

wish, it is that by which social concerns in life are determined; the *suffrage* is a *vote* given only in particular cases; the *voice* is the declared opinion or wish, expressed either by individuals or the public at large. The *vote* and *voice* are given either for or against a person or thing; the *suffrage* is commonly given in favor of a person: in all public assemblies the majority of *votes* decide the question; members of Parliament are chosen by the *suffrages* of the people; in the execution of a will, every executor has a *voice* in all that is transacted.

The popular *vote*
Inclines here to continue. MILTON.

Reputation is commonly lost, because it never was deserved; and was conferred at first, not by the *suffrage* of criticism, but by the fondness of friendship. JOHNSON.

That something's ours when we from life depart,
This all conceive, all feel it at the heart;
The wise of learn'd antiquity proclaim
This truth; the public *voice* declares the same. JENYNS.

W.

TO WAIT, WAIT FOR, AWAIT, LOOK FOR, EXPECT.

WAIT, WAIT FOR, AWAIT, in German *warten*, which is an intensive of *währen*, to see or look, and EXPECT, from the Latin *ex*, out of, and *specto*, to behold, both signify originally the same thing as LOOK FOR, *i. e.*, to look with concern for a thing.

All these terms express the action of the mind when directed to future matters of personal concern to the agent. *Wait*, *wait for*, and *await*, differ less in sense than in application, the former two being in familiar use, and the latter only in the grave style: these words imply the looking simply toward an object in a state of suspense or still regard; as to *wait* until a person arrives, or *wait for* his arrival; and *await* the hour of one's death, that is, to keep the mind in readiness for it.

Wait till thy being shall be unfolded. BLAIR.
Not less resolv'd, Antenor's valiant heir
Confronts Achilles, and *awaits* the war. POPE.

Wait and *wait for* refer to matters that are remote and obscure in the prospect, or uncertain in the event; *await* may be

applied to that which is considered to be near at hand and probable to happen, and in this sense it is clearly allied to *look for* and *expect*, the former of which expresses the acts of the eye as well as the mind, the latter, the act of the mind only, in contemplating an object as very probable or even certain. It is our duty patiently to *await* the severest trials when they threaten us. When children are too much indulged and caressed, they are apt to *look for* a repetition of caresses at inconvenient seasons; it is in vain to *look for* or *expect* happiness from the conjugal state, when it is not founded on a cordial and mutual regard.

This said, he sat, and *expectation* held
His looks suspense, *awaiting* who appeared
To second, or oppose, or undertake
The perilous attempt. MILTON.

If you *look for* a friend in whose temper there is not to be found the least inequality, you *look for* a pleasing phantom. BLAIR.

We are not to *expect* from our intercourse with others, all that satisfaction we fondly wish. BLAIR.

WAKEFUL, WATCHFUL, VIGILANT.

WE may be WAKEFUL without being WATCHFUL; but we cannot be *watchful* without being *wakeful*. *Wakefulness* is an affair of the body, and depends upon the temperament; *watchfulness* is an affair of the will, and depends upon the determination: some persons are more *wakeful* than they wish to be; few are as *watchful* as they ought to be. VIGILANCE, from the Latin *vigil*, and the Greek *αγαλλος*, *αγαλλιαω*, to be on the alert, expresses a high degree of *watchfulness*: a sentinel is *watchful* who on ordinary occasions keeps good *watch*; but it is necessary for him, on extraordinary occasions, to be *vigilant*, in order to detect whatever may pass. We are *watchful* only in the proper sense of *watching*; but we may be *vigilant* in detecting moral as well as natural evils.

Music shall wake her that hath power to charm
Pale sickness, and avert the stings of pain:
Can raise or quell our passions, and beam
In sweet oblivion the too *wakeful* sense. FENTON.

He who remembers what has fallen out, will be *watchful* against what may happen. SOUTH.

Let a man strictly observe the first hints and whispers of good and evil that pass in his heart: this will keep conscience quick and *vigilant*. SOUTH.

TO WANDER, TO STROLL, RAMBLE, ROVE, ROAM, RANGE.

WANDER, in German *wandern*, is a frequentative of *wenden*, to turn, signifying to turn frequently. To STROLL is probably an intensive of to *roll*, that is, to go in a planless manner. RAMBLE, from the Latin *re* and *ambulo*, is to walk backward and forward; and ROVE is probably a contraction of *ramble*. ROAM is connected with our word *room*, space, signifying to go in a wide space, and the Hebrew *rom*, to be violently moved backward and forward. RANGE, from the noun *range*, a rank, row, or extended space, signifies to go over a great space.

The idea of going in an irregular and free manner is common to all these terms. To *wander* is to go in no fixed path; to *stroll* is to *wander* out of a path that we had taken. To *wander* may be an involuntary action; a person may *wander* to a great distance, or for an indefinite length of time; in this manner a person *wanders* who has lost himself in a wood: to *stroll* is a voluntary action, limited at our discretion; thus when a person takes a walk, he sometimes *strolls* from one path into another as he pleases: to *ramble* is to *wander* without any object, and consequently with more than ordinary irregularity; in this manner he who sets out to take a walk, without knowing or thinking where he shall go, *rambles* as chance directs: to *rove* is to *wander* in the same planless manner, but to a wider extent; a fugitive who does not know his road *roves* about the country in quest of some retreat: to *roam* is to *wander* from the impulse of a troubled mind; in this manner a lunatic who has broken loose may *roam* about the country; so likewise a person who travels about, because he cannot rest in quiet at home, may also be said to *roam* in quest of peace: to *range* is the contrary of to *roam*; as the former indicates a disordered state of mind, the latter indicates composure and fixedness; we *range* within certain limits, as the hunter *ranges* the forest, the shepherd *ranges* the mountains.

But far about they *wander* from the grave
Of him, whom his ungentle fortune urg'd
Against his own sad breast to lift the hand
Of impious violence. THOMSON.

I found by the voice of my friend who walked by me, that we had insensibly *strolled* into the grove sacred to the widow. ADDISON.

I thus *rambled* from pocket to pocket until the beginning of the civil wars. ADDISON.

Where is that knowledge now, that regal thought,
With just advice and timely counsel fraught?
Where now, O judge of Israel, does it *rove*? PRIOR.

She looks abroad, and prunes herself for flight,
Like an unwilling inmate longs to *roam*
From this dull earth, and seek her native home. JENYNS.

The stag, too, singled from the herd, where long
He *rang'd* the branching monarch of the shades,
Before the tempest drives. THOMSON.

TO WANT, NEED, LACK.

To be without is the common idea expressed by these terms; but to WANT is to be without that which contributes to our comfort, or is an object of our desire; to NEED is to be without that which is essential for our existence or our purposes; to LACK, which is probably a variation from *leak*, and a term not in frequent use, expresses little more than the general idea of being without, unaccompanied by any collateral idea. From the close connection which subsists between desiring and *want*, it is usual to consider what we *want* as artificial, and what we *need* as natural and indispensable: what one man *wants* is a superfluity to another; but that which is *needed* by all: tender people *want* a fire when others would be glad not to have it; all persons *need* warm clothing and a warm house in the winter.

To be rich is to have more than is desired, and more than is *wanted*. JOHNSON.

The old from such affairs are only freed,
Which vig'rous youth and strength of body *need*. DENHAM.

To *want* and *need* may extend indefinitely to many or all objects; to *lack*, or be deficient, is properly said of a single object; we may *want* or *need* everything; we *lack* one thing, we *lack* this or that; a rich man may *lack* understanding, virtue, or religion; he who *wants* nothing is a happy man; he who *needs* nothing may be happy if he *wants* no more than he has; for then he *lacks* that which alone can make him happy, which is contentment.

See the mind of beastly man!
That hath so soon forgot the excellence
Of his creation, when he life began,
That now he chooseth with vile difference
To be a beast, and *lacke* intelligence. SPENSER.

WATERMAN, BOATMAN, FERRYMAN.

THESE three terms are employed for persons who are engaged with boats; but the term WATERMAN is specifically applied to such whose business it is to let out their boats and themselves for a given time; the BOATMAN may use a boat only occasionally for the transfer of goods; a FERRYMAN uses a boat only for the conveyance of persons or goods across a particular river or piece of water.

Bubbles of air working upward from the very bottom of the lake, the *waterman* told us that they are observed always to rise in the same places. ADDISON.

Now nearer to the Stygian lake they draw,
Whom from the shore the surly *boatman* saw. DRYDEN.

So forth they rowed: and that *ferryman*,
With his stiffe oars, did brush the sea so strong
That the hoarse waters from his frigot ran. SPENSER.

WAVE, BILLOW, SURGE, BREAKER.

WAVE, from the Saxon *waegan*, and German *wiegen*, to weigh or rock, is applied to water in an undulating state; it is, therefore, the generic term, and the rest are specific terms: those *waves* which swell more than ordinarily are termed BILLOWS, which is derived from *bulge* or *bilge*, and German *balg*, the paunch or belly: those *waves* which rise higher than usual are termed SURGES, from the Latin *surgere*, to rise: those *waves* which dash against the shore, or against vessels, with more than ordinary force, are termed BREAKERS.

The *wave* behind impels the *wave* before. POPE.
I saw him beat the *billows* under him,
And ride upon their backs. SHAKESPEARE.

He flies aloft, and with impetuous roar,
Pursues the foaming *surges* to the shore. DRYDEN.

Now on the mountain *wave* on high they ride,
Then downward plunge beneath th' involving
tide,
Till one who seems in agony to strive,
The whirling *breakers* heave on shore alive. FALCONER.

WAY, MANNER, METHOD, MODE, COURSE, MEANS.

ALL these words denote the steps which are pursued from the beginning to the

completion of any work. The WAY is both general and indefinite; it is either taken by accident or chosen by design: the MANNER and METHOD are species of the *way* chosen by design. Whoever attempts to do that which is strange to him, will at first do it in an awkward *way*; the *manner* of conferring a favor is often more than the favor itself; experience supplies men in the end with a suitable *method* of carrying on their business.

The *ways* of Heaven are dark and intricate.

My mind is taken up in a more melancholy *manner*. ATTERBURY.

Men are willing to try all *methods* of reconciling guilt and quiet. JOHNSON.

The *method* is said of that which requires contrivance; the MODE, of that which requires practice and habitual attention; the former being applied to matters of art, and the latter to mechanical actions: the master has a good *method* of teaching to write; the scholar has a good or bad *mode* of holding his pen. The COURSE and the MEANS are the *way* which we pursue in our moral conduct; the *course* is the *course* of measures which are adopted to produce a certain result; the *means* collectively for the *course* which lead to a certain end: in order to obtain legal redress, we must pursue a certain *course* in law; law is one *means* of gaining redress, but we do wisely, if we can, to adopt the safer and pleasanter *means* of persuasion and cool remonstrance.

Modes of speech, which owe their prevalence to modish folly, die away with their inventors. JOHNSON.

All your sophisters cannot produce anything better adapted to preserve a rational and manly freedom than the *course* that we have pursued. BURKE.

The most wonderful things are brought about in many instances by *means* the most absurd and ridiculous. BURKE.

WEAK, FEEBLE, INFIRM.

WEAK, in Saxon *wace*, Dutch *wack*, German *schwach*, is in all probability an intensive of *weich*, soft, which comes from *weichen*, to yield, and this from *bevegen*, to move. FEEBLE, probably contracted from *failable*. INFIRM, *v. Debility*.

The Saxon term *weak* is here, as it usu-

ally is, the familiar and universal term; *feeble* is suited to a more polished style; *infirm* is only a species of the *weak*: we may be *weak* in body or mind; but we are commonly *feeble* and *infirm* only in the body: we may be *weak* from disease, or *weak* by nature, it equally conveys the gross idea of a defect: but the term *feeble* and *infirm* are qualified expressions for *weakness*: a child is *feeble* from its infancy; an old man is *feeble* from age; the latter may likewise be *infirm* in consequence of sickness. We pity the *weak*, but their *weakness* often gives us pain; we assist the *feeble* when they attempt to walk; we support the *infirm* when they are unable to stand. The same distinction exists between *weak* and *feeble* in the moral use of the words: a *weak* attempt to excuse a person conveys a reproachful meaning; but the *feeble* efforts which we make to defend another may be praiseworthy, although *feeble*.

You, gallant Vernon! saw
The miserable scene; you pitying saw;
To infant *weakness* sunk the warrior's arm. THOMSON.

Command th' assistance of a friend,
But *feeble* are the succors I can send. DRYDEN.

At my age, and under my *infirmities*, I can have no relief but those with which religion furnishes me. ATTERBURY.

TO WEAKEN, ENFEEBLE, DEBILITATE, ENERVATE, INVALIDATE.

TO WEAKEN is to make *weak* (*v. Weak*), and is, as before, the generic term: to ENFEEBLE is to make *feeble* (*v. Weak*): to DEBILITATE is to cause *debility* (*v. Debility*): to ENERVATE is to *unnerve*; and to INVALIDATE is to make not valid or strong: all of which are but modes of *weakening* applicable to different objects. To *weaken* may be either a temporary or permanent act when applied to persons; *enfesble* is permanent, either as to the body or the mind: we may be *weakened* suddenly by severe pain; we are *enfesbled* in a gradual manner, either by the slow effects of disease or age. To *weaken* is either a particular or a complete act; to *enfesble*, to *debilitate*, and *enervate* are properly partial acts: what *enfesbles* deprives of vital or essential power; what *debilitates* may lessen power in one particular, though not in another; the severe exercise of any power,

such as the memory or the attention, will tend to *debilitate* that faculty: what *enervates* acts particularly on the nervous system; it relaxes the frame, and unfits the person for action either of body or mind. To *weaken* is said of things as well as persons; to *invalidate* is said of things only: we *weaken* the force of an argument by an injudicious application; we *invalidate* the claim of another by proving its informality in law.

No article of faith can be true which *weakens* the practical part of religion. ADDISON.

So much hath hell debas'd, and pain
Enfeebled me, to what I was in heav'n. MILTON.

Sometimes the body in full strength we find,
While various ails *debilitate* the mind. JENYNS.

Those pleasures which *enervated* the mind
Must be dearly purchased. HARVEY.

Do they (the Jacobins) mean to *invalidate*
That great body of our statute law which passed
Under those whom they treat as usurpers? BURKE.

WEARISOME, TIRESOME, TEDIOUS.

WEARISOME (*v. To weary*) is the general and indefinite term; TIRESOME (*v. To weary*), and TEDIOUS, causing *tedium*, a specific form of *wearisomeness*: common things may cause *weariness*; that which acts painfully is either *tiresome* or *tedious*; but in different degrees the repetition of the same sounds will grow *tiresome*; long waiting in anxious suspense is *tedious*: there is more of that which is physical in the *tiresome*, and mental in the *tedious*.

All weariness presupposes weakness, and consequently every long, importune, *wearisome* petition is truly and properly a force upon him that is pursued with it. SOUTH.

Far happier were the meanest peasant's lot,
Than to be plac'd on high, in anxious pride,
The purple drudge and slave of *tiresome* state. WEST.

Happy the mortal man who now, at last,
Has through this doleful vale of mis'ry past,
Who to his destin'd stage has carried on
The *tedious* load, and laid his burden down. PRIOR.

TO WEARY, TIRE, JADE, HARASS.

TO WEARY is a frequentative of *wear*, that is, to *wear* out the strength. To TIRE, from the French *tirer* and the Latin *trahere*, to draw, signifies to *draw* out the strength. To JADE is the same as to *goad*. HARASS, *v. Distress*.

Long exertion *wearies*; a little exertion will *tire* a child or a weak man; forced exertions *jade*; painful exertions, or exertions coupled with painful circumstances, *harass*: the horse is *jaded* who is forced on beyond his strength; the soldier is *harassed* who in his march is pressed on by a pursuing enemy. We are *wearied* with thinking when it gives us pain to think any longer; we are *tired* of our employment when it ceases to give us pleasure; we are *jaded* by incessant attention to business; we are *harassed* by perpetual complaints which we cannot redress.

All pleasures that affect the body must needs *wear*. SOUTH.

Every morsel to a satisfied hunger is only a new labor to a *tired* digestion. SOUTH.

I recall the time (and am glad it is over) when about this hour (six in the morning) I used to be going to bed surfeited with pleasure or *jaded* with business. BOLINGBROKE.

Bankrupt nobility, a factious, giddy, and Divided senate, a *harass'd* commonality, Is all the strength of Venice. OTWAY.

WEIGHT, HEAVINESS, GRAVITY.

WEIGHT, from *to weigh*, is that which a thing *weighs*. HEAVINESS, from *heavy* and *heave*, signifies the abstract quality of the *heavy*, or difficult to heave. GRAVITY, from the Latin *gravis*, likewise denotes the same abstract quality.

Weight is indefinite; whatever may be *weighed* has a *weight*, whether large or small: *heaviness* and *gravity* are the property of bodies having a great *weight*. *Weight* is only opposed to that which has or is supposed to have no *weight*, that is, what is incorporeal or immaterial; for we may speak of the *weight* of the lightest conceivable bodies, as the *weight* of a feather: *heaviness* is opposed to lightness; the *heaviness* of lead is opposed to the lightness of a feather. *Weight* lies absolutely in the thing; *heaviness* is relatively considered with respect to the person: we estimate the *weight* of things according to a certain measure; we estimate the *heaviness* of things by our feelings. *Gravity* is that species of *weight* which is scientifically considered as inherent in certain bodies; the term is therefore properly scientific.

Universally a body plunged in water loses as much of its *weight* as is equal to the weight of a body of water of its own bulk. GOLDSMITH.

The object is concerning the *heaviness* of several bodies, or the proportion that is required between any *weight* and the power which may raise it. WILKINS.

Of all bodies considered within the confines of a fluid there is a twofold *gravity*, true and absolute. QUINCY.

WEIGHT, BURDEN, LOAD.

WEIGHT, *v. Weight*. BURDEN, from *bear*, signifies the thing borne. LOAD, in German *laden*, low German and Dutch *laeyen*, is connected with our word *lay*, *laid*, signifying to lay on or in anything.

The term *weight* is here considered in common with the other terms, in the sense of a positive *weight*; by which it is allied to the word *burden*: the *weight* is said either of persons or things; the *burden* more commonly respects persons; the *load* may be said of either: a person may sink under the *weight* that rests upon him; a platform may break down from the *weight* upon it: a person sinks under his *burden* or *load*; a cart breaks down from the *load*. The *weight* is abstractedly taken for what has weight, without reference to the cause of its being there; *burden* and *load* have respect to the person or thing by which they are produced; accident produces the *weight*; a person takes a *burden* upon himself, or has it imposed upon him; the *load* is always laid on: it is not proper to carry any *weight* that exceeds our strength; those who bear the *burden* expect to reap the fruit of their labor; he who carries *loads* must be contented to take such as are given him.

On the tops of the highest mountains, where the air is so pure and refined, and where there is not that immense *weight* of gross vapors pressing upon the body, the mind acts with greater freedom. BRYDONE.

Camels have their provender Only for bearing *burdens*, and sore blows For sinking under them. SOMERVILLE.

His barns are stor'd, And groaning staddles bend beneath their *load*. SOMERVILLE.

In the moral application these terms mark the pain which is produced by a pressure; but the *weight* and *load* rather describe the positive severity of the pressure; the *burden* respects the temper and inclinations of the sufferer; the *load* is in this case a very great *weight*: a minister of state has a *weight* on his mind at

all times, from the heavy responsibility which attaches to his station; one who labors under strong apprehensions or dread of an evil has a *load* on his mind; any sort of employment is a *burden* to one who wishes to be idle; and time unemployed is a *burden* to him who wishes to be always in action.

With what oppressive *weight* will sickness, disappointment, or old age fall upon the spirits of that man who is a stranger to God! BLAIR.

I understood not that a grateful mind By owing owes not, but still pays at once; Indebted and discharg'd; what *burden* then? MILTON.

How a man can have a quiet and cheerful mind under a *burden* and *load* of guilt, I know not, unless he be very ignorant. RAY.

WELL-BEING, WELFARE, PROSPERITY, HAPPINESS.

WELL-BEING may be said of one or many, but more of a body; the *well-being* of society depends upon a due subordination of the different ranks of which it is composed. WELFARE, or *faring well*, from the German *fahren*, to go, respects the good condition of an individual; a parent is naturally anxious for the *welfare* of his child. *Well-being* and *welfare* consist of such things as more immediately affect our existence: PROSPERITY, which comprehends both *well-being* and *welfare*, includes likewise all that can add to the enjoyments of man. The *prosperity* of a state, or of an individual, therefore, consists in the increase of wealth, power, honors, and the like; as outward circumstances more or less affect the HAPPINESS of man: *happiness* is, therefore, often substituted for *prosperity*; but it must never be forgotten that *happiness* properly lies only in the mind, and that consequently *prosperity* may exist without *happiness*; but *happiness*, at least as far as respects a body of men, cannot exist without some portion of *prosperity*.

Have freethinkers been authors of any inventions that conduce to the *well-being* of mankind? BERKELEY.

For his own sake no duty he can ask, The common *welfare* is our only task. JENYNS.

Religion affords to good men peculiar security in the enjoyment of their *prosperity*. BLAIR.

The author is here only showing the providential issue of the passions, and how by God's gracious disposition they are turned away from their

natural bias to promote the *happiness* of mankind. WARBURTON.

WHOLE, ENTIRE, COMPLETE, TOTAL, INTEGRAL.

WHOLE excludes subtraction; ENTIRE excludes division; COMPLETE excludes deficiency: a *whole* orange has had nothing taken from it; an *entire* orange is not yet cut; and a *complete* orange is grown to its full size: it is possible, therefore, for a thing to be *whole* and not *entire*: and to be both, and yet not *complete*: an orange cut into parts is *whole* while all the parts remain together, but it is not *entire*; it may be *whole* as distinguished from a part, *entire* as far as it has no wound or incision in it; but it may not be a *complete* orange if it is defective in its growth. *Whole* is applied to everything of which there may be a part actually or in imagination; as the *whole* line, the *whole* day, the *whole* world: *entire* is applied only to such things as may be damaged or injured, or is already damaged to its fullest extent; as an *entire* building, or *entire* ruin: *complete* is applied to that which does not require anything further to be done to it; as a *complete* house, a *complete* circle, and the like.

The *whole* island produces corn only sufficient to support its inhabitants for five months, or little more. BRYDONE.

And oft, when unobserv'd, Steal from the barn a straw, till soft and warm, Clean and *complete*, their habitation grows. THOMSON.

This (model) is the more remarkable, as it is *entire* in those parts where the statue is maintained. ADDISON.

TOTAL, from *totus*, the whole, has the same signification, but only a limited application; as a *total* amount, or a *total* darkness, as distinguished from a partial amount, or a partial degree of darkness.

They set and rise, Least *total* darkness should by night regain Possession. MILTON.

So also in application to moral objects.

Nothing under a *total* thorough change in the convert will suffice. SOUTH.

INTEGRAL, from *integer*, entire, has the same signification, but is applied now to parts or numbers not broken.

Nothing passes in the accounts of God for repentance but a change of life; ceasing to do evil, and doing good, are the two great *integral* parts of this duty. SOUTH.

WICKED, INIQUITOUS, NEFARIOUS.

WICKED (*v. Bad*) is here the generic term; INIQUITOUS, from *iniquus*, unjust, signifies that species of *wickedness* which consists in violating the law of right between man and man; NEFARIOUS, from the Latin *nefas*, wicked or abominable, is that species of *wickedness* which consists in violating the most sacred obligations. The term *wicked*, being indefinite, is commonly applied in a milder sense than *iniquitous*; and *iniquitous* than *nefarious*: it is *wicked* to deprive another of his property unlawfully, under any circumstances; but it is *iniquitous* if it be done by fraud and circumvention; and *nefarious* if it involves any breach of trust; any undue influence over another, in the making of his will, to the detriment of the rightful heir, is *iniquitous*; any underhand dealing of a servant to defraud his master is *nefarious*.

In the corrupted currents of this world,
Offence's gilded hand may shove by justice;
And oft 'tis seen, the *wicked* prize itself
Buys out the law. SHAKESPEARE.

Lucullus found that the province of Pontus
had fallen under great disorders and oppressions
from the *iniquity* of usurers and publicans.

That unhallowed villany *nefariously* attempt-
ed upon our agent. PRIDEAUX.
MILTON.

TO WILL, WISH.

THE WILL is that faculty of the soul which is the most prompt and decisive; it immediately impels to action: the WISH is but a gentle motion of the soul toward a thing. We can *will* nothing but what we can effect; we may *wish* for many things which lie above our reach. The *will* must be under the entire control of reason, or it will lead a person into every mischief: *wishes* ought to be under the direction of reason; or otherwise they may greatly disturb our happiness.

A good inclination is but the first rude draught
of virtue; but the finishing strokes are from the
will. SOUTH.

The *wishing* of a thing is not properly the
willing of it; it imports no more than an idle,
unoperative complacency in, and desire of the
object. SOUTH.

WILLINGLY, VOLUNTARILY, SPONTANEOUSLY.

To do a thing WILLINGLY is to do it with a good will; to do a thing VOLUNTARILY is to do it of one's own accord: the former respects one's *willingness* to comply with the wishes of another; we do what is asked of us; it is a mark of good-nature: the latter respects our freedom from foreign influence; we do that which we like to do; it is a mark of our sincerity. It is pleasant to see a child do his task *willingly*; it is pleasant to see a man *voluntarily* engage in any service of public good. SPONTANEOUSLY is but a mode of the *voluntary*, applied, however, more commonly to inanimate objects than to the will of persons: the ground produces *spontaneously*, when it produces without culture; and words flow *spontaneously* which require no effort on the part of the speaker to produce them. If, however, applied to the will, it bespeaks in a stronger degree the totally unbiassed state of the agent's mind: the *spontaneous* effusions of the heart are more than the *voluntary* services of benevolence. The *willing* is opposed to the *unwilling*, the *voluntary* to the mechanical or *involuntary*, the *spontaneous* to the reluctant or the artificial.

Food not of angels, yet accepted so,
As that more *willingly* thou couldst not seem,
At Heav'n's high feasts 't have fed. MILTON.

Thoughts are only criminal when they are first
chosen, and then *voluntarily* continued. JOHNSON.

Of these none uncontroll'd and lawless rove,
But to some destin'd end *spontaneous* move. JENYNS.

WISDOM, PRUDENCE.

WISDOM, from *wissen*, to know, is the general term; it embraces the whole of practical knowledge: PRUDENCE (*v. Prudent*) is a branch of *wisdom*. *Wisdom* directs all matters present or to come. *Prudence*, which acts by foresight, directs what is to come. Rules of conduct are framed by *wisdom*, and it is the part of *prudence* to apply these rules to the business of life.

Two things speak much the *wisdom* of a nation:
good laws, and a *prudent* management of them. STILLINGFLEET.

WIT, HUMOR, SATIRE, IRONY, BURLESQUE.

WIT, like wisdom, according to its original, from *wissen*, to know, signifies knowledge, but it has so extended its meaning as to signify that faculty of the mind by which knowledge or truth is perceived, and in a more limited sense the faculty of discovering the agreements or disagreements of different ideas. *Wit*, in this latter sense, is properly a spontaneous faculty, and is, as it were, a natural gift: labored or forced *wit* is no *wit*. Reflection and experience supply us with wisdom; study and labor supply us with learning; but *wit* seizes with an eagle eye that which escapes the notice of the deep thinker, and elicits truths which are in vain sought for with any severe effort.

Wit lies most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety. ADDISON.

In a true piece of *wit* all things must be,
Yet all things there agree. COWLEY.

HUMOR is a species of *wit* which flows out of the *humor* of a person. *Wit*, as distinguished from *humor*, may consist of a single brilliant thought: but *humor* runs in a vein; it is not a striking, but an equable and pleasing flow of *wit*. Of this description of *wit* Mr. Addison has given us the most admirable specimens in his writings, who knew best how to explain what *wit* and *humor* was, and to illustrate it by his practice.

For sure by *wit* is chiefly meant
Applying well what we invent:
What *humor* is not, all the tribe
Of logic-mongers can describe:
Here nature only acts her part,
Unhelp'd by practice, books, or art. SWIFT.

There is a kind of nature, a certain regularity
of thought, which must discover the writer (of
humor) to be a man of sense at the same time
that he appears altogether given up to caprice. ADDISON.

Humor may likewise display itself in
actions as well as words, whereby it is
more strikingly distinguished from *wit*,
which displays itself only in the happy
expression of happy thoughts.

I cannot help remarking that sickness which
often destroys both *wit* and wisdom, yet seldom
has power to remove that talent which we call
humor. Mr. Wycherley showed his in his last
compliment paid to his young wife, when he made
her promise, on his dying bed, that she would not
marry an old man again. POPE.

SATIRE, from *satyr*, probably from *sat* and *ira*, abounding in anger, and IRONY, from the Greek *ειρωνια*, simulation and dissimulation, are personal and censorious sorts of *wit*; the first of which openly points at the object, and the second in a covert manner takes its aim.

The ordinary subjects of *satire* are such as excite the greatest indignation in the best tempers. ADDISON.

In writings of *humor*, figures are sometimes used of so delicate a nature, that it shall often happen that some people will see things in a direct contrary sense to what the author and the majority of the readers understand them: to such the most innocent *irony* may appear irreligion. CAMBRIDGE.

BURLESQUE is rather a species of *humor* than direct *wit*, which consists in an assemblage of ideas extravagantly discordant. The *satire* and *irony* are the most ill-natured kinds of *wit*; *burlesque* stands in the lowest rank.

One kind of *burlesque* represents mean persons in the accoutrements of heroes. ADDISON.

WONDER, ADMIRE, SURPRISE, ASTONISH, AMAZE.

WONDER, in German *wundern*, etc., is in all probability a variation of *wonder*; because *wonder* throws the mind off its bias. ADMIRE, from the Latin *miror*, and the Hebrew *marah*, to look at, signifies looking at attentively. SURPRISE, compounded of *sur* and *prise*, or the Latin *prehendo*, signifies to take on a sudden. ASTONISH, from the Latin *attonitus*, and *tonitru*, thunder, signifies to strike as it were with the overpowering noise of thunder. AMAZE signifies to be in a *maze*, so as not to be able to collect one's self.

That particular feeling which anything unusual produces on our minds is expressed by all these terms, but under various modifications. *Wonder* is the most indefinite in its signification or application, but it is still the least vivid sentiment of all: it amounts to little more than a pausing of the mind, a suspension of the thinking faculty, an incapacity to fix on a discernible point in an object that rouses our curiosity: it is that state which all must experience at times, but none so much as those who are ignorant: they *wonder* at everything, because they know nothing. *Admiration* is *wonder*

mixed with esteem or veneration: the *admirer* suspends his thoughts, not from the vacancy, but the fulness of his mind: he is riveted to an object which for a time absorbs his faculties: nothing but what is great and good excites *admiration*, and none but cultivated minds are susceptible of it: an ignorant person cannot *admire*, because he cannot appreciate the value of anything. *Surprise* and *astonishment* both arise from that which happens unexpectedly; they are species of *wonder* differing in degree, and produced only by the events of life: the *surprise*, as its derivation implies, takes us unawares; we are *surprised* if that does not happen which we calculate upon, as the absence of a friend whom we looked for; or we are *surprised* if that happens which we did not calculate upon; thus we are *surprised* to see a friend returned whom we supposed was on his journey; *astonishment* may be awakened by similar events which are more unexpected and more unaccountable: thus we are *astonished* to find a friend at our house whom we had every reason to suppose was many hundred miles off; or we are *astonished* to hear that a person has got safely through a road which we conceived to be absolutely impassable.

The reader of the Seasons *wonders* that he never saw before what Thomson shows him.
JOHNSON.

With eyes insatiate and tumultuous joy,
Beholds the presents, and *admires* the boy.
DRYDEN.

So little do we accustom ourselves to consider the effects of time, that things necessary and certain often *surprise* us like unexpected contingencies.
JOHNSON.

I have often been *astonished*, considering that the mutual intercourse between the two countries (France and England) has lately been very great, to find how little you seem to know of us.
BURKE.

Surprise may for a moment startle; *astonishment* may stupefy and cause an entire suspension of the faculties; but *amazement* has also a mixture of perturbation. We may be *surprised* and *astonished* at things in which we have no particular interest: we are mostly *amazed* at that which immediately concerns us.

Amazement seizes all; the gen'ral cry
Proclaims Laocoon justly doom'd to die.
DRYDEN.

WONDER, MIRACLE, MARVEL, PRODIGY, MONSTER.

WONDER is that which causes *wonder* (*v. Wonder*). MIRACLE, in Latin *miraculum*, and *miror*, to *wonder*, comes from the Hebrew *merah*, seen, signifying that which strikes the sense. MARVEL is a variation of *miracle*. PRODIGY, in Latin *prodigium*, from *prodigo*, or *procul* and *ago*, to launch forth, signifies the thing launching forth. MONSTER, in Latin *monstrum*, comes from *monco*, to advise or give notice; because among the Romans any unaccountable appearance was considered as an indication of some future event.

Wonders are natural: *miracles* are supernatural. The whole creation is full of *wonders*; the Bible contains an account of the *miracles* which happened in those days. *Wonders* are real; *marvels* are often fictitious; *prodigies* are extravagant and imaginary. Natural history is full of *wonders*; travels abound in *marvels* or in *marvellous* stories, which are the inventions either of the artful or the ignorant and credulous: ancient history contains numberless accounts of *prodigies*. *Wonders* are agreeable to the laws of nature; they are *wonderful* only as respects ourselves: *monsters* are violations of the laws of nature. The production of a tree from a grain of seed is a *wonder*; but the production of a calf with two heads is a *monster*.

His wisdom such as once it did appear,
Three kingdoms' *wonder*, and three kingdoms' fear.
DENHAM.

Murder, though it have no tongue, will speak
With most *miraculous* organ.
SHAKESPEARE.

Ill omens may the guilty tremble at,
Make every accident a *prodigy*,
And *monsters* frame where nature never err'd.
LEE.

WORD, TERM, EXPRESSION.

WORD is here the generic term; the other two are specific. Every TERM and EXPRESSION is a *word*; but every *word* is not denominated a *term* or *expression*. Language consists of *words*; they are the connected sounds which serve for the communication of thought. *Term*, from *terminus*, a boundary, signifies any *word* that has a specific or limited meaning; *expression* (*v. To express*) signifies

any *word* which conveys a forcible meaning. Usage determines *words*; science fixes *terms*; sentiment provides *expressions*. The purity of a style depends on the choice of *words*; the precision of a writer depends upon the choice of his *terms*; the force of a writer depends upon the aptitude of his *expressions*. The grammarian treats on the nature of *words*; the philosopher weighs the value of scientific *terms*; the rhetorician estimates the force of *expressions*.

As all *words* in few letters live,
Thou to few words all sense dost give.
COWLEY.

The use of the *word* minister is brought down to the literal signification of it, a servant; for now to serve and to minister, servile and ministerial, are *terms* equivalent.
SOUTH.

A maxim, or moral saying, naturally receives this form of the antithesis, because it is designed to be engraven on the memory, which it recalls more easily by the help of such contrasted *expressions*.
BLAIR.

WORK, LABOR, TOIL, DRUDGERY,
TASK.

WORK, in Saxon *weorc*, Greek *εργον*, Hebrew *areg*, is the general term, as including that which calls for the exertion of our strength: LABOR (*v. To labor*) differs from it in the degree of exertion required; it is hard *work*: TOIL, probably connected with *till*, expresses a still higher degree of painful exertion: DRUDGERY (*v. Servant*) implies a mean and degrading *work*. Every member of society must *work* for his support, if he is not in independent circumstances: the poor are obliged to *labor* for their daily subsistence; some are compelled to *toil* incessantly for the pittance which they earn: *drudgery* falls to the lot of those who are the lowest in society. A man wishes to complete his *work*; he is desirous of resting from his *labor*; he seeks for a respite from his *toil*; he submits to *drudgery*.

The masters encourage it, they think it gives them spirits, and makes the *work* go on more cheerfully.
BRYDENE.

But sometimes virtue starves while vice is fed;
What then is the reward of virtue? bread,
That vice may merit: 'tis the price of *toil*,
The knave deserves it when he tills the soil.
POPE.

In childhood the mind and body are both nimble but not strong; they can skip and frisk about with wonderful agility, but hard *labor* spoils them both.
COWPER.

With the unwearied application of a plodding French painter, who draws a shrimp with the most minute exactness, he had all the genius of one of the first masters. Never, I believe, were such talents and *drudgery* united.
COWPER.

TASK, in French *tasche*, Italian *tassa*, probably from the Greek *τασσω*, to order, is a *work* imposed by others, and consequently more or less burdensome.

Relieves me from my *task* of servile toil
Daily in the common prison, else enjoined me.
MILTON.

Sometimes taken in the good sense for that which one imposes on one's self.

No happier *task* these faded eyes pursue,
To read and weep is all they now can do.
POPE.

WRITER, PENMAN, SCRIBE.

WRITER is an indefinite term; every one who *writes* is called a *writer*; but none are PENMEN but such as are expert at their pen. Many who profess to teach *writing* are themselves but sorry *writers*: the best *penmen* are not always the best teachers of *writing*. The SCRIBE is one who *writes* for the purpose of copying; he is, therefore, an official *writer*.

The copying of books for the use of religious houses or common sale, was a business in those days that employed many people; some *writers* far exceeded others in that art.
MASSEY.

Our celebrated *penman*, Peter Bales, among his other excellences in writing, is said to have improved the art of cryptography.
MASSEY.

The office of *scribe*, a secretary or public writer, was an honorable post among the Jews.
MASSEY.

Writer and *penman* have an extended application to one who *writes* his own compositions; the former is now used for an author or composer, as the *writer* of a letter, or the *writer* of a book (*v. Writer*); the latter for one who *pens* down anything worthy of notice for the use of the public.

My wife had scarcely patience to hear me to the end, but railed against the *writer* with unrestrained resentment.
GOLDSMITH.

The descriptions which the Evangelists give, show that both our blessed Lord and the holy *penmen* of his story were deeply affected.
ATTERBURY.

Scribe may be taken for one who performs, as it were, the office of writing for another.

My master being the *scribe* to himself should write the letter.
SHAKESPEARE.

WRITER, AUTHOR.

WRITER refers us to the act of *writing*; AUTHOR to the act of inventing. There are therefore many *writers*, who are not *authors*; but there is no *author* of books who may not be termed a *writer*: compilers and contributors to periodical works are properly *writers*, though not always entitled to the name of *authors*. Poets and historians are properly termed *authors* rather than *writers*.

Many *writers* have been witty, several have been sublime, and some few have even possessed both these qualities separated. WARBURTON.

An *author* has the choice of his own thoughts and words, which the translator has not. DRYDEN.

Y.

YOUTHFUL, JUVENILE, PUERILE.

YOUTHFUL signifies full of *youth*, or in the complete state of *youth*: JUVENILE, from the Latin *juvenis*, signifies the same; but PUERILE, from *puer*, a

boy, signifies literally *boyish*. Hence the first two terms are taken in an indifferent sense; but the latter in a bad sense, or at least always in the sense of what is suitable to a boy only: thus we speak of *youthful* vigor, *youthful* employments, *juvenile* performances, *juvenile* years, and the like: but *puerile* objections, *puerile* conduct, and the like. We expect nothing from a *youth* but what is *juvenile*; we are surprised and dissatisfied to see what is *puerile* in a man.

Choræbus then, with *youthful* hopes beguil'd,
Swoll'n with success, and of a daring mind,
This new invention fatally design'd. DRYDEN.

It would be unreasonable to expect much from the immaturity of *juvenile* years. JOHNSON.

Sometimes *juvenile* is taken in the bad sense when speaking of *youth* in contrast with men, as *juvenile* tricks.

Raw *juvenile* writers imagine that, by pouring forth figures often, they render their compositions warm and animated. BLAIR.

And *puerile* may be taken in the indifferent sense for what belongs to a boy.

After the common course of *puerile* studies, he was put an apprentice to a brewer. JOHNSON.

ASSUMPTION, PRESUMPTION, ARROGANCE (vide also p. 97).

ASSUMPTION, the act of assuming (*v. To appropriate*). PRESUMPTION, from presume, in Latin *presumo*, from *præ*, before, and *sumo*, to take, signifies to take beforehand, to take for granted. ARROGANCE, *v. To appropriate*.

Assumption is a person's taking upon himself to act a part which does not belong to him. *Presumption* is the taking a place which does not belong to him. *Assumption* has to do with one's general conduct; *presumption* relates to matters of right and precedence. A person may be guilty of *assumption* by giving commands when he ought to receive them, or by speaking when he ought to be silent: he is guilty of *presumption* in taking a seat which is not fit for him. *Assumption* arises from self-conceit and self-sufficiency, *presumption* from self-importance. *Assumption* and *presumption* both

denote a taking to one's self merely, *arrogance* claiming from others. A person is guilty of *assumption* and *presumption* for his own gratification only, without any direct intentional offence to others; but a man cannot be *arrogant*, be guilty of *arrogance*, without direct offence to others. The arrogant man exacts deference and homage from others; his demands are as extravagant as his mode of making them is offensive. Children are apt to be *assuming*, low people to be *presuming*; persons among the higher orders, inflated with pride and bad passions, are apt to be *arrogant*.

Arrogant in prosperity, abject in adversity, he (John) neither conciliated affection in the one, nor excited esteem in the other. LINGARD.

TO COMPEL, IMPEL, CONSTRAIN, RESTRAIN.

To COMPEL and IMPEL are both derived from the verb *pello*, to drive; the

former, by the force of the preposition *com*, is to drive to any particular action or for a given purpose; but the latter, from the preposition *im* or *in*, into, is to force into action generally. A person, therefore, is *compelled* by outward circumstances, but he is *impelled* from within: he is *compelled* by another to go farther than he wished, he is *impelled* by curiosity to go farther than he intended. CONSTRAIN and RESTRAIN are both from *stringo*, to bind or oblige. The former, by force of the *con* or *com*, to force in a particular manner, or for a particular purpose; the latter by the *re*, back or again, is to keep back from anything. To *constrain*, like to *compel*, is to force to act; to *restrain* to prevent from acting. *Constrain* and *compel* differ only in the degree of force used, *constrain* signifying a less degree of force than *compel*. A person who is *compelled* has no choice whatever left to him; but when he is only *constrained*, he may do it or not at discretion.

He was *compelled* by want to attendance and solicitation. JOHNSON.

We cannot avoid observing the homage which the world is *constrained* to pay to virtue. BLAIR.

Constraint is put on the actions or movements of the body only, *restraint* on the movements of both body and mind: a person who is in a state of *constraint* shows his want of freedom in the awkwardness of his movements; he who is in a state of *restraint* may be unable to move at all. *Constraint* arises from that which is inherent in the person, *restraint* is imposed upon him (*v. CONSTRAINT*, p. 255).

DELUSION, ILLUSION (vide also p. 419).

BOTH these words, being derived from the Latin *ludo* (*v. To deceive*), are applied

to such matters as act upon the imagination; but *delude*, by the force of the preposition *de*, signifies to carry away from the right line, to cause to deviate into error; while *illude*, from the preposition *il*, *im*, in or upon, signifies simply to act on the imagination. The former is therefore taken in a bad sense, but the latter in an indifferent sense. A deranged person falls into different kinds of *delusions*: as when he fancies himself poor while he is very rich, or that every one who comes in his way is looking at him, or having evil designs against him, and the like; but there may be optical *illusions*, when an object is made to appear brighter or larger than it really is.

Who therefore seeks in these
True wisdom, finds her not, or by *delusion*
Far worse, her false resemblance only meets. YOUNG.

While the fond soul,
Wrapt in gay visions of unreal bliss,
Still paints the *illusive* form. THOMSON.

TO MENTION, NOTICE.

MENTION, from *mens*, mind, signifies here to bring to mind. NOTICE (*v. To mark*). These terms are synonymous only inasmuch as they imply the act of calling things to another person's mind. We *mention* a thing in direct terms: we *notice* it indirectly, or in a casual manner; we *mention* that which may serve as information; we *notice* that which may be merely of a personal or incidental nature. One friend *mentions* to another what has passed at a particular meeting: in the course of conversation he *notices* or calls to the *notice* of his companion the badness of the road, the wideness of the street, or the like.

The great critic I have before *mentioned*, though a heathen, has taken *notice* of the sublime manner in which the lawgiver of the Jews has described the creation. ADDISON.