Meantime the mountain billows, to the clouds
In dreadful tumult *swell'*.. surge above surge.
THOMSON.

HEAVY, DULL, DROWSY.

HEAVY is allied to both DULL and DROWSY, but the latter have no close connection with each other.

Heavy and *dull* are employed as epithets both for persons and things; *heavy* characterizes the corporeal state of a person; *dull* qualifies the spirits or the understanding of the subject. A person has a *heavy* look whose temperament seems composed of gross and weighty materials which weigh him down and impede his movements; he has a *dull* countenance in whom the ordinary brightness and vivacity of the mind is wanting.

Heavy with age, Entellus stands his ground,
But with his warping body wards the wound.
DRYDEN.

O thou *dull* god! Why liest thou with the vile
In loathsome beds: and leav'st the kingly couch
A watch-case to a common larum bell?
SHAKSPEARE.

Heavy and *drowsy* are both employed in the sense of sleepy; but the former is only a particular state, the latter particular or general; all persons may be occasionally *heavy* or *drowsy;* some are habitually *drowsy* from disease: they likewise differ in degree, the latter being much the greater of the two; and occasionally they are applied to such things as produce sleepiness.

And *drowsy* tinklings lull the distant fold.
GRAY.

HEAVY, BURDENSOME, WEIGHTY, PONDEROUS.

HEAVY, from *heave*, signifies the causing to heave, or requiring to be lifted up with force; BURDENSOME signifies having a *burden;* WEIGHTY, having a *weight;* and PONDEROUS, from the Lat-