

junction natural or artificial; but to SEVER, which is but a variation of *separate*, is a mode of *separating* natural bodies, or bodies naturally joined: we may *separate* in part or entirely; we *sever* entirely: we *separate* with or without violence; we *sever* with violence only: we may *separate* papers which have been pasted together, or fruits which have grown together; but the *head* is *severed* from the body, or a branch from the trunk.

Can a body be inflammable from which it would puzzle a chemist to *separate* an inflammable ingredient? BOYLE.

To mention only that species of shell-fish that grow to the surface of several rocks, and immediately die upon their being *severed* from the place where they grow. ADDISON.

To *separate* may be said of things which are only remotely connected; DISJOIN, signifying to destroy a junction, is said of that which is intimately connected so as to be joined: we *separate* as convenience requires; we may *separate* in a right or a wrong manner; we mostly *disjoin* things which ought to remain joined: we *separate* syllables in order to distinguish them; but they are sometimes *disjoined* in writing by an accidental erasure. To DETACH, signifying to destroy a contact, has an intermediate sense between *separate* and *disjoin*, applying to bodies which are neither so loosely connected as the former, nor so closely as the latter: we *separate* things that directly meet in no point; we *disjoin* those which may meet in many points; we *detach* those things which meet in one point only.

Our Saviour did not *separate* from the Jewish Church, though the Scribes and Pharisees, who ruled in ecclesiastical matters at that time, had perverted the law. BENNET.

In times and regions, so *disjoined* from each other that there can scarcely be imagined any communication of sentiments, has prevailed a general and uniform expectation of propitiating God by corporeal austerities. JOHNSON.

The several parts of it are *detached* one from the other, and yet join again one cannot tell how. POPE.

Separate, *sever*, and *detach* may be applied to mental as well as corporeal objects; persons may be *separated* from each other by diversity of interests or opinions; they may be *severed* from each

other when their affections are estranged toward each other; they may be *detached* from each other by circumstances after having been attached by any tie.

They (the French Republicans) never have abandoned, and never will abandon, their old steady maxim of *separating* the people from their government. BURKE.

Better I were distract,
So should my thoughts be *severed* from my
griefs. SHAKESPEARE.

As for the *detached* rhapsodies which Lycurgus in more early times brought with him out of Asia, they must have been exceedingly imperfect. CUMBERLAND.

SEQUEL, CLOSE.

SEQUEL is a species of CLOSE; it is that which follows by way of termination; but the *close* is simply that which *closes*, or puts an end to anything. There cannot be a *sequel* without a *close*, but there may be a *close* without a *sequel*. A story may have either a *sequel* or a *close*; when the end is detached from the beginning so as to follow, it is a *sequel*; if the beginning and end are uninterrupted, it is simply a *close*. When a work is published in distinct parts, those which follow at the end may be termed the *sequel*: if it appears all at once, the concluding pages are the *close*.

Oh let me say no more;
Gather the *sequel* by what went before. SHAKESPEARE.

A tale should be judicious, clear, succinct,
The language plain, and incidents well link'd;
Tell not as new what everybody knows,
And, new or old, still hasten to a *close*. COWPER.

SERIES, COURSE.

A SERIES, in Latin *series*, from *sero*, to bind or connect, is applied to things which are connected with each other, simply in order of time or number. COURSE, in Latin *cursum*, from *curro*, to run, signifying the line formed or the direction taken in running, applies to things which are so connected together as to form, as it were, a line; a *series* of events are such as follow in order of time; a *series* of numbers of any work are such as follow in numerical order; a *course* of events are such as tend to the same end; a *course* of lectures, such as are delivered on the same subject.

You may believe me I shall never forget from whom this long *series* of applications took its rise. BEATTIE.

If it be asked what is the improper expectation which it is dangerous to indulge, experience will answer, that it is an expectation that requires the common *course* of things to be changed. JOHNSON.

SERVANT, DOMESTIC, MENIAL, DRUDGE.

In the term SERVANT is included the idea of the service performed: in the term DOMESTIC, from *domus*, a house, is included the idea of one belonging to the house or family: in the word MENIAL, from *manus*, the hand, is included the idea of labor; and the term DRUDGE, that of *drudgery*. We hire a *servant* at a certain rate, and for a particular service; we are attached to our *domestics* according to their assiduity and attention to our wishes; we employ as a *menial* one who is unfit for a higher employment; and a *drudge* in any labor, however hard and disagreeable.

A *servant* dwells remote from all knowledge of his lord's purposes. SOUTH.

Montezuma was attended by his own *domestics*, and served with his usual state. ROBERTSON.

Some were his (King Charles's) own *menial* servants, and ate bread at his table before they lifted up their heel against him. SOUTH.

He who will be vastly rich must resolve to be a *drudge* all his days. SOUTH.

SERVITUDE, SLAVERY, BONDAGE.

SERVITUDE expresses less than SLAVERY, and this less than BONDAGE.

Servitude, from *servio*, conveys simply the idea of performing a service without specifying the principle upon which it is performed. Among the Romans, *servus* signified a slave, because all who served were literally slaves, the power over the person being almost unlimited. The mild influence of Christianity has corrected men's notions with regard to their rights as well as their duties, and established *servitude* on the just principle of a mutual compact, without any infraction on that most precious of all human gifts, personal liberty. *Slavery*, which marks a condition incompatible with the existence of this invaluable endowment, is a term odious to the Christian ear: it had its origin in the grossest state of society; the word being derived from the German *slave*, or *Sclavonians*, a fierce and intrepid

people who made a long stand against the Germans, and, being at last defeated, were made *slaves*. *Slavery*, therefore, includes not only *servitude*, but also the odious circumstance of the entire subjection of one individual to another. *Bondage*, from to *bind*, denotes the state of being *bound*, that is, *slavery* in its most aggravated form, in which, to the loss of personal liberty, is added cruel treatment; the term is seldom applied in its proper sense to any persons but the Israelites in Egypt. In a figurative sense, we speak of being a *slave* to our passions, and under the *bondage* of sin, in which cases the terms preserve precisely the same distinction.

It is fit and necessary that some persons in the world should be in love with a splendid *servitude*. SOUTH.

So different are the geniuses which are formed under Turkish *slavery* and Grecian liberty. ADDISON.

We make a choir, as doth the prison'd bird,
And sing our *bondage* freely. SHAKESPEARE.

The same distinction exists between the epithets *servile* and *slavish*, which are employed only in the moral application. He who is *servile* has the mean character of a servant, but he is still a free agent; but he who is *slavish* is bound and fettered in every possible form.

That *servile* path thou nobly dost decline,
Of tracing word by word, and line by line.
Those are the labor'd births of *slavish* brains,
Not the effect of poetry, but pains. DENHAM.

SHADE, SHADOW.

SHADE and SHADOW, in German *schatten*, are in all probability connected with the word *shine*, *show* (*v. To show*, etc.). Both these terms express that darkness which is occasioned by the sun's rays being intercepted by any body; but *shade* simply expresses the absence of the light, and *shadow* signifies also the figure of the body which thus intercepts the light. Trees naturally produce a *shade*, by means of their branches and leaves: and wherever the image of the tree is reflected on the earth that forms its *shadow*. It is agreeable in the heat of summer to sit in the *shade*; the constancy with which the *shadow* follows the man has been proverbially adopted as a simile for one who clings close to another.

Welcome, ye *shades*! ye bowery thickets, hail!
THOMSON.

At every step,
 Solemn and slow, the *shadows* blacker fall,
 And all is awful listening gloom around.
THOMSON.

In the moral application they are more widely distinguished in their signification. As a *shade* implies darkness, so to be in the *shade* is the same as to be in obscurity; as the *shadow* is but a reflection or appearance, so, in the moral sense, the *shadow* of a thing is that which is opposed to the substance.

The pious prince then seeks the *shade*
 Which hides from sight the pious maid.
DRYDEN.

As a man he has hardly left him the *shadow*
 of a good quality.
COWPER.

TO SHAKE, TREMBLE, SHUDDER,
 QUIVER, QUAKE.

SHAKE, SHUDDER (in the German *schütteln, schütten*), QUIVER, and QUAKE, in the Latin *quatio, cutio*, and the Italian *scussere*, are all derived from one common original; TREMBLE comes from the Latin *tremo*.

To *shake* is a generic term, the rest are but modes of *shaking*: to *tremble* is to *shake* from an inward cause, or what appears to be so: in this manner a person *trembles* from fear, from cold, or weakness; and a leaf which is imperceptibly agitated by the air is also said to *tremble*: to *shudder* is to *tremble* violently: to *quiver* and to *quake* are both to *tremble* quickly; but the former denotes rather a vibratory motion, as the point of a spear when thrown against wood; the latter a quick motion of the whole body, as in the case of bodies that have not sufficient consistency in themselves to remain still.

Under his burning wheels
 The steadfast empyrean *shook* throughout,
 All but the throne itself of God.
MILTON.

The *trembling* pilot, from his rudder torn,
 Was headlong hurl'd.
DRYDEN.

He said, and hurl'd against the mountain side
 His *quivering* spear.
DRYDEN.

There to as cold and dreary as a snake,
 That seem'd to *tremble* evermore and *quake*.
SPENSER.

TO SHAKE, AGITATE, TOSS.

SHAKE, *v.* To *shake*. AGITATE, in Latin *agito*, is a frequentative of *ago*,

to drive, that is, to drive different ways. TOSS is probably contracted from *torsi*, perfect of *torgueo*, to whirl.

A motion more or less violent is signified by all these terms, which differ both in the manner and the cause of the motion. *Shake* is indefinite, it may differ in degree as to the violence; to *agitate* and *toss* rise in sense upon the word *shake*: a breeze *shakes* a leaf, a storm *agitates* the sea, and the waves *toss* a vessel to and fro: large and small bodies may be *shaken*; large bodies are *agitated*: a handkerchief may be *shaken*; the earth is *agitated* by an earthquake. What is *shaken* and *agitated* is not removed from its place; but what is *tossed* is thrown from place to place. A house may frequently be *shaken*, while the foundation remains good; the waters are most *agitated* while they remain within their bounds; but a ball is *tossed* from hand to hand.

An unwholesome blast of air, a cold, or a surf-felt, may *shake* in pieces a man's hardy fabric.
SOUTH.

I found the magnetical needle greatly *agitated*
 near the summit of the mountain.
BYRDONE.

Toss'd all the day in rapid circles round,
 Breathless I fell.
PORR.

To *shake* and *toss* are the acts either of persons or things; to *agitate* is the act of things when taken in the active sense. A person *shakes* the hand of another, or the motion of a carriage *shakes* persons in general, and *agitates* those who are weak in frame: a child *tosses* his food about; or the violent motion of a vessel *tosses* everything about which is in it. To *shake* arises from external or internal causes; we may be *shaken* by others, or *shake* ourselves from cold: to *agitate* and *toss* arise always from some external action, direct or indirect; the body may be *agitated* by violent concussion from without, or from the action of perturbed feelings; the body may be *tossed* by various circumstances, and the mind may be *tossed* to and fro by the violent action of the passions. Hence the propriety of using the terms in the moral application. The resolution is *shaken*, as the tree is by the wind; the mind is *agitated* like troubled waters; a person is *tossed* to and fro in the ocean of life, as the vessel is *tossed* by the waves.

Not my firm faith
 Can by his hand be *shaken* or seduc'd.
MILTON.

We all must have observed that a speaker *agitated* with passion, or an actor who is indeed strictly an imitator, are perpetually changing the tone and pitch of their voice, as the sense of their words varies.
SIR W. JONES.

Your mind is *tossing* on the sea,
 There where your argosies
 Do overpeer the petty traffickers.
SHAKESPEARE.

SHARP, ACUTE, KEEN.

THE general property expressed by these epithets is that of *sharpness*, or an ability to cut. The term SHARP, in German, etc., *scharf*, from *scheren*, to cut, is generic and indefinite; the two others are modes of *sharpness* differing in the circumstance or the degree: the ACUTE (*v. Acute*) is not only more than *sharp* in the common sense, but signifies also *sharp-pointed*: a knife may be *sharp*; but a needle is properly *acute*. Things are *sharp* that have either a long or a pointed edge; but the KEEN (*v. Acute*) is applicable only to the long edge; and that in the highest degree of *sharpness*: a common knife may be *sharp*; but a razor or a lancet are properly said to be *keen*. These terms preserve the same distinction in their figurative use. Every pain is *sharp* which may resemble that which is produced by cutting; it is *acute* when it resembles that produced by piercing deep: words are said to be *sharp* which have any power in them to wound; they are *keen* when they cut deep and wide.

Be sure you avoid as much as you can to inquire after those that have been *sharp* in their judgments toward me.
EARL OF STRAFFORD.

Wisdom's eye
 Acute for what? To spy more miseries.
 To this great end *keen* instinct stings him on.
YOUNG.

TO SHINE, GLITTER, GLARE, SPARKLE,
 RADIATE.

SHINE, in Saxon *schinean*, German *scheinen*, is in all probability connected with the words *show, see*, etc. GLITTER and GLARE are variations from the German *gleissen, glänzen*, etc., which have a similar meaning. To SPARKLE signifies to produce *sparks*; and *spark* is in Saxon *spearce*, low German and Dutch *spark*. To RADIATE is to produce rays, from the Latin *radius*, a ray.

The emission of light is the common idea conveyed by these terms. To *shine* expresses simply this general idea: *glitter* and the other verbs include some collateral idea in their signification. To *shine* is a steady emission of light; to *glitter* is an unsteady emission of light, occasioned by the reflection on transparent or bright bodies: the sun and moon *shine* whenever they make their appearance; but a set of diamonds *glitter* by the irregular reflection of the light on them; or the brazen spire of a steeple *glitters* when the sun in the morning *shines* upon it. This is the same in the improper as the proper application.

Yet something *shines* more glorious in his word,
 His mercy this.
WALLEER.

The happiness of success *glittering* before him
 withdraws his attention from the atrociousness
 of the guilt.
JOHNSON.

Shine specifies no degree of light; it may be barely sufficient to render itself visible, or it may be a very strong degree of light: *glare*, on the contrary, denotes the highest possible degree of light: the sun frequently *glares* when it *shines* only at intervals; and the eye also *glares*.

This glorious morning star was not the transitory light of a comet, which *shines* and *glares* for awhile, and then presently vanishes into nothing.
SOUTH.

Against the capitol I met a lion,
 Who *glar'd* upon me, and went surly by
 Without annoying me.
SHAKESPEARE.

To *shine* is to emit light in a full stream; but to *sparkle* is to emit it in small portions; and to *radiate* is to emit it in long lines. The fire *sparkles* in the burning of wood; or the light of the sun *sparkles* when it strikes on knobs or small points; or the eye *sparkles*: the sun *radiates* when it seems to emit its light in rays.

His eyes so *sparkled* with a lively flame.
DRYDEN.

Now had the sun withdrawn his *radiant* light.
DRYDEN.

SHOCK, CONCUSSION.

SHOCK denotes a violent *shake* or agitation; CONCUSSION, a shaking together. The *shock* is often instantaneous, but does not necessarily extend beyond the act of the moment; the *concussion* is permanent in its consequences, it tends to derange the system. Hence the different application of the terms: the *shock* may

affect either the body or the mind; the *concussion* affects properly only the body, or corporeal objects: a violent and sudden blow produces a *shock* at the moment it is given; but it does not always produce a *concussion*: the violence of a fall will, however, sometimes produce a *concussion* in the brain, which in future affects the intellect.

He stood the *shock* of a whole host of foes.
ADDISON.

How can that *concussion* of atoms be capable of begetting those internal and vital affections, that self-consciousness, and those other powers and energies that we feel in our minds, seeing they only strike upon the outward surfaces? They cannot inwardly pervade one another; they cannot have any penetration of dimensions and conjunction of substance.
BENTLEY.

As *shock* conveys no idea of separation, only of impression, it is equally applicable to the mind and the body. Sudden news of an exceedingly painful nature will often produce a *shock* on the mind; but time mostly serves to wear away the effect which has been produced.

It is inconceivable how any such man, that hath stood the *shock* of an eternal duration without corruption or alteration, should after be corrupted or altered.
HALL.

TO SHOOT, DART.

To SHOOT and DART, in the proper sense, are clearly distinguished from each other, as expressing different modes of sending bodies to a distance from a given point. From the circumstances of the actions arise their different application to other objects in the improper sense; as that which proceeds by *shooting* goes forth from a body unexpectedly, and with great rapidity; so, in the figurative sense, a plant *shoots* up that comes so unexpectedly as not to be seen; a star is said to *shoot* in the sky, which seems to move in a *shooting* manner from one place to another.

Tell, how like a tall old oak, how learning *shoots* To heaven her branches, and to hell her roots.
DENHAM.

From a similarity in the form of rays, lightning, etc., to darts, they are figuratively said to be *darted*.

Till safe at distance to his god he prays,
The god who *darts* around the world his rays.
POPE.

SHORT, BRIEF, CONCISE, SUCCINCT, SUMMARY.

SHORT, in French *court*, German *kurz*, Latin *curtus*, Greek *κυριος*, is the generic, the rest are specific terms: everything which admits of dimensions may be *short*, as opposed to the long, that is, either naturally or artificially; the rest are species of artificial *shortness*, or that which is the work of art: hence it is that material, as well as spiritual, objects may be termed *short*: but the BRIEF, in Latin *brevis*, in Greek *βραχυς*, CONCISE, in Latin *concisus*, signifying cut into a small body, SUCCINCT, in Latin *succinctus*, participle of *succingo*, to tuck up, signifying brought within a small compass, and SUMMARY (*v. Abridgment*) are intellectual or spiritual only. We may term a stick, a letter, or a discourse, *short*; but we speak of *brevis* only in regard to the mode of speech; *conciseness* and *succinctness* as to the matter of speech; *summary* as to the mode either of speaking or acting: the *brief* is opposed to the prolix; the *concise* and *succinct* to the diffuse; the *summary* to the circumstantial or ceremonious. It is a matter of comparatively little importance whether a man's life be long or *short*; but it deeply concerns him that every moment be well spent; *brevis* of expression ought to be consulted by speakers, even more than by writers; *conciseness* is of peculiar advantage in the formation of rules for young persons; and *succinctness* is a requisite in every writer who has extensive materials to digest; a *summary* mode of proceeding may have the advantage of saving time, but it has the disadvantage of incorrectness, and often of injustice.

The widest excursions of the mind are made by *short* flights frequently repeated.
JOHNSON.

Premeditation of thought and *brevis* of expression are the great ingredients of that reverence that is required to a pious and acceptable prayer.
SOUTH.

Aristotle has a dry *conciseness*, that makes one imagine one is perusing a table of contents.
GRAY.

Let all your precepts be *succinct* and clear,
That ready wits may comprehend them soon.
ROSCOMMON.

Nor spend their time to show their reading,
She'd have a *summary* proceeding.
SWIFT.

TO SHOW, OR SHEW, POINT OUT, MARK, INDICATE.

SHOW, in German *schauen*, etc., Greek *θεωρειναι*, from the Hebrew *shoah*, to look upon, is here the general term, and the others specific: the common idea included in the signification of them all is that of making a thing visible to another. To *show* is an indefinite term; one *shows* by simply setting a thing before the eyes of another: to POINT OUT, to fix a *point* upon a thing, is specific; it is to *show* some particular *point* by a direct and immediate application to it: we *show* a person a book when we put it into his hands; but we *point out* the beauties of its contents by making a *point* upon them, or accompanying the action with some particular movement, which shall direct the attention of the observer in a specific manner. Many things, therefore, may be *shown* which cannot be *pointed out*: a person *shows* himself, but he does not *point himself out*; towns, houses, gardens, and the like, are *shown*; but single things of any description are *pointed out*.

If I do feign,
Oh let me in my present wildness die,
And never live to *show* the incredulous world
The noble change that I have purposed.
SHAKESPEARE.

I shall do justice to those who have distinguished themselves in learning, and *point out* their beauties.
ADDISON.

To *show* and *point out* are direct personal acts; to MARK (*v. Mark, impression*), *i. e.*, to put a *mark* on, is an indirect means of making a thing visible or observable: a tradesman *marks* the prices of the articles which he sets forth in his shop.

Were they allowed first to *show* what they really are, I am persuaded they would not be half so bad.
BRYDNE.

When her eyes began to fail, she employed a reader, who *marked* on every volume or pamphlet the day when he began and ended his task.
WHITAKER.

Show and *mark* denote the acts of conscious or unconscious agents; *point out*, that of conscious agents only: INDICATE (*v. Mark, sign*), that of unconscious agents only: in this case, what *shows*, serves as an evidence or proof; what *marks*, serves to direct or guide; what *indicates*, serves as an index to *point out*. That *shows* the

fallacy of forming schemes for the future; it *marks* the progress of time; it *indicates* decay.

The glowworm *shows* the matin to be near,
And 'gins to pale his ineffectual fire.
SHAKESPEARE.

Weakness of counsels, fluctuation of opinion, and deficiency of spirit, *marked* his administration during an inglorious period of sixteen years.
COXE.

Above the steeple shines a plate,
That turns and turns, to *indicate*
From what point blows the weather.
COWPER.

In an extended moral application they preserve the same distinction; to *show* is to prove in a general way that a thing is or will be; to *indicate* is to *show* or *point out* in a particular manner that a thing is.

That strengthens our argument. *Exceptio probat regulam*. Some being found, *shows* that if all remained many would be found.
JOHNSON.

Amidst this wreck of human nature, traces still remain which *indicate* its author. BLAIR.

TO SHOW, EXHIBIT, DISPLAY.

To SHOW (*v. To show*) is here, as before, the generic term; to EXHIBIT (*v. To give*) and DISPLAY, in French *deployer*, in all probability changed from the Latin *plico*, signifying to unfold or set forth to view, are specific: they may all designate the acts either of persons or things: the first, however, does this either in the proper or the improper sense; the latter two rather in the improper sense. To *show* is an indefinite action applied to every object: things are *shown* for purposes of convenience; as one *shows* a book to a friend: *exhibit* is applied to matters that are extraordinary or unusual; things are *exhibited* to attract notice; as to *exhibit* flowers or animals: we *show* to one or many; we *exhibit* or *display* in as public a manner, and to as great numbers, as possible; as to *show* the marks to the by-standers; to *exhibit* a figure upon a pole; to *display* one's finery.

Signor Recupero, who obligingly engages to be our cicerone, has *shown* us some curious remains of antiquity.
BRYDNE.

If any claim redress of injustice, they should *exhibit* their petition in the street.
SHAKESPEARE.

They are all couched in a pit with their lights put out, which at the very time of our meeting they will at once *display* to the night.
SHAKESPEARE.

They admit of the same distinction when applied to moral objects; we may *show* courage, dislike, or any other affection; *exhibit* skill, prowess, etc., in the field of battle; *display* heroism, and whatever may shine forth.

The courage he had *showed* in opposing ship-money raised his reputation to a great height.

CLARENDON.

He has no power of assuming that dignity or elegance, which some who have little of either in common life can *exhibit* on the stage.

JOHNSON.

Which interwoven Britons seem to raise,
And show the triumph that their shame *displays*.

DRYDEN.

When said of things, they differ principally in the manner or degree of clearness with which the thing appears to present itself to view: to *show* is, as before, altogether indefinite, and implies simply to bring to view; *exhibit* implies to bring inherent properties to light, that is, apparently by a process; to *display* is to set forth so as to strike the eye: the windows on a frosty morning will *show* the state of the weather; experiments with the air-pump *exhibit* the many wonderful and interesting properties of air; the beauties of the creation are peculiarly *displayed* in the spring season.

Then let us fall, but fall amid our foes,
Despair of life the means of living *shows*.

DRYDEN.

The world has ever been a great theatre, *exhibiting* the same repeated scene of the follies of men.

BLAIR.

Thou Heav'n's alternate beauty canst *display*,
The blush of morning and the Milky Way.

DRYDEN.

SHOW, EXHIBITION, REPRESENTATION, SIGHT, SPECTACLE.

SHOW signifies the thing shown (*v. To show*); EXHIBITION signifies the thing exhibited (*v. To show*); REPRESENTATION, the thing represented; SIGHT, the thing to be seen; and SPECTACLE, from the Latin *speculo*, stands for the thing to be beheld.

Show is here, as in the former article, the most general term. Everything set forth to view is *shown*; and, if set forth for the amusement of others, it is a *show*. This is the common idea included in the terms *exhibition* and *representation*: but *show* is a term of vulgar meaning and ap-

plication; the others have a higher use and signification. The *show* consists of that which merely pleases the eye; it is not a matter either of taste or art, but merely of curiosity: an *exhibition*, on the contrary, presents some effort of talent or some work of genius; and a *representation* sets forth the image or imitation of something by the power of art: hence we speak of a *show* of wild beasts; an *exhibition* of paintings; and a theatrical *representation*. The conjuror makes a *show* of his tricks at a fair to the wonder of the gazing multitude; the artist makes an *exhibition* of his works; *representations* of men and manners are given on the stage.

Charm'd with the wonders of the *show*,
On ev'ry side, above, below,
She now of this or that inquires,
What least was understood admires.

GAY.

Copley's picture of Lord Chatham's death is an *exhibition* of itself.

BEATTIE.

There are many virtues which in their own nature are incapable of any outward *representation*.

ADDISON.

Shows, exhibitions, and representations are presented by some one to the view of others; *sights* and *spectacles* present themselves to view. *Sight*, like *show*, is a vulgar term; and *spectacle* the nobler term. Whatever is to be seen to excite notice is a *sight*, in which general sense it would comprehend every *show*, but in its particular sense it includes only that which casually offers itself to view: a *spectacle*, on the contrary, is that species of *sight* which has something in it to interest either the heart or the head of the observer: processions, reviews, sports, and the like, are *sights*; but battles, bull-fights, or public games of any description, are *spectacles*, which interest, but shock the feelings.

Their various arms afford a pleasing *sight*.

DRYDEN.

The weary Britons, whose warrable youth
Was by Maximilian lately led away,
Were to those pagans made an open pray,
And daily *spectacle* of sad decay.

SPENSER.

SHOW, OUTSIDE, APPEARANCE, SEMBLANCE.

WHERE there is SHOW (*v. To show*) there must be OUTSIDE and APPEARANCE; but there may be the last without the former. The term *show* always

denotes an action, and refers to some person or thing as agent; but the *outside* may be merely the passive quality of some thing. We speak, therefore, of a thing as mere *show*, to signify that what is shown is all that exists; and in this sense it may be termed mere *outside*, as consisting only of what is on the *outside*. In describing a house, however, we speak of its *outside*, and not of its *show*; as also of the *outside* of a book, and not of the *show*. *Appearance* denotes an action as well as *show*; but the former is the act of an unconscious agent, the latter of one that is conscious and voluntary: the *appearance* presents itself to the view; the *show* is purposely presented to view. A person makes a *show* so as to be seen by others; his *appearance* is that which shows itself in him. To look only to *show*, or to be concerned for *show* only, signifies to be concerned for that only which will attract notice; to look only to the *outside* signifies to be concerned only for that which may be seen in a thing, to the disregard of that which is not seen: to look only to *appearances* signifies the same as the former, except that *outside* is said in the proper sense of that which literally strikes the eye; but *appearances* extend to a man's conduct, and whatever may affect his reputation.

You'll find the friendship of the world is *show*,
Mere outward *show*.

SAVAGE.

The greater part of men behold nothing more than the rotation of human affairs. This is only the *outside* of things.

BLAIR.

Every accusation against persons of rank was heard with pleasure (by James I. of Scotland). Every *appearance* of guilt was examined with rigor.

ROBERTSON.

SEMBLANCE or seeming (*v. To seem*) always conveys the idea of an unreal *appearance*, or at least is contrasted with that which is real; he who only wears the *semblance* of friendship would be ill deserving the confidence of a friend.

But man, the wildest beast of prey,
Wears friendship's *semblance* to betray.

MOORE.

SHOW, PARADE, OSTENTATION.

THESE terms are synonymous when they imply abstract actions: SHOW is here, as in the preceding article, taken in the vulgar sense; OSTENTATION and

PARADE include the idea of something particular. *Show* consists simply in letting that be seen which a person might if he pleased keep out of view; *parade* is a studious effort to show, it is that which serves to attract notice: in this manner a person may make a *show* of his equipage or furniture, who sets it out to be seen; he makes a *parade* of his wealth if he sets it forth with any artifice or formality so as to make it more striking. *Ostentation* is, like *parade*, a studied show, but it refers rather to the intention of the person than to the method by which the *show* is made. *Show* and *parade* may, therefore, according to the circumstances, serve the purpose of *ostentation*. A person makes a *show* of his liberality, or a *parade* of his gifts, and thus he gratifies his *ostentation*.

'Tis not alone my inky cloak, good mother,
Nor customary suits of solemn black,
Nor the dejected 'havior of the visage,
Together with all forms, modes, *shows* of grief,
That can denote me truly sad.

SHAKESPEARE.

Be rich, but of your wealth make no *parade*.

SWIFT.

His charity to those in want, and bounty to learned men, was extraordinary, but without *ostentation*.

BURNET.

When taken in reference to things, the *show* is opposed to the reality; it is that which shows itself: the *parade* and *ostentation* is that which is ceremonious and artificial: the former in respect to what strikes the eye, and the latter in respect to what strikes the mind.

Great in themselves,
They smile superior of external *show*.

SOMERVILLE.

It was not in the mere *parade* of royalty that the Mexican potentates exhibited their power.

ROBERTSON.

We are dazzled with the splendor of titles, the *ostentation* of learning, and the noise of victories.

SPECTATOR.

SHOWY, GAUDY, GAY.

SHOWY, having or being full of *show* (*v. Show, outside*), is mostly an epithet of dispraise; that which is *showy* has seldom anything to deserve notice beyond that which catches the eye: GAUDY, from the Latin *gaudeo*, to rejoice, signifies literally full of joy; and is applied figuratively to the exterior of objects, but with the annexed bad idea of being strik-

ing to an excess: GAY, on the contrary, which is only a contraction of *gaudy*, is used in the same sense as an epithet of praise. Some things may be *showy*, and in their nature properly so; thus the tail of a peacock is *showy*: artificial objects may likewise be *showy*, but they will not be preferred by persons of taste: that which is *gaudy* is always artificial, and is always chosen by the vain, the vulgar, and the ignorant; a maid-servant will bedizen herself with *gaudy*-colored ribbons. That which is *gay* is either nature itself, or nature imitated in the best manner: spring is a *gay* season, and flowers are its *gayest* accompaniments.

Men of warm imaginations neglect solid and substantial happiness for what is *showy* and superficial. ADDISON.

The *gaudy*, babbling, and remorseful day
Is crept into the bosom of the sea. SHAKESPEARE.

Jocund day
Upon the mountain-tops sits *gayly* dress'd. SHAKESPEARE.

SICK, SICKLY, DISEASED, MORBID.

SICK denotes a partial state, SICKLY a permanent state, of the body, a proneness to be *sick*: he who is *sick* may be made well; but he who is *sickly* is seldom really well: all persons are liable to be *sick*, though few have the misfortune to be *sickly*: a person may be *sick* from the effect of cold, violent exercise, and the like; but he is *sickly* only from constitution.

For aught I see, they are as *sick* that surfeit
with too much, as they that starve with nothing. SHAKESPEARE.

Both Homer and Virgil were of a very delicate
and *sickly* constitution. WALSH.

Sickly expresses a permanent state of indisposition unless otherwise qualified; but DISEASED expresses a violent state of derangement without specifying its duration; it may be for a time only, or for a permanency: the person, or his constitution, is *sickly*; the person, or his frame, or particular parts, as his lungs, his inside, his brain, and the like, may be *diseased*.

Would we know what health and ease are worth,
let us ask one that is *sickly* and in pain, and we have the price. GREW.

They should choose such places as were open to the favorable aspects and influence of the heavens, where there was a well-tempered soil,

clear air, pure springs of water, that *diseased* persons coming from unhealthy places might obtain recovery. BATES.

Sick, *sickly*, and *diseased* may all be used in a moral application; MORBID is used in no other, except in a technical sense. *Sick* denotes a partial state, as before, namely, a state of disgust, and is always associated with the object of the *sickness*; we are *sick* of turbulent enjoyments, and seek for tranquillity: *sickly* and *morbid* are applied to the habitual state of the feelings or character; a *sickly* sentimentality, a *morbid* sensibility: *diseased* is applied in general to individuals or communities, to persons or to things; a person's mind is in a *diseased* state when it is under the influence of corrupt passions or principles; society is in a *diseased* state when it is overgrown with wealth and luxury.

He was not so *sick* of his master as of his work. L'ESTRANGE.

There affectation, with a *sickly* mien,
Shows in her cheek the roses of eighteen. POPE.

For a mind *diseased* with vain longings after
unattainable advantages, no medicine can be prescribed. JOHNSON.

While the distempers of a relaxed fibre prognosticate all the *morbid* force of convulsion in the body of the state, the steadiness of the physician is overpowered by the very aspect of the disease. BURKE.

SICKNESS, ILLNESS, INDISPOSITION.

SICKNESS denotes the state of being *sick* (*v. Sick*): ILLNESS that of being *ill* (*v. Evil*): INDISPOSITION that of being not well disposed. *Sickness* denotes the state generally or particularly; *illness* denotes it particularly: we speak of *sickness* as opposed to good health; in *sickness* or in health; but of the *illness* of a particular person: when *sickness* is said of the individual, it designates a protracted state; a person may be said to have much *sickness* in his family. *Illness* denotes only a particular or partial *sickness*: a person is said to have had an *illness* at this or that time, in this or that place, for this or that period. *Indisposition* is a slight *illness*, such a one as is capable of deranging him either in his enjoyments or in his business; colds are the ordinary causes of *indisposition*.

Sickness is a sort of earthly old age; it teaches us a diffidence in our earthly state. POPE.

This is the first letter that I have ventured upon, which will be written, I fear, *vacillantis literis*; as Tully says, Tyro's letters were after his recovery from an *illness*. ATTERBURY.

It is not, as you conceive, an *indisposition* of body, but the mind's disease. FORD.

SIGN, SIGNAL.

SIGN and SIGNAL are both derived from the same source (*v. Mark, sign*), and the latter is but a species of the former. The *sign* enables us to recognize an object; it is, therefore, sometimes natural; *signal* serves to give warning; it is always arbitrary. The movements which are visible in the countenance are commonly the *signs* of what passes in the heart; the beat of the drum is the *signal* for soldiers to repair to their post. We converse with those who are present by *signs*; we make ourselves understood by those who are at a distance by means of *signals*.

The nod that ratifies the will divine,
The faithful, fix'd, irrevocable *sign*,
This seals thy suit. POPE.

Then first the trembling earth the *signal* gave,
And flashing fires enlighten all the cave. DRYDEN.

SIGNAL, MEMORABLE.

SIGNAL signifies serving as a sign, MEMORABLE signifies worthy to be remembered. They both express the idea of extraordinary, or being distinguished from every other thing: whatever is *signal* deserves to be stamped on the mind, and to serve as a sign of some property or characteristic; whatever is *memorable* impresses upon the memory, and refuses to be forgotten: the former applies to the moral character; the latter to events and times: the Scriptures furnish us with many *signal* instances of God's vengeance against impenitent sinners, as also of his favor toward those who obey his will; the Reformation is a *memorable* event in the annals of ecclesiastical history.

We find, in the Acts of the Apostles, not only no opposition to Christianity from the Pharisees, but several *signal* occasions in which they assisted their first teachers. WOTTON.

That such deliverances are actually afforded, those three *memorable* examples of Abimelech, Esau, and Balaam sufficiently demonstrate. SOUTH.

TO SIGNALIZE, DISTINGUISH.

TO SIGNALIZE, or make one's self a sign of anything, is a much stronger term

than simply to DISTINGUISH; it is in the power of many to do the latter, but few only have the power of effecting the former: the English have always *signalized* themselves for their unconquerable valor in battle; there is no nation that has not *distinguished* itself, at some period or another, in war.

The knight of La Mancha gravely recounts to his companion the adventures by which he is to *signalize* himself. JOHNSON.

The valued file
Distinguishes the swift, the slow, the subtle. SHAKESPEARE.

SIGNIFICANT, EXPRESSIVE.

THE SIGNIFICANT is that which serves as a sign; the EXPRESSIVE is that which speaks out or declares; the latter is therefore a stronger term than the former: a look is *significant* when it is made to *express* an idea that passes in the mind; but it is *expressive* when it is made to *express* a feeling of the whole mind or heart: looks are but occasionally *significant*, but the countenance may be habitually *expressive*. *Significant* is applied in an indifferent sense, according to the nature of the thing signified; but *expressive* is always applied to that which is good: a *significant* look may convey a very bad idea; but an *expressive* countenance always *expresses* good feeling.

I could not help giving my friend the merchant a *significant* look upon this occasion. CUMBERLAND.

Through her *expressive* eyes her soul distinctly spoke. LITTLETON.

The distinction between these words is the same when applied to things as to persons: a word is *significant* of whatever it is made to signify, but a word is *expressive* according to the force with which it conveys an idea. The term *significant*, in this case, simply explains the nature; but the epithet *expressive* characterizes it as something good: technical terms are *significant* only of the precise ideas which belong to the art; most languages have some terms which are peculiarly *expressive*, and consequently adapted for poetry.

Common life is full of this kind of *significant* expressions, by knocking, beckoning, frowning, and pointing. HOLDER.

The English, madam, particularly what we call the plain English, is a very copious and *expressive* language. RICHARDSON.

SIGNIFICATION, MEANING, IMPORT, SENSE.

THE SIGNIFICATION (*v. To express*) is that which is signified to another; the MEANING is that which the person means to express: this latter word, therefore, is properly used in connection with the person *meaning*.

A lie consists in this, that it is a false *signification* knowingly and voluntarily used. SOUTH.

When beyond her expectation I hit upon her *meaning*, I can perceive a sudden cloud of disappointment spread over her face. JOHNSON.

The *signification* of a word is that which it is made to signify, and the *meaning* is that which it is meant to express: in this sense, therefore, we may indifferently say the proper, improper, metaphorical, general, etc., *signification* or *meaning* of words; but, in reference to individuals, *meaning* is more proper than *signification*, as to convey a *meaning*, to attach a *meaning* to a word, and not to convey or attach a *signification*.

It was very frequent to dedicate their enemy's armor and hang it in their temples, but the Lacedæmonians were forbidden this custom, which perhaps may be the *meaning* of Cleomenes's reply.

On the other hand, it is more appropriate to say a literal *signification* than a literal *meaning*.

The use of the word minister is brought down to the literal *signification* of it, a servant; for now to serve and to minister, servile and ministerial, are terms equivalent. SOUTH.

There is also this further distinction between *signify* and *mean*, that the latter is applied in its proper sense to things as well as words.

What *means* this shouting? SHAKESPEARE.

IMPORT, from *im* or *in* and *porto*, to carry, signifying that which is carried or conveyed to the understanding, is most allied to *signification*, inasmuch as it is applied to single words. The *signification* may include the whole or any part of what is understood by a word; the *import* is the whole that is comprehended under a word. The *signification* of words may be learned by definition, but their full *import* can be collected only from examples.

To draw near to God is an expression of awful and mysterious *import*. BLAIR.

SENSE (*v. Feeling*), signifying that which is perceived by the senses, is most nearly allied to the word *meaning*, inasmuch as they both refer to the mind of the individual; but the *sense* being that which is rational and consistent with *sense*, is that which is taken or admitted abstractedly.

Satan, in tempting our Lord, separated the word "stone" from its metaphorical *meaning*, to change the *sense* of the promise and promote his own malicious intentions. JONES.

It is no hard matter for witty men to put perverse *senses* on Scripture to favor their heretical doctrines. SHERLOCK.

TO SIGNIFY, IMPLY.

SIGNIFY, *v. To express*. IMPLY, from the Latin *implico*, to fold in, signifies to fold or involve an idea in any object.

These terms may be employed either as respects actions or words. In the first case *signify* is the act of the person making known by means of a *sign*, as we *signify* our approbation by a look; *imply* marks the value or force of the action; our assent is *implied* in our silence. When applied to words or marks, *signify* denotes the positive and established act of the thing; *imply* is its relative act: a word *signifies* whatever it is made literally to stand for; it *implies* that which it stands for figuratively or morally. The term house *signifies* that which is constructed for a dwelling; the term residence *implies* something superior to a house. A cross, thus, +, *signifies* addition in arithmetic or algebra; a long stroke, thus —, with a break in the text of a work, *implies* that the whole sentence is not completed. It frequently happens that words which *signify* nothing particular in themselves may be made to *imply* a great deal by the tone, the manner, and the connection.

Words *signify* not immediately and primarily things themselves, but the conceptions of the mind concerning things. SOUTH.

Pleasure *implies* a proportion and agreement to the respective states and conditions of men. SOUTH.

TO SIGNIFY, AVAIL.

SIGNIFY (*v. To signify*) is here employed with regard to events of life, and their relative importance. AVAIL (*v. To avail*) is never used otherwise. That

which a thing *signifies* is what it contains; if it *signifies* nothing, it contains nothing, and is worth nothing; if it *signifies* much, it contains much, or is worth much. That which *avails* produces; if it *avails* nothing, it produces nothing, is of no use; if it *avails* much, it produces or is worth much. We consider the end as to its *signification*, and the means as to their *avail*. Although it is of little or no *signification* to a man what becomes of his remains, yet no one can be reconciled to the idea of leaving them to be exposed to contempt; words are but too often of little *avail* to curb the unruly wills of children.

As for wonders, what *signifieth* telling us of them? CUMBERLAND.

What *avail* a parcel of statutes against gaming, when they who make them conspire together for the infraction of them? CUMBERLAND.

SILENCE, TACITURNITY.

The Latins have the two verbs *sileo* and *taceo*: the former of which is interpreted by some to signify to cease to speak; and the latter not to begin to speak; others maintain the direct contrary. According to the present use of the words, SILENCE expresses less than TACITURNITY: the *silent* man seldom speaks, the *taciturn* man will not speak at all. The Latins designated the most profound *silence* by the epithet of *taciturna silentia*.

Taciturnity is always of some duration, arising either from necessity or from a particular frame of mind.

Pythagoras enjoined his scholars an absolute *silence* for a long novitiate. I am far from approving such a *taciturnity*; but I highly approve the end and intent of Pythagoras's injunction. EARL OF CHATHAM.

I have talked more already than I have formerly done in three visits. You remember my *taciturnity*, never to be forgotten by those who knew me. COWPER.

Silence always supposes something occasional that is adopted to suit the convenience of the party.

Silence is the perfectest herald of joy: I were but little happy, if I could say how much. SHAKESPEARE.

SILENT, TACIT.

SILENT (*v. Silence*) characterizes either the person or the thing: a person

is *silent* as opposed to one that talks; a place is *silent* as opposed to one that is noisy. TACIT (*v. Silence*) characterizes only the act of the person; a person gives a *tacit* consent, or there was a *tacit* agreement between the parties.

The people beheld the violence of their conduct in *silent* fright, internally disapproving, yet not daring to avow their detestation. GOLDSMITH.

In elective governments there is a *tacit* covenant that the king of their own making shall make his makers princes. L'ESTRANGE.

SILENT, DUMB, MUTE, SPEECHLESS.

Not speaking is the common idea included in the signification of these terms, which differ either in the cause or the circumstance: SILENT (*v. Silence*) is altogether an indefinite and general term, expressing little more than the common idea. We may be *silent* because we will not speak, or we may be *silent* because we cannot speak; but in distinction from the other terms it is always employed in the former case. DUMB, from the German *dumm*, stupid or idiotic, denotes a physical incapacity to speak: hence persons are said to be born *dumb*; they may likewise be *dumb* from temporary physical causes, as from grief, shame, and the like, a person may be struck *dumb*. MUTE, in Latin *mutus*, Greek *μῦτος*, from *μῦω*, to shut, signifies a shut mouth, a temporary disability to speak from arbitrary and incidental causes: hence the office of *mutes*, or of persons who engage not to speak for a certain time; and, in like manner, persons are said to be *mute* who dare not give utterance to their thoughts.

But *silent*, breathing rage, resolv'd and skill'd
By mutual aid to fix a doubtful field,
Swift march the Greeks. POPE.

The truth of it is, half the great talkers in the nation would be struck *dumb* were this fountain of discourse (party lies) dried up. ADDISON.

Long *mute* he stood, and, leaning on his staff,
His wonder witness'd with an idiot laugh. DRYDEN.

SPEECHLESS, or void of speech, denotes a physical incapacity to speak from incidental causes; as when a person falls down *speechless* in an apoplectic fit, or in consequence of a violent contusion.

But who can paint the lover as he stood,
Pierc'd by severe amazement, hating life,
Speechless, and fix'd in all the death of woe? THOMSON.

The terms *silent*, *mute*, and *dumb* are also applied to things as well as persons, the former two in the sense of not sending forth a sound; as the *silent* grove, a *mute* tongue, or a *mute* letter: *dumb*, in the sense of being without words; as *dumb* show.

And just before the confines of the wood,
The gliding Lethe leads her *silent* flood.

DRYDEN.

'Tis listening fear and *dumb* amazement all.

THOMSON.

Mute was his tongue, and upright stood his hair.

DRYDEN.

SIMILE, SIMILITUDE, COMPARISON.

SIMILE and SIMILITUDE are both drawn from the Latin *similis*, like: the former signifying the thing that is like, the latter either the thing that is like, or the quality of being like: in the former sense only it is to be compared with *simile*, when employed as a figure of speech or thought; everything is a *simile* which associates objects together on account of any real or supposed likeness between them; but a *similitude* signifies a prolonged or continued *simile*. The latter may be expressed in a few words, as when we say the godlike Achilles; but the former enters into minute circumstances of COMPARISON, as when Homer compares any of his heroes fighting and defending themselves against multitudes to lions who are attacked by dogs and men. Every *simile* is more or less a *comparison*, but every comparison is not a *simile*: the latter compares things only as far as they are alike, but the former extends to those things which are different: in this manner, there may be a *comparison* between large things and small, although there can be no good *simile*.

There are also several noble *similes* and allusions in the first book of Paradise Lost.

ADDISON.

Such as have a natural bent to solitude (to carry on the former *similitude*) are like waters which may be forced into fountains.

POPE.

Your image of worshipping once a year in a certain place, in imitation of the Jews, is but a *comparison* and *simile non est idem*.

JOHNSON.

SIMPLE, SINGLE, SINGULAR.

SIMPLE, in Latin *simplex* or *sine plicā*, without a fold, is opposed to the complex,

which has many folds, or to the compound, which has several parts involved or connected with each other. SINGLE and SINGULAR (*v. One*) are opposed, one to double, and the other to multifarious. We may speak of a *simple* circumstance as independent of anything; of a *single* instance or circumstance as unaccompanied by any other; and a *singular* instance as one that rarely has its like. In the moral application to the person, *simplicity*, as far as it is opposed to duplicity in the heart, can never be excessive: but when it lies in the head, so that it cannot penetrate the folds and doublings of other persons, it is a fault. *Singleness* of heart and intention is that species of *simplicity* which is altogether to be admired: *singularity* may be either good or bad according to circumstances; to be *singular* in virtue is to be truly good; but to be *singular* in manner is affectation, which is at variance with genuine *simplicity*, if not directly opposed to it.

Nothing extraneous must cleave to the eye in the act of seeing; its bare object must be as naked as truth, as *simple* and unmixed as sincerity.

SOUTH.

Mankind with other animals compare,
Single, how weak and impotent they are!

JENYNS.

From the union of the crowns to the Revolution in 1688, Scotland was placed in a political situation the most *singular* and most unhappy.

ROBERTSON.

SIMPLE, SILLY, FOOLISH.

THE SIMPLE (*v. Simple*), when applied to the understanding, implies such a contracted power as is incapable of combination; SILLY, which is but a variation of *simple*, and FOOLISH, *i. e.*, like a fool, rise in sense upon the former, signifying either the perversion or the total deficiency of understanding; the behavior of a person may be *silly* who from any excess of feeling loses his sense of propriety; the conduct of a person will be *foolish* who has not judgment to direct himself. Country people may be *simple* owing to their want of knowledge; children will be *silly* in company if they have too much liberty given to them; there are some persons who never acquire wisdom enough to prevent them from committing *foolish* errors.

And had the *simple* natives

Observ'd his sage advice,
Their wealth and fame some years ago
Had reach'd above the skies.

SWIFT.

Two gods a *silly* woman have undone.

DRYDEN.

Virgil justly thought it a *foolish* figure for a grave man to be overtaken by death, while he was weighing the cadence of words and measuring verses.

WALSH.

SIMULATION, DISSIMULATION.

SIMULATION, from *similis*, is the making one's self like what one is not; and DISSIMULATION, from *dissimilis*, unlike, is the making one's self appear unlike what one really is. The hypocrite puts on the *semblance* of virtue to recommend himself to the virtuous; the *disssembler* conceals his vices when he wants to gain the simple or ignorant to his side.

Simulation is a pretence of what is not, and *dissimulation* is a concealment of what is.

TATLER.

He would never suffer any man to depart from him with an opinion that he was inclined to gratify him, when in truth he was not holding that *dissimulation* to be the worst sort of lying.

CLARENDON.

SINCERE, HONEST, TRUE, PLAIN.

SINCERE (*v. Candid*) is here the most comprehensive term: HONEST (*v. Honesty*), TRUE, and PLAIN (*v. Even*) are but modes of *sincerity*.

Sincerity is a fundamental characteristic of the person; *honesty* is but a part of *sincerity*, it denotes simply the absence of intentional or fraudulent concealment; we look for a *sincere* friend to tell us everything; we look for an *honest* companion who will speak without disguise; truth is a characteristic of *sincerity*, for a *sincere* friend is a *true* friend; but *sincerity* is, properly speaking, only a mode of truth. *Sincere* and *honest* are personal characteristics; *true* is a characteristic of the thing, as a *sincere* man, an *honest* confession, a *true* statement.

The more *sincere* you are, the better it will fare with you at the great day of account. In the mean time give us leave to be *sincere* too in condemning heartily what we disapprove.

WATERLAND.

He never applies to the passions or prejudices of his audience: when they listen with attention and *honest* minds, he never fails of carrying his point.

ADDISON.

Fear not my *truth*; the moral of my wit
Is *plain* and *true*.

SHAKESPEARE.

A *sincere* man must needs be *plain*, because *plainness* consists in an unvarnished style; and the *sincere* man will always adopt that mode of speech which expresses his sentiments most truly; but a person may be occasionally *plain* in his speech who is not so from *sincerity*. The *plain*, whether it respects the language or the conduct, is that which is divested of everything extraneous or artificial, and so far *plainness* is an auxiliary to *truth*, by enabling the *truth* to be better seen.

Poetical ornaments destroy that character of *truth* and *plainness* which ought to characterize history.

REYNOLDS.

SITUATION, CONDITION, STATE, PRECIPITATION, FLIGHT, CASE.

SITUATION (*v. Place*) is said generally of objects as they respect others; CONDITION (*v. Condition*), as they respect themselves: our *situation* consists of those external circumstances in respect of property, honor, liberty, and the like, which affect our standing in society generally. Whatever affects our person immediately is our *condition*: a person who is unable to pay a sum of money to save himself from a prison is in a bad *situation*: a traveller who is left in a ditch robbed and wounded is in a bad *condition*.

The man who has a character of his own is little changed by varying his *situation*.

Mrs. MONTAGUE.

It is indeed not easy to prescribe a successful manner of approach to the distressed or necessitous, whose *condition* subjects every kind of behavior equally to miscarriage.

JOHNSON.

Situation and *condition* are said of that which is contingent and changeable, the latter still more so than the former; STATE, from *sto*, signifying that position in which one stands, is said of that which is comparatively stable or established. A tradesman is in a good *situation* who is in the way of carrying on a good trade: his affairs are in a good *state* if he is enabled to answer every demand and to keep up his credit. Hence it is that we speak of the *state* of health and the *state* of the mind, not the *situation* or *condition*, because the body and mind are considered as to their general frame, and not as to any relative or particular circumstances; so likewise a *state* of infancy, a *state* of guilt, a *state* of innocence,