

sense to what may be usefully employed: *use* to that which is actually so employed; things are said to be of general *utility*, or a thing is said to be of a particular *use*.

Those things which have long gone together are confederate, whereas new things piece not so well; but, though they help by their *utility*, yet they trouble by their inconformity. BACON.

The Greeks in the heroic age seem to have been unacquainted with the *use* of iron. ROBERTSON.

The word *use* refers us to the employment of things generally, and the advantage derived from such *use*; *service*, the particular state or capacity of a thing to be usefully employed. It is most proper, therefore, to say that prayers and entreaties are of *use*; but in speaking of tools, weapons, and the like, to say they are of *service*. Prudence forbids us to destroy anything that may be of *use*; economy enjoins upon us not to throw aside anything as long as it is fit for *service*.

A man with great talents but void of discretion is like Polyphemus in the fable, strong and blind, endued with an irresistible force, which for want of sight is of no *use* to him. ADDISON.

Perhaps it might be of *service* to these people (hypochondriacs) to wear some electric substance next their skin, to defend the nerves and fibres from the damp of non-electric air. BRYDENE.

All the preceding terms are taken absolutely: AVAIL is a term of relative import; it respects the circumstances under which a thing may be fit or otherwise to be employed with efficacy. When entreaties are found to be of no *avail*, females sometimes try the force of tears.

What does it *avail*, though Seneca had taught as good morality as Christ himself from the mount? CUMBERLAND.

TO UTTER, SPEAK, ARTICULATE, PRONOUNCE.

UTTER, from *out*, signifies to put out; that is, to send forth a sound: this, therefore, is a more general term than SPEAK, which is to *utter* an intelligible sound. We may *utter* a groan; we *speak* words only, or that which is intended to serve as words. To *speak*, therefore, is only a species of *utterance*; a dumb man has *utterance*, but not *speech*. ARTICULATE and PRONOUNCE are modes of *speaking*; to *articulate*, from *articulum*, a joint,

is to *pronounce* distinctly the letters or syllables of words; which is the first effort of a child beginning to *speak*. It is of great importance to make a child *articulate* every letter when he first begins to *speak* or read. To *pronounce*, from the Latin *pronuncio*, to speak out loud, is a formal mode of *speaking*. A child must first *articulate* the letters and the syllables, then he *pronounces* or sets forth the whole word; this is necessary before he can *speak* to be understood.

At each word that my destruction *utter'd* My heart recoiled. OTWAY.

What you keep by you, you may change and mend, But words once *spoke* can never be recall'd. WALLER.

The torments of disease can sometimes only be signified by groans or sobs, or *inarticulate* ejaculations. JOHNSON.

*Speak* the speech, I pray you, as I *pronounced* it to you. SHAKESPEARE.

V.

VACANCY, VACUITY, INANITY.

VACANCY and VACUITY both denote the space unoccupied, or the abstract quality of being unoccupied. INANITY, from the Latin *inanis*, denotes the abstract quality of emptiness, or of not containing anything; hence the former terms *vacancy* and *vacuity* are used in an indifferent sense; *inanity* always in a bad sense: there may be a *vacancy* in the mind, or a *vacancy* in life, which we may or may not fill up as we please; but *inanity* of character denotes the want of the essentials that constitute a character.

There are *vacuities* in the happiest life, which it is not in the power of the world to fill. BLAIR.

When I look up and behold the heavens, it makes me scorn the world and the pleasures thereof, considering the vanity of these and the *inanity* of the other. HOWELL.

VAIN, INEFFECTUAL, FRUITLESS.

THESE epithets are all applied to our endeavors; but the term VAIN (*v. Idle*) is the most general and indefinite; the other terms are particular and definite. What we aim at, as well as what we

strive for, may be *vain*; but INEFFECTUAL, that is, not *effectual* (*v. Effective*), and FRUITLESS, that is, without *fruit*, signifying not producing the desired fruit of one's labor, refer only to the termination or value of our labors. When the object aimed at is general in its import, it is common to term the endeavor *vain* when it cannot attain this object: it is *vain* to attempt to reform a person's character until he is convinced that he stands in need of reformation; when the means employed are inadequate for the attainment of the particular end, it is usual to call the endeavor *ineffectual*; cool arguments will be *ineffectual* in convincing any one inflamed with a particular passion: when labor is specifically employed for the attainment of a particular object, it is usual to term it *fruitless* if it fail: peace-makers will often find themselves in this condition, that their labors will be rendered *fruitless* by the violent passions of angry opponents.

Nature aloud calls out for balmy rest, But all in *vain*. GENTLEMAN.

After many *fruitless* overtures, the Inca, despairing of any cordial union with a Spaniard, attacked him by surprise with a numerous body. ROBERTSON.

Thou thyself with scorn And anger wouldst resent the offer'd wrong, Though *ineffectual* found. MILTON.

VALUABLE, PRECIOUS, COSTLY.

VALUABLE signifies fit to be *valued*; PRECIOUS, having a high price; COSTLY, *costing* much money. *Valuable* expresses directly the idea of *value*; *precious* and *costly* express the same idea indirectly: on the other hand, that which is *valuable* is only said to be fit or deserving of *value*; but *precious* and *costly* denote that which is highly *valuable*, according to the ordinary measure of *valuing* objects, that is, by the *price* they bear; hence, the latter two express the idea much more strongly than the former.

Remote countries cannot convey their commodities by land to those places, when on account of their rarity they are desired and become *valuable*. ROBERTSON.

It is no improper comparison that a thankful heart is like a box of *precious* ointment. HOWELL.

The King gave him all the duke's rich furs, and much of his *costly* household stuff. LLOYD.

They are similarly distinguished in their moral application: a book is *valuable* according to its contents, or according to the estimate which men set upon it, either individually or collectively. The Bible is the only *precious* book in the world that has intrinsic *value*, that is, set above all price. There are many *costly* things, which are only *valuable* to the individuals who are disposed to expend money upon them.

What an absurd thing it is to pass over all the *valuable* parts of a man, and fix our attention on his infirmities! ADDISON.

Two other *precious* drops that ready stood Each in their crystal sluice, he, ere they fell, Kiss'd as the gracious signs of sweet remorse. MILTON.

Christ is sometimes pleased to make the profession of himself *costly*. SOUTH.

VALUE, WORTH, RATE, PRICE.

VALUE, from the Latin *valeo*, to be strong, respects those essential qualities which constitute its strength. WORTH, in German *wert*, from *währen*, to perceive, signifies that good which is experienced or felt to exist in a thing. RATE, *v. Proportion*. PRICE, in Latin *pretium*, from the Greek *πρασσω*, to sell, signifies what a thing is sold for.

*Value* is a general and indefinite term, applied to whatever is conceived to be good in a thing: the *worth* is that good only which is conceived or known as such. The *value*, therefore, of a thing is as variable as the humors and circumstances of men; it may be nothing or something very great in the same object at the same time in the eyes of different men. The *worth* is, however, that *value* which is acknowledged; it is therefore something more fixed and permanent: we speak of the *value* of external objects which are determined by taste; but the *worth* of things as determined by rule. The *value* of a book that is out of print is fluctuating and uncertain; but its real *worth* may not be more than what it would fetch for waste paper. The *rate* and *price* are the measures of that *value* or *worth*; the former in a general, the latter in a particular application to mercantile transactions. Whatever we give in exchange for another thing, whether according to a definite or an indefinite estimation, that is said to be done at a

certain *rate*; thus we purchase pleasure at a dear *rate*, when it is at the expense of our health: *price* is the *rate* of exchange estimated by coin or any other medium: hence *price* is a fixed *rate*, and may be figuratively applied in that sense to moral objects; as, when health is expressly sacrificed to pleasure, it may be termed the *price* of pleasure.

Life has no *value* as an end, but means.  
An end deplorable! A means divine. YOUNG.

Pay  
No moment, but in purchase of its *worth*:  
And what it's *worth* ask death-beds. YOUNG.

If you will take my humor as it runs, you shall have hearty thanks into the bargain for taking it off at such a *rate*.

EARL OF SHAFTESBURY.  
The soul's high *price*  
Is writ in all the conduct of the skies. YOUNG.

## TO VALUE, PRIZE, ESTEEM.

To VALUE is in the literal sense to fix a *value* on a thing. PRIZE, signifying to fix a *price*, and ESTEEM (*v. Esteem*), are both modes of *valuing*.

To *value* is to set any *value*, real or supposititious, relative or absolute, on a thing: in this sense men *value* gold above silver, or an appraiser *values* goods. To *value* may either be applied to material or spiritual subjects, to corporeal or mental actions: *prize* and *esteem* are taken only as mental actions; the former in reference to sensible or moral objects, the latter only to moral objects; we may *value* books according to their market price, or we may *value* them according to their contents; we *prize* books only for their contents, in which sense *prize* is a much stronger term than *value*; we also *prize* men for their usefulness to society; we *esteem* their moral characters.

The *prize*, the beauteous *prize*, I will resign,  
So dearly *valu'd*, and so justly mine. POPE.

Nothing makes women *esteemed* by the opposite sex more than chastity; whether it be that we always *prize* those most who are hardest to come at, or that nothing besides chastity, with its collateral attendants, fidelity and constancy, gives a man a property in the person he loves.

ADDISON.

## VARIATION, VARIETY.

VARIATION denotes the act of *varying* (*v. To change*); VARIETY denotes the quality of *varying*, or the thing *varied*. The astronomer observes the va-

riations in the heavens; the philosopher observes the *variations* in the climate from year to year. *Variety* is pleasing to all persons, but to none so much as the young and the fickle: there is an infinite *variety* in every species of objects, animate or inanimate.

The idea of *variation* (as a constituent in beauty), without attending so accurately to the manner of *variation*, has led Mr. Hogarth to consider angular figures as beautiful. BURKE.

As to the colors usually found in beautiful bodies, it may be difficult to ascertain them, because in the several parts of nature there is an infinite *variety*. BURKE.

## VENAL, MERCENARY.

VENAL, from the Latin *venalis*, signifies salable or ready to be sold, which, applied as it commonly is to persons, is a much stronger term than MERCENARY (*v. Mercenary*). A *venal* man gives up all principle for interest; a *mercenary* man seeks his interest without regard to principle: *venal* writers are such as write in favor of the cause that can promote them to riches or honors; a servant is commonly a *mercenary*, who gives his services according as he is paid: those who are loudest in their professions of political purity are the best subjects for a minister to make *venal*; a *mercenary* spirit is engendered in the minds of those who devote themselves exclusively to trade.

The minister, well pleas'd at small expense,  
To silence so much rude impertinence,  
With squeeze and whisper yields to his demands,  
And on the *venal* list enroll'd he stands.

JENYNS.

For their assistance they repair to the Northern steel, and bring in an unnatural, *mercenary* crew. SOUTH.

## VENIAL, PARDONABLE.

VENIAL, from the Latin *venia*, pardon or indulgence, is applied to what may be tolerated without express disparagement to the individual, or direct censure; but the PARDONABLE is that which may only escape severe censure, but cannot be allowed: garrulity is a *venial* offence in old age; levity in youth is *pardonable* in single instances.

While the clergy are employed in extirpating mortal sins, I should be glad to rally the world out of indecencies and *venial* transgressions.

CUMBERLAND.

The weaknesses of Elizabeth were not confined to that period of life when they are more *paradonable*. ROBERTSON.

## VERBAL, VOCAL, ORAL.

VERBAL, from *verbum*, a word, signifies after the manner of a spoken word; ORAL, from *os*, a mouth, signifies by word of mouth; and VOCAL, from *vox*, the voice, signifies by the voice: the former two of these words are used to distinguish the speaking from writing; the latter to distinguish the sounds of the voice from any other sounds, particularly in singing: a *verbal* message is distinguished from one written on a paper, or in a note; *oral* tradition is distinguished from that which is handed down to posterity by means of books; *vocal* music is distinguished from instrumental; *vocal* sounds are more harmonious than those which proceed from any other bodies.

Among all the Northern nations, shaking of hands was held necessary to bind the bargain, a custom which we still retain in many *verbal* contracts. BLACKSTONE.

Forth came the human pair,  
And join'd their *vocal* worship to the choir  
Of creatures wanting voice. MILTON.

In the first ages of the world instruction was commonly *oral*. JOHNSON.

## VEXATION, MORTIFICATION, CHAGRIN.

VEXATION (*v. To displease*) springs from a variety of causes, acting unpleasantly on the inclinations or passions of men; MORTIFICATION (*v. To humble*) is a strong degree of *vexation*, which arises from particular circumstances acting on particular passions: the loss of a day's pleasure is a *vexation* to one who is eager for pleasure; the loss of a prize, or the circumstance of coming into disgrace where we expected honor, is a *mortification* to an ambitious person. *Vexation* arises principally from our wishes and views being crossed; *mortification*, from our pride and self-importance being hurt; CHAGRIN, in French *chagrin*, from *aignir*, and the Latin *acer*, sharp, signifying a sharp point, arises from a mixture of the two; disappointments are always attended with more or less of *vexation*, according to the circumstances which give pain and trouble; an exposure of our poverty may be more or less of a *mortification*, according to the value

which we set on wealth and grandeur; a refusal of a request will produce more or less of *chagrin*, as it is accompanied with circumstances more or less *mortifying* to our pride.

Poverty is an evil complicated with so many circumstances of uneasiness and *vexation*, that every man is studious to avoid it. JOHNSON.

I am *mortified* by those compliments which were designed to encourage me. POPE.

It was your purpose to balance my *chagrin* at the inconsiderable effect of that essay, by representing that it obtained some notice. HILL.

## VIEW, SURVEY, PROSPECT.

VIEW (*v. To look*), and SURVEY, compounded of *vey* or *view* and *sur*, over, mark the act of the person, namely, the looking over a thing with more or less attention: PROSPECT, from the Latin *prospectus* and *prospicio*, to see before, designates the thing seen. We take a *view* or *survey*; the *prospect* presents itself: the *view* is of an indefinite extent; the *survey* is always comprehensive in its nature. Ignorant people take but narrow *views* of things; men take more or less enlarged *views*, according to their cultivation: the capacious mind of a genius takes a *survey* of all nature. The *view* depends altogether on the train of a person's thoughts; the *prospect* is set before him, it depends upon the nature of the thing: our *views* of advancement are sometimes very fallacious; our *prospects* are very delusive; both occasion disappointment: the former is the keener, as we have to charge the miscalculation upon ourselves. Sometimes our *prospects* depend upon our *views*, at least in matters of religion; he who forms erroneous *views* of a future state has but a wretched *prospect* beyond the grave.

With inward *view*  
Thence on the ideal kingdom swift she turns  
Her eye. THOMSON.

Fools *view* but part, and not the whole *survey*,  
So crowd existence all into a day. JENYNS.

No land so rude but looks beyond the tomb  
For future *prospects* in a world to come. JENYNS.

## VIEW, PROSPECT, LANDSCAPE.

VIEW and PROSPECT (*v. View, prospect*), though applied here to external objects of sense, have a similar distinction as in the preceding article. The

*view* is not only that which may be seen, but that which is actually seen; the *prospect* is that which may be seen; hence the term *view* is mostly coupled with the person *viewing*, although a *prospect* exists continually, whether seen or not: hence we speak of our *view* being intercepted, but not our *prospect* intercepted; a confined or bounded *view*, but a lively or dreary *prospect*, or the *prospect* clears up or extends.

Ye noble few! who here unbending stand  
Beneath life's pressure, yet bear up awhile,  
And what your bounded *view*, which only saw  
A little part, deemed evil, is no more. THOMSON.

The great eternal scheme,  
Involving all, and in a perfect whole  
Uniting as the *prospect* wider spreads  
To reason's eye refin'd, clears up apace.

THOMSON.

*View* is an indefinite term; it may be said either of a number of objects or of a single object, of a whole or of a part: *prospect* is said only of an aggregate number of objects: we may have a *view* of a town, of a number of scattered houses, of a single house, or of the spire of a steeple; but the *prospect* comprehends that which comes within the range of the eye. *View* may be said of that which is seen directly or indirectly; *prospect* only of that which directly presents itself to the eye: hence a drawing of an object may be termed a *view*, although not a *prospect*. *View* is confined to no particular objects; *prospect* mostly respects rural objects; and LANDSCAPE respects no others. *Landscape*, *landskip*, or *landshape*, denote any portion of country which is in a particular form: hence the *landscape* is a species of *prospect*. A *prospect* may be wide, and comprehend an assemblage of objects both of nature and art; but a *landscape* is narrow, and lies within the compass of the naked eye: hence it is also that *landscape* may be taken for the drawing of a *landscape*, and consequently for a species of *view*: the taking of *views* or *landscapes* is the last exercise of the learner in drawing.

This was this place  
A happy rural seat of various *views*. MILTON.  
Now skies and seas their *prospect* only bound. DRYDEN.

So lovely seem'd  
That *landscape*, and of pure now purer air  
Meets his approach. MILTON.

VIOLENT, FURIOUS, BOISTEROUS, VEHEMENT, IMPETUOUS.

VIOLENT signifies having force (*v. Force*). FURIOUS signifies having *fury* (*v. Anger*). BOISTEROUS in all probability comes from *bestir*, signifying ready to *bestir* or come into motion. VEHEMENT, in Latin *vehemens*, compounded of *veho* and *mens*, signifies carried away by the mind or the force of passion. IMPETUOUS signifies having an *impetus*.

*Violent* is here the most general term, including the idea of force or violence, which is common to them all; it is as general in its application as in its meaning. When *violent* and *furious* are applied to the same objects, the latter expresses a higher degree of the former: a *furious* whirlwind is *violent* beyond measure. *Violent* and *boisterous* are likewise applied to the same objects; but the *boisterous* refers only to the *violence* of the motion or noise: hence we say that a wind is *violent*, inasmuch as it acts with great force upon all bodies; it is *boisterous*, inasmuch as it causes the great motion of bodies: *impetuous*, like *boisterous*, is also applied to bodies moving with great *violence*.

Probably the breadth of it (the passage between Scylla and Charybdis) is greatly increased by the *violent impetuosity* of the current.

BRYDGE.

The *furious* pard,  
Cow'd and subdu'd, flies from the face of man. SOMERVILLE.

Ye too, ye winds! that now begin to blow  
With *boisterous* sweep, I raise my voice to you. THOMSON.

The central waters round *impetuous* rush'd. THOMSON.

These terms are all applied to persons, or what is personal, with a similar distinction: a man is *violent* in his opinions, *violent* in his measures, *violent* in his resentments; he is *furious* in his anger, or has a *furious* temper; he is *vehement* in his affections or passions, *vehement* in love, *vehement* in zeal, *vehement* in pursuing an object, *vehement* in expression: *violence* transfers itself to some external object on which it acts with force; but *vehemence* respects that species of *violence* which is confined to the person himself: we may dread *violence*, because it is always liable to do mischief; we ought to

suppress our *vehemence*, because it is injurious to ourselves: a *violent* partisan renders himself obnoxious to others; a man who is *vehement* in any cause puts it out of his own power to be of use. *Impetuosity* is rather the extreme of *violence* or *vehemence*: an *impetuous* attack is an excessively *violent* attack; an *impetuous* character is an excessively *vehement* character. *Boisterous* is said of the manner and the behavior rather than the mind.

This gentleman, among a thousand others, is a great instance of the fate of all who are carried away by party-spirit of any side; I wish all *violence* may succeed as ill. POPE.

If there be any use of *gesticulation*, it must be applied to the ignorant and rude, who will be more affected by *vehemence* than delighted by propriety. JOHNSON.

But there a power steps in and limits the arrogance of raging passions and *furious* elements. BURKE.

Is there a passion whose *impetuous* force  
Disturbs the human breast, and breaking forth  
With sad eruptions deals destruction round,  
But, by the magic strains of some soft air,  
Is harmonized to peace? COWPER.

They in this examination, of which there is printed an account not unentertaining, behaved with the *boisterousness* of men elated with recent authority. JOHNSON.

VISION, APPARITION, PHANTOM, SPECTRE, GHOST.

VISION, from the Latin *visus*, seeing or seen, signifies either the act of seeing or thing seen: APPARITION, from *appear*, signifies the thing that appears. As the thing seen is only the improper signification, the term *vision* is never employed but in regard to some agent: the *vision* depends upon the state of the *visual* organ; the *vision* of a person whose sight is defective will frequently be fallacious; he will see some things double which are single, long which are short, and the like.

He clasps his lens, if haply they may see,  
Close to the part where *vision* ought to be,  
But finds that, though his tubes assist the sight,  
They cannot give it, or make darkness light. COWPER.

In like manner, if the sight be miraculously impressed, his *vision* will enable him to see that which is supernatural: hence it is that *vision* is either true or false, according to the circumstances of the individual; and a *vision*, signifying a thing seen, is taken for a supernatural

exertion of the *vision*: *apparition*, on the contrary, refers us to the object seen; this may be true or false, according to the manner in which it presents itself. Joseph was warned by a *vision* to fly into Egypt with his family; Mary Magdalene was informed of the resurrection of our Saviour by an *apparition*: feverish people often think they see *visions*; timid and credulous people sometimes take trees and posts for *apparitions*.

*Visions* and inspirations some expect  
Their course here to direct. COWLEY.

Full fast he flies, and dares not look behind him,  
Till out of breath he overtakes his fellows,  
Who gather round and wonder at the tale  
Of horrid *apparition*. BLAIR.

PHANTOM, from the Greek *φανω*, to appear, is used for a false *apparition*, or the appearance of a thing otherwise than what it is; thus the *ignis fatuus*, vulgarly called Jack-o'-Lantern, is a *phantom*. SPECTRE, from *specio*, to behold, and GHOST, from *geist*, a spirit, are the *apparitions* of immaterial substances. The *spectre* is taken for any spiritual being that appears; but *ghost* is taken only for the spirits of departed men who appear to their fellow-creatures: a *spectre* is sometimes made to appear on the stage; *ghosts* exist mostly in the imagination of the young and the ignorant.

The *phantoms* which haunt a desert are want,  
and misery, and danger. JOHNSON.

Rous'd from their slumbers,  
In grim array the grisly *spectres* rise. BLAIR.

The lonely tower  
Is also shunn'd, whose mournful chambers hold,  
So night-struck fancy dreams, the yelling *ghost*. THOMSON.

VOTE, SUFFRAGE, VOICE.

VOTE, in Latin *votum*, from *voceo*, to vow, is very probably from *vox*, a voice, signifying the voice that is raised in supplication to heaven. SUFFRAGE, in Latin *suffragium*, is in all probability compounded of *sub* and *frango*, to break out or declare for a thing. VOICE is here figuratively taken for the *voice* that is raised in favor of a thing.

The *vote* is the wish itself, whether expressed or not; a person has a *vote*, that is, the power of wishing; but the *suffrage* and the *voice* are the wish that is expressed; a person gives his *suffrage* or his *voice*. The *vote* is the settled and fixed