

God, Moses first, then David, did inspire
To compose anthems for his heavenly quire;
To th' one the style of friend he did impart,
On th' other stamp'd the likeness of his heart.

DENHAM.

Or else the comic muse
Holds to the world a picture of itself.

THOMSON.

The mind of man is an image, not only of
God's spirituality, but of his infinity.

SOUTH.

A likeness and a picture contain actual
likenesses of the things which they are in-
tended to represent; but an effigy may be
only an arbitrary likeness, as where a hu-
man figure is made to stand for the figure
of any particular man without any like-
ness of the individual. This term is ap-
plied to the rude or fictitious pictures of
persons in books, and also to the figures
of persons on tombstones or on coins,
which contain but few traces of likeness.

I have read somewhere that one of the popes
refused to accept an edition of a saint's works,
which were presented to him, because the saint,
in his effigies before the book, was drawn with-
out a beard.

ADDISON.

Or to the still ruder representations of
individuals who are held up to public
odium by the populace.

The people of Turvey have burned him in effigy.

COWPER.

LIMIT, EXTENT.

LIMIT is a more specific and definite
term than EXTENT: by the former we
are directed to the point where anything
ends; by the latter we are led to no par-
ticular point, but to the whole space in-
cluded: limits are in their nature some-
thing finite; extent is either finite or in-
finite: we therefore speak of that which
exceeds the limits, or comes within the
limits; and of that which comprehends
the extent, or is according to the extent:
a plenipotentiary or minister must not
exceed the limits of his instruction; when
we think of the immense extent of this
globe, and that it is among the small-
est of an infinite number of worlds, the
mind is lost in admiration and amaze-
ment: it does not fall within the limits
of a periodical work to enter into histor-
ical details; a complete history of any
country is a work of great extent.

Whatsoever a man accounts his treasure an-
swers all his capacities of pleasure. It is the ut-
most limit of enjoyment.

SOUTH.

It is observable that, either by nature or habit,

our faculties are fitted to images of a certain ex-
tent.

JOHNSON.

TO LINGER, TARRY, LOITER, LAG,
SAUNTER.

LINGER, from longer, signifies to
make the time long in doing a thing.
TARRY, from tardus, slow, is to be slow.
LOITER may probably come from len-
tus, slow. LAG, from lie, signifies to lie
back. SAUNTER, from sancta terra, the
Holy Land; because, in the time of the
Crusades, many idle persons were going
backward and forward: hence idle, plan-
less going comes to be so denominated.

Suspension of action or slow move-
ment enters into the meaning of all these
terms: to linger is to stop altogether, or
to move but slowly forward; to tarry is
properly to suspend one's movement: the
former proceeds from reluctance to leave
the spot on which we stand; the latter
from motives of discretion: he will nat-
urally linger who is going to leave the
place of his nativity for an indefinite pe-
riod; those who have much business to
transact will be led to tarry long in a
place: to loiter is to move slowly and re-
luctantly; but, from a bad cause, a child
loiters who is unwilling to go to school:
to lag is to move slower than others, to
stop while they are going on; this is sel-
dom done for a good purpose; those who
lag have generally some sinister and pri-
vate end to answer: to saunter is alto-
gether the act of an idler; those who
have no object in moving either back-
ward or forward will saunter if they move
at all.

'Tis long since I, for my celestial wife,
Loath'd by the gods, have dragg'd a ling'ring
life.

DRYDEN.

Rapid wits loiter, or faint, and suffer them-
selves to be surpass'd by the even and regular
perseverance of slower understandings.

JOHNSON.

I shall not lag behind, nor err
The way, thou leading.

MILTON.

Herod having tarried only seven days at Rome
for the despatch of his business, returned to his
ships at Brundisium.

PRIDEAUX.

She walks all the morning sauntering about
the shop, with her arms through her pocket-
holes.

JOHNSON.

LIQUID, LIQUOR, JUICE, HUMOR.

LIQUID (v. Fluid) is the generic term:
LIQUOR, which is but a variation from

the same Latin verb, *liquesco*, whence *li-
quid* is derived, is a liquid which is made
to be drunk: JUICE, in French *jus*, is a
liquid that issues from bodies: and HU-
MOR, in Latin *humor*, probably from the
Greek *ρῆμα* and *ρῆω*, to flow or pour
out, is a species of liquid which flows in
bodies, and forms a constituent part of
them. All natural bodies consist of li-
quids or solids, or a combination of both:
liquor serves to quench the thirst as food
satisfies the hunger; the juices of bodies
are frequently their richest parts; and
the humors are commonly the most im-
portant parts; the former of these two
belong peculiarly to vegetable, and the
latter to animal bodies: water is the sim-
plest of all liquids; wine is the most in-
viting of all liquors; the orange produces
the most agreeable juice; the humors of
both men and brutes are most liable to
corruption.

How the bee

Sits on the bloom, extracting liquid sweets!

MILTON.

They who Minerva from Jove's head derive,
Might make old Homer's skull the muse's hive,
And from his brain that Helicon distil,
Whose racy liquor did his offspring fill.

DENHAM.

Give me to drain the cocoa's milky bowl,
And from the palm to draw its freshening wine,
More bounteous far than all the frantic juice
Which Bacchus pours.

THOMSON.

Is Brutus sick, and is it physical
To walk unbraced, and suck up the humors
Of the dank morning?

SHAKESPEARE.

LIST, ROLL, CATALOGUE, REGISTER.

LIST, in French *liste*, and German *liste*,
comes from the German *leiste*, a last, sig-
nifying in general any long and narrow
body. ROLL signifies in general any-
thing rolled up, particularly paper with
its written contents. CATALOGUE, in
Latin *catalogus*, Greek *καταλογος*, from
κατα and *λογω*, to write down, signifies a writ-
ten enumeration. REGISTER, from the
verb *rego*, to govern, signifies what is
done or inserted by order of government,
or for the purposes of order.

A collection of objects brought into
some kind of order is the common idea
included in the signification of these
terms. The contents and disposition of
a list is the most simple; it consists of
little more than names arranged under
one another in a long narrow line, as a

list of words, a list of plants and flowers,
a list of voters, a list of visits, a list of
deaths, of births, of marriages: roll, which
is figuratively put for the contents of a
roll, is a list rolled up for convenience, as
a long roll of saints: catalogue involves
more details than a simple list; it speci-
fies not only names, but dates, qualities,
and circumstances. A list of books con-
tains their titles; a catalogue of books
contains an enumeration of their size,
price, number of volumes, edition, etc.: a
roll of saints simply specifies their names;
a catalogue of saints enters into particu-
lars of their ages, deaths, etc.: a register
contains more than either; for it con-
tains events, with dates, actors, etc., in all
matters of public interest.

After I had read over the list of the persons
elected into the Tiers Etat, nothing which they
afterward did could appear astonishing.

BURKE.

It appears from the ancient rolls of Parlia-
ment, and from the manner of choosing the lords
of articles, that the proceedings of that high court
must have been in a great measure under their
direction.

ROBERTSON.

Ay! in the catalogue ye go for men,
As hounds, and greyhounds, mongrels, spaniels,
curs,

All by the name of dogs.

SHAKESPEARE.

I am credibly informed by an antiquary, who
has searched the registers, that the maids of
honor in Queen Elizabeth's time were allowed
three rumps of beef for their breakfast.

ADDISON.

LITTLE, SMALL, DIMINUTIVE.

LITTLE, in Dutch *littel*, connected
with *light*, etc., is a general term both
in its sense and application. SMALL,
in German *smahl*, narrow, and DIMINU-
TIVE, from *minus*, less, signifying made
less, are particular terms conveying some
collateral idea. What is little is so in
the ordinary sense in respect to size; it
is properly opposed to great: the small
is that which is less than others in point
of bulk; it is opposed to the large: the
diminutive is that which is less than it
ought to be; as a person is said to be di-
minutive in stature who is below the or-
dinary stature.

While the promis'd fruit
Lies yet a little embryo, unperceived,
Within its crimson folds.

THOMSON.

The smallest humming-bird is about the size
of a hazel-nut.

GOLDSMITH.

That the stars appear like so many *diminutive* and scarcely distinguishable points, is owing to their immense and inconceivable distance.

ADDISON.

In the moral application, *little* is frequently used in a bad sense, *small* and *diminutive* may be extended to other than physical objects without any change in their signification.

The talent of turning men into ridicule, and exposing to laughter those one converses with, is the qualification of *little*, ungenerous tempers.

ADDISON.

To him no high, no low, no great, no *small*; He fills, He bounds, connects, and equals all.

POPE.

He whose knowledge is at best but limited, and whose intellect proceeds by a *small, diminutive* light, cannot but receive an additional light by the conceptions of another man.

SOUTH.

LIVELIHOOD, LIVING, SUBSISTENCE, MAINTENANCE, SUPPORT, SUSTENANCE.

The means of *living* or supporting life is the idea common to all these terms, which vary according to the circumstances of the individual and the nature of the object which constitutes the means: a LIVELIHOOD is that which is sought after by the day; a laborer earns a *livelihood* by the sweat of his brow: a SUBSISTENCE is obtained by irregular efforts of various descriptions; beggars meet with so much that they obtain something better than a precarious and scanty *subsistence*: LIVING is obtained by more respectable and less severe efforts than the former two; tradesmen obtain a good *living* by keeping shops; artists procure a *living* by the exercise of their talents: MAINTENANCE, SUPPORT, and SUSTENANCE differ from the other three, inasmuch as they do not comprehend what one gains by one's own efforts, but by the efforts of others: *maintenance* is that which is permanent: it supplies the place of *living*: *support* may be casual, and vary in degree: the object of most public charities is to afford a *maintenance* to such as cannot obtain a *livelihood* or *living* for themselves; it is the business of the parish to give *support*, in time of sickness and distress, to all who are legal parishioners. *Maintenance* and *support* are always granted; but *sustenance* is that which is

taken or received: the former comprehends the means of obtaining food; *sustenance* comprehends that which sustains the body and supplies the place of food.

A man may as easily know where to find one to teach to debauch, whore, game, and blaspheme, as to teach him to write or cast accounts; 'tis the very profession and *livelihood* of such people, getting their *living* by those practices for which they deserve to forfeit their lives.

SOUTH.

Just the necessities of a bare *subsistence* are not to be the only measure of a parent's care for his children.

SOUTH.

The Jews in Babylonia honored Hyrcanus their king, and supplied him with a *maintenance* suitable thereto.

PRIDEAUX.

If it be a curse to be forced to toil for the necessary *support* of life, how does he heighten the curse who toils for superfluities!

SOUTH.

War and the chase engross the savage whole, War followed for revenge, or to supplant The envied tenants of some happier spot, The chase for *sustenance*.

COWPER.

LIVELY, SPRIGHTLY, VIVACIOUS, SPORTIVE, MERRY, JOCUND.

THE activity of the heart when it beats high with a sentiment of gayety is strongly depicted by all these terms: the LIVELY is the most general and literal in its signification; *life*, as a moving or active principle, is supposed to be inherent in spiritual as well as material bodies; the feeling, as well as the body which has within a power of moving arbitrarily of itself, is said to have *life*; and in whatever object this is wanting, this object is said to be dead: in like manner, according to the degree or circumstances under which this moving principle displays itself, the object is denominated *lively*, that is, having life. SPRIGHTLY, that is, *sprightly* or *spirited*, full of spirits, and VIVACIOUS, in Latin *vivax*, from *vivo*, to live, that is, the same as *lively*. *Liveliness* is the property of childhood, youth, or even maturer age; *sprightliness* is the peculiar property of youth; *vivacity* is a quality compatible with the sobriety of years: an infant shows itself to be *lively* or otherwise in a few months after its birth; a female, particularly in her early years, affords often a pleasing picture of *sprightliness*; a *vivacious* companion recommends himself wherever he goes. SPORTIVENESS, that is, fondness of or readiness for sport, is an accompaniment of *liveliness* or *sprightliness*:

a *sprightly* child will show its *sprightliness* by its *sportive* humor: MIRTH, *i. e.*, *merriness* (*v. Cheerful*), and JOCUNDITY, from *jocundus* or *juvundus*, and *juvo*, to delight or please, signifying the state of being delighted, are the forms of *liveliness* which display themselves in social life; the former is a familiar quality, more frequently to be discovered in vulgar than in polished society: *jocundity* is a form of *liveliness* which poets have ascribed to nymphs and goddesses, and other aerial creatures of the imagination. The terms preserve the same sense when applied to the characteristics or actions of persons as when applied to the persons themselves: imagination, wit, conception, representation, and the like, are *lively*; a person's air, manner, look, tune, dance, are *sprightly*; a conversation, a turn of mind, a society, is *vivacious*; the muse, the pen, the imagination, is *sportive*: the meeting, the laugh, the song, the conceit, is *merry*: the train, the dance is *jocund*.

One study is inconsistent with a *lively* imagination, another with a solid judgment. JOHNSON.

His *sportive* lambs,

This way and that convolv'd, in friskful glee Their frolics play. And now the *sprightly* race Invites them forth.

THOMSON.

By every victory over appetite or passion, the mind gains new strength to refuse those solicitations by which the young and *vivacious* are hourly assaulted.

JOHNSON.

Thus *jocund* flects with them the winter night.

THOMSON.

Warn'd by the streaming light and *merry* lark, Forth rush the jolly clans.

SOMERVILLE.

LIVING, BENEFICE.

LIVING signifies literally the pecuniary resource by which one lives. BENEFICE, from *benefacio*, signifies whatever one obtains as a benefit: the former is applicable to any situation of life, but particularly to that resource which a parish affords to the clergyman; the latter is applicable to no other object: we speak of a *living* as a resource immediately derived from the parish, in distinction from a curacy, which is derived from an individual; we speak of a *benefice* in respect to the terms by which it is held, according to the ecclesiastical law: there are many *livings* which are not *benefices*, although not *vice versa*.

In consequence of the Pope's interference, the best *livings* were filled by Italian, and other foreign, clergy.

BLACKSTONE.

Estates held by feudal tenure, being originally gratuitous donations, were at that time denominated *beneficia*; their very name, as well as constitution, was borrowed, and the care of the souls of a parish thence came to be denominated a *benefice*.

BLACKSTONE.

LODGINGS, APARTMENTS.

A LODGING, or a place to *lodge* or dwell in, comprehends single rooms, or many rooms, or in fact any place which can be made to serve the purpose; APARTMENTS respect only suits of rooms: *apartments*, therefore, are, in the strict sense, *lodgings*; but all *lodgings* are not *apartments*: on the other hand, the word *lodgings* is mostly used for rooms that are let out to hire, or that serve a temporary purpose; but the word *apartments* may be applied to the suits of rooms in any large house: hence the word *lodging* becomes on one ground restricted in its use, and *apartments* on the other: all *apartments* to let out for hire are *lodgings*: but *apartments* not to let out for hire are not *lodgings*.

LOOK, GLANCE.

LOOK (*v. Air*) is the generic, and GLANCE (*v. To glance at*) the specific term; that is to say, a casual or momentary *look*: a *look* may be characterized as severe or mild, fierce or gentle, angry or kind; a *glance* as hasty or sudden, imperfect or slight: so likewise we speak of taking a *look*, or catching a *glance*.

Here the soft flocks, with the same harmless *look* They wore alive.

THOMSON.

The tiger, darting fierce

Impetuous on his prey, the *glance* has doom'd.

THOMSON.

TO LOOK, SEE, BEHOLD, VIEW, EYE.

LOOK, in Saxon *locan*, upper German *lügen*, comes from the same source as *lux*, light, and the Greek *λαω*, to see. SEE is in Saxon *seon*, Swedish *se*, Æolic Greek *σᾶειν*, Hebrew *sheeah*, to see. BEHOLD, compounded of the intensive *be* and *hold*, signifies to *hold* or fix the eye on an object. VIEW, from the French *voir*, and the Latin *video*, signifies simply to see. To EYE, from the noun *eye*, naturally signifies to fathom with the eye.

We *look* voluntarily; we *see* involuntarily: the eye *sees*; the person *looks*: absent people often *see* things before they are fully conscious that they are at hand: we may *look* without *seeing*, and we may *see* without *looking*: near-sighted people often *look* at that which is too distant to strike the visual organ. To *behold* is to *look* at for a continuance; to *view* is to *look* at in all directions; to *eye* is to *look* at earnestly, and by side glances; that which is *seen* may disappear in an instant; it may strike the eye and be gone; but what is *looked* at must make some stay; consequently lightning, and things equally fugitive and rapid in their flight, may be *seen*, but cannot be *looked* at. To *look* at is the familiar as well as the general term, in regard to the others; we *look* at things in general, which we wish to *see*, that is, to *see* clearly, fully, and in all their parts; but we *behold* that which excites a moral or intellectual interest; we *view* that which demands intellectual attention; we *eye* that which gratifies any particular passion: an inquisitive child *looks* at things which are new to it, but does not *behold* them; we *look* at plants, or finery, or whatever gratifies the senses, but we do not *behold* them: on the other hand, we *behold* any spectacle which excites our admiration, our astonishment, our pity, or our love: we *look* at objects in order to observe their external properties; but we *view* them in order to find out their component parts, their internal properties, their powers of motion and action, etc.: we *look* at things to gratify the curiosity of the moment, or for mere amusement; but the jealous man *eyes* his rival, in order to mark his movements, his designs, and his successes; the envious man *eyes* him who is in prosperity, with a malignant desire to *see* him humbled.

They climb the next ascent, and, *looking* down,
Now at a nearer distance *view* the town;
The prince with wonder *sees* the stately tow'rs
(Which late were huts and shepherds' bow'rs).
DRYDEN.

The most unpardonable malefactor in the world
going to his death, and bearing it with composure,
would win the pity of those who should *behold* him.
STEELE.

Half afraid, he first
Against the window beats, then brisk alights
On the warm hearth; then, hopping o'er the
floor,
Eyes all the smiling family askance. THOMSON.

TO LOOK, APPEAR.

LOOK is here taken in the neuter and improper sense: in the preceding article (*v. To look*) it denotes the action of persons striving to see; in the present case it denotes the action of things figuratively striving to be seen. APPEAR, from the Latin *appareo* or *parco*, Greek *παρῆμι*, signifies to be present or at hand, within sight.

The *look* of a thing respects the impressions which it makes on the senses, that is, the manner in which it *looks*; its *appearance* implies the simple act of its coming into sight: the *look* of anything is therefore characterized as good or bad, mean or handsome, ugly or beautiful; the *appearance* is characterized as early or late, sudden or unexpected: there is something very unseemly in the *look* of a clergyman affecting the airs of a fine gentleman; the *appearance* of the stars in an evening presents an interesting view even to the ordinary beholder. As what *appears* must *appear* in some form, the signification of the term has been extended to the manner of the *appearance*, and brought still nearer to *look* in its application; in this case the term *look* is rather more familiar than that of *appearance*: we may speak either of regarding the *look* or the *appearance* of a thing, as far as it may impress others; but the latter is less colloquial than the former: a man's conduct is said to *look* rather than to *appear* ill; but on the other hand, we say a thing assumes an *appearance*, or has a certain *appearance*.

Distressful nature pants;
The very streams *look* languid from afar.
THOMSON.

Never does liberty *appear* more amiable than
under the government of a pious and good prince.
ADDISON.

Look is always employed for what is real; what a thing *looks* is that which it really is: *appear*, however, sometimes refers not only to what is external, but to what is superficial. If we say a person *looks* ill, it supposes some positive and unequivocal evidence of illness: if we say he *appears* to be ill, it is a less positive assertion than the former; it leaves room for doubt, and allows the possibility of a mistake. We are at liberty to

judge of things by their *looks*, without being chargeable with want of judgment; but as *appearances* are said to be deceitful, it becomes necessary to admit them with caution as the rule of our judgment. *Look* is employed mostly in regard to objects of sense; *appearance* respects natural and moral objects indifferently: the sky *looks* lowering; an object *appears* through a microscope greater than it really is; a person's conduct *appears* in a more culpable light when seen through the representation of an enemy.

Then Nature all
Wears to the lover's eye a *look* of love.
THOMSON.
It has always been my endeavor to distinguish
between realities and *appearances*. TATLER.

LOOKER-ON, SPECTATOR, BEHOLDER,
OBSERVER.

THE LOOKER-ON and the SPECTATOR are both opposed to the agents or actors in any scene; but the former is still more abstracted from the objects he sees than the latter.

A *looker-on* (*v. To look at*) is careless; he has no part, and takes no part, in what he sees; he *looks on*, because the thing is before him, and he has nothing else to do: a *spectator* may likewise be unconcerned, but in general he derives amusement, if nothing else, from what he sees. A clown may be a *looker-on*, who with open mouth gapes at all that is before him, without understanding any part of it; but he who *looks on* to draw a moral lesson from the whole is in the moral sense not an uninterested *spectator*. The BEHOLDER has a nearer interest than the *spectator*; and the OBSERVER has an interest not less near than that of the *beholder*, but somewhat different: the *beholder* has his affections roused by what he sees; the *observer* has his understanding employed in that which passes before him: the *beholder* indulges himself in contemplation; the *observer* is busy in making it subservient to some proposed object: every *beholder* of our Saviour's sufferings and patience was struck with the conviction of his Divine character, not excepting even some of those who were his most prejudiced adversaries; every calm *observer* of our

Saviour's words and actions was convinced of his Divine mission.

Lookers-on many times see more than gamblers.
BACON.
But high in heaven they sit, and gaze from far,
The tame *spectators* of his deeds of war. POPE.
Objects imperfectly designed take forms from
the hope or fear of the *beholder*. JOHNSON.
Swift was an exact *observer* of life. JOHNSON.

LOOSE, VAGUE, LAX, DISSOLUTE, LICENTIOUS.

LOOSE is in German *los*, etc., Latin *laxus*, Greek *αλασσειν*, and Hebrew *chalatz*, to make free. VAGUE, in Latin *vagus*, signifies wandering. LAX, in Latin *laxus*, has a similar origin with *loose*. DISSOLUTE, in Latin *dissolutus*, participle of *dissolvo*, signifies *dissolved* or set free. LICENTIOUS signifies having the *license* or power to do as one pleases (*v. Leave, liberty*).

Loose is the generic, the rest are specific terms; they are all opposed to that which is bound or adheres closely: *loose* is employed either for physical, moral, or intellectual objects; *vague* only for intellectual objects; *lax* sometimes for what is intellectual, but oftener for the moral; *dissolute* and *licentious* only for moral matters: whatever wants a proper connection, or linking together of the parts, is *loose*; whatever is scattered and remotely separated is *vague*: a style is *loose* where the words and sentences are not made to coalesce, so as to form a regularly connected series; assertions are *vague* which have but a remote connection with the subject referred to: by the same rule, *loose* hints thrown out at random may give rise to speculation and conjecture, but cannot serve as the ground of any conclusion; ignorant people are apt to credit every *vague* rumor, and to communicate it as a certainty. Opinions are *loose*, either inasmuch as they want logical precision, or as they fail in moral strictness; suggestions and surmises are in their nature *vague*, as they spring from a very remote channel, or are produced by the wanderings of the imagination; opinions are *lax*, inasmuch as they have a tendency to lessen the moral obligation, or to *loosen* moral ties. A *loose* man injures himself, but a *lax* man injures society at large. *Dissoluteness* is the excess

of *looseness*; *licentiousness* is the consequence of *laxity*, or the freedom from external constraint. *Looseness* of character, if indulged, soon sinks into *dissoluteness* of morals; and *laxity* of discipline is quickly followed by *licentiousness* of manners.

The most voluptuous and *loose* person breathing, were he but tied to follow his dice and his courtships every day, would find it the greatest torment that could befall him. SOUTH.

That action which is *vague* and indeterminate will at last settle into habit, and habitual peculiarities are quickly ridiculous. JOHNSON.

In this general depravity of manners and *laxity* of principles, pure religion is nowhere more strongly inculcated (than in our universities). JOHNSON.

As the life of Petronius Arbitrator was altogether *dissolute*, the indifference which he showed at the close of it is to be looked upon as a piece of natural carelessness rather than fortitude. ADDISON.

Moral philosophy is very agreeable to the paradoxical and *licentious* spirit of the age. BEATTIE.

LORD'S-SUPPER, EUCHARIST, COMMUNION, SACRAMENT.

THE LORD'S-SUPPER is a term of familiar and general use among Christians, as designating in literal terms the supper of our Lord; that is, either the last solemn supper which he took with his disciples previous to his crucifixion, or the commemoration of that event which conformably to his commands has been observed by the professors of Christianity. EUCHARIST is a term of peculiar use among the Roman Catholics, from the Greek *ευχαριστω*, to give thanks, because personal adoration, by way of returning thanks, constitutes in their estimation the chief part of the ceremony. As the social affections are kept alive mostly by the common participation of meals, so is brotherly love, the essence of Christian fellowship, cherished and warmed in the highest degree by the common participation in this holy festival: hence, by distinction, it has been denominated the COMMUNION. As the vows which are made at the altar of our Lord are the most solemn which a Christian can make, comprehending in them the entire devotion of himself to Christ, the general term SACRAMENT, signifying an oath, has been employed by way of distinction for this ordinance. The Roman Catholics

have employed the same term for six other ordinances; but the Protestants, who attach a similar degree of sacredness to no other than baptism, annex this appellation only to these two.

To the worthy participation of the *Lord's-Supper*, there is indispensably required a suitable preparation. SOUTH.

This ceremony of feasting belongs most properly both to marriage and to the *eucharist*, as both of them have the nature of a covenant. SOUTH.

One woman he could not bring to the *communion*, and when he reproved or exhorted her, she only answered that she was no scholar. JOHNSON.

I could not have the consent of the physician to go to church yesterday; I therefore received the holy *sacrament* at home. JOHNSON.

TO LOSE, MISS.

LOSE, in all probability, is but a variation of *loose*, because what gets *loose* or away from a person is *lost* to him. TO MISS, probably from the participle *mis*, wrong, signifies to put wrong.

What is *lost* is supposed to be entirely and irrecoverably gone; but what is *missed* may be only out of sight or not at hand at the time when it is wanted; health or property may be *lost*; one *misses* a coach, or one *misses* what has been mislaid. Things may be *lost* in a variety of ways independent of the person *losing*; but *missing* is mostly by the instrumentality of the person who *misses*. We *lose* an opportunity which it is not in our power to use; we *miss* an opportunity when we suffer it to pass without using.

Some ants are so unfortunate as to fall down with their load when they almost come home; when this happens, they seldom *lose* their corn, but carry it up again. ADDISON.

By hope and faith secure of future bliss, Gladly the joys of present life we *miss*. LEWIS.

LOSS, DAMAGE, DETRIMENT.

LOSS signifies the act of *losing* or the thing *lost*. DAMAGE, in French *dommage*, Latin *dammum*, from *demo*, to take away, signifies the thing taken away. DETRIMENT, *v. Disadvantageous*.

Loss is here the generic term; *damage* and *detriment* are species or modes of *loss*. The person sustains the *loss*, the thing suffers the *damage* or *detriment*. Whatever is gone from us which we

wish to retain is a *loss*; hence we may sustain a *loss* in our property, in our reputation, in our influence, in our intellect, and every other object of possession: whatever renders an object less serviceable or valuable, by any external violence, is a *damage*; as a vessel suffers a *damage* in a storm: whatever is calculated to cross a man's purpose is a *detriment*; the bare want of a good name may be a *detriment* to a young tradesman; the want of prudence is always a great *detriment* to the prosperity of a family.

What trader would purchase such airy satisfaction (as the charms of conversation) by the loss of solid gain. JOHNSON.

The ants were still troubled with the rain, and the next day they took a world of pains to repair the *damage*. ADDISON.

The expenditure should be with the least possible *detriment* to the morals of those who expend. BURKE.

LOUD, NOISY, HIGH-SOUNDING, CLAMOROUS.

LOUD, in German, etc., *laut*, is connected with *laud*, a sound, *lauschen*, to listen, and the Greek *αλωω*, to hear, because sounds are the object of hearing. NOISY, having a *noise*, like *noisome* and *noxious*, comes from the Latin *noceo*, to hurt, signifying in general offensive, and in this case offensive to the sense of hearing. HIGH-SOUNDING signifies the same as pitched upon an elevated key, so as to make a great noise, to be heard at a distance. CLAMOROUS, from the Latin *clamo*, to cry, signifies crying with a loud voice.

Loud is here the generic term, since it signifies a great sound, which is the idea common to them all. As an epithet for persons, *loud* is mostly taken in an indifferent sense; all the others are taken for being *loud* beyond measure: *noisy* is to be lawlessly and unseasonably *loud*; *high-sounding* is only to be *loud* from the bigness of one's words; *clamorous* is to be disagreeably and painfully *loud*. We must speak *loudly* to a deaf person in order to make ourselves heard: children will be *noisy* at all times if not kept under control: flatterers are always *high-sounding* in their eulogiums of princes: children will be *clamorous* for what they want, if they expect to get it by dint of *noise*; they will be turbulent in

case of refusal, if not under proper discipline. In the improper application, *loud* is taken in as bad a sense as the rest; the *loudest* praises are the least to be regarded: the applause of a mob is always *noisy*; *high-sounding* titles serve only to excite contempt where there is not some corresponding quality: it is the business of a party to be *clamorous*, as that serves the purpose of exciting the ignorant.

The clowns, a boist'rous, rude, ungovern'd crew,
With furious haste to the *loud* summons flew.
DRYDEN.

Oh leave the *noisy* town. DRYDEN.

I am touched with sorrow at the conduct of some few men, who have lent the authority of their *high-sounding* names to the designs of men with whom they could not be acquainted. BURKE.

Clam'rous around the royal hawk they fly.
DRYDEN.

LOVE, FRIENDSHIP.

LOVE (*v. Affection*) is a term of very extensive import; it may be either taken in the most general sense for every strong and passionate attachment, or only for such as subsist between the sexes; in either of which cases it has features by which it is easily distinguished from FRIENDSHIP.

Love subsists between members of the same family; it springs out of their natural relationship, and is kept alive by their close intercourse and constant interchange of kindnesses: *friendship* excludes the idea of any tender and natural relationship; nor is it, like *love*, to be found in children, but is confined to maturer years; it is formed by time, by circumstances, by congruity of character, and sympathy of sentiment. *Love* always operates with ardor; *friendship* is remarkable for firmness and constancy. *Love* is peculiar to no station; it is to be found equally among the high and the low, the learned and the unlearned: *friendship* is of nobler growth; it finds admittance only into minds of a loftier make: it cannot be felt by men of an ordinary stamp. Both *love* and *friendship* are gratified by seeking the good of the object; but *love* is more selfish in its nature than *friendship*; in indulging another it seeks its own gratification, and when this is not to be obtained, it will change into the contrary passion of

hatred; *friendship*, on the other hand, is altogether disinterested, it makes sacrifices of every description, and knows no limits to its sacrifice.

So every passion but fond *love*,
Unto its own redress does move. WALLER.
For natural affection soon doth cease,
And quenched is with Cupid's greater flame,
But faithful *friendship* doth them both suppress,
And them with mastering discipline doth tame. SPENSER.

LOVER, SUITOR, WOOER.

LOVER signifies literally one who *loves*, and is applicable to any object; there are *lovers* of money, and *lovers* of wine, *lovers* of things individually, and things collectively, that is, *lovers* of particular women in the good sense, or *lovers* of women in the bad sense. The SUITOR is one who *sues* and strives after a thing; it is equally undefined as to the object, but may be employed for such as *sue* for favors from their superiors, or *sue* for the affections and person of a female. The WOOER is only a species of *lover*, who *woos* or solicits the kind regards of a female. When applied to the same object, namely, the female sex, the term *lover* is employed for persons of all ranks, who are equally alive to the tender passion of *love*: *sutor* is a title adapted to that class of life where all the genuine affections of human nature are adulterated by a false refinement, or entirely lost in other passions of a guilty nature. *Wooer* is a tender and passionate title, which is adapted to that class of beings that live only in poetry and romance. There is most sincerity in the *lover*, he simply proffers his *love*; there is most ceremony in the *sutor*, he prefers his *suit*; there is most ardor in the *wooer*, he makes his vows.

It is very natural for a young friend and a young *lover* to think the persons they love have nothing to do but to please them. POPE.

What pleasure can it be to be thronged with petitioners, and those perhaps *suitors* for the same thing? SOUTH.

I am glad this parcel of *woosers* are so reasonable, for there is not one of them but I dote on his very absence. SHAKESPEARE.

LOW, MEAN, ABJECT.

LOW, *v. Humble*. MEAN, in German *gemein*, etc., comes from the same source

as the Latin *communis*, common (*v. Common*). ABJECT, in French *abject*, Latin *abjectus*, participle of *abjicio*, to cast down, signifies literally cast down or brought very low.

Low is a much stronger term than *mean*; for what is *low* stands more directly opposed to what is high, but what is *mean* is intermediate: the *low* is applied only to a certain number or description; but *mean*, like common, is applicable to the great bulk of mankind. A man of *low* extraction falls below the ordinary level; he is opposed to a noble man: a man of *mean* birth does not rise above the ordinary level; he is upon a level with the majority. *Abject* expresses more than either of the others, for it denotes the lowest depression in a person's outward condition or position, as *abject* poverty.

Had I been born a servant, my *low* life
Had steady stood from all these miseries. RANDOLPH.

For 'tis the mind that makes the body rich;
And as the sun breaks through the darkest clouds,
So honor 'peareth in the *meanest* habit. SHAKESPEARE.

Or in this *abject* posture have ye sworn
T'adore the conqueror? MILTON.

When employed to designate character, they preserve the same distinction; the *low* is that which is positively sunk in itself; but the *mean* is that which is comparatively *low*, in regard to the outward circumstances and relative condition of the individual. Swearing and drunkenness are *low* vices; boxing, cudgelling, and wrestling are *low* games; a misplaced economy in people of property is *mean*; a condescension to those who are beneath us for our own petty advantages is *meanness*. A man is commonly *low* by birth, education, or habits; but *meanness* is a defect of nature which sinks a person in spite of every external advantage. *Abject*, as a characteristic, is applied particularly to the spirit. Slavery is most apt to produce an *abject* spirit by depriving a man of the use of those faculties which elevate him above the brutes; poverty, fear, or any base passion, may have the same effect.

Yet sometimes nations will decline so *low*
From virtue. MILTON.

We fast not to please men, nor to promote any mean worldly interest. SMALLRIDGE.

There needs no more be said to extol the excellence and power of his wit, than that it was of magnitude enough to cover a world of very great faults, that is, a narrowness in his nature to the *lowest* degree, an *abjectness* and want of courage, an insinuating and servile flattering. CLARENDON.

M.

MADNESS, PHRENSY, RAGE, FURY.

MADNESS, *vide Derangement*. PHRENSY, in Latin *phrenesis*, Greek *φρενιτις*, from *φρην*, the mind, signifies a disordered mind. RAGE is in French *rage*, Latin *rabies*, madness. FURY, in Latin *furor*, comes in all probability from *feror*, to be carried, because *fury* carries a person away.

Madness and *phrensy* are used in the physical and moral sense; *rage* and *fury* only in the moral sense: in the first case, *madness* is a confirmed derangement in the organ of thought; *phrensy* is only a temporary derangement from the violence of any disease or other cause: the former lies in the system, and is, in general, incurable; the latter is only occasional, and yields to the power of medicine. In the moral sense of these terms the cause is put for the effect, that is, *madness* and *phrensy* are put for that excessive violence of passion by which they are caused; and as *rage* and *fury* are species of this passion, namely, the angry passion, they are, therefore, to *madness* and *phrensy* sometimes as the cause is to the effect: the former, however, are so much more violent than the latter, as they altogether destroy the reasoning faculty, which is not expressly implied in the signification of the latter terms. Moral *madness* differs both in degree and duration from *phrensy*: if it spring from the extravagance of *rage*, it bursts out into every conceivable extravagance, but is only transitory; if it spring from disappointed love, or any other disappointed passion, it is as permanent as direct physical *madness*; *phrensy* is always temporary, but even more impetuous than *madness*; in the *phrensy* of despair men com-

mit acts of suicide; in the *phrensy* of distress and grief, people are hurried into many actions fatal to themselves or others.

'Twas no false heraldry when *madness* drew
Her pedigree from those who too much knew. DENHAM.

What *phrensy*, shepherd, has thy soul possess'd?
DRYDEN.

Rage refers more immediately to the agitation that exists within the mind; *fury* refers to that which shows itself outwardly: a person contains or stifles his *rage*; but his *fury* breaks out into some external mark of violence: *rage* will subside of itself; *fury* spends itself; a person may be choked with *rage*; but his *fury* finds a vent: an *enraged* man may be pacified; a *furiosus* one is deaf to every remonstrance. *Rage*, when applied to persons, commonly signifies highly inflamed anger; but it may be employed for inflamed passion toward any object which is specified; as a *rage* for music, a *rage* for theatrical performances, a fashionable *rage* for any whim of the day. *Fury*, though commonly signifying *rage* bursting out, yet it may be an impetuous feeling displaying itself in extravagant action; as the divine *fury* supposed to be produced upon the priestess of Apollo by the inspiration of the god, and the Bacchanalian *fury*, which expression depicts the influence of wine upon the body and mind. In the improper application, to inanimate objects, the words *rage* and *fury* preserve a similar distinction: the *rage* of the heat denotes the excessive height to which it is risen; the *fury* of the winds indicates their violent commotion and turbulence: so in like manner the *raging* of the tempest characterizes figuratively its burning anger; and the *fury* of the flames marks their impetuous movements, their wild and rapid spread.

First Socrates
Against the *rage* of tyrants single stood,
Invincible! THOMSON.

Confin'd their *fury* to those dark abodes. DRYDEN.

MAGISTERIAL, MAJESTIC, STATELY,
POMPOUS, AUGUST, DIGNIFIED.

MAGISTERIAL, from *magister*, a master, and MAJESTIC, from *majestas*, a re-