others' distresses; a *sad* story contains an account of one's own distress; a *mournful* event befalls our friends and relatives; a *sad* misfortune befalls ourselves. Selfish people find nothing *mournful*, but many things *sad:* tender-hearted people are always affected by what is *mournful*, and are less troubled about what is *sad.*

Narcissa follows ere his tomb is closed,
Her death invades his *mournful* right, and claims
The grief that started from my lids for him.
YOUNG.

How *sad* a sight is human happiness
To those whose thoughts can pierce beyond an hour!
YOUNG.

MOVING, AFFECTING, PATHETIC.

THE MOVING is in general whatever moves the affections or the passions; the AFFECTING and PATHETIC are what move the *affections* in different degrees. The good or bad feelings may be *moved;* the tender feelings only are *affected.* A field of battle is a *moving* spectacle: the death of a friend is an *affecting* spectacle. The *affecting* acts by means of the senses as well as the understanding; the *pathetic* applies only to what is addressed to the heart: hence, a sight or a description is *affecting;* but an address is *pathetic.*

There is something so *moving* in the very image of weeping beauty.
STEELE.

I do not remember to have seen any ancient or modern story more *affecting* than a letter of Ann of Bouleyne.
ADDISON.

What think you of the bard's enchanting art,
Which, whether he attempts to warm the heart
With fabled scenes, or charm the ear with rhyme,
Breathes all *pathetic*, lovely, and sublime?
JENYNS.

MULTITUDE, CROWD, THRONG, SWARM.

THE idea of many is common to all these terms, and peculiar to that of MULTITUDE, from the Latin *multus;* CROWD, from the verb to *crowd*, signifies the many that *crowd* together; and THRONG, like the German *drängen*, to press, signifies the many that press together; and SWARM, like the German *schwärmen*, to fly about, signifies running together in numbers. These terms vary, either in regard to the object or the circumstance: *multitude* is applicable to any object; *crowd*, *throng*, and *swarm* are in the proper sense applicable only to animate objects: the two first in regard to persons; the latter to animals in general, but particularly brutes. A *multitude* may be either in a stagnant or a moving state; all the rest denote a *multitude* in a moving state: a *crowd* is always pressing, generally eager and tumultuous; a *throng* may be busy and active, but not always pressing or incommodious: it is always inconvenient, sometimes dangerous, to go into a *crowd;* it is amusing to see the *throng* that is perpetually passing in the streets of the city: the *swarm* is more active than either of the two others; it is commonly applied to bees which fly together in numbers, but sometimes to human beings, to denote their very great numbers when scattered about; thus the children of the poor in low neighborhoods *swarm* in the streets.

A *multitude* is incapable of framing orders.
TEMPLE.

The *crowd* shall Cæsar's Indian war behold.
DRYDEN.

I shone amid the heav'nly *throng*.
MASON.

Numberless nations, stretching far and wide,
Shall (I foresee it) soon, with Gothic *swarms*, come forth,
From ignorance's universal North.
SWIFT.

TO MUTILATE, MAIM, MANGLE.

MUTILATE, in Latin *mutilatus*, from *mutilo* and *mutilus*, Greek μυτιλος, without horns, signifies to take off any necessary part. MAIM and MANGLE are connected with the Latin *mancus*, which comes from *manus*, signifying to deprive of a hand or to wound in general.

Mutilate has the most extended meaning; it implies the abridging of any limb: *mangle* is applied to irregular wounds in any part of the body: *maim* is confined to wounds in the limbs, particularly the hands. Men are exposed to be *mutilated* by means of cannon-balls; they are in danger of being *mangled* when attacked promiscuously with the sword; they frequently get *maimed* when boarding vessels or storming places.

When a man is in danger of the *mutilation* of an arm, a leg, and the like, it is lawful to prevent the loss of either by the death of the assailant.
SOUTH.

By the ancient law of England, he that *maimed* any man whereby he lost any part of his body, was sentenced to lose the like part.
BLACKSTONE.

What have they (the French nobility) done that they should be hunted about, *mangled*, and tortured?
BURKE.

Mutilate and *mangle* are applicable to moral objects; *maim* is employed in the natural or figurative sense. In this case *mangle* is a much stronger term than *mutilate;* the latter signifies to lop off an essential part; to *mangle* is to *mutilate* a thing to such a degree as to render it useless or worthless. Every sect of Christians is fond of *mutilating* the Bible by setting aside such parts as do not favor its own scheme; and among them all the sacred Scriptures become literally *mangled*, and stripped of all its most important doctrines.

How Hales would have borne the *mutilations* which his Plea of the Crown has suffered from the editor, they who know his character will easily conceive.
JOHNSON.

I have shown the evil of *maiming* and splitting religion.
BLAIR.

MUTUAL, RECIPROCAL.

MUTUAL, in Latin *mutuus*, from *muto*, to change, signifies exchanged so as to be equal, or the same, on both sides. RECIPROCAL, in Latin *reciprocus*, from *recipio*, to take back, signifies giving backward and forward by way of return. *Mutual* supposes a sameness in condition at the same time: *reciprocal* supposes an alternation or succession of returns. Exchange is free and voluntary; we give in exchange, and this action is *mutual:* return is made either according to law or equity; it is obligatory, and when equally obligatory on each in turn it is *reciprocal.* Voluntary disinterested services rendered to each other are *mutual:* imposed or merited services, returned from one to the other, are *reciprocal:* friends render one another *mutual* services; the services between servants and masters are *reciprocal.* The husband and wife pledge their faith to each other *mutually;* they are *reciprocally* bound to keep their vow of fidelity. The sentiment is *mutual*, the tie is *reciprocal.*

Faults in the life breed errors in the brain,
And these, *reciprocally*, those again
The mind and conduct *mutually* imprint,
And stamp their image in each other's mint.
COWPER.

Mutual applies mostly to matters of will and opinion: a *mutual* affection, a *mutual* inclination to oblige, a *mutual* interest for each other's comfort, a *mutual* concern to avoid that which will displease the other — these are the sentiments which render the marriage state happy: *reciprocal* ties, *reciprocal* bonds, *reciprocal* rights, *reciprocal* duties—these are what every one ought to bear in mind as a member of society, that he may expect of no man more than what in equity he is disposed to return.

The soul and spirit that animates and keeps up society is *mutual* trust.
SOUTH.

Life cannot subsist in society but by *reciprocal* concessions.
JOHNSON.

Mutual applies to nothing but what is personal; *reciprocal* is applied to things remote from the idea of personality, as *reciprocal* verbs, *reciprocal* terms, *reciprocal* relations, and the like.

MYSTERIOUS, MYSTIC.

MYSTERIOUS (*v. Dark*) and MYSTIC are but variations of the same original; the former, however, is more commonly applied to that which is supernatural, or veiled in an impenetrable obscurity; the latter to that which is natural, but concealed by an artificial or fantastical veil; hence we speak of the *mysterious* plans of Providence: *mystic* schemes of theology, or *mystic* principles.

As soon as that *mysterious* veil, which now covers futurity, was (should be) lifted up, all the gayety of life would disappear.
BLAIR.

And ye five other wand'ring fires, that move
In *mystic* dance not without song,
Resound his praise.
MILTON.

N.

TO NAME, CALL.

NAME, which comes, through the medium of the Northern languages, from the Hebrew *nam*, is properly to pronounce a word, but is now employed for distinguishing or addressing one by *name.* To CALL (*v. To call*) signifies properly to address one loudly, consequently we may *name* without *calling*, when we only mention a *name* in conversation; and we may *call* without *naming.*

Some haughty Greek, who lives thy tears to see,
Embitters all thy woes, by *naming* me.
POPE.

And oft the nightly necromancer boasts,
With these to *call* from tombs the stalking ghosts.
DRYDEN.

The terms may, however, be employed in the sense of assigning a *name*. In this case a person is *named* by his *name*, whether proper, patronymic, or whatever is usual; he is *called* according to the characteristics by which he is distinguished. The Emperor Tiberius was *named* Tiberius; he was *called* a monster. William the First of England is *named* William; he is *called* the Conqueror.

I lay the deep foundations of a wall,
And Ænos, *nam'd* from me, the city *call*.
DRYDEN.

I'll *call* thee Hamlet,
King, father, royal Dane; oh answer me.
SHAKSPEARE.

NAME, APPELLATION, TITLE, DENOMINATION.

NAME, *v. To name*. APPELLATION, in French *appellation*, Latin *appellatio*, from *appello*, to call, signifies that by which a person is called. TITLE, in French *titre*, Latin *titulus*, from the Greek τιω, to honor, signifies that appellation which is assigned to any one for the purpose of honor. DENOMINATION signifies that which *denominates* or distinguishes.

Name is a generic term, the rest are specific. Whatever word is employed to distinguish one thing from another is a *name;* therefore, an *appellation* and a *title* is a *name*, but not *vice versa*. A *name* is either common or proper; an *appellation* is generally a common *name* given for some specific purpose as characteristic. Several kings of France had the *names* of Charles, Louis, Philip; but one was distinguished by the *appellation* of Stammerer, another by that of the Simple, and a third by that of the Hardy, arising from particular characters or circumstances. A *title* is a species of *appellation*, not drawn from anything personal, but conferred as a ground of political distinction. An *appellation* may be often a term of reproach; but a *title* is always a mark of honor. An *appellation* is given to all objects, animate or inanimate; a *title* is given mostly to persons, sometimes to things. A particular house may have the *appellation* of "the Cottage," or "the Hall," as a particular person may have the *title* of Duke, Lord, or Marquis.

Then on your *name* shall wretched mortals call,
And offer'd victims at your altars fall. DRYDEN.

The *names* derived from the profession of the ministry, in the language of the present age, are made but the *appellatives* of scorn. SOUTH.

We generally find in *titles* an intimation of some particular merit that should recommend men to the high stations which they possess.
ADDISON.

Denomination is to particular bodies, what *appellation* is to an individual; namely, a term of distinction, drawn from their peculiar characters and circumstances. The Christian world is split into a number of different bodies or communities, under the *denominations* of Catholics, Protestants, Calvinists, Presbyterians, etc., which have their origin in the peculiar form of faith and discipline adopted by these bodies.

It has cost me much care and thought to marshal and fix the people under their proper *denominations*. ADDISON.

TO NAME, DENOMINATE, STYLE, ENTITLE, DESIGNATE, CHARACTERIZE.

To NAME (*v. To name, call*) signifies simply to give a *name* to, or to address or specify by the given *name;* to DENOMINATE is to give a specific *name* upon specific ground, to distinguish by the *name;* to STYLE, from the noun *style* or manner (*v. Diction, style*), signifies to address by a specific *name;* to ENTITLE is to give the specific or appropriate title. Adam *named* everything; we *denominate* the man who drinks excessively, "a drunkard;" subjects *style* their monarch "His Majesty;" books are *entitled* according to the judgment of the author.

I could *name* some of our acquaintance who have been obliged to travel as far as Alexandria in pursuit of money.
MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

A fable in tragic or epic poetry is *denominated* simple, when the events it contains follow each other in an unbroken tenor. WARTON.

Happy those times
When lords were *styl'd* fathers of families.
SHAKSPEARE.

To *name*, *denominate*, *style*, and *entitle*, are the acts of conscious agents only. To DESIGNATE, signifying to mark out, and CHARACTERIZE, signifying to form a *characteristic*, are said only of things, and agree with the former only inasmuch as words may either *designate* or *characterize:* thus the word "capacity" is said to *designate* the power of holding; and "finesse" *characterizes* the people by whom it was adopted.

This is a plain *designation* of the Duke of Marlborough. One kind of stuff used to fatten land is called marl, and every one knows that borough is the *name* of a town. SWIFT.

There are faces not only individual, but gentilitious and national, as European, Asiatic, African, and Grecian faces, which are *characterized*. ARBUTHNOT.

NAME, REPUTATION, REPUTE, CREDIT.

NAME is here taken in the improper sense for a *name* acquired in public by any peculiarity or quality in an object. REPUTATION and REPUTE, from *reputo*, or *re* and *puto*, to think back, or in reference to some immediate object, signifies the thinking of or the state of being thought of by the public, or held in public estimation. CREDIT (*v. Credit*) signifies the state of being believed or trusted in general.

Name implies something more specific than the *reputation;* and *reputation* something more substantial than *name;* a *name* may be acquired by some casualty or by some quality that has more show than worth; *reputation* is acquired only by time, and built only on merit: a *name* may be arbitrarily given, simply by way of distinction; *reputation* is not given, but acquired, or follows as a consequence of one's honorable exertions. A physician sometimes gets a *name* by a single instance of professional skill, which by a combination of favorable circumstances he may convert to his own advantage in forming an extensive practice; but unless he have a commensurate degree of talent, this *name* will never ripen into a solid *reputation*.

Who fears not to do ill, yet fears the *name*,
And free from conscience, is a slave to fame.
DENHAM.

Splendor of *reputation* is not to be counted among the necessaries of life. JOHNSON.

Name and *reputation* are of a more extended nature than *repute* and *credit*. The *name* and *reputation* are given by the public at large; the *repute* and *credit* are acquired within a narrow circle. Strangers and distant countries hear of the *name* and the *reputation* of anything; but only neighbors and those who have the means of personal observation can take a part in its *repute* and *credit*. It is possible, therefore, to have a *name* and *reputation* without having *repute* and *credit*, and *vice versa*, for the objects which constitute the former are sometimes different from those which produce the latter. A manufacturer has a *name* for the excellence of a particular article of his own manufacture; a book has a *name* among witlings and pretenders to literature: a good writer, however, seeks to establish his *reputation* for genius, learning, industry, or some praiseworthy characteristic: a preacher is in high *repute* among those who attend him: a master gains great *credit* from the good performances of his scholars. There is also this distinction between *reputation* and *repute*, that *reputation* signifies the act of reputing or the state of being reputed, *repute* signifies only the state of being reputed.

What men of *name* resort to him. SHAKSPEARE.

The slow sale and tardy *reputation* of this book (Paradise Lost) have always been mentioned as evidences of neglected merit. JOHNSON.

Mutton has likewise been in great *repute* among our valiant countrymen. ADDISON.

Would you true happiness attain,
Let honesty your passions rein;
So live in *credit* and esteem,
And the good *name* you lost, redeem. GAY.

Name and *repute* are taken either in a good or bad sense; *reputation* mostly, and *credit* always, is taken in the good sense only: a person or thing may get a good or an ill *name;* a person or thing may be in good or ill *repute;* *reputation* may rise to different degrees of height, or it may sink again into nothing; *credit* may likewise be high or low, but both *reputation* and *credit*, absolutely taken imply that which is good.

The king's army was the last enemy the West had been acquainted with, and had left no good *name* behind them. CLARENDON.

Who can imagine that it should grow into such *repute* of a sudden. WATERLAND ON THE CREED.

The first degree of literary *reputation* is certainly due to him who adorns or improves his country by original writings. JOHNSON.

His name, together with the intrinsic worth and value of the form itself, gave it *credit* enough to be received in France as an orthodox Formulary, or System of Faith, about the middle of the sixth century. WATERLAND.

NATAL, NATIVE, INDIGENOUS.

NATAL, in Latin-*natalis*, from *natus*, signifies belonging to one's birth, or the act of one's being born; but NATIVE, in Latin *nativus*, likewise from *natus*, signifies having the origin or beginning. INDIGENOUS, in Latin *indigena*, from *inde* and *genitus*, signifies sprung from that place.

The epithet *natal* is applied only to the circumstance of a man's birth, as his *natal* day; his *natal* hour; a *natal* song; a *natal* star. *Native* has a more extensive meaning, as it comprehends the idea of one's relationship by origin to an object; as one's *native* country, one's *native* soil, *native* village, or *native* place, *native* language, and the like.

Safe in the hand of one disposing pow'r,
Or in the *natal*, or the mortal hour. POPE.

Nor can the grov'lling mind
In the dark dungeon of the limbs confin'd,
Assert the *native* skies or own its heav'nly kind.
DRYDEN.

Indigenous is a particular term used to denote the country where races of men are supposed to have first existed.

Negroes were all originally transported from Africa, and not *indigenous* or proper natives of America. BROWN.

It is also applied to plants in the same sense.

The other *indigenous* productions of this class are plantains, capavi, and sweet-potatoes.
EDWARDS.

NATIVE, NATURAL.

NATIVE (*v. Natal*) is to NATURAL as a species to the genus: everything *native* is, according to its strict signification, *natural;* but many things are *natural* which are not *native*. Of a person we may say that his worth is *native*, to designate that it is some valuable property which is born with him, not foreign to him, or ingrafted upon his character; but we say of his disposition, that it is *natural*, as opposed to that which is acquired or otherwise. The former is mostly employed in a good sense, in opposition to what is artful, assumed, and unreal; the other is used in an indifferent sense, as opposed to whatever is the effect of habit or circumstances. When children display themselves with all their *native* simplicity, they are interesting objects of notice: when they display their *natural* turn of mind, it is not always that which tends to raise human nature in our esteem.

Music awakes
The *native* voice of undissembled joy.
THOMSON.

He had a good *natural* understanding.
WHITAKER.

NATURALLY, IN COURSE, CONSEQUENTLY, OF COURSE.

THE connection between events, actions, and things is expressed by all these terms. NATURALLY signifies according to the *nature* of things, and applies therefore to the connection which subsists between events according to the original constitution or inherent properties of things: IN COURSE signifies *in* the *course* of things, that is, in the regular order that things ought to follow: CONSEQUENTLY signifies by a *consequence*, that is, by a necessary law of dependence, which makes one thing follow another: OF COURSE signifies on account *of* the *course* which things most commonly or even necessarily take. Whatever happens *naturally*, happens as it should do; whatever happens *in course*, happens as we approve of it: whatever follows *consequently*, follows as we judge it right; whatever follows *of course*, follows as we expect it. Children *naturally* imitate their parents: people *naturally* fall into the habits of those they associate with: both these circumstances result from the *nature* of things; whoever is made a peer of the realm, takes his seat in the upper house *in course;* he requires no other qualification to entitle him to this privilege, he goes thither according to the established *course* of things; *consequently*, as a peer, he is admitted without question; this is a decision of the judgment by which the question is at once determined: *of course* none are admitted who are not peers; this flows necessarily out of the constituted law of the land.

Egotists are generally the vain and shallow part of mankind; people being *naturally* full of themselves when they have nothing else in them. ADDISON.

The forty-seventh proposition of the first book of Euclid is the foundation of trigonometry, and *consequently* of navigation. BARTLETT.

What do trust and confidence signify in a matter *of course* and formality? STILLINGFLEET.

Our Lord foresaw that all the Mosaic orders would cease *in course* upon his death.
BEVERIDGE.

NECESSARY, EXPEDIENT, ESSENTIAL, REQUISITE.

NECESSARY (*v. Necessity*), from the Latin *necesse* and *ne cedo*, signifies not to be departed from. EXPEDIENT signifies belonging to, or forming a part of, expedition or despatch: ESSENTIAL, containing that essence or property which cannot be omitted. REQUISITE signifies literally required (*v. To demand*).

Necessary is a general and indefinite term; things may be *necessary* in the course of nature; it is *necessary* for all men once to die; or they may be *necessary* according to the circumstances of the case, or our views of *necessity;* in this manner we conceive it *necessary* to call upon another. *Expedient*, *essential*, and *requisite* are modes of relative *necessity:* the *expedience* of a thing is a matter of discretion and calculation, and therefore not so self-evidently *necessary* as many things which we so denominate: it may be *expedient* for a person to consult another, or it may not, according as circumstances may present themselves. The *requisite* and the *essential* are more obviously *necessary* than the *expedient;* but the former is less so than the latter: what is *requisite* may be *requisite* only in part or entirely; it may be *requisite* to complete a thing when begun, but not to begin it; the *essential*, on the contrary, is that which constitutes the *essence*, and without which a thing cannot exist. It is *requisite* for one who will have a good library to select only the best authors; exercise is *essential* for the preservation of good health. In all matters of dispute it is *expedient* to be guided by some impartial judge; it is *requisite* for every member of the community to contribute his share to the public expenditure as far as he is able: it is *essential* to a teacher, particularly a spiritual teacher, to know more than those he teaches.

One tells me he thinks it absolutely *necessary* for women to have true notions of right and equity. ADDISON.

It is highly *expedient* that men should, by some settled scheme of duties, be rescued from the tyranny of caprice. JOHNSON.

The English do not consider their Church establishment as convenient, but as *essential* to their State. BURKE.

It is not enough to say that faith and piety, joined with active virtue, constitute the *requisite* preparation for heaven: they in truth begin the enjoyment of heaven. BLAIR.

NECESSITIES, NECESSARIES.

NECESSITY, in Latin *necessitas*, and NECESSARY, in Latin *necessarius*, from *necesse*, or *ne* and *cedo*, signify not to be yielded or given up. *Necessity* is the mode or state of circumstances, or the thing which circumstances render *necessary;* the *necessary* is that which is absolutely and unconditionally *necessary*. Art has ever been busy in inventing things to supply the various *necessities* of our nature, and yet there are always numbers who want even the first *necessaries* of life. Habit and desire create *necessities;* nature only requires *necessaries:* a voluptuary has *necessities* which are unknown to a temperate man; the poor have in general little more than *necessaries*.

Those whose condition has always restrained them to the contemplation of their own *necessities* will scarcely understand why nights and days should be spent in study. JOHNSON.

To make a man happy, virtue must be accompanied with at least a moderate provision of all the *necessaries* of life, and not disturbed by bodily pains. BUDGELL.

NECESSITY, NEED.

NECESSITY, *v. Necessary*. NEED, in Saxon *nead*, *neod*, Icelandish *nöd*, German *noth*, is probably connected with *near*, and the German *genau*, exact, close, as also the Greek *αναγκη*, which denotes contraction.

Necessity respects the thing wanted; *need* the condition of the person wanting. There would be no *necessity* for punishments, if there were not evil-doers; he is peculiarly fortunate who finds a friend in time of *need*. *Necessity* is more pressing than *need:* the former places in a positive state of compulsion to act; it is said to have no law, it prescribes the law for itself; the latter yields to circumstances, and leaves in a state of deprivation. We are frequently under the *necessity* of going without that of which we stand most in *need*.

Where *necessity* ends, curiosity begins.
JOHNSON.

One of the many advantages of friendship, is that one can say to one's friend the things that stand in *need* of pardon. POPE.

From these two nouns arise two epithets for each, which are worthy of observation, namely, *necessary* and *needful*, *necessitous* and *needy*. *Necessary* and *needful* are both applicable to the thing wanted; *necessitous* and *needy* to the person wanting: NECESSARY is applied to every object indiscriminately; NEEDFUL only to such objects as supply temporary or partial wants. Exercise is *necessary* to preserve the health of the body; restraint is *necessary* to preserve that of the mind; assistance is *needful* for one who has not sufficient resources in himself: it is *necessary* to go by water to the Continent: money is *needful* for one who is travelling. The dissemination of knowledge is *necessary* to dispel the ignorance which would otherwise prevail in the world; it is *needful* for a young person to attend to the instructions of his teacher, if he will improve.

It seems to me most strange that men should fear,
Seeing that death, a *necessary* end,
Will come, when it will come. SHAKSPEARE.

Time, long expected, eas'd us of our load,
And brought the *needful* presence of a god.
DRYDEN.

Necessitous and *needy* are both applied to persons in want of something important; but *necessitous* may be employed to denote an occasional want, as to be in a *necessitous* condition in a foreign country for want of remittances from home; *needy* denotes a permanent state of want, as to be *needy* either from extravagance or misfortune.

Steele's imprudence of generosity, or vanity of profusion, kept him always incurably *necessitous*. JOHNSON.

Charity is the work of Heaven, which is always laying itself out on the *needy* and the impotent. SOUTH.

TO NEGLECT, OMIT.

NEGLECT, *v. To disregard*. OMIT, in Latin *omitto*, or *ob* and *mitto*, signifies to put aside.

The idea of letting pass or slip, or of not using, is comprehended in the signification of both these terms; the former is, however, a culpable, the latter an indifferent, action. What we *neglect* ought not to be *neglected*: but what we *omit* may by *omitted* or otherwise, as convenience requires.

It is the great excellence of learning, that it borrows very little from time or place; but this quality which constitutes much of its value is one occasion of *neglect*. What may be done at all times with equal propriety is deferred from day to day, till the mind is gradually reconciled to the *omission*. JOHNSON.

These terms differ likewise in the objects to which they are applied; that is *neglected* which is practicable or serves for action; that is *omitted* which serves for intellectual purposes: we *neglect* an opportunity, we *neglect* the means, the time, the use, and the like; we *omit* a word, a sentence, a figure, a stroke, a circumstance, and the like.

In heaven,
Where honor due, and reverence none *neglect*.
MILTON.

These personal comparisons I *omit*, because I would say nothing that may savor of flattery. BACON.

NEGLIGENT, REMISS, CARELESS, THOUGHTLESS, HEEDLESS, INATTENTIVE.

NEGLIGENCE (*v. To disregard*) and REMISSNESS respect the outward action: CARELESS, HEEDLESS, THOUGHTLESS, and INATTENTIVE respect the state of the mind.

Negligence and *remissness* consist in not doing what ought to be done; *carelessness* and the other mental defects may show themselves in doing wrong, as well as in not doing at all; *negligence* and *remissness* are, therefore, to *carelessness* and the others, as the effect to the cause; for no one is so apt to be *negligent* and *remiss* as he who is *careless*, although at the same time *negligence* and *remissness* arise from other causes, and *carelessness*, *thoughtlessness*, etc., produce likewise other effects. *Negligent* is a stronger term than *remiss*: one is *negligent* in *neglecting* the thing that is expressly before one's eyes; one is *remiss* in forgetting that which was enjoined some time previously: the want of will renders a person *negligent*; the want of interest renders a person *remiss*: one is *negligent* in regard to business, and the performance of bodily labor; one is *remiss* in duty, or in such things as respect mental exertion. Servants are commonly *negligent* in what concerns their master's

interest; teachers are *remiss* in not correcting the faults of their pupils. *Negligence* is therefore the fault of persons of all descriptions, but particularly those in low condition; *remissness* is a fault peculiar to those in a more elevated station: a clerk in an office is *negligent* in not making proper memorandums; a magistrate, or the head of an institution, is *remiss* in the exercise of his authority to check irregularities.

The two classes most apt to be *negligent* of this duty (religious retirement) are the men of pleasure and the men of business. BLAIR.

My gen'rous brother is of gentle kind,
He seems *remiss*, but bears a valiant mind.
POPE.

Careless denotes the want of care (*v. Care*) in the manner of doing things; *thoughtless* denotes the want of thought or reflection about things; *heedless* denotes the want of heeding (*v. To attend*) or regarding things; *inattentive* denotes the want of attention to things (*v. To attend to*). One is *careless* only in trivial matters of behavior; one is *thoughtless* in matters of greater moment, in what respects the conduct. *Carelessness* leads children to make mistakes in their mechanical exercises, in whatever they commit to memory or to paper; *thoughtlessness* leads many who are not children into serious errors of conduct, when they do not think of, or bear in mind, the consequences of their actions. *Thoughtless* is applied to things past, present, or to come; *careless* to things present or to come.

If the parts of time were not variously colored, we should never discern their departure and succession, but should live *thoughtless* of the past, and *careless* of the future. JOHNSON.

Careless is applied to such things as require permanent care; *thoughtless* to such as require permanent thought; *heedless* and *inattentive* are applied to passing objects that engage the senses or the thoughts of the moment. One is *careless* in business, *thoughtless* in conduct, *heedless* in walking or running, *inattentive* in listening: *heedless* children are unfit to go by themselves; *inattentive* children are unfit to be led by others.

There in the ruin, *heedless* of the dead,
The shelter-seeking peasant builds his shed.
GOLDSMITH.

In the midst of his glory the Almighty is not *inattentive* to the meanest of his subjects. BLAIR.

TO NEGOTIATE, TREAT FOR OR ABOUT, TRANSACT.

THE idea of conducting business with others is included in the signification of all these terms; but they differ in the mode of conducting it, and the nature of the business to be conducted. NEGOTIATE, in the Latin *negotiatus*, participle of *negotior*, from *negotium*, is applied in the original mostly to merchandise or traffic, but it is more commonly employed in the complicated concerns of governments and nations. TREAT, from the Latin *tracto*, frequentative of *traho*, to draw, signifies to turn over and over or set forth in all ways: these two verbs, therefore, suppose deliberation; but TRANSACT, from *transactus*, participle of *transago*, to carry forward or bring to an end, supposes more direct agency than consultation or deliberation; this latter is therefore adapted to the more ordinary and less entangled concerns of commerce. A congress carries on *negotiations* for the establishment of good order among different states; individual states *treat* with each other, to settle their particular differences. To *negotiate* mostly respects political concerns, except in the case of *negotiating* bills: to *treat*, as well as *transact*, is said of domestic and private concerns: we *treat* with a person about the purchase of a house; and *transact* our business with him by making good the purchase and paying down the money.

That weighty business to *negotiate*
They must find one of special weight and trust.
DRAYTON.

To *treat* the peace a hundred senators
Shall be commissioned. DRYDEN.

It cannot be expected that they should mention particulars which were *transacted* among some few of the disciples only, as the transfiguration and the agony. ADDISON.

As nouns, *negotiation* expresses rather the act of deliberating than the thing deliberated: *treaty* includes the ideas of the terms proposed, and the arrangement of those terms: *transaction* expresses the idea of something actually done and finished. *Negotiations* are sometimes very long pending before the preliminary terms are even proposed, or any basis

is defined; *treaties* of commerce are entered into by all civilized countries, in order to obviate mĭsunderstandings, and enable them to preserve an amicable intercourse; the *transactions* which daily pass in a great metropolis, like that of London, are of so multifarious a nature, and so infinitely numerous, that the bare contemplation of them fills the mind with astonishment. *Negotiations* are long or short; *treaties* are advantageous or the contrary; *transactions* are honorable or dishonorable.

I do not love to mingle speech with any about news or worldly *negotiations* in God's holy house. HOWELL.

You have a great work in hand, for you write to me that you are upon a *treaty* of marriage. HOWELL.

It is not to the purpose of this history to set down the particular *transactions* of this *treaty*. CLARENDON.

NEIGHBORHOOD, VICINITY.

NEIGHBORHOOD, from *nigh*, signifies the place which is nigh, that is, nigh to one's habitation. VICINITY, from *vicus*, a village, signifies the place which does not exceed in distance the extent of a village.

Neighborhood, which is of Saxon origin, is employed in reference to the inhabitants, or in regard to inhabited places, to denote nearness of persons to each other or to objects in general: but *vicinity*, which in Latin bears the same acceptation as *neighborhood*, is employed in English to denote nearness of one object to another, whether person or thing; hence the propriety of saying, a populous *neighborhood*, a quiet *neighborhood*, a respectable *neighborhood*, a pleasant *neighborhood*, and to be in the *neighborhood*, either as it respects the people or the country; to live in the *vicinity* of a manufactory, to be in the *vicinity* of the metropolis or of the sea.

He feared the dangerous *neighborhood* of so powerful, aspiring, and fortunate a prince. TEMPLE.

The Dutch, by the *vicinity* of their settlements to the coast of Caraccas, gradually engrossed the greatest part of the cocoa trade. ROBERTSON.

NEW, NOVEL, MODERN, FRESH, RECENT.

NEW is in German *neu*, Latin *novus*, and Greek νεος; NOVEL is more immediately derived from the Latin *novus*; MODERN, in low Latin *modernus*, is probably changed from *hodiernus*, *i. e.*, being of to-day; FRESH, in German *frisch*, probably from *frieren*, to freeze, because cold is the predominant idea in its application to the air; RECENT, in Latin *recens*, from *re* and *candeo*, to whiten, *i. e.*, to brighten or make appear like *new*.

All these epithets are applied to what has not long existed; *new* expresses this idea simply without any qualification; *novel* is something strange or unexpected; the *modern* is the thing of to-day, as distinguished from that which existed in fore times; the *fresh* is that which is so *new* as not to be the worse for use, or that which has not been before used or employed; the *recent* is that which is so *new* as to appear as if it were just made or done. Agreeably to this distinction, *new* is most aptly applied to such things as may be permanent or durable, as *new* houses, *new* buildings, *new* clothes, and the like; in such cases it is properly opposed to the old; the term may, however, be applied generally to whatever arises or comes first into existence or notice, as *new* scenes, *new* sights, *new* sounds.

'Tis on some evening sunny, grateful, mild,
When naught but balm is beaming through the woods,
With yellow lustre bright, that the *new* tribes
Visit the spacious heav'ns. THOMSON.

Novel may be applied to whatever is either never or but rarely seen; the freezing of the river Thames is a *novelty*; but the frost in every winter is something *new* when it first comes.

As the liturgy, so the ceremonies used and enjoined in the Church of England, were not the private and *novel* inventions of any late bishops, but they were of very ancient choice and primitive use in the Church of Christ. GAUDEN.

Modern is applied to that which is *new*, or springs up in the day or age in which we live; as *modern* books, *modern* writers, *modern* science; a book is *new* which is just formed into a book and has not been used; it is *modern* at the time when it is first published; so likewise principles are *new* which have never been broached before; they are *modern* if they have been published lately, or within a given period: the *modern* is opposed to the ancient.

Some of the ancient, and likewise divers of the *modern* writers that have labored in natural magic, have noted a sympathy between the sun and certain herbs. BACON.

Do not all men complain how little we know, and how much is still unknown? And can we ever know more unless something *new* be discovered? BURNET.

Fresh is said of that which may lose its color, vigor, or other perfection; as a *fresh* flower, the *freshness* of youth, etc.

Lo! great Æneas rushes to the fight,
Sprung from a god, and more than mortal bold,
He *fresh* in youth, and I in arms grown old.
DRYDEN.

So pleasures or passions are *fresh* which have not lost their power by satiety; they are *new* if they are but just sprung into activity.

That love which first was set will first decay,
Mine of a *fresher* date will longer stay. DRYDEN.

Seasons but change *new* pleasures to produce,
And elements contend to serve our use. JENYNS.

Recent is applied to those events or circumstances which have just happened, as a *recent* transaction, or an occurrence of *recent* date.

He was far from deficient in natural understanding: and, what strongly marks an ingenuous mind in a state of *recent* elevation, depressed by a consciousness of his own deficiencies. WHITAKER.

NEWS, TIDINGS.

NEWS implies anything *new* that is related or circulated; but TIDINGS, from *tide*, signifies that which flows in periodically like the tide. *News* is unexpected; it serves to gratify idle curiosity: *tidings* are expected; they serve to allay anxiety. In time of war the public are eager after *news*; and they who have relatives in the army are anxious to have *tidings* of them.

I wonder that in the present situation of affairs you can take pleasure in writing anything but *news*. SPECTATOR.

Too soon some demon to my father bore
The *tidings* that his heart with anguish tore. FALCONER.

NIGHTLY, NOCTURNAL.

NIGHTLY, immediately from the word *night*, and NOCTURNAL, from *nox*, night, signify belonging to the night, or the night season; the former is therefore more familiar than the latter: we speak of *nightly* depredations to express what passes every night, or *nightly* disturbances, *nocturnal* dreams, *nocturnal* visits.

Yet not alone, while thou
Visit'st my slumbers *nightly*, or when morn
Purples the east. MILTON.

Or save the sun his labor, and that swift
Nocturnal and diurnal rhomb suppos'd
Invisible else above all stars the wheel
Of day and night. MILTON.

NOBLE, GRAND.

NOBLE, in Latin *nobilis*, from *nosco*, to know, signifying knowable, or worth knowing, is a term of general import; it simply implies the quality by which a thing is distinguished for excellence above other things: the GRAND (*v. Grandeur*) is, properly speaking, one of those qualities by which an object acquires the name of *noble*; but there are many *noble* objects which are not denominated *grand*. A building may be denominated *noble* for its beauty as well as its size; but a *grand* building is rather so called for the expense which is displayed upon it in the style of building. A family may be either *noble* or *grand*; but it is *noble* by birth; it is *grand* by wealth, and an expensive style of living. *Nobleness* of acting or thinking comprehends all moral excellence that rises to a high pitch; but *grandeur* of mind is peculiarly applicable to such actions or traits as denote an elevation of character, rising above all that is common.

What then worlds
In a far thinner element sustain'd,
And acting the same part with greater skill,
More rapid movement, and for *noblest* ends.
YOUNG.

More obvious ends to pass, are not these stars,
The seats majestic, proud imperial thrones,
On which angelic delegates of Heav'n
Discharge high trusts of vengeance or of love,
To clothe in outward grandeur *grand* designs?
YOUNG.

NOISE, CRY, OUTCRY, CLAMOR.

NOISE is any loud sound; CRY, OUTCRY, and CLAMOR, are particular kinds of *noises*, differing either in the cause or the nature of the sounds. A *noise* proceeds either from animate or inanimate objects; the *cry* proceeds only from animate objects. The report of a cannon, or the loud sounds occasioned by a high wind, are *noises*, but not *cries*; *cries* issue from birds, beasts, and men. A *noise* is

produced often by accident; a *cry* is always occasioned by some particular circumstance: when many horses and carriages are going together they make a great *noise;* hunger and pain cause *cries* to proceed both from animals and human beings. *Noise*, when compared with *cry*, is sometimes only an audible sound; the *cry* is a very loud *noise:* whatever disturbs silence, as the falling of a pin in a perfectly still assembly, is denominated a *noise;* but a *cry* is that which may often drown other *noises*, as the *cries* of people selling things about the streets.

Nor was his ear less peal'd
With *noises* loud and ruinous. MILTON.

From either host, the mingled shouts and *cries*
Of Trojans and Rutilians rend the skies.
DRYDEN.

A *cry* is in general a regular sound, but *outcry* and *clamor* are irregular sounds; the former may proceed from one or many, the latter from many in conjunction. A *cry* after a thief becomes an *outcry* when set up by many at a time; it becomes a *clamor*, if accompanied with shouting, bawling, and *noises* of a mixed and tumultuous nature.

And now great deeds
Had been achiev'd, whereof all hell had rung,
Had not the snaky sorceress, that sat
Fast by hell gate, and kept the fatal key,
Ris'n, and with hideous *outcry* rush'd between.
MILTON.

Their darts with *clamor* at a distance drive,
And only keep the languish'd war alive.
DRYDEN.

These terms may all be taken in an improper as well as a proper sense. Whatever is obtruded upon the public notice, so as to become the universal subject of conversation and writing, is said to make a *noise;* in this manner a new and good performer at the theatre makes a *noise* on his first appearance.

Socrates lived in Athens during the great plague, which has made so much *noise* through all ages, and never caught the infection.
ADDISON.

A *noise* may be either for or against; but a *cry*, *outcry*, and *clamor*, are always against the object, varying in the degree and manner in which they display themselves: *cry* implies less than *outcry*, and this is less than *clamor*. When the public voice is raised in an audible manner against any particular matter, it is a *cry;* if it be mingled with intemperate language, it is an *outcry;* if it be vehement and exceedingly *noisy*, it is a *clamor:* partisans raise a *cry* in order to form a body in their favor; the discontented are ever ready to set up an *outcry* against men in power; a *clamor* for peace in the time of war is easily raised by those who wish to thwart the government.

What *noise* have we had about transplantation of diseases and transfusion of blood! BAKER.

Amazement seizes all; the general *cry*
Proclaims Laocoon justly doom'd to die.
DRYDEN.

These *outcries* the magistrates there shun,
Since they are hearkened unto here. SPENSER.

The people grew then exorbitant in their *clamors* for justice. CLARENDON.

TO NOMINATE, NAME.

NOMINATE comes immediately from the Latin *nominatus*, participle of *nomino;* NAME comes from the Teutonic *name*, etc. (*v. To name*). To *nominate* and to *name* are both to mention by *name:* but the former is to mention for a specific purpose; the latter is to mention for general purpose: persons only are *nominated;* things as well as persons are *named:* one *nominates* a person in order to propose him, or appoint him, to an office; but one *names* a person casually, in the course of conversation, or one *names* him in order to make some inquiry respecting him. To be *nominated* is a public act; to be *named* is generally private: one is *nominated* before an assembly; one is *named* in any place: to be *nominated* is always an honor; to be *named* is either honorable, or the contrary, according to the circumstances under which it is mentioned: a person is *nominated* as member of Parliament; he is *named* whenever he is spoken of.

Elizabeth *nominated* her commissioners to hear both parties. ROBERTSON.

Then Calchas (by Ulysses first inspir'd)
Was urg'd to *name* whom th' angry gods requir'd.
DENHAM.

NOTED, NOTORIOUS.

NOTED (*v. Distinguished*) may be employed either in a good or a bad sense; NOTORIOUS is never used but in a bad sense: men may be *noted* for their talents or their eccentricities; they are *notorious* for their vices: *noted* characters excite many and divers remarks from their friends and their enemies; *notorious* characters are universally shunned.

An engineer of *noted* skill
Engag'd to stop the growing ill. GAY.

What principles of ordinary prudence can warrant a man to trust a *notorious* cheat? SOUTH.

TO NOTICE, REMARK, OBSERVE.

To NOTICE (*v. To attend to*) is either to take or to give *notice:* to REMARK, compounded of *re* and *mark* (*v. Mark*), signifies to reflect or bring back any *mark* to our own mind, or communicate the same to another; to mark is to mark a thing once, but to *remark* is to *mark* it again. OBSERVE (*v. Looker-on*) signifies either to keep a thing present before one's own view, or to communicate our view to another.

In the first sense of these words, as the action respects ourselves, to *notice* and *remark* require simple attention, to *observe* requires examination. To *notice* is a more cursory action than to *remark:* we may *notice* a thing by a single glance, or on merely turning one's head; but to *remark* supposes a reaction of the mind on an object; we *notice* a person passing at any time; but we *remark* that he goes past every day at the same hour: we *notice* that the sun sets this evening under a cloud, and we *remark* that it has done so for several evenings successively: we *notice* the state of a person's health or his manners in company; we *remark* his habits and peculiarities in domestic life. What is *noticed* and *remarked* strikes on the senses, and awakens the mind; what is *observed* is looked after and sought for: the former are often involuntary acts; we see, hear, and think because the objects obtrude themselves uncalled for; but the latter is intentional as well as voluntary; we see, hear, and think on that which we have watched. We *remark* things as matters of fact; we *observe* them in order to judge of, or draw conclusions from, them: we *remark* that the wind lies for a long time in a certain quarter; we *observe* that whenever it lies in a certain quarter it brings rain with it. People who have no particular curiosity may be sometimes attracted to *notice* the stars or planets, when they are particularly bright; those who look frequently will *remark* that the same star does not rise exactly in the same place for two successive nights; but the astronomer goes farther, and *observes* all the motions of the heavenly bodies, in order to discover the scheme of the universe.

The depravity of mankind is so easily discoverable, that nothing but the desert or cell can exclude it from *notice*. JOHNSON.

The glass that magnifies its object contracts the sight to a point, and the mind must be fixed upon a single character to *remark* its minute peculiarities. JOHNSON.

The course of time is so visibly marked, that it is *observed* even by the birds of passage.
JOHNSON.

In the latter sense of these verbs, as respects the communications to others of what passes in our own minds, to *notice* is to make known our sentiments by various ways; to *remark* and *observe* are to make them known only by means of words: to *notice* is a personal act toward an individual, in which we direct our attention to him, as may happen either by a bow, a nod, a word, or even a look; but to *remark* and *observe* are said only of the thoughts which pass in our own minds, and are expressed to others: friends *notice* each other when they meet; they *remark* to others the impression which passing objects make upon their minds: the *observations* which intelligent people make are always entitled to *notice* from young persons.

As some do perceive, yea, and like it well, they should be so *noticed*. HOWARD.

He cannot distinguish difficult and noble speculations from trifling and vulgar *remarks*.
COLLIER.

Wherever I have found her notes to be wholly another's, which is the case in some hundreds, I have barely quoted the true proprietor, without *observing* upon it. POPE.

TO NOURISH, NURTURE, CHERISH.

To NOURISH and NURTURE are but variations from the same verb *nutrio*, CHERISH, *v. Foster*. Things *nourish*, persons *nurture* and *cherish:* to *nourish* is to afford bodily strength, to supply the physical necessities of the body; to *nurture* is to extend one's care to the supply of all its physical necessities, to preserve life, occasion growth, and increase vigor: the breast of the mother *nourishes;* the

fostering care and attention of the mother *nurtures*. To *nurture* is a physical act; to *cherish* is a mental as well as a physical act: a mother *nurtures* her infant while it is entirely dependent upon her; she *cherishes* her child in her bosom and protects it from every misfortune, or affords consolation in the midst of all its troubles, when it is no longer an infant.

Air, and ye elements, the eldest birth,
Of nature's womb, that in quaternion run
Perpetual circle, multiform; and mix
And *nourish* all things. MILTON.

They suppose mother earth to be a great animal, and to have *nurtured* up her young offspring with conscious tenderness. BENTLEY.

Of thy superfluous brood, she'll *cherish* kind
The alien offspring. SOMERVILLE.

NUMB, BENUMBED, TORPID.

NUMB and BENUMBED come from the Hebrew *num*, to sleep; the former denoting the quality, and the latter the state: there are but few things *numb* by nature; but there may be many things which may be *benumbed*. TORPID, in Latin *torpidus*, from *torpeo*, to languish, is most commonly employed to express the permanent state of being *benumbed*, as in the case of some animals, which lie in a *torpid* state all the winter; or, in the moral sense, to depict the *benumbed* state of the thinking faculty; in this manner we speak of the *torpor* of persons who are *benumbed* by any strong affection, or by any strong external action.

The night, with its silence and darkness, shows the winter in which all the powers of vegetation are *benumbed*. JOHNSON.

There must be a grand spectacle to rouse the imagination, grown *torpid* with the lazy enjoyment of sixty years' security. BURKE.

NUMERAL, NUMERICAL.

NUMERAL, or belonging to number, is applied to a class of words in grammar, as a *numeral* adjective or a *numeral* noun: NUMERICAL, or containing number, is applied to whatever other objects respect number; as a *numerical* difference, where the difference consists between any two numbers, or is expressed by numbers.

God has declared that he will, and therefore can, raise the same *numerical* body at the last day. SOUTH.

O.

OBEDIENT, SUBMISSIVE, OBSEQUIOUS.

OBEDIENT, *v. Dutiful.* SUBMISSIVE denotes the disposition to submit (*v. To yield*). OBSEQUIOUS, in Latin *obsequius*, from *obsequor*, or the intensive *ob* and *sequor*, to follow, signifies following diligently, or with intensity of mind.

One is *obedient* to command, *submissive* to power or the will, *obsequious* to persons. *Obedience* is always taken in a good sense; one ought always to be *obedient* where *obedience* is due: *submission* is relatively good; it may, however, be indifferent or bad: one may be *submissive* from interested motives, or meanness of spirit, which is a base kind of *submission;* but to be *submissive* for conscience' sake is the bounden duty of a Christian: *obsequiousness* is never good; it is an excessive concern about the will of another which has always interest for its end. *Obedience* is a course of conduct conformable either to some specific rule, or the express will of another; *submission* is often a personal act, immediately directed to the individual. We show our *obedience* to the law by avoiding the breach of it; we show our *obedience* to the will of God, or of our parent, by making that will the rule of our life: on the other hand, we show *submission* to the person of the magistrate; we adopt a *submissive* deportment by a downcast look and a bent body. *Obedience* is founded upon principle, and cannot be feigned; *submission* is a partial bending to another, which is easily affected in our outward behavior: the understanding and the heart produce *obedience;* but force, or the necessity of circumstances, give rise to *submission.*

The *obedience* of men is to imitate the *obedience* of angels, and rational beings on earth are to live unto God as rational beings in heaven live unto him. LAW.

Her at his feet, *submissive* in distress,
He thus with peaceful words uprais'd. MILTON.

Obedience and *submission* suppose a restraint on one's own will, in order to bring it into accordance with that of another; but *obsequiousness* is the consulting the will or pleasure of another: we are *obedient* from a sense of right; we are *submissive* from a sense of necessity; we are *obsequious* from a desire of gaining favor: a love of God is followed by *obedience* to his will; they are coincident sentiments that reciprocally act on each other, so as to serve the cause of virtue: a *submissive* conduct is at the worst an involuntary sacrifice of our independence to our fears or necessities, the evil of which is confined principally to the individual who makes the sacrifice; *obsequiousness* is a voluntary sacrifice of ourselves to others for interested purposes.

What gen'rous Greek, *obedient* to thy word,
Shall form an ambush, or shall lift the sword? POPE.

In all *submission* and humility
York doth present himself unto your highness. SHAKSPEARE.

Adore not so the rising son that you forget the father who raised you to this height, nor be you so *obsequious* to the father, that you give just cause to the son to suspect that you neglect him. BACON.

OBJECT, SUBJECT.

OBJECT, in Latin *objectus*, participle of *objicio*, to lie in the way, signifies the thing that lies in one's way. SUBJECT, in Latin *subjectus*, participle of *subjicio*, to lie under, signifies the thing forming the groundwork.

The *object* puts itself forward; the *subject* is in the background: we notice the *object;* we observe or reflect on the *subject: objects* are sensible; the *subject* is altogether intellectual: the eye, the ear, and all the senses, are occupied with the surrounding *objects;* the memory, the judgment, and the imagination, are supplied with *subjects* suitable to the nature of the operations.

Dishonor not your eye
By throwing it on any other *object*. SHAKSPEARE.

This *subject* for heroic song pleases me. MILTON.

When *object* is taken for that which is intellectual, it retains a similar signification; it is the thing that presents itself to the mind; it is seen by the mind's eye: the *subject*, on the contrary, is that which must be sought for, and when found it engages the mental powers: hence we say an *object* of consideration, an *object* of delight, an *object* of concern; a *subject* of reflection, a *subject* of mature deliberation, the *subject* of a poem, the *subject* of grief, of lamentation, and the like. When the mind becomes distracted by too great a multiplicity of *objects*, it can fix itself on no one individual *object* with sufficient steadiness to take a survey of it; in like manner, if a child have too many *objects* set before it, for the exercise of its powers, it will acquire a familiarity with none: such things are not fit *subjects* of discussion.

He whose sublime pursuit is God and truth,
Burns, like some absent and impatient youth,
To join the *object* of his warm desires. JENYNS.

The hymns and odes (of the inspired writers) excel those delivered down to us by the Greeks and Romans, in the poetry as much as in the *subject*. ADDISON.

TO OBJECT, OPPOSE.

To OBJECT (*v. Object*) is to cast in the way, to OPPOSE is to place in the way; there is, therefore, very little original difference, except that casting is a more momentary and sudden proceeding, placing is a more premeditated action; which distinction, at the same time, corresponds with the use of the terms in ordinary life: to *object* to a thing is to propose or start something against it; but to *oppose* it is to set one's self up steadily against it: one *objects* to ordinary matters that require no reflection; one *opposes* matters that call for deliberation, and afford serious reasons for and against: a parent *objects* to his child's learning the classics, or to his running about the streets; he *opposes* his marriage when he thinks the connection or the circumstances not desirable.

About this time, an Archbishop of York *objected* to clerks (recommended to benefices by the Pope), because they were ignorant of English. TYRWHITT.

'Twas of no purpose to *oppose*,
She'd hear to no excuse in prose. SWIFT.

OBJECTION, DIFFICULTY, EXCEPTION.

OBJECTION (*v. Demur*) is here a general term; it comprehends both the DIFFICULTY and the EXCEPTION, which are but species of the *objection:* an *objection* and a *difficulty* are started; an *exception* is made: the *objection* to a thing is in general that which renders it less desirable; but the *difficulty* is that which renders it less practicable; there is an *objection* against every scheme which incurs a serious risk: the want of means