

TO OVERRULE, SUPERSEDE.

To OVERRULE is literally to get the superiority of rule; and to SUPERSEDE is to get the upper or superior seat; but the former is employed only as the act of persons; the latter is applied to things as the agents: a man may be *overruled* in his domestic government, or he may be *overruled* in a public assembly, or he may be *overruled* in the cabinet; large works in general *supersede* the necessity of smaller ones, by containing that which is superior both in quantity and quality.

When fancy begins to be *overruled* by reason, and corrected by experience, the most artful tale raises but little curiosity. JOHNSON.

Christoval received a commission empowering him to *supersede* Cortes. ROBERTSON.

OVERSPREAD, OVERRUN, RAVAGE.

To OVERSPREAD signifies simply to cover the whole surface of a body; but to OVERRUN is a mode of spreading, namely, by running; things in general, therefore, are said to *overspread* which admit of extension; nothing can be said to *overrun* but what literally or figuratively runs: the face is *overspread* with spots; the ground is *overrun* with weeds. To *overrun* and to RAVAGE are both employed to imply the active and extended destruction of an enemy; but the former expresses more than the latter: a small body may *ravage* in particular parts; but immense numbers are said to *overrun*, as they run into every part; the Barbarians *overran* all Europe, and settled in different countries; detachments are sent out to *ravage* the country or neighborhood.

The storm of hail and fire, with the darkness that *overspread* the land for three days, are described with great strength. ADDISON.

Most despotic governments are naturally *overrun* with ignorance and barbarity. ADDISON.

While Herod was absent, the thieves of Trachonites *ravaged* with their depredations all the parts of Judea and Cælo-Syria that lay within their reach. PRIDEAUX.

TO OVERTURN, OVERTHROW, SUBVERT, INVERT, REVERSE.

To OVERTURN is simply to turn over, which may be more or less gradual; but to OVERTHROW is to throw over, which will be more or less violent. To *overturn* is to turn a thing either with its side or

its bottom upward; but to SUBVERT is to turn that under which should be upward: to REVERSE is to turn that before which should be behind; and to INVERT is to place that on its head which should rest on its feet. These terms differ accordingly in their application and circumstances: things are *overturned* by contrivance and gradual means; infidels attempt to *overturn* Christianity by the arts of ridicule and falsehood: governments are *overthrown* by violence. To *overturn* is said of small matters; to *subvert* only of national or large concerns: domestic economy may be *overturned*; religious or political establishments may be *subverted*: that may be *overturned* which is simply set up; that is *subverted* which has been established: an assertion may be *overturned*; the best sanctioned principles may by artifice be *subverted*.

To *overturn*, *overthrow*, and *subvert* generally involve the destruction of the thing so *overturned*, *overthrown*, or *subverted*, or at least renders it for the time useless, and are, therefore, mostly unallowed acts; but *reverse* and *invert*, which have a more particular application, have a less specific character of propriety: we may *reverse* a proposition by taking the negative instead of the affirmative; a decree may be *reversed* so as to render it nugatory; but both of these acts may be right or wrong, according to circumstances: likewise, the order of particular things may be *inverted* to suit the convenience of parties; but the order of society cannot be *inverted* without *subverting* all the principles on which civil society is built.

An age is rip'ning in revolving fate,
When Troy shall *overturn* the Grecian State. DRYDEN.

Thus prudes, by characters *o'erthrown*,
Imagine that they raise their own. GAY.

Others, from public spirit, labored to prevent a civil war, which, whatever party should prevail, must shake, and perhaps *subvert*, the Spanish power. ROBERTSON.

Our ancestors affected a certain pomp of style, and this affectation, I suspect, was the true cause of their so frequently *inverting* the natural order of their words, especially in poetry. TYRWHITT.

He who walks not uprightly has neither from the presumption of God's mercy *reversing* the decree of his justice, nor from his own purposes of a future repentance, any sure ground to set his foot upon. SOUTH.

TO OVERWHELM, CRUSH.

To OVERWHELM (*v. To overbear*) is to cover with a heavy body, so that one should sink under it: to CRUSH is to destroy the consistency of a thing by violent pressure: a thing may be *crushed* by being *overwhelmed*, but it may be *overwhelmed* without being *crushed*; and it may be *crushed* without being *overwhelmed*: the girl Tarpeia, who betrayed the Capitoline Hill to the Sabines, is said to have been *overwhelmed* with their arms, by which she was *crushed* to death: when many persons fall on one, he may be *overwhelmed*, but not necessarily *crushed*: when a wagon goes over a body, it may be *crushed*, but not *overwhelmed*.

Let not the political metaphysics of Jacobins break prison, to burst like a Levanter, to sweep the earth with their hurricane, and to break up the fountains of the great deep to *overwhelm* us. BURKE.

Melt his cold heart, and wake dead nature in him,
Crush him in thy arms. OTWAY.

P.

PACE, STEP.

PACE, in French *pas*, Latin *passus*, comes from the Hebrew *pashat*, to pass, and signifies the act of passing, or the ground passed over. STEP, which comes through the medium of the Northern languages, from the same source as the Greek *στειβω*, to tread, signifies the act of *stepping*, or the ground *stepped* over.

As respects the act, the *pace* expresses the general manner of passing on, or moving the body; the *step* implies the manner of setting or extending the foot: the *pace* is distinguished by being either a walk or a run; and in regard to horses a trot or a gallop: the *step* is distinguished by being long or short, to the right or left, forward or backward. The same *pace* may be modified so as to be more or less easy, more or less quick; the *step* may vary as it is light or heavy, graceful or ungraceful, long or short: we may go a slow *pace* with long *steps*, or we may go a quick *pace* with short *steps*: a slow *pace* is best suited to the solemnity of a funeral; a long *step* must be taken by soldiers in a slow march.

To-morrow, to-morrow, and to-morrow,
Creeps in a stealing *pace* from day to day. SHAKESPEARE.

Grace was in all her *steps*, Heaven in her eye,
In every gesture dignity and love. MILTON.

As respects the space passed or *stepped* over, the *pace* is a measured distance, formed by a long *step*; the *step*, on the other hand, is indefinitely employed for any space *stepped* over, but particularly that ordinary space which one *steps* over without an effort: a thousand *paces* was the Roman measurement for a mile; a *step* or two designates almost the shortest possible distance.

PAIN, PANG, AGONY, ANGUISH.

PAIN, in Saxon *pin*, German *pein*, etc., is connected with the Latin *pæna*, and the Greek *πῶνη*, punishment, *πῶνος*, labor, and *πενομαι*, to be poor or in trouble. PANG is but a variation of *pain*. AGONY comes from the Greek *ἀγωνίζω*, to struggle or contend, signifying the labor or *pain* of a struggle. ANGUISH, from the Latin *ango*, contracted from *ante* and *ago*, to act against, or in direct opposition to, signifies the *pain* arising from severe pressure.

Pain, which expresses the feeling that is most repugnant to the nature of all sensible beings, is here the generic, and the rest specific terms: *pain* and *agony* are applied indiscriminately to what is physical and mental; *pang* and *anguish* mostly respect that which is mental: *pain* signifies either an individual feeling or a permanent state; *pang* is only a particular feeling; *agony* is sometimes employed for the individual feeling, but more commonly for the state; *anguish* is always employed for the state. *Pain* is indefinite with regard to the degree; it may rise to the highest, or sink to the lowest possible degree; the rest are positively high degrees of *pain*: the *pang* is a sharp *pain*; the *agony* is a severe and permanent *pain*; the *anguish* is an overwhelming *pain*.

We should pass on from crime to crime, heedless and remorseless, if misery did not stand in our way, and our own *pains* admonish us of our folly. JOHNSON.

What *pangs* the tender breast of Dido tore!
DRYDEN.

Thou shalt behold him stretch'd in all the *agonies*
Of a tormenting and a shameful death. OTWAY.

Are these the parting *pangs* which nature feels,
When *anguish* rends the heartstrings? ROWE.

TO PAINT, DEPICT.

PAINT and DEPICT both come from the Latin *pingo*, to represent forms and figures: as a verb, to *paint* is employed either literally to represent figures on paper, or to represent circumstances and events by means of words; to *depict* is used only in this latter sense, but the former word expresses a greater exercise of the imagination than the latter: it is the art of the poet to *paint* nature in lively colors; it is the art of the historian or narrator to *depict* a real scene of misery in strong colors.

But who can *paint* the lover, as he stood
Pierc'd by severe amazement, hating life,
Speechless, and fix'd in all the death of woe?
THOMSON.

When the distractions of a tumult are sensibly
depicted, every object and every occurrence are
so presented to your view, that while you read
you seem indeed to see them. FELTON.

As nouns, *painting* rather describes the action or operation, and *picture* the result. When we speak of a good *painting*, we think particularly of its execution as to drapery, disposition of colors, and the like; but when we speak of a fine *picture*, we refer immediately to the object represented, and the impression which it is capable of producing on the beholder: *paintings* are confined either to oil-*paintings* or *paintings* in colors: but every drawing, whether in pencil, in crayons, or in India ink, may produce a *picture*; and we have likewise *pictures* in embroidery, *pictures* in tapestry, and *pictures* in Mosaic.

The *painting* is almost the natural man,
He is but outside. SHAKESPEARE.
A *picture* is a poem without words. ADDISON.

Painting is employed only in the proper sense; *picture* is often used figuratively: old *paintings* derive a value from the master by whom they were executed; a well-regulated family, bound together by the ties of affection, presents the truest *picture* of human happiness.

I do not know of any *paintings*, bad or good,
which produce the same effect as a poem. BURKE.

Vision is performed by having a *picture*, formed by the rays of light, reflected from an object on the retina of the eye. BURKE.

PALATE, TASTE.

PALATE, in Latin *palatum*, comes either from the Greek *παιω*, to eat, or, which is more probable, from the Etruscan word *farlantum*, signifying the roof or arch of heaven, or, by an extended application, the roof of the mouth. TASTE comes from the German *tasten*, to touch lightly, because the sense of *taste* requires but the slightest touch to excite it.

Palate is, in an improper sense, employed for *taste*, because it is the seat of *taste*; but *taste* is never employed for *palate*: a person is said to have a nice *palate* when he is nice in what he eats or drinks; but his *taste* extends to all matters of sense, as well as those which are intellectual. A man of *taste*, or of a nice *taste*, conveys much more as a characteristic than a man of a nice *palate*: the former is said only in a good sense; but the latter is particularly applicable to the epicure.

No fruit our *palate* courts, or flow'r our smell.
JENYNS.

In more exalted joys to fix our *taste*,
And wean us from delights that cannot last.
JENYNS.

PALE, PALLID, WAN.

PALE, in French *pale*, and PALLID, in Latin *pallidus*, both come from *pallere*, to turn *pale*, which probably comes from the Greek *παλλινω*, to make white, and that from *παλη*, flour. WAN is connected with *want* and *vane*, signifying, in general, a deficiency or a losing color.

Pallid rises upon *pale*, and *wan* upon *pallid*: the absence of color in any degree, where color is a requisite quality, constitutes *paleness*; but *pallidness* is an excess of *paleness*, and *wan* is an unusual degree of *pallidness*: *paleness* in the countenance may be temporary; but *pallidness* and *wanness* are permanent; fear, or any sudden emotion, may produce *paleness*; but protracted sickness, hunger, and fatigue bring on *pallidness*; and when these calamities are combined and heightened by every aggravation, they may produce that which is peculiarly termed *wanness*.

Now morn, her lamp *pale* glimmering on the
sight,
Scatter'd before her sun reluctant night.
FALCONER.

Her spirits faint,
Her cheeks assume a *pallid* tint. ADDISON.

And with them comes a third with regal pomp,
But faded splendor *wan*. MILTON.

TO PALPITATE, FLUTTER, PANT, GASP.

PALPITATE, in Latin *palpitatus*, from *palpito*, is a frequentative of the Greek *παλλω*, to vibrate. FLUTTER is a frequentative of fly, signifying to fly backward and forward in an agitated manner. PANT, probably derived from *pen*, and the Latin *pendo*, to hang in a state of suspense, so as not to be able to move backward or forward, as is the case with the breath when one *pants*. GASP is a variation of *gape*, which is the ordinary accompaniment in the action of *gasp*ing.

These terms agree in a particular manner, as they respect the irregular action of the heart or lungs: the former two are said of the heart; and the latter two of the lungs or breath; to *palpitate* expresses that which is strong; it is a strong beating of the blood against the vessels of the heart: to *flutter* expresses that which is rapid; it is a violent and alternate motion of the blood backward and forward: fear and suspense produce commonly *palpitation*, but joy and hope produce a *fluttering*; *panting* is, with regard to the breath, what *palpitating* is with regard to the heart; *panting* is occasioned by the inflated state of the respiratory organs which renders this *palpitating* necessary: *gasp*ing differs from the former, inasmuch as it denotes a direct stoppage of the breath; a cessation of action in the respiratory organs.

No plays have oftener filled the eyes with
tears, and the breast with *palpitation*, than
those which are variegated with interludes of
mirth. JOHNSON.

She springs aloft, with elevated pride,
Above the tangling mass of low desires,
That bind the *fluttering* crowd. THOMSON.

All nature fades extinct, and she alone,
Heard, felt, and seen, possesses every thought,
Fills every sense, and *pants* in every vein.
THOMSON.

Had not the soul this outlet to the skies,
In this vast vessel of the universe,
How should we *gasp*, as in an empty void!
YOUNG.

PARABLE, ALLEGORY.

BOTH these terms imply a veiled mode of speech, which serves more or less to conceal the main object of the discourse by presenting it under the appearance of

something else, which accords with it in most of the particulars: the PARABLE, in French *parabole*, Greek *παραβολη*, from *παραβαλλω*, signifying what is thrown out or set before one, in lieu of something which it resembles, is mostly employed for moral purposes; the ALLEGORY (*v. Figure*) in describing historical events. The *parable* substitutes some other subject or agent, who is represented under a character that is suitable to the one referred to. In the *allegory* are introduced strange and arbitrary persons in the place of the real personages, or imaginary characteristics, and circumstances are ascribed to real persons. The *parable* is principally employed in the sacred writings; the *allegory* forms a grand feature in the productions of the Eastern nations.

What is thy fulsome *parable* to me?
My body is from all diseases free. DRYDEN.

Neither must we draw out our *allegory* too
long, lest either we make ourselves obscure, or
fall into affectation which is childish.

B. JOHNSON.

PART, DIVISION, PORTION, SHARE.

PART, in Latin *pars*, from the Hebrew *peresh*, to divide, is a term not only of more general use, but of more comprehensive meaning than DIVISION (*v. To divide*); it is always employed for the thing *divided*, but *division* may be either employed for the act of *dividing*, or the thing that is *divided*: but in all cases the word *division* has always a reference to some action, and the agent by whom it has been performed; whereas *part*, which is perfectly abstract, has altogether lost this idea. We always speak of the *part* as opposed to the whole, but of the *division* as it has been made of the whole. A *part* is formed of itself by accident, or made by design; a *division* is always the effect of design: a *part* is indefinite as to its quantity or nature, it may be large or small, round or square, of any dimension, of any form, of any size, or of any character; but a *division* is always regulated by some certain principles, it depends upon the circumstances of the *divider* and thing to be *divided*. A page, a line, or a word, is the *part* of any book; but the books, chapters, sections, and paragraphs are the *divisions* of the book.

Stones, wood, water, air, and the like, are *parts* of the world; fire, air, earth, and water are physical *divisions* of the globe; continents, seas, rivers, mountains, and the like, are geographical *divisions*, under which are likewise included its political *divisions* into countries, kingdoms, etc.

Shall little haughty ignorance pronounce
His works unwise, of which the smallest *part*
Exceeds the narrow vision of her mind.

THOMSON.
A *division* (in a discourse) should be natural
and simple. BLAIR.

A *part* may be detached from the whole; a *division* is always conceived of in connection with the whole; PORTION, in Latin *portio*, is supposed to be changed from *partio*, which comes from *partior*, to distribute, and originally from *peresh*, to break in pieces, and SHARE, in Saxon *scyran*, to divide, German *scheren*, to sheer, in all probability from the Hebrew *karah*, to break in pieces, are particular species of *divisions*, which are said of such matters as are assignable to individuals; *portion* respects individuals without any distinction; *share* respects individuals specially referred to. The *portion* of happiness which falls to every man's lot is more equal than is generally supposed; the *share* which partners have in the profits of any undertaking depends upon the sum which each has contributed toward its completion. The *portion* is that which simply comes to any one; but the *share* is that which belongs to him by a certain right. According to the ancient customs of Normandy, the daughters could have no more than a third *part* of the property for their *share*, which was divided in equal *portions* between them.

The jars of gen'rous wine, Acestes' gift,
He set abroad, and for the feast prepar'd,
In equal *portions* with the ven'son shar'd.

DRYDEN.
The monarch, on whom fertile Nile bestows
All which that grateful earth can bear,
Deceives himself, if he suppose
That more than this falls to his *share*.

COWLEY.
PART, PIECE, PATCH.

PART (*v. Part*) in its strict sense is taken in connection with the whole; PIECE, in French *pièce*, in Hebrew *pas*, to diminish, signifying the thing in its diminished form, that which is less than

a whole, is the part detached from the whole; and the PATCH, which is a variation of *piece*, is that *piece* which is distinguished from others.

Things may be divided into *parts* without any express separation; but when divided into *pieces* they are actually cut asunder. Hence we may speak of a loaf as divided into twelve *parts* when it is conceived only to be so; and divided into twelve *pieces* when it is really so. On this ground we talk of the *parts* of a country, but not of the *pieces*; and of a *piece* of land, not a *part* of land; so, likewise, letters are said to be the component *parts* of a word, but the half or the quarter of any given letter is called a *piece*. The chapters, the pages, the lines, etc., are the various *parts* of a book; certain passages or quantities drawn from the book are called *pieces*: the *parts* of matter may be infinitely decomposed; various bodies may be formed out of so ductile a *piece* of matter as clay. The *piece* is that which may sometimes serve as a whole; but the *patch* is that which is always broken and disjointed, a something imperfect: many things may be formed out of a *piece*; but the *patch* only serves to fill up a chasm.

I understand both these sides to be not only
returns, but *parts* of the front. BACON.

These lesser rocks or great bulky stones, that
lie scattered in the sea or upon the land, are they
not manifest fragments and *pieces* of these greater
masses? BURNET.

It hath been much feared by the great critic
Lipsius, lest some more impolitic hand hath
sewed many *patches* of base cloth into that rich
web, as his own metaphor expresses it. SELDEN.

TO PARTAKE, PARTICIPATE, SHARE.

PARTAKE and PARTICIPATE, the one English, and the other Latin, signify literally to take a *part* in a thing, and may be applied either in the sense of having a part in more than one object at the same time, or to have a part with others in the same object. In the first sense *partake* is the more familiar and ordinary expression, as a body may be said to *partake* of the essence of a salt and an acid. *Participate* is also used in the same sense, sometimes in poetry.

This passion may *partake* of the nature of
those which regard self-preservation. BURKE.

Our God, when heav'n and earth he did create,
Form'd man, who should of both *participate*.
DENHAM.

In the sense of having a part with others in the same object, to *partake* is a selfish action, to *participate* is either a selfish or benevolent action; we *partake* of that which pleases ourselves, we *participate* in that which pleases others, or in their pleasures.

Portia, go in awhile,
And by-and-by thy bosom shall *partake*
The secrets of my heart. SHAKESPEARE.

Of fellowship I speak,
Such as I seek fit to *participate* all rational
delights
Wherein the brute cannot be human consort.

MILTON.

To *partake* is the act of taking or getting a thing to one's self; to SHARE is the act of having a title to a *share*, or being in the habit of receiving a *share*: we may, therefore, *partake* of a thing without *sharing* it, and *share* it without *partaking*. We *partake* of things mostly through the medium of the senses: whatever, therefore, we take a *part* in, whether gratuitously or casually, that we may be said to *partake* of; in this manner we *partake* of an entertainment without *sharing* it: on the other hand, we *share* things that promise to be of advantage or profit, and what we *share* is what we claim; in this manner we *share* a sum of money which has been left to us in common with others.

All else of nature's common gift *partake*,
Unhappy Dido was alone awake. DRYDEN.

Avoiding love, I had not found despair,
But shar'd with savage beasts the common air.
DRYDEN.

PARTICULAR, SINGULAR, ODD, ECCENTRIC, STRANGE.

PARTICULAR, in French *particulier*, Latin *particularis*, from *particula*, a particle, signifies belonging to a particle or a very small part. SINGULAR, in French *singulier*, Latin *singularis*, from *singulus*, every one, very probably comes from the Hebrew *igelet*, *peculium*, or private. ODD, in Swedish *udd*, without an equal, signifies literally unmatched (*v. Odd*). ECCENTRIC, from *ex* and *centre*, signifies out of the centre or direct line. STRANGE, in French *étrange*, Latin *extra*, and Greek *εξ*, out of, signifies out of

some other part, or not belonging to this part.

All these terms are employed either as characteristics of persons or things. What is *particular* belongs to some small *particle* or point to which it is confined; what is *singular* is *single*, or the only one of its kind; what is *odd* is without an equal or anything with which it is fit to pair; what is *eccentric* is not to be brought within any rule or estimate, it deviates to the right and the left; what is *strange* is different from that which one is accustomed to see, it does not admit of comparison or assimilation. A person is *particular* as it respects himself; he is *singular* as it respects others; he is *particular* in his habits or modes of action; he is *singular* in that which is about him; we may be *particular* or *singular* in our dress; in the former case we study the minute points of our dress to please ourselves; in the latter case we adopt a mode of dress that distinguishes us from all others.

There is such a *particularity* forever affected by great beauties, that they are encumbered with their charms in all they say or do.

HUGHES.
Singularity is only vicious, as it makes men
act contrary to reason. ADDISON.

One is *odd*, *eccentric*, and *strange*, more as it respects established modes, forms, and rules, than individual circumstances: a person is *odd* when his actions or his words bear no resemblance to that of others; he is *eccentric* if he irregularly departs from the customary modes of proceeding; he is *strange* when that which he does makes him new or unknown to those who are about him. *Particularity* and *singularity* are not always taken in a bad sense; *oddness*, *eccentricity*, and *strangeness* are never taken in a good one. A person ought to be *particular* in the choice of his society, his amusements, his books, and the like; he ought to be *singular* in virtue, when vice is unfortunately prevalent; but *particularity* becomes ridiculous when it respects trifles; and *singularity* becomes culpable when it is not warranted by the most imperious necessity. As *oddness*, *eccentricity*, and *strangeness* consist in the violation of good order, of the decencies of human life, or the more important

points of moral duty, they can never be justifiable and are often unpardonable. An *odd* man whom no one can associate with, and who likes to associate with no one, is an outcast by nature, and a burden to the society which is troubled with his presence. An *eccentric* character, who distinguishes himself by nothing but the breach of every established rule, is a being who deserves nothing but ridicule or the more serious treatment of censure or rebuke. A *strange* person, who makes himself a *stranger* among those to whom he is bound by the closest ties, is a being as unfortunate as he is worthless.

Even *particularities* were becoming in him, as he had a natural ease, that immediately adopted, and saved them from the air of affectation.

LORD ORFORD.

So proud, I am no slave;
So impudent, I own myself no knave;
So *odd*, my country's ruin makes me grave.

POPE.

That acute though *eccentric* observer, Rousseau, had perceived that, to strike and interest the public, the marvellous must be produced.

BURKE.

A *strange* proud return you may think I make you, madam, when I tell you it is not from every-body I would be thus obliged.

SUCKLING.

When applied to characterize inanimate objects, they are mostly used in an indifferent, but sometimes in a bad sense: the term *particular* serves to define or specify, it is opposed to the general or indefinite; a *particular* day or hour, a *particular* case, a *particular* person, are expressions which confine one's attention to one precise object in distinction from the rest; *singular*, like the word *particular*, marks but one object, and that which is clearly pointed out in distinction from the rest; but this term differs from the former, inasmuch as the *particular* is said only of that which one has arbitrarily made *particular*, but the *singular* is so from its own properties: thus a place is *particular* when we fix upon it, and mark it out in any manner so that it may be known from others; a place is *singular* if it have anything in itself which distinguishes it from others. *Odd*, in an indifferent sense, is opposed to even, and applied to objects in general; an *odd* number, an *odd* person, an *odd* book, and the like; but it is also employed in a bad sense, to mark objects which are totally

dissimilar to others; thus an *odd* idea, an *odd* conceit, an *odd* whim, an *odd* way, an *odd* place. *Eccentric* is applied in its proper sense to mathematical lines or circles, which have not the same centre, and is never employed in an improper sense; *strange*, in its proper sense, marks that which is unknown or unusual, as a *strange* face, a *strange* figure, a *strange* place; but in the moral application it is like the word *odd*, and conveys the unfavorable idea of that which is uncommon and not worth knowing; a *strange* noise designates not only that which has not been heard before, but that which it is not desirable to hear; a *strange* place may signify not only that which we have been unaccustomed to see, but that which has also much in it that is objectionable.

Artists who propose only the imitation of such a *particular* person, without election of ideas, have been often reproached for that omission.

DRYDEN.

So *singular* a madness
Must have a cause as *strange* as the effect.

DENHAM.

History is the great looking-glass through which we may behold with ancestral eyes, not only the various actions of past ages, and the *odd* accidents that attend time, but also discern the different humors of men.

HOWELL.

Is it not *strange* that a rational man should worship an ox?

SOUTH.

PARTICULAR, INDIVIDUAL.

PARTICULAR, *v. Peculiar*. INDIVIDUAL, in French *individuel*, Latin *individuus*, signifies that which cannot be divided.

Both these terms are employed to express one object; but *particular* is much more specific than *individual*; the *particular* confines us to one object only of many; but *individual* may be said of any one object among many. A *particular* object cannot be misunderstood for any other, while it remains *particular*; but the *individual* object can never be known from other *individual* objects, while it remains only *individual*. *Particular* is a term used in regard to *individuals*, and is opposed to the general: *individual* is a term used in regard to collectives; and is opposed to the whole or that which is divisible into parts.

Those *particular* speeches which are commonly known by the name of rants, are blemishes in our English tragedy.

ADDISON.

To give thee being, I lent
Out of my side to thee, nearest my heart,
Substantial life, to have thee by my side;
Henceforth an *individual* solace dear.

MILTON.

PATIENCE, ENDURANCE, RESIGNATION.

PATIENCE applies to any troubles or pains whatever, small or great; RESIGNATION is employed only for those of great moment, in which our dearest interests are concerned: *patience*, when compared with *resignation*, is somewhat negative; it consists in the abstaining from all complaint or indication of what one suffers: but *resignation* consists in a positive sentiment of conformity to the existing circumstances, be they what they may. There are perpetual occurrences which are apt to harass the temper, unless one regards them with *patience*; the misfortunes of some men are of so calamitous a nature, that if they have not acquired the *resignation* of Christians, they must inevitably sink under them. *Patience* applies only to the evils that actually hang over us; but there is a *resignation* connected with a firm trust in Providence which extends its views to futurity, and prepares us for the worst that may happen.

Though the duty of *patience* and subjection, where men suffer wrongfully, might possibly be of some force in those times of darkness, yet modern Christianity teaches that then only men are bound to suffer when they are not able to resist.

SOUTH.

My mother is in that dispirited state of *resignation* which is the effect of a long life, and the loss of what is dear to us.

POPE.

As *patience* lies in the manner and temper of suffering, and ENDURANCE in the act, we may have *endurance* and not *patience*: for we may have much to *endure*, and consequently *endurance*: but if we do not *endure* it with an easy mind and without the disturbance of our looks and words, we have not *patience*: on the other hand, we may have *patience* but not *endurance*: for our *patience* may be exercised by momentary trifles, which are not sufficiently great or lasting to constitute *endurance*.

There was never yet philosopher
That could *endure* the toothache patiently.

SHAKESPEARE.

28*

PATIENT, PASSIVE, SUBMISSIVE.

PATIENT, from the Latin *patiens*, signifies literally suffering, and is applied to things in general, but especially to what is painful. PASSIVE, from the Latin *passivus* or *passus*, signifying literally suffered or acted upon, applies to those matters in which persons have to act; he is *patient* who bears what he has to suffer without any expression of complaint; he is *passive* who abstains altogether from acting when he might act.

Patient of thirst and toil,
Son of the desert, even the camel feels
Shoot through his wither'd heart the fiery blast.

THOMSON.

Some men have conceited that the soul has no knowledge or notion but what is in a *passive* way impressed or delineated upon her from the objects of sense.

MORE.

Patience is a virtue springing from principle; *passiveness* is always involuntary, and may be supposed to arise from want of spirit.

All I could end in with any satisfaction was *patience* and abstinence; and although I easily resolved of the last, yet the first was hard to be found in the circumstances of my business as well as of my health.

TEMPLE.

I know that we are supposed a dull, sluggish race, rendered *passive* by finding our situation tolerable.

BURKE.

Patience is therefore applicable to conscious agents only; *passiveness* is applicable to inanimate objects which do not act at all, or at least not adversely.

For high above the ground
Their march was; and the *passive* air upbore
Their nimble tread.

MILTON.

Passive and SUBMISSIVE both refer to the will of others; but *passive* signifies simply not resisting; *submissive* signifies positively conforming to the will of another.

Not those alone, who *passive* own her laws,
But who, weak rebels, more advance her cause.

POPE.

He, in delight
Both of her beauty and *submissive* charms,
Smil'd with superior love.

MILTON.

PEACE, QUIET, CALM, TRANQUILLITY.

PEACE, in Latin *pax*, may either come from *pactio*, an agreement or compact which produces *peace*, or it may be con-

nected with *pausa*, and the Greek *παυω*, to cease. QUIET, *v. Easy*. CALM, *v. Calm*. TRANQUILLITY, in Latin *tranquillitas*, from *tranquillus*, that is, *trans*, the intensive syllable, and *quillus* or *quietus*, signifying altogether or exceedingly quiet.

Peace is a term of more general application and more comprehensive meaning than the others; it respects either communities or individuals; but *quiet* respects only individuals or small communities. Nations are said to have *peace*, but not *quiet*; persons or families may have both *peace* and *quiet*. *Peace* implies an exemption from public or private broils; *quiet* implies a freedom from noise or interruption. Every well-disposed family strives to be at *peace* with its neighbors, and every affectionate family will naturally act in such a manner as to promote *peace* among all its members: the *quiet* of a neighborhood is one of its first recommendations as a place of residence.

A false person ought to be looked upon as a public enemy, and a disturber of the *peace* of mankind. SOUTH.

A paltry tale-bearer will discompose the *quiet* of a whole family. SOUTH.

Peace and *quiet*, in regard to individuals, have likewise a reference to the internal state of the mind; but the former expresses the permanent condition of the mind, the latter its transitory condition. Serious matters only can disturb our *peace*; trivial matters may disturb our *quiet*: a good man enjoys the *peace* of a good conscience; but he may have unavoidable cares and anxieties which disturb his *quiet*. There can be no *peace* where a man's passions are perpetually engaged in a conflict with each other; there can be no *quiet* where a man is embarrassed in his pecuniary affairs.

Religion directs us rather to secure inward *peace* than outward ease, to be more careful to avoid everlasting torments than light afflictions. TILLOTSON.

Indulgent *quiet*; power serene, Mother of *peace*, and joy, and love. HUGHES.

Calm is a species of *quiet*, which respects objects in the natural or the moral world; it indicates the absence of violent motion as well as violent noise; it is that state which more immediately suc-

ceeds a state of agitation. As storms at sea are frequently preceded as well as succeeded by a dead *calm*, so political storms have likewise their *calms* which are their attendants, if not their precursors. *Tranquillity*, on the other hand, is taken more absolutely: it expresses the situation as it exists in the present moment, independently of what goes before or after; it is sometimes applicable to society, sometimes to natural objects, and sometimes to the mind. The *tranquillity* of the State cannot be preserved unless the authority of the magistrates be upheld; the *tranquillity* of the air and of all the surrounding objects is one thing which gives the country its peculiar charms; the *tranquillity* of the mind in the season of devotion contributes essentially to produce a suitable degree of religious fervor.

Cheerfulness banishes all anxious care and discontent, soothes and composes the passions, and keeps the soul in a perpetual *calm*. ADDISON.

By a patient acquiescence under painful events for the present, we shall be sure to contract a *tranquillity* of temper. CUMBERLAND.

As epithets, these terms bear the same relation to each other: people are *peaceable* as they are disposed to promote *peace* in society at large, or in their private relations; they are *quiet*, inasmuch as they abstain from every loud expression, or are exempt from any commotion in themselves; they are *calm*, inasmuch as they are exempt from the commotion which at any given moment rages around them; they are *tranquil*, inasmuch as they enjoy an entire exemption from everything which can discompose. A town is *peaceable* as respects the disposition of the inhabitants: it is *quiet* as respects its external circumstances, or freedom from bustle and noise: an evening is *calm* when the air is lulled into a particular stillness, which is not interrupted by any loud sounds: a scene is *tranquil* which combines everything calculated to soothe the spirits to rest.

Having awed them into very *peaceable* dispositions, and settled his colony in a very growing condition, he returned home for the benefit of his health. BURKE.

Reputation, beauty, grandeur, nay, royalty itself, would have been gladly exchanged by the possessors for that more *quiet* and humble station which you enjoy. BLAIR.

Instead of resorting to Jews, computing the value of his father's life, and raising great sums by anticipation, methods which are better suited to the *calm* unenterprising dissipation of the present age, Henry Clifford turned outlaw.

WHITAKER.

I had been happy
So I had nothing known. Oh now forever
Farewell the *tranquil* mind! Farewell content.
SHAKESPEARE.

PEACEABLE, PEACEFUL, PACIFIC.

PEACEABLE is used in the proper sense of the word *peace*, as it expresses an exemption from strife or contest (*v. Peace*); but PEACEFUL is used in its improper sense, as it expresses an exemption from agitation or commotion. Persons or things are *peaceable*; things, particularly in the higher style, are *peaceful*: a family is designated as *peaceable* in regard to its inhabitants; a house is designated as a *peaceful* abode, as it is remote from the bustle and hurry of a multitude. PACIFIC signifies either making *peace*, or disposed to make *peace*, and is applied mostly to what we do to others. We are *peaceable* when we do not engage in quarrels of our own; we are *pacific* if we wish to keep *peace*, or make *peace*, between others. Hence the term *peaceable* is mostly employed for individual or private concerns, and *pacific* most properly for national concerns: subjects ought to be *peaceable*, and monarchs *pacific*.

I know that my *peaceable* disposition already gives me a very ill figure here (at Ratisbon).
LADY W. MONTAGUE.

Still as the *peaceful* walks of ancient night,
Silent as are the lamps that burn in tombs.
SHAKESPEARE.

The tragical and untimely death of the French monarch put an end to all *pacific* measures with regard to Scotland.
ROBERTSON.

PECULIAR, APPROPRIATE, PARTICULAR.

PECULIAR, in Latin *peculiaris*, from *pecus*, cattle, in which property consisted, is said of that which belongs to persons or things; APPROPRIATE, signifying appropriated (*v. To ascribe*), is said of that which belongs to things only: the faculty of speech is *peculiar* to man, in distinction from all other animals; an address may be *appropriate* to the circumstances of the individual. *Peculiar* and PARTICULAR (*v. Particular*) are

both employed to distinguish objects; but the former distinguishes the object by showing its connection with, or alliance to, others; *particular* distinguishes it by a reference to some acknowledged circumstance; hence we may say that a person enjoys *peculiar* privileges or *particular* privileges: in this case *peculiar* signifies such as are confined to him, and enjoyed by none else; *particular* signifies such as are distinguished in degree and quality from others of the kind.

Great father Bacchus, to my song repair,
For clust'ring grapes are thy *peculiar* care.
DRYDEN.

Modesty and diffidence, gentleness and meekness, were looked upon as the *appropriate* virtues of the sex.
JOHNSON.

When we trust to the picture that objects draw of themselves on the mind, we deceive ourselves, without accurate and *particular* observation: it is but ill-drawn at first, the outlines are soon blurred, the colors every day grow fainter.
GRAY.

TO PEEL, PARE.

PEEL, from the Latin *pellis*, a skin, is the same as to skin or to take off the skin: to PARE, from the Latin *paro*, to trim or make in order, signifies to smooth. The former of these terms denotes a natural, the latter an artificial process: the former excludes the idea of a forcible separation; the latter includes the idea of separation by means of a knife or sharp instrument: potatoes and apples are *peeled* after they are boiled; they are *pared* before they are boiled; an orange and a walnut are always *peeled* but not *pared*; a cucumber must be *pared* and not *peeled*: in like manner, the skin may sometimes be *peeled* from the flesh, and the nails be *pared*.

PELLUCID, TRANSPARENT.

PELLUCID, in Latin *pellucidus*, changed from *perlucidus*, signifies very shining. TRANSPARENT, in Latin *transparentis*, from *trans*, through or beyond, and *pareo*, to appear, signifies that which admits light through it. *Pellucid* is said of that which is pervious to the light, or of that into which the eye can penetrate; *transparent* is said of that which is throughout bright: a stream is *pellucid*; it admits of the light so as to reflect objects, but it is not *transparent* for the eye.

TO PENETRATE, PIERCE, PERFORATE,
BORE.

To PENETRATE (*v. Discernment*) is simply to make an entrance into any substance; to PIERCE, in French *percer*, Chaldee *perék*, to break or rend, is to go still deeper: to PERFORATE, from the Latin *per*, through, and *foris*, a door, signifies to make a door through, and to BORE, in Saxon *borian*, probably changed from *fore* or *foris*, a door, signifying to make a door or passage, are to go through, or at all events to make a considerable hollow. To *penetrate* is a natural and gradual process; in this manner rust *penetrates* iron, water *penetrates* wood; to *pierce* is a violent, and commonly artificial, process; thus an arrow or a bullet *pierces* through wood. The instrument by which the act of *penetration* is performed is in no case defined; but that of *piercing* commonly proceeds by some pointed instrument: we may *penetrate* the earth by means of a spade, a plough, a knife, or various other instruments; but one *pierces* the flesh by means of a needle, or one *pierces* the ground or a wall by means of a pickaxe.

For if when dead we are but dust or clay,
Why think of what posterity shall say?
Their praise or censure cannot us concern,
Nor ever *penetrate* the silent urn. JENYNS.

Subtle as lightning, bright, and quick, and fierce,
Gold through doors and walls did *pierce*.
COWLEY.

To *perforate* and *bore* are modes of *piercing* that vary in the circumstances of the action, and the objects acted upon; to *pierce*, in its peculiar use, is a sudden action by which a hollow is produced in any substance; but to *perforate* and *bore* are commonly the effect of mechanical art. The body of an animal is *pierced* by a dart; but cannon is made by *perforating* or *boring* the iron: channels are formed under ground by *perforating* the earth; holes are made in the ear by *perforation*; holes are made in the leather, or in the wood, by *boring*; these last two words do not differ in sense, but in application; the latter being a term of vulgar use, though sometimes used in poetry.

Descending like a torrent, it bore directly
against the middle of the mountain, and they pretend
perforated it from side to side: this, how-

ever, I doubt; but certain it is that it *pierced*
to a great depth. BRYDONE.

But Capys, and the graver sort, thought fit,
The Greeks' suspected present to commit
To seas or flames, at least to search or *bore*
The sides, and what that space contains 't' explore.
DENHAM.

To *penetrate* and *pierce* are likewise employed in an improper sense; to *perforate* and *bore* are employed only in the proper sense. The first two bear the same relation to each other as in the former case: *penetrate* is, however, only employed as the act of persons; *pierce* is used in regard to things. There is a power in the mind to *penetrate* the looks and actions, so as justly to interpret their meaning; the eye of the Almighty is said to *pierce* the thickest veil of darkness. Affairs are sometimes involved in such mystery, that the most enlightened is unable to *penetrate* either the end or the beginning; the shrieks of distress are sometimes so loud as to seem to *pierce* the ear.

Inveterate habits choke the unfruitful heart,
Their fibres *penetrate* its tenderest part.

COWPER.

These metaphysic rights entering into common
life, like rays of light which *pierce* into a dense
medium, are by the laws of nature refracted from
their straight line. BURKE.

PENETRATION, ACUTENESS, SAGACITY.

As characteristics of mind, these terms have much more in them in which they differ than in what they agree: PENE- TRATION is a necessary property of mind; it exists to a greater or less degree in every rational being that has the due exercise of its rational powers: ACUTENESS is an accidental property that belongs to the mind only, under certain circumstances. As *penetration* (*v. Discernment*) denotes the process of entering into substances physically or morally, so *acuteness*, which is the same as sharpness, denotes the fitness of the thing that performs this process: and as the mind is in both cases the thing that is spoken of, the terms *penetration* and *acuteness* are in this particular closely allied. It is clear, however, that the mind may have *penetration* without having *acuteness*, although one cannot have *acuteness* without *penetration*. If by *penetration* we are commonly enabled to get at

the truth which lies concealed, by *acuteness* we succeed in piercing the veil that hides it from our view; the former is, therefore, an ordinary, and the latter an extraordinary gift.

He saw the strong and the feeble of a question
with much *penetration*. CUMBERLAND.

Their affairs lay in a narrower compass, their
libraries were indifferently furnished, and philo-
sophical researches were carried on with much
less industry and *acuteness* of penetration.
COWPER.

SAGACITY, in Latin *sagacitas*, from *sagio*, to perceive quickly, comes in all probability from the Persian *sag*, a dog, whence the term has been peculiarly applied to dogs, and from thence extended to all brutes which discover an intuitive wisdom, and also to children, or uneducated persons, in whom there is more *penetration* than may be expected from the narrow compass of their knowledge; hence, properly speaking, *sagacity* is natural or uncultivated *acuteness*.

Activity to seize, not *sagacity* to discern, is
the requisite which youth value. BLAIR.

PEOPLE, NATION.

PEOPLE is in Latin *populus*, which is connected with the Greek *λαος*, people, *πληθυσ*, a multitude, and *πολυς*, many. Hence the simple idea of numbers is expressed by the word *people*: but the term NATION, from *natus*, marks the connection of numbers by birth; *people* is, therefore, the generic, and *nation* the specific term. A *nation* is a *people* connected by birth; there cannot, therefore, strictly speaking, be a *nation* without a *people*: but there may be a *people* where there is not a *nation*. The Jews, when considered as an assemblage, under the special direction of the Almighty, are termed the *people* of God; but when considered in regard to their common origin, they are denominated the Jewish *nation*. The Americans, when spoken of in relation to Britain, are a distinct *people*, because they have each a distinct government; but they are not a distinct *nation*, because they have a common descent. On this ground the Romans are not called the Roman *nation*, because their origin was so various, but the Roman *people*, that is, an assemblage, living under one form of government.

It is too flagrant a demonstration how much
vice is the darling of any *people*, when many
among them are preferred for those practices for
which in other places they can scarce be pardoned.
SOUTH.

When we read the history of *nations*, what do
we read but the crimes and follies of men?
BLAIR.

In a still closer application, *people* is taken for a part of the State, namely, that part of a state which consists of a multitude, in distinction from its government; whence arises a distinction in the use of the terms; for we may speak of the British *people*, the French or the Dutch *people*, when we wish merely to talk of the mass, but we speak of the British *nation*, the French *nation*, and the Dutch *nation*, when public measures are in question, which emanate from the government, or the whole *people*. The English *people* have ever been remarkable for their attachment to liberty: the abolition of the slave-trade is one of the most glorious acts of public justice which was ever performed by the British *nation*. Upon the same ground republican States are distinguished by the name of *people*: but kingdoms are commonly spoken of in history as *nations*. Hence we say the Spartan *people*, the Athenian *people*, the *people* of Genoa, the *people* of Venice; but the *nations* of Europe, the African *nations*, the English, French, German, and Italian *nations*.

You speak o' the *people*
As if you were a god to punish, not
A man of their infirmity. SHAKESPEARE.

It was the resolution of the present ministry
to put an end to it (the war), as it had involved
the *nation* in debt almost to bankruptcy.
GOLDSMITH.

PEOPLE, POPULACE, MOB, MOBILITY.

PEOPLE and POPULACE are evidently changes of the same word to express a number. The signification of these terms is that of a number gathered together. *People* is said of any body supposed to be assembled, as well as really assembled: *populace* is said of a body only, when actually assembled. The voice of the *people* is sometimes too loud to be disregarded; the *populace* in England are fond of dragging their favorites in carriages.

The *people* like a headlong torrent go,
And every dam they break or overflow.
SHAKESPEARE.

The pliant *populace*,
Those dupes of novelty, will bend before us.

MALLETT.

MOB and MOBILITY are from the Latin *mobilis*, signifying movableness, which is the characteristic of the multitude: hence Virgil's *mobile vulgus*. These terms, therefore, designate not only what is low, but tumultuous. A *mob* is at all times an object of terror: the *mobility*, whether high or low, are a fluttering order that mostly run from bad to worse.

By the senseless and insignificant clink of misapplied words, some restless demagogues had inflamed the mind of the sottish *mobile* to a strange, unaccountable abhorrence of the best of men.

SOUTH.

PEOPLE, PERSONS, FOLKS.

THE term PEOPLE has already been considered in two acceptations (*v. People, Nation; People, Populace*), under the general idea of an assembly; but in the present case it is employed to express a small number of individuals: the word *people*, however, is always considered as one undivided body, and the word PERSON may be distinctly used either in the singular or plural; as we cannot say one, two, three, or four *people*: but we may say one, two, three, or four *persons*: yet, on the other hand, we may indifferently say, such *people* or *persons*; many *people* or *persons*; some *people* or *persons*, and the like.

With regard to the use of these terms, which is altogether colloquial, *people* is employed in general propositions; and *persons* in those which are specific or referring directly to some particular individuals: *people* are generally of that opinion; some *people* think so; some *people* attended: there were but few *persons* present at the entertainment; the whole company consisted of six *persons*.

As the term *people* is employed to designate the promiscuous multitude, it has acquired a certain meanness of acceptation which makes it less suitable than the word *persons*, when *people* of respectability are referred to: were I to say, of any individuals, I do not know who the *people* are, it would not be so respectful as to say, I do not know who those *persons* are: in like manner one says, from *people* of that stamp, better is not to be

expected; *persons* of their appearance do not frequent such places.

FOLKS, through the medium of the Northern languages, is connected with the Latin *vulgus*, the common *people*: it is not unusual to say good *people*, or good *folks*; and in speaking jocularly to one's friends, the latter term is likewise admissible: but in the serious style it is never employed except in a disrespectful manner: such *folks* (speaking of gamesters) are often put to sorry shifts.

Performance is even the duller for
His act; and, but in the plainer and simple
Kind of the *people*, the deed is quite out of
Use.

SHAKESPEARE.

You may observe many honest, inoffensive *persons* strangely run down by an ugly word.

SOUTH.

I paid some compliments to great *folks*, who like to be complimented.

HERRING.

TO PERCEIVE, DISCERN, DISTINGUISH.

TO PERCEIVE, in Latin *percipio*, or *per* and *capio*, signifying to take hold of thoroughly, is a positive, to DISCERN (*v. Discernment*) a relative, action: we *perceive* things by themselves; we *discern* them amidst many others: we *perceive* that which is obvious; we *discern* that which is remote, or which requires much attention to get an idea of it. We *perceive* by a person's looks and words what he intends; we *discern* the drift of his actions. We may *perceive* sensible or spiritual objects; we commonly *discern* only that which is spiritual: we *perceive* light, darkness, colors, or the truth or falsehood of anything; we *discern* characters, motives, the tendency and consequences of actions, etc. It is the act of a child to *perceive* according to the quickness of its senses; it is the act of a man to *discern* according to the measure of his knowledge and understanding.

And lastly, turning inwardly her eyes,
Perceives how all her own ideas rise.

JENTYNS.

He was not only of a very keen courage in the exposing of his person, but an excellent *discerner* and pursuer of advantage upon the enemy.

CLARENDON.

To *discern* and DISTINGUISH (*v. Difference*) approach the nearest in sense to each other; but the former signifies to see only one thing, the latter to see two or more in quick succession so as to compare them. We *discern* what lie in things;

we *distinguish* things according to their outward marks; we *discern* things in order to understand their essences; we *distinguish* in order not to confound them together. Experienced and discreet people may *discern* the signs of the times; it is just to *distinguish* between an action done from inadvertence, and that which is done from design. The conduct of people is sometimes so veiled by art, that it is not easy to *discern* their object: it is necessary to *distinguish* between practice and profession.

One who is actuated by party spirit is almost under an incapacity of *discerning* either real blemishes or beauties.

ADDISON.

Mr. Boyle observes that though the mole be not totally blind (as is generally thought), she has not sight enough to *distinguish* objects.

ADDISON.

PERCEPTION, IDEA, CONCEPTION, NOTION.

PERCEPTION expresses either the act of *perceiving* (*v. To perceive*), or the impression produced by that act; in this latter sense it is analogous to an IDEA (*v. Idea*). The impression of an object that is present to us is termed a *perception*; the revival of that impression, when the object is removed, is an *idea*. A combination of *ideas* by which any image is presented to the mind is a CONCEPTION (*v. To comprehend*); the association of two or more *ideas*, so as to constitute a decision, is a NOTION (*v. Opinion*). *Perceptions* are clear or confused, according to the state of the sensible organs, and the *perceptive* faculty; *ideas* are faint or vivid, vague or distinct, according to the nature of the *perception*; *conceptions* are gross or refined, according to the number and extent of one's *ideas*; *notions* are true or false, correct or incorrect, according to the extent of one's knowledge. The *perception* which we have of remote objects is sometimes so indistinct as to leave hardly any traces of the image on the mind; we have in that case a *perception*, but not an *idea*: if we read the description of any object, we may have an *idea* of it; but we need not have any immediate *perception*: the *idea* in this case being complex, and formed of many images of which we have already had a *perception*.

If we present objects to our minds, according to different images which have

already been impressed, we are said to have a *conception* of them: in this case, however, it is not necessary for the objects really to exist; they may be the offspring of the mind's operation within itself: but with regard to *notions* it is different, for they are formed respecting objects that do really exist, although perhaps the properties or circumstances which we assign to them are not real. If I look at the moon, I have a *perception* of it; if it disappear from my sight, and the impression remains, I have an *idea* of it; if an object, differing in shape and color from that or anything else which I may have seen present itself to my mind, it is a *conception*; if of this moon I conceive that it is no bigger than what it appears to my eye, this is a *notion*, which, in the present instance, assigns an unreal property to a real object.

What can the fondest mother wish for more,
Ev'n for her darling son, than solid sense,
Perceptions clear, and flowing eloquence?

WYNNE.

Imagination selects *ideas* from the treasures of remembrance.

JOHNSON.

It is not a head that is filled with extravagant *conceptions* which is capable of furnishing the world with diversions of this nature (from humor).

ADDISON.

Those *notions* which are to be collected by reason, in opposition to the senses, will seldom stand forward in the mind, but be treasured in the remoter repositories of the memory.

JOHNSON.

TO PERISH, DIE, DECAY.

To PERISH, in French *périr*, in Latin *perire*, compounded of *per* and *eo*, signifying to go thoroughly away, expresses more than to DIE (*v. To die*), and is applicable to many objects; for the latter is properly applied only to express the extinction of animal life, and figuratively to express the extinction of life or spirit in vegetables, or other bodies; but the former is applied to express the dissolution of substances, so that they lose their existence as aggregate bodies. What *perishes*, therefore, does not always *die*, although whatever *dies*, by that very act perishes to a certain extent. Hence we say that wood *perishes*, although it does not *die*; people are said either to *perish* or *die*: but as the term *perish* expresses even more than *dying*, it is possible for the same thing to *die* and not *perish*; thus a plant may be