Austria-Hungary from 1878 to 1898. — Count Taaffe was minister-president from 1879 to 1893. An opportunist and a moderate, he endeavored to be hardly more than a political peacemaker. His efforts in that direction met little success, as did those of the Polish Count Badeni, who was in office from 1895 until November 30, 1897. Constantly the Austrian, and in less degree the Hungarian, parliament presented a scene of indescribable turbulence and confusion. Sometimes their disorder and lawlessness disgraced the name of legislation. Yet in their babel of languages and their bedlam of factional strife there was always something definite which the speaker or the party was seeking. What appeared to the ear or the eye mere wrangling was at bottom a serious assertion of principles, true or false, and a vindication or denial of rights. Hardly anywhere else has personality counted so little.

Since October, 1895, Count Goluchowski, a Pole, has been minister of foreign affairs. To him more than to any other statesman is due the policy of concert, followed by the six great Powers in reference to the Armenian, Cretan and Greek questions of 1895–1897.

Political Problems of To-day. — In more than one respect the Austro-Hungarian rather than the Ottoman Empire is the sick man of Europe. The antagonism of its races was never more pronounced than to-day and their interests never more divergent. The general advance of education renders each more able to secure those ends on which it is fiercely determined. Circumstances have made Austria-Hungary a migratory state upon the map, moving toward the south and east. But farther progress in that direction is checked by the vigorous youthful states along the Danube and the Balkans, while further disintegration is probable on the north and southwest. Yet her internal weakness is not so manifest as in the dark days when the present sovereign assumed his crown.

X

RUSSIA

Nicholas I (1825–1855). — As ruler of Russia the Tsar Nicholas during his reign of thirty years exercised a threefold influence upon European politics. First, as heir, not only to the victorious empire, but to the ideas of his brother, Alexander I, he was the acknowledged head of the absolutist or reactionary party throughout Europe. Second, as sovereign of the largest Slavic state, he was the hope of an awakening pan-Slavism, that should reunite Slavic tribes. The overthrow and absorption of Poland, the second largest Slavic state, after an intermittent warfare of centuries between her and Russia, was congenial to the other Slavs. It was among the Western states that she found most sympathizers and not among peoples of the same blood. Third, as sovereign of the empire of orthodoxy, he was regarded, and regarded himself, as of right the protector and champion of his coreligionists, subjects of other rulers, specially of the Greek Orthodox Christians, subjects of the Sultan of Turkey.

This presumed right of a Russian Tsar had been recognized by treaties, such as those of Kaïnardji (1774), Yassi (1792), Adrianople (1829) and Hunkiar Iskelessi (1833), with the Ottoman Empire. In this respect Nicholas was the legitimate successor of Peter the Great. Yet unlike Peter he detested Western civilization. A young man of eighteen at the time of the French invasion, the horrors and the triumph of that gigantic struggle were burned into his soul. Russia unaided had then annihilated the hosts of the hitherto invincible Napoleon. It is not strange if Nicholas thought that Russia could withstand the world. By his accession in 1825, just a century after the death of the great Tsar, the Muscovite Empire, for the first time in a hundred years, had a sovereign who was wholly Russian at heart and who believed only in Russia. The Russians adored him with such loyalty as no other ruler of the house

of Romanoff had received. His unlooked-for advent to the throne was regarded as the special interposition of Providence. His brother, Constantine, seventeen years his senior, was the natural heir of Alexander I. But Constantine in 1820 had become devotedly attached to the Polish Countess Groudsinska. He could marry her only on condition of renouncing his rights of inheritance. He preferred the hand of the lady to the crown of Russia. "That, surely," said the peasants, "must have come from God."

The Crimean War (1853–1856). — Its apparent cause was a contention between Greek Orthodox and Latin priests as to the custody of certain holy places in Jerusalem (1851). The former were supported by Russia and the latter by France and Austria. A mixed commission to examine the matter was appointed by Sultan Abd-ul Medjid, which, while giving a temperate report, on the whole favored the Latins. The Russians and the Greek Orthodox rayahs of Turkey were indignant at the decision. It was a general Eastern superstition that the year 1853, which completed four centuries from the capture of Constantinople, would see the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. The Tsar believed all things were propitious to hasten that event.

He held two secret interviews (January 9 and 14, 1853) with Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, wherein he spoke without reserve and asked the coöperation of Great Britain. He proposed to unite the Danubian provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia into an independent state under the protection of Russia, and create two states of Servia and Bulgaria. He said nothing definite about Constantinople, but offered Crete and Egypt to Great Britain. It is interesting to remark that, with the exception of Crete, whose destiny is still undecided, the other propositions of the Tsar have become facts. "If we agree," he said, "I care little what the others" — France and Austria — "may do." The British ambassador shrewdly made public all that had been said to him in confidence. "The others" were enraged at the small account taken of them rather than at the propositions.

In May, 1853, Prince Mentchikoff was sent to Constantinople with a peremptory note, demanding that the complaints of Russian pilgrims to the Holy Land receive

satisfaction and that guarantees be given for the protection of the Greek Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, British ambassador to the Porte from 1842 to 1858, encouraged the Sultan to refuse compliance. The Russian armies crossed the Pruth and occupied the principalities. To avert war the Austrian government drew up the "Vienna Note," which was approved by France and Great Britain and accepted by Russia. But the British ambassador at Constantinople secured its rejection by the Sultan and persuaded him to take resolute action. The Porte delivered an ultimatum to Russia (September 26) and declared war (October 4).

The subsequent events of the struggle and its conclusion in the treaty of Paris are narrated in the chapter on the "Second French Empire." Nicholas had been outwitted in diplomacy and defeated in arms. Broken-hearted and disillusioned, even before the capture of Sebastopol, the "iron emperor" gave way. Sick and suffering, he committed imprudences which can only be explained as a desire to hasten his end. He himself dictated the despatch which he sent to all the great cities of Russia, "The emperor is dying," and expired on March 2, 1855.

The disasters of the Crimea had been a cruel revelation, not only to him but to his subjects. His army and his people had supposed they were to revolutionize the East, indefinitely extend their empire, and drive out the crescent from Jerusalem. Instead, they were obliged to dismantle their own fortresses and withdraw their warships from the Black Sea. Nothing however had occurred to disprove their proud boast that, should any hostile nation really penetrate Russia, its sovereign would there lose his crown like Charles XII and Napoleon the Great, and its army would leave there its bones.

Alexander II (1855–1881). — "Your burden will be heavy," his father had said to him when dying. To bear this burden nature had well fitted the new Tsar. Though devoted to his father's memory, he realized that his father's system had been found wanting and that another epoch must open in Russia. Everywhere there was the sullen rumble of discontent. Of mediocre ability, self-distrustful rather than headstrong, just, patient and plodding, he desired to inaugurate a new era. He determined to reform where it was possible and to mitigate what

he could not reform. In his manifesto immediately after the conclusion of peace he outlined his policy almost with boldness. The corruption and inefficiency of administration had been protected by a muzzled press, by a rigorous police and by a compulsory silence on the part of the people. He encouraged freedom of speech and thought. "The conservative Russia of Nicholas I seemed buried under the sod. Every one declared himself a liberal." Public opinion wished to undertake every reform at once, but the question of social reform dominated all others.

There were then 47,200,000 serfs, divided into two great classes. Of these 24,700,000, dependent upon the crown, enjoyed a large degree of personal freedom. They exercised local self-government, administered their own affairs in communes, or mirs, by an elected council, and possessed tribunals which they had themselves chosen. The prohibition to dispose of or acquire property and to remove from the place of birth was abolished by successive ukases, beginning July, 1858.

The other 22,500,000 serfs, the "disposition" of 120,000 nobles, were hardly better than slaves. The system had grown up strangely when Russia was bowed under the Tartar yoke, but it had been introduced by native princes and not by foreigners. Gradually the preceding Tsars or dukes of Moscow had imposed their absolute will on their vassals, the nobles, and the nobles had succeeded in doing the same to their vassals, the peasants or serfs, only more effectually. These aristocratic usurpations had been even confirmed and the mujik still further restricted by successive ukases during two centuries. Alexander I and Nicholas I himself had vainly tried to modify the iniquitous system. Innumerable difficulties stood in the way. Who should indemnify the proprietors for their loss? What was the advantage of freedom to emancipated serfs who could possess nothing of their own?

In March, 1856, Alexander II invited his "faithful nobility" to consider what steps were necessary to bring about emancipation. His suggestions were coldly received. He travelled over the country, appealing to the nobles to assist him, but their inertia was harder to overcome than active opposition. Finally, he issued his immortal edict of emancipation (March 3, 1861). Thus by a stroke of the pen, the serfs, hitherto fastened to the soil, were raised to

the rank of freemen. Provision was made for their acquiring property and for the protection of their newly granted liberty. But a change so radical was accompanied by local disturbances and bloodshed.

An annual statement of the public finances began to be made. The universities were delivered from the restrictions imposed by Nicholas. Foreigners acquired the same rights as were enjoyed by Russians abroad. Censorship of the press had been already relaxed. The use of the knout was abolished. Such Jews as exercised any manual occupation received permission to settle freely in the empire.

Reforms were likewise introduced into the administration of Poland. But the spirit of nationality was not extinct and nothing less than independence could satisfy the Poles. Further concessions accomplished little. The troubles went on increasing until January, 1863, when they took the form of guerilla warfare. Resistance was cruelly put down. The insurrection cost dearly to Poland. The last remains of her national life were stamped out. Polish was replaced by Russian as the official language and was forbidden in the schools. Ardent Slavophils wished likewise to Russify Finland, but the Tsar confirmed all its political privileges. Livonia, Esthonia and Courland were not disquieted but continued to exist as vassal provinces, with their own language and laws, under the Russian crown.

Meanwhile the war in America was going on for the preservation of the Union. Russia was pronounced and outspoken in friendliness to the United States. The firm and consistent course pursued by her, when other powers were desirous of our national dissolution, is something which Americans cannot forget.

Revision of the Treaty of Paris (1871). — In 1870 Prince Gortschakoff, the Russian chancellor, informed the European Powers that Russia no longer considered herself bound by the Treaty of Paris as far as it curtailed her natural rights on the Black Sea. Various infractions of that treaty were assigned as reasons for this declaration. A conference of the signatory states at London accepted the declaration of Russia. Thus the most important result of the Crimean War was annulled. Russia has since been free to construct such fortifications as she pleased upon the shores of the Black Sea and to maintain a navy upon its waters. This

right was furthermore ratified by an agreement with Turkey (March 18, 1872).

The Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878). — The promises of the Sultan to introduce reform in the treatment of his Christian subjects had been flagrantly and constantly broken. Protected by the Treaty of Paris, wherein the Powers had waived all right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks were no longer influenced by the restraint of fear. In 1874 the Slavic rayahs of Bosnia and Herzegovina rebelled. Again the Sultan promised reforms, but the insurgents demanded guarantees that he would keep his word. To prevent the flames of insurrection from spreading, Count Andrassy, the Austro-Hungarian chancellor, obtained the Sultan's approval to certain measures enumerated in a formal note (February 12, 1876), but the insurgents were still distrustful. Suddenly the consuls of Germany and France at Salonica were massacred by a Mussulman mob. Russia, Germany and Austria united in the memorandum of Berlin (May 1), demanding of the Sultan a two months' armistice with the Bosnians and Herzegovinians and immediate introduction of the reforms. They threatened the employment of force in case of refusal. Encouraged by the support of Great Britain, who refused to approve the memorandum, the Sultan withheld his consent.

The horrors of Bulgaria broke out, where more than 20,000 Bulgarians were massacred. Public meetings in Great Britain denounced the atrocities. Servia and Montenegro took up arms. The latter was victorious. The former was totally defeated, though the Servian army contained many Russian volunteers and was commanded by the Russian General Tchernaïeff. Alexander II and the Russian official party wished to avoid war, though the Tsar in a speech at Moscow (November 12) openly expressed his sympathy for the Christians. France and Germany held themselves aloof. Austria did her utmost to preserve peace. Great Britain proposed a conference of the Powers at Constantinople, which met on November 23. It presented an ultimatum, requiring the autonomy of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Bulgaria, concessions of territory to Montenegro, the status quo for Servia, a general amnesty, genuine reform in Turkish administration and judiciary, and the nomination by the great Powers of two commissions to see that the promises were carried out. In case of

refusal all the ambassadors were to demand their passports. Sultan Abd-ul Hamid II was on the throne, his predecessors, Sultan Abd-ul Aziz and Sultan Mourad V, having been overthrown that same year by revolution. The astute Midhat Pasha was grand vizier. Again encouraged by the British ambassador, the Sultan refused to comply.

No Power was willing to act, though the ambassadors in a body had formally left Constantinople. Midhat Pasha signed a treaty with Servia, but Montenegro held out. Prince Gortschakoff sent a circular note to the European courts (January 31) and General Ignatieff, the Russian ambassador, travelled over Europe to induce united action. The protocol of London (March 31) invited the Sultan to disarm, and announced, that if he continued to violate his promises of reform, the great Powers would consult further.

Nothing had been accomplished. The resources of a diplomacy of words were exhausted. Turkey was still indifferent or defiant. In Russia the Tsar and the official classes still hesitated, but the Russian people were aflame. Public sentiment, even in a despotic empire, could not be resisted. The same forces of humanity and sympathy, which compelled the American government to take up arms in the effort to end the horrors in Cuba, compelled the reluctant Tsar to take up arms to end longer-continued and more atrocious horrors in the dominions of the Sultan. The Russian war of 1877–1878 against Turkey finds its exact parallel in the American war of 1898 against Spain. Both were spontaneous armed uprisings in behalf of mankind.

The Tsar issued his manifesto on April 24, 1877. The war lasted until the preliminary treaty of San Stephano on March 3, 1878. It was carried on in both Asia and Europe.

In Asia the Russian general-in-chief, the Armenian Loris Melikoff, captured Ardahan (May 17). General Der Hougassoff, also an Armenian, took Bayezid (April 20) and gained the battles of Dram Dagh (June 10) and Daïar (June 21). Melikoff, defeated at Zewin (June 26) by Mouktar Pasha, was obliged to retreat. The Russians received reënforcements. Mouktar Pasha was crushed at Aladja Dagh (October 14–16) and driven into Erzeroum. Kars was stormed (November 18) and fell with 17,000 pris-

oners and 300 cannon. The road to Constantinople through Asia Minor was open.

In Europe Abd-ul Kerim Pasha, Turkish commander-in-chief, remained apathetic in his camp at Shoumla. The main Russian army crossed the Danube at Sistova (June 27). Baron von Krüdener took Nicopolis with 7000 prisoners, 113 cannon and two monitors (July 15). General Gourko attacked the Turks in the Balkans and seized the Shipka Pass (July 17–19). Panic reigned at Constantinople. The Ottoman Minister of War, Redif Pasha, who had proclaimed the Holy War, was removed. Abd-ul Kerim Pasha was replaced by Mehemet Ali Pasha, the son of a German tailor converted to Islam. Souleïman Pasha was recalled from Montenegro to protect the capital. Jealousy prevented coöperation among the Ottoman generals. Souleïman Pasha dashed his army against the Russians and the Bulgarian legion in vain attempts to regain the Shipka Pass (August 16 and September 17). Mehemet Ali Pasha was terribly defeated at Tserkoria (September 21). Osman Pasha was forced into Plevna (August 31). There he defended himself with skill and bravery. But his capitulation was only a question of time. General Todleben, who had fortified Sebastopol in the Crimean war, took charge of the siege. Skobeleff and Gourko cut off all communication. The Roumanians, who had declared themselves independent and had joined the Russians with 60,000 men, performed prodigies of valor. By a general sortie Osman Pasha tried to break through the iron circle, but was forced to surrender with 43,000 soldiers (December 10). The siege had lasted almost four months. The Sultan now wished to treat for peace, but was persuaded by the British ambassador, Sir Austin Layard, to continue the war. Souleïman Pasha replaced Mehemet Ali Pasha and gained a tardy victory at Elena (November 20).

The famous Turkish quadrilateral of Silistria, Roustchouk, Shoumla and Varna was still intact. Already the mountain passes were blocked with snow. An unusually severe season had begun. The Turks supposed that hostilities would cease until spring. The Grand Duke Nicholas ordered General Gourko to force the Balkans. Then followed a magnificent winter campaign along ravines and precipices, where the soldiers themselves dragged the cannon. The astounded Turks were everywhere defeated.

Sofia, the Bulgarian capital, which had not seen a Christian army for 400 years, was entered (January 3, 1878). Six days later Wessir Pasha surrendered with 32,000 men and sixty-six cannon.

The Ottoman Empire seemed entering its death agony. The Servians had declared war. Thessaly, Macedonia and Albania were in open rebellion. The Cretans were tumultuously demanding union with Greece. The Greek army crossed the frontier. The Montenegrins captured fortress after fortress in the west. The Russians effected their junction at Adrianople (January 20) and reached the Marmora on January 31. That same day an armistice was signed at Adrianople. It was time. To oppose the advance of the invaders the Sultan had only a corps of 12,000 men, camped on the hills of Tchataldja, an easy day's march from the capital.

The rapid Russian successes produced intense excitement in Great Britain. The government made vigorous preparations for war. The British fleet passed the Dardanelles and anchored close to Constantinople (February 14). Thereupon the Grand Duke Nicholas advanced to San Stephano, seven miles from the city walls.

On March 3 the Russian and Ottoman plenipotentiaries signed the preliminary treaty of San Stephano. It recognized the independence of both Roumania and Servia. The latter was enlarged by the district of Nisch. The former received the Dobroudja in exchange for Bessarabia, which was restored to Russia as before the Crimean war. Montenegro gained the ports of Spizza and Antivari on the Adriatic and more than doubled its territory. In Asia Russia was confirmed in the possession of the eastern quadrilateral, Kars, Ardahan, Bayezid and Batoum. The Turks were condemned to pay a war indemnity of 300,000,000 roubles. Bulgaria was created a vassal principality of the Sultan. It was to extend from the Danube to the Ægean Sea, thus cutting in twain the still remaining Turkish possessions in Europe. Never had the Ottoman Empire signed a treaty as fatal.

The Congress of Berlin (1878). — The preliminary treaty of San Stephano terrified Austria, who saw aggrandized Slavic states on her southwest frontier neighboring upon her own Slavic peoples. It enraged Great Britain, who saw in it the practical extinction of the Ottoman Empire. But

Austria was held in check by Germany. Great Britain, though unable to put a large army into the field, employed every weapon known to diplomacy. Russia was neither desirous of nor prepared for further war. After much negotiation with the courts of Great Britain and Germany, she agreed to submit the treaty to a congress of the Powers at Berlin. A secret agreement however had just been arrived at for their two governments by Count Schouvaloff and Lord Salisbury.

The congress opened on June 13 and continued in session just one month. The nations were represented by their ablest and most illustrious statesmen. Among the delegates were Count Andrassy, Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Monsieur Waddington from France, Count Corti from Italy, Mehemet Ali Pasha and Caratheodoridi Pasha from Turkey, Lord Salisbury from Great Britain and Count Schouvaloff from Russia. The three most conspicuous figures were Prince Bismarck, who presided, Prince Gortschakoff, chancellor of Russia, and Lord Beaconsfield, prime minister of Great Britain.

The treaty of Berlin much reduced the size of the proposed Bulgaria. It also divided it in two: "Principality of Bulgaria," between the Danube and the Balkans, an autonomous state tributary to the Sultan; "Province of Eastern Roumelia," extending south of the Balkans halfway to the Ægean Sea. The latter, though under a Christian governor, was to depend directly upon the Sultan. The independence of Roumania and Servia was recognized, but, as in the case of the always independent Montenegro, their proposed acquisitions were diminished. Bosnia and Herzegovina were assigned to Austria. The wish was expressed, though not inserted in the treaty, that the Sultan make certain concessions of territory to the Greeks. As to the Christian subjects of the Sultan, the congress contented itself with a repetition of his familiar promises to introduce reforms. In Asia Khotour was ceded to Persia, and the Russians restored Bayezid to Turkey, though retaining Kars, Batoum and Ardahan.

During the session the revelation was made of a secret treaty for defensive alliance between Great Britain and Turkey, which had been concluded on the preceding 4th of June. In this secret treaty Great Britain agreed to unite in arms with the Sultan in defense of the Ottoman Empire

in case it should ever be attacked by Russia. In return the Sultan promised to assign the island of Cyprus to Great Britain and to introduce the necessary reforms in the treatment of his Christian subjects — such reforms to be determined later by the two Powers.

The congress of Berlin, not only in the very fact of its existence but in its decisions, was a diplomatic defeat for Russia. Her main object, the deliverance of Bulgaria, was indeed attained, but this Bulgaria was torn asunder and shorn of its strength. Great Britain and Austria without fighting had gained: the one, Cyprus and preponderance in Asia Minor; and the other, Bosnia and Herzegovina, advancement on the road to Salonica and hence direct influence over Montenegro and Servia. The Turkish Empire had been rescued from destruction, its existence prolonged and further opportunity afforded for future outrage and massacre. For Beaconsfield and Great Britain that congress was a striking but none the less a deplorable triumph.

The Nihilists. — The reforms after the accession of Alexander II had come upon the people like a galvanic shock. However warmly, though vaguely, desired, their application caused everywhere dissatisfaction. The ingrained despotic system had vitiated every activity of life. The serfs were dissatisfied because they had not gained more. The nobles were sullen because, when dispossessed of their serfs, their revenues were curtailed. The hosts of students from the humbler classes, attracted by scholarships or purses to the universities and newly opened colleges, found on completion of their studies that all the civil and official positions were already occupied by the privileged and themselves shut out. Everywhere there was discontent, like morbid soreness of the body ready to propagate political disease.

The irresolute Tsar was discouraged. Some proposed reforms he withheld and others he partially withdrew. The government tried to relax and tighten the reins at the same time. Reaction set in, and the counter reaction was nihilism. Russian nihilism could resemble the mad vagaries of no other country, for it was stamped with the peculiarities of the Russian mind. Though the nihilist considered Russia diseased, he looked upon all other lands as equally or still more rotten. In Russia he saw nothing worth the keeping, and in the rest of the world he saw nothing worth the taking. Some of the nihilists were theorists and

dreamers. Others, the more daring and dangerous, were revolutionists. Their ranks were recruited by men and women from the universities, who were maddened by enforced idleness and poverty and social wrongs. Never numerous, their almost inhuman activity multiplied their numbers in common opinion. Their contempt for death gave them horrible efficiency. Tracked and hunted like wild beasts, they surpassed wild beasts in merciless ferocity. For years Russia was mined and countermined by them and their terrible antagonists, the secret police of the dreaded third section.

Assassinations and attempts at assassination followed fast. Matvéeff, rector of the university of Kiev, Mezentseff, chief of the third section, Prince Krapotkine, governor of Kharkof, Colonel Knoop at Odessa, Captain Reinstein at Moscow, Pietrovski, chief of police at Archangel, and scores of prominent persons were stabbed or shot. An attempt was made to blow up the imperial family with dynamite at the winter palace (1880). The explosion killed sixty soldiers and wounded forty. The Tsarina died in June, 1880. The nihilists matured their plans to blow up the bridge over which the funeral cortege was to pass and destroy the imperial hearse with all the mourners, the foreign princes and guards. A sudden storm so swelled the waters of the Neva as to prevent the execution of the plot.

On December 4, 1879, the Nihilist Executive Committee sent the Tsar his sentence of death, but for a long time every effort to put it in execution failed. In February, 1881, he submitted the scheme of a constitution to a council. On March 9 he gave the elaborated form his approval, but, hesitating still, delayed its proclamation. On the morning of March 13 he sent the order for its publication in the official messenger. That afternoon, while riding, a bomb was thrown against his carriage. Many soldiers and pedestrians were killed, but the emperor was unharmed. "Let me see the wounded," he exclaimed, and sprang from his carriage. Instantly a second bomb was thrown at him. Horribly mutilated, he was borne to his palace, where he expired without uttering a word.

In 1861 he had emancipated the serfs. In 1878 he had freed Bulgaria. At the moment of his death the Constitution which he had granted was being set in type. It is a strange and sad coincidence that the two liberators, the president who freed the slaves in the United States and the Tsar who freed the serfs in Russia, should both perish by the hand of an assassin.

Reign of Alexander III (1881–1894). — Alexander III had to choose between two roads. Should he follow the progressive policy of his father and confirm the still unpublished constitution, or should he set his face backward and reign like Nicholas I? "Change none of my father's orders," he said at first. "It" — the Constitution — "shall be his last will and testament." Unhappily for Russia such sentiments did not last. In Pobiédonostseff, High Procurator of the Holy Synod, a reactionary fanatic of spotless integrity, and the Slavophil, General Ignatieff, he found congenial counsellors. The Constitution was withheld. The temperate and humane General Melikoff, the trusted friend of his father, tendered his resignation. General Ignatieff was made Minister of the Interior.

The day of absolutism, espionage and Russification by force had come back. The government endeavored in domestic affairs to undo all that Alexander II had done. Hatred of everything foreign was the mode. Katkoff, the violent editor of the *Moscow Gazette*, was allowed the utmost latitude, because he so fully expressed all the dynastic and popular passions of the hour. Never was Russian intolerance manifested in more annoying ways and with greater severity. The treatment of the Jews was a disgrace to humanity. They were forbidden to own or lease land or to exercise any liberal profession. They were ordered to concentrate in a few western provinces so as to be more easily watched. More than 300,000 emigrated. The government was no more cruel than the people. In Balta the peasants without provocation sacked 976 Jewish houses and killed or wounded 219 Jews. The Lutherans and Dissenters were treated unmercifully. At last even General Ignatieff was shocked or alarmed, and proposed moderation.

Prince Gortschakoff, at the age of eighty-two, asked to be relieved from his duties as chancellor (1882). As his successor the war party desired General Ignatieff, the peace party M. de Giers. Despite its antipathy for Europe, the foreign policy of the government was pacific. M. de Giers was appointed. His rival, in chagrin, withdrew to private life. Count Tolstoï was made Minister of the Interior and under him the anti-Semitic agitation was sternly repressed.

Improvement in the public finances, brought about by Vichnegradzy, the Minister of Finance, is almost the only alleviation in this dismal reign.

The nihilists, boastful of their success in "removing" a Tsar, continued their work. They held Russia in such terrorism that the coronation of Alexander III had been postponed almost two years. The Tsar had distinguished himself as a soldier in the Russo-Turkish war, but his life on the throne was passed in constant fear of assassination. Immediately on accession he had appointed his brother, Vladimir, to serve as regent in case of necessity. Ceaseless watchfulness and dread sapped his strength. The long illness from which he finally died (October 31, 1894) was largely due to the incessant attempts of the nihilists upon his life.

Nicholas II (1894–). — Though at first apparently desirous of following in his father's steps, he soon showed himself awake to the spirit of the age. On November 27 at St. Petersburg he married the Princess Alix of Hesse, granddaughter of Queen Victoria. All the troops and police were withdrawn from the streets. The people were allowed without restraint to climb the lamp-posts and trees and crowd the windows along the route of the bridal procession. Such freedom on such an occasion had never been known in Russia. This manifest confidence in his subjects made a profound impression and won him immense popularity. In the formal visits of the imperial consorts to different parts of the empire the same shrewd etiquette of confidence has been followed.

On the death of M. de Giers (January, 1895), who had been the real director of Russian foreign policy since the treaty of Berlin, Prince Lobanoff became Minister of Foreign Affairs and proved himself equally pacific. The serious Pamir difficulty as to the boundary between the British and Russian Asiatic possessions was settled in a manner honorable to both countries.

The splendor of the coronation ceremonies at Moscow (May 20, 1896) was darkened by a terrible catastrophe. Over 400,000 people had crowded together on the Khodynskoye plain to feast as guests of the Tsar. Insufficient police were present to control the immense mass. In the crush over 3000 persons were suffocated or trampled to death. In his coronation manifesto the Tsar announced

that the land tax was diminished one-half and that a comprehensive amnesty had been granted to political offenders. Soon afterward Nicholas II and the Tsarina visited Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, France and Germany.

In 1897 the Tsar was received with enthusiasm at Warsaw. As a token of his appreciation he granted permission for the erection of a statue to Mickievitch, the patriot poet whose songs had inspired the Poles in their former resistance to Russia. In the same year for the first time a general census of the empire was undertaken.

The present of Russia is full of hope. A more enlightened spirit is making its way among the government and people. Nihilism for a time at least is silent or has disappeared. Slowly, but none the less surely, the condition of the serfs is improving. The energies of the country are concentrating in industrial and commercial channels and its limitless natural resources being utilized.

With progress at home is coupled a parallel advance of Russian influence abroad. To-day that influence in a striking manner is being exerted in behalf of the world's tranquillity and peace. On August 28, 1898, the Russian government communicated to the courts of Europe one of the most memorable State papers ever issued. This document in graphic language set forth the terrible burden imposed by the existence of vast standing armies and by national rivalry in military armaments. It deplored the waste of men and material resources, consequent on this unnatural condition of affairs. It declared that "the supreme duty to-day imposed upon all States" is "to put an end to these incessant armaments and to seek the means of warding off the calamities which are threatening the whole world." In dignified terms, such as a mighty empire dreading no superior alone could use, it proposed a conference of all the Powers "to occupy itself with this grave problem of universal peace." Whatever the outcome of the conference, the proposition is a blessed augury for the twentieth century.