

hatred; *friendship*, on the other hand, is altogether disinterested, it makes sacrifices of every description, and knows no limits to its sacrifice.

So every passion but fond love,
Unto its own redress does move. WALLER.
For natural affection soon doth cease,
And quenched is with Cupid's greater flame,
But faithful *friendship* doth them both suppress,
And them with mastering discipline doth tame. SPENSER.

LOVER, SUITOR, WOOER.

LOVER signifies literally one who loves, and is applicable to any object; there are *lovers* of money, and *lovers* of wine, *lovers* of things individually, and things collectively, that is, *lovers* of particular women in the good sense, or *lovers* of women in the bad sense. The SUITOR is one who *sues* and strives after a thing; it is equally undefined as to the object, but may be employed for such as *sue* for favors from their superiors, or *sue* for the affections and person of a female. The WOOER is only a species of *lover*, who *woos* or solicits the kind regards of a female. When applied to the same object, namely, the female sex, the term *lover* is employed for persons of all ranks, who are equally alive to the tender passion of *love*: *sutor* is a title adapted to that class of life where all the genuine affections of human nature are adulterated by a false refinement, or entirely lost in other passions of a guilty nature. *Wooer* is a tender and passionate title, which is adapted to that class of beings that live only in poetry and romance. There is most sincerity in the *lover*, he simply proffers his *love*; there is most ceremony in the *sutor*, he prefers his *suit*; there is most ardor in the *wooer*, he makes his vows.

It is very natural for a young friend and a young *lover* to think the persons they love have nothing to do but to please them. POPE.

What pleasure can it be to be thronged with petitioners, and those perhaps *suitors* for the same thing? SOUTH.

I am glad this parcel of *woosers* are so reasonable, for there is not one of them but I dote on his very absence. SHAKESPEARE.

LOW, MEAN, ABJECT.

LOW, *v. Humble*. MEAN, in German *gemein*, etc., comes from the same source

as the Latin *communis*, common (*v. Common*). ABJECT, in French *abject*, Latin *abjectus*, participle of *abjicio*, to cast down, signifies literally cast down or brought very low.

Low is a much stronger term than *mean*; for what is *low* stands more directly opposed to what is high, but what is *mean* is intermediate: the *low* is applied only to a certain number or description; but *mean*, like common, is applicable to the great bulk of mankind. A man of *low* extraction falls below the ordinary level; he is opposed to a noble man: a man of *mean* birth does not rise above the ordinary level; he is upon a level with the majority. *Abject* expresses more than either of the others, for it denotes the lowest depression in a person's outward condition or position, as *abject* poverty.

Had I been born a servant, my *low* life
Had steady stood from all these miseries. RANDOLPH.

For 'tis the mind that makes the body rich;
And as the sun breaks through the darkest clouds,
So honor 'peareth in the *meanest* habit. SHAKESPEARE.

Or in this *abject* posture have ye sworn
To adore the conqueror? MILTON.

When employed to designate character, they preserve the same distinction; the *low* is that which is positively sunk in itself; but the *mean* is that which is comparatively *low*, in regard to the outward circumstances and relative condition of the individual. Swearing and drunkenness are *low* vices; boxing, cudgelling, and wrestling are *low* games; a misplaced economy in people of property is *mean*; a condescension to those who are beneath us for our own petty advantages is *meanness*. A man is commonly *low* by birth, education, or habits; but *meanness* is a defect of nature which sinks a person in spite of every external advantage. *Abject*, as a characteristic, is applied particularly to the spirit. Slavery is most apt to produce an *abject* spirit by depriving a man of the use of those faculties which elevate him above the brutes; poverty, fear, or any base passion, may have the same effect.

Yet sometimes nations will decline so *low*
From virtue. MILTON.

We fast not to please men, nor to promote any mean worldly interest. SMALRIDGE.

There needs no more be said to extol the excellence and power of his wit, than that it was of magnitude enough to cover a world of very great faults, that is, a narrowness in his nature to the *lowest* degree, an *abjectness* and want of courage, an insinuating and servile flattering. CLARENDON.

M.

MADNESS, PHRENSY, RAGE, FURY.

MADNESS, *vide Derangement*. PHRENSY, in Latin *phrenesis*, Greek *φρενιτις*, from *φρην*, the mind, signifies a disordered mind. RAGE is in French *rage*, Latin *rabies*, madness. FURY, in Latin *furor*, comes in all probability from *feror*, to be carried, because *fury* carries a person away.

Madness and *phrensy* are used in the physical and moral sense; *rage* and *fury* only in the moral sense: in the first case, *madness* is a confirmed derangement in the organ of thought; *phrensy* is only a temporary derangement from the violence of any disease or other cause: the former lies in the system, and is, in general, incurable; the latter is only occasional, and yields to the power of medicine. In the moral sense of these terms the cause is put for the effect, that is, *madness* and *phrensy* are put for that excessive violence of passion by which they are caused; and as *rage* and *fury* are species of this passion, namely, the angry passion, they are, therefore, to *madness* and *phrensy* sometimes as the cause is to the effect: the former, however, are so much more violent than the latter, as they altogether destroy the reasoning faculty, which is not expressly implied in the signification of the latter terms. Moral *madness* differs both in degree and duration from *phrensy*: if it spring from the extravagance of *rage*, it bursts out into every conceivable extravagance, but is only transitory; if it spring from disappointed love, or any other disappointed passion, it is as permanent as direct physical *madness*; *phrensy* is always temporary, but even more impetuous than *madness*; in the *phrensy* of despair men com-

mit acts of suicide; in the *phrensy* of distress and grief, people are hurried into many actions fatal to themselves or others.

'Twas no false heraldry when *madness* drew
Her pedigree from those who too much knew. DENHAM.
What *phrensy*, shepherd, has thy soul possess'd? DRYDEN.

Rage refers more immediately to the agitation that exists within the mind; *fury* refers to that which shows itself outwardly: a person contains or stifles his *rage*; but his *fury* breaks out into some external mark of violence: *rage* will subside of itself; *fury* spends itself; a person may be choked with *rage*; but his *fury* finds a vent: an *enraged* man may be pacified; a *furiosus* one is deaf to every remonstrance. *Rage*, when applied to persons, commonly signifies highly inflamed anger; but it may be employed for inflamed passion toward any object which is specified; as a *rage* for music, a *rage* for theatrical performances, a fashionable *rage* for any whim of the day. *Fury*, though commonly signifying *rage* bursting out, yet it may be an impetuous feeling displaying itself in extravagant action; as the divine *fury* supposed to be produced upon the priestess of Apollo by the inspiration of the god, and the Bacchanalian *fury*, which expression depicts the influence of wine upon the body and mind. In the improper application, to inanimate objects, the words *rage* and *fury* preserve a similar distinction: the *rage* of the heat denotes the excessive height to which it is risen; the *fury* of the winds indicates their violent commotion and turbulence: so in like manner the *raging* of the tempest characterizes figuratively its burning anger; and the *fury* of the flames marks their impetuous movements, their wild and rapid spread.

First Socrates
Against the *rage* of tyrants single stood,
Invincible! THOMSON.
Confin'd their *fury* to those dark abodes. DRYDEN.

MAGISTERIAL, MAJESTIC, STATELY,
POMPOUS, AUGUST, DIGNIFIED.

MAGISTERIAL, from *magister*, a master, and MAJESTIC, from *majestas*, a re-

both derived from *magis*, more, or *major*, greater, that is, more or greater than others; but they differ in this respect, that the *magisterial* is something assumed, and is therefore often false; the *majestic* is natural, and consequently always real: an upstart, or an intruder into any high station or office, may put on a *magisterial* air, in order to impose on the multitude; but it will not be in his power to be *majestic*, which never shows itself in a borrowed shape; none but those who have a superiority of character, of birth, or outward station, can be *majestic*.

Government being the noblest and most mysterious of all arts, is very unfit for those to talk *magisterially* of who never bore any share in it.

Then Aristides lifts his honest front,
In pure *majestic* poverty rever'd. THOMSON.

STATELY and POMPOUS are most nearly allied to *magisterial*; AUGUST and DIGNIFIED to *majestic*: the former being merely extrinsic and assumed, the latter intrinsic and inherent. *Magisterial* respects the authority which is assumed; *stately* regards splendor and rank; *pompous* regards personal importance, with all the appendages of greatness and power: a person is *magisterial* in the exercise of his office, and the distribution of his commands; he is *stately* in his ordinary intercourse with his inferiors and equals; he is *pompous* on particular occasions of appearing in public: a person demands silence in a *magisterial* tone; he marches forward with a *stately* air; he comes forward in a *pompous* manner, so as to strike others with a sense of his importance.

Such seems thy gentle height, made only proud
To be the basis of that *pompous* load. DENHAM.

There is for the most part as much real enjoyment under the meanest cottage, as within the walls of the *stateliest* palace. SOUTH.

Majestic is an epithet that characterizes the exterior of an object; *august* is that which marks an essential characteristic in the object; *dignified* serves to characterize a person's action as tending to give dignity: the form of a female is termed *majestic*, when it has something imposing in it, suited to the condition of majesty, or the most elevated station in society; a monarch is entitled *august* in order to describe the extent of his empire; a public

assembly is denominated *august* to bespeak its high character, and its weighty influence in the scale of society; a reply is termed *dignified* when it upholds the individual and personal character of a man as well as his relative character in the community to which he belongs: the former two of these terms are associated only with grandeur of outward circumstances: the last is applicable to men of all stations, who have each in his sphere a *dignity* to maintain which belongs to man as an independent moral agent.

A royal robe he wore with graceful pride,
Embroider'd sandals glitter'd as he trod,
And forth he mov'd *majestic* as a god. POPE.
Nor can I think that God, creator wise,
Though threat'ning, will in earnest so destroy
Us, his prime creatures, *dignified* so high. MILTON.

How poor, how rich, how abject, how *august*,
How complicate, how wonderful, is man. YOUNG.

MAGNIFICENCE, SPLENDOR, POMP.

MAGNIFICENCE, from *magnus* and *facio*, signifies doing largely, or on a large scale. SPLENDOR, in Latin *splendor*, from *splendeo*, to shine, signifies brightness in the external. POMP, in Latin *pompa*, Greek *πομπη*, a procession, from *πεμπω*, to send, signifies in general formality and ceremony.

Magnificence lies not only in the number and extent of the objects presented, but in their degree of richness as to their coloring and quality; *splendor* is but a characteristic of *magnificence*, attached to such objects as dazzle the eye by the quantity of light, or the beauty and strength of coloring; the entertainments of the Eastern monarchs and princes are remarkable for their *magnificence*, from the immense number of their attendants, the crowd of equipages, the size of their palaces, the multitude of costly utensils, and the profusion of viands which constitute the arrangements for the banquet; the entertainments of Europeans present much *splendor*, from the richness, the variety, and the brilliancy of dress, of furniture, and all the apparatus of a feast, which the refinements of art have brought to perfection. *Magnificence* is seldom accompanied with *splendor* than *splendor* with *magnificence*; since quantity, as well as quality, is essential to the one; but

quality more than quantity is an essential to the other: a large army drawn up in battle array is a *magnificent* spectacle, from the immensity of their numbers and the order of their disposition; it will in all probability be a *splendid* scene if there be much richness in the dresses; the *pomp* will here consist in such large bodies of men acting by one impulse, and directed by one will: hence military *pomp*; it is the appendage of power, when displayed to public view: on particular occasions a monarch seated on his throne, surrounded by his courtiers and attended by his guards, is said to appear with *pomp*.

Not Babylon,
Nor great Alcairo, such *magnificence*
Equall'd in all their glories. MILTON.

Vain transitory *splendors* could not all
Relieve the tottering mansion from its fall.
GOLDSMITH.

Was all that *pomp* of woe for this prepar'd;
These fires, this fun'ral pile, these altars rear'd.
DRYDEN.

TO MAKE, FORM, PRODUCE, CREATE.

THE idea of giving birth to a thing is common to all these terms, which vary in the circumstances of the action: to MAKE (*v. To act*) is the most general and unqualified term; to FORM (*v. To form*) signifies to give a *form* to a thing, that is, to *make* it after a given *form*; to PRODUCE (*v. To afford*) is to bring forth into the light, to call into existence; to CREATE (*v. To cause*) is to bring into existence by an absolute exercise of power: to *make* is the simplest action of all, and comprehends a simple combination by the smallest efforts; to *form* requires care and attention, and greater efforts; to *produce* requires time and also labor: whatever is put together, so as to become another thing, is *made*; a chair or a table is *made*: whatever is put into any distinct *form* is *formed*; the potter *forms* the clay into an earthen vessel: whatever emanates from a thing, so as to become a distinct object, is *produced*; fire is often *produced* by the violent friction of two pieces of wood with each other. The process of *making* is always performed by some conscious agent, who employs either mechanical means, or the simple exercise of power: a bird *makes* its nest; man *makes* various things, by the exercise of his understanding and his

limbs; the Almighty Maker has *made* everything by his word. The process of *forming* does not always require a conscious agent; things are *formed* of themselves; or they are *formed* by the active operations of other bodies; melted lead, when thrown into water, will *form* itself into various little bodies; hard substances are *formed* in the human body, which give rise to the disease termed the gravel. What is *produced* is oftener *produced* by the process of nature, than by any express design; the earth *produces* all kinds of vegetables from seed; animals, by a similar process, *produce* their young. *Create*, in this natural sense of the term, is employed as the act of an intelligent being, and that of the Supreme Being only; it is the act of *making* by a simple effort of power, without the use of materials, and without any process. Hence it has been extended in its application to the *making* of anything by an immediate exercise of power. The *creative* power of the human mind is a faint image of that power which brought everything into existence out of nothing.

King Edward the Sixth's Common Prayer Book was *made* with the advice of the foreign and even the Presbyterian Protestants. SECKER.

Dire Scylla here, a scene of horror forms,
And here Charybdis fills the deep with storms.
POPE.

It is strange, you will say, that nature should *make* use of the same agent to *create* as to *destroy*, and that what has been looked upon as the consumer of countries is, in fact, the very power that *produces* them. BRYDONE.

A wondrous hieroglyphic robe she wore,
In which all colors and all figures were,
That nature or that fancy can *create*. COWLEY.

They are all employed in the moral sense, and with a similar distinction: *make* is indefinite; we may *make* a thing that is difficult or easy, simple or complex; we may *make* a letter, or *make* a poem; we may *make* a word, or *make* a sentence. To *form* is the work either of intelligence or of circumstances: education has much to do in *forming* the habits, but nature has more to do in *forming* the disposition and the mind altogether; sentiments are frequently *formed* by young people before they have sufficient maturity of thought and knowledge to justify them in coming to any decision. To *produce* is the effect of

great mental exertion; or it is the natural operation of things: no industry could ever produce a poem or a work of the imagination: but a history or a work of science may be produced by the force of mere labor. All things, both in the moral and intellectual world, are linked together upon the same principle of cause and effect, by which one thing is the producer, and the other the thing produced: quarrels produce hatred, and kindness produces love; as heat produces inflammation and fever, or disease produces death. What is created is not made by any natural process, but is called into existence by the creating power; small matters create jealousies in jealous minds.

Though he could not agree to the making a king as things stood, yet, if he found one made, he would be more faithful to him than those that made him could be according to their own principles. BURNET.

Homer's and Virgil's heroes do not form a resolution without the conduct and direction of some deity. ADDISON.

A supernatural effect is that which is above any natural power that we know of to produce. TILLOTSON.

By this means alone their greatest obstacles will vanish, and what usually creates their dislike will become their satisfaction. POPE.

MALEDICTION, CURSE, IMPRECATION, EXECRATION, ANATHEMA.

MALEDICTION, from *male* and *dico*, signifies a saying ill, that is, declaring an evil wish against a person. CURSE, in Saxon *kursian*, comes, in all probability, from the same root as the Greek *κρῖνω*, to sanction or ratify, signifying a bad wish declared upon oath, or in a solemn manner. IMPRECATION, from *im* and *precor*, signifies a praying down evil upon a person. EXECRATION, from the Latin *execror*, that is, *è sacris excludere*, signifies the same as to excommunicate, with every form of solemn imprecation. ANATHEMA, in Greek *ἀνάθημα*, signifies a setting out, that is, a putting out of a religious community as a penance.

The malediction is the most indefinite and general term, signifying simply the declaration of evil; curse is a solemn denunciation of evil: the former is employed mostly by men; the latter by some superior being as well as by men: the rest are species of the curse pronounced

only by men. The malediction is caused by simple anger; the curse is occasioned by some grievous offence: men, in the heat of their passions, will utter maledictions against any object that offends them; God pronounced a curse upon Adam, and all his posterity, after the fall.

With many praises of his good play, and many maledictions on the power of chance, he took up the cards and threw them in the fire. MACKENZIE.

But know, that ere your promis'd walls you build, My curses shall severely be fulfill'd. DRYDEN.

The term curse differs in the degree of evil pronounced or wished; imprecation and execration always imply some positive great evil, and, in fact, as much evil as can be conceived by man in his anger; the anathema respects the evil which is pronounced according to the canon law, by which a man is not only put out of the Church, but held up as an object of offence. The malediction is altogether an unallowed expression of private resentment; the curse was admitted, in some cases, according to the Mosaic law; and that, as well as the anathema, at one time formed a part of the ecclesiastical discipline of the Christian Church; the imprecation formed a part of the heathenish ceremony of religion; but the execration is always the informal expression of the most violent personal anger.

Thus either host their imprecations join'd. POPE.

I have seen in Bedlam a man that has held up his face in a posture of adoration toward heaven to utter execrations and blasphemies. STEELE.

The bare anathemas of the Church fall like so many *bruta fulmina* upon the obstinate and schismatical. SOUTH.

MALEVOLENT, MALICIOUS, MALIGNANT.

THESE words have all their derivation from *malus*, bad; that is, MALEVOLENT, wishing ill; MALICIOUS (*v. Malice*), having malice; and MALIGNANT, having an evil tendency.

Malevolence has a deep root in the heart, and is a settled part of the character; we denominate the person malevolent, to designate the ruling temper of his mind: maliciousness may be applied as an epi-

thet to particular parts of a man's character or conduct; one may have a malicious joy or pleasure in seeing the distresses of another: malignity is not so often employed to characterize the person as the thing; the malignity of a design is estimated by the degree of mischief which was intended to be done.

I have often known very lasting malevolence excited by unlucky censures. JOHNSON.

Greatness, the earnest of malicious Fate For future woe, was never meant a good. SOUTHERN.

Still horror reigns, a dreary twilight round, Of struggling night and day malignant mix'd. THOMSON.

MALICE, RANCOR, SPITE, GRUDGE, PIQUE.

MALICE, in Latin *malitia*, from *malus*, bad, signifies the very essence of badness lying in the heart; RANCOR (*v. Hatred*) is only continued hatred; the former requires no external cause to provoke it, it is inherent in the mind; the latter must be caused by some personal offence. Malice is properly the love of evil for evil's sake, and is, therefore, confined to no number or quality of objects, and limited by no circumstance; rancor, as it depends upon external objects for its existence, so it is confined to such objects only as are liable to cause displeasure or anger; malice will impel a man to do mischief to those who have not injured him, and are perhaps strangers to him; rancor can subsist only between those who have had sufficient connection to be at variance.

If any chance has hither brought the name Of Palamedes, not unknown to fame, Who suffer'd from the malice of the times. DRYDEN.

Party-spirit fills a nation with spleen and rancor. ADDISON.

SPITE, from the Italian *dispetto* and the French *despit*, from *spit*, a pointed instrument, denotes a petty kind of malice, or disposition to offend another in trifling matters; it may be in the temper of the person, or it may have its source in some external provocation: children often show their spite to each other.

Can heav'nly minds such high resentment show, Or exercise their spite in human woe? DRYDEN.

GRUDGE, connected with *grumble* and *groul*, and PIQUE, from *pique*, denoting the prick of a pointed instrument, are

employed for that particular state of rancorous or spiteful feeling which is occasioned by personal offences: the grudge is that which has long existed; the pique is that which is of recent date; a person is said to owe another a grudge for having done him a disservice; or he is said to have a pique toward another, who has shown him an affront.

The god of wit, to show his grudge, Clapp'd asses' ears upon the judge. SWIFT.

You may be sure the ladies are not wanting, on their side, in cherishing and improving these important piques, which divide the town almost into as many parties as there are families. LADY M. W. MONTAGUE.

MANLY, MANFUL.

MANLY, or like a man, is opposed to juvenile, and of course applied properly to youths; but MANFUL, or full of manhood, is opposed to effeminate, and is applicable more properly to grown persons: a premature manliness in young persons is hardly less unseemly than a want of manfulness in one who is called upon to display his courage.

I love a manly freedom as much as any of the band of cashierers of kings. BURKE.

I opposed his whim manfully, which I think you will approve of. CUMBERLAND.

MANNERS, MORALS.

MANNERS (*v. Air, Manner*) respect the minor forms of acting with others and toward others; MORALS include the important duties of life: manners have therefore been denominated minor morals. By an attention to good manners we render ourselves good companions; by an observance of good morals we become good members of society: the former gains the good-will of others, the latter their esteem. The manners of a child are of more or less importance, according to his station in life; his morals cannot be attended to too early, let his station be what it may.

In the present corrupted state of human manners, always to assent and to comply is the very worst maxim we can adopt. It is impossible to support the purity and dignity of Christian morals, without opposing the world on various occasions. BLAIR.

MARITIME, MARINE, NAVAL, NAUTICAL.

MARITIME and MARINE, from the Latin *mare*, a sea, signifies belonging to

the sea; NAVAL, from *navis*, a ship, signifies belonging to a ship; and NAUTICAL, from *navita*, a sailor, signifies belonging to a sailor, or to navigation. Countries and places are denominated *maritime* from their proximity to the sea, or their great intercourse by sea; hence England is called the most *maritime* nation in Europe. *Marine* is a technical term, employed by persons in office, to denote that which is officially transacted with regard to the sea in distinction from what passes on land; hence we speak of the *marines* as a species of soldiers acting by sea, of the *marine* society, or *marine* stores. *Naval* is another term of art as opposed to military, and used in regard to the arrangements of government or commerce: hence we speak of *naval* affairs, *naval* officers, *naval* tactics, and the like. *Nautical* is a scientific term, connected with the science of navigation or the management of vessels: hence we talk of *nautical* instruction, of *nautical* calculations. The *maritime* laws of England are essential for the preservation of the *naval* power which it has so justly acquired. The *marine* of England is one of its glories. The *naval* administration is one of the most important branches of our government in the time of war. *Nautical* tables and a *nautical* almanac have been expressly formed for the benefit of all who apply themselves to *nautical* subjects.

Octavianns reduced Lepidus to a necessity to beg his life, and be content to lead the remainder of it in a mean condition at Circeii, a small *maritime* town among the Latins. PRIDEAUX.

A man of a very grave aspect required notice to be given of his intention to set out on a certain day on a *submarine* voyage. JOHNSON.

Sextus Pompey having together such a *naval* force as made up 350 ships, seized Sicily. PRIDEAUX.

He elegantly showed by whom he was drawn, which depicted the *nautical* compass with *aut Magnæ, aut Magna*. CAMDEN.

MARK, PRINT, IMPRESSION, STAMP.

MARK is the same in the Northern languages, and in the Persian *marz*. PRINT and IMPRESSION, both from the Latin *premo*, to press, signify the visible effect produced by *printing* or *pressing*. STAMP signifies the effect produced by *stamping*.

The word *mark* is the most general in sense: whatever alters the external face of an object is a *mark*; a *print* is some specific *mark*, or a figure drawn upon the surface of an object; an *impression* is the *mark* pressed either upon or into a body; a *stamp* is the *mark* that is *stamped* in or upon the body. The *mark* is confined to no size, shape, or form; the *print* is a *mark* that represents an object: the *mark* may consist of a spot, a line, a stain, or a smear; but a *print* describes a given object, as a house, a man, etc. A *mark* is either a protuberance or a depression; an *impression* is always a sinking in of the object: a hillock or a hole are both *marks*; but the latter is properly the *impression*: the *stamp* is an *impression* made in a specific manner and for a specific object, as the *stamp* of a seal on wax. The *mark* is occasioned by every sort of action, gentle or violent, artificial or natural; by the voluntary act of a person, or the unconscious act of inanimate bodies, by means of compression or friction, by a touch or a blow, and the like: all the others are occasioned by one or more of these modes. The *print* is occasioned by artificial means of compression, as when the *print* of letters or pictures is made on paper; or by accidental and natural compression, as when the *print* of the hand is made on the wall, or the *print* of the foot is made on the ground. The *impression* is made by means more or less violent, as when an *impression* is made upon wood by the axe or hammer; or by gradual and natural means, as by the dripping of water on stone. The *stamp* is made by means of direct pressure with an artificial instrument.

De La Chambre asserts positively that from the *marks* on the body the configuration of the planets at a nativity may be gathered. WALSH. From hence *Astrea* took her flight, and here The *prints* of her departing steps appear. DRYDEN.

The hammered gold coins which were made in the reigns of the several kings and queens from Edward the First inclusively till the beginning of the reign of Charles the Second, are almost totally vanished, either to make vessels or utensils, or to convert into gold coin of more modern *stamps*. LOWNDEN.

Every piece is brought to the press, which is called the mill, and there receives the *impression* which makes it milled money. LOWNDEN.

Mark is of such universal application, that it is confined to no objects whatever, either in the natural or moral world; *print* is mostly applied to material objects, the face of which undergoes a lasting change, as the *printing* made on paper or wood; *impression* is more commonly applied to such natural objects as are particularly solid; *stamp* is generally applied to paper, or still softer and more yielding bodies. *Impression* and *stamp* have both a moral application: events or speeches make an *impression* on the mind: things bear a certain *stamp* which bespeaks their origin. Where the passions have obtained an ascendancy, the occasional good *impressions* which are produced by religious observances but too frequently die away; the Christian religion carries with itself the *stamp* of truth.

When a man thinks of anything in the darkness of the night, whatever deep *impressions* it may make in his mind, they are apt to vanish as soon as the day breaks about him. ADDISON.

Strange that the gods should give those laws Bearing no *stamp* of honor, nor design'd With provident thought. POTTER.

MARK, SIGN, NOTE, SYMPTOM, TOKEN, INDICATION.

MARK, *v.* *Mark*, *impression*. SIGN, in Latin *signum*, Greek *σημα*, from *σιζω*, to punctuate, signifies the thing that points out. SYMPTOM, in Latin *symptomata*, Greek *συμπτωμα*, from *συμπτω*, to fall out in accordance, signifies what presents itself to confirm one's opinion. TOKEN, *v.* *To betoken*. INDICATION, in Latin *indicatio*, from *indico*, and the Greek *ενδεικω*, to point out, signifies the thing which points out.

The idea of an external object, which serves to direct the observer, is common to all these terms; the difference consists in the objects that are employed. Anything may serve as a *mark*, a stroke, a dot, a stick set up, and the like; it serves simply to guide the senses; the *sign* is something more complex; it consists of a figure or representation of some object, as the twelve *signs* of the zodiac, or the *signs* which are affixed to houses of entertainment, or to shops. *Marks* are arbitrary; every one chooses his *mark* at pleasure: *signs* have commonly

a connection with the object that is to be observed: a house, a tree, a letter, or any external object, may be chosen as a *mark*: but a tobaccoist chooses the *sign* of a black man; the innkeeper chooses the head of the reigning prince. *Marks* serve in general simply to aid the memory in distinguishing the situation of objects, or the particular circumstances of persons or things, as the *marks* which are set up in a garden to distinguish the ground that is occupied; they may, therefore, be private, and known only to the individual that makes them, as the private *marks* by which a tradesman distinguishes his prices: they may likewise be changeable and fluctuating, according to the humor and convenience of the maker, as the private *marks* which are employed by the military on guard. *Signs*, on the contrary, serve to direct the understanding; they have either a natural or an artificial resemblance to the object to be represented; they are consequently chosen, not by the will of one, but by the universal consent of a body; they are not chosen for the moment, but for a permanency, as in the case of language, either oral or written, in the case of the zodiacal *signs*, or the *sign* of the cross, the algebraical *signs*, and the like. It is clear, therefore, that many objects may be both a *mark* and a *sign*, according to the above illustration: the cross which is employed in books, by way of reference to notes, is a *mark* only, because it serves merely to guide the eye or assist the memory; but the figure of the cross, when employed in reference to the cross of our Saviour, is a *sign*, inasmuch as it conveys a distinct idea of something else to the mind; so likewise little strokes over letters, or even letters themselves, may merely be *marks*, while they only point out a difference between this or that letter, this or that object; but this same stroke becomes a *sign* if, as in the first declension of Latin nouns, it points out the ablative case, it is a *sign* of the ablative case; and a single letter affixed to different parcels is merely a *mark* so long as it simply serves this purpose; but the same letter, suppose it were a word, is a *sign* when it is used as a *sign*. A *mark* may be something accidental, and mean nothing; but a *sign* is that to

which a meaning is always given: there may be *marks* on a wall occasioned by the elements or otherwise, but a *sign* is always the *sign* of something: a *mark*, if it consist of a sensible object, is only visible, but *signs* may be the object of hearing, smell, or any other sense; many things, therefore, may be *signs* which are not *marks*; when words are spoken and not written, they are *signs* and not *marks*; and, in like manner, the cross made on the forehead of a child in baptism is a *sign*, but not a *mark*.

It was an ancient custom to cull out of the flocks the goodliest of the cattle, and put certain *marks* upon them whereby they might be distinguished from the rest.

Now part in peace secure thy prayer is sped,
Witness the sacred honors of our head,
The nod that ratifies the will divine,
The faithful, fix'd, irrevocable *sign*.

POPE.

When *mark* and *sign* are both taken to denote something by which one forms a judgment, the former serves either to denote that which has been or which is, the latter to designate that which is or will be, as persons bear the *marks* of age, or the *marks* of violence; or we may judge by the *marks* of a person's foot that some one has been walking in a particular place; hoarseness is a *sign* that a person has a cold; when mariners meet with certain birds at sea, they consider them as a *sign* that land is near at hand.

Hannibal bore the *marks* in his visage of hard campaigns.

GOLDSMITH.

So plain the *signs*, such prophets are the skies.

DRYDEN.

So likewise in application to moral objects or matters of a purely intellectual nature; as a *mark* of honor, or a *mark* of distinction; an outward and visible *sign* of an inward and spiritual grace.

The ceremonial laws of Moses were the *marks* to distinguish the people of God from the Gentiles.

BACON.

The sacring of the kings of France (as Loysel says) is the *sign* of their sovereign priesthood.

TEMPLE.

So likewise in application to objects which serve as characteristics of the person, the *mark* illustrates the spring of the action; the *sign* shows the state of the mind or sentiments; it is a *mark* of folly or weakness in a man to yield himself implicitly to the guidance of an in-

terested friend; tears are not always a *sign* of repentance.

These institutions and precepts were considered by the neighboring powers rather as *marks* of cowardice than wisdom.

GOLDSMITH.

It's but a bad *sign* of humility to declaim against pride.

COLLIER.

Note is rather a *sign* than a *mark*; but it is properly the *sign* which consists of *marks*, as a note of admiration (!); or, in the moral sense, the *sign* by which the object is known; as persons of *note*, that is, which have a *note* upon them, or that by which they are known.

They who appertain to the visible Church have all the *notes* of external profession.

HOOKER.

Symptom is rather a *mark* than a *sign*; it explains the cause or origin of complaints by the appearances they assume, and is employed as a technical term only in the science of medicine: as a foaming at the mouth and an abhorrence of drink are *symptoms* of canine madness; motion and respiration are *signs* of life; but it may likewise be used figuratively in application to moral objects.

This fall of the French monarchy was far from being preceded by any exterior *symptoms* of decline.

BURKE.

Token is a species of *mark* in the moral sense, *indication* a species of *sign*: a *mark* shows what is, a *token* serves to keep in mind what has been: a *gift* to a friend is a *mark* of one's affection and esteem: if it be permanent in its nature it becomes a *token*; friends who are in close intercourse have perpetual opportunities of showing each other *marks* of their regard by reciprocal acts of courtesy and kindness; when they separate for any length of time, they commonly leave some *token* of their tender sentiments in each other's hands, as a pledge of what shall be, as well as an evidence of what has been.

He came thither to the prince as he was taking coach, and was received by him with all the *marks* of affection and esteem.

BURNET.

The famous bull-feasts are an evident *token* of the Quixotism and romantic taste of the Spaniards.

SOMERVILLE.

Sign, as it respects *indication*, is said in abstract and general propositions: *indication* itself is only employed for a *sign* given by any individual; it bespeaks

the act of the persons: but the *sign* is only the face or appearance of the thing. When a man does not live consistently with the profession which he holds, it is a *sign* that his religion is built on a wrong foundation; parents are gratified when they observe the slightest *indications* of genius or goodness in their children.

At the same time the king was pleased to discharge forever to him and his heirs a feu duty that had been formerly payable to the exchequer out of the barony of Cadzou, a *sign* of the prevalence of his interest at that prince's court.

CRAUFORD.

It is certain Virgil's parents gave him a good education, to which they were inclined by the early *indications* he gave of a sweet disposition and excellent wit.

WALSH.

MARK, TRACE, VESTIGE, FOOTSTEP, TRACK.

The word MARK has already been considered at large in the preceding article, but it will admit of further illustration when taken in the sense of that which is visible, and serves to show the existing state of things; *mark* is here, as before, the most general and unqualified term; the other terms varying in the circumstances or manner of the *mark*. TRACE, in Italian *treccia*, Greek *τρεχειν*, to run, and Hebrew *darek*, way, signifies any continued *mark*. VESTIGE, in Latin *vestigium*, not improbably contracted from *pedis*, and *stigma* or *stigma*, from *στίλω*, to imprint, signifies a print of the foot. FOOTSTEP is taken for the place in which the foot has stepped, or the *mark* made by that step. TRACK, derived from the same as trace, signifies the way run, or the *mark* produced by that running.

The *mark* is said of a fresh and uninterrupted line; the *trace* is said of that which is broken by time: a carriage in driving along the sand leaves *marks* of the wheels, but in a short time all *traces* of its having been there will be lost; a *mark* is produced by the action of bodies on one another in every possible form; the spilling of a liquid may leave a *mark* on the floor; the blow of a stick leaves a *mark* on the body; but the *trace* is a *mark* produced only by bodies making a progress or proceeding in a continued course: the ship that cuts the waves,

and the bird that cuts the air, leaves no *trace* of their course behind; so men pass their lives, and after death leave no *traces* that they ever were. The *vestige* is a species of *mark* or *trace* caused by the feet of men, or, which is the same thing, by the works of active industry; as the *vestiges* of buildings: there are *traces* of the Roman roads still visible in England; there are many *vestiges* of Roman temples in Italy.

I have served him
In this old body; yet the *marks* remain
Of many wounds.

OTWAY.

The greatest favors to an ungrateful man are but like the motion of a ship upon the waves: they leave no *trace*, no sign behind them.

SOUTH.

Both Britain and Ireland had temples for the worship of the gods, the *vestiges* of which are now remaining.

PARSONS.

In an extended and moral application they are similarly distinguished. The *mark* serves to denote as well that which is as that which has been; as *marks* of desolation, or *marks* of antiquity: *trace* and *vestige* show the remains of something that has been; the former in reference to matters of intellectual research generally, the latter in reference to that which has been built up or pulled down, as there are *traces* of a universal affinity in all known languages; there are *vestiges* of ancient customs in different parts of England.

He tells us these Phisians had a very holy temple, in which there was no image either openly to be seen or kept in secret. This is certainly a *mark* of great antiquity.

BISHOP CUMBERLAND.

He could not certainly expect to find *traces* of his family in his Arundell marbles.

HOWARD'S ANECDOTES.

Her unexpensive though magnificent habits, and above all her own personal inspection, enabled her, in a short time, to remove every *vestige* of devastation which the civil wars had left.

WHITAKER.

Footstep is employed only for the *steps* of an individual: the *track* is made by the *steps* of many; it is the line which has been beaten out or made by stamping: the *footstep* is now commonly and properly employed only for men or brutes; but the *track* is applied to inanimate objects, as the wheel of a carriage. When Cacus took away the oxen of Hercules, he dragged them backward that they might not be *traced* by their *footsteps*: a *track*

of blood from the body of a murdered man may sometimes lead to the detection of the murderer.

Muse, first of Arden tell, whose *footsteps* yet are found
In her rough woodlands more than any other ground. DRAYTON.

Stanley, having dispersed the right wing, now pursued their *track*. HALL.

In the metaphorical application they do not signify a *mark*, but a course of conduct; the former respects one's moral feelings or mode of dealing; the latter one's mechanical and habitual manner of acting; the former is the consequence of having the same principles; the latter proceeds from imitation or constant repetition. A good son will walk in the *footsteps* of a good father. In the management of business, it is rarely wise in a young man to leave the *track* which has been *marked* out for him by his superiors in age and experience.

Virtue alone ennobles humankind,
And power should on her glorious *footsteps* wait. WYNNE.

Though all seems lost, 'tis impious to despair,
The *tracks* of Providence, like rivers, wind. HIGGONS.

MARK, BADGE, STIGMA.

MARK (*v. Mark, print*) is still the general, and the two others specific terms; they are employed for whatever serves to characterize persons externally, or betoken any part either of their character or circumstances: *mark* is employed either in a good, bad, or indifferent sense; *BADGE* in an indifferent one; *STIGMA* in a bad sense: a thing may either be a *mark* of honor, of disgrace, or of simple distinction: a *badge* is a *mark* simply of distinction; the *stigma* is a *mark* of disgrace. The *mark* is that which is conferred upon a person for his merits, as medals, stars, and ribbons are bestowed by princes upon meritorious officers and soldiers; or the *mark* attaches to a person, or is affixed to him, in consequence of his demerits; as a low situation in his class is a *mark* of disgrace to a scholar; or a fool's-cap is a *mark* of ignominy affixed to idlers and dunces; or a brand in the forehead is a *mark* of ignominy for criminals: the *badge* is that which is voluntarily assumed by one's self according

to established custom; it consists of dress, by which the office, station, and even religion of a particular community is distinguished: as the gown and wig is the *badge* of gentlemen in the law; the gown and surplice that of clerical men; the uniform of charity children is the *badge* of their condition; the peculiar habit of the Quakers and Methodists is the *badge* of their religion: the *stigma* consists not so much in what is openly imposed upon a person as what falls upon him in the judgment of others; it is the black *mark* which is set upon a person by the public, and is consequently the strongest of all *marks*, and one which every one most dreads, and every good man seeks least to deserve.

In these revolutionary meetings, every counsel, in proportion as it is daring and violent and perfidious, is taken for the *mark* of superior genius. BURKE.

The people of England look upon hereditary succession as a security for their liberty, not as a *badge* of servitude. BURKE.

The cross which our Saviour's enemies thought was to *stigmatize* him with infamy, became the ensign of his renown.

MARK, BUTT.

AFTER all that has been said upon the word *MARK* (*v. Mark, print*), it has this additional meaning in common with the word *BUTT*, that it implies an object aimed at: the *mark* is literally a *mark* that is said to be shot at by the *marksman* with a gun or a bow.

A fluttering dove upon the top they tie,
The living *mark* at which their arrows fly. DRYDEN.

It is also metaphorically employed for the man who by his peculiar characteristics makes himself the object of notice; he is the *mark* at which every one's looks and thoughts are directed: the *butt*, from the French *bout*, the end, is a species of *mark* in this metaphorical sense; but the former only calls forth general observation, the latter provokes the laughter and jokes of every one. Whoever renders himself conspicuous by his eccentricities, either in his opinions or his actions, must not complain if he become a *mark* for the derision of the public: it is a man's misfortune rather than his fault if he become the *butt* of a company who are rude and

unfeeling enough to draw their pleasures from another's pain.

I mean those honest gentlemen that are pelted by men, women, and children, by friends and foes, and, in a word, stand as *butts* in conversation. ADDISON.

TO MARK, NOTE, NOTICE.

MARK is here taken in the intellectual sense, fixing as it were a *mark* (*v. Mark*) upon a thing so as to keep it in mind, which is in fact to fix one's attention upon it in such a manner as to be able to distinguish it by its characteristic qualities: to *mark* is therefore altogether an intellectual act: to *NOTE* has the same end as that of *marking*; namely, to aid the memory, but one *notes* a thing by making a written *note* of it; this is therefore a mechanical act: to *NOTICE*, on the other hand, is a sensible operation, from *notitia*, knowledge, signifying to bring to one's knowledge, perception, or understanding by the use of our senses. We *mark* and *note* that which particularly interests us: the former is that which serves a present purpose; *notice* that which may be of use in future. The impatient lover *marks* the hours until the time arrives for meeting his mistress: travellers *note* whatever strikes them of importance to be remembered when they return home: *notice*, which is a species of noting in small matters, may serve either for the present or the future; we may *notice* things merely by way of amusement; as a child will *notice* the actions of animals, or we may *notice* a thing for the sake of bearing it in mind, as a person *notices* a particular road when he wishes to return by the same way.

Many who *mark* with such accuracy the course of time appear to have little sensibility of the decline of life. JOHNSON.

O treach'rous conscience! while she seems to sleep,
Unnoted, *notes* each moment misapplied. YOUNG.

An Englishman's *notice* of the weather is the natural consequence of changeable skies and uncertain seasons. JOHNSON.

MARRIAGE, WEDDING, NUPTIALS.

MARRIAGE, from *to marry*, denotes the act of *marrying*; WEDDING and NUPTIALS denote the ceremony of being *married*. To *marry*, in French *marier*,

and Latin *marito*, to be joined to a male; hence *marriage* comprehends the act of choosing and being legally bound to a man or a woman; *wedding*, from *wed*, and the Teutonic *welten*, to promise or betroth, implies the ceremony of *marrying*, inasmuch as it is binding upon the parties. *Nuptials* comes from the Latin *nubo*, to veil, because the Roman ladies were veiled at the time of *marriage*: hence it has been put for the whole ceremony itself. *Marriage* is an institution which, by those who have been blessed with the light of Divine Revelation, has always been considered as sacred: with some persons, particularly among the lower orders of society, the day of their *wedding* is converted into a day of riot and intemperance: among the Roman Catholics in England it has been the practice to have their *nuptials* solemnized by a priest of their own persuasion as well as by the Protestant clergyman.

O fatal maid! thy *marriage* is endow'd
With Phrygian, Latian, and Rutulian blood. DRYDEN.

Ask any one how he has been employed to-day, he will tell you, perhaps, I have been at the ceremony of taking the manly robe: this friend invited me to a *wedding*; that desired me to attend the hearing of his cause. MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF PLINY.

Fir'd with disdain for Turnus disposess'd,
And the new *nuptials* of the Trojan guest. DRYDEN.

MARRIAGE, MATRIMONY, WEDLOCK.

MARRIAGE (*v. Marriage*) is oftener an act than a state: MATRIMONY and WEDLOCK both describe states.

Marriage is taken in the sense of an act, when we speak of the laws of *marriage*, the day of one's *marriage*, the congratulations upon one's *marriage*, a happy or unhappy *marriage*, the fruits of one's *marriage*, and the like; it is taken in the sense of a state, when we speak of the pleasures or pains of *marriage*; but in this latter case *matrimony*, which signifies a *married* life abstractedly from all agents or acting persons, is preferable; so likewise, to think of *matrimony*, and to enter into the holy state of *matrimony*, are expressions founded upon the signification of the term. As *matrimony* is derived from *mater*, a mother, because *married* women are in general mothers, it

has particular reference to the domestic state of the two parties; broils are but too frequently the fruits of *matrimony*, yet there are few cases in which they might not be obviated by the good-sense of those who are engaged in them. Hasty *marriages* cannot be expected to produce happiness; young people who are eager for *matrimony* before they are fully aware of its consequences will purchase their experience at the expense of their peace. *Wedlock* is the old English word for *matrimony*, and is in consequence admitted in law, when one speaks of children born in *wedlock*; agreeably to its derivation, it has a reference to the bond of union which follows the *marriage*: hence one speaks of living happily in a state of *wedlock*, of being joined in holy *wedlock*.

Marriage is rewarded with some honorable distinctions which celibacy is forbidden to usurp.
JOHNSON.

As love generally produces *matrimony*, so it often happens that *matrimony* produces love.
SPECTATOR.

The men who would make good husbands, if they visit public places, are frighted at *wedlock*, and resolve to live single.
JOHNSON.

MARTIAL, WARLIKE, MILITARY, SOLDIER-LIKE.

MARTIAL, from *Mars*, the god of war, is the Latin term for belonging to war: **WARLIKE** signifies literally like *war*, having the image of war. In sense these terms approach so near to each other, that they may be easily admitted to supply each other's place; but custom, the lawgiver of language, has assigned an office to each that makes it not altogether indifferent how they are used. *Martial* is both a technical and a more comprehensive term than *warlike*; on the other hand, *warlike* designates the temper of the individual more than *martial*: we speak of *martial* array, *martial* preparations, *martial* law, a court *martial*; but of a *warlike* nation, meaning a nation who is fond of war; a *warlike* spirit or temper, also a *warlike* appearance, inasmuch as the temper is visible in the air and carriage of a man. **MILITARY**, from *miles*, signifies belonging to a soldier, and **SOLDIER-LIKE**, like a soldier. *Military*, in comparison with *martial*, is a term of particular import, *martial* hav-

ing always a reference to war in general; and *military* to the proceedings consequent upon that: hence we speak of *military* in distinction from naval, as *military* expeditions, *military* movements, and the like; but in characterizing the men, we should say that they had a *martial* appearance; but of a particular place, that it had a *military* appearance, if there were many soldiers. *Military*, compared with *soldier-like*, is used for the body, and the latter for the individual. The whole army is termed the *military*: the conduct of an individual is *soldier-like* or otherwise.

An active prince, and prone to *martial* deeds.
DRYDEN.

Last from the Volscians fair Camilla came,
And led her *warlike* troops, a warrior dame.
DRYDEN.

The Tascalans were, like all unpolished nations, strangers to *military* order and discipline.
ROBERTSON.

The fears of the Spaniards led them to presumptuous and *unsoldier-like* discussions concerning the propriety of their general's measures.
ROBERTSON.

MATTER, MATERIALS, SUBJECT.

MATTER and **MATERIALS** are both derived from the same source, namely, the Latin *materia*, which comes in all probability from *mater*, a mother, because *matter*, from which everything is made, acts in the production of bodies like a mother. **SUBJECT**, in Latin *subjectum*, participle of *subjicio*, to lie, signifies the thing lying under and forming the foundation.

Matter, in the physical application, is taken for all that composes the sensible world, in distinction from that which is spiritual, or discernible only by the thinking faculty; hence *matter* is always opposed to mind. In regard to *materials*, it is taken in an indivisible as well as a general sense; the whole universe is said to be composed of *matter*, though not of *materials*: on the other hand, *materials* consist of those particular parts of *matter* which serve for the artificial production of objects; and *matter* is said of those things which are the natural parts of the universe: a house, a table, and a chair, consist of *materials*, because they are works of art; but a plant, a tree, an animal body, consist of *matter*, because they are the productions of nature.

The motion of the planets round him (the sun) is performed in the same time, of consequence his quantity of *matter* still continues the same.
BRYDENE.

The *materials* of that building very fortunately ranged themselves into that delicate order that it must be very great chance that parts them.
TILLOTSON.

The distinction of these terms in their moral application is very similar; the *matter* which composes a moral discourse is what emanates from the author; but the *materials* are those with which one is furnished by others. The style of some writers is so indifferent that they disgrace the *matter* by the manner; periodical writers are furnished with *materials* for their productions out of the daily occurrences in the political and moral world. Writers of dictionaries endeavor to compress as much *matter* as possible into a small space; they draw their *materials* from every other writer.

Whence tumbled headlong from the height of life,
They furnish *matter* for the tragic muse.
THOMSON.

The principal *materials* of our comfort or uneasiness lie within ourselves.
BLAIR.

Matter seems to bear the same relation to *subject* as the whole does to any particular part, as it respects moral objects: the *subject* is the groundwork of the *matter*; the *matter* is that which flows out of the subject: the *matter* is that which we get by the force of invention; the *subject* is that which offers itself to notice: many persons may therefore have a *subject* who have no *matter*, that is, nothing in their own minds which they can offer by way of illustrating this *subject*: but it is not possible to have *matter* without a *subject*: hence the word *matter* is taken for the substance, and for that which is substantial; the *subject* is taken for that which engages the attention: we speak of a *subject* of conversation and *matter* for deliberation; a *subject* of inquiry, a *matter* of curiosity. Nations in a barbarous state afford but little *matter* worthy to be recorded in history; people who live a secluded life and in a contracted sphere have but few *subjects* to occupy their attention.

Son of God! Saviour of men! Thy name
Shall be the copious *matter* of my song.
MILTON.

Love hath such a strong virtual force that when it fasteneth on a pleasing *subject* it sets the imagination at a strange fit of working.
HOWELL.

MAXIM, PRECEPT, RULE, LAW.

MAXIM (*v. Axiom*) is a moral truth that carries its own weight with itself. **PRECEPT** (*v. Command*), **RULE** (*v. Guide*), and **LAW**, from *lex* and *lego*, signifying the thing specifically chosen or marked out, all borrow their weight from some external circumstance: the *precept* derives its authority from the individual delivering it; in this manner the *precepts* of our Saviour have a weight which gives them a decided superiority over everything else: the *rule* acquires a worth from its fitness for guiding us in our proceeding: the *law*, which is a species of *rule*, derives its weight from the sanction of power. *Maxims* are often *precepts*, inasmuch as they are communicated to us by our parents; they are *rules*, inasmuch as they serve as a *rule* for our conduct; they are *laws*, inasmuch as they have the sanction of conscience. We respect the *maxims* of antiquity as containing the essence of human wisdom; we reverence the *precepts* of religion as the foundation of all happiness; we regard the *rules* of prudence as preserving us from errors and misfortunes; we respect the *laws* as they are the support of civil society.

I think I may lay it down as a *maxim*, that every man of good common-sense may, if he pleases, most certainly be rich.
BUDGELL.

Philosophy has accumulated *precept* upon *precept* to warn us against the anticipation of future calamities.
JOHNSON.

I know not whether any *rule* has yet been fixed by which it may be decided when poetry can properly be called easy.
JOHNSON.

God is thy *law*, thou mine.
MILTON.

MEAN, PITIFUL, SORDID.

THE moral application of these terms to the characters of men, in their transactions with each other, is what constitutes their common signification. Whatever a man does in common with those below him is **MEAN**; it evinces a temper that is prone to sink rather than to rise in the scale of society: whatever makes him an object of pity, and consequently of contempt for his sunken character, makes him **PITIFUL**: whatever makes