

Fraction is used only in respect to broken numbers, as the *fraction* of a unit.

Pliny put a round number near the truth rather than a *fraction*. ARBUTHNOT.

Rupture is also used in an improper application; as the *rupture* of a treaty.

To be an enemy, and once to have been a friend, does it not embitter the *rupture*? SOUTH.

RURAL, RUSTIC.

ALTHOUGH both these terms, from the Latin *rus*, country, signify belonging to the country, yet the former is used in a good, and the latter in a bad or an indifferent sense. RURAL applies to all country objects except man; it is, therefore, always connected with the charms of nature: RUSTIC applies only to persons, or what is personal, in the country, and is, therefore, always associated with the want of culture. Rural scenery is always interesting; but the rustic manners of the peasants have frequently too much that is uncultivated and rude in them to be agreeable; a rural habitation may be fitted for persons in a higher station; but a rustic cottage is adapted only for the poorer inhabitants of the country.

E'en now, methinks, as pondering here I stand,
I see the rural virtues leave the land.

GOLDSMITH.

The freedom and laxity of a rustic life produces remarkable peculiarities of conduct. JOHNSON.

S.

SAFE, SECURE.

SAFE, in Latin *salvus*, coming from the Hebrew *salah*, to be tranquil, implies exemption from harm, or the danger of harm; SECURE (*v. Certain*), the exemption from danger: a person may be *safe* or saved in the midst of a fire, if he be untouched by the fire; but he is, in such a case, the reverse of *secure*. In the sense of exemption from danger, *safety* expresses much less than *security*: we may be *safe* without using any particular measures; but none can reckon on any degree of *security* without great precaution: a person may be very *safe* on the top of a

coach, in the daytime; but if he wish to *secure* himself, at night, from falling off, he must be fastened.

It cannot be *safe* for any man to walk upon a precipice, and to be always on the very border of destruction. SOUTH.

No man can rationally account himself *secure* unless he could command all the chances of the world. SOUTH.

SAGE, SAGACIOUS, SAPIENT.

SAGE and SAGACIOUS are variations from the Latin *sagax* and *sagio*, probably from the Persian *sag*, a dog, sagacity being the peculiar property of a dog. SAPIENT is in Latin *sapiens*, from *sapio*, which is either from the Greek *σοφος*, wise, or, in the sense of tasting, from the Hebrew *seph*, the lip.

The first of these terms has a good sense, in application to men, to denote the faculty of discerning immediately, which is the fruit of experience, and very similar to that *sagacity* in brutes which instinctively perceives a thing without the deductions of reason; *sapient* is now employed only in regard to animals which are trained up to particular arts; its use, therefore, in respect to human beings, is mostly in the lofty or burlesque style.

So strange they will appear, but so it happen'd
That these most *sage* Academicians sate
In solemn consultation—on a cabbage.

CUMBERLAND.

Sagacious all to trace the smallest game,
And bold to seize the greatest. YOUNG.

Many a wretch in Bedlam,
Though perhaps among the rout
He wildly flings his filth about,
Still has gratitude and *sapience*,
To spare the folks that give them ha'pence.

SWIFT.

SAKE, ACCOUNT, REASON, PURPOSE, END.

THESE terms are all employed adverbially, to modify or connect propositions; hence one says, for his SAKE, on his ACCOUNT, for this REASON, for this PURPOSE, and to this END. *Sake*, which comes from the word to *seek*, is mostly said of persons; what is done for a person's *sake* is the same as because of his seeking or at his desire; one may, however, say in regard to things, for the *sake* of good order, implying what good order requires: *account* is indifferently employed for persons or things; what is done

on a person's *account* is done in his behalf, and for his interest; what is done on *account* of indisposition is done in consequence of it, the indisposition being the cause: *purpose* is properly personal, and refers to that which a person *purposes* to himself; if we ask, therefore, for what *purpose* a thing is done, it may be to know something of a person's character and principle: *reason* and *end* are applied to things only: we speak of the *reason* as the thing that justifies: we explain why we do a thing when we say we do it for this or that *reason*: we speak of the *end* by way of explaining the nature of the thing: the propriety of measures cannot be known unless we know what *end* it will answer.

Thou neither dost persuade me to seek wealth
For empire's *sake*, nor empire to affect
For glory's *sake*. SHAKESPEARE.

In matters where his judgment led him to oppose men, on a public *account*, he would do it vigorously and heartily. ATTERBURY.

He travelled the world on *purpose* to converse with the most learned men. GUARDIAN.

I mark the business from the common eye
For sundry weighty *reasons*. SHAKESPEARE.

Others are apt to attribute them to some false *end* or intention. ADDISON.

SALUTE, SALUTATION, GREETING.

SALUTE (*v. Accost*) respects the thing; and SALUTATION, which is a variation of *salute*, respects the person giving the *salute*: a *salute* may consist either of a word or an action; *salutations* pass from one friend to another: the *salute* may be either direct or indirect; the *salutation* is always direct and personal; guns are fired by way of a *salute*: bows are given in the way of a *salutation*.

He was received on board the Bellerophon respectfully, but without any *salute* or distinguished honors. SIR W. SCOTT.

Josephus makes mention of a Manaken, who had the spirit of prophecy, and one time meeting with Herod among his school-fellows, greeted him with this *salutation*, "Hail, King of the Jews!" PRIDEAUX.

The *salutation* is a familiar and ordinary form of courtesy between individuals; GREETING (*v. To accost*) is frequently a particular mode of *salutation* adopted on extraordinary occasions, indicative of great joy or satisfaction in those who *greet*.

After the first *salutations* they began to make inquiries about their absent friends. The *greeting* which took place between the parties upon their remeeting was general and cordial.

SIR W. SCOTT.

I was harassed by the multitude of eager *salutations*, and returned the common civilities with hesitation and impropriety. JOHNSON.

SANGUINARY, BLOODY, BLOOD-THIRSTY.

SANGUINARY, from *sanguis*, is employed both in the sense of BLOODY, or having *blood*, and BLOOD-THIRSTY, or thirsting after *blood*: *sanguinary*, in the first case, relates only to *blood* shed, as a *sanguinary* engagement, or a *sanguinary* conflict; *bloody* is used in the familiar application, to denote the simple presence of *blood*, as a *bloody* coat, or a *bloody* sword.

The scene is now more *sanguinary* and fuller of actors; never was such a confused mysterious civil war as this. HOWELL.

And from the wound,
Black *bloody* drops distill'd upon the ground. DRYDEN.

In the second case, *sanguinary* is employed to characterize the tempers of persons only; *blood-thirsty* to characterize the tempers of persons or any other beings: revolutionists will be frequently *sanguinary*, because they are abandoned to their passions, and follow a lawless course of violence; tigers are by nature the most *blood-thirsty* of all creatures.

They have seen the French rebel against a mild and lawful monarch with more fury than ever any people has been known to rise against the most illegal usurper or the most *sanguinary* tyrant. BURKE.

The Peruvians fought not like the Mexicans, to glut *blood-thirsty* divinities with human sacrifices. ROBERTSON.

SAP, UNDERMINE.

SAP signifies the juice which springs from the root of a tree; hence to *sap* signifies to come at the root of anything by digging: to UNDERMINE signifies to form a mine under the ground, or under whatever is upon the ground: we may *sap*, therefore, without *undermining*; and *undermine* without *sapping*: we may *sap* the foundation of a house without making any mine underneath; and in fortifications we may *undermine* either a mound, a ditch, or a wall, without striking immediately at the foundation: hence, in

the moral application, to *sap* is a more direct and decisive mode of destruction; to *undermine* is a gradual, and may be a partial action. Infidelity *saps* the morals of a nation; courtiers *undermine* one another's interests at court.

With morning drams,
A filthy custom which he caught from thee,
Clean from his former practice, now he *saps*
His youthful vigor. CUMBERLAND.

To be a man of business is, in other words, to be a plague and spy, a treacherous supplanter and *underminer* of the peace of families.

SOUTH.

TO SATISFY, PLEASE, GRATIFY.

To SATISFY (*v. Contentment*) is rather to produce pleasure indirectly; to PLEASE (*v. Agreeable*) is to produce it directly: the former is negative, the latter positive pleasure: as every desire is accompanied with more or less pain, *satisfaction*, which is the removal of desire, is itself to a certain extent pleasure; but what *satisfies* is not always calculated to *please*; nor is that which *pleases*, that which will always *satisfy*: plain food *satisfies* a hungry person, but does not *please* him when he is not hungry; social enjoyments *please*, but they are very far from *satisfying* those who do not restrict their indulgences. To GRATIFY is to *please* in a high degree, to produce a vivid pleasure: we may be *pleased* with trifles: but we are commonly *gratified* with such things as act strongly either on the senses or the affections: an epicure is *gratified* with those delicacies which suit his taste; an amateur in music will be *gratified* with hearing a piece of Handel's composition finely performed.

He who has run over the whole circle of earthly pleasures will be forced to complain that either they were not pleasures or that pleasure was not satisfaction. SOUTH.

Did we consider that the mind of man is the man himself, we should think it the most unnatural sort of self-murder to sacrifice the sentiment of the soul to *gratify* the appetites of the body. STEELE.

TO SATISFY, SATIATE, GLUT, CLOY.

To SATISFY is to take enough: SATIATE is a frequentative, formed from *satis*, enough, signifying to have more than enough. GLUT, in Latin *glutio*, from *gula*, the throat, signifies to take down the throat. *Satisfaction* brings

pleasure; it is what nature demands; and nature, therefore, makes a suitable return: *satiety* is attended with disgust; it is what appetite demands; but appetite is the corruption of nature, and produces nothing but evil: *glutting* is an act of intemperance; it is what the inordinate appetite demands; it greatly exceeds the former in degree both of the cause and the consequence: CLOYING is the consequence of *glutting*. Every healthy person *satisfies* himself with a regular portion of food; children, if unrestrained, seek to *satiare* their appetites, and *cloy* themselves by their excesses; brutes, or men debased into brutes, *glut* themselves with that which is agreeable to their appetites. So, in the moral application, we *satisfy* desires in general, or any particular desire; we *satiare* the appetite for pleasure; one *gluts* the eyes or the ears by anything that is horrid or painful, or *cloy*s the mind.

The only thing that can give the mind any solid *satisfaction* is a certain complacency and repose in the good providence of God. HERRING.

'Twas not enough
By subtle fraud to snatch a single life,
Puny impiety! whole kingdoms fell,
To *sate* the lust of power. PORTEUS.

If the understanding be detained by occupations less pleasing, it returns again to study with greater alacrity than when it is *glutted* with ideal pleasures. JOHNSON.

Religious pleasure is such a pleasure as can never *cloy* or overwork the mind. SOUTH.

TO SAVE, SPARE, PRESERVE, PROTECT.

To SAVE is to keep or make safe (*v. Safe*). SPARE, in German *sparen*, like the Latin *parco*, comes from the Hebrew *parek*, to free. PRESERVE, compounded of *præ* and *servo*, to keep, signifies to keep off. PROTECT, *v. To defend*.

The idea of keeping free from evil is the common idea of all these terms, and the peculiar signification of the term *save*; they differ either in the nature of the evil kept off, or the circumstances of the agent: we may be *saved* from every kind of evil; but we are *spared* only from those which it is in the power of another to inflict: we may be *saved* from falling, or *saved* from an illness; a criminal is *spared* from punishment, or we may be *spared* by Divine Providence in the midst of some calamity.

The plague destroying those the sword would *spare*,

'Tis time to *save* the few remains of war. POPE.

Spare my sight the pain
Of seeing what a world of tears it cost you.

DRYDEN.

We may be *saved* and *spared* from any evils, great or small; we are *preserved* and *protected* only from evils of magnitude: we may be *saved* either from the inclemency of the weather, or the fatal vicissitudes of life: we may be *spared* the pain of a disagreeable meeting, or we may be *spared* our lives; we are *preserved* from ruin, or *protected* from oppression. To *save* and *spare* apply to evils that are actual and temporary; *preserve* and *protect* to those which are possible or permanent: we may be *saved* from drowning; a person may be *preserved* from infection, or *protected* from an attack. To *save* may be the effect of accident or design; to *spare* is always the effect of intentional forbearance; to *preserve* and *protect* are the effect of a special exertion of power; the latter in a still higher degree than the former: we may be *preserved*, by ordinary means, from the evils of human life; but we are *protected* by the government, or by Divine Providence, from the active assaults of those who aim at doing us mischief.

A wondrous ark
To *save* himself and household from amid
A world devote to universal wreck. MILTON.

Let Caesar spread his conquests far,
Less pleas'd to triumph than to *spare*.

JOHNSON.

Cortes was extremely solicitous to *preserve*
the city of Mexico as much as possible from being
destroyed. ROBERTSON.

How poor a thing is man, whom death itself
Cannot *protect* from injuries! RANDOLPH.

To *spare* and *protect* refer mostly to personal injuries; *save* and *preserve* are said of whatever one keeps from injury on account of its value; as to *save* one's good name, to *preserve* one's honor.

Atillius sacrific'd himself to *save*
That faith which to his barb'rous foes he gave.
DENHAM.

Then to *preserve* the fame of such a deed
For Pythia slain were Pythian games decreed.

DRYDEN.

SCARCITY, DEARTH.

SCARCITY (*v. Rare*) is a generic term to denote the circumstance of a thing be-

ing *scarce*. DEARTH, which is the same as dearness, is a mode of *scarcity* applied in the literal sense to provisions mostly, as provisions are mostly dear when they are *scarce*; the word *dearth*, therefore, denotes *scarcity* in a high degree: whatever men want, and find it difficult to procure, they complain of its *scarcity*: when a country has the misfortune to be visited with a famine, it experiences the frightfullest of all *dearths*.

They drink very few liquors that have not lain
in fresco, insomuch that a *scarcity* of snow
would raise a mutiny at Naples. ADDISON.

I find the *dearth* at this time very great.
Wheat was at four marks the quarter. BURNET.

Dearth is figuratively applied to moral objects; as a *dearth* of intelligence, of talent, and the like.

The French have brought on themselves that
dearth of plot. DRYDEN.

SCHOLAR, DISCIPLE.

SCHOLAR and DISCIPLE are both applied to such as learn from others: but the former is said only of those who learn the rudiments of knowledge; the latter of one who acquires any art or science from the instruction of another: the *scholar* is opposed to the teacher; the *disciple* to the master: children are always *scholars*; adult persons may be *disciples*. *Scholars* chiefly employ themselves in the study of words; *disciples*, as the *disciples* of our Saviour, in the study of things: we are the *scholars* of any one under whose care we are placed, or from whom we learn anything, good or bad; we are the *disciples* only of those who are distinguished, and for the most part in the good sense, though not always so: children are sometimes too apt *scholars* in learning evil from one another. Philosophers of old had their *disciples*, and nowadays there are many who have been exalted into that character who have their *disciples* and followers.

The Romans confessed themselves the *scholars*
of the Greeks. JOHNSON.

We are not the *disciples* of Voltaire. BURKE.

SCHOOL, ACADEMY.

THE Latin term *schola* signifies a loitering-place, a place for desultory conversation or instruction, from the Greek *σχολη*, leisure; hence it has been extended

to any place where instruction is given, particularly that which is communicated to youth. ACADEMY derives its name from the Greek *ακαδημία*, the name of a public place in Athens, where the philosopher Plato first gave his lectures, which afterward became a place of resort for learned men; hence societies of learned men have since been termed *academies*. The leading idea in the word SCHOOL is that of instruction given and doctrine received; in the word *academy* is that of association among those who have already learned: hence we speak in the literal sense of the *school* where young persons meet to be taught, or in the extended and moral sense of the old and new *school*, the Pythagorean *school*, the philosophical *school*, and the like; but the *academy* of arts or sciences, the French *academy*, being members of any *academy* and the like.

The world is a great *school*, where deceit, in all its forms, is one of the lessons that is first learned. BLAIR.

As for other *academies*, such as those for painting, sculpture, or architecture, we have not so much as heard the proposal. SHAFTESBURY.

TO SCOFF, GIBE, JEER, SNEER.

SCOFF comes from the Greek *σκωπῶ*, to deride. GIBE and JEER are connected with the words gabble and jabber, denoting an unseemly mode of speech. SNEER is connected with sneeze and nose, the member by which *sneering* is performed.

Scoffing is a general term for expressing contempt; we may *scoff* either by *gibes*, *jeers*, or *sneers*; or we may *scoff* by opprobrious language and contemptuous looks with *gibing*, *jeering*, or *sneering*: to *gibe*, *jeer*, and *sneer*, are personal acts; the *gibe* and *jeer* consist of words addressed to an individual: the former has most of ill-nature and reproach in it; the latter has more of ridicule or satire in it; they are both, however, applied to the actions of vulgar or unseemly people, who practise their coarse jokes on others.

Truth from his lips prevail'd with double sway,
And fools who came to *scoff* remain'd to pray.

GOLDSMITH.

And *sneers* as learnedly as they,
Like females o'er their morning tea.

SWIFT.

Scoff and *sneer* are directed either to persons or things, as the object; *gibe* and

jeer only toward persons; *scoff* is taken only in the proper sense; *sneer* derives its meaning from the literal act of *sneering*: the *scoffer* speaks lightly of that which deserves serious attention: the *sneerer* speaks either actually with a *sneer*, or as it were by implication with a *sneer*: the *scoffers* at religion set at naught all thoughts of decorum, they openly avow the little estimation in which they hold it; the *sneerers* at religion are more sly, but not less malignant; they wish to treat religion with contempt, but not to bring themselves into the contempt they deserve.

The fop sets learning at defiance,
Scoffs at the pedant and the science. GAY.
Shrewd fellows, and such arch wags! A tribe
That meet for nothing but to *gibe*. SWIFT.

That *jeering* demeanor is a quality of great offence to others and danger toward a man's self.
LORD WENTWORTH.

There is one short passage still remaining (of Alexes the poet's) which conveys a *sneer* at Pythagoras. CUMBERLAND.

Where town and country vicars flock in tribes,
Secur'd by numbers from the laymen's *gibes*. SWIFT.

Midas, expos'd to all their *jeers*,
Had lost his art, and kept his ears. SWIFT.

TO SCRUPLE, HESITATE, WAVER.

TO SCRUPLE (*v. Conscientious*) simply keeps us from deciding; the terms HESITATE (*v. To demur*) and WAVER, from the word *wave*, signifying to move backward and forward like a *wave*, bespeak a fluctuating or variable state of the mind. We *scruple* simply from motives of doubt as to the propriety of a thing; we *hesitate* and *waver* from various motives, particularly such as affect our interests. Conscience produces *scruples*, fear produces *hesitation*, irresolution produces *wavering*: a person *scruples* to do an action which may hurt his neighbor or offend his Maker; he *hesitates* to do a thing which he fears may not prove advantageous to him; he *wavers* in his mind between going or staying, according as his inclinations impel him to the one or the other: a man who does not *scruple* to say or do as he pleases will be an offensive companion, if not a dangerous member of society: he who *hesitates* only when the doing of good is proposed, evinces himself a worthless member of society; he who *wavers* between his duty

and his inclination will seldom maintain a long or doubtful contest.

The Jacobins desire a change, and they will have it if they can; if they cannot have it by English cabal, they will make no sort of *scruple* to have it by the cabal of France. BURKE.

The lords of the congregation did not *hesitate* a moment whether they should employ their whole strength in one generous effort to rescue their religion and liberty from impending destruction. ROBERTSON.

It is the greatest absurdity to be *wavering* and unsettled without closing with that side which appears the most safe and probable. ADDISON.

SEAL, STAMP.

SEAL is a specific, STAMP a general term: there cannot be a *seal* without a *stamp*; but there may be many *stamps* where there is no *seal*. The *seal*, in Latin *sigillum*, signifies a signet or little sign, consisting of any one's coat of arms or any device; the *stamp* is, in general, any impression whatever which has been made by *stamping*, that is, any impression which is not easily to be effaced. In the improper sense, the *seal* is the authority; thus, to set one's *seal* is the same as to authorize, and the *seal* of truth is any outward mark which characterizes it: but the *stamp* is the impression by which we distinguish the thing; thus a thing is said to bear the *stamp* of truth, of sincerity, of veracity, and the like.

Therefore not long in force this charter stood,
Wanting that *seal*, it must be *seal'd* in blood. DENHAM.

Wisdom for parts is madness for the whole.
This *stamps* the paradox, and gives us leave
To call the wisest weak. YOUNG.

SEAMAN, WATERMAN, SAILOR, MARINER.

ALL these words denote persons occupied in navigation; the SEAMAN, as the word implies, follows his business on the sea; the WATERMAN is one who gets his livelihood on fresh water: the SAILOR and the MARINER are both specific terms to designate the *seaman*: every *sailor* or *mariner* is a *seaman*; although every *seaman* is not a *sailor* or *mariner*; the former is one who is employed about the laborious part of the vessel; the latter is one who traverses the ocean to and fro, who is attached to the water, and

passes his life upon it. Men of all ranks are denominated *seamen*, whether officers or men, whether in a merchantman or a king's ship: *sailor* is only used for the common men, or, in the sea phrase, for those before the mast, particularly in vessels of war; hence our *sailors* and soldiers are spoken of as the defenders of our country: a *mariner* is an independent kind of *seaman* who manages his own vessel, and goes on an expedition on his own account; fishermen, and those who trade along the coast, are in a particular manner distinguished by the name of *mariners*.

Thus the toss'd *seaman*, after boist'rous storms,
Lands on his country's breast. LEE.

Many a lawyer who makes but an indifferent figure at the bar might have made a very elegant *waterman*. SOUTH.

Through storms and tempests so the *sailor* drives. SHIRLEY.

Welcome to me, as to a sinking *mariner*
The lucky plank that bears him to the shore. LEE.

TO SECOND, SUPPORT.

TO SECOND is to give the assistance of a *second* person; to SUPPORT is to bear up on one's own shoulders. To *second* does not express so much as *support*: we *second* only by our presence or our word; but we *support* by our influence, and all the means that are in our power: we *second* a motion by a simple declaration of our assent to it; we *support* a motion by the force of persuasion: so likewise we are said always to *second* a person's views when we give him openly our countenance by declaring our approbation of his measures; and we are said to *support* him when we give the assistance of our purse, our influence, or any other thing essential for the attainment of an end.

The blasting vollied thunder made all speed,
And *seconded* thy else not dreaded spear. MILTON.

Impeachments no can best resist,
And *aye support* the civil list. GAY.

SECOND, SECONDARY, INFERIOR.

SECOND and SECONDARY both come from the Latin *secundus*, changed from *sequendus* and *sequor*, to follow, signifying the order of succession: the former simply expresses this order; but the latter

includes the accessory idea of comparative demerit: a person stands *second* in a list, or a letter is *second* which immediately succeeds the first; but a consideration is *secondary*, or of *secondary* importance, which is opposed to that which holds the first rank. *Secondary* and *INFERIOR* both designate some lower degree of a quality: but *secondary* is only applied to the importance or value of things; *inferior* is applied generally to all qualities: a man of business reckons everything as *secondary* which does not forward the object he has in view; men of *inferior* abilities are disqualified by nature for high and important stations, although they may be more fitted for lower stations than those of greater abilities.

Fond, foolish man! with fear of death surpris'd,
Which either should be wish'd for or despis'd;
This, if our souls with bodies death destroy,
That, if our souls a *second* life enjoy. DENHAM.

Many, instead of endeavoring to form their own opinions, content themselves with the *secondary* knowledge which a convenient bench in a coffee-house can supply. JOHNSON.

Who am alone
From all eternity; for none I know
Second to me, or like. MILTON.

Hast thou not made me here thy substitute,
And these *inferior* far beneath me set?
MILTON.

SECRET, HIDDEN, LATENT, OCCULT,
MYSTERIOUS.

WHAT IS SECRET (*v. Clandestine*) is so apart or removed away as to be out of observation; what is HIDDEN (*v. To conceal*) is so covered over as to be altogether concealed: as, a corner may be *secret*; a hole under ground is *hidden*.

Ye boys, who pluck the flow'rs and spoil the spring,
Beware the *secret* snake that shoots a sting. DRYDEN.

The blind laborious mole
In winding mazes works her *hidden* hole. DRYDEN.

What is *secret* is known to some one; what is *hidden* may be known to no one: it rests in the breast of an individual to keep a thing *secret*; it depends on the course of things if anything remains *hidden*: every man has more or less of that which he wishes to keep *secret*; the talent of many lies *hidden* for want of opportunity to bring it into exercise, as

many treasures lie *hidden* in the earth for want of being discovered and brought to light. A *secret* may concern only the individual or individuals who hold it, and those from whom it is kept; but that which is *hidden* may concern all the world: sometimes the success of a transaction depends upon its being kept *secret*; the stores of knowledge which yet remain *hidden* may be much greater than those which have been laid open. The *LATENT*, in Latin *latens*, lying hid, is the *secret* or concealed, in cases where it ought to be open: a *latent* motive is that which a person intentionally, though not justifiably, keeps to himself; the *latent* cause for any proceeding is that which is not revealed.

The cruelty of this boy, which he had long practised in so *secret* a manner that no creature suspected it, was at length discovered. COWPER.

Then deeply think, O man! how great thou art,
Pay thyself homage with a trembling heart;
Enter the sacred temple of thy breast,
And gaze and wander there a ravish'd guest:
Gaze on those *hidden* treasures thou shalt find. YOUNG.

Mem'ry confus'd, and interrupted thought,
Death's harbingers, lie *latent* in the draught. PRIOR.

OCCULT, in Latin *occultus*, participle of *oculo*, compounded of *oc* or *ob* and *culo* or *colo*, to cover over by tilling or ploughing, that is, to cover over with the earth, or by any natural body, and *MYSTERIOUS* (*v. Dark*), are species of the *hidden*: the former respects that which has a veil naturally thrown over it; the latter respects that mostly which is covered with a supernatural veil: an *occult* science is one that is *hidden* from the view of persons in general, which is attainable but by few; *occult* causes or qualities are those which lie too remote to be discovered by the inquirer: the operations of Providence are said to be *mysterious*, as they are altogether past our finding out; many points of doctrine in our religion are equally *mysterious*, as connected with and dependent upon the attributes of the Deity.

Some men have an *occult* power of stealing on the affections. JOHNSON.

From his void embrace,
Mysterious heaven! that moment to the ground
A blackened corse, was struck the beauteous
maid. THOMSON.

SECULAR, TEMPORAL, WORLDLY.

SECULAR, in Latin *secularis*, from *seculum*, an age or division of time, signifies belonging to time or this life. TEMPORAL, in Latin *temporalis*, from *tempus*, time, signifies lasting only for a time. WORLDLY signifies after the manner of the world.

Secular is opposed to ecclesiastical; *temporal* and *worldly* are opposed to spiritual or eternal. The idea of the *world* or the outward objects and pursuits of the world, in distinction from that which is set above the world, is implied in common by all the terms; but *secular* is an indifferent term, applicable to the allowed pursuits and concerns of men; *temporal* is used either in an indifferent or a bad sense; and *worldly* mostly in a bad sense, as contrasted with things of more value. The office of a clergyman is ecclesiastical, but that of a school-master is *secular*, which is frequently vested in the same hands; the Upper House of Parliament consists of lords spiritual and *temporal*; *worldly* interest has a more powerful sway upon the minds of the great bulk of mankind than their spiritual interests.

Some saw nothing in what has been done in France but a firm and temperate exertion of freedom, so consistent with morals and piety, as to make it deserving not only of the *secular* applause of dashing Machiavelian politicians, but to make it a fit theme for all the devout effusions of sacred eloquence. BURKE.

The ultimate purpose of government is *temporal*, and that of religion is eternal, happiness. JOHNSON.

Worldly things are of such quality as to lessen upon dividing. GROVE.

SEDULOUS, DILIGENT, ASSIDUOUS.

The idea of application is expressed by these epithets; but *SEDULOUS*, from the Latin *sedulus* and *sedeo*, signifying sitting close to a thing, is a particular, *DILIGENT* (*v. Active, diligent*) is a general term: one is *sedulous* by habit; one is *diligent* either habitually or occasionally: a *sedulous* scholar pursues his studies with a regular and close application; a scholar may be *diligent* at a certain period, though not invariably so. One is *sedulous* from a conviction of the importance of the thing; one may be *diligent* by fits and starts, according to the humor of the moment.

One thing I would offer is, that he would constantly and *sedulously* read Tully, which will insensibly work him into a good Latin style. LOCKE.

I would recommend a *diligent* attendance on the courts of justice (to a student for the bar). DUNNING.

ASSIDUOUS and *sedulous* both express the quality of sitting or sticking close to a thing, but the former may, like *diligent*, be employed on a partial occasion; the latter is always permanent: we may be *assiduous* in our attentions to a person; but we are *sedulous* in the important concerns of life. *Sedulous* peculiarly respects the quiet employments of life, but may be applied to any pursuit requiring persevering attention; a teacher may be entitled *sedulous*: *diligent* respects the active employments; one is *diligent* at work: *assiduity* holds a middle rank; it may be employed equally for that which requires active exertion, or otherwise: we may be *assiduous* in the pursuits of literature, or we may be *assiduous* in our attendance upon a person, or the performance of any office.

Methinks her sons before me patient stand,
Where the broad ocean leans against the land,
And, *sedulous* to stop the coming tide,
Lift the tall rampire's artificial pride. GOLDSMITH.

We flatter ourselves that we shall cultivate with great *diligence* the arts of peace. JOHNSON.

Man cannot retain through life that respect and *assiduity* (toward a woman) by which he pleases for a day or a month. JOHNSON.

TO SEE, PERCEIVE, OBSERVE.

SEE, in the German *sehen*, Greek *θεωω*, Hebrew *sacah* or *soah*, is a general term; it may be either a voluntary or involuntary action: *PERCEIVE*, from the Latin *percipio* or *per* and *capio*, to take into the mind, is always a voluntary action; and *OBSERVE* (*v. To notice*) is an intentional action. The eye sees when the mind is absent; the mind and the eye or other senses perceive in conjunction: hence, we may say that a person sees, but does not perceive: we observe not merely by a simple act of the mind, but by its positive and fixed exertion. We see a thing without knowing what it is; we perceive a thing, and know what it is, but the impression passes away; we observe a thing, and afterward retrace the image of it in our mind. We see a star

when the eye is directed toward it; we *perceive* it move if we look at it attentively; we *observe* its position in different parts of the heavens. The blind cannot *see*, the absent cannot *perceive*, the dull cannot *observe*. *Seeing*, as a corporeal action, is the act only of the eye; *perceiving* and *observing* are actions in which all the senses are concerned. We *see* colors, we *perceive* the state of the atmosphere, and *observe* its changes.

There plant eyes, all mist from thence
Purge and disperse, that I may *see* and tell
Of things invisible to mortal sight. MILTON.

Sated at length, ere long I might *perceive*
Strange alteration in me. MILTON.

I doubt not but the same discrimination in the
cast of countenances would be discoverable in
hares (as in sheep); a circumstance little sus-
pected by those who have not had opportunity to
observe it. COWPER.

Seeing sometimes extends further in
its application to the mind's operations,
in which it has an indefinite sense; but
perceive and *observe* have both a definite
sense: we may *see* a thing distinctly and
clearly, or otherwise; we *perceive* it al-
ways with a certain degree of distinct-
ness; and *observe* it with a positive de-
gree of minuteness: we *see* the truth of
a remark; we *perceive* the force of an
objection; we *observe* the reluctance of
a person. It is further to be observed,
however, that, when *see* expresses a men-
tal operation, it expresses what is purely
mental; *perceive* and *observe* are applied
to such objects as are seen by the senses
as well as the mind. We *see* the light
with our eyes, or we *see* the truth of a
proposition with our mind's eye; but we
perceive the difference of climate, or we
perceive the difference in the comfort of
our situation; we *observe* the motions of
the heavenly bodies.

Who is so gross
As cannot see this palpable device,
Yet who so bold but says he *sees* it not,
When such ill dealings must be seen in thought?
SHAKESPEARE.

I *perceive* these lords
At this encounter do so much admire,
That they devour their reason, and scarce think
Their eyes do offices of truth. SHAKESPEARE.

Every part of your last letter glowed with that
warmth of friendship which, though it was by no
means new to me, I could not but *observe* with
peculiar satisfaction.

MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

TO SEEK, SEARCH.

To SEEK and SEARCH (*v. To exam-
ine*) are but variations from the same
word, and are both employed in the sense
of looking after something that is not in
sight: *seek* applies to that which is near
at hand and easily found; *search*, to that
which is remote, hidden, or not to be found
without difficulty: to *search*, therefore,
is properly to *seek* laboriously; we *seek* a
person by simply going to the place where
he is supposed to be; *search* is made from
place to place when it is not known where
he is: a school-boy *seeks* birds'-nests; the
botanist *searches* for plants.

I have a venturesome fancy, that shall *seek*
The squirrel's hoard, and fetch thee thence new
nuts. SHAKESPEARE.

Errors, like straws, upon the surface flow;
He who would *search* for pearls must dive below.
DRYDEN.

These terms may also be applied to
moral objects with the same distinction:
as to *seek* peace, knowledge; to *search*
the thoughts, to *search* into mysteries.

Sweet peace, where dost thou dwell?
I humbly crave,
Let me once know.
I *sought* thee in a secret cave,
And ask'd if peace were there. HERBERT.

Vain, very vain, my weary *search* to find
That bliss which only centres in the mind.
GOLDSMITH.

TO SEEM, APPEAR.

THE idea of coming to the view is
expressed by both these terms; but the
word *seem* rises upon that of *appear*.
SEEM, from the Latin *similis*, like, signi-
fies literally to *appear* like, and is there-
fore a species of *appearance*; APPEAR,
from the Latin *appareo* or *pareo*, and the
Greek *παρεμναι*, to be present, signifies to
be present, or before the eye. Every ob-
ject may *appear*; but nothing *seems*, ex-
cept that which the mind admits to *ap-
pear* in any given form. To *seem* requires
some reflection and comparison of objects
in the mind one with another; it is, there-
fore, peculiarly applicable to matters that
may be different from what they *appear*,
or of an indeterminate kind: that the
sun *seems* to move is a conclusion which
we draw from the exercise of our senses,
and comparing this case with others of a
similar nature; it is only by a further re-
search into the operations of nature that

we discover this to be no conclusive proof
of its motion. To *appear*, on the contra-
ry, is the express act of the things them-
selves on us; it is, therefore, peculiarly
applicable to such objects as make an
impression on us: to *appear* is the same
as to present itself: the stars *appear* in
the firmament, but we do not say that
they *seem*; the sun *appears* dark through
the clouds.

Lash'd into foam, the fierce conflicting brine
Seems o'er a thousand raging waves to burn.
THOMSON.

O heav'nly poet! Such thy verse *appears*,
So sweet, so charming to my ravish'd ears,
DRYDEN.

They are equally applicable to moral
as well as natural objects with the above-
mentioned distinction. *Seem* is said of
that which is dubious, contingent, or fut-
ure; *appear*, of that which is actual, posi-
tive, and past. A thing *seems* strange
which we are led to conclude as strange
from what we see of it: a thing *appears*
clear when we have a clear conception of
it: a plan *seems* practicable or impracti-
cable; an author *appears* to understand
his subject or the contrary. It *seems* as
if all efforts to reform the bulk of man-
kind will be found inefficient; it *appears*,
from the long catalogue of vices which
are still very prevalent, that little pro-
gress has hitherto been made in the work
of reformation.

No man had ever a greater power over him-
self, or was less the man he *seemed* to be, which
shortly after *appeared* to everybody, when he
cared less to keep on the mask. CLARENDON.

SELF-WILL, SELF-CONCEIT, SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

SELF-WILL signifies the *will* in one's
self: SELF-CONCEIT, *conceit* of one's
self: SELF-SUFFICIENCY, *sufficiency*
in one's self. As characteristics they
come very near to each other, but that
depravity of the will which refuses to
submit to every control either within or
without is born with a person, and is
among the earliest indications of char-
acter; in some it is less predominant
than in others, but, if not early checked,
it is that defect in our natures which will
always prevail; *self-conceit* is a vicious
habit of the mind which is superinduced
on the original character; it is that

which determines in matters of judg-
ment: a *self-willed* person thinks nothing
of right or wrong; whatever the impulse
of the moment suggests, is the motive to
action: the *self-conceited* person is always
much concerned about right and wrong,
but it is only that which he conceives to
be right and wrong; *self-sufficiency* is a
species of *self-conceit* applied to action:
as a *self-conceited* person thinks of no
opinion but his own; a *self-sufficient* per-
son refuses the assistance of every one
in whatever he is called upon to do.

First appetite enlists him truth's sworn foe,
Then obstinate *self-will* confirms him so.
COWPER.

Nothing so haughty and assuming as igno-
rance, where *self-conceit* bids it set up for in-
fallible. SOUTH.

There, safe in *self-sufficient* impudence,
Without experience, honesty, or sense,
Unknowing in her interest, trade, or laws,
He vainly undertakes his country's cause.
JENYNS.

SENIOR, ELDER, OLDER.

THESE are all comparatives expressive
of the same quality, and differ, therefore,
less in sense than in application. SEN-
IOR is employed not only in regard to
the extent of age, but also to duration
either in office or any given situation:
ELDER is employed only in regard to
age: an officer in the army is a *senior* by
virtue of having served longer than an-
other; a boy is a *senior* in a school ei-
ther by virtue of his age, his standing in
the school, or his situation in the class;
when, therefore, age alone is to be ex-
pressed, *elder* is more suitable than *sen-
ior*; the *elder* children or the *elder* branch-
es of a family are clearly understood to
include those who have priority of age.

How can you admit your *seniors* to the exam-
ination or calling of them, not only being infe-
rior in office and calling, but in gifts also?
WHITGIFT.

They bring the comparison of younger daugh-
ters conforming themselves in their attire to
their *elder* sisters. HOOKER.

Senior and *elder* are both employed as
substantives, OLDER only as an adject-
ive: hence we speak of the *seniors* in a
school, or the *elders* in an assembly; but
an *older* inhabitant, an *older* family. *El-
der* has only a partial use; *older* is em-
ployed in general cases: in speaking of
children in the same family we may say,

the *elder* son is heir to the estate; he is *older* than his brother by ten years.

The Spartans to their highest magistrate
The name of *elder* did appropriate. DENHAM.

Since oft
Man must compute that age he cannot feel,
He scarce believes he's *older* for his years. YOUNG.

SENSE, JUDGMENT.

SENSE (*v. Feeling*) signifies in general the faculty of feeling corporeally or perceiving mentally; in the latter case it is synonymous with JUDGMENT, which is a special operation of the mind. The *sense* is that primitive portion of the understanding which renders an account of things; and the *judgment* that portion of the reason which selects or rejects from this account. The *sense* is, so to speak, the reporter which collects the details, and exposes the facts; the *judgment* is the *judge* that passes sentence upon them. According to the strict import of the terms, the *judgment* depends upon the *sense*, and varies with it in degree. He who has no *sense* has no *judgment*; and he who loses *sense* loses *judgment*: since *sense* supplies the knowledge of things, and *judgment* pronounces upon them, it is evident that there must be *sense* before there can be *judgment*.

Then is the soul a nature, which contains
The power of *sense* within a greater power. DAVIES.

His apprehension was keen and ready; his
judgment deep and sound; his reason clear
and comprehensive; his method and elocution
elegant and easy. LIFE OF LORD ELLESMERE.

On the other hand, *sense* may be so distinguished from *judgment*, that there may be *sense* without *judgment*, and *judgment* without *sense*: *sense* is the faculty of perceiving in general; it is applied to abstract science as well as general knowledge: *judgment* is the faculty of determining, that is, of determining mostly in matters of practice. By *sense* the mind perceives by an immediate act, by the *judgment* it arrives at conclusions by a process. It is the lot of many, therefore, to have *sense* in matters of theory, who have no *judgment* in matters of practice; while others, on the contrary, who have nothing above common *sense* will have a soundness of *judgment* that is not to be surpassed. Nay, further, it is possible

for a man to have good *sense*, and yet not a solid *judgment*: as they are both natural faculties, men are gifted with them as variously as with every other faculty. By good *sense* a man is enabled to discern, as it were, intuitively, that which requires another of less *sense* to ponder over and study; by a solid *judgment* a man is enabled to avoid those errors in conduct which one of a weak *judgment* is always falling into. There is, however, this distinction between *sense* and *judgment*, that the deficiencies of the former may be supplied by diligence and attention; but a defect in the latter is not so easily to be supplied by efforts of one's own. A man may improve his *sense* in proportion as he has the means of information; but the *judgment* once matured rarely makes any advances toward improvement afterward.

There's something previous ev'n to taste: 'tis
sense,
Good *sense*, which only is the gift of heav'n,
And, though no science, fairly worth the seven;
A light within yourself you must perceive,
Jones and Le Notre have it not to give. POPE.

In all instances where our experience of the past has been extensive and uniform, our *judgment* concerning the future amounts to certainty. BEATTIE.

The words *sense* and *judgment* are frequently employed without any epithets to denote a positively large share of these faculties.

The fox, in deeper cunning vers'd,
The beauties of her mind rehears'd,
And talk'd of knowledge, taste, and *sense*,
To which the fair have vast pretence. MOORE.

To speak without flattery, few have like use
of learning, or like *judgment* in learning, as I
have observed in your lordship. BACON.

As epithets, *sensible* and *judicious* both denote the possession of these faculties in a high degree, but in their application they are distinguished as above. A writer or a speaker is said to be *sensible*; a friend, or an adviser, to be *judicious*. *Sense* displays itself in the conversation or the communication of one's ideas; *judgment* in the propriety of one's actions. A *sensible* man may be an entertaining companion, but a *judicious* man in any post of command is an inestimable treasure. *Sensible* remarks are always calculated to please and interest *sensible* people; *judicious* measures have

a sterling value in themselves that is appreciated according to the importance of the object. Hence it is obvious that to be *sensible* is a desirable thing, but to be *judicious* is an indispensable requisite in those who have to act a part.

I have been tired with accounts from *sensible*
men furnished with matters of fact which have
happened within their own knowledge.

ADDISON.

Your observations are so *judicious*, I wish
you had not been so sparing of them.

SIR W. JONES.

SENSIBLE, SENSITIVE, SENTIENT.

ALL these epithets, which are derived from the same source (*v. To feel*), have obviously a great sameness of meaning, though not of application. SENSIBLE and SENSITIVE both denote the capacity of being moved to feeling; SENTIENT implies the very act of feeling. *Sensible* expresses either a habit of the body and mind, or only a particular state referring to some particular object: a person may be *sensible* of things in general, or *sensible* of cold, *sensible* of injuries, *sensible* of the kindnesses which he has received from an individual. *Sensitive* signifies always an habitual or permanent quality; it is the characteristic of objects: a *sensitive* creature implies one whose sense is by distinction quickly to be acted upon; a *sensitive* plant is a peculiar species of plants, marked for the property of having *sense* or being *sensible* of the touch.

And, with affection wondrous *sensible*,
He wrung Bassanio's hand, and so they parted.
SHAKESPEARE.

Those creatures live more alone whose food,
and therefore prey, is upon other *sensitive* creatures. TEMPLE.

Sensible and *sensitive* have always a reference to external objects; but *sentient* expresses simply the possession of feeling or the power of feeling, and excludes the idea of the cause. Hence, the terms *sensible* and *sensitive* are applied only to persons or corporeal objects: but *sentient*, which conveys the most abstract meaning, is applicable to men and spirits; *sentient* beings, taken absolutely, may include angels as well as men; it is restricted in its meaning by the context only.

If circumspection and caution are a part of wisdom, when we work only upon inanimate matter, surely they become a part of duty too, when the subject of our demolition and construction is not brick and mortar, but *sentient* beings, by the sudden alteration of whose condition and habits multitudes may be rendered miserable. BURKE.

SENSIBLE, PERCEPTIBLE.

THESE epithets are here applied not to the persons capable of being impressed, but to the objects capable of impressing: in this case SENSIBLE (*v. To feel*) applies to that which acts on the senses merely; PERCEPTIBLE (*v. To see*), to that which acts on the senses in conjunction with the mind. All corporeal objects are naturally termed *sensible*, inasmuch as they are *sensible* to the eye, the ear, the nose, the touch, and the taste; particular things are *perceptible*, inasmuch as they are to be *perceived* or recognized by the mind. Sometimes *sensible* signifies discernible by means of the senses, as when we speak of a *sensible* difference in the atmosphere, and in this case it comes nearer to the meaning of *perceptible*; but the latter always refers more to the operation of the mind than the former: the difference between colors is said to be scarcely *perceptible* when they approach very near to each other; so likewise the growth of a body is said not to be *perceptible* when it cannot be marked from one time to another by the difference of state.

I have suffered a *sensible* loss, if that word is strong enough to express the misfortune which has deprived me of so excellent a man.

MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

What must have been the state into which the Assembly has brought your affairs, that the relief afforded by so vast a supply has been hardly *perceptible*? BURKE.

SENSUALIST, VOLUPTUARY, EPICURE.

THE SENSUALIST lives for the indulgence of his senses: the VOLUPTUARY (from *voluptas*, pleasure) is devoted to his pleasures, and, as far as these pleasures are the pleasures of sense, the *voluptuary* is a *sensualist*: the EPICURE, from *Epicurus*, is one who makes the pleasures of sense his god, and in this sense he is a *sensualist* and a *voluptuary*. In the application of these terms, however, the *sensualist* is one who is a slave to the grossest appetites; the *voluptuary* is one who studies his pleasures so as to make them

the most valuable to himself; the *epicure* is a species of *voluptuary* who practises more than ordinary refinement in the choice of his pleasures.

Let the *sensualist* satisfy himself as he is able; he will find that there is a certain living spark within which all the drink he can pour in will never be able to quench. SOUTH.

To fill up the drawing of this personage, he conceived a *voluptuary*, who in his person should be bloated and blown up to the size of a Silenus; lazy, luxurious, in *sensuality* a satyr, in intemperance a bacchanalian. CUMBERLAND.

What *epicure* can be always plying his palate? SOUTH.

SENTENCE, PROPOSITION, PERIOD, PHRASE.

SENTENCE, in Latin *sententia*, is but a variation of *sentiment* (*v. Opinion*). PROPOSITION, *v. Proposal*. PERIOD, in Latin *periodus*, Greek *περιόδος*, from *περι*, about, and *όδος*, way, signifies the circuit or round of words which renders the sense complete. PHRASE, from the Greek *φράζω*, to speak, signifies the words uttered.

The *sentence* consists of any words which convey sentiment: the *proposition* consists of the thing set before the mind, that is, either our own minds or the minds of others; hence the term *sentence* has more special regard to the form of words, and the *proposition* to the matter contained: they are both used technically or otherwise: the former in grammar and rhetoric; the latter in logic. The *sentence* is simple and complex; the *proposition* is universal or particular. *Period* and *phrase*, like *sentence*, are forms of words, but they are solely so, whereas the *sentence* depends on the connection of ideas by which it is formed: we speak of *sentences* either as to their structure or their sentiment; hence the *sentence* is either grammatical or moral: but the *period* regards only the structure: it is either well or ill turned: the term *phrase* denotes the character of the words; hence it is either vulgar or polite, idiomatic or general: the *sentence* must consist of at least two words to make sense; the *phrase* may be a single word or otherwise.

Some expect in letters pointed *sentences* and forcible *periods*. JOHNSON.

Chrysippus, laboring how to reconcile these two *propositions*, that all things are done by

fate, and yet that something is in our own power, cannot extricate himself. HAMMOND.

Disastrous words can best disaster show, In angry *phrase* the angry passions glow. ELPHINSTONE.

TO SENTENCE, DOOM, CONDEMN.

To SENTENCE, or pass *sentence*, is to give a final opinion or decision which is to influence the fate of an object. CONDEMN, from *damnum*, a loss, is to pass such a *sentence* as shall be to the hurt of an object. DOOM, in Saxon *dom*, a judgment, comes from *denan*, to judge or deem.

When these terms are taken in the juridical sense, to *sentence* is indefinite as to the quantum of punishment, it may be great or small; a criminal may be *sentenced* to a mild or severe punishment: to *condemn* and *doom* are always employed to denote a severe punishment, and the latter still severer than the former. A person is *condemned* to the galleys, to transportation for life, or to death; he is *doomed* to eternal misery.

At the end of the tenth book, the poet joins this beautiful circumstance, that they offered up their penitential prayers on the very place where their judge appeared to them when he pronounced their *sentence*. ADDISON.

It so happened, by one of the judges withdrawing upon a sudden fit of the stone, the court was divided, one half for the *condemning* him, and the other half that he was not guilty. CLARENDON.

To *sentence* is always the act of some conscious agent; but to *condemn* and *doom* may be the effect of circumstances, or brought about by the nature of things. A person is always *sentenced* by some one to suffer in consequence of his conduct; he is *condemned* or *doomed*, either by his misfortune or his fault, to suffer whatever circumstances impose upon him; immoral writers are justly *condemned* to oblivion or infamy; or persons may be *condemned* by their hard lot to struggle through life for a bare living; and some are *doomed* by a still harder lot to penury and wretchedness.

Liberty (Thomson's "Liberty") called in vain upon her votaries to read her praises; her praises were *condemned* to harbor spiders and gather dust. JOHNSON.

Even the abridger, compiler, and translator, though their labors cannot be ranked with those of the diurnal biographer, yet must not be rashly *doomed* to annihilation. JOHNSON.

To *sentence* is to pass sentence in the judicial sense only; but the noun *sentence* is taken in the sense of a judgment, and has likewise a moral as well as a judicial application, in which latter case it admits of a further comparison with *condemn* or *condemnation*. The *sentence* is a formal and the *condemnation* an informal judgment: the *sentence* may be favorable or unfavorable; the *condemnation* is always unfavorable: critics pronounce their *sentence* on the merits or demerits of a work; the public may *condemn* a measure in any manner by which they make their sentiments known. To *doom*, which signifies only to determine the fate of a person, is not allied to the other terms in their moral application.

Let him set out some of Luther's works, that by them we may pass *sentence* upon his doctrines. ATTERBURY.

This practice being intended only to honor Christ, the Sun of Righteousness, who hath risen upon us to enlighten us with that doctrine of salvation, to which we then declare our adherence, it ought not to be *condemned* as superstition. SECKER.

SENTENTIOUS, SENTIMENTAL.

SENTENTIOUS signifies having or abounding in *sentences* or judgments; SENTIMENTAL, having *sentiment* (*v. Opinion*). Books and authors are termed *sententious*; but travellers, society, intercourse, correspondence, and the like, are characterized as *sentimental*. Moralists, whose works and conversation abound in moral *sentences*, like Dr. Johnson's, are termed *sententious*; novelists and romance writers, like Mrs. Radcliffe, are properly *sentimental*. *Sententious* books always serve for improvement; *sentimental* works, unless they are of a superior order, are in general hurtful.

His (Mr. Ferguson's) love of Montesquien and Tacitus has led him into a manner of writing too short-winded and *sententious*. GRAY.

In books, whether moral or amusing, there are no passages more captivating than those delicate strokes of *sentimental* morality which refer our actions to the determination of feeling. MACKENZIE.

SENTIMENT, SENSATION, PERCEPTION.

SENTIMENT and SENSATION are obviously derived from the same source (*v. To feel*). PERCEPTION, from *perceive* (*v. To see*), expresses the act of per-

ceiving, or the impressions produced by *perceiving*.

The impressions which objects make upon the person are designated by all these terms; but the *sentiment* has its seat in the heart, the *sensation* is confined to the senses, and the *perception* rests in the understanding. *Sentiments* are lively, *sensations* are grateful, *perceptions* are clear. Gratitude is a *sentiment* the most pleasing to the human mind; the *sensation* produced by the action of electricity on the frame is generally unpleasant; a nice *perception* of objects is one of the first requisites for perfection in any art.

I am framing every possible pretence to live hereafter according to my own taste and *sentiments*. MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

Diversity of constitution or other circumstances vary the *sensations*, and to them Java pepper is cold. GLANVIL.

Matter hath no life nor *perception*, and is not conscious of its own existence. BENTLEY.

The *sentiment* extends to manners, and renders us alive to the happiness or misery of others as well as our own; it is that by which men are most nearly allied to each other: the *sensation* is purely physical, and the effect of external objects upon either the body or the mind: *perceptions* carry us into the district of science; they give us an interest in all the surrounding objects as intellectual observers. A man of spirit or courage receives marks of honor, or affronts, with very different *sentiments* from the poltroon: he who bounds his happiness by the present fleeting existence must be careful to remove every painful *sensation*: we judge of objects as complex or simple according to the number of *perceptions* which they produce in us.

Alike to council or the assembly came, With equal souls and *sentiments* the same. POPE.

When we describe our *sensations* of another's sorrows in condolence, the customs of the world scarcely admit of rigid veracity. JOHNSON.

When first the trembling eye receives the day, External forms on young *perception* play. LANGHORNE.

TO SEPARATE, SEVER, DISJOIN, DETACH.

To SEPARATE (*v. To abstract*) is the general term: whatever is united or joined in any way may be *separated*, be the