

The office of an *arbiter*, although not so elevated as a *judge* in its literal sense, has often the important duty of a Christian peace-maker; and as the determinations of an *arbiter* are controlled by no external circumstances, the term is applied to monarchs, and even to the Creator as the sovereign *Arbiter* of the world.

You once have known me,
Twixt warring monarchs and contending states,
The glorious *arbiter*.
LEWIS.

JUDGMENT, DISCRETION, PRUDENCE.

THESE terms are all employed to express the various modes of practical wisdom, which serve to regulate the conduct of men in ordinary life. JUDGMENT is that faculty which enables a person to distinguish right and wrong in general: DISCRETION and PRUDENCE serve the same purpose in particular cases. *Judgment* is conclusive; it decides by positive inference; it enables a person to discover the truth: *discretion* is intuitive (*v. Discernment*); it discerns or perceives what is in all probability right. *Judgment* acts by a fixed rule; it admits of no question or variation; *discretion* acts according to circumstances, and is its own rule. *Judgment* determines in the choice of what is good: *discretion* sometimes only guards against error or direct mistakes; it chooses what is nearest to the truth. *Judgment* requires knowledge and actual experience; *discretion* requires reflection and consideration: a general exercises his *judgment* in the disposition of his army, and in the mode of attack; while he is following the rules of military art he exercises his *discretion* in the choice of officers for different posts, in the treatment of his men, in his negotiations with the enemy, and various other measures which depend upon contingencies.

If a man have that penetration of *judgment* as he can discern what things are to be laid open, and what to be secreted, to him a habit of dissimulation is a hindrance and a poorness. BACON.

Let your own
Discretion be your tutor. Suit the action
To the words. SHAKESPEARE.

Discretion looks to the present; *prudence*, which is the same as providence or foresight, calculates on the future: *discretion* takes a wide survey of the case that offers; it looks to the moral fitness of

things, as well as the consequences which may follow from them; it determines according to the real propriety of anything, as well as the ultimate advantages which it may produce: *prudence* looks only to the good or evil which may result from things; it is, therefore, but a mode or accompaniment of *discretion*: we must have *prudence* when we have *discretion*, but we may have *prudence* where there is no occasion for *discretion*. Those who have the conduct or direction of others require *discretion*; those who have the management of their own concerns require *prudence*. For want of *discretion* the master of a school, or the general of an army, may lose his authority: for want of *prudence* the merchant may involve himself in ruin; or the man of fortune may be brought to beggary.

As to forms of human institution, they were added by the bishops and governors of the Church according to their wisdom and *discretion*.

The ignorance in which we are left concerning good and evil is not such as to supersede *prudence* in conduct. BINGHAM. BLAIR.

As epithets, *judicious* is applied to things oftener than to persons; *discreet* is applied to persons rather than to things; *prudent* is applied to both: a remark, or a military movement is *judicious*; it displays the *judgment* of the individual from whom they emanate; a matron is *discreet* who, by dint of years, experience, and long reflection, is enabled to determine on what is befitting the case; a person is *prudent* who does not inconsiderately expose himself to danger; a measure is *prudent* that guards against the chances of evil. Counsels will be *injudicious* which are given by those who are ignorant of the subject: it is dangerous to intrust a secret to one who is *in-discreet*: the impetuosity of youth naturally impels them to be *imprudent*; an *imprudent* marriage is seldom followed by *prudent* conduct in the parties that have involved themselves in it.

So bold, yet so *judiciously* you dare,
That your least praise is to be regular. DRYDEN.

To elder years, to be *discreet* and grave:
Then to old age maturity she gave. DENHAM.
The monarch rose preventing all reply,
Prudent, lest from his resolution rais'd
Others among the chiefs might offer. MILTON.

JUSTICE, EQUITY.

JUSTICE, from *jus*, right, is founded on the laws of society: EQUITY, from *aequitas*, fairness, rightness, and equality, is founded on the laws of nature. *Justice* is a written or prescribed law, to which one is bound to conform and make it the rule of one's decisions: *equity* is a law in our hearts; it conforms to no rule but to circumstances, and decides by the consciousness of right and wrong. The proper object of *justice* is to secure property; the proper object of *equity* is to secure the rights of humanity. *Justice* is exclusive, it assigns to every one his own; it preserves the subsisting inequality between men: *equity* is communicative; it seeks to equalize the condition of men by a fair distribution. *Justice* forbids us doing wrong to any one; and requires us to repair the wrongs we have done to others: *equity* forbids us doing to others what we would not have them do to us; it requires us to do to others what in similar circumstances we would expect from them.

They who supplicate for mercy from others
can never hope for *justice* through themselves. BURKE.

Ev'ry rule of *equity* demands
That vice and virtue from the Almighty's hands
Should due rewards and punishments receive. JENYNS.

JUSTNESS, CORRECTNESS.

JUSTNESS, from *jus*, law (*v. Justice*), is the conformity to established principle: CORRECTNESS, from *rectus*, right or straight (*v. Correct*), is the conformity to a certain mark or line: the former is used in the moral or improper sense only; the latter is used in the proper or improper sense. We estimate the value of remarks by their *justness*, that is, their accordance to certain admitted principles. *Correctness* of outline is of the first importance in drawing; *correctness* of dates enhances the value of a history. It has been *justly* observed by the moralists of antiquity that money is the root of all evil; partisans seldom state *correctly* what they see and hear.

Few men, possessed of the most perfect sight,
can describe visual objects with more spirit and
justness than Mr. Blacklock, the poet born blind. BURKE.

I do not mean the popular eloquence which cannot be tolerated at the bar, but that *correctness* of style and elegance of method which at once pleases and persuades the hearer.

SIR W. JONES.

K.

TO KEEP, PRESERVE, SAVE.

THE idea of having in one's possession is common to all these terms; which is, however, the simple meaning of KEEP (*v. To hold, keep*): to PRESERVE, from *pre* and *servo*, to *keep*, that is, to *keep* from mischief, signifies to *keep* with care, and free from all injury; to SAVE, from *safe*, is to *keep* laid up in a safe place, and free from destruction. Things are *kept* at all times, and under all circumstances; they are *preserved* in circumstances of peculiar difficulty and danger; they are *saved* in the moment in which they are threatened with destruction: things are *kept* at pleasure; they are *preserved* by an exertion of power; they are *saved* by the use of extraordinary means: the shepherd *keeps* his flock by simply watching over them; children are sometimes wonderfully *preserved* in the midst of the greatest dangers; things are frequently *saved* in the midst of fire, by the exertions of those present.

We are resolved to *keep* an established church,
an established monarchy, an established aristocracy,
and an established democracy, each in the
degree in which it exists, and no greater. BURKE.

A war to *preserve* national independence,
property, and liberty, from certain, universal
havoc, is a war just and necessary. BURKE.

Sav'd from the general fate, but two remain,
And ah! those hapless two were sav'd in vain. POPE.

TO KEEP, OBSERVE, FULFIL.

THESE terms are synonymous in the moral sense of abiding by, and carrying into execution what is prescribed or set before one for his rule of conduct: to KEEP (*v. To hold, keep*) is simply to have by one in such manner that it shall not depart; to OBSERVE, in Latin *observo*, compounded of *ob* and *servo*, signifying to *keep* in one's view, to fix one's attention, is to *keep* with a steady attention;

to FULFIL (*v. To accomplish*) is to *keep* to the end or to the full intent. A day is either *kept* or *observed*: yet the former is not only a more familiar term, but it likewise implies a much less solemn act than the latter; one must add, therefore, the mode in which it is *kept*, by saying that it is *kept* holy, *kept* sacred, or *kept* as a day of pleasure; the term *observe*, however, implies always that it is *kept* religiously: we may *keep*, but we do not *observe* a birthday; we *keep* or *observe* the Sabbath.

Wednesdays and Fridays were the days *kept* in the Greek Church for more solemn fasts.

WHEATLEY.

The Apostles and primitive Christians continued to *observe* the same hours of prayer with the Jews.

WHEATLEY.

To *keep* marks simply a perseverance or continuance in a thing; a man *keeps* his word if he do not depart from it: to *observe* marks fidelity and consideration; we *observe* a rule when we are careful to be guided by it: to *fulfil* marks the perfection and consummation of that which one has *kept*; we *fulfil* a promise by acting in strict conformity to it.

It is a great sin to swear unto a sin. But greater sin to *keep* a sinful oath.

SHAKESPEARE.

He was so strict in the *observation* of his word and promise as a commander, that he could not be persuaded to stay in the West when he found it not in his power to perform the agreement he had made with Dorchester.

CLARENDON.

You might have seen this poor child arrived at an age to *fulfil* all your hopes, and then you might have lost him.

GRAY.

KEEPING, CUSTODY.

KEEPING (*v. To keep, hold*) is, as before, the general term. CUSTODY, in Latin *custodia* and *custos*, in all probability from *cura*, care, because care is particularly required in *keeping*: the first of these terms is, as before, the most general in its signification; the latter is more frequent in its use. The *keeping* amounts to little more than having purposely in one's possession; but *custody* is a particular kind of *keeping*, for the purpose of preventing an escape: inanimate objects may be in one's *keeping*; but a prisoner, or that which is in danger of getting away, is placed in *custody*: a person has in his *keeping* that which he values as the property of an absent friend; the

officers of justice get into their *custody* those who have offended against the laws, or such property as has been stolen.

Life and all its enjoyments would be scarce worth the *keeping*, if we were under a perpetual dread of losing them.

SPECTATOR.

Prior was suffered to live in his own house under the *custody* of a messenger, until he was examined before a committee of the Privy Council.

JOHNSON.

TO KILL, MURDER, ASSASSINATE, SLAY, OR SLAUGHTER.

KILL, in Saxon *cýelan*, Dutch *kelan*, is probably connected with the Low German *killen*, to torment, the Icelandic *quella*, to stifle, and our *quell*. MURDER, in German *mord*, etc., is connected with the Latin *mors*, death. ASSASSINATE signifies to *kill* after the manner of an *assassin*; which word probably comes from the *Levant*, where a prince of the Arsacides or *assassins*, who was called the old man of the mountains, lived in a castle between Antioch and Damascus, and brought up young men to lie in wait for passengers. SLAY or SLAUGHTER, in German *schlagen*, etc., comes probably from *liegen*, to lie, signifying to lay low.

To *kill* is the general and indefinite term, signifying simply to take away life; to *murder* is to *kill* with open violence and injustice; to *assassinate* is to *murder* by surprise, or by means of lying in wait; to *slay* is to *kill* in battle: to *kill* is applicable to men, animals, and also vegetables; to *murder* and *assassinate* to men only; to *slay* mostly to men, but sometimes to animals; to *slaughter* only to animals in the proper sense, but it may be applied to men in the improper sense, when they are *killed* like brutes, either as to the numbers or to the manner of *killing* them.

The fierce young hero who had overcome the Curiatii, being upbraided by his sister for having *slain* her lover, in the height of his resentment *kills* her.

ADDISON.

Murders and executions are always transacted behind the scenes in the French theatre.

ADDISON.

The women interposed with so many prayers and entreaties, that they prevented the mutual *slaughter* which threatened the Romans and the Sabines.

ADDISON.

On this vain hope, adulterers, thieves rely, And to this altar vile *assassins* fly.

JENYNS.

KIND, SPECIES, SORT.

KIND, like the Gothic *kind*, a child, comes from the Gothic *keinan*, Saxon *cennan*, to beget, which answers to the Latin *gigno*, whence *genus*, and the Greek *γενος*, a kind. SPECIES, in Latin *species*, from *specio*, to behold, signifies literally the form or appearance, and in an extended sense that which comes under a particular form. SORT, in Latin *sors*, a lot, signifies that which constitutes a particular lot or parcel.

Kind and *species* are both employed in their proper sense; *sort* has been diverted from its original meaning by colloquial use: *kind* is properly employed for animate objects, particularly for mankind, and improperly for moral objects; *species* is a term used by philosophers, classing things according to their external or internal properties. *Kind*, as a term in vulgar use, has a less definite meaning than *species*, which serves to form the groundwork of science: we discriminate things in a loose or general manner by saying that they are of the animal or vegetable *kind*; of the canine or feline *kind*; but we discriminate them precisely if we say that they are a *species* of the arbutus, of the pomegranate, of the dog, the horse, and the like. By the same rule we may speak of a *species* of madness, a *species* of fever, and the like; because diseases have been brought under a systematic arrangement: but on the other hand, we should speak of a *kind* of language, a *kind* of feeling, a *kind* of influence; and in similar cases where a general resemblance is to be expressed.

An ungrateful person is a *kind* of thoroughfare or common sewer for the good things of the world to pass into.

SOUTH.

If the French should succeed in what they propose, and establish a democracy in a country circumstanced like France, they will establish a very bad government, a very bad *species* of tyranny.

BURKE.

Sort may be used for either *kind* or *species*; it does not necessarily imply any affinity, or common property in the objects, but simple assemblage, produced, as it were, by *sors*, chance: hence we speak of such *sort* of folks or people; such *sort* of practices; different *sorts* of grain; the various *sorts* of merchandises: and in similar cases where things are *sort-*

ed or brought together, rather at the option of the person, than according to the nature of the thing.

The French made and recorded a *sort* of institute, and digest of anarchy, called the rights of man.

BURKE.

KINDRED, RELATIONSHIP, AFFINITY, CONSANGUINITY.

The idea of a state in which persons are placed with regard to each other is common to all these terms, which differ principally in the nature of this state. KINDRED signifies that of being of the same *kin* or *kind* (*v. Kind*). RELATIONSHIP signifies that of holding a nearer *relation* than others (*v. To connect*). AFFINITY (*v. Affinity*) signifies that of being affined or coming close to each other's boundaries. CONSANGUINITY, from *sanguis*, the blood, signifies that of having the same blood.

The *kindred* is the most general state here expressed: it may embrace all mankind, or refer to particular families or communities; it depends upon possessing the common property of humanity: the philanthropist claims *kindred* with all who are unfortunate, when it is in his power to relieve them. *Relationship* is a state less general than *kindred*, but more extended than either *affinity* or *consanguinity*; it applies to particular families only, but it applies to all of the same family, whether remotely or distantly related. *Affinity* denotes a close *relationship*, whether of an artificial or a natural *kind*: there is an *affinity* between the husband and the wife in consequence of the marriage tie; and there is an *affinity* between those who descend from the same parents or relations in a direct line. *Consanguinity* is, strictly speaking, this latter species of descent; and the term is mostly employed in all questions of law respecting descent and inheritance.

Though separated from my *kindred* by little more than half a century of miles, I know as little of their concerns as if oceans and continents were between us.

COWPER.

The wisdom of our Creator hath linked us by the ties of natural affection; first, to our families and children; next, to our brothers, *relations*, and friends.

BLACKSTONE.

Consanguinity, or *relation* by blood, and *affinity*, or *relation* by marriage, are canonical disabilities (to contract a marriage).

BLACKSTONE.

TO KNOW, BE ACQUAINTED WITH.

To KNOW is a general term; to BE ACQUAINTED WITH is particular (*v. Acquaintance*). We may know things or persons in various ways; we may *know* them by name only; or we may *know* their internal properties or characters; or we may simply *know* their figure; we may *know* them by report; or we may *know* them by a direct intercourse: one is *acquainted with* either a person or a thing, only in a direct manner, and by an immediate intercourse in one's own person. We *know* a man to be good or bad, virtuous or vicious, by being a witness to his actions; we become *acquainted with* him by frequently being in his company.

Is there no temp'rate region can be *known*,
Between their frigid and our torrid zone?
Could we not wake from that lethargic dream,
But to be restless in a worse extreme?

DENHAM.

But how shall I express my anguish for my
little boy, who became *acquainted with* sorrow
as soon as he was capable of reflection.

MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

KNOWLEDGE, SCIENCE, LEARNING,
ERUDITION.

KNOWLEDGE signifies the thing *k. own*. SCIENCE, in Latin *scientia*, from *scio*, to know, has the same original meaning. LEARNING, from *learn*, signifies the thing *learned*. ERUDITION, in Latin *eruditio*, comes from *erudio*, to bring out of a state of rudeness or ignorance, that is, the bringing into a state of perfection.

Knowledge is a general term which simply implies the thing *known*: *science*, *learning*, and *erudition* are modes of *knowledge* qualified by some collateral idea: *science* is a systematic species of *knowledge* which consists of rule and order; *learning* is that species of *knowledge* which one derives from schools, or through the medium of personal instruction; *erudition* is scholastic *knowledge* obtained by profound research: *knowledge* admits of every possible degree, and is expressly opposed to ignorance; *science*, *learning*, and *erudition* are positively high degrees of *knowledge*.

The attainment of *knowledge* is of itself a pleasure independent of the many

extrinsic advantages which it brings to every individual, according to the station of life in which he is placed; the pursuits of *science* have a peculiar interest for men of a peculiar turn. *Learning* is less dependent on the genius than on the will of the individual; men of moderate talents have overcome the deficiencies of nature, by labor and perseverance, and have acquired such stores of *learning* as have raised them to a respectable station in the republic of letters. Profound *erudition* is obtained but by few; a retentive memory, a patient industry, and deep penetration, are requisites for one who aspires to the title of an *erudite* man. *Knowledge*, in the unqualified and universal sense, is not always a good; we may have a *knowledge* of evil as well as good: *science* is good as far as it is founded upon experience; *learning* is more generally and practically useful to the morals of men than *science*: *erudition* is always good, as it is a profound *knowledge* of what is worth knowing.

Can *knowledge* have no bound, but must advance

So far, to make us wish for ignorance?

DENHAM.

O sacred poesy, thou spirit of Roman arts,
The soul of *science*, and the queen of souls.

B. JOHNSON.

As *learning* advanced, new words were adopted into our language, but I think with little improvement of the art of translation. JOHNSON.

Two of the French clergy with whom I passed my evenings were men of deep *erudition*.

BURKE.

L.

TO LABOR, TAKE PAINS OR TROUBLE,
USE ENDEAVOR.

LABOR, in Latin *labor*, comes, in all probability, from *labo*, to falter or faint, because *labor* causes faintness. To TAKE PAINS is to expose one's self to *pains*; and to TAKE THE TROUBLE is to impose *trouble* on one's self. ENDEAVOR (*v. To endeavor*).

The first three terms suppose the necessity for a painful exertion; but to *labor* expresses more than to *take pains*, and this more than to *trouble*; to *use*

endeavor excludes every idea of pain or inconvenience: great difficulties must be conquered; great perfection or correctness requires *pains*; a concern to please will give *trouble*; but we *use endeavors* wherever any object is to be obtained or any duty to be performed. To *labor* is either a corporeal or a mental action; to *take pains* is principally an effort of the mind or the attention: to *take trouble* is an effort either of the body or mind: a faithful minister of the Gospel *labors* to instil Christian principles into the minds of his audience, and to heal all the breaches which the angry passions make between them: when a child is properly sensible of the value of improvement, he will take the utmost *pains* to profit by the instruction of the master: he who is too indolent to *take the trouble* to make his wishes known to those who would comply with them, cannot expect others to *trouble* themselves with inquiring into his necessities: a good name is of such value to every man that he ought to *use his best endeavors* to preserve it unblemished.

They (the Jews) were fain to *take pains* to rid themselves of their happiness; and it cost them *labor* and violence to become miserable.

SOUTH.

A good conscience hath always enough to reward itself, though the success fall not out according to the merit of the *endeavor*. HOWELL.

LABYRINTH, MAZE.

INTRICACY is common to both the objects expressed by these terms; but the term LABYRINTH has it to a much greater extent than MAZE: the *labyrinth*, from the Greek *λαβυρινθος*, was a work of antiquity which surpassed the *maze* in the same proportion as the ancients surpassed the moderns in all other works of art; it was constructed on so prodigious a scale, and with so many windings, that when a person was once entered, he could not find his way out without the assistance of a clue or thread. *Maze*, probably from the Saxon *mase*, a gulf, is a modern term for a similar structure on a smaller scale, which is frequently made by way of ornament in large gardens. From the proper meaning of the two words we may easily see the ground of their metaphorical appli-

cation: political and polemical discussions are compared to a *labyrinth*; because the mind that is once entangled in them is unable to extricate itself by any efforts of its own: on the other hand, that perplexity and confusion into which the mind is thrown by unexpected or inexplicable events, is termed a *maze*; because, for the time, it is bereft of its power to pursue its ordinary functions of recollection and combination.

From the slow mistress of the school, Experience,
And her assistant, pausing, pale Distrust,
Purchase a dear-bought clue to lead his youth
Through serpentine obliquities of human life,
And the dark *labyrinth* of human hearts.

YOUNG.

To measur'd notes while they advance,
He in wild *maze* shall lead the dance.

CUMBERLAND.

LAND, COUNTRY.

LAND, in German *land*, etc., connected with *lean* and *line*, signifies an open, even space, and refers strictly to the earth. COUNTRY, in French *contrée*, from *con* and *terra*, signifies *lands* adjoining so as to form one portion. The term *land*, therefore, in its proper sense, excludes the idea of habitation; the term *country* excludes that of the earth, or the parts of which it is composed: hence we speak of the *land*, as rich or poor, according to what it yields: of a *country*, as rich or poor, according to what its inhabitants possess: so, in like manner, we say, the *land* is ploughed or prepared for receiving the grain; or a man's *land*, for the ground which he possesses or occupies: but the *country* is cultivated; the *country* is under a good government; or a man's *country* is dear to him.

Rons'd by the prince of air, the whirlwinds sweep
The surge, and plunge his father in the deep,
Then fall against the Cornish *lands* they roar,
And two rich shipwrecks bless the lucky shore.

POPE.

We love our *country* as the seat of religion,
liberty, and laws.

BLAIR.

In an extended application, however, these words may be put for one another: the word *land* may sometimes be put for any portion of *land* that is under a government, as the *land* of liberty; and *country* may be put for any spot of earth or line of *country*, together with that which is upon it; as a rich *country*.