

ly serving them; but, if we feel *compassion*, we naturally turn our thoughts toward relieving them.

Their countrymen were particularly attentive to their story, and *sympathized* with these heroes in all their adventures. ADDISON.

'Mongst those whom honest lives can recommend, Our justice more *compassion* should extend. DENHAM.

*Sympathy*, indeed, may sometimes be taken for a secret alliance or kindred feeling between two objects.

Or *sympathy*, or some connatural force, Powerful at greatest distance to unite With secret amity, things of like kind By secretest conveyance. MILTON.

That mind and body often *sympathize* Is plain: such is this union nature ties. JENYNS.

*Compassion* is awakened by any sort of suffering, but particularly those which are attributable to our misfortunes; *commiseration* is awakened by sufferings arising from our faults; *condolence* is awakened by the troubles of life, to which all are equally liable. Poverty and want excite our *compassion*; we endeavor to relieve them: a poor criminal suffering the penalty of the law excites our *commiseration*; we endeavor, if possible, to mitigate his punishment: the loss which a friend sustains produces *condolence*; we take the best means of testifying it to him.

I am very sorry that her Majesty did not see this assembly of objects, so proper to excite that charity and *compassion* which she bears to every one who stands in need of it. ADDISON.

Her lowly plight Immovable, till peace, obtained from fault Acknowledg'd and deplored, in Adam wrought *Commiseration*. MILTON.

Rather than all must suffer, some must die, Yet nature must *condole* their misery. DENHAM.

*Compassion* is the sentiment of one mortal toward another; *commiseration* is represented as the feeling which our wretchedness excites in the Supreme Being. *Compassion* may be awakened in persons of any condition; *commiseration* is awakened toward those who are in an abject state of misery; *condolence* supposes an entire equality, and is often produced by some common calamity.

The good-natured man is apt to be moved with *compassion* for those misfortunes and infirmities which another would turn into ridicule. ADDISON.

Then must we those who groan beneath the weight Of age, disease, or want, *commiserate*? DENHAM.

Why should I think that all that devout multitude which so lately cried Hosanna in the streets, did not also bear their part in those public *condolings* (in the crucifixion of our Saviour)? HALL.

## SYSTEM, METHOD.

SYSTEM, in Latin *systema*, Greek *συστημα*, from *συστημι*, or *συν* and *ιστημι*, to stand together, signifies that which is put together so as to form a whole. METHOD, in Latin *methodus*, from the Greek *μετα* and *οδος*, a way by which anything is effected.

*System* expresses more than *method*, which is but a part of *system*: *system* is an arrangement of many single or individual objects according to some given rule, so as to make them coalesce; *method* is the manner of this arrangement, or the principle upon which this arrangement takes place. The term *system*, however, applies to a complexity of objects; but arrangement, and consequently *method*, may be applied to everything that is to be put into execution. All sciences must be reduced to *system*; and without *system* there is no science: all business requires *method*; and without *method* little can be done to any good purpose.

If a better *system's* thine, Impart it frankly, or make use of mine. FRANCIS.

The great defect of the Seasons is the want of *method*, but for this I know not that there was any remedy. JOHNSON.

## T.

## TO TAKE, RECEIVE, ACCEPT.

TAKE, from the Latin *tactum*, participle of *tango*, is as much as to get into one's possession by touching or laying hands on it. RECEIVE, in French *recevoir*, Latin *recipio*, from *re* and *capio*, signifies to take back; and ACCEPT, from *ac* or *ad* and *capio*, signifies to take for a special purpose.

To take is the general term, receive and accept are modes of taking. To take is an unqualified action; we take whatever comes in the way; we receive only that

which is offered or sent: we take a book from a table; we receive a parcel which has been sent; we take either with or without consent; we receive with the consent, or according to the wishes, of another: a robber takes money from a traveller; a person receives a letter from a friend.

Each takes his seat, and each receives his share. POPE.

To receive is frequently a passive act; whatever is offered or done to another is received; but to accept is an act of choice: many things, therefore, may be received which cannot be accepted; as a person receives a blow or an insult: so in an engagement one may be said to receive the enemy, who is ready to receive his attack; on the other hand, we accept apologies.

Till, seiz'd with shame, they wheel about and face, Receive their foes, and raise a threat'ning cry; The Tuscans take their turn to fear and fly. DRYDEN.

She accepted my apology, and we are again reconciled. BRYDENE.

Some things are both received and accepted, but with the same distinction. What is given as a present may be both received and accepted, but the inferior receives and the superior accepts. What is received comes to a person either by indirect means, or, if by direct means, it comes as a matter of right; but what is accepted is a matter of favor either on the part of the giver or receiver. Rent in law may be both received and accepted; it is received when it is due from the tenant, but it is accepted if it be received from a tenant after he has broken his contract with his landlord. A challenge may be received contrary to the wishes of the receiver, but it rests with himself whether he will accept it or not.

Unransom'd here receive the spotless fair, Accept the hecatomb the Greeks prepare. POPE.

Animals and things, as well as persons, may take; things may receive; but persons only accept. An animal may take what is offered to it; things take whatever attaches to them, but they receive that which by an express effort is given to them. The chameleon is said to take its hue from the surrounding objects; marble receives its polish from the hands of the workman.

The sapless wood, divested of the bark, Grows fungous, and takes fire at every spark. COWPER.

The soft settee, one elbow at each end, And in the midst an elbow it received, United, yet divided. COWPER.

## TALKATIVE, LOQUACIOUS, GARRULOUS.

TALKATIVE implies ready or prone to talk (*v. To speak*). LOQUACIOUS, from *loquor*, to speak or talk, has the same original meaning. GARRULOUS, in Latin *garrulus*, from *garrus*, to blab, signifies prone to tell or make known.

These reproachful epithets differ principally in the degree. To talk is allowable, and consequently it is not altogether so unbecoming to be occasionally talkative; but loquacity, which implies an immoderate propensity to talk, is always bad, whether springing from affectation or an idle temper: and garrulity, which arises from the excessive desire of communicating, is a failing that is pardonable only in the aged, who have generally much to tell.

Every absurdity has a champion to defend it; for error is always talkative. GOLDSMITH.

Thersites only clamor'd in the throng, Loquacious, loud, and turbulent of tongue. POPE.

Pleas'd with that social sweet garrulity, The poor disbanded vet'ran's sole delight. SOMERVILLE.

## TASTE, FLAVOR, RELISH, SAVOR.

TASTE comes from the Teutonic *tasten*, to touch lightly, and signifies either the organ which is easily affected, or the act of discriminating by a light touch of the organ, or the quality of the object which affects the organ; in this latter sense it is closely allied to the other terms. FLAVOR most probably comes from the Latin *flō*, to breathe, signifying the rarefied essence of bodies which affect the organ of taste. RELISH is derived by Minshew from *relēcher*, to lick again, signifying that which pleases the palate so as to tempt to a renewal of the act of tasting. SAVOR, in Latin *sapor* and *sapio*, to smell, taste, or be sensible, most probably comes from the Hebrew *sapah*, the mouth or palate, which is the organ of taste.

Taste is the most general and indefinite of all these; it is applicable to every object that can be applied to the or-

gan of *taste*, and to every degree and manner in which the organ can be affected: some things are *tasteless*, other things have a strong *taste*, and others a mixed *taste*. The *flavor* is the predominating *taste*, and consequently is applied to such objects as may have a different kind or degree of *taste*; an apple may not only have the general *taste* of apple, but also a *flavor* peculiar to itself; the *flavor* is commonly said of that which is good; as a fine *flavor*, a delicious *flavor*; but it may designate that which is not always agreeable; as the *flavor* of fish, which is unpleasant in things that do not admit of such a *taste*. The *relish* is also a particular *taste*; but it is that which is artificial, in distinction from the *flavor*, which may be the natural property. We find the *flavor* such as it is; we give the *relish* such as it should be, or we wish it to be: milk and butter receive a *flavor* from the nature of the food with which the cow is supplied: sauces are used in order to give a *relish* to the food that is dressed with them.

What order so contriv'd as not to mix  
Tastes not well join'd? MILTON.

Every person remembers how great a pleasure he found in sweets while a child; but his taste growing more obtuse with age, he is obliged to use artificial means to excite it. It is then he is found to call in *relishes* of salts and aromatics. GOLDSMITH.

The Philippic islands give a *flavor* to our European bowls. ADDISON.

*Savor* is a term in less frequent use than the others, but, agreeable to the Latin derivation, it is employed to designate that which smells as well as *tastes*, a sweet-smelling *savor*; so likewise, in the moral application, a man's actions or expressions may be said to *savor* of vanity.

The pleasant *savory* smell  
So quicken'd appetite, that I methought  
Could not but *taste*. MILTON.

*Taste* and *relish* may be, moreover, compared as the act or power of *tasting* or *relishing*: we *taste* whatever affects our *taste*; but we *relish* that only which pleases our *taste*: we *taste* fruits in order to determine whether they are good or bad; we *relish* fruits as a dessert, or at certain seasons of the day.

When the tongue and the thing to be tasted are extremely dry, no *taste* ensues. GOLDSMITH.

Were men born with those advantages which they possess by industry, they would probably enjoy them with a blunter *relish*. GOLDSMITH.

So in the extended or moral application, they are distinguished in the same manner.

Ten thousand thousand precious gifts  
My daily thanks employ;  
Nor is the least a cheerful heart,  
That *tastes* those gifts with joy. ADDISON.

I love the people,  
But do not like to stage me to their eyes,  
Though it do well, I do not *relish* well  
Their loud applause. SHAKESPEARE.

## TASTE, GENIUS.

TASTE, in all probability from the Latin *tactum* and *tango*, to touch, seems to designate the capacity to derive pleasure from an object: GENIUS designates the power we have for accomplishing any object. He who derives particular pleasure from music may be said to have a *taste* for music; he who makes very great proficiency in the theory and practice of music may be said to have a *genius* for it. It is obvious, therefore, that we may have a *taste* without having *genius*; but it would not be possible to have *genius* for a thing without having a *taste* for it: for nothing can so effectually give a *taste* for any accomplishment as the capacity to learn it, and the susceptibility of all its beauties, which circumstances are inseparable from *genius*.

The cause of a wrong *taste* is a defect of judgment. BURKE.

*Taste* consists in the power of judging, *genius* in the power of executing. BLAIR.

## TAX, DUTY, CUSTOM, TOLL, IMPOST, TRIBUTE, CONTRIBUTION.

THE idea of something given by the people to the government is expressed by all these terms. TAX, in French *taxe*, Latin *taxo*, from the Greek *τασσω*, *ταξω*, to dispose or put in order, signifies what is disposed in order for each to pay. CUSTOM signifies that which is given under certain circumstances, according to *custom*. DUTY signifies that which is given as a due or debt. TOLL, in Saxon *toll*, etc., Latin *telonium*, Greek *τελος*, a custom, signifies a particular kind of *custom* or due.

*Tax* is the most general of these terms,

and applies to or implies whatever is paid by the people to the government, according to a certain estimate: the *customs* are a species of *tax* which are less specific than other *taxes*, being regulated by *custom* rather than any definite law; the *customs* apply particularly to what was *customarily* given by merchants for the goods which they imported from abroad: the *duty* is a species of *tax* more positive and binding than the *custom*, being a specific estimate of what is *due* upon goods, according to their value; hence it is not only applied to goods that are imported, but also to many other articles inland: *toll* is that species of *tax* which serves for the repair of roads and havens, or the liberty to buy or sell at fairs or other places.

The remission of a debt, the taking off a *duty*, the giving up a *tax*, the mending a port, or the making a highway, were not looked upon as improper subjects for a coin. ADDISON.

Strabo tells you that Britain bore heavy *taxes*, especially the *customs* on the importation of the Gallic trade. ARBUTHNOT.

The same Prusias joined with the Rhodians against the Byzantines, and stopped them from levying the *toll* on their trade in the Euxine. ARBUTHNOT.

The preceding terms refer to that which is levied by authority on the people; but they do not directly express the idea of levying or paying: IMPOST, on the contrary, signifies literally that which is imposed; and TRIBUTE that which is paid or yielded; the former, therefore, exclude that idea of coercion which is included in the latter. The *tax* is levied by the consent of many; the *impost* is imposed by the will of one; and the *tribute* is paid at the demand of one or a few: the *tax* serves for the support of the nation; the *impost* and the *tribute* serve to enrich a government. Conquerors lay heavy *imposts* upon the conquered countries; distant provinces pay a *tribute* to the princes to whom they owe allegiance. CONTRIBUTION signifies the *tribute* of many in unison, or for the same end; in this general sense it includes all the other terms; for *taxes* and *imposts* are alike paid by many for the same purpose; but, as the predominant idea in *contribution* is that of common consent, it supposes a degree of freedom in the agent which is incompatible with

the exercise of authority expressed by the other terms: hence the term is with more propriety applied to those cases in which men voluntarily unite in giving toward any particular object; as *charitable contributions*, or *contributions* in support of a war; but it may be taken in the general sense of a forced payment, as in speaking of military *contribution*.

Taxes and *imposts* upon merchants seldom do any good to the king's revenue, for that that he wins in the hundred he loseth in the shire. BACON.

The Athenians having barbarously murdered Androgeus, the son of Minos, were obliged by his father to send a novennial or septennial, or, as others write an annual, *tribute* of seven young men. POTTER.

The Roman officers sometimes took the liberty of raising *contributions* of their own accord. POTTER.

These words, *tax*, *tribute*, and *contribution*, have an extended application to other objects besides those which are pecuniary: *tax*, in the sense of what is laid on without the consent of the person on whom it is imposed; *tribute*, that which is given to another as his due; and *contribution*, that which is given by one in common with others for some common object.

And levying thus, and with an easy sway,  
A *tax* of profit from his very play. COWPER.

I pay this *tribute* without reluctance to the memory of that noble, reverend, learned, and excellent person. BURKE.

The English people are satisfied that the consolations of religion are as necessary as its instructions. They, too, are among the unhappy. They feel personal pain and domestic sorrow. In these they have no privilege, but are subject to pay their full contingent to the *contribution* levied on mortality. BURKE.

## TAX, RATE, ASSESSMENT.

TAX, agreeably to the above explanation (*v. Tax*), and RATE, from the Latin *ratu*s and *reor*, to think or estimate, both derive their principal meaning from the valuation or proportion according to which any sum is demanded from the people; but the *tax* is imposed directly by the government for public purposes, as the land-*tax*, and the window-*tax*; and the *rate* is imposed indirectly for the local purposes of each parish, as the church-*rates*, and the poor-*rates*. The *tax* or *rate* is a general rule or ratio, by which a certain sum is raised upon a given num-

ber of persons; the ASSESSMENT is the application of that rule to the individual.

They (the French noblesse) paid also a land-tax called the twentieth penny. BURKE.

They paid the church and parish rate, And took, but read not, the receipt. PRIOR.

As to the reimbursement, and the other great objects of public credit, no doubt but that a very moderate and proportionate assessment on the citizens would have provided for all. BURKE.

TO TEASE, VEX, TAUNT, TANTALIZE, TORMENT.

TEASE is most probably a frequentative of tear. VEX, *v.* To displease. TAUNT is probably contracted from *tantalize*. TANTALIZE, *v.* To aggravate. TORMENT, from the Latin *tormentum* and *torqueo*, to twist, signifies to give pain by twisting or griping.

The idea of acting upon others so as to produce a painful sentiment is common to all these terms; they differ in the mode of the action, and in the degree of the effect. To *tease* is applied to that which is most trifling; *torment* to that which is most serious. We are *teased* by a fly that buzzes in our ears; we are *vexed* by the carelessness and stupidity of our servants; we are *taunted* by the sarcasms of others; we are *tantalized* by the fair prospects which only present themselves to disappear again; we are *tormented* by the importunities of troublesome beggars. It is the repetition of unpleasant trifles which *teases*; it is the crossness and perversity of persons and things which *vex*; it is the contemptuous and provoking behavior which *taunts*; it is the disappointment of awakened expectations which *tantalizes*; it is the repetition of greivous troubles which *torments*. We may be *teased* and *tormented* by that which produces bodily or mental pain; we are *vexed*, *taunted*, and *tantalized* only in the mind. Irritable and nervous people are most easily *teased*; captious and fretful people are most easily *vexed* or *taunted*; sanguine and eager people are most easily *tantalized*: in all these cases the imagination or the bodily state of the individual serves to increase the pain: but persons are *tormented* by such things as inflict positive pain.

Louisa began to take a little mischievous pleasure in *teasing*. CUMBERLAND.

To hear you prate would vex a saint. GAY.

Sharp was his voice, which, in the shrillest tone, Thus with injurious taunts attacks the throne. POPE.

When the maid (in Sparta) was once sped, she was not suffered to *tantalize* the male part of the commonwealth. ADDISON.

Truth exerting itself in the searching precepts of self-denial and mortification is *tormenting* to vicious minds. SOUTH.

TEGUMENT, COVERING.

TEGUMENT, in Latin *tegumentum*, from *tego*, to cover, is properly but another word to express the sense of COVERING, yet it is now employed in cases where the term *covering* is inadmissible. *Covering* signifies mostly that which is artificial; but *tegument* is employed for that which is natural: clothing is the *covering* for the body; the skin of vegetable substances, as seeds, is called the *tegument*. The *covering* is said of that which covers the outer surface: the *tegument* is said of that which covers the inner surface; the pods of some seeds are lined with a soft *tegument*.

In the nutmeg another *tegument* is the mace between the green pericarpium and the hard shell. RAY.

It is by being naked that he (man) knows the value of *covering*. GOLDSMITH.

TEMPERAMENT, TEMPERATURE.

TEMPERAMENT and TEMPERATURE are both used to express that state which arises from the tempering of opposite or varying qualities; the *temperament* is said of animal bodies, and the *temperature* of the atmosphere. Men of a sanguine *temperament* ought to be cautious in their diet; all bodies are strongly affected by the *temperature* of the air.

Without a proper *temperament* for the particular art which he studies, his utmost pains will be to no purpose. BUDGELL.

Oh happy England, where there is such a rare *temperature* of heat and cold! HOWELL.

TEMPLE, CHURCH.

THESE words designate an edifice destined for the exercise of religion, but with collateral ideas, which sufficiently distinguish them from each other. The *templum* of the Latins signified originally an open, elevated spot, marked out by

the augurs with their *lituus*, or sacred wand, whence they could best survey the heavens on all sides: the idea, therefore, of spacious, open, and elevated, enters into the meaning of this word, in the same manner as it does into that of the Hebrew word *hichel*, derived from *hechel*, which in the Arabic signifies great and lofty. The Greek *vao*, from *vaiw*, to inhabit, signifies a dwelling-place, and, by distinction, the dwelling-place of the Almighty; in which sense the Hebrew word is also taken to denote the high and holy place where Jehovah peculiarly dwelleth, otherwise called the *holy heavens*, Jehovah's dwelling or resting-place; whence St. Paul calls our bodies the *temples* of God when the Spirit of God dwelleth in us. The Roman poets used the word *templum* in a similar sense.

Cœli tonitralia templa. LUCRET.

Qui templa cœli summa sonitu crederit. TERENT.

Contremuit templum magnum Jovis altitonantis. ENNIUS.

The word TEMPLE, therefore, strictly signifies a spacious open place set apart for the peculiar presence and worship of the Divine Being: it is applied with particular propriety to the sacred edifices of the Jews, but may be applied to any sacred place without distinction of religion.

Here we have no temple but the wood, no assembly but horn beasts. SHAKESPEARE.

CHURCH, in Saxon *circe*, German, etc., *kirche*, Greek *κυριακος*, from *κυριος*, a lord, signifies literally what belonged to a lord, and by Christians was applied to that which belonged to our Lord and Saviour; as the Lord's Supper, the Lord's day; and, in a particular manner, as the Lord's House; in which sense it has been retained to the present day. A church is therefore a building consecrated to the Lord, and from the earliest periods of building churches this was done by some solemn ordinance.

That churches were consecrated unto none but the Lord only the very general name chiefly doth sufficiently point out: church doth signify no other than the Lord's House. HOOKER.

The word church has by a figure of speech been applied to any building consecrated to the service of the true God.

Truth it is, the patriarchs for a great number of years had neither temple nor church to resort unto. The cause was, they were not stayed in any place, but were in a continual peregrination and wandering that they could not conveniently build any church. BEVERIDGE.

Church, in the sense of a religious assembly, is altogether a different word, bearing no affinity to the word temple.

TEMPORARY, TRANSIENT, TRANSITORY, FLEETING.

TEMPORARY, from *tempus*, time, characterizes that which is intended to last only for a time, in distinction from that which is permanent; offices depending upon a state of war are *temporary*, in distinction from those which are connected with internal policy: TRANSIENT, that is, passing, or in the act of passing, characterizes what in its nature exists only for the moment: a glance is *transient*. TRANSITORY, that is, apt to pass away, characterizes everything in the world which is formed only to exist for a time, and then to pass away; thus our pleasures, and our pains, and our very being, are denominated *transitory*. FLEETING, which is derived from the verb to fly and flight, is but a stronger term to express the same idea as *transitory*.

By the force of superior principles the temporary prevalence of passions may be restrained. JOHNSON.

Any sudden diversion of the spirits, or the justling in of a transient thought, is able to deface the little images of things (in the memory). SOUTH.

Man is a transitory being. JOHNSON.

Thus when my fleeting days at last, Unheeded, silently are past, Calmly I shall resign my breath, In life unknown, forgot in death. SPECTATOR.

TENACIOUS, PERTINACIOUS.

To be TENACIOUS is to hold a thing close, to let it go with reluctance: to be PERTINACIOUS is to hold it out in spite of what can be advanced against it, the prepositive syllable *per* having an intensive force. A man of a *tenacious* temper insists on trifles that are supposed to affect his importance; a *pertinacious* temper insists on everything which is apt to affect his opinions. *Tenacity* and *pertinacity* are both foibles, but the former is sometimes more excus-

able than the latter. We may be *tenacious* of that which is good, as when a man is *tenacious* of whatever may affect his honor; but we cannot be *pertinacious* in anything but our opinions, and that too in cases when they are least defensible. It commonly happens that people are most *tenacious* of being thought to possess that in which they are most deficient, and most *pertinacious* in maintaining that which is most absurd. A liar is *tenacious* of his reputation for truth: sophists, freethinkers, and sceptics are the most *pertinacious* objectors to what- ever is established.

So *tenacious* are we of the old ecclesiastical modes, that very little alteration has been made in them since the fourteenth or fifteenth century; adhering to our old settled maxim, never entirely, nor at once, to depart from antiquity.

BURKE.

The most *pertinacious* and vehement demonstrator may be wearied in time by continual negation.

JOHNSON.

## TENDENCY, DRIFT, SCOPE, AIM.

TENDENCY, from to *tend*, denotes the property of tending toward a certain point, which is the characteristic of all these words, but this is applied only to things; and DRIFT, from the verb to *drive*; SCOPE, from the Greek *σκοπεμα*, to look; and AIM, from the verb to *aim* (*v. Aim*), all characterize the thoughts of a person looking forward into futurity, and directing his actions to a certain point. Hence we speak of the *tendency* of certain principles or practices as being pernicious; the *drift* of a person's discourse; the *scope* which he gives himself either in treating of a subject, or in laying down a plan; or a person's *aim* to excel, or *aim* to supplant another, and the like. The *tendency* of many writings in modern times has been to unhinge the minds of men: where a person wants the services of another, whom he dares not openly solicit, he will discover his wishes by the *drift* of his discourse: a man of a comprehensive mind will allow himself full *scope* in digesting his plans for every alteration which circumstances may require when they come to be developed: our desires will naturally give a cast to all our *aims*; and, so long as they are but innocent, they are necessary to give a proper stimulus to exertion.

It is no wonder if a great deal of knowledge, which is not capable of making a man wise, has a natural *tendency* to make him vain and arrogant.

ADDISON.

This said, the whole audience soon found out his *drift*. The convention was summoned in favor of Swift.

SWIFT.

Merit in every rank has the freest *scope* (in England).

BLAIR.

Each nobler *aim*, repress'd by long control,  
Now sinks at last, or feebly mans the soul.

GOLDSMITH.

## TENET, POSITION.

THE TENET is the opinion which we hold in our minds; the POSITION is that which we lay down for others. Our *tenets* may be hurtful, our *positions* false. He who gives up his *tenets* readily evinces an unstable mind; he who argues on a false *position* shows more tenacity and subtlety than good-sense. The *tenets* of the different denominations of Christians are scarcely to be known or distinguished; they often rest upon such trivial points: the *positions* which an author lays down must be very definite and clear when he wishes to build upon them any theory or system.

The occasion of Luther's being first disgusted with the *tenets* of the Romish Church is known to every one the least conversant with history.

ROBERTSON.

To the *position* of Tully, that if virtue could be seen she must be loved, may be added, that if truth could be heard, she must be obeyed.

JOHNSON.

## TERM, LIMIT, BOUNDARY.

TERM, in Latin *terminus*, from the Greek *τερμα*, an end, is the point that ends, and that to which we direct our steps: LIMIT, from the Latin *limes*, a landmark, is the line which marks: BOUNDARY, from to *bound*, is the obstacle which interrupts our progress, and prevents us from passing.

We are either carried toward or away from the *term*; we either keep within *limits*, or we overstep them; we contract or extend a *boundary*. The *term* and the *limit* belong to the thing; by them it is ended: the *boundary* is that which is made or conceived by the person *bounding*. The *term* is the point that terminates; the *limit* is either a line or point which marks where to stop; the *boundary* is a line which includes a space, and points out the extent beyond which one

may not pass. The Straits of Gibraltar was the *term* of Hercules's voyages: it was said, with more eloquence than truth, that the *limits* of the Roman empire were those of the world: the sea, the Alps, and the Pyrenees are the natural *boundaries* of France.

Then heav'd the goddess in her mighty hand  
A stone, the *limit* of the neighboring land.

DRYDEN.

But still his native country lies  
Beyond the *bound'ries* of the skies.

COTTON.

So likewise in application to moral objects. We mostly reach the term of our prosperity when we attempt to pass the *limits* which Providence has assigned to human efforts: human ambition often finds a *boundary* set to its gratification by circumstances which were the most unlooked for, and apparently the least adapted to bring about such important results. We see the *term* of our evils only in the term of our life: our desires have no *limits*; their gratification only serves to extend our prospects indefinitely: those only are happy whose fortune is the *boundary* of their desires.

No *term* of time this union shall divide.

DRYDEN.

Corruption is a reciprocal to generation; and they two are as nature's two *terms* or boundaries, and the guides to life and death.

BACON.

Providence has fixed the *limits* of human enjoyment by immovable *boundaries*.

JOHNSON.

## TERRITORY, DOMINION.

BOTH these terms respect a portion of country under a particular government; but the word TERRITORY brings to our minds the land which is included; DOMINION conveys to our minds the power which is exercised; the *territory* speaks of that which is in its nature bounded; *dominion* may be said of that which is boundless. A petty prince has his *territory*; the monarch of a great empire has *dominions*. It is the object of every ruler to guard his *territory* against the irruptions of an enemy; ambitious monarchs are always aiming to extend their *dominions*.

The conquered *territory* was divided among the Spanish invaders, according to rules which custom had introduced.

ROBERTSON.

And, while the heroic Pyrrhus shines in arms,  
Our wide *dominions* shall the world o'errun.

TRAPP.

## THANKFULNESS, GRATITUDE.

THANKFULNESS, or a *fulness* of *thanks*, is the outward expression of a *grateful* feeling. GRATITUDE, from the Latin *gratitudo*, is the feeling itself. Our *thankfulness* is measured by the number of our words; our *gratitude* is measured by the nature of our actions. A person appears very *thankful* at the time who afterward proves very *ungrateful*. *Thankfulness* is the beginning of *gratitude*: *gratitude* is the completion of *thankfulness*.

He scarcely would give me thanks for what I had done, for fear that *thankfulness* might have an introduction of reward.

SIDNEY.

Shall the commonness and continuance of these exceeding favors abate and enervate our *gratitude*, which in all reason should mainly increase and confirm it?

BARROW.

## THEORY, SPECULATION.

THEORY, from the Greek *θεωμα*, to behold, and SPECULATION, from the Latin *speculo*, to behold, are both employed to express what is seen with the mind's eye. *Theory* is the fruit of reflection, it serves the purposes of science; practice will be incomplete when the *theory* is false; *speculation* belongs more to the imagination; it has therefore less to do with realities: it is that which is rarely to be reduced to practice, and can therefore seldom be brought to the test of experience.

True piety without cessation tost

By *theories*, the practice past is lost.

DENHAM.

You were the prime object of my *speculation*.

HOWELL.

Hence it arises that *theory* is contrasted sometimes with the practice, to designate its insufficiency to render a man complete; and *speculation* is put for that which is fanciful and unreal: a general who is so only in *theory* will acquit himself miserably in the field; a religionist who is so only in *speculation* will make a wretched Christian.

True Christianity depends on fact;

Religion is not *theory*, but act.

HARTE.

It is amusing enough to trace the progress of a philosophical fancy let loose in airy *speculation*.

GOLDSMITH.

## THEREFORE, CONSEQUENTLY, ACCORDINGLY.

THEREFORE, that is, for this reason, marks a deduction; CONSEQUENTLY,

that is, in *consequence*, marks a *consequence*; ACCORDINGLY, that is, according to some thing, implies an agreement or adaptation. *Therefore* is employed particularly in abstract reasoning; *consequently* is employed either in reasoning or in the narrative style; *accordingly* is used principally in the narrative style. Young persons are perpetually liable to fall into error through inexperience; they ought *therefore* the more willingly to submit themselves to the guidance of those who can direct them: the world is now reduced to a state of little better than moral anarchy; *consequently* nothing but religion and good government can bring the people back to the use of their sober senses: every preparation was made, and every precaution was taken; *accordingly* at the fixed hour they proceeded to the place of destination.

If you cut off the top branches of a tree, it will not *therefore* cease to grow. HUGHES.

Reputation is power; *consequently* to despise is to weaken. SOUTH.

The pathetic, as Longinus observes, may animate the sublime; but is not essential to it. *Accordingly*, as he further remarks, we very often find that those who excel most in stirring up the passions very often want the talent of writing in the sublime manner. ADDISON.

## THICK, DENSE.

BETWEEN THICK and DENSE there is little other difference, than that the latter is employed to express that species of *thickness* which is philosophically considered as the property of the atmosphere in a certain condition: hence we speak of *thick* in regard to hard or soft bodies, as a *thick* board or *thick* cotton; solid or liquid, as a *thick* cheese or *thick* milk; but the term *dense* mostly in regard to the air in its various forms, as a *dense* air, a *dense* vapor, a *dense* cloud, and figuratively a *dense* population.

He from *thick* films shall purge the visual ray,  
And on the sightless eyeballs pour the day. POPE.

I have discovered, by a long series of observations, that invention and elocution suffer great impediments from *dense* and impure vapors. JOHNSON.

## THIN, SLENDER, SLIGHT, SLIM.

THIN, in Saxon *thinne*, German *dünn*, Latin *tener*, from *teno*, in Greek *τενω*, to extend or draw out, and the Hebrew *taken*, to grind or reduce to powder.

SLENDER, SLIGHT, and SLIM are all variations from the German *schlank*, which are connected with the words *slime* and *sling*, as also with the German *schlingen*, to wind or wreath, and *schlange*, a serpent, designating the property of length and smallness, which is adapted for bending or twisting. *Thin* is the generic term, the rest are specific: *thin* may be said of that which is small and short, as well as small and long; *slender* is always said of that which is small and long at the same time: a board is *thin* which wants solidity or substance: a poplar is *slender*, because its tallness is disproportioned to its magnitude or the dimensions of its circumference. *Thinness* is sometimes a natural property; *slight* and *slim* are applied to that which is artificial: the leaves of trees are of a *thin* texture; a board may be made *slight* by continually planing; a paper box is very *slim*. *Thinness* is a good property sometimes; *thin* paper is frequently preferred to that which is thick: *slightness* and *slimness*, which is a greater degree of *slightness*, are always defects; that which is made *slight* is unfit to bear the stress that will be put upon it; that which is *slim* is altogether unfit for the purpose proposed: a carriage that is made *slight* is quickly broken, and always out of repair; paper is altogether too *slim* to serve the purpose of wood.

Remembrance and reflection, how allied!  
What *thin* partitions sense from thought divide! POPE.

The Ionic order doth represent a feminine kind of *slenderness*. WOTTON.

There is but a very *slight* depth, in comparison of the distance to the centre. GOLDSMITH.

I was jogged on the elbow by a *slim* young girl of seventeen. ADDISON.

*Thinness* is a natural property of many bodies, whether solid or fluid; *slender* and *slight* have a moral and figurative application.

I have found dulness to quicken into sentiment in a *thin* ether. JOHNSON.

Very *slender* differences will sometimes part those whom beneficence has united. JOHNSON.

Friendship is often destroyed by a thousand secret and *slight* competitions. JOHNSON.

## TO THINK, REFLECT, PONDER, MUSE.

THINK, in Saxon *thincan*, German *denken*, etc., comes from the Hebrew

*dan*, to direct, rule, or judge. REFLECT, in Latin *reflecto*, signifies literally to bend back, that is, to bend the mind back on itself. PONDER, from *pondus*, a weight, signifies to weigh. MUSE, from *musa*, a song, signifies to dwell upon with the imagination.

To *think* is a general and indefinite term; to *reflect* is a particular mode of *thinking*; to *ponder* and *muse* are different modes of *reflecting*, the former on grave matters, the latter on matters that interest either the affections or the imagination: we *think* whenever we receive or recall an idea to the mind; but we *reflect* only by recalling, not one only, but many ideas: we *think* if we only suffer the ideas to revolve in succession in the mind; but in *reflecting* we compare, combine, and judge of those ideas which thus pass in the mind: we *think*, therefore, of things past, as they are pleasurable or otherwise; we *reflect* upon them as they are applicable to our present condition: we may *think* on things past, present, or to come; we *reflect*, *ponder*, and *muse* mostly on that which is past or present. The man *thinks* on the days of his childhood, and wishes them back; the child *thinks* on the time when he shall be a man, and is impatient until it is come: the man *reflects* on his past follies, and tries to profit by experience; he *ponders* on any serious concern that affects his destiny, and *muses* on the happy events of his childhood.

No man was ever weary of *thinking*, much less of *thinking* that he had done well or virtuously. SOUTH.

Let men but *reflect* upon their own observation, and consider impartially with themselves how few in the world they have known made better by age. SOUTH.

Stood on the brink of hell, and look'd awhile  
*Pond'ring* his voyage. MILTON.

I was sitting on a sofa one evening, after I had been caressed by Amurath, and my imagination kindled as I *mused*. HAWKSWORTH.

## TO THINK, SUPPOSE, IMAGINE, BELIEVE, DEEM.

To THINK is here, as in the preceding article, the generic term. It expresses, in common with the other terms, the act of having a particular idea in the mind; but it is indefinite as to the mode and the object of the action. To *think*

may be the act of the understanding, or merely of the *imagination*: to SUPPOSE and IMAGINE are rather the acts of the *imagination* than of the understanding. To *think*, that is, to have any thought or opinion upon a subject, requires reflection; it is the work of time: to *suppose* and *imagine* may be the acts of the moment. We *think* a thing right or wrong; we *suppose* it to be true or false; we *imagine* it to be real or unreal. To *think* is employed promiscuously in regard to all objects, whether actually existing or not, or, if existing, are above our comprehension: to *suppose* applies to those which are uncertain or precarious; *imagine*, to those which are unreal. *Think* and *imagine* are said of that which affects the senses immediately; *suppose* is only said of that which occupies the mind. We *think* that we hear a noise as soon as the sound catches our attention; in certain states of the body or mind we *imagine* we hear noises which were never made: we *think* that a person will come to-day, because he has informed us that he intends to do so; we *suppose* that he will come to-day, at a certain hour, because he came at the same hour yesterday.

If to conceive how anything can be  
From shape extracted, and locality,  
Is hard: what *think* you of the Deity? JENTENS.

It is absurd to *suppose* that while the relations, in which we stand to our fellow-creatures, naturally call forth certain sentiments and affections, there should be none to correspond to the first and greatest of all beings. BLAIR.

How ridiculous must it be to *imagine* that the clergy of England favor popery, when they cannot be clergymen without renouncing it. BEVERIDGE.

In regard to moral points, in which case the word DEEM may be compared with the others, to *think* is a conclusion drawn from certain premises. I *think* that a man has acted wrong: to *suppose* is to take up an idea arbitrarily or at pleasure; we argue upon a *supposed* case, merely for the sake of argument: to *imagine* is to take up an idea by accident, or without any connection with the truth or reality; we imagine that a person is offended with us, without being able to assign a single reason for the idea; *imaginary* evils are even more numerous than those which are real: to *deem* is to

form a conclusion; things are deemed hurtful or otherwise in consequence of observation.

We sometimes think we could a speech produce  
Much to the purpose, if our tongues were loose.  
COWPER.

It moves me more, perhaps, than folly ought,  
When some green heads, as void of wit as thought,  
Suppose themselves monopolists of sense.  
COWPER.

An empty house is by the players deemed the  
most dreadful sign of popular disapprobation.  
HAWKSWORTH.

To think and believe are both opposite to knowing or perceiving; but think is a more partial action than believe: we think as the thing strikes us at the time; we believe from a settled deduction: hence it expresses much less to say that I think a person speaks the truth, than that I believe that he speaks the truth. I think from what I can recollect that such and such were the words, is a vague mode of speech, not admissible in a court of law as positive evidence: the natural question which follows upon this is, do you firmly believe it? to which whoever can answer in the affirmative, with the appearance of sincerity, must be admitted as a testimony. Hence it arises that the word can only be employed in matters that require but little thought in order to come to a conclusion; and believe is applicable to things that must be admitted only on substantial evidence. We are at liberty to say that I think, or I believe that the account is made out right; but, we must say, that I believe, not think, that the Bible is the word of God.

They think that they (the objectors) do not believe it (the Gospel) who do not take care that it should be preached to the poor.  
BURKE.

For they can conquer who believe they can.  
DRYDEN.

THOUGHTFUL, CONSIDERATE, DELIBERATE.

THOUGHTFUL, or full of thinking (v. To think, reflect); CONSIDERATE, or ready to consider (v. To consider, reflect); and DELIBERATE, ready to deliberate (v. To consult), rise upon each other in their signification: he who is thoughtful does not forget his duty; he who is considerate pauses, and considers properly what is his duty; he who deliberates, considers deliberately. It is a recommen-

dation to a subordinate person to be thoughtful in doing what is wished of him: it is the recommendation of a confidential person to be considerate, as he has often to judge according to his own discretion; it is the recommendation of a person who is acting for himself in critical matters to be deliberate. There is this further distinction in the word deliberate, that it may be used in the bad sense to mark a settled intention to do evil: young people may sometimes plead in extenuation of their guilt that their misdeeds do not arise from deliberate malice.

Men's minds are in general inclined to levity, much more than to thoughtful melancholy.  
BLAIR.

Some things will not bear much zeal; and the more earnest we are about them, the less we recommend ourselves to the approbation of sober and considerate men.  
TILLOTSON.

There is a vast difference between sins of infirmity and those of presumption, as vast as between inadvertency and deliberation.  
SOUTH.

#### THREAT, MENACE.

THREAT is of Saxon origin; MENACE is of Latin extraction. They do not differ in signification; but, as is frequently the case, the Saxon is the familiar term, and the Latin word is employed only in the higher style. We may be threatened with either small or great evils; but we are menaced only with great evils. One individual threatens to strike another: a general menaces the enemy with an attack. We are threatened by things as well as persons: we are menaced by persons only (or things personified): a person is threatened with a look: he is menaced with a prosecution by his adversary.

By turns put on the suppliant and the lord;  
Threaten'd this moment, and the next implor'd.  
PRIOR.

Of the sharp axe  
Regardless, that o'er his devoted head  
Hangs menacing.  
SOMERVILLE.

#### TIME, SEASON.

TIME is here the generic term; it is taken either for the whole or the part: SEASON is any given portion of time. We speak of time when the simple idea of time only is to be expressed; as the time of the day, or the time of the year; the season is spoken in reference to some

circumstances; the year is divided into four parts, called the seasons, according to the nature of the weather: hence it is that in general that time is called the season which is suitable for any particular purpose; youth is the season for improvement. It is a matter of necessity to choose the time; it is an affair of wisdom to choose the season.

You will often want religion in times of most danger.  
CHATHAM.

Piso's behavior toward us in this season of affliction has endeared him to us.  
MELMOTH'S LETTERS OF CICERO.

#### TIME, PERIOD, AGE, DATE, ERA, EPOCH.

TIME (v. Time) is, as before, taken either for time in general, or time in particular; all the other terms are taken for particular portions of time. In the sense of a particular portion of time, the word time is applied generally and indefinitely.

There is a time when we should not only number our days, but our hours.  
YOUNG.

Time included within any given points is termed a PERIOD, from the Greek *περιόδος*, signifying a course, round, or any revolution: thus, the period of day, or of night, is the space of time comprehended between the rising and setting, or setting and rising of the sun; the period of a year comprehends the space which, according to astronomers, the earth requires for its annual revolution. So, in an extended and moral application, we have stated periods in our life for particular things: during the period of infancy a child is in a state of total dependence on its parents; a period of apprenticeship has been appointed for youth to learn different trades.

Some experiment would be made how by art to make plants more lasting than their ordinary period, as to make a stalk of wheat last a whole year.  
BACON.

The period is sometimes taken not only for the space of time included between two points of time, but sometimes for the terminating point; in this sense, to put a period to a thing is to terminate its existence, to destroy it.

But the last period, and the fatal hour,  
Of Troy is come.  
DENHAM.

The AGE is the period comprehended within the life of one man, or of numbers living at the same time, and consequently refers to what is done by men living within that period: hence we speak of the different ages that have existed since the commencement of the world, and characterize this or that age by the particular degrees of vice or virtue, genius, and the like, for which it is distinguished.

The story of Haman only shows us what human nature has too generally appeared to be in every age.  
BLAIR.

The date is properly the point of time which is marked on a writing, either to show the time when it was written, as the date of a letter, or to show when any contract is to be performed, or thing done, as the date of a bill of exchange. As the date in the first case shows when anything has been done, the word date may be applied generally to the time of any past event, as a thing of late date, or early date; so of a thing out of date, which is so long gone by as that the date of it is not known.

This mountain was formed by the first eruption that destroyed the country of Mel Passi, and is of a very old date.  
BRYDENE.

As the date in the second case shows how long it will be before a thing is to be done, as a bill of short date shows that it has but a short time to run, so the term date may be applied to the duration of any event.

Plantations have one advantage in them which is not to be found in most other works, as they give a pleasure of a more lasting date.  
ADDISON.

ERA, in Latin *æra*, probably from *æs*, brass, signifying coin with which one computes; and EPOCH, from the Greek *εποχη*, from *επεχω*, to stop, signifying a resting-place; both refer to points of time that are in some manner marked or distinguished; but the former is more commonly employed in the literal sense for points of computation in chronology, as the Christian *era*; the latter is indefinitely employed for any period distinguished by remarkable events: the captivity of the Jews is an *epoch* in the history of that nation. The terms may also be figuratively employed in the latter sense, as an eventful *era*.

That *period* of the Athenian history which is included within the *era* of Pisistratus, and the death of Menander the comic poet, may justly be styled the literary *age* of Greece. CUMBERLAND.

The institution of this library (by Pisistratus) forms a signal *epocha* in the annals of literature. CUMBERLAND.

## TIMELY, SEASONABLE.

THE same distinction exists between the epithets TIMELY and SEASONABLE as between *time* and *season* in the preceding article. The former signifies within the time, that is, before the time is past; the latter according to the season, or what the season requires. A *timely* notice prevents that which would otherwise happen; a *seasonable* hint seldom fails of its effect because it is *seasonable*. We must not expect to have a *timely* notice of death, but must be prepared for it at any time; an admonition to one who is on a sick-bed is very *seasonable*, when given by a minister or a friend. The opposites of these terms are *untimely* or *ill-timed* and *unseasonable*: *untimely* is directly opposed to *timely*, signifying before the time appointed; as an *untimely* death: but *ill-timed* is indirectly opposed, signifying in the wrong *time*; as an *ill-timed* remark.

It imports all men, especially bad men, to think on the judgment, that by a *timely* repentance they may prevent the woful effects of it.

SOUTH.  
What you call a bold, is not only the kindest, but the most *seasonable* proposal you could have made. LOCKE.

## TIME-SERVING, TEMPORIZING.

TIME-SERVING and TEMPORIZING are both applied to the conduct of one who adapts himself servilely to the time and season; but a *time-server* is rather active, and a *temporizer* passive. A *time-server* avows those opinions which will serve his purpose: the *temporizer* forbears to avow those which are likely for the time being to hurt him. The former acts from a desire of gain, the latter from a fear of loss. *Time-servers* are of all parties, as they come in the way: *temporizers* are of no party, as occasion requires. Sycophant courtiers must always be *time-servers*: ministers of state are frequently *temporizers*.

Ward had complied during the late times, and held in by taking the covenant: so he was hated by the high men as a *time-server*. BURNET.

Feeble and *temporizing* measures will always be the result, when men assemble to deliberate in a situation where they ought to act.

ROBERTSON.

## TORMENT, TORTURE.

TORMENT (*v. To tease*) and TORTURE both come from *torqueo*, to twist, and express the agony which arises from a violent twisting or griping of any part; but the latter, which is more immediately derived from the verb, expresses much greater violence and consequent pain than the former. *Torture* is an excess of *torment*. We may be *tormented* by a variety of indirect means; but we are mostly said to be *tortured* by the direct means of the rack, or similar instrument. *Torment* may be permanent: *torture* is only for a time, or on certain occasions. It is related in history that a person was once *tormented* to death, by a violent and incessant beating of drums in his prison: the Indians practice every species of *torture* upon their prisoners; whence the application of these terms to moral objects. A guilty conscience may *torment* a man all his life: the horrors of an awakened conscience are a *torture* to one who is on his death-bed.

Yet in his empire o'er thy abject breast,  
His flames and *torments* only are express'd.

PRIOR.

To a wild sonnet or a wanton air,  
Offence and *torture* to a sober ear.

PRIOR.

## TRADE, COMMERCE, TRAFFIC, DEALING.

TRADE, in Italian *tratto*, Latin *tracto*, to treat, signifies the transaction of business. COMMERCE, *v. Intercourse*. TRAFFIC, in French *traffique*, Italian *traffico*, compounded of *tra* or *trans* and *facio*, signifies to make to pass over from hand to hand. DEALING, from the verb to *deal*, in German *theilen*, to divide, signifies to get together in parts according to a certain ratio, or at a given price.

The leading idea in *trade* is that of carrying on business for purposes of gain; the rest are but modes of *trade*; *commerce* is a mode of *trade* by exchange: *traffic* is a sort of personal *trade*, a sending from hand to hand; *dealing* is a bargaining or calculating kind of *trade*. *Trade* is either on a large or small scale; *commerce* is always on a large scale: we

may *trade* retail or wholesale; we always carry on *commerce* by wholesale: *trade* is either within or without the country; *commerce* is always between different countries: there may be a *trade* between two towns; but there is a *commerce* between France and America, between France and Germany: hence it arises that the general term *trade* is of inferior import when compared with *commerce*. The *commerce* of a country, in the abstract and general sense, conveys more to our mind, and is a more noble expression, than the *trade* of the country, as the merchant ranks higher than the *tradesman*, and a *commercial* house than a *trading* concern. *Trade* may be altogether domestic, and between neighbors; the *traffic* is that which goes backward and forward between any two or more points: in this manner there may be a great *traffic* between two towns or cities, as between London and the capitals of the different counties. *Trade* may consist simply in buying and selling according to a stated valuation; *dealings* are carried on in matters that admit of a variation: hence we speak of *dealers* in wool, in corn, seeds, and the like, who buy up portions of these goods, more or less, according to the state of the market.

The statesman, lawyer, merchant, man of *trade*,  
Pants for the refuge of some rural shade.

COWPER.

Instructed ships shall sail to quick *commerce*,  
By which remotest regions are allied,  
Which makes one city of the universe,  
Where some may gain, and all may be supplied.

DRYDEN.

But ah! what wish can prosper, or what prayer  
For merchants rich in cargoes of despair,  
Who drive a loathsome *traffic*, gauge and span,  
And buy the bones and muscles of the man?

COWPER.

The doctor must needs die rich, he had great  
*dealings* in his way.

SWIFT.

*Trade*, however, in its most extended sense, comprehends all the rest.

*Trade*, without enlarging the British territories, has given us a kind of additional empire.

ADDISON.

These terms admit of the same distinction when applied to moral objects.

Disinterested good, is not our *trade*.

COWPER.

And drives thee out from the society  
And *commerce* of mankind for breach of faith.

SOUTHERN.

How hast thou dar'd to think so vilely of me,  
That I would condescend to thy mean arts,  
And *traffic* with thee for a prince's ruin? ROWE.

Whose own hard *dealings* teach them to suspect  
The thoughts of others.

SHAKESPEARE.

## TO TRANSFIGURE, TRANSFORM, METAMORPHOSE.

TRANSFIGURE is to make to pass over into another figure; TRANSFORM and METAMORPHOSE is to put into another form; the former being said only of spiritual beings, and particularly in reference to our Saviour; the other two terms being applied to that which has a corporeal form.

*Transformation* is commonly applied to that which changes its outward form; in this manner a harlequin *transforms* himself into all kinds of shapes and likenesses. *Metamorphosis* is applied to the form internal as well as external, that is, to the whole nature; in this manner Ovid describes, among others, the *metamorphoses* of Narcissus into a flower, and Daphne into a laurel: with the same idea we may speak of a rustic being *metamorphosed*, by the force of art, into a fine gentleman.

We have of this gentleman a piece of the *transfiguration*, which I think is held a work second to none in the world.

STEELE.

A lady's shift may be *metamorphosed* into billets-doux, and come into her possession a second time.

ADDISON.

Can a good intention, or rather a very wicked one so miscalled, *transform* perjury and hypocrisy into merit and perfection?

SOUTH.

## TREACHEROUS, TRAITOROUS, TREASONABLE.

THESE epithets are all applied to one who betrays his trust; but TREACHEROUS (*v. Faithless*) respects a man's private relations; TRAITOROUS, his public relation to his prince and his country: he is a *treacherous* friend, and a *traitorous* subject. We may be *treacherous* to our enemies as well as our friends, for nothing can lessen the obligation to be faithful in keeping a promise; we may be *traitorous* to our country by abstaining to lend that aid which is in our power. *Traitorous* and TREASONABLE are both applicable to subjects: but the former is extended to all public acts; the latter only to those which affect the su-