

from *noceo*, to *hurt*, are species of the *hurtful*: things may be *hurtful* both to body and mind; *noxious* and *noisome* only to the body: that which is *noxious* inflicts a direct injury; that which is *noisome* inflicts it indirectly: *noxious* insects are such as wound; *noisome* vapors are such as tend to create disorders.

The *hurtful* hazel in thy vineyard shun.

DRYDEN.

Of strength, *pernicious* to myself, I boast,  
The powers I have were given me to my cost.

LEWIS.

The serpent, subtlest beast of all the field,  
Of huge extent sometimes, with brazen eyes,  
And hairy mane, terrific, though to thee  
Not *noxious*, but obedient at thy call.

MILTON.

The only prison that enslaves the soul  
As the dark habitation where she dwells  
Is in a *noisome* dungeon.

BELLER.

#### HYPOCRITE, DISSEMBLER.

HYPOCRITE, in Greek *υποκριτης*, from *υπο* and *κρινωμαι*, signifies one appearing under a mask. DISSEMBLER, from *dissemble*, in Latin *dissimulo* or *dis* and *similis*, signifies one who makes himself appear unlike what he really is.

The *hypocrite* feigns to be what he is not; the *dissembler* conceals what he is: the former takes to himself the credit of virtues which he has not; the latter conceals the vices that he has; every *hypocrite* is a *dissembler*; but every *dissembler* is not a *hypocrite*: the *hypocrite* makes truth serve the purpose of falsehood; the *dissembler* is content with making falsehood serve his own particular purpose.

In regard to others, *hypocrisy* is not so pernicious as barefaced irreligion.

ADDISON.

So spake the false *dissembler* unperceived.

MILTON.

### I.

#### IDEA, THOUGHT, IMAGINATION.

IDEA, in Latin *idea*, in Greek *ειδα*, signifies the form or image of an object, from *ειδω*, to see, that is, the thing seen in the mind. THOUGHT literally signifies the thing *thought*. IMAGINATION signifies the thing *imagined*.

The *idea* is the simple representation

of an object; the *thought* is the reflection; and the *imagination* is the combination of *ideas*: we have *ideas* of the sun, the moon, and all material objects; we have *thoughts* on moral subjects; we have *imaginings* drawn from the *ideas* already existing in the mind. *Ideas* are formed; they are the rude materials with which the *thinking* faculty exerts itself:

*thoughts* arise in the mind by means of association and combination, or recur in the mind by the power of the memory; they are the materials with which the *thinking* faculty employs itself: *imaginings* are created by the mind's reaction on itself; they are the materials with which the understanding seeks to enrich itself. The term *idea* is used in all cases for the mental representation, abstractedly from the agent that represents them: hence *ideas* are either clear or distinct; *ideas* are attached to words; *ideas* are analyzed, confounded, and the like; in which cases the word *thought* could not be substituted. *Thought* belongs only to thinking and rational beings: the brutes may be said to have *ideas*, but not *thoughts*: hence *thoughts* are either mean, fine, grovelling, or sublime, according to the nature of the mind in which they exist: hence we say with more propriety, to indulge a *thought* than to indulge an *idea*; to express one's *thoughts*, rather than one's *ideas*, on any subject: although the latter term *idea*, on account of its comprehensive use, may, without violation of any express rule, be indifferently employed in general discourse for *thought*; but the former term does not on this account lose its characteristic meaning. *Imagination* is not only the fruit of *thought*, but of peculiar *thought*: the *thought* may be another's: the *imagination* is one's own: the *thought* occurs and recurs; it comes and it goes; it is retained or rejected at the pleasure of the *thinking* being: the *imagination* is framed by the power which we term *imagination*; it is cherished with the partiality of a parent for its offspring. *Thoughts* are busied with the surrounding objects; *imaginings* are employed on distant and strange objects: hence *thoughts* are denominated sober, chaste, and the like; *imaginings*, wild and extravagant.

Every one finds that many of the *ideas* which he desired to retain have slipped away irremediably.

JOHNSON.

O calm

The warring passions, and tumultuous *thoughts*  
That rage within thee!

ROWE.

Different climates produce in men, by a different mixture of the humors, a different and unequal course of *imaginings* and passions.

TEMPLE.

#### IDEAL, IMAGINARY.

IDEAL does not strictly adhere to the sense of its primitive *idea* (*v. Idea*): the *idea* is the representation of a real object in the mind; but *ideal* signifies belonging to the *idea* independently of the reality or the external object. IMAGINARY preserves the signification of its primitive *imagination* (*v. Fancy*, also *v. Idea*), as denoting what is created by the mind itself. The *ideal* is not directly opposed to, but abstracted from, the real; the *imaginary*, on the other hand, is directly opposed to the real; it is the unreal thing formed by the *imagination*. *Ideal* happiness is the happiness which is formed in the mind without having any direct and actual prototype in nature; but it may, nevertheless, be something possible to be realized; it may be above nature, but not in direct contradiction to it: the *imaginary* is that which is opposite to some positive existing reality; the pleasure which a lunatic derives from the conceit of being a king is altogether *imaginary*.

There is not, perhaps, in all the stores of *ideal* anguish, a thought more painful than the consciousness of having propagated corruption.

JOHNSON.

Superior beings know well the vanity of those *imaginary* perfections that swell the heart of man.

ADDISON.

#### IDLE, LAZY, INDOLENT.

IDLE is in German *eitel*, vain. LAZY, in German *lassig*, is connected with the Latin *lassus*, weary, because weariness naturally engenders *laziness*. INDOLENT, in Latin *indolens*, signifies without feeling, having apathy or unconcern.

A propensity to inaction is the common idea by which these words are connected; they differ in the cause and degree of the quality: *idle* expresses less than *lazy*, and *lazy* less than *indolent*: one is termed *idle* who will do nothing useful; one is *lazy* who will do nothing at all without great

reluctance; one is *indolent* who does not care to do anything or set about anything. There is no direct inaction in the *idler*; for a child is *idle* who will not learn his lesson, but he is active enough in that which pleases himself: there is an aversion to corporeal action in a *lazy* man, but not always to mental action; he is *lazy* at work, *lazy* in walking, or *lazy* in sitting; but he may not object to any employment, such as reading or thinking, which leaves his body entirely at rest: an *indolent* man, on the contrary, fails in activity from a defect both in the mind and the body; he will not only not move, but he will not even think, if it give him trouble; and trifling exertions of any kind are sufficient, even in prospect, to deter him from attempting to move.

As pride is sometimes hid under humility, *idleness* is often covered by turbulence and hurry.

JOHNSON.

Wicked condemned men will ever live like rogues and not fall to work, but be *lazy* and spend victuals.

BACON.

Nothing is so opposite to the true enjoyment of life as the relaxed and feeble state of an *indolent* mind.

BLAIR.

*Lazy* is figuratively applied to other objects.

The daw,  
The rook, and magpie, to the gray-grown oaks,  
That the calm village in their verdant arms  
Sheltering embrace, direct their *lazy* flight.

THOMSON.

*Idle* is also applied to things in the sense of leisure and vanity, for which see the next articles.

#### IDLE, LEISURE, VACANT.

IDLE (*v. Idle*) is opposed here to the busy; LEISURE, otherwise spelled *leisure*, from *lease*, as in the compound *release*, and the Latin *laxo*, to make lax or loose, that is, loosed or set free, is opposed simply to the employed; he, therefore, who is *idle*, instead of being busy, commits a fault; which is not always the case with him who is at *leisure* or free from his employment. *Idle* is always taken in a sense more or less unfavorable; *leisure* in a sense perfectly indifferent: if a man says of himself that he has spent an *idle* hour in this or that place, in amusement, company, and the like, he means to signify he would have spent it better if anything had offered; on the other hand, he



would say that he spends his *leisure* moments in a suitable relaxation: he who values his time will take care to have as few *idle* hours as possible; but since no one can always be employed in severe labor, he will occupy his *leisure* hours in that which best suits his taste.

Life is sustained with so little labor, that the tediousness of *idle* time cannot otherwise be supported (than by artificial desires). JOHNSON.

The plant that shoots from seed, a sullen tree,  
At *leisure* grows, for late posterity. DRYDEN.

*Idle* and *leisure* are said in particular reference to the time that is employed; VACANT (*v. Free*) is a more general term, that simply qualifies the thing: an *idle* hour is one without any proper employment; a *vacant* hour is in general one free from the employments with which it might be filled up; a person has *leisure* time according to his wishes; but he may have *vacant* time from necessity, that is, when he is in want of employment.

*Idleness* dictates expedients by which life may be passed unprofitably, without the tediousness of many *vacant* hours. JOHNSON.

## IDLE, VAIN.

THESE epithets are both opposed to the solid or substantial; but IDLE (*v. Idle, lazy*) has a more particular reference to what ought or ought not to engage the time or attention; VAIN, in Latin *vanus*, probably changed from *vacaneus*, signifying empty, seems to qualify the thing without any such reference. A pursuit may be termed either *idle* or *vain*: in the former case, it reflects immediately on the agent for not employing his time on something more serious; but in the latter case it simply characterizes the pursuit as one that will be attended with no good consequences: when we consider ourselves as beings who have but a short time to live, and that every moment of that time ought to be thoroughly well-spent, we should be careful to avoid all *idle* concerns; when we consider ourselves as rational beings, who are responsible for the use of those powers with which we have been invested by our Almighty Maker, we shall be careful to reject all *vain* concerns: an *idle* effort is made by one who does not care to exert himself for any useful purpose, who works only to please himself; a *vain* ef-

fort may be made by one who is in a state of desperation.

And let no spot of *idle* earth be found,  
But cultivate the genius of the ground.

DRYDEN.

Deluded by *vain* opinions, we look to the advantages of fortune as our ultimate-goods.

BLAIR.

IGNORANT, ILLITERATE, UNLEARNED, UNLETTERED.

IGNORANT, in Latin *ignorans*, from the privative *ig* or *in* and *novus*, or the Greek *γινωσκω*, signifies not knowing things in general, or not knowing any particular circumstance. UNLEARNED, ILLITERATE, and UNLETTERED, are compared with *ignorant* in the general sense.

*Ignorant* is a comprehensive term; it includes any degree from the highest to the lowest, and consequently includes the other terms, *illiterate*, *unlearned*, and *unlettered*, which express different forms of *ignorance*. *Ignorance* is not always to one's disgrace, since it is not always one's fault; the term is not, therefore, directly reproachful: the poor *ignorant* savage is an object of pity, rather than condemnation; but when *ignorance* is coupled with self-conceit and presumption, it is a perfect deformity: hence the word *illiterate*, which is mostly used in such cases as become a term of reproach: an *ignorant* man who sets up to teach others, is termed an *illiterate* preacher; and quacks, whether in religion or medicine, from the very nature of their calling, are altogether an *illiterate* race of men. The term *illiterate* is in all cases taken for one who is without education or even the knowledge of his letters; the words *unlearned* and *unlettered* are disengaged from any unfavorable associations. A modest man, who makes no pretensions to learning, may suitably apologize for his supposed deficiencies by saying he is an *unlearned* or *unlettered* man; the former is, however, a term of more familiar use than the latter. A man may be described either as generally *unlearned*, or as *unlearned* in particular sciences or arts; as *unlearned* in history; *unlearned* in philosophy; *unlearned* in the ways of the world: a poet may describe his muse as *unlettered*.

He said, and sent Cyllenius with command  
To free the ports, and ope the Punic land  
To Trojan guests; lest, *ignorant* of fate,  
The queen might force them from her town and state.

DRYDEN.

On the accession of Henry VII., emerged from the Fells of Cumberland, where he had been principally concealed for twenty-five years, Henry Lord Clifford, with the manners and education of a shepherd. He was almost *illiterate*, but not deficient in natural understanding.

WHITAKER.

Because this doctrine may have appeared to the *unlearned* light and whimsical, I must take leave to unfold the wisdom and antiquity of my first proposition in these my essays, to wit, that "every worthless man is a dead man."

ADDISON.

Ajax, the haughty chief, the *unlettered* soldier, had Lo way of making his anger known but by gloomy sullenness.

JOHNSON.

TO ILLUMINATE, ILLUMINE, ENLIGHTEN.

ILLUMINATE, in Latin *illuminatus*, participle of *illumino*, and ENLIGHTEN, from the noun *light*, both denote the communication of light; the former in the natural, the latter in the moral sense. We *illuminate* by means of artificial lights; the sun *illuminates* the world by its own light: preaching and instruction *enlighten* the minds of men. *Illumine* is but a poetic variation of *illuminate*; as, the Sun of Righteousness *illuminated* the benighted world; *illuminations* are employed as public demonstrations of joy: no nation is now termed *enlightened* but such as have received the light of the Gospel.

Reason our guide, what can she more reply,  
Than that the sun *illuminates* the sky? PEARSON.

But if neither you nor I can gather so much  
from these places, they will tell us it is because  
we are not inwardly *enlightened*. SOUTH.

What in me is dark,  
*Illumine*; what is low, raise and support. MILTON.

TO IMITATE, COPY, COUNTERFEIT.

The idea of taking a likeness of some object is common to all these terms; but IMITATE (*v. To follow*) is the generic: COPY (*v. Copy*), and COUNTERFEIT, from the Latin *contra* and *facio*, signifying to make in opposition to the reality, are the specific terms: to *imitate* is to take a general likeness; to *copy*, to take an exact likeness; to *counterfeit*, to take a false likeness: to *imitate* is, therefore,

almost always used in a good or an indifferent sense; to *copy* mostly, and to *counterfeit* still oftener, in a bad sense: to *imitate* an author's style is at all times allowable for one who cannot form a style for himself; but to *copy* an author's style would be a too slavish adherence even for the dullest writer.

Poetry and music have the power of *imitating* the manners of men. SIR W. JONES.

I need not enlarge on this relation; it is evident from hence that the Sorbonists were the original authors, and our schismatics in England were the *copiers* of rebellion. DRYDEN.

To *imitate* is applicable to every object, for every external object is susceptible of *imitation*; and in man the *imitative* faculty displays itself alike in the highest and the lowest matters, in works of art and moral conduct: to *copy* is applicable only to certain objects which will admit of a minute likeness being taken; thus, an artist may be said to *copy* from nature.

The mind, impressible and soft, with ease  
Imbibes and *copies* what she hears and sees.

COWPER.

Nothing was more natural than to *imitate*, by the sound of the voice, the quality of the sound or noise which any external object made. BLAIR.

To *counterfeit* is applicable but to few objects; we may *counterfeit* coin, which is an unlawful act, or we may *counterfeit* the person, the character, the voice, or the handwriting, of any one for whom we would wish to pass, which is also an unlawful act except on the stage.

I can *counterfeit* the deep tragedian,  
Speak and look big, and pry on every side. SHAKESPEARE.

TO IMITATE, MIMIC, APE, MOCK.

TO IMITATE (*v. To follow*) is here the general term: to MIMIC, from the Greek *μιμος*, and to APE, signifying to *imitate* like an *ape*, are both species of vicious *imitation*. One *imitates* that which is deserv- ing of *imitation*, or the contrary: one *mimics* either that which is not an authorized subject of *imitation*, or which is *imitated* imperfectly or so as to excite laughter. A person wishes to make that his own which he *imitates*, but he *mimics* for the entertainment of others.

Because we sometimes walk on two!  
I hate the *imitating* crew. GAY.



Nor will it less delight th' attentive sage  
T' observe that instinct which unerring guides  
The brutal race which *mimics* reason's love.  
SOMERVILLE.

To *ape* is a serious though an absurd  
act of *imitation*; to *MOCK*, in French  
*mocquer*, Greek *μωκω*, to laugh at, is an  
ill-natured and vulgar act of *imitation*.  
The *ape imitates* to please himself; the  
mockers *mocks* to insult others.

A courtier any *ape* surpasses;  
Behold him, humbly cringing, wait  
Upon the minister of state.  
View him soon after to inferiors  
*Aping* the conduct of superiors.  
SWIFT.

What though no friends in sable weeds appear,  
Grieve for an hour, perhaps, then mourn a year,  
And bear about the *mockery* of woe  
To midnight dances.  
POPE.

IMMINENT, IMPENDING, THREATEN-  
ING.

IMMINENT, in Latin *imminens*, from  
*maneo*, to remain, signifies resting or com-  
ing upon. IMPENDING, from the Lat-  
in *pendeo*, to hang, signifies hanging upon  
or over. THREATENING, containing a  
*threat*.

All these terms are used in regard to  
some evil that is exceedingly near: *im-*  
*minent* conveys no idea of duration; *im-*  
*pending* excludes the idea of what is mo-  
mentary. A person may be in *imminent*  
danger of losing his life in one instant,  
and the danger may be over the next in-  
stant: but an *impending* danger is that  
which has been long in existence and  
gradually approaching; we can seldom  
escape *imminent* danger by any efforts  
of one's own; but we may be success-  
fully warned to escape from an *impending*  
danger. *Imminent* and *impending*  
are said of dangers that are not discov-  
erable; but a *threatening* evil gives intima-  
tions of its own approach; we perceive  
the *threatening* tempest in the black-  
ness of the sky; we hear the *threat-*  
*ening* sounds of the enemy's clashing  
swords.

The *threatening* voice and fierce gestures with  
which these words were uttered, struck Monte-  
zuma. He saw his own danger was *imminent*,  
the necessity unavoidable.  
ROBERTSON.

There was an opinion, if we may believe the  
Spanish historians, almost universal among the  
Americans, that some dreadful calamity was *im-*  
*pending* over their heads.  
ROBERTSON.

## IMMODEST, IMPUDENT, SHAMELESS.

IMMODEST signifies the want of *mod-*  
*esty*: IMPUDENT and SHAMELESS sig-  
nify without *shame*. *Immodest* is less than  
either *impudent* or *shameless*: an *immod-*  
*est* girl lays aside the ornament of her  
sex, and puts on another garb that is less  
becoming; but her heart need not be cor-  
rupt until she becomes *impudent*: she  
wants a good quality when she is *immod-*  
*est*; she is possessed of a positively bad  
quality when she is *impudent*. There is  
always hope that an *immodest* woman may  
be sensible of her error, and amend; but  
of an *impudent* woman there is no such  
chance, she is radically corrupt. *Impu-*  
*dent* may characterize the person or the  
thing: *shameless* characterizes the person.  
A person's air, look, and words are *impu-*  
*dent*, when contrary to all modesty: the  
person himself is *shameless* who is devoid  
of all sense of *shame*.

Music diffuses a calm all around us, and makes  
us drop all those *immodest* thoughts which would  
be a hindrance to us in the performance of the  
great duty of thanksgiving.  
SPECTATOR.

I am at once equally fearful of sparing you,  
and of being too *impudent* a corrector.  
POPE.  
The sole remorse his greedy heart can feel,  
Is if one life escapes his murdering steel;  
*Shameless* by force or fraud to work his way,  
And no less prompt to flatter than betray.  
CUMBERLAND.

## TO IMPAIR, INJURE.

IMPAIR comes from the Latin *im* and  
*pair*, *pejoro* or *pejor*, worse, signifying to  
make worse. INJURE, from *in* and *ju*,  
against right, signifies to make otherwise  
than it ought to be.

*Impair* seems to be in regard to *injure*  
as the species to the genus; what is *im-*  
*paired* is *injured*, but what is *injured* is  
not necessarily *impaired*. To *impair* is  
a progressive mode of *injuring*: an *inju-*  
*ry* may take place either by degrees or  
by an instantaneous act: straining of the  
eyes *impairs* the sight, but a blow *injures*  
rather than *impairs* the eye. A man's  
health may be *impaired* or *injured* by his  
vices, but his limbs are *injured* rather  
than *impaired* by a fall. A person's cir-  
cumstances are *impaired* by a succession  
of misfortunes; they are *injured* by a  
sudden turn of fortune.

It is painful to consider that this sublime ep

joyment of friendship may be *impaired* by in-  
numerable causes.  
JOHNSON.

Who lives to nature rarely can be poor,  
O what a patrimony this! a being  
Of such inherent strength and majesty,  
Not worlds possess can raise it; worlds destroy'd  
can't injure.  
YOUNG.

## IMPERFECTION, DEFECT, FAULT, VICE.

THESE terms are applied either to per-  
sons or things. IMPERFECTION, denot-  
ing either the abstract quality of *imper-*  
*fect*, or the thing which constitutes it *im-*  
*perfect*, in a person arises from his want  
of *perfection*, and the infirmity of his na-  
ture; there is no one without some point  
of *imperfection* which is obvious to oth-  
ers, if not to himself; he may strive to  
diminish it, although he cannot expect to  
get altogether rid of it: a DEFECT (*v.*  
*Blemish*) is a deviation from the general  
constitution of man; it is what may be  
natural to the man as an individual, but  
not natural to man as a species; in this  
manner we may speak of a *defect* in the  
speech, or a *defect* in temper. The FAULT  
and VICE rise in degree and character  
above either of the former terms; they  
both reflect disgrace more or less on the  
person possessing them; but the *fault*  
always characterizes the agent, and is  
said in relation to an individual; the *vice*  
characterizes the action, and may be con-  
sidered abstractedly: hence we speak of  
a man's *faults* as the things we may con-  
demn in him; but we may speak of the  
*vices* of drunkenness, lying, and the like,  
without any immediate reference to any  
one who practises these *vices*. When  
they are both employed for an individual,  
their distinction is obvious: the *fault* may  
lessen the amiability or excellence of the  
character; the *vice* is a stain; a single  
act destroys its purity; a habitual prac-  
tice is a pollution.

It is a pleasant story that we, forsooth, who  
are the only *imperfect* creatures in the universe,  
are the only beings that will not allow of *imper-*  
*fection*.  
STEELE.

The low race of men take a secret pleasure in  
finding an eminent character levelled to their  
condition by a report of its *defects*, and keep  
themselves in countenance, though they are ex-  
celled in a thousand virtues, if they believe that  
they have in common with a great person any  
one *fault*.  
ADDISON.

I did myself the honor this day to make a visit  
to a lady of quality, who is one of those that are  
ever railing at the *vices* of the age.  
STEELE.

In regard to things, the distinction de-  
pends upon the preceding explanation in  
a great measure, for we can scarcely use  
these words without thinking on man as  
a moral agent, who was made the most  
perfect of all creatures, and became the  
most *imperfect*; and from our *imperfec-*  
*tion* has arisen, also, a general *imperfec-*  
*tion* throughout all the works of creation.  
The word *imperfection* is therefore the  
most unqualified term of all: there may be  
*imperfection* in regard to our Maker;  
or there may be *imperfection* in regard to  
what we conceive of *perfection*: and in  
this case, the term simply and generally  
implies whatever falls short in any degree  
or manner of *perfection*. *Defect* is a posi-  
tive degree of *imperfection*; it is contrary  
both to our ideas of *perfection*, or our par-  
ticular intention: thus, there may be a  
*defect* in the materials of which a thing is  
made; or a *defect* in the mode of making  
it: the term *defect*, however, whether said  
of persons or things, characterizes rather  
the object than the agent. *Fault*, on the  
other hand, when said of things, always  
refers to the agent: thus we may say  
there is a *defect* in the glass, or a *defect* in  
the spring; but there is a *fault* in the  
workmanship, or a *fault* in the putting  
together, and the like. *Vice*, with regard  
to things, is properly a serious or radical  
*defect*: the former lies in the constitution  
of the whole, the latter may lie in the  
parts; the former lies in essentials, the  
latter lies in the accidents: there may be  
a *defect* in the shape or make of a horse;  
but the *vice* is said in regard to his sound-  
ness or unsoundness, his docility or indoc-  
ility.

Go, wiser thou! and in thy scale of sense,  
Weigh thy opinion against providence;  
Call *imperfection* what thou fanciest such.  
POPE.

The lovers soon esp'y'd  
This small *defect*, for love is eagle-eyed,  
And in soft whispers soon the passage try'd.  
PYRAMUS AND THISBE.

He who is gratified with what is *faulty* in works  
of art is a man of bad taste.  
BEATTIE.  
Or when the latent *vice* is cured by fire,  
Redundant humors by the pores expire.  
DRYDEN.

IMPERFECTION, WEAKNESS, FRAILTY,  
FAILING, FOIBLE.

IMPERFECTION (*v.* *Imperfection*) has  
already been considered as that which,



in the most extended sense, abridges the moral perfection of man; the rest are but modes of *imperfection* varying in degree and circumstances. **WEAKNESS** is a positive and strong degree of *imperfection* which is opposed to strength; it is what we do not so necessarily look for, and therefore distinguishes the individual who is liable to it. **FRAILTY** is another strong mode of *imperfection* which characterizes the fragility of man, but not of all men in the same degree; it differs from *weakness* in respect to the object. A *weakness* lies more in the judgment or in the sentiment; *frailty* lies more in the moral features of an action. It is a *weakness* in a man to yield to the persuasions of any one against his better judgment; it is a *frailty* to yield to intemperance or illicit indulgences. **FAILINGS** and **FOIBLES** are the smallest degrees of *imperfection* to which the human character is liable: we have all our *failings* in temper, and our *foibles* in our habits and our prepossessions; and he, as Horace observes, is the best who has the fewest.

You live in a reign of human infirmity where every one has *imperfections*. BLAIR.

The folly of allowing ourselves to delay what we know cannot finally be escaped, is one of the general *weaknesses* which, to a greater or less degree, prevail in every mind. JOHNSON.

There are circumstances which every man must know will prove the occasions of calling forth his latent *frailties*. BLAIR.

Never allow small *failings* to dwell on your attention so much as to deface the whole of an amiable character. BLAIR.

I confess my *foible* in regard to flattery; I am as fond of it as Voltaire can be, but with this difference, that I love it from a masterly hand. CHESTERFIELD.

IMPERIOUS, LORDLY, DOMINEERING, OVERBEARING.

ALL these epithets imply an unseemly exercise or affectation of power or superiority. **IMPERIOUS**, from *impero*, to command, characterizes either the disposition to command without adequate authority, or to convey one's commands in an offensive manner: **LORDLY**, signifying like a *lord*, characterizes the manner of acting the *lord*: and **DOMINEERING**, from *dominus*, a *lord*, denotes the manner of ruling like a *lord*, or rather of attempting to rule; hence a person's tem-

per or his tone is denominated *imperious*; his air or deportment is *lordly*; his tone is *domineering*. A woman of an *imperious* temper commands in order to be obeyed: she commands with an *imperious* tone in order to enforce obedience. A person assumes a *lordly* air in order to display his own importance: he gives orders in a *domineering* tone in order to make others feel their inferiority. There is always something offensive in *imperiousness*; there is frequently something ludicrous in that which is *lordly*; and a mixture of the ludicrous and offensive in that which is *domineering*.

Thy willing victim, Carthage, bursting loose  
From all that pleading nature could oppose;  
From a whole city's tears, by rigid faith  
*Imperious* call'd, and honor's dire command.

THOMSON.

Lords are *lordliest* in their wine. MILTON.

He who has sunk so far below himself as to have given up his assent to a *domineering* error is fit for nothing but to be trampled on. SOUTH.

These terms are employed for such as are invested with some sort of power, or endowed with some sort of superiority, however trifling; but **OVERBEARING** is employed for men in the general relations of society, whether superiors or equals. A man of an *imperious* temper and some talent will frequently be so *overbearing* in the assemblies of his equals as to awe the rest into silence, and carry every measure of his own without contradiction.

I reflected within myself how much society would suffer if such insolent, *overbearing* characters as Leontine were not held in restraint. CUMBERLAND.

IMPURTINENT, RUDE, SAUCY, IMPUDENT, INSOLENT.

**IMPURTINENT**, in Latin *in per tinens*, not belonging to one, signifies being or wanting to do what it does not belong to one to be or do. **RUDE**, in Latin *rudis*, rude, and *raudus*, a ragged stone, in the Greek *ραβδος*, a rough stick, signifies literally unpolished; and, in an extended sense, wanting all culture. **SAUCY** comes from *sauce*, and the Latin *salsus*, signifying literally salt; and, in an extended sense, stinging like salt. **IMPUDENT**, *v. Assurance*. **INSOLENT**, from the Latin *in solens*, contrary to custom, signifies being or wanting to be contrary to custom.

*Impertinent* is allied to *rude*, as respects one's general relations in society, without regard to station; it is allied to *saucy*, *impudent*, and *insolent*, as respects the conduct of inferiors. He who does not respect the laws of civil society in his intercourse with individuals, and wants to assume to himself what belongs to another, is *impertinent*: if he carry this *impertinence* so far as to commit any violent breach of decorum in his behavior, he is *rude*. *Impertinence* seems to spring from a too high regard of one's self: *rudeness* from an ignorance of what is due to others. *Impertinent*, in comparison with the other terms, *saucy*, *impudent*, and *insolent*, is the most general and indefinite: whatever one does or says that is not compatible with our humble station is *impertinent*; *saucy* is a sharp kind of *impertinence*: *impudent* an unblushing kind of *impertinence*; *insolence* is an outrageous kind of *impertinence*, it runs counter to all established order: thus, the terms seem to rise in sense. A person may be *impertinent* in words or actions: he is *saucy* in words or looks: he is *impudent* or *insolent* in words, tones, gesture, looks, and every species of action.

It is publicly whispered as a piece of *impertinent* pride in me, that I have hitherto been *saucily* civil to everybody, as if I thought nobody good enough to quarrel with.

LADY M. W. MONTAGUE.

My house should no such *rude* disorders know,  
As from high drinking consequently flow.

POMFRET.

Whether he knew the thing or no,  
His tongue eternally would go;  
For he had *impudence* at will.

GAY.

He claims the bull with lawless *insolence*,  
And having seiz'd his horns, accosts the prince.

DRYDEN.

IMPERVIOUS, IMPASSABLE, INACCESSIBLE.

**IMPERVIOUS**, from the Latin *in per*, and *via*, signifies not having a way through; **IMPASSABLE**, not to be passed through; **INACCESSIBLE**, not to be approached. A wood is *impervious* when the trees, branches, and leaves are entangled to such a degree as to admit of no passage at all: a river is *impassable* that is so deep that it cannot be forded: a rock or a mountain is *inaccessible* the summit of which is not to be reached by

any path whatever. What is *impervious* is so for a permanency; what is *impassable* is commonly so only for a time: roads are frequently *impassable* in the winter that are *passable* in the summer, while a thicket is *impervious* during the whole of the year: *impassable* is likewise said only of that which is to be passed by living creatures, but *impervious* may be extended to inanimate objects; a wood may be *impervious* to the rays of the sun.

The monster, Cacus, more than half a beast,  
This hold, *impervious* to the sun, possess'd.

DRYDEN.

But lest the difficulty of passing back  
Stay his return perhaps over this gulf,  
*Impassable*, *impervious*, let us try  
Advent'rous work.

MILTON.

At least our envious foe hath fall'd, who thought  
All like himself rebellious, by whose aid  
This *inaccessible* high strength, the seat  
Of Deity Supreme, us dispossess'd,  
He trusted to have seiz'd.

MILTON.

IMPLACABLE, UNRELENTING, RELENTLESS, INEXORABLE.

**IMPLACABLE**, unappeasable, signifies not to be allayed nor softened. **UNRELENTING** or **RELENTLESS**, from the Latin *lenio*, to soften, or to make pliant, signifies not rendered soft. **INEXORABLE**, from *oro*, to pray, signifies not to be turned by prayers.

Inflexibility is the idea expressed in common by these terms, but they differ in the causes and circumstance with which it is attended. Animosities are *implacable* when no misery which we occasion can diminish their force, and no concessions on the part of the offender can lessen the spirit of revenge: the mind or character of a man is *unrelenting* when it is not to be turned from its purpose by a view of the pain which it inflicts: a man is *inexorable* who turns a deaf ear to every solicitation or entreaty that is made to induce him to lessen the rigor of his sentence. A man's angry passions render him *implacable*; it is not the magnitude of the offence, but the temper of the offended that is here in question; by *implacability* he is rendered insensible to the misery he occasions, and to every satisfaction which the offender may offer him: fixedness of purpose renders a man *unrelenting* or *relentless*; an *unrelenting* temper is not less



callous to the misery produced, than an *implacable* temper; but it is not grounded always on resentment for personal injuries, but sometimes on a certain principle of right and a sense of necessity: the *inexorable* man adheres to his rule, as the *unrelenting* man does to his purpose; the former is insensible to any workings of his heart which might shake his purpose, the latter turns a deaf ear to all the solicitations of others which would go to alter his decrees: savages are mostly *implacable* in their animosities; Titus Manlius Torquatus displayed an instance of *unrelenting* severity toward his son; Minos, *Eacus*, and Rhadomanthus were the *inexorable* judges of hell.

*Implacable* as the enmity of the Mexicans was, they were so unacquainted with the science of war, that they knew not how to take the proper measures for the destruction of the Spaniards.

ROBERTSON.

These are the realms of *unrelenting* fate.

DRYDEN.

*Implacable* and *unrelenting* are said only of animate beings in whom is wanting an ordinary portion of the tender affections: *inexorable* may be improperly applied to inanimate objects; justice and death are both represented as *inexorable*.

Acca, 'tis past, he swims before my sight,  
*Inexorable* death, and claims his right.

DRYDEN.

TO IMPLANT, INGRAFT, INCULCATE,  
INSTIL, INFUSE.

To *plant* is properly to fix plants in the ground; to *IMPLANT* is, in the improper sense, to fix principles in the mind. *Graft* is to make one plant grow on the stock of another; to *INGRAFT* is to make particular principles flourish in the mind, and form a part of the character. *Calco* is in Latin to tread; and *INCULCATE*, to stamp into the mind. *Stillo*, in Latin, is literally to fall dropwise: *instillo*, to *INSTIL*, is, in the improper sense, to make sentiments, as it were, drop into the mind. *Fundo*, in Latin, is literally to pour in a stream: *infundo*, to *INFUSE*, is, in the improper sense, to pour principles or feelings into the mind.

To *implant*, *ingraft*, and *inculcate*, are said of abstract opinions, or rules of right and wrong; *instil* and *infuse* of

such principles as influence the heart, the affections, and the passions. It is the business of the parent in early life to *implant* sentiments of virtue in his child; it is the business of the teacher to *ingraft* them. *Instil* is a corresponding act with *implant*; we *implant* belief; we *instil* the feeling which is connected with this belief. It is not enough to have an abstract belief of a God *implanted* into the mind: we must likewise have a love, and a fear of him, and reverence for his holy name and Word *instilled* into the mind. To *instil* is a gradual process which is the natural work of education; to *infuse* is a more arbitrary and immediate act. Sentiments are *instilled* into the mind, not altogether by the personal efforts of any individual, but likewise by collateral endeavors; they are, however, *infused* at the express will and with the express endeavor of some person. *Instil* is applicable only to permanent sentiments; *infuse* may be said of any partial feeling: hence we speak of *infusing* a poison into the mind by means of insidious and mischievous publications; or *infusing* a jealousy by means of crafty insinuations, or *infusing* an ardor into the minds of soldiers by means of spirited addresses coupled with military successes.

With various seeds of art deep in the mind  
*Implanted*.

THOMSON.

The reciprocal attraction in the minds of men is a principle *ingrafted* in the very first formation of the soul by the author of our nature.

BERKELEY.

To preach practical sermons, as they are called, that is, sermons upon virtues and vices, without *inculcating* the great Scripture truths of redemption, grace, etc., which alone can enable and incite us to forsake sin and follow after righteousness; what is it, but to put together the wheels and set the hands of a watch, forgetting the spring which is to make them all go?

BISHOP HORNE.

The apostle often makes mention of sound doctrine in opposition to the extravagant and corrupt opinions which false teachers, even in those days, *instilled* into the minds of their ignorant and unwary disciples.

BEVERIDGE.

No sooner grows  
The soft *infusion* prevalent and wide,  
Than, all alive, at once their joy o'erflows  
In music unconfin'd.

THOMSON.

TO IMPLICATE, INVOLVE.

*IMPLICATE*, from *plico*, to fold, denotes to fold into a thing; and *INVOLVE*,

*VOLVE*, from *volvo*, to roll, signifies to roll into a thing: by which explanation we perceive, that to *implicate* marks something less entangled than to *involve*: for that which is folded may be folded only once, but that which is rolled is turned many times. In application, therefore, to human affairs, people are said to be *implicated* who have taken ever so small a share in a transaction; but they are *involved* only when they are deeply concerned: the former is likewise especially applied to criminal transactions, the latter to those things which are in themselves troublesome: thus a man is *implicated* in the guilt of robbery who should stand by and see it done, without interfering for its prevention; he who is in debt in every direction is strictly said to be *involved* in debt.

He is much too deeply *implicated* to make the presence or absence of these notes of the least consequence to him.

STATE TRIALS.

Those who cultivate the memory of our Revolution will take care how they are *involved* with persons who, under pretext of zeal toward the Revolution and constitution, frequently wander from their true principles.

BURKE.

IMPORTANCE, CONSEQUENCE, WEIGHT,  
MOMENT.

*IMPORTANCE*, from *porto*, to carry, signifies the carrying or bearing with, or in itself. *CONSEQUENCE*, from *consequor*, to follow, or result, signifies the following, or resulting from a thing. *WEIGHT* signifies the *quantum* that the thing weighs. *MOMENT*, from *momentum*, signifies the force that puts in motion.

*Importance* is what things have in themselves; they may be of more or less *importance*, according to the value which is set upon them: this may be real or unreal; it may be estimated by the experience of their past utility, or from the presumption of their utility for the future: the idea of *importance*, therefore, enters into the meaning of the other terms more or less. *Consequence* is the *importance* of a thing from its *consequences*. This term, therefore, is peculiarly applicable to such things, the *consequences* of which may be more immediately discerned either from the neglect or the attention: it is of *consequence* for a letter to go off on a certain day, for the

affairs of an individual may be more or less affected by it; an hour's delay sometimes in the departure of a military expedition may be of such *consequence* as to determine the fate of a battle. The term *weight* implies a positively great degree of *importance*: it is that *importance* which a thing has intrinsically in itself, and which makes it *weigh* in the mind: it is applied, therefore, to such things as offer themselves to deliberation; hence the counsels of a nation are always *weighty*, because they involve the interests of so many. *Moment* is that *importance* which a thing has from the power in itself to produce effects, or to determine interests: it is applicable, therefore, only to such things as are connected with our prosperity or happiness: when used without any adjunct, it implies a great degree of *importance*, but may be modified in various ways, as a thing of no *moment*, or small *moment*, or great *moment*; but we cannot say with the same propriety, a thing of small *weight*, and still less a thing of great *weight*: it is a matter of no small *moment* for every one to choose that course of conduct which will stand the test of a death-bed reflection.

He that considers how soon he must close his life, will find nothing of so much *importance* as to close it well.

JOHNSON.

The corruption of our taste is not of equal *consequence* with the deprivation of our virtue.

WARTON.

The finest works of invention are of very little *weight*, when put in the balance with what refines and exalts the rational mind.

SPECTATOR.

Whoever shall review his life, will find that the whole tenor of his conduct has been determined by some accident of no apparent *moment*.

JOHNSON.

TO IMPRINT, IMPRESS, ENGRAVE.

*PRINT* and *PRESS* are both derived from *pressus*, participle of *primis*, signifying in the literal sense to press, or to make a mark by pressing: to *IMPRESS* and *IMPRINT* are figuratively employed in the same sense. Things are *impressed* on the mind so as to produce a conviction: they are *imprinted* on it so as to produce recollection. If the truths of Christianity be *impressed* on the mind, they will show themselves in a corresponding conduct: whatever is *imprinted* on the mind in early life, or by any



particular circumstance, is not readily forgotten. ENGRAVE, from *grave* and the German *graben*, to dig, expresses more in the proper sense than either, and the same in its moral application; for we may truly say that if the truths of Christianity be *engraven* in the minds of youth, they can never be eradicated.

Whence this disdain of life in ev'ry breast,  
But from a notion on their minds *imprest*  
That all who for their country die, are blest!

JENYNS.

Such a strange, sacred, and inviolable majesty  
has God *imprinted* upon this faculty (the conscience), that it can never be deposed.

SOUTH.

Deep on his front *engraven*,  
Deliberation sat, and public care.

MILTON.

## TO IMPUGN, ATTACK.

THESE terms are employed synonymously only in regard to doctrines or opinions; in which case, to IMPUGN, from *in* and *pugno*, to fight against, signifies to call in question, or bring arguments against; to ATTACK (*v. To attack*) is to oppose with warmth. Sceptics *impugn* every opinion, however self-evident or well-grounded they may be; infidels make the most indecent *attacks* upon the Bible, and all that is held sacred by the rest of the world. He who *impugns* may sometimes proceed insidiously and circuitously to undermine the faith of others: he who *attacks* always proceeds with more or less violence. To *impugn* is not necessarily taken in a bad sense; we may sometimes *impugn* absurd doctrines by a fair train of reasoning: to *attack* is always objectionable, either in the mode of the action, or its object, or in both; it is a mode of proceeding oftener employed in the cause of falsehood than truth: when there are no arguments wherewith to *impugn* a doctrine, it is easy to *attack* it with ridicule and scurrility.

The creed of Athanasius, concerning that truth which Arianism did so mightily *impugn*, was both in the East and West churches accepted as a treasure of inestimable price.

HOOKER.

In case of renewed *attacks*, our present creed would be a much better defence than any new one that would be made at the time it was wanted.

HEY.

## INABILITY, DISABILITY.

INABILITY denotes the absence of *ability* in the most general and abstract sense. DISABILITY implies the ab-

sence of *ability* only in particular cases; the *inability* lies in the nature of the thing, and is irremediable; the *disability* lies in the circumstances, and may sometimes be removed: weakness, whether physical or mental, will occasion an *inability* to perform a task; there is a total *inability* in an infant to walk and act like an adult: a want of knowledge or of the requisite qualifications may be a *disability*; in this manner minority of age or an objection to take certain oaths may be a *disability* for filling a public office.

It is not from *inability* to discover what they ought to do that men err in practice.

BLAIR.

Want of age is a legal *disability* to contract a marriage.

BLACKSTONE.

## INACTIVE, INERT, LAZY, SLOTHFUL, SLUGGISH.

A reluctance to bodily exertion is common to all these terms. INACTIVE is the most general and unqualified term of all; it expresses simply the want of a stimulus to exertion. INERT is something more positive, from the Latin *iners* or *sine arte*, without art or mind; it denotes a specific deficiency either in body or mind. LAZY (*v. Idle*). SLOTHFUL, from *slow*, that is, full of slowness; and SLUGGISH, from *slug*, that is, like a *slug*, drowsy and heavy, all rise upon one another to denote an expressly defective temperament of the body which directly impedes action.

To be *inactive* is to be indisposed to action; that is, to the performance of any office, to the doing any specific business: to be *inert* is somewhat more; it is to be indisposed to movement: to be *lazy* is to move with pain to one's self; to be *slothful* is never to move otherwise than slowly: to be *sluggish* is to move in a sleepy and heavy manner. A person may be *inactive* from a variety of incidental causes, as timidity, ignorance, modesty, and the like, which combine to make him averse to enter upon any business, or take any serious step; a person may be *inert* from temporary indisposition; but *laziness*, *slothfulness*, and *sluggishness* are inherent physical defects: *laziness* is, however, not altogether independent of the mind or the will; but *slothfulness* and *sluggishness* are purely the offspring of nature, or, which is the same thing,

habit superinduced upon nature. A man of a mild character is frequently *inactive*.

Virtue conceal'd within our breast  
Is *inactivity* at least.

SWIFT.

Hence the term *inactive* is applied to matter.

What laws are these? instruct us if you can;  
There's one design'd for brutes, and one for man,  
Another guides *inactive* matter's course.

JENYNS.

Some diseases, particularly of the melancholy kind, are accompanied with a strong degree of *inertness*; since they seem to deprive the frame of its ordinary powers to action, and to produce a certain degree of torpor; hence the term is properly applied to matter to express the highest degree of *inactivity*, which will not move without an external impulse.

Informer of the planetary train,  
Without whose quickening glance their cumbersome orbs

Were brute, unlovely mass, *inert* and dead.

THOMSON.

*Lazy* people move as if their bodies were a burden to themselves; they are fond of rest, and particularly averse to be put in action; but they will sometimes move quickly, and perform much when once impelled to move.

The first canto (in Thomson's "Castle of Indolence") opens a scene of *lazy* luxury that fills the imagination.

JOHNSON.

*Slothful* people never vary their pace; they have a physical impediment in themselves to quick motion: *sluggish* people are with difficulty brought into action; it is their nature to be in a state of stupor.

Falsely luxurious, will not man awake,  
And, springing from the bed of *sloth*, enjoy  
The cool, the fragrant, and the silent hour?

THOMSON.

Conversation would become dull and vapid, if negligence were not sometimes roused, and *sluggishness* quickened, by due severity of reprehension.

JOHNSON.

## INADVERTENCY, INATTENTION, OVERSIGHT.

INADVERTENCY, from *advert*, to turn the mind to, is allied to INATTENTION (*v. Attentive*), when the act of the mind is signified in general terms; and to OVERSIGHT when any particular instance of *inadvertency* occurs. *Inadvertency* never designates a habit, but *inat-*

*tention* does; the former term, therefore, is unqualified by the reproachful sense which attaches to the latter: any one may be guilty of *inadvertencies*, since the mind that is occupied with many subjects equally serious may be turned so steadily toward some that others may escape notice; but *inattention*, which designates a direct want of *attention*, is always a fault, and belongs only to the young, or such as are thoughtless by nature: since *inadvertency* is an occasional act, it must not be too often repeated, or it becomes *inattention*. An *oversight* is properly a species of *inadvertency*, which arises from looking over, or passing by, a thing: we pardon an *inadvertency* in another, since the consequences are never serious; we must be guarded against *oversights* in business, as their consequences may be serious.

Ignorance or *inadvertency* will admit of some extenuation.

SOUTH.

The expense of attending (the Scottish Parliament), the *inattention* of the age to any legal or regular system of government, but, above all, the exorbitant authority of the nobles, made this privilege of so little value as to be almost neglected.

ROBERTSON.

The ancient critics discover beauties which escape the observation of the vulgar, and very often find reasons for palliating such little slips and *oversights* in the writings of eminent authors.

ADDISON.

## INCAPABLE, INSUFFICIENT, INCOMPETENT, INADEQUATE.

INCAPABLE, that is, *not* having *capacity* (*v. Ability*); INSUFFICIENT, or *not sufficient*, or *not* having what is *sufficient*; INCOMPETENT, or *not competent* (*v. Competent*), are employed either for persons or things: the first in a general, the last two in a specific sense: INADEQUATE, or *not adequate* or equalled, is applied most generally to things.

When a man is said to be *incapable*, it characterizes his whole mind; if he be said to have *insufficiency* and *incompetency*, it respects the particular objects to which the power is applied: he may be *insufficient* or *incompetent* for certain things; but he may have a *capacity* for other things: the term *incapacity*, therefore, implies a direct charge upon the understanding, which is not implied by *insufficiency* and *incompetency*.



It chiefly proceedeth from natural *incapacity* and general indisposition. BROWN.

When God withdraws his hand, and lets nature sink into its original weakness and *insufficiency*, all a man's delights fail him. SOUTH.

*Incapable* is applied sometimes, in colloquial discourse, to signify the absence of that which is bad; *insufficient* and *incompetent* always convey the idea of a deficiency in that which is, at least, desirable: it is an honor to a person to be *incapable* of falsehood, or *incapable* of doing an ungenerous action; but to be *insufficient* and *incompetent* are, at all events, qualities not to be boasted of, although they may not be expressly disgraceful. These terms are likewise applicable to things, in which they preserve a similar distinction: infidelity is *incapable* of affording a man any comfort; when the means are *insufficient* for obtaining the ends, it is madness to expect success; it is a sad condition of humanity when a man's resources are *incompetent* to supply him with the first necessaries of life.

Were a human soul *incapable* of farther enlargements, I could imagine it might fall away insensibly. ADDISON.

The minister's aptness or *insufficiency*, otherwise than by reading, to instruct the flock, standeth as a stranger, with whom our Common Prayer has nothing to do. HOOKE.

Laymen, with equal advantages of parts, are not the most *incompetent* judges of sacred things. DRYDEN.

*Inadequate* is relative in its signification, like *insufficient* and *incompetent*; but the relation is different. A thing is *insufficient* which does not suffice either for the wishes, the purposes, or necessities of any one, in particular or in general cases; thus, a quantity of materials may be *insufficient* for a particular building: *incompetency* is an *insufficiency* for general purposes, in things of the first necessity; thus, an income may be *incompetent* to support a family: *inadequacy* is still more particular, for it denotes any deficiency which is measured by comparison with the object to which it refers; thus, the strength of an animal may be *inadequate* to the labor which is required, or a reward may be *inadequate* to the service.

We want not time, but diligence, for great performances, and squander much of our allowance, even while we think it sparing and *insufficient*. JOHNSON.

All the attainments possible in our present state are evidently *inadequate* to our capacities of enjoyment. JOHNSON.

**INCESSANTLY, UNCEASINGLY, UNINTERRUPTEDLY, WITHOUT INTERMISSION.**

**INCESSANTLY** and **UNCEASINGLY** are but variations from the same word, *cease*. **UNINTERRUPTEDLY**, *v. To disturb*. **INTERMISSION**, *v. To subside*.

Continuity, but not duration, is denoted by these terms: *incessantly* is the most general and indefinite of all; it signifies without ceasing, but may be applied to things which admit of certain intervals: *unceasingly* is definite, and signifies never ceasing; it cannot, therefore, be applied to what has any cessation. In familiar discourse, *incessantly* is an extravagant mode of speech, by which one means to denote the absence of those ordinary intervals which are to be expected; as when one says a person is *incessantly* talking; by which is understood that he does not allow himself the ordinary intervals of rest from talking: *unceasingly*, on the other hand, is more literally employed for a positive want of cessation; a noise is said to be *unceasing* which literally never ceases; or complaints are *unceasing* which are made without any pauses or intervals. *Incessantly* and *unceasingly* are said of things which act of themselves; *uninterruptedly* is said of that which depends upon other things: it rains *incessantly*, marks a continued operation of nature, independent of everything; but to be *uninterruptedly* happy, marks one's freedom from every foreign influence which is unfriendly to one's happiness. *Incessantly* and the other two words are employed either for persons or things; *without intermission* is, however, mostly employed for persons: things act and react *incessantly* upon one another; a man of a persevering temper goes on laboring *without intermission*, until he has effected his purpose.

Surfeit, misdiet, and unthrifty waste, Vaine feastes, and ydle superfluitie, All those this sence's fort assaye *incessantly*. SPENCER.

Impell'd, with steps *unceasing*, to pursue Some fleeting good that mocks me with the view. GOLDSMITH.

She draws a close, incumbent cloud of death, *Uninterrupted* by the living winds. THOMSON.

For any one to be always in a laborious, hazardous posture of defence, *without intermission*, must needs be intolerable. SOUTH.

**INCLINATION, TENDENCY, PROPENSITY, PRONENESS.**

ALL these terms are employed to designate the state of the will toward an object: **INCLINATION** (*v. Attachment*) denotes its first movement toward an object: **TENDENCY** (from *to tend*) is a continued *inclination*: **PROPENSITY**, from the Latin *propensus* and *propendo*, to hang forward, denotes a still stronger leaning of the will; and **PRONE**, from the Latin *pronus*, downward, characterizes a habitual and fixed state of the will toward an object. The *inclination* expresses the leaning, but not the direction of that leaning; it may be to the right or to the left, upward or downward; consequently we may have an *inclination* to that which is good or bad, high or low; *tendency* does not specify any particular direction; but from the idea of pressing, which it conveys, it is appropriately applied to those things which degenerate or lead to what is bad; excessive strictness in the treatment of children has a *tendency* to damp their spirit: *propensity* and *proneness* both designate a downward direction, and consequently refer only to that which is bad and low; a person has a *propensity* to drinking, and a *proneness* to lying.

*Inclination* is always at the command of the understanding; it is our duty, therefore, to suppress the first risings of any *inclination* to extravagance, intemperance, or any irregularity: as *tendency* refers to the thing rather than the person, it is our business to avoid that which has a *tendency* to evil: the *propensity* will soon get the mastery of the best principles, and the firmest resolution; it is our duty, therefore, to seek all the aids which religion affords to subdue every *propensity*: *proneness* to evil is inherent in our nature, which we derive from our first parents; it is the grace of God alone which can lift us up above this grovelling part of ourselves.

Partiality is properly the understanding's judging according to the *inclination* of the will. SOUTH.

The *inclinations* of men should frequently be thwarted. BURKE.

Such is the *propensity* of our nature to vice, that stronger restraints than those of mere reason are necessary to be imposed on man. BLAIR.

Every commission of sin imprints upon the soul a further disposition and *proneness* to sin. SOUTH.

Every immoral act, in the direct *tendency* of it, is certainly a step downward. SOUTH.

**TO INCLOSE, INCLUDE.**

FROM the Latin *includo*, and its participle *inclusus*, are derived **INCLOSE** and **INCLUDE**: the former to express the proper, and the latter the improper signification: a yard is *inclosed* by a wall; particular goods are *included* in a reckoning: the kernel of a nut is *inclosed* in a shell; morality, as well as faith, is *included* in Christian perfection.

With whom she marched straight against her foes, And then unawares besides the Severne did *inclose*. SPENCER.

The idea of being once present is *included* in the idea of its being past. GROVE.

**INCONSISTENT, INCONGRUOUS, INCOHERENT.**

**INCONSISTENT**, from *sisto*, to place, marks the unfitness of being placed together. **INCONGRUOUS**, from *congruo*, to suit, marks the unsuitableness of one thing to another. **INCOHERENT**, from *haereo*, to stick, marks the incapacity of two things to coalesce or be united to each other.

*Inconsistency* attaches either to the actions or sentiments of men; *incongruity* attaches to the modes and qualities of things; *incoherency* to words or thoughts: things are made *inconsistent* by an act of the will; a man acts or thinks *inconsistently*, according to his own pleasure: *incongruity* depends upon the nature of the things; there is something very *incongruous* in blending the solemn and decent service of the church with the extravagant rant of Methodism: *incoherence* marks the want of coherence in that which ought to follow in a train; extemporary effusions from the pulpit are often distinguished most by their *incoherence*.

Every individual is so unequal to himself that man seems to be the most wavering and *inconsistent* being in the universe. HUGHES.

The solemn introduction of the Phoenix, in the last scene of Sampson Agonistes, is *incongruous* to the personage to whom it is ascribed. JOHNSON.