

and the like; but not either a *situation* or a *condition*.

Your *situation* is an odd one; the duchess is your treasurer, and Mr. Pope tells me you are the duke's.

SWIFT.

Patience itself is one virtue by which we are prepared for that *state* in which evil shall be no more.

JOHNSON.

When speaking of bodies, there is the same distinction in the terms as in regard to individuals. An army may be either in a *situation*, a *condition*, or a *state*. An army that is on service may be in a critical *situation* with respect to the enemy and its own comparative weakness; it may be in a deplorable *condition* if it stand in need of provisions and necessities: an army that is at home will be in a good or bad *state*, according to the regulations of the commander-in-chief. Of a prince who is threatened with invasion from foreign enemies, and with a rebellion from his subjects, we should not say that his *condition*, but his *situation*, was critical. Of a prince, however, who like Alfred was obliged to fly, and to seek safety in disguise and poverty, we should speak of his hard *condition*: the *state* of a prince cannot be spoken of, but the *state* of his affairs and government may; hence, likewise, *state* may with most propriety be said of a nation: but *situation* seldom, unless in respect to other nations, and *condition* never. On the other hand, when speaking of the poor, we seldom employ the term *situation*, because they are seldom considered as a body in relation to other bodies: we mostly speak of their *condition* as better or worse, according as they have more or less of the comforts of life; and of their *state* as regards their moral habits.

No *situation* could be more unfavorable than that in which it (the army) found itself.

GOLDSMITH.

And oh! what man's *condition* can be worse Than his whom plenty starves, and blessings curse?
The beggars but a common fate deplore,
The rich poor man's emphatically poor.

COWLEY.

Relate what Latium was;
Declare the past and present *state* of things.

DRYDEN.

These terms may likewise be applied to inanimate objects; and, upon the same

grounds, a house is in a good *situation* as respects the surrounding objects; it is in a good or bad *condition* as respects the painting, and exterior altogether; it is in a bad *state* as respects the beams, plaster, roof, and interior structure altogether. The hand of a watch is in a different *situation* every hour; the watch itself may be in a bad *condition* if the wheels are clogged with dirt; but in a good *state* if the works are altogether sound and fit for service.

We have been admiring the wonderful strength of this place both by nature and art; it is certainly the happiest *situation* that can be imagined.

BRYDNE.

Six of the houses of her ancestors were in ruins. The church of Skipton, in consequence of the damage it had sustained during the siege of the castle, was in little better *condition*.

WHITAKER.

There are many remains of antiquity in this city, indeed most of them are in a very ruinous *state*.

BRYDNE.

Situation and *condition* are either permanent or temporary. The PREDICAMENT, from the Latin *predico*, to assert or declare, signifies the committing one's self by an assertion; and, when applied to circumstances, it expresses a temporary embarrassed *situation* occasioned by an act of one's own: hence we always speak of bringing ourselves into a *predicament*. PLIGHT, contracted from the Latin *plicatus*, participle of *plico*, to fold, signifies any circumstance in which one is disagreeably entangled; and CASE (*v. Case*) signifies anything which may befall us, or into which we fall, mostly, though not necessarily, contrary to our inclination. Those latter two terms, therefore, denote a species of temporary *condition*, for they both express that which happens to the object itself, without reference to any other. A person is in an unpleasant *situation* who is shut up in a stage-coach with disagreeable company. He is in an awkward *predicament* when, in attempting to please one friend, he displeases another. He may be in a wretched *plight* if he is overturned in a stage at night, and at a distance from any habitation. He will be in evil *case* if he is compelled to put up with a spare and poor diet.

Satan beheld their *plight*,
And to his mates thus in derision call'd.

MILTON.

The offender's life lies in the mercy
Of the duke only, 'gainst all other voice,
In which *predicament* I say thou stand'st.

SHAKESPEARE.

Our *case* is like that of a traveller upon the Alps who should fancy that the top of the next hill must end his journey because it terminates his prospect.

ADDISON.

SIZE, MAGNITUDE, GREATNESS, BULK.

SIZE, from the Latin *cisus* and *caedo*, to cut, signifying that which is cut or framed according to a certain proportion, is a general term including all manner of dimension or measurement; MAGNITUDE, from the Latin *magnitudo*, answering literally to the English word GREATNESS, is employed in science or in an abstract sense to denote some specific measurement; *greatness* is an unscientific term applied in the same sense to objects in general: *size* is indefinite, it never characterizes anything either as large or small; but *magnitude* and *greatness* always suppose something *great*; and BULK (*v. Bulky*) denotes a considerable degree of *greatness*: things which are diminutive in *size* will often have an extraordinary degree of beauty, or some other adventitious perfection to compensate the deficiency; astronomers have classed the stars according to their different *magnitudes*; *greatness* has been considered as one source of the sublime; *bulk* is that species of *greatness* which destroys the symmetry, and consequently the beauty, of objects.

Soon grows the pigmy to gigantic *size*.

DRYDEN.

Then form'd the moon
Globose, and every *magnitude* of stars.

MILTON.

Awe is the first sentiment that rises in the mind at the view of God's *greatness*.
His huge *bulk* on seven high volumes roll'd.

BLAIR.
DRYDEN.

SKETCH, OUTLINES.

A SKETCH may form a whole; OUTLINES are but a part: the *sketch* may comprehend the *outlines*, and some of the particulars; *outlines*, as the term bespeaks, comprehend only the line on the exterior: the *sketch*, in drawing, may serve as a landscape, as it presents some of the features of a country; but the *outlines* serve only as bounding lines, within which the *sketch* may be formed. So in the mor-

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al application, we speak of the *sketches* of countries, characters, manners, and the like, which serve as a description; but of the *outlines* of a plan, of a work, a project, and the like, which serve as a basis on which the subordinate parts are to be formed: barbarous nations present us with rude *sketches* of nature; an abridgment is little more than the *outlines* of a larger work.

In few, to close the whole,
The moral muse has shadow'd out a *sketch*.
Of most our weakness needs believe or do.

YOUNG.

This is the *outline* of the fable.

JOHNSON.

SKIN, HIDE, PEEL, RIND.

SKIN, which is in German *schin*, Swedish *skinn*, Danish *skind*, probably connected with the Greek *σκηρος*, a tent or covering, is the term in most general use; it is applicable both to human creatures and to animals: HIDE, in Saxon *hyd*, German *haut*, Low German *huth*, Latin *cutis*, from the same root as the Greek *κευθειν*, to *hide*, cover, is used only for the *skins* of large animals: we speak of the *skins* of birds or insects; but of the *hides* of oxen or horses and other animals, which are to be separated from the body and converted into leather. *Skin* is equally applied to the inanimate and the animate world; but PEEL, in German *fell*, etc., Latin *pellis*, a skin, in Greek *φελλος* or *φλοιος*, bark, which is from *φλω*, to burst or crack, because bark is easily broken, and RIND, in all probability changed from round, signifying that which goes round and envelops, belong only to inanimate objects: the *skin* is generally said of that which is interior, in distinction from the exterior, which is the *peel*: an orange has both its *peel* and its thin *skin* underneath; an apple, a pear, and the like, has a *peel*. The *peel* is a soft substance on the outside; the *rind* is generally interior, and of a harder substance: in regard to a stick, we speak of its *peel* and its inner *skin*; in regard to a tree, we speak of its bark and its *rind*: hence, likewise, the term *rind* is applied to cheese, and other incrustated substances that envelop bodies.

The priest on *skins* of offerings takes his ease,
And nightly visions in his slumbers sees.

DRYDEN

The body is covered with a strong *hide* exactly resembling leather.

On twigs of hawthorn he regal'd,
On pippins' russet peel.

As when the stock and grafted twig combin'd,
Shoot up the same and wear a common rind.

SLACK, LOOSE.

SLACK, in Saxon *slaec*, Low German *slack*, French *lache*, Latin *laxus*, and LOOSE, in Saxon *laes*, both from the Hebrew *halatz*, to make free or loose, differ more in application than in sense: they are both opposed to that which is close bound; but *slack* is said only of that which is tied, or that with which anything is tied; while *loose* is said of any substances, the parts of which do not adhere closely: a rope is *slack* in opposition to the tight rope, which is stretched to its full extent; and in general cords or strings are said to be *slack* which fail in the requisite degree of tightness; but they are said to be *loose* in an indefinite manner, without conveying any collateral idea: thus the string of an instrument is denominated *slack* rather than *loose*; on the other hand, *loose* is said of many bodies to which the word *slack* cannot be applied: a garment is *loose*, but not *slack*; the leg of a table is *loose*, but not *slack*.

The vein in the arm is that which Aretæus commonly opens; and he gives a particular caution in this case to make a *slack* compression, for fear of producing a convulsion.

War wearied hath perform'd what war can do,
And to disorder'd rage let loose the reins.

In the moral application, that which admits of additional activity is denominated *slack*; and that which fails in consistency and close adherence is *loose*: trade is *slack*, or a person's zeal, etc., becomes *slack*; but an engagement is *loose*, and principles are *loose*.

Nor were it just, would he resume that shape,
That *slack* devotion should his thunder scape.

Nor fear that he who sits so loose to life,
Should too much shun its labors and its strife.

TO SLANT, SLOPE.

SLANT is probably a variation of *leaned*, and SLOPE of *slip*, expressive of a sideward movement or direction: they are the same in sense, but different in application: *slant* is said of small bodies

only; *slope* is said indifferently of all bodies, large and small: a book may be made to *slant* by lying in part on another book on a desk or a table; but a piece of ground is said to *slope*.

Justling or push'd with winds, rude in their shock,
Fire the slant lightning.

Its uplands *stopping* deck the mountain's side.

TO SLEEP, SLUMBER, DOZE, DROWSE, NAP.

SLEEP, in Saxon *slæpan*, low German *slap*, German *schlaf*, is supposed to come from the low German *slap* or *slack*, *slack*, because *sleep* denotes an entire relaxation of the physical frame. SLUMBER, in Saxon *slumeran*, etc., is but an intensive verb of *schlummern*, which is a variation from the preceding *slæpan*, etc. DOZE, in low German *dusen*, in all probability comes from the same root as the Latin *dormio*, to sleep. DROWSE is a variation of *doze*. NAP is in all probability a variation of *nob* and *nod*.

Sleep is the general term, which designates in an indefinite manner that state of the body to which all animated beings are subject at certain seasons in the course of nature; to *slumber* is to sleep lightly and softly; to *doze* is to incline to sleep, or to begin sleeping; to *nap* is to sleep for a time: every one who is not indisposed sleeps during the night; those who are accustomed to wake at a certain hour of the morning commonly *slumber* only after that time; there are many who, though they cannot sleep in a carriage, will yet be obliged to *doze* if they travel in the night; in hot climates the middle of the day is commonly chosen for a *nap*.

From carelessness it shall fall into a *slumber*,
and from a *slumber* it shall settle into a deep and long *sleep*.

There was no sleeping under his roof; if he happened to *doze* a little, the jolly cobbler waked him.

He *drowsed* upon his couch.

And see! delighted, down he drops, secure
Of sweet refreshment, ease without annoy,
A luscious noonday *nap*.

SLEEPY, DROWSY, LETHARGIC.

SLEEPY (*v. To sleep*) expresses either a temporary or a permanent state:

DROWSY, which comes from the low German *drusen*, and is a variation of *doze* (*v. To sleep*), expresses mostly a temporary state; LETHARGIC, from *lethargy*, in Latin *lethargia*, Greek *ληθαργια*, compounded of *ληθη*, forgetfulness, and *αργος*, swift, signifying a proneness to forgetfulness or sleep, describes a permanent or habitual state.

Sleepy, as a temporary state, expresses also what is natural or reasonable; *drowsiness* expresses an inclination to sleep at unseasonable hours; it is natural to be *sleepy* at the hour when we are accustomed to retire to rest; it is common to be *drowsy* when sitting still after dinner. *Sleepiness*, as a permanent state, is an infirmity to which some persons are subject constitutionally; *lethargy* is a disease with which people, otherwise the most wakeful, may be occasionally attacked.

She wak'd her *sleepy* crew,
And, rising hasty, took a short adieu.

Drowsy am I, and yet can rarely sleep.

Too long Jove lull'd us in *lethargic* charms,
But now in peals of thunder calls to arms.

TO SLIP, SLIDE, GLIDE.

SLIP is in low German *slipan*, Latin *labor*, to slip, and *libo*, to pour, Greek *λειβουσαι*, to pour down as water does, and the Hebrew *salap*, to turn aside. SLIDE is a variation of *slip*, and GLIDE of *slide*.

To *slip* is an involuntary, and *slide* a voluntary, motion: those who go on the ice in fear will *slip*; boys *slide* on the ice by way of amusement. To *slip* and *slide* are lateral movements of the feet; but to *glide* is the movement of the whole body, and just that easy motion which is made by *slipping*, *sliding*, flying, or swimming: a person *glides* along the surface of the ice when he *slides*; a vessel *glides* along through the water.

A skilful dancer *slips* willingly, and makes a seeming stumble that you may think him in great danger.

Thessander bold, and Sthenelus their guide,
And dire Ulysses down the cable *slide*.

And softly let the running waters *glide*.

In the moral and figurative applica-

tion, a person *slips* who commits unin-

tentional errors; he *slides* into a course of life who wittingly, and yet without difficulty, falls into the practice and habits which are recommended; he *glides* through life if he pursues his course smoothly and without interruption.

Every one finds that many of the ideas which he desired to retain have irretrievably *slipped* away.

Nor could they have *slid* into those brutish immoralities of life had they duly manured those first practical notions and dictates of right reason.

May plod it in a week, why may not I
Glide thither in a day?

SLOW, DILATORY, TARDY, TEDIOUS.

SLOW is doubtless connected with *sloth* and *slide*, which kind of motion when walking is the *slowest* and the *laziest*. DILATORY, from the Latin *defero*, *dilatatus*, to defer, signifies prone to defer. TARDY, from the Latin *tardus*, signifies literally slow. TEDIOUS, from the Latin *tedium*, weariness, signifies causing weariness.

Slow is a general and unqualified term applicable to the motion of any object, or to the motions and actions of persons in particular, and to their dispositions also; *dilatory* relates to the disposition only of persons: we are *slow* in what we are about; we are *dilatory* in setting about a thing. *Slow* is applied to corporeal or mental actions; a person may be *slow* in walking, or *slow* in conceiving; *tardy* is applicable to mental actions; we are *tardy* in our proceedings or our progress; we are *tardy* in making up accounts or in concluding a treaty. We may be *slow* with propriety or not, to our own inconvenience or that of others; when we are *tedious* we are always so improperly: "To be *slow* and sure" is a vulgar proverb, but a great truth; by this we do ourselves good, and inconvenience no one; but he who is *tedious* is *slow* to the annoyance of others: a prolix writer must always be *tedious*, for he keeps the reader long in suspense before he comes to the conclusion of a period.

The powers above are *slow*

In punishing, and should not we resemble them?

A *dilatory* temper is unfit for a place of trust.

The swains and *tardy* neat-herds came, and
last
Menalcas, wet with beating winter-mast.

DRYDEN.

Her sympathizing lover takes his stand
High on th' opponent bank, and ceaseless sings
The *tedious* time away.

THOMSON.

TO SMEAR, DAUB.

To SMEAR is literally to do over with *smear*, in Saxon *smær*, German *schmeer*, in Greek *μυρος*, a salve. To DAUB, from *do* and *ub*, *über*, over, signifies literally to do over with anything unseemly, or in an unsightly manner.

To *smear* in the literal sense is applied to such substances as may be rubbed like grease over a body; if said of grease itself, it may be proper, as coachmen *smear* the coach-wheels with tar or grease; but if said of anything else, it is an improper action, and tends to disfigure, as children *smear* their hands with ink, or *smear* their clothes with dirt. To *smear* and *daub* are both actions which tend to disfigure; but we *smear* by means of rubbing over; we *daub* by rubbing, throwing, or any way covering over: thus a child *smears* the window with his finger, or he *daubs* the wall with dirt.

Smear'd as she was with black Gorgonian blood,
The fury sprang above the Stygian flood.

DRYDEN.

He's honest, though *daub'd* with the dust of the mill.

CUNNINGHAM.

By a figurative application, *smear* is applied to bad writing, or whatever is soiled or contaminated, and *daub* to bad painting, or to whatever is executed coarsely or clumsily: indifferent writers who wish to excel are fond of retouching their letters until they make their performance a sad *smear*; bad artists, who are injudicious in the use of their pencil, load their paintings with color, and convert them into *daubs*.

Why had I not, with charitable hand,
Took up a beggar's issue at my gates?
Who, *smear'd* thus, and mir'd with infamy,
I might have said no part of it is mine.

SHAKESPEARE.

In truth the age demanded nothing correct,
nothing complete; capable of tasting the power
of Dryden's numbers, and the majesty of Knel-
ler's heads, it overlooked doggerel and *daubing*.

WALPOLE.

SMELL, SCENT, ODOR, PERFUME, FRAGRANCE.

SMELL and melt are in all probability connected together, because *smells* arise from the evaporation of bodies. SCENT, changed from *sent*, comes from the Latin *sentio*, to perceive or feel. ODOR, in Latin *odor*, comes from *oleo*, in Greek *ὄζω*, to smell. PERFUME, compounded of *per* or *pro*, and *fumo* or *fumus*, a smoke or vapor, that is, the vapor that issues forth. FRAGRANCE, in Latin *fragrantia*, comes from *fragro*, anciently *frago*, that is, to *perfume* or *smell* like the *fraga* or strawberry.

Smell and *scent* are said either of that which receives, or that which gives the *smell*; the *odor*, the *perfume*, and *fragrance*, of that which communicates the *smell*. In the first case, *smell* is said generally of all living things without distinction; *scent* is said only of such animals as have this peculiar faculty of tracing objects by their *smell*: some persons have a much quicker *smell* than others, and some have an acuter *smell* of particular objects than they have of things in general: dogs are remarkable for their quickness of *scent*, by which they can trace their masters and other objects at an immense distance; other animals are gifted with this faculty to a surprising degree, which serves them as a means of defence against their enemies.

Next in the nostrils she doth use the *smell*;
As God the breath of life in them did give,
So makes he now his power in them to dwell,
To judge all airs, whereby we breathe and live.

DAVIES.

Its (the dog's) *scent* is exquisite, when his nose is moist.

PENNANT.

In the second case, *smell* and *scent* are compared with *odor*, *perfume*, and *fragrance*, either as respects the objects communicating the *smell*, or the nature of the *smell* which is communicated. *Smell* is indefinite in its sense, and universal in its application; *scent*, *odor*, *perfume*, and *fragrance* are species of *smell*: every object is said to *smell* which acts on the olfactory nerves; flowers, fruits, woods, earth, water, and the like, have a *smell*; *scent* is most commonly applied to the *smell* which proceeds from animal bodies; the *odor* is said of that which is artificial or extraneous; the *perfume* and

fragrance of that which is natural: the burning of things produces an *odor*; the *perfume* and *fragrance* arises from flowers or sweet-smelling herbs, spices, and the like. The terms *smell* and *odor* do not specify the exact nature of that which issues from bodies; they may both be either pleasant or unpleasant; but *smell*, if taken in certain connections, signifies a bad *smell*, and *odor* signifies that which is sweet: meat which is kept too long will have a *smell*, that is, of course, a bad *smell*; the *odors* from a sacrifice are acceptable, that is, the sweet *odors* ascend to heaven. *Perfume* is properly a wide-spreading *smell*, and when taken without any epithet signifies a pleasant *smell*; *fragrance* never signifies anything but what is good; it is the sweetest and most powerful *perfume*: the *perfume* from flowers and shrubs is as grateful to one sense as their colors and conformation are to the other; the *fragrance* from groves of myrtle and orange trees surpasses the beauty of their fruits or foliage.

All sweet *smells* have joined with them some
earthy or crude *odors*.

BACON.

Then curses his conspiring feet, whose *scent*
Betrays that safety which their swiftness lent.

DENHAM.

So flowers are gathered to adorn a grave,
To lose their freshness among bones and rotten-
ness,

And have their *odors* stifled in the dust.

ROWE.

At last a soft and solemn breathing sound
Rose like a steam of rich distilled *perfumes*.

MILTON.

Soft vernal *fragrance* clothed the flow'ring
earth.

MASON.

TO SOAK, DRENCH, STEEP.

SOAK is a variation of *suck*. DRENCH is a variation of *drink*. STEEP, in Saxon *steapan*, etc., from the Hebrew *satep*, signifies to overflow or overwhelm.

The idea of communicating or receiving a liquid is common to these terms. A person's clothes are *soaked* in rain when the water has penetrated every thread; he himself is *drenched* in the rain when it has penetrated, as it were, his very body; *drench*, therefore, in this case only expresses the idea of *soak* in a stronger manner. To *steep* is a species of *soaking* employed as an artificial process; to *soak* is, however, a permanent

action by which hard things are rendered soft; to *steep* is a temporary action by which soft bodies become penetrated with a liquid: thus salt meat requires to be *soaked*; fruits are *steeped* in brandy.

Drill'd through the sandy stratum, every way
The waters with the sandy stratum rise,
And clear and sweeten as they *soak* along.

THOMSON.

And deck with fruitful trees the fields around,
And with refreshing waters *drench* the ground.

DRYDEN.

O sleep, O gentle sleep,
Nature's soft nurse! how have I frighted thee,
That thou no more wilt weigh my eyelids down,
And *steep* my senses in forgetfulness?

SHAKESPEARE.

SOBER, GRAVE.

SOBER (*v. Abstemious*) expresses the absence of all exhilaration of spirits: GRAVE (*v. Grave*) expresses a weight in the intellectual operations which makes them proceed slowly. *Sobriety* is therefore a more natural and ordinary state for the human mind than *gravity*: it behooves every man to be *sober* in all situations; but those who fill the most important stations of life must be *grave*. Even in our pleasures we may observe *sobriety*, which keeps us from every unseemly ebullition of mirth; but on particular occasions, where the importance of the subject ought to weigh on the mind, it becomes us to be *grave*. At a feast we have need of *sobriety*; at a funeral we have need of *gravity*.

Now came still ev'ning on, and twilight gray
Had in her *sober* liv'ry all things clad.

So spake the cherub, and his *grave* rebuke,
Severe in youthful beauty, added grace
Invincible.

MILTON.

Sobriety extends to many more objects than *gravity*; we must be *sober* in our thoughts and opinions, as well as in our outward conduct and behavior; but we can be *grave*, properly speaking, only in our looks and our outward deportment.

He had just sentiments of the dignity of human nature in him, and a universal charity for it in others; not measuring the wisdom he studied by the subtlety and curiosity of speculation, but by a *sober* and due government of his own actions.

LLOYD.

Skill'd in the globe and sphere, he *gravely*
stands,
And with his compass measures seas and lands.

DRYDEN.

SOCIAL, SOCIABLE.

SOCIAL, from *socius*, a companion, signifies belonging or allied to a companion, having the disposition of a companion; **SOCIABLE**, from the same, signifies able or fit to be a companion; the former is an active, the latter a passive quality: *social* people seek others; *sociable* people are sought for by others. It is possible for a man to be *social*, and not *sociable*; to be *sociable*, and not *social*: he who draws his pleasures from society without communicating his share to the common stock of entertainments is *social*, but not *sociable*; men of a taciturn disposition are often in this case; they receive more than they give: he, on the contrary, who has talents to please company, but not the inclination to go into company, may be *sociable*, but is seldom *social*; of this description are humorists who go into company to gratify their pride, and stay away to indulge their humor.

Social friends

Attun'd to happy unison of soul. THOMSON.

To make man mild, and *sociable* to man,
To cultivate the wild licentious savage
With wisdom, discipline. ADDISON.

Social and *sociable* are likewise applicable to things, with a similar distinction; *social* intercourse is that intercourse which men have together for the purposes of society; *social* pleasures are what they enjoy by associating together: a path or a carriage is denominated *sociable* which encourages the association of many.

Absolute solitude is not good for us; the *social* affections must be cherished. BEATTIE.

Sciences are of a *sociable* disposition, and flourish best in the neighborhood of each other. BLACKSTONE.

SOCIETY, COMPANY.

SOCIETY (*v. Association*) and **COMPANY** (*v. Association*) here express either the persons associating, the act of associating, or the state of being associated. In either case *society* is a general, and *company* a particular, term; as respects persons associating, *society* comprehends either all the associated part of mankind, as when we speak of the laws of *society*, the well-being of *society*; or it is said only of a particular number of individuals associated, in which latter

case it comes nearest to *company*, and differs from it only as to the purpose of the association. A *society* is always formed for some solid purpose, as the *Humane Society*; and a *company* is always brought together for pleasure or profit, as has already been observed. Good sense teaches us the necessity of conforming to the rules of the *society* to which we belong: good-breeding prescribes to us to render ourselves agreeable to the *company* of which we form a part.

I am here, at present, quite alone, which comes nearest to the happiness one finds in the *society* of those one loves best. MRS. MONTAGU.

Knowledge of men and manners, and conversation of the best *company* of both sexes, is necessary. DRYDEN.

When expressing the abstract action of associating, the term *society* is even more general and indefinite than before; it expresses that which is common to mankind; and *company* that which is peculiar to individuals. The love of *society* is inherent in our nature; it is weakened or destroyed only by the vice of our constitution, or the derangement of our system: every one naturally likes the *company* of his own friends and connections in preference to that of strangers. *Society* is a permanent and habitual act; *company* is only a particular act suited to the occasion: it behooves us to shun the *society* of those from whom we can learn no good, although we may sometimes be obliged to be in their *company*. The *society* of intelligent men is desirable for those who are entering life; the *company* of facetious men is agreeable in travelling.

Unhappy he, who from the first of joys,
Society, cut off, is left alone
Amid this world of death. THOMSON.

Company, though it may relieve a man from his melancholy, cannot secure him from his conscience. SOUTH.

SOFT, MILD, GENTLE, MEEK.

SOFT, in Saxon *soft*, German *sanft*, comes most probably from the Saxon *sib*, Gothic *sef*, Hebrew *sabbath*, rest. **MILD**, in Saxon *milde*, *milide*, German, etc., *milde*, is connected with our *melt* and *milk*, the Latin *mollis*, Greek *μελικος*, *μελισσω*, to soothe with *soft* words, and *μελ*, honey, etc. **GENTLE**, *v. Gentle*. **MEEK**, like

the Latin *mitis*, may in all probability come from the Greek *μεω*, to make less, signifying to make one's self small, to be humble.

All these terms denote the absence of an unpleasant action, sometimes also a positively pleasant action, and sometimes a positive readiness to yield to the action of other bodies. *Soft* is taken in these different senses, as a *soft* pressure or tread which is not easily felt or heard, and a *soft* substance that yields readily to the touch or pressure. *Mild* and *gentle* are mostly taken in the sense of not acting with an unpleasant force; as *mild* cheese, or *mild* fruits, *gentle* motion. *MEEK* is taken in the passive sense of not resisting force to force. The first three terms have a physical and moral application; the latter only a moral application. *Soft* is applied to such objects as act pleasantly in point of strength on the ear or the eye; as a *soft* voice, a *soft* light; or pleasantly in point of smoothness on the feeling; as a *soft* cushion, a *soft* skin. *Mild* and *gentle* are applied to objects that act not unpleasantly on the senses; as *mild* beer, not too strong either for the palate or the body; *mild* air, that is, not unpleasantly cold; *gentle* exercise, *gentle* motion, not violent or excessive in degree: so a *gentle* stream, and a *gentle* rain. These terms are, agreeably to this distinction, applied to the same objects; a *soft* voice, *soft* music, as that which is positively pleasant; a *gentle* voice is one not loud.

And ever against eating cares,
Lap me in *soft* Lydian airs. MILTON.
Close at mine ear one called me forth to walk,
With *gentle* voice. MILTON.

A *soft* air or climate is positively pleasant; a *mild* air or climate is simply without any undue cold; a *gentle* wind is opposed to one that is boisterous.

Soft stillness, and the night,
Become the touches of sweet harmony. SHAKESPEARE.

Such as were permitted soon went forward to the *milder* climates. GOLDSMITH.
As when the woods by *gentle* winds are stirr'd. DRYDEN.

Soft is sometimes applied to motion in the purely negative sense; as a *soft* step, *i. e.*, one made without great pressure of the foot; a *gentle* motion is one that is

made slowly, not quick. It is necessary to tread *softly* when no noise is to be made; and to move *gently* when one is ill.

Pray you tread *softly*, that the blind mole may not
Hear a foot fall. SHAKESPEARE.

How inevitably does immoderate laughter end in a sigh, which is only nature's recovering itself after a force done to it; but the religious pleasure of a well-disposed mind moves *gently*, and therefore constantly. SOUTH.

So likewise when these terms are applied to objects that act on the moral feelings, they admit of a similar distinction. Words are either *soft*, *mild*, or *gentle*; *soft* words are calculated to soften or diminish the angry feeling of others. The proverb says, "A *soft* answer turneth away wrath." A reproof is *mild*, inasmuch as it does not wound the feelings; a censure, or admonition, or a reproach, is *gentle*, inasmuch as it is free from asperity. So likewise punishments are *mild* that inflict little pain; means of coercion are *gentle* that are not violent. Manners are *soft*, *mild*, and *gentle*, but *softness* in this case is not always commendable. Too much *softness* in the manners of a man is inconsistent with manly firmness. *Mildness* and *gentleness* are more generally commendable. *Mild* manners are peculiarly becoming in superiors, or those who have the power of controlling others, provided they do not interfere with good order. *Gentle* manners are becoming in all persons who take a part in social life. *Softness* of manner may likewise be assumed, but *mildness* and *gentleness* are always genuine; the former arising from the temper, the latter either from the temper or from good-breeding, of which it is the greatest mark.

"It is not by the sword, nor by strength of arm," replied Valeria, "that we are to prevail. These belong not to us. *Soft* moving words must be our weapons." HOOKE.

Though he used very frankly to deny, yet the manner of it was so *gentle* and obliging, and his condescension such to inform the persons whom he could not satisfy, that few departed from him with ill will or ill wishes. CLARENDON.

When these terms are employed as characteristics of the person or his disposition, they are comparable with *mEEK*, which is used only in this sense. *Soft*,

as far as it denotes a susceptibility of soft or tender emotions, may and ought to exist in both sexes; but it ought to be the peculiar characteristic of the female sex; *mildness*, as a natural gift, may disqualify a man for command, unless it be tempered by firmness and discretion. *Gentleness*, as a part of the character, is not so much to be recommended as *gentleness* from habit.

And much he blames the *softness* of his mind,
Obnoxious to the charms of womankind.
DRYDEN.

She had all the courage and liberality of the other sex, united to the devotion, order, and economy (perhaps not all the *softness*) of her own.
WHITAKER.

He united in a most remarkable degree the seemingly repugnant characters of the *mildest* of men, and the most vehement of orators.
MACKINTOSH.

Let no complaisance, no *gentleness* of temper, no weak desire of pleasing on your part, no wheedling, coaxing, nor flattery on other people's, make you recede one jot from any point that reason and prudence have bid you pursue.
CHESTERFIELD.

Meekness denotes the forbearance to use force, even in cases of peculiar provocation: in those who are called upon to direct or command it may be carried to an excess.

A yielding timid *meekness* is always abused and insulted by the unjust and the unfeeling, but *meekness*, when sustained by the *fortiter in re*, is always respected and commonly successful.
CHESTERFIELD.

Gentle, mild, and meek are likewise applied to animals; the former to designate that easy flow of spirits which fits them for being guided in their movements, and the latter to mark that passive temper that submits to every kind of treatment, however harsh, without an indication even of displeasure. A horse is *gentle*, as opposed to one that is spirited; the former is devoid of that impetus in himself to move, which renders the other ungovernable: the lamb is a pattern of *meekness*, and yields to the knife of the butcher without a struggle or a groan.

How *meek*, how patient, the *mild* creature lies,
What *softness* in its melancholy face,
What dumb-complaining innocence appears!
THOMSON.

They (the Arabian mares) are less vicious, of a *gentler* nature, and not so apt to neigh.
GOLDSMITH.

SOLICITATION, IMPORTUNITY.

SOLICITATION is general; *IMPORTUNITY* is particular: it is importunate or troublesome *solicitation*. *Solicitation* is itself indeed that which gives trouble to a certain extent, but it is not always unreasonable: there may be cases in which we may yield to the *solicitations* of friends, to do that which we have no objection to be obliged to do; but *importunity* is that *solicitation* which never ceases to apply for that which it is not agreeable to give. We may sometimes be urgent in our *solicitations* of a friend to accept some proffered honor; the *solicitation*, however, in this case, although it may even be troublesome, yet it is sweetened by the motive of the action: the *importunity* of beggars is often a politic means of extorting money from the passenger.

Although the devil cannot compel a man to sin, yet he can follow a man with continual *solicitations*.
SOUTH.

The torment of expectation is not easily to be borne when the heart has no rival engagements to withdraw it from the *importunities* of desire.
JOHNSON.

SOLITARY, SOLE, ONLY, SINGLE.

ALL these terms are more or less opposed to several or many. *SOLITARY* and *SOLE*, both derived from *solus*, alone or whole, signify one left by itself; the former mostly in application to particular sensible objects, the latter in regard mostly to moral objects: a *solitary* shrub expresses not only one shrub, but one that has been left to itself: the *sole* cause or reason signifies that reason or cause which stands unsupported by anything else. *ONLY*, that is, *only*, signifying the quality of unity, does not include the idea of desertion or deprivation, but it comprehends that of want or deficiency: he who has *only* one shilling in his pocket means to imply that he wants more, or ought to have more. *SINGLE*, which is an abbreviation of singular (*v. Simple*), signifies simply one or more detached from others, without conveying any other collateral idea: a *single* sheet of paper may be sometimes more convenient than a double one; a *single* shilling may be all that is necessary for the present purpose: there may be *single*

ones, as well as a *single* one; but the other terms exclude the idea of there being anything else. A *solitary* act of generosity is not sufficient to characterize a man as generous: with most criminals the *sole* ground of their defence rests upon their not having learned to know and do better: harsh language and severe looks are not the *only* means of correcting the faults of others: *single* instances of extraordinary talents now and then present themselves in the course of an age.

The cattle in the fields and meadows green,
Those rare and *solitary*, these in flocks.
MILTON.

All things are but insipid to a man, in comparison of that one which is the *sole* minion of his fancy.
SOUTH.

Will save us trial, what the least can do,
Single against the wicked.
MILTON.

In the adverbial form, *solely, only, and singly* are employed with a similar distinction. The disasters which attend an unsuccessful military enterprise are seldom to be attributed *solely* to the incapacity of the general: there are many circumstances both in the natural and moral world which are to be accounted for *only* by admitting a providence as presented to us in Divine revelation: there are many things which men could not effect *singly* that might be effected by them conjointly.

You knew my father well, and in him me,
Left *solely* heir to all his lands.
SHAKESPEARE.

The practice of virtue is attended not *only* with present quiet and satisfaction, but with comfortable hope of a future recompense.
NELSON.

They tend to the perfection of human nature, and to make men *singly* and personally good.
TILLOTSON.

SOLITARY, DESERT, DESOLATE.

SOLITARY, v. Alone. *DESERT* is the same as *deserted*. *DESOLATE*, in Latin *desolatus*, signifies made *solitary*.

All these epithets are applied to places, but with different modifications of the common idea of solitude which belongs to them. *Solitary* simply denotes the absence of all beings of the same kind: thus a place is *solitary* to a man where there is no human being but himself; and it is *solitary* to a brute, when there are no brutes with which it can hold so-

ciety. *Desert* conveys the idea of a place made *solitary* by being shunned, from its unfitnes as a place of residence; all *deserts* are places of such wildness as seem to frighten away almost all inhabitants. *Desolate* conveys the idea of a place made *solitary*, or bare of inhabitants, and all traces of habitation, by violent means: *desolation* is solitude coupled with wretchedness; every country may become *desolate* which is exposed to the inroads of a ravaging army, and a person may be *desolate* who feels himself unable to associate with others.

The first time we behold the hero (Ulysses),
we find him disconsolately sitting on the *solitary* shore, sighing to return to Ithaca.
WHARTON.

A peopled city made a *desert* place.
Supporting and supported, polish'd friends
And dear relations mingle into bliss;
But this the rugged savage never felt,
E'en *desolate* in crowds.
THOMSON.

TO SOLVE, RESOLVE.

SOLVE and *RESOLVE* both come from the Latin *solvo*, in Greek *λυω*, in Hebrew *sal*, to loosen.

Between *solve* and *resolve* there is no considerable difference either in sense or application: the former seems merely to speak of unfolding in a general manner that which is wrapped up in obscurity; to *resolve* is rather to unfold it by the particular method of carrying one back to first principles; we *solve* a problem, and *resolve* a difficulty.

He would *solve* a high dispute
With conjugal caresses.
MILTON.

Something yet of doubt remains,
Which only thy *solution* can *resolve*.
MILTON.

SOME, ANY.

SOME, in Saxon *sum*, connected with the word *sum*, signifying a collected or specified quantity, is altogether restrictive in its sense: *ANY*, from *a one*, is altogether universal and indefinite. *Some* applies to one particular part in distinction from the rest: *any* to every individual part without distinction. *Some* think this, and others that: *any* person might believe if he would; *any* one can conquer his passions who calls in the aid of religion. In consequence of this distinction in sense, *some* can only be used in particular affirmative proposi-

tions; but *any*, which is equivalent to all, may be either in negative, interrogative, or hypothetical propositions: *some* say so: does *any* one believe it? He will not give to *any*.

Some to the shores do fly,
Some to the woods, or whither fear advis'd.

He is a path, if *any* be misled,
He is a robe, if *any* naked be,
If *any* chance to hunger, he is bread,
If *any* be a bondsman, he is free.

SOON, EARLY, BETIMES.

ALL these words are expressive of time; but SOON respects some future period in general; EARLY, or *ere*, before, and BETIMES, or by the time, before a given time, respect some particular period at no great distance. A person may come *soon* or *early*; in the former case he may not be long in coming from the time that the words are spoken; in the latter case he comes before the time appointed. He who rises *soon* does nothing extraordinary; but he who rises *early* or *betimes* exceeds the usual hour considerably. *Soon* is said mostly of particular acts, and is always dated from the time of the person speaking, if not otherwise expressed; come *soon* signifies after the present moment: *early* and *betimes*, if not otherwise expressed, have always respect to some specific time appointed; come *early* will signify a visit, a meeting, and the like; do it *betimes* will signify before the thing to be done is wanted: in this manner, both are employed for the actions of youth. An *early* attention to religious duties will render them habitual and pleasing; we must begin *betimes* to bring the stubborn will into subjection.

But *soon*, too *soon*! the lover turns his eyes;
Again she falls—again she dies—she dies.

Pope not being sent *early* to school, was taught to read by an aunt.

Happy is the man who *betimes* acquires a relish for holy solitude.

SORRY, GRIEVED, HURT.

SORRY and GRIEVED are epithets somewhat differing from their primitives *sorrow* and *grief* (*v. Affliction*), inasmuch as they are applied to ordinary subjects. We speak of being *sorry* for anything, however trivial, which concerns our-

selves; but we are commonly *grieved* for that which concerns others. I am *sorry* that I was not at home when a person called upon me; I am *grieved* that it is not in my power to serve a friend who stands in need. Both these terms respect only that which we do ourselves: HURT (*v. To displease and To injure*) respects that which is done to us, denoting painful feeling from *hurt* or wounded feelings; we are *hurt* at being treated with disrespect.

The ass, approaching next, confess'd
That in his heart he lov'd a jest;
One fault he hath, is *sorry* for't,
His ears are half a foot too short.

The mimic ape began to chatter,
How evil tongues his name bespatter;
He saw, and he was *griev'd* to see't,
His zeal was sometimes indiscreet.

No man is *hurt*, at least few are so, by hearing his neighbor esteemed a worthy man.

SOUL, MIND.

THESE terms, or the equivalents to them, have been employed by all civilized nations to designate that part of human nature which is distinct from matter. The SOUL, however, from the German *seele*, etc., and the Greek *ζωη*, to live, like the *anima* of the Latin, which comes from the Greek *ανεμος*, wind or breath, is represented to our minds by the subtlest or most ethereal of sensible objects, namely, breath or spirit, and denotes properly the quickening or vital principle. MIND, on the contrary, from the Greek *μυος*, which signifies strength, is that sort of power which is closely allied to, and in a great measure dependent upon, corporeal organization: the former is, therefore, the immortal, and the latter the mortal, part of us; the former connects us with angels, the latter with brutes; in the former we distinguish consciousness and will, which is possessed by no other created being that we know of; in the latter we distinguish nothing but the power of receiving impressions from external objects, which we call ideas, and which we have in common with the brutes. Poets and philosophers speak of the *soul* in the same strain, as the active and living principle.

Man's *soul* in a perpetual motion flows,
And to no outward cause that motion owes.

In bashful coyness, or in maiden pride,
The soft return conceal'd, save when it stole
In sidelong glances from her downcast eyes,
Or from her swelling *soul* in stifled sighs.

The *soul* consists of many faculties, as the understanding, and the will, with all the senses, both outward and inward; or, to speak more philosophically, the *soul* can exert herself in many different ways of action.

The ancients, though unaided by the light of Divine revelation, yet represented the *soul* as a distinct principle. The Psyche of the Greeks, which was the name they gave to the human *soul*, was feigned to be one of their incorporeal or celestial beings. The *anima* of the Latins was taken precisely in the modern sense of the *soul*, by which it was distinguished from the *animus* or *mind*. Thus the Emperor Adrian is said on his dying bed to have addressed his *soul* in words which clearly denote what he thought of its independent existence:

Animula vagula, blandula,
Quæ nunc abibis in loca?
Hospes comesque corporis,
Pallidula, rigida, undula,
Nec (ut soles) dabis Joca!

The *mind*, being considered as an attribute to the *soul*, is taken sometimes for one faculty, and sometimes for another; as for the understanding, when we say a person is not in his right *mind*.

I am a very foolish fond old man;
I fear I am not in my perfect *mind*.

Sometimes for the intellectual power:
I thought the eternal *mind*
Had made us masters.

Or for the intellectual capacity:
We say that learning's endless, and blame fate
For not allowing life a longer date;
He did the utmost bounds of knowledge find,
He found them not so large as was his *mind*.

Or for the imagination or conception.
In the judgment of Aristotle and Bacon, the true poet forms his imitations of nature after a model of ideal perfection, which perhaps has no existence but in his own *mind*.

Sometimes the word *mind* is employed to denote the operations of the thinking faculty, the thoughts or opinions:
The ambiguous god,
In these mysterious words his *mind* express'd;
Some truths revealed, in terms involved the rest.

The earth was not of my *mind*,
If you suppose as fearing you it shook.

Or the will, choice, determination, as in the colloquial phrase, to have a *mind* to do a thing.

All the arguments to a good life will be very insignificant to a man that hath a *mind* to be wicked, when remission of sins may be had on such cheap terms.

Our question is, whether all be sin which is done without direction by Scripture, and not whether the Israelites did at any time amiss by following their own *minds* without asking counsel of God.

Sometimes it stands for the memory, as in the familiar expressions to call to *mind*, put in *mind*, etc.

The king knows their disposition; a small touch will put him in *mind* of them.

These, and more than I to *mind* can bring,
Menalcas has not yet forgot to sing.

They will put him in *mind* of his own waking thoughts, ere these dreams had as yet made their impressions on his fancy.

A wholesome law, time out of *mind*,
Had been confirm'd by fate's decree.

Lastly, the *mind* is considered as the seat of all the faculties:
Every faculty is a distinct taste in the *mind*, and hath objects accommodated to its proper relish.

And also of the passions or affections.
E'en from the body's purity, the *mind*
Receives a secret sympathetic aid.

This word, being often used for the *soul* giving life, is attributed abusively to madmen when we say that they are of a distracted *mind*, instead of a broken understanding; which word *mind* we use also for opinion, as I am of this or that *mind*; and sometimes for men's conditions or virtues, as he is of an honest *mind*, or a man of a just *mind*; sometimes for affection, as I do this for my *mind's* sake, etc.

The *soul* being the better part of a man, is taken for the man's self; as Horace says, in allusion to his friend Virgil, "et serves animæ dimidium meæ:" hence the term is figuratively extended, in its application, to denote a human being:

The moral is the case of every *soul* of us.

It is a republic; there are in it a hundred bourgeois, and about a thousand *souls*.

The poor *soul* sat singing by a sycamore-tree.

Or the individual in general.

Join voices, all ye living *souls*. Ye birds
That singing up to heaven-gate ascend
Bear on your wings and in your notes his praise.
MILTON.

Also, what is excellent, the essential
or principal part of a thing, the spirit.

Thou sun, of this great world both eye and *soul*.
MILTON.

He has the very *soul* of bounty. SHAKESPEARE.
There is some *soul* of goodness in things evil,
Would men observingly distil it out.
SHAKESPEARE.

SOUND, SANE, HEALTHY.

SOUND and SANE, in Latin *sanus*,
comes probably from *sanguis*, the blood,
because in that lies the seat of health or
sickness. HEALTHY, *v. Healthy*.

Sound is extended in its application to
all things that are in the state in which
they ought to be, so as to preserve their
vitality; thus, animals and vegetables are
said to be *sound* when in the former there
is nothing amiss in their breath, and in
the latter in their root. By a figurative
application, wood and other things may
be said to be *sound* when they are entire-
ly free from any symptom of decay; *sane*
is applicable to human beings, in the same
sense, but with reference to the mind; a
sane person is opposed to one that is in-
sane.

He hath a heart as *sound* as a bell, and his
tongue is the clapper: for what his heart thinks
his tongue speaks. SHAKESPEARE.

How pregnant sometimes his replies are,
A happiness that often madness hits on,
Which *sanity* and reason could not be
So prosperously delivered of. SHAKESPEARE.

The mind is also said to be *sound* when
it is in a perfect state to form right opin-
ions.

But Capys, and the rest of *sounder* mind,
The fatal present to the flames design'd.
DRYDEN.

Healthy expresses more than either
sound or *sane*; we are *healthy* in every
part, but we are *sound* in that which is
essential for life; he who is *sound* may
live, but he who is *healthy* enjoys life.

But the course of succession (to the crown) is
the *healthy* habit of the British constitution.
BURKE.

SOUND, TONE.

SOUND, in Latin *sonus*, and TONE, in
Latin *tonus*, may probably both come from

the Greek *τονος*, from *τεινω*, to stretch
or exert, signifying simply an exertion of
the voice; and that is connected with the
Hebrew *shaon*, a noise.

Sound is that which issues from any
body, so as to become audible; *tone* is a
species of *sound* which is produced from
particular bodies: a *sound* may be acci-
dental; we may hear the *sounds* of wa-
ters or leaves, of animals or men: *tones*
are those particular *sounds* or modula-
tions of *sound*, which are made either to
express a particular feeling or to produce
harmony; a sheep will cry for its lost
young in a *tone* of distress; an organ is
so formed as to send forth the most sol-
emn *tones*.

The *sounds* of the voice, according to the va-
rious touches which raise them, form themselves
into an acute or grave, quick or slow, loud or
soft, *tone*. HUGHES.

SPACE, ROOM.

SPACE is in Latin *spatium*, Greek
σπαδιον, *Æol. σπαδιον*, a race-ground.
ROOM is in Saxon, etc., *rum*, Hebrew *ra-
mah*, a wide place.

These are both abstract terms, expres-
sive of that portion of the universe which
is supposed not to be occupied by any
solid body: *space* is a general term, which
includes within itself that which infinite-
ly surpasses our comprehension; *room* is
a limited term, which comprehends those
portions of *space* which are artificially
formed: *space* is either extended or
bounded; *room* is always a bounded
space: the *space* between two objects is
either natural, incidental, or designedly
formed; the *room* is that which is the
fruit of design, to suit the convenience
of persons: there is a sufficient *space* be-
tween the heavenly bodies to admit of
their moving without confusion; the va-
lue of a house essentially depends upon
the quantity of *room* which it affords:
in a row of trees there must always be
vacant *spaces* between each tree; in a
coach there will be only *room* for a given
number of persons.

The man of wealth and pride
Takes up a *space* that many poor supplied.
GOLDSMITH.

For the whole world, without a native home,
Is nothing but a prison of a larger *room*.
COWLEY.

Space is only taken in the natural
sense; *room* is also employed in the

moral application: in every person there
is ample *room* for amendment or im-
provement.

He was incapable of laying traps for discourse,
or putting other people's conversation aside to
make *room* for his own. CUMBERLAND.

TO SPEAK, SAY, TELL.

SPEAK, in Saxon *specan*, is probably
changed from the German *sprechen*, and
connected with *brechen*, to break, the Lat-
in *precor*, to pray, and the Hebrew *barek*,
to bless. SAY, in Saxon *seegan*, German
sagen, Latin *seco* or *sequor*, changed into
dico, and Hebrew *shoch*, to *speak* or *say*.
TELL, in Saxon *taellan*, low German *tel-
lan*, etc., is probably an onomatopœia in
language.

To *speak* may simply consist in utter-
ing an articulate sound; but to *say* is
to communicate some idea by means of
words: a child begins to *speak* the mo-
ment it opens its lips to utter any ac-
knowledged sound; but it will be some
time before it can *say* anything: a per-
son is said to *speak* high or low, distinct-
ly or indistinctly; but he *says* that which
is true or false, right or wrong: a dumb
man cannot *speak*; a fool cannot *say*
anything that is worth hearing: we *speak*
languages, we *speak* sense or nonsense,
we *speak* intelligibly or unintelligibly;
but we *say* what we think at the time.

He that questioneth much shall learn much,
and content much, for he shall give occasion to
those whom he asketh to please themselves in
speaking. BACON.

He possessed to admiration that rare faculty
of always *saying* enough, and not too much, on
any subject. CUMBERLAND.

In an extended sense, *speak* may refer
as much to sense as to sound; but then
it applies only to general cases, and *say*
to particular and passing circumstances
of life: it is a great abuse of the gift of
speech not to *speak* the truth; it is very
culpable in a person to *say* that he will
do a thing and not to do it.

In what I now shall *say* of him, I have *spoken*
the truth conscientiously. CUMBERLAND.

To *say* and *tell* are both the ordinary
actions of men in their daily intercourse;
but *say* is very partial, it may compre-
hend single unconnected sentences, or
even single words: we may *say* yes or

no; but we *tell* that which is connected,
and which forms more or less of a nar-
rative. To *say* is to communicate that
which passes in our own minds, to ex-
press our ideas and feelings as they rise;
to *tell* is to communicate events or cir-
cumstances respecting ourselves or oth-
ers: it is not good to let children *say*
foolish things for the sake of talking; it
is still worse for them to be encouraged
in *telling* everything they hear: when
every one is allowed to *say* what he likes
and what he thinks, there will common-
ly be more *speakers* than hearers; those
who accustom themselves to *tell* long sto-
ries impose a tax upon others, which is
not repaid by the pleasure of their com-
pany.

Say, Yorke (for sure, if any, thou canst *tell*),
What virtue is, who practise it so well? JENYNS

TO SPEAK, TALK, CONVERSE, DIS-
COURSE.

THE idea of communicating with, or
communicating to, another, by means of
signs, is common in the signification of
all these terms: to SPEAK (*v. To speak*)
is an indefinite term, specifying no cir-
cumstance of the action; we may *speak*
only one word or many; but TALK,
which is but a variation of tell (*v. To
speak*), is a mode of *speaking*, namely, for
a continuance: we may *speak* from va-
rious motives; we *talk* for pleasure; we
CONVERSE (*v. Conversation*) for im-
provement, or intellectual gratification:
we *speak* with or to a person; we *talk*
commonly to others; we *converse* with
others. *Speaking* a language is quite
distinct from writing it: those who think
least *talk* most: *conversation* is the ra-
tional employment of social beings, who
seek by an interchange of sentiments to
purify the affections, and improve the
understanding.

Falsehood is a *speaking* against our thoughts.
SOUTH.

Talkers are commonly vain, and credulous
withal; for he that *talketh* what he knoweth,
will also *talk* what he knoweth not. BACON.

Words learned by rote a parrot may rehearse,
But *talking* is not always to *converse*. COWPER.
Go, therefore, half this day, as friend with friend,
Converse with Adam. MILTON.

Conversation is the act of many togeth-
er; DISCOURSE, in Latin *discursus*, ex-