

The *pretence* and *PRETEXT* alike consist of what is unreal; but the former is not so great a violation of truth as the latter: the *pretence* may consist of truth and falsehood blended; the *pretext* consists altogether of falsehood: the *pretence* may sometimes serve only to conceal or palliate a fault; the *pretext* serves to hide something seriously culpable or wicked: a child may make indisposition a *pretence* for idleness; a thief makes his acquaintance with the servants a *pretext* for getting admittance into a house.

Let not the Trojans, with a feigned *pretence* Of proffer'd peace, delude the Latin prince.

DRYDEN.

Justifying perfidy and murder for public benefit, public benefit would soon become the *pretext*, and perfidy and murder the end.

BURKE.

The *pretence* and *EXCUSE* are both set forth to justify one's conduct in the eyes of others; but the *pretence* always conceals something more or less culpable, and by a greater or less violation of truth; the *excuse* may sometimes justify that which is justifiable, and with strict regard to truth. To oblige one's self under the *pretence* of obliging another, is a despicable trick; illness is an allowable *excuse* to justify any omission in business.

I should have dressed the whole with greater care, but I had little time, which I am sure you know to be more than *pretence*.

WAKE.

Nothing but love this patience could produce, And I allow your rage that kind *excuse*.

DRYDEN.

And even where the *excuse* may be frivolous it does not imply direct falsehood.

The last refuge of a guilty person is to take shelter under an *excuse*.

SOUTH.

PRETENSION, CLAIM.

PRETENSION (*v. Pretence*) and *CLAIM* (*v. To ask for*) both signify an assertion of rights, but they differ in the nature of the rights. The first refers only to the rights which are considered as such by the individual; the latter to those which exist independent of his supposition: there cannot, therefore, be a *pretension* without some one to pretend, but there may be a *claim* without any immediate claimant: thus we say a person rests his *pretension* to the crown upon the ground of being descended from the former king; in hereditary monarchies there is no one

who has any *claim* to the crown except the next heir in succession.

But if to unjust things thou dost pretend, Ere they begin, let thy *pretensions* end.

DENHAM.

Whence is this pow'r, this fondness of all arts, Serving, adorning life through all its parts: Which names imposed, by letters mark'd those names, Adjusted property by legal *claims*?

JENYNS.

The *pretension* is commonly built upon personal merits; the *claim* rests upon the laws of civil society: a person makes high *pretensions* who estimates his merits and consequent deserts at a high rate; he judges of his *claims* according as they are supported by the laws of his country or the circumstances of the case: the *pretension* when denied can never be proved; the *claim*, when proved, can be enforced.

It is often charged upon writers, that, with all their *pretensions* to genius and discoveries, they do little more than copy one another.

JOHNSON.

This night our minister we name, Let every servant speak his *claim*.

GAY.

PREVAILING, PREVALENT, RULING, OVERRULING, PREDOMINANT.

PREVAILING and *PREVALENT* both come from the Latin *prevaleo*, to be strong above others. *RULING*, *OVERRULING*, and *PREDOMINANT* (from *dominor*, to rule), signify *ruling* or bearing greater sway than others.

Prevailing expresses the actual state or quality of a particular object: *prevaleant* marks the quality of *prevailing*, as it affects objects in general. The same distinction exists between *overruling* and *predominant*. A person has a *prevailing* sense of religion; religious feeling is *prevaleant* in a country or in a community. There is always some *prevailing* fashion which some persons are ever ready to follow. The idea has of late years become *prevaleant*.

The evils naturally consequent upon a *prevailing* temptation are intolerable.

SOUTH.

The conduct of a peculiar providence made the instruments of that great design *prevaleant* and victorious, and all those mountains of opposition to become plains.

SOUTH.

Whate'er thou shalt ordain, thou *ruling* pow'r, Unknown and sudden be the dreadful hour.

ROWE.

Prevailing and *prevaleant* mark simply the existing state of superiority: *ruling*

and *predominant* express this state, in relation to some other which it has superseded or reduced to a state of inferiority. An opinion is said to be *prevailing* as respects the number of persons by whom it is maintained: a principle is said to be *ruling* as respects the superior influence which it has over the conduct of men more than any other. Particular disorders are *prevaleant* at certain seasons of the year, when they affect the generality of persons: a particular taste or fashion is *predominant* which supersedes all other tastes or fashions.

Nor can a man, independently of the *overruling* influence of God's blessing and care, call himself one penny richer.

SOUTH.

The doctrine of not owning a foreigner to be a king was held and taught by the Pharisees, a *predominant* sect of the Jews.

PRIDEAUX.

TO PREVENT, ANTICIPATE.

TO PREVENT is literally to come beforehand, and *ANTICIPATE* to take beforehand: the former is employed for actual occurrences; the latter as much for calculations as for actions: to *prevent* is the act of a person toward other persons or things; to *anticipate* is the act of a being either toward himself or another. In this sense God is said to *prevent* man with his favor by interposing so as to direct his purposes to the right object.

Be careful still to guard thy soul from wrong, And let thy thought *prevent* thy hand and tongue.

ROWE.

And a man may *prevent* what is to happen, by causing it to happen before the time.

But I do think it most cowardly and vile, For fear of what might fall, so to *prevent* The time of life.

SHAKESPEARE.

We *anticipate* the happiness which we are to enjoy in future; we *anticipate* what a person is going to say by saying the same thing before him.

Why should we *Anticipate* our sorrows? 'Tis like those Who die for fear of death.

SHAKESPEARE.

These words may also be both taken in the sense of causing a thing not to be done, but with this distinction, that to *prevent* is to cause a thing not to be done or happen at all, and *anticipate* is to *prevent* another from doing it by doing it one's self.

They sent a party of twelve hundred horse and dragoons, under the command of Sir George Chudleigh, to surprise the high-sheriff and principal gentlemen of the county, and thereby to *prevent* the coming up of any more strength to the king's party.

CLARENDON.

I am far from pretending to instruct the profession, or *anticipating* their directions to such as are under their government.

ARBUTHNOT.

TO PREVENT, OBVIATE, PRECLUDE.

ALL these terms imply the causing something not to take place or exist. *TO PREVENT* (*v. To hinder*) is to happen before, so as to render the thing impracticable. *TO OBVIATE*, from *ob* and *via*, signifies coming in the way so as to render the thing unnecessary or of no value. *Prevent* applies to events or circumstances in life; *obviate* to mental acts or objects: bad weather *prevents* a person setting out according to a certain arrangement; a change of plan *obviates* every difficulty.

Ev'ry disease of age we may *prevent*, Like those of youth, by being diligent.

DENHAM.

The wind and my unfortunate sprain together, in a great measure *prevented* our electrical experiments.

BRYDONE.

The imputation of folly, if it is true, must be suffered without hope; but that of immorality may be *obviated* by removing the cause.

HAWKSWORTH.

Upon the ministers of the Church it is incumbent, as occasions offer, to explain and illustrate its design and uses to the more unlearned, as well as to *obviate* the crude exceptions made against its doctrines or language.

CLEAVER.

TO PRECLUDE, from *pre* and *cludo*, or *claudo*, to shut, signifying to shut before or out, to put a stop to by the intervention of something, is, like *obviate*, applied to mental objects.

The design of subscription being to preserve one uniform tenor of faith, and to *preclude* diversity of opinion.

WATERLAND.

To prevent and *preclude* are rather the act of the thing than of the person; to *obviate* is rather the act of the person than of the thing. Circumstances may *prevent* or *preclude* anything from happening: a person *obviates* a difficulty or objection; so, according to this distinction, we may say either to *obviate* a necessity, or to *preclude* a necessity for anything, according as this is effected by any person, or by any circumstance.

I have begun two or three letters to you by snatches, and been *prevented* from finishing them by a thousand avocations and dissipations.

SWIFT.

There appears to be no reason to suppose that he paid any attention to the law; indeed, his dramatic pursuits must have *precluded* the necessary application.

ANTHONY A. WOOD.

For the *obviating* that difficulty, I have willingly declined that instance against the eternal succession of mankind.

HALE.

PREVIOUS, PRELIMINARY, PREPARATORY, INTRODUCTORY.

PREVIOUS, in Latin *prævius*, compounded of *præ* and *via*, signifies leading the way or going before. PRELIMINARY, from *præ* and *limen*, a threshold, signifies belonging to the threshold or entrance. PREPARATORY and INTRODUCTORY signify belonging to a preparation or introduction.

Previous denotes simply the order of succession: the other terms, in addition to this, convey the idea of connection between the objects which succeed each other. *Previous* applies to actions and proceedings in general; as a *previous* question, a *previous* inquiry, a *previous* determination: *preliminary* is employed only for matters of contract: a *preliminary* article, a *preliminary* condition, are what precede the final settlement of any question: *preparatory* is employed for matters of arrangement; the disposing of men in battle is *preparatory* to an engagement; the making of marriage deeds and contracts is *preparatory* to the final solemnization of the marriage: *introductory* is employed for matters of science or discussion; as remarks are *introductory* to the main subject in question; compendiums of grammar, geography, and the like, as *introductory* to larger works, are useful for young people. Prudent people are careful to make every *previous* inquiry before they seriously enter into engagements with strangers: it is impolitic to enter into details until all *preliminary* matters are fully adjusted: one ought never to undertake any important matter without first adopting every *preparatory* measure that can facilitate its prosecution: in complicated matters it is necessary to have something *introductory* by way of explanation.

One step by which a temptation approaches to

its crisis is a *previous* growing familiarity of the mind with the sin which a man is tempted to.

SOUTH.

I have discussed the nuptial *preliminaries* so often, that I can repeat the forms in which jointures are settled and pin-money secured.

JOHNSON.

Æschylus is in the practice of holding the spectator in suspense by a *preparatory* silence in his chief person.

CUMBERLAND.

Consider yourselves as acting now, under the eye of God, an *introductory* part to a more important scene.

BLAIR.

PRIDE, VANITY, CONCEIT.

PRIDE is in all probability connected with the word *parade*, and the German *pracht*, show or splendor, as it signifies that high-flown temper in a man which makes him paint to himself everything in himself as beautiful or splendid. VANITY, in Latin *vanitas*, from *vain* and *vanus*, is compounded of *ve* or *valde* and *inanis*, signifying exceeding emptiness. CONCEIT, *v. Conceit*.

The valuing of one's self on the possession of any property is the idea common to these terms, but they differ either in regard to the object or the manner of the action. *Pride* is the term of most extensive import and application, and comprehends in its signification not only that of the other two terms, but likewise ideas peculiar to itself. *Pride* is applicable to every object, good or bad, high or low, small or great; *vanity* is applicable only to small objects: *pride* is therefore good or bad; *vanity* is always bad, it is always emptiness or nothingness. A man is *proud* who values himself on the possession of his literary or scientific talent, on his wealth, on his rank, on his power, on his acquisitions, or his superiority over his competitors; he is *vain* of his person, his dress, his walk, or anything that is frivolous. *Pride* is the inherent quality in man; and, while it rests on noble objects, it is his noblest characteristic; *vanity* is the distortion of one's nature flowing from a vicious constitution or education: *pride* shows itself variously, according to the nature of the object on which it is fixed; a noble *pride* seeks to display itself in all that can command the respect or admiration of mankind; the *pride* of wealth, of power, or of other adventitious properties, commonly displays itself in an unseemly deportment toward others; *vanity* shows itself in false pretensions.

He was commonly represented as a *proud* and distant man, but in fact he had no more *pride* at heart than every man of honor carries about with him, and which serves to repel everything that inclines toward meanness with becoming indignation.

CUMBERLAND.

His *vanity* disposed him to be his excellency, and his weakness to believe that he should be the general in the houses as well as in the field, and be able to govern their counsels and restrain their passions, as well as to fight their battles.

CLARENDON.

Pride, in the limited and bad sense, is always associated with strength, and produces more or less violence; *vanity* is coupled with weakness.

Vanity makes men ridiculous, *pride* odious, and ambition terrible.

STEELE.

'Tis an old maxim in the schools, That *vanity's* the food of fools.

SWIFT.

Conceit is that species of self-valuation that respects one's talents only; it is so far, therefore, closely allied to *pride*; but a man is said to be *proud* of that which he really has, but to be *conceited* of that which he really has not: a man may be *proud* to an excess of merits which he actually possesses; but when he is *conceited*, his merits are all in his own *conceit*; the latter is therefore obviously founded on falsehood altogether. As self-*conceit* is the offspring of ignorance and *vanity*, it is most frequently found in youth, but, as it is the greatest obstacle to improvement, it may grow up with a person and go with him through life.

The self-*conceit* of the young is the great source of those dangers to which they are exposed.

BLAIR.

PRIDE, HAUGHTINESS, LOFTINESS, DIGNITY.

PRIDE is employed principally as respects the temper of the mind: HAUGHTINESS (*v. Haughty*) and LOFTINESS (*v. High*) respect either the temper of mind or the external behavior. DIGNITY (*v. Honor*) respects only the external behavior. *Pride* is, as before (*v. Pride*), the general term; the others are modes of *pride*. *Pride*, inasmuch as it consists purely of self-esteem, is a positive sentiment which one may entertain independently of other persons: it lies in the inmost recesses of the human heart, and mingles itself insensibly with our affections and passions. *Haughtiness* is that mode of *pride* which springs out of one's

comparison of one's self with others: the *haughty* man dwells on the inferiority of others; the *proud* man, in the strict sense, dwells on his own perfections. *Loftiness* is a mode of *pride* which raises the spirit above objects supposed to be inferior; it does not set man so much above others as above himself, or that which concerns himself.

Every demonstration of an implacable rancor and an untamable *pride* were the only encouragements we received (from the regicides) to the renewal of our supplications.

BURKE.

Prosperity doth not only shut the earth against counsel by reason of the dulness which it leaves upon the senses, but also on account of that arrogance and untutored *haughtiness* that it brings upon the mind.

SOUTH.

Augustus and Tiberius had *loftiness* enough in their temper, and affected to make a sovereign figure.

COLLIER.

As respects the exterior, *pride* in the behavior is always bad.

He was commonly represented as a *proud* and distant man.

CUMBERLAND.

But it is taken in an indifferent sense in application to brutes or unconscious agents.

He, like a *proud* steed rein'd, went *haughty* on.

MILTON.

Haughtiness in one's carriage, and *loftiness* in one's tone or air, are mostly unbecoming, and seldom warranted.

Provoked by Edward's *haughtiness*, even the passive Baliol began to mutiny.

ROBERTSON.

Waller describes Sacharissa as a predominant beauty, of *lofty* charms and imperious influence.

JOHNSON.

Dignity, which arises from a proper consciousness of what is due to one's self, is always taken in a good sense. It is natural to some men, and shows itself at all times; on other occasions it requires to be assumed.

As soon as Almagro knew his fate to be inevitable, he met it with the *dignity* and fortitude of a veteran.

ROBERTSON.

PRIMARY, PRIMITIVE, PRISTINE, ORIGINAL.

PRIMARY, from *primus*, signifies belonging to or like the first. PRIMITIVE, from the same, signifies being the first. PRISTINE, in Latin *pristinus*, from *præius*, signifies in former times. ORIGINAL signifies containing the *origin*.

The *primary* denotes simply the order of succession, and is therefore the generic term; *primitive*, *pristine*, and *original* include also the idea of some other relation to the thing that succeeds, and are therefore modes of the *primary*. The *primary* has nothing to come before it; in this manner we speak of the *primary* cause as the cause which precedes secondary causes: the *primitive* is that after which other things are formed; in this manner a *primitive* word is that after which, or from which, the derivatives are formed: the *pristine* is that which follows the *primitive*, so as to become customary; there are but few specimens of the *pristine* purity of life among the professors of Christianity: the *original* is that which either gives birth to the thing, or belongs to that which gives birth to the thing; the *original* meaning of a word is that which was given to it by the makers of the word.

Memory is the *primary* and fundamental power, without which there could be no other intellectual operation. JOHNSON.

Meanwhile our *primitive* great sire to meet,
His godlike guest walks forth. MILTON.

As to the share of power each individual ought to have in the State, that I must deny to be among the direct *original* rights of man. BURKE.

While with her friendly clay he deign'd to dwell,
Shall she with safety reach her *pristine* seat. PRIOR.

PRINCE, MONARCH, SOVEREIGN,
POTENTATE.

PRINCE, in French *prince*, Latin *princeps*, from *primus*, signifies the chief or the first person in the nation. MONARCH, from the Greek *μονος*, alone, and *αρχη*, government, signifies one having sole authority. SOVEREIGN has been supposed to be changed from *superregnum*, but, like the French *souverain*, the Spanish *soberano*, and the Italian *sovrano*, it may, perhaps, with greater propriety, be derived from *supernus* or *supremus*, supreme. POTENTATE, from *potens*, powerful, signifies one having supreme power.

Prince is the generic term, the rest are specific terms; every *monarch*, *sovereign*, and *potentate* is a *prince*, but not *vice versa*. The term *prince* is indefinite as to the degree of power: a *prince* may

have a limited or despotic power; but in its restricted sense it denotes a smaller degree of power than any of the other terms: the term *monarch* does not define the extent of the power, but simply that it is undivided, as opposed to that species of power which is lodged in the hands of many: *sovereign* and *potentate* indicate the highest degree of power; but the former is employed only as respects the nation that is governed, the latter respects other nations: a *sovereign* is supreme over his subjects; a *potentate* is powerful by means of his subjects. Every man having independent power is a *prince*, let his territory be ever so inconsiderable: Germany is divided into a number of small states, which are governed by petty *princes*. Every one reigning by himself in a state of some considerable magnitude, and having an independent authority over his subjects, is a *monarch*; kings and emperors, therefore, are all *monarchs*. Every *monarch* is a *sovereign* whose extent of dominion and number of subjects rises above the ordinary level; he is a *potentate* if his influence either in the cabinet or the field extends very considerably over the affairs of other nations.

Of all the *princes* who had swayed the Mexican sceptre, Montezuma was the most haughty. ROBERTSON.

The Mexican people were warlike and enterprising, the authority of the *monarch* unbounded. ROBERTSON.

The Peruvians yielded a blind submission to their *sovereigns*. ROBERTSON.

How mean must the most exalted *potentate* upon earth appear to that eye which takes in innumerable orders of spirits! ADDISON.

PRINCIPLE, MOTIVE.

THE PRINCIPLE (*v. Doctrine*) may sometimes be the MOTIVE; but often there is a *principle* where there is no *motive*, and there is a *motive* where there is no *principle*. The *principle* lies in conscious and unconscious agents; the *motive* only in conscious agents: all nature is guided by certain *principles*; its movements go forward upon certain *principles*: man is put into action by certain *motives*; the *principle* is the prime moving cause of everything that is set in motion; the *motive* is the prime moving cause that sets the human machine into action.

The *principle* in its restricted sense comes still nearer to the *motive*, when it refers to the opinions which we form: the *principle* in this case is that idea which we form of things, so as to regulate our conduct; the *motive* is that idea which simply impels to action: the former is therefore something permanent, and grounded upon the exercise of our reasoning powers; the latter is momentary, and arises simply from our capacity of willing and thinking: bad *principles* lead a man into a bad course of life; but a man may be led by bad *motives* to do what is good as well as what is bad.

The best legislators have been satisfied with the establishment of some sure, solid, and ruling *principle* in government. BURKE.

The danger of betraying our weakness to our servants, and the impossibility of concealing it from them, may be justly considered as one *motive* to a regular life. JOHNSON.

PRIORITY, PRECEDENCE, PRE-EMINENCE, PREFERENCE.

PRIORITY denotes the abstract quality of being before others: PRECEDENCE, from *præ* and *cedo*, signifies the state of going before: PRE-EMINENCE signifies being more eminent or elevated than others: PREFERENCE signifies being put before others. *Priority* respects simply the order of succession, and is applied to objects either in a state of motion or rest; *precedence* signifies *priority* in going, and depends upon a right or privilege; *pre-eminence* signifies *priority* in being, and depends upon merit; *preference* signifies *priority* in placing, and depends upon favor. The *priority* is applicable rather to the thing than the person; it is not that which is sought for, but that which is to be had: age frequently gives *priority* where every other claim is wanting. The immoderate desire for *precedence* is often nothing but a childish vanity; it is a distinction that flows out of rank and power; a nobleman claims a *precedence* on all occasions of ceremony. The love of *pre-eminence* is laudable, inasmuch as it requires a degree of moral worth which exceeds that of others; a general aims at *pre-eminence* in his profession. Those who are anxious to obtain the best for themselves are eager to have the *preference*: we

seek for the *preference* in matters of choice.

A better place, a more commodious seat, *priority* in being helped at table, etc., what is it but sacrificing ourselves in such trifles to the convenience and pleasures of others? EARL CHATHAM.

Ranks will then (in the next world) be adjusted, and *precedency* set aright. ADDISON.

It is the concern of mankind that the destruction of order should not be a claim to rank; that crimes should not be the only title to *pre-eminence* and honor. BURKE.

We find in ourselves a power to begin or forbear several actions of our minds or motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or *preference* of the mind. LOCKE.

PRIVACY, RETIREMENT, SECLUSION.

PRIVACY literally denotes the abstract quality of *private*; but when taken by itself it signifies the state of being *private*: RETIREMENT literally signifies the abstract act of *retiring*: and SECLUSION that of *secluding* one's self: but *retirement* by itself frequently denotes a state of being retired, or a place of *retirement*; *seclusion*, a state of being *secluded*: hence we say a person lives in *privacy*, in *retirement*, in *seclusion*: *privacy* is opposed to publicity; he who lives in *privacy*, therefore, is one who follows no public line, who lives so as to be little known: *retirement* is opposed to openness or freedom of access; he, therefore, who lives in *retirement* withdraws from the society of others, he lives by himself: *seclusion* is the excess of *retirement*; he who lives in *seclusion* bars all access to himself; he shuts himself from the world. *Privacy* is most suitable for such as are in circumstances of humiliation, whether from their misfortune or their fault; *retirement* is peculiarly agreeable to those who are of a reflective turn; but *seclusion* is chosen only by those who labor under some strong affection of the mind, whether of a religious or a physical nature.

Fly with me to some safe, some sacred *privacy*. ROWE.

In our *retirements* everything disposes us to be serious. ADDISON.

There have appeared divines of enlightened and discerning minds, who have confirmed the observation that superstitious gloom ever grows darker and assumes new horrors in *seclusion*. ZIMMERMAN.

PRIVILEGE, PREROGATIVE, EXEMPTION, IMMUNITY.

PRIVILEGE, in Latin *privilegium*, compounded of *privus* and *lex*, signifies a law made for any individual or set of individuals. PREROGATIVE, in Latin *prærogativi*, was so called from *præ* and *rogō*, to ask, because they were first asked whom they would have to be consuls; hence applied in our language to the right of determining or choosing first in many particulars. EXEMPTION, from the verb to *exempt*, and IMMUNITY, from the Latin *immunis*, free, are both employed for the object from which one is exempt or free.

Privilege and *prerogative* consist of positive advantages; *exemption* and *immunity* of those which are negative: by the former we obtain an actual good, by the latter the removal of an evil. *Privilege*, in its most extended sense, comprehends all the rest: for every *prerogative*, *exemption*, and *immunity* are *privileges*, inasmuch as they rest upon certain laws or customs, which are made for the benefit of certain individuals. In the restricted sense, the *privilege* may be enjoyed by many; the *prerogative*, which is a peculiar and distinguished *privilege*, can be enjoyed only by a few. As they respect the public, *privileges* belong to or are granted to the subject; *prerogatives* belong to the crown. It is the *privilege* of a member of Parliament to escape arrest for debt; it is the *prerogative* of the crown to be irresponsible for the conduct of its ministers: as respects private cases, it is the *privilege* of females to have the best places assigned to them; it is the *prerogative* of the male to address the female.

As the aged depart from the dignity, so they forfeit the *privileges*, of gray hairs. BLAIR.

By the worst of usurpations, a usurpation on the *prerogatives* of nature, you attempt to force tailors and carpenters into the State. BURKE.

Privileges are applied to every object which it is desirable to have; *prerogative* is confined to the case of making one's election, or exercising any special power; *exemption* is applicable to cases in which one is exempted from any tribute or payment; *immunity*, from the Latin *munus*, an office, is peculiarly applica-

ble to cases in which one is freed from a service: all chartered towns or corporations have *privileges*, *exemptions*, and *immunities*: it is the *privilege* of the city of London to shut its gates against the king.

Neither nobility nor clergy (in France) enjoy any *exemption* from the duty on consumable commodities. BURKE.

You claim an *immunity* from evil, which belongs not to the lot of man. BLAIR.

PROCEEDING PROCESS, PROGRESS.

THE manner of performing actions for the attainment of a given end is the common idea comprehended in these terms. PROCEEDING is the most general, as it simply expresses the general idea of the manner of going on; the rest are specific terms, denoting some particularity in the action, object, or circumstance. *Proceeding* is said commonly of such things as happen in the ordinary way of doing business; PROCESS is said of such things as are done by rule: the former is considered in a moral point of view; the latter in a scientific or technical point of view: the Freemasons have bound themselves together by a law of secrecy not to reveal some part of their *proceedings*; the *process* by which paper is made has undergone considerable improvements since its first invention.

What could be more fair than to lay open to an enemy all that you wished to obtain, and to desire him to imitate your ingenious *proceeding*? BURKE.

Saturnian Juno now, with double care, Attends the fatal *process* of the war. DRYDEN.

Proceeding and PROGRESS both refer to the moral actions of men; but the *proceeding* simply denotes the act of going on, or doing something; the *progress* denotes an approximation to the end: the *proceeding* may be only a partial action comprehending both the beginning and the end; but the *progress* is applied to that which requires time, and a regular succession of action, to bring it to a completion: that is a *proceeding* in which every man is tried in a court of law; that is a *progress* which one makes in learning, by the addition to one's knowledge: hence we do not talk of the *proceeding* of life, but of the *progress* of life.

It is very observable that our *proceedings* discovered plainly when his lordship thought well of himself, and when not, for if he was in good heart he observed us narrowly. NORTH.

His penetrating and comprehensive mind saw that the *progress* of social, and especially commercial, intercourse was producing new combinations, which had not been specifically foreseen when the laws applied to such subjects were enacted. BISSET.

PROCEEDING, TRANSACTION.

PROCEEDING signifies literally the thing that *proceeds*; and TRANSACTION the thing *transacted*: the former is, therefore, of something that is going forward; the latter of something that is already done: we are witnesses to the whole *proceeding*; we inquire into the whole *transaction*. The term *proceeding* is said of every event or circumstance which goes forward through the agency of men; *transaction* comprehends only those matters which have been deliberately *transacted* or brought to a conclusion: in this sense we use the word *proceeding* in application to an affray in the street; and the word *transaction* to some commercial negotiation that has been carried on between certain persons. The term *proceeding* marks the manner of *proceeding*; as when we speak of the *proceedings* in a court of law: *transaction* marks the business *transacted*; as the *transactions* on the Exchange. A *proceeding* may be characterized as disgraceful; a *transaction* as iniquitous.

The *proceedings* of a council of old men in an American tribe, we are told, were no less formal and sagacious than those in a senate in more polished republics. ROBERTSON.

It was Bothwell's interest to cover, if possible, the whole *transaction* under the veil of darkness and silence. ROBERTSON.

PROCESSION, TRAIN, RETINUE.

PROCESSION, from the verb *proceed*, signifies the act of going forward or before, that is, in the present instance, of going before others, or one before another. TRAIN in all probability comes from the Latin *traho*, to draw, signifying the thing drawn after another; and in the present instance the persons who are led after, or follow, any object. RETINUE, from the verb to *retain*, signifies those who are retained as attendants.

All these terms are said of any number of persons who follow in a certain order; but this, which is the leading idea in the word *procession*, is but collateral in the terms *train* and *retinue*: on the other hand, the *procession* may consist of persons of all ranks and stations; but *train* and *retinue* apply only to such as follow some person or thing in a subordinate capacity: the former in regard to such as make up the concluding part of some *procession*; the latter only in regard to the servants or attendants on the great. At funerals there is frequently a long *train* of coaches belonging to the friends of the deceased, which close the *procession*; princes and nobles never go out on state or public occasions without a numerous *retinue*: the beauty of every *procession* consists in the order with which every one keeps his place, and the regularity with which the whole goes forward; the length of a *train* is what renders it most worthy of notice; the number of a *retinue* in Eastern nations is one criterion by which the wealth of the individual is estimated.

And now the priests, Potitius at their head, In skins of beasts involv'd, the long *procession* led. DRYDEN.

The moon, and all the starry *train*, Hung the vast vault of heav'n. GAY.

Him and his sleeping slaves he slew; then spies Where Remus with his rich *retinue* lies. DRYDEN.

PRODUCTION, PRODUCE, PRODUCT.

THE term PRODUCTION expresses either the act of *producing* or the thing *produced*; PRODUCT and PRODUCE express only the thing *produced*: the *production* of a tree from a seed is one of the wonders of nature; the *produce* will not be considerable. In the sense of the thing *produced*, *production* is applied to every individual thing that is *produced*, whether by nature or art; as a tree is a *production*, or a painting is a *production* of art or skill: *produce* and *product* are properly applicable to those *productions* of nature which are made to turn to account; the former in a collective sense, and in reference to some particular object; the latter in an abstract and general sense: the aggregate quantity of grain drawn from a field is termed the *produce* of the field; but corn,

hay, vegetables, and fruits in general, are termed *products* of the earth; the naturalist examines all the *productions* of nature; the husbandman looks to the *produce* of his lands; the topographer and traveller inquire about the *products* of different countries.

He was expert in all the parts of physic; but for the history of nature, of the *productions* of all countries, of the virtues and improvements of plants, ores, and minerals, with their varieties in different climates, he was perhaps the perfectest and exactest man in the world. BURNET.

A storm of hail, I am informed, has destroyed all the *produce* of my estate in Tuscany. MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

Our British *products* are of such kinds and quantities as can turn the balance of trade to our advantage. ADDISON.

There is the same distinction between these terms in their improper as in their proper acceptation; the *production* is whatever results from an effort, physical or mental, as a *production* of genius, a *production* of art, and the like; the *produce* is the amount or aggregate result from physical or mental labor: thus, whatever the husbandman reaps from the cultivation of his land is termed the *produce* of his labor; whatever results from any public subscription or collection is, in like manner, the *produce*: the *product* is employed properly in regard to the mental operation of figures, as the *product* from multiplication, but may be extended to anything which is the fruit of the brain.

What would become of the scrupulous consumptive *productions* furnished by our men of wit and learning? SWIFT.

This tax has already been so often tried, that we know the exact *produce* of it. ADDISON.

I cannot help thinking the Arabian tales the *product* of some woman's imagination. ATTEBURY.

PRODUCTION, PERFORMANCE, WORK.

WHEN we speak of anything as resulting from any specified operation, we term it a PRODUCTION; as the *production* of an author, signifying what he has *produced* by the effort of his mind: Homer's Iliad is esteemed as one of the finest *productions* of the imagination. When we speak of anything as executed or *performed* by some person, we term it a PERFORMANCE, as a drawing or a painting is denominated the *performance*

of a particular artist. The term *production* cannot be employed without specifying or referring to the source from which it is *produced*, or the means by which it is *produced*; as the *production* of art, the *production* of the inventive faculty, the *production* of the mind, etc.: a *performance* cannot be spoken of without referring to the individual by whom it has been *performed*; hence we speak of this or that person's *performance*. When we wish to specify anything that results from WORK or labor, it is termed a *work*: in this manner we either speak of the *work* of one's hands, or a *work* of the imagination, a *work* of time, a *work* of magnitude.

Nature, in her *productions* slow, aspires
By just degrees to reach perfection's height. SOMERVILLE.

The *performances* of Pope were burned by those whom he had, perhaps, selected as most likely to publish them. JOHNSON.

Yet there are some *works* which the author must consign unpublished to posterity. JOHNSON.

TO PROFESS, DECLARE.

PROFESS, in Latin *professus*, participle of *profiteor*, compounded of *pro* and *fateor*, to speak, signifies to set forth, or present to public view. DECLARE, *v. To declare*.

An exposure of one's thoughts or opinions is the common idea in the signification of these terms; but they differ in the manner of the action, as well as the object: one *professes* by words or by actions; one *declares* by words only: a man *professes* to believe that on which he acts; but he *declares* his belief of it either with his lips or in his writings. A *profession* may be general and partial, it may amount to little more than an intimation: a *declaration* is positive and explicit; it leaves no one in doubt: a *profession* may, therefore, sometimes be hypocritical; he who *professes* may wish to imply that which is not real: a *declaration* must be either directly true or false; he who *declares* expressly commits himself upon his veracity. One *professes* either as respects single actions, or a regular course of conduct; one *declares* either passing thoughts or settled principles. A person *professes* to have walked to a certain distance; to have taken a certain route, and the like: a Christian *professes* to follow the doc-

trine and precepts of Christianity; a person *declares* that a thing is true or false, or he *declares* his firm belief in a thing.

A naked *profession* may have credit, when no other evidence can be given. SWIFT.

We are a considerable body, who, upon a proper occasion, would not fail to *declare* ourselves. ADDISON.

To *profess* is employed only for what concerns one's self; to *declare* is likewise employed for what concerns others: one *professes* the motives and principles by which one is guided: one *declares* facts and circumstances with which one is acquainted: one *professes* nothing but what one thinks may be creditable and fit to be known; but one *declares* whatever may have fallen under one's notice, or passed through one's mind, as the case requires; there is always a particular and private motive for *profession*; there are frequently public grounds for making a *declaration*.

Pretending first
Wise to fly pain, *professing* next the spy,
Argues no leader. MILTON.

There are nowhere so plain and full *declarations* of mercy and love to the sons of men as are made in the Gospel. TILLOTSON.

PROFLIGATE, ABANDONED, REPROBATE.

PROFLIGATE, in Latin *profligatus*, participle of *profligo*, compounded of the intensive *pro* and *fligo*, to dash or beat, signifies completely ruined and lost to everything. ABANDONED, *v. To abandon*. REPROBATE (*v. To reprove*) signifies one thoroughly rejected.

These terms, in their proper acceptation, express the most wretched condition of fortune into which it is possible for any human being to be plunged, and consequently, in their improper application, they denote that state of moral desertion and ruin which cannot be exceeded in wickedness or depravity. A *profligate* man has lost all by his vices, and consequently to his vices alone he looks for the regaining those goods of fortune which he has squandered; as he has nothing to lose, and everything to gain in his own estimation, by pursuing the career of his vices, he surpasses all others in his unprincipled conduct: an *abandoned* man is altogether *abandoned* to his pas-

sions, which, having the entire sway over him, naturally impel him to every excess: the *reprobate* man is one who has been reprov'd until he becomes insensible to reproof, and is given up to the malignity of his own passions.

Aged wisdom can check the most forward, and abash the most *profligate*. BLAIR.

To be negligent of what any one thinks of you, does not only show you arrogant but *abandoned*. HUGHES.

And here let those who boast in mortal things,
Learn how their greatest monuments of fame,
And strength, and art, are easily outdone
By *reprobate* spirits. MILTON.

PROFUSION, PROFUSENESS.

PROFUSION, from the Latin *profundo*, to pour forth, is taken in relation to unconscious objects, which pour forth in great plenty; PROFUSENESS is taken from the same, in relation to conscious agents, who likewise pour forth in great plenty: the term *profusion*, therefore, is put for plenty itself, and the term *profuseness* as a characteristic of persons in the sense of extravagance. At the hospitable board of the rich, there will naturally be a *profusion* of everything which can gratify the appetite; when men see an unusual degree of *profusion*, they are apt to indulge themselves in *profuseness*.

Ye glittering towns with wealth and splendor
crown'd,
Ye fields where summer spreads *profusion*
round,
For me your tributary stores combine. GOLDSMITH.

I was convinced that the liberality of my young companions was only *profuseness*. JOHNSON.

PROGRESS, PROGRESSION, ADVANCE, ADVANCEMENT.

A FORWARD motion is designated by these terms: but PROGRESS and PROGRESSION simply imply this sort of motion; ADVANCE and ADVANCEMENT also imply an approximation to some object: we may make a *progress* in that which has no specific termination, as a *progress* in learning, which may cease only with life; but the *advance* is only made to some limited point or object in view; as an *advance* in wealth or honor, which may find a termination within the life. *Progress* and *advance* are said of that which has been passed over; but

progression and *advancement* may be said of that which one is passing; the *progress* is made, or the person is in *advance*; he is in the act of *progression* or *advancement*: a child makes a *progress* in learning by daily attention; the *progression* from one stage of learning to another is not always perceptible; it is not always possible to overtake one who is in *advance*; sometimes a person's *advancement* is retarded by circumstances that are altogether contingent: the first step in any destructive course still prepares for the second, and the second for the third, after which there is no stop, but the *progress* is infinite.

I wish it were in my power to give a regular history of the *progress* which our ancestors have made in this species of versification. TYRWHITT.

And better thence again, and better still,
In infinite *progression*. THOMSON.

The most successful students make their *advances* in knowledge by short flights. JOHNSON.

I have lived to see the fierce *advancement*, the sudden turn, and the abrupt period, of three or four enormous friendships. POPE.

PROGRESS, PROFICIENCY, IMPROVEMENT.

PROGRESS (*v. Proceeding*) is a generic term, the rest are specific; PROFICIENCY, from the Latin *proficio*, compounded of *pro* and *facio*, signifies a profited state, that is to say, a *progress* already made; and IMPROVEMENT, from the verb *improvel*, signifies an improved condition; that is, *progress* in that which *improves*. The term *progress* here, as in the former paragraph, marks the step or motion onward, and the two others the point already reached; but *progress* is applied either in the proper or improper sense, that is, either to those travelling forward, or to those going on stepwise in any work; *proficiency* is applied, in the improper sense, to the ground gained in an art, and *improvement* to what is gained in knowledge, or understanding, or abilities; when idle people set about any work, it is difficult to perceive that they make any *progress* in it from time to time; those who have a thorough taste for either music or drawing will make a *proficiency* in it which is astonishing to those who are unacquainted with the circumstances; the *improvement* of the mind can never be so

effectually and easily obtained as in the period of childhood.

Solon, the sage, his *progress* never ceased,
But still his learning with his days increas'd.

DENHAM.

When the lad was about nineteen, his uncle desired to see him, that he might know what *proficiency* he had made.

HAWKSWORTH.

The *improvement* which grows from habituating the mind to the comprehensive views of religion must not be thought wholly to regard the understanding.

ADDISON.

Progress and *proficiency* are applied to the acts of persons, but *improvement* denotes also the act or state of things; one must make a *progress* or *proficiency*, but things admit of *improvement*.

The metrical part of our poetry, in the time of Chaucer, was capable of more *improvement*.

TYRWHITT.

PROMINENT, CONSPICUOUS.

PROMINENT signifies hanging over; CONSPICUOUS (*v. Distinguished*) signifies easy to be beheld: the former is, therefore, to the latter, in some measure, as the species to the genus; what is *prominent* is, in general, on that very account *conspicuous*; but many things may be *conspicuous* which are not expressly *prominent*: nothing is *prominent* but what projects beyond a certain line; everything is *conspicuous* which may be seen by many: the nose on a man's face is a *prominent* feature, owing to its projecting situation; and it is sometimes *conspicuous*, according to the position of the person: a figure in a *painting* is said to be *prominent*, if it appears to stand forward or before the others; but it is not properly *conspicuous*, unless there be something in it which attracts the general notice, and distinguishes it from all other things; on the contrary, it is *conspicuous*, but not expressly *prominent*, when the colors are vivid.

Lady Macbeth's walking in her sleep is an incident so full of tragic horror, that it stands out as a *prominent* feature in the most sublime drama in the world.

CUMBERLAND.

That innocent mirth which had been so *conspicuous* in Sir Thomas More's life, did not forsake him to the last.

ADDISON.

PROMISCUOUS, INDISCRIMINATE.

PROMISCUOUS, in Latin *promiscuus*, from *promisceo*, or *pro* and *miscéo*, to min-

gle, signifies thoroughly mingled. INDISCRIMINATE, from the Latin *in*, privative, and *discrimen*, a difference, signifies without any difference.

Promiscuous is applied to any number of different objects mingled together; *indiscriminate* is only applied to the action in which one does not discriminate different objects: a multitude is termed *promiscuous*, as characterizing the thing; the use of different things for the same purpose, or of the same things for different purposes, is termed *indiscriminate*, as characterizing the person: things become *promiscuous* by the want of design in any one; they are *indiscriminate* by the express intention of some one: plants of all descriptions are to be found *promiscuously* situated in the beds of a garden: it is folly to level any charge *indiscriminately* against all the members of any community or profession.

Victors and vanquish'd join *promiscuous* cries.

POPE.

From this *indiscriminate* distribution of misery, the moralists have always derived one of their strongest moral arguments for a future state.

JOHNSON.

PROMISE, ENGAGEMENT, WORD.

PROMISE, in Latin *promissus*, from *promitto*, compounded of *pro*, before, and *mitto*, to set or fix; that is, to fix beforehand, is specific, and consequently more binding than the ENGAGEMENT (*v. Business*); we *promise* a thing in a set form of words, that are clearly and strictly understood; we *engage* in general terms, that may admit of alteration: a *promise* is mostly unconditional; an *engagement* is frequently conditional. In *promises* the faith of an individual is admitted upon his word, and built upon as if it were a deed; in *engagements* the intentions of an individual for the future are all that are either implied or understood: on the fulfilment of *promises* often depend the most important interests of individuals; an attention to *engagements* is a matter of mutual convenience in the ordinary concerns of life: a man makes a *promise* of payment, and upon his *promise* it may happen that many others depend for the fulfilment of their *promises*: when *engagements* are made to visit or meet others, an inattention to such *engagements* causes great trouble.

An acre of performance is worth the whole world of *promise*.

HOWELL.

The *engagements* I had to Dr. Swift were such as the actual services he had done me, in relation to the subscription for Homer, obliged me to.

POPE.

As a *promise* and *engagement* can be made only by words, the WORD is often put for either, or for both, as the case requires: he who breaks his *word* in small matters cannot be trusted when he gives his *word* in matters of consequence.

Eneas was our prince; a juster lord,
Or nobler warrior, never drew a sword;
Observant of the right, religious of his *word*.

DRYDEN.

PROOF, EVIDENCE, TESTIMONY.

THE PROOF (*v. Argument*) is that which simply *proves*; the EVIDENCE is that which makes *evident* (*v. Clear*); the TESTIMONY, from *testis*, a witness, is a species of *evidence* by means of witnesses. In the legal acceptance of the terms *proofs* are commonly denominated *evidence*, because nothing can be admitted as *proof* which does not tend to make *evident*; but as what is *proved* is made more certain or indubitable than what is made *evident*, *proof* is more than *evidence*. *Proof* is likewise taken for the act of *proving* as well as for the thing that *proves*, which distinguishes it still further from *evidence*.

Positive *proof* is always required where, from the nature of the case, it appears it might possibly have been had. But next to positive *proof* circumstantial *evidence*, or the doctrine of presumptions, must take place.

BLACKSTONE.

Evidence comprehends whatever is employed to make *evident*, be it words or deeds, be it writing or discourse; *testimony* is properly *evidence* by words spoken, and, more strictly speaking, the person giving the *evidence*.

Evidence is either written or parole.

BLACKSTONE.

Our law considers that there are many transactions to which only one person is privy, and therefore does not always demand the *testimony* of two.

BLACKSTONE.

In an extended application of these terms they are employed with a similar distinction: the *proof* is the mark or sign which *proves*: the *evidence* is the mark or sign which makes *evident*: the *testimony* is that which is offered or giv-

en by things personified in *proof* of anything.

Of the fallaciousness of hope and the uncertainty of schemes, every day gives me new *proof*.
JOHNSON.

Cato Major, who had borne all the great offices, has left us an *evidence*, under his own hand, how much he was versed in country affairs.
LOCKE.

Evidence is said to arise from *testimony*, when we depend upon the credit and relation of others for the truth or falsehood of anything.
WILKINS.

The *proof* is employed for facts or physical objects: the *evidence* is applied to that which is moral; *testimony* regards that which is personal. All that our Saviour did and said were *evidences* of his divine character, which might have produced faith in the minds of many, even if they had not had such numerous and miraculous *proofs* of his power. One friend makes a present to another in *testimony* of his regard: the *proof* and the *testimony* is something external, or some outward mark or indication; the *evidence* may be internal, or lie in the thing itself, as the internal *evidences* of Christianity.

Men ought not to expect either sensible *proof* or demonstration for such matters as are not capable of such *proofs*, supposing them to be true.
WILKINS.

Of Swift's general habits of thinking, if his letters can be supposed to afford any *evidence*, he was not a man to be either loved or envied.
JOHNSON.

Ye Trojan flames, your *testimony* bear
What I perform'd, and what I suffer'd there.
DRYDEN.

PROPORTIONATE, COMMENSURATE, ADEQUATE.

PROPORTIONATE, from the Latin *proportio*, compounded of *pro* and *portio*, signifies having a *portion*, suitable to, or in agreement with, some other object. COMMENSURATE, from the Latin *commensus* or *commentior*, signifies measuring in accordance with some other thing, being suitable in measure to something else. ADEQUATE, in Latin *adequatus*, participle of *adequo*, signifies made level with some other body.

Proportionate is here a term of general use; the others are particular terms, employed in a similar sense, in regard to particular objects: that is *proportionate* which rises as a thing rises, and falls as

a thing falls; that is *commensurate* which is made to rise to the same measure or degree; that is *adequate* which is made to come up to the height of another thing. *Proportionate* is employed either in the proper or improper sense; in all recipes and prescriptions of every kind *proportionate* quantities must always be taken; when the task increases in difficulty and complication, a *proportionate* degree of labor and talent must be employed upon it. *Commensurate* and *adequate* are employed only in the moral sense; the former to denote suitability of things in point of measure, the latter to denote the equalizing of powers: a person's recompense should in some measure be *commensurate* with his labor and deserts: a person's resources should be *adequate* to the work he is engaged in.

All envy is *proportionate* to desire.
JOHNSON.

Where the matter is not *commensurate* to the words, all speaking is but tautology. SOUTH.

Outward actions are not *adequate* expressions of our virtues.
ADDISON.

PROPOSAL, PROPOSITION.

PROPOSAL comes from *propose*, in the sense of offer: PROPOSITION comes from *propose*, in the sense of setting down in a distinct form of words. We make a *proposal* to a person to enter into a partnership with him; we make a *proposition* to one who is at variance with us to settle the difference by arbitration.

I have *proposed* a visit to her friend Lady Campbell, and my Anna seemed to receive the *proposal* with pleasure. SIR WILLIAM JONES.

The Protestants, averse from proceeding to any act of violence, listened with pleasure to the pacific *proposition* of the queen regent.
ROBERTSON.

TO PROROGUE, ADJOURN.

PROROGUE, from the Latin *prorogo*, signifies to put off, and is used in the general sense of deferring for an indefinite period. ADJOURN, from *journer*, the day, signifies only to put off for a day, or some short period: the former is applied to national assemblies only; the latter is applicable to any meeting.

A *prorogation* is the continuance of Parliament from one session to another. BLACKSTONE.

An *adjournment* is no more than a continuance of the session from one day to another.
BLACKSTONE.

TO PROVE, DEMONSTRATE, EVINCE, MANIFEST.

PROVE, in Latin *probo*, signifies to make good, *i. e.*, to make good by proofs, which is here the general term; the other terms imply different modes of *proving*: we *prove* in different ways, and in different degrees. To DEMONSTRATE, from *monstro*, to show, and the intensive syllable *de*, signifies to *prove* in a specific manner, that is, in a clear and undeniable manner; we may *prove* facts, innocence, guilt, and the like; we *demonstrate* the truth or falsity of a thing.

The existence of a God is so far from being a thing that wants to be *proved*, that I think it the only thing of which we are certain.
GUARDIAN.

The nature of this eternity is utterly inconceivable by the mind of man: our reason *demonstrates* to us that it has been, but at the same time can frame no idea of it, but what is big with absurdity and contradiction.
ADDISON.

Prove and *demonstrate* may also be applied to that which a person may show of himself; *evince* and *manifest* are used only in this application. To *prove* in this case is to give a proof, as to *prove* one's valor; to *demonstrate* is to give a clear or ocular proof, as to *demonstrate* an attachment to a thing; to *evince* is to show by convincing proof, as to *evince* one's integrity by the whole course of one's dealings; to *manifest* is to make manifest, as to *manifest* one's displeasure or satisfaction.

From what is left on record of his actions, he plainly appears to have *proved*, what the prophet foresaw him to be, a man of violence, cruelty, and blood.
BLAIR.

By the very setting apart and consecrating places for the service of God, we *demonstrate* our acknowledgment of his power and sovereignty over us.
BEVERIDGE.

We must *evince* the sincerity of our faith by good works.
BLAIR.

In the life of a man of sense, a short life is sufficient to *manifest* himself a man of honor and virtue.
STEELE.

In regard to things, to *prove* is to serve as a proof; to *evince* is to serve as a particular proof; to *manifest* is to serve as a public proof. The beauty and order in the Creation *prove* the wisdom

of the Creator; a persistence in a particular course of conduct may either *evince* great virtue or great folly; the miracles wrought in Egypt *manifested* the Divine power.

Why on those shores are they with joy survey'd,
Admir'd as heroes, and as gods obey'd,
Unless great acts superior merit *prove*? POPE.
His master's interest and his own combined,
Prompt every movement of his heart and mind,
Thought, word, and deed his liberty *evince*,
His freedom is the freedom of a prince. COWPER.

This intermediate space is so well husbanded and managed that there is scarce a degree of perception which does not exist in some one part of the world of life. Is the goodness or wisdom of the Divine Being more *manifested* in this proceeding?
ADDISON.

TO PROVIDE, PROCURE, FURNISH, SUPPLY.

PROVIDE, in Latin *provideo*, signifies literally to see before, but figuratively to get in readiness for some future purpose. PROCURE, *v. To get*. FURNISH is in French *fournir*. SUPPLY, in French *suppléer*, Latin *suppleo*, from *sub* and *pleo*, signifies to fill up a deficiency, or make up what is wanting.

Provide and *procure* are both actions that have a special reference to the future; *furnish* and *supply* are employed for that which is of immediate concern: one *provides* a dinner in the contemplation that some persons are coming to partake of it; one *procures* help in the contemplation that it may be wanted; we *furnish* a room, as we find it necessary for the present purpose; one *supplies* a family with any article of domestic use. Calculation is necessary in *providing*; one does not wish to *provide* too much or too little: labor and management are requisite in *procuring*; when a thing is not always at hand, or not easily come at, one must exercise one's time, strength, or ingenuity to *procure* it: judgment is requisite in *furnishing*; what one *furnishes* ought to be selected with reference to the circumstances of the individual who *furnishes*; care and attention are wanted in *supplying*; we must be careful to know what a person really wants, in order to *supply* him to his satisfaction. One *provides* against all contingencies; one *procures* all necessaries; one *furnishes* all comforts; one *supplies* all deficiencies.

A rude hand may build walls, form roofs, and lay floors, and *provide* all that warmth and security require. JOHNSON.

Such dress as may enable the body to endure the different seasons, the most unenlightened nations have been able to *procure*. JOHNSON.

Auria having driven the Turks from Corone, both by sea and land, *furnished* the city with corn, wine, victual, and gunpowder. KNOLLES.

Although I neither lend nor borrow, Yet to *supply* the ripe wants of my friend I'll break a custom. SHAKESPEARE.

Provide and *procure* are the acts of persons only; *furnish* and *supply* are the acts of unconscious agents: one's garden and orchard may be said to *furnish* him with delicacies; the earth *supplies* us with food. So in the improper application: the daily occurrences of a great city *furnish* materials for a newspaper; a newspaper, to an Englishman, *supplies* almost every other want.

Your ideas are new, and borrowed from a mountainous country, the only one that can *furnish* truly picturesque scenery. GRAY.

And clouds, dissolv'd, the thirsty ground *supply*. DRYDEN.

PROVIDENCE, PRUDENCE.

PROVIDENCE and PRUDENCE are both derived from the verb to *provide*; but the former expresses the particular act of providing; the latter the habit of providing. The former is applied both to animals and men; the latter is employed only as a characteristic of men. We may admire the *providence* of the ant in laying up a store for the winter; the *prudence* of a parent is displayed in his concern for the future settlement of his child. It is *provident* in a person to adopt measures of escape for himself, in certain situations of peculiar danger; it is *prudent* to be always prepared for all contingencies.

In Albion's isle, when glorious Edgar reign'd, He, wisely *provident*, from her white cliffs, Launch'd half her forests. SOMERVILLE.

Prudence operates on life in the same manner as rules on composition; it produces vigilance rather than elevation. JOHNSON.

PRUDENT, PRUDENTIAL.

PRUDENT (*v. Judgment*) characterizes the person or the thing; PRUDENTIAL characterizes only the thing. *Prudent* signifies having *prudence*; *prudential*, according to rules of *prudence*, or as re-

spects *prudence*. The *prudent* is opposed to the *imprudent* and inconsiderate; the *prudential* is opposed to the voluntary; the course is *prudent* which accords with the principles of *prudence*; the reason or motive is *prudential*, as flowing out of circumstances of *prudence* or necessity. Every one is called upon at certain times to adopt *prudent* measures; those who are obliged to consult their means in the management of their expenses must act upon *prudential* motives.

Ulysses first in public care she found, For *prudent* counsel like the gods renown'd. POPE.

Those who possess elevated understandings are naturally apt to consider all *prudential* maxims as below their regard. JOHNSON.

TO PRY, SCRUTINIZE, DIVE INTO.

PRY is in all probability changed from prove, in the sense of try. SCRUTINIZE comes from the Latin *scrutor*, to search thoroughly. DIVE, *v. To plunge*.

Pry is taken in the bad sense of looking more narrowly into things than one ought: *scrutinize* and *dive into* are employed in the good sense of searching things to the bottom. A person who *pries* looks into that which does not belong to him; and too narrowly also into that which may belong to him; it is the consequence of a too eager curiosity or a busy meddling temper: a person who *scrutinizes* looks into that which is intentionally concealed from him; it is an act of duty flowing out of his office: a person who *dives* penetrates into that which lies hidden very deep; he is impelled to this action by the thirst of knowledge and a laudable curiosity.

A love of *prying* into the private affairs of families makes a person a troublesome neighbor: it is the business of the magistrate to *scrutinize* all matters which affect the good order of society: there are some minds so imbued with a love of science that they delight to *dive into* the secrets of nature.

The peaceable man never officiously seeks to *pry* into the secrets of others. BLAIR.

He who enters upon this *scrutiny* (into the depths of the mind) enters into a labyrinth. SCOTT.

In man the more we *dive*, the more we see Heaven's signet stamping an immortal make. YOUNG.

TO PUBLISH, PROMULGATE, DIVULGE, REVEAL, DISCLOSE.

PUBLISH, *v. To advertise*. PROMULGATE, in Latin *promulgatus*, participle of *promulgo* or *provulgo*, signifies to make vulgar. DIVULGE, in Latin *divulgo*, that is, in *diversos vulgo*, signifies to make vulgar in different parts. REVEAL, in Latin *revelo*, from *velo*, to veil, signifies to take off the veil or cover. DISCLOSE signifies to make the reverse of *close*.

To *publish* is the most general of these terms, conveying in its extended sense the idea of making known; but it is in many respects indefinite: we may *publish* to many or few; but to *promulgate* is always to make known to many. We may *publish* that which is a domestic or a national concern; we *promulgate* properly only that which is of general interest: the affairs of a family or of a nation are *published* in the newspapers; doctrines, principles, precepts, and the like, are *promulgated*.

The Jews read Moses and the Prophets of old time, as their Book of Acts informs us. And so, indeed, do writers of their own in the same age with it, who boast of the practice as a most useful and honorable distinction peculiar to their nation, that the laws of life were thus *published* to the people. SECKER.

An absurd theory on one side of a question forms no justification for alleging a false fact or *promulgating* mischievous maxims on the other. BURKE.

We may *publish* things to be known, or things not to be known; we *divulge* things mostly not to be known: we may *publish* our own shame, or the shame of another, and we may *publish* that which is advantageous to another; but we commonly *divulge* the secrets or the crimes of another.

There was, we may very well think, some cause which moved the Apostle St. Paul to require that those things which any one church's affairs gave particular occasion to write, might, for the instruction of all, be *published*, and that by reading. HOOKER.

Tremble, thou wretch, That hast within thee *undivulged* crimes. SHAKESPEARE.

To *publish* is said of that which was never before known, or never before exposed; to *reveal* and *disclose* are said of that which has been only concealed or

lay hidden: we *publish* the events of the day; we *reveal* the secret or the mystery of a transaction; we *disclose* the whole affair from beginning to end, which has never been properly known or accounted for.

If I should tell you how these two did coact, Shall I not lie in *publishing* the truth? SHAKESPEARE.

In confession, the *revealing* is not for worldly use, but for the ease of a man's heart. BACON.

Then earth and ocean various forms *disclose*. DRYDEN.

TO PURPOSE, PROPOSE.

WE PURPOSE (*v. To design*) that which is near at hand, or immediately to be set about; we PROPOSE that which is more distant: the former requires the setting before one's mind, the latter requires deliberation and plan. We *purpose* many things which we never think worth while doing; but we ought not to *propose* anything to ourselves which is not of too much importance to be lightly adopted or rejected. We *purpose* to go to town on a certain day; we *propose* to spend our time in a particular study.

When listening Philomela deigns To let them joy, and *purposes* in thought Elate, to make her night excel their day. THOMSON.

There are but two plans on which any man can *propose* to conduct himself through the dangers and distresses of human life. BLAIR.

TO PUSH, SHOVE, THRUST.

ALL these words denote the giving an impulse to a body with more or less force, but differ as to the situation in which the impulse is given. PUSH and SHOVE require the bodies which give and receive the impulse to be in contact: one person cannot *push* or *shove* another without coming in direct personal contact with him; as when a person touches another in passing, it may be a *push* more or less violent: to *shove* is a continued action, which causes the body to move forward; as to *shove* a load along the ground. A body may be both *pushed* and *shoved* along, but in the former case this is effected by repeated *pushes*, and in the latter case by a continuation of the same act. To THRUST, like *push*, is a single act; but *thrusting* is commonly performed by some instrument, as