soon undertook to reconquer its lost provinces. Protestantism was now threatened in its turn, and the struggle which ensued is the central interest in European history for the rest of the century.

CHAPTER VI

SPAIN UNDER CHARLES I. (1516–56), KNOWN AS EMPEROR CHARLES V., AND PHILIP II. (1556–98); HER WORLD EMINENCE AND HER DECAY

REFERENCES: JOHNSON, Europe in the Sixteenth Century, Chapters III., IV., V. (rivalry with France), VII. (Philip); ARMSTRONG, The Emperor Charles V.; M. A. S. HUME, Philip II.; M. A. S. HUME, Spain, 1479–1788; LEA, The Moriscoes in Spain; CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, Vol. II., Chapters II., III.; and Vol. III., Chapters XV., XVI.

SOURCE READINGS: ROBINSON, Readings, Vol. II., Chapter XXVIII., Parts 3 and 4 (Charles and Philip).

The reign of Charles I., 1516–56.

FROM the Spanish national point of view it was a great misfortune that Charles I. (1516–56) was elected to the Empire in 1519, and became Emperor Charles V. Henceforth, having duties to perform in Germany, he could no longer give his whole time to Spain. In fact, from the time of his imperial election he seems gradually to have lost sight of any strictly national point of view; he became, above all, desirous of playing a grand European rôle, and that naturally brought with it a division of his service and a perpetual compromise of the interests of all the nations which he represented. Now, the interests of Spain and Germany were not necessarily opposed. One great interest, the defeat of the Turks, who were pushing along the Danube into Germany, and along the Mediterranean toward Spain, they even had in common; but what had Germany to do with the emperor's Italian wars or his colonial policy, and what

benefit did Spain derive from his life-long struggle against Protestantism? Moreover, although the government of Spain needed Charles's personal attention because he was the focus of political life, out of a reign of forty years he spent in Spain hardly fifteen. It is true, he was the greatest political figure of his day, and his fellow-actors upon the European stage shrank to pigmies when he made his entrance; it is true, he was of tireless activity and with all seriousness tried to live up to the demands which the old illusory ideal of the emperor, the arbiter of the world, made upon him; but it is also true that his grandeur was a personal grandeur, and not identified with the nation, as is the case with the world's great sovereigns, for instance, Elizabeth of England and Henry IV. of France. In a word, Charles used the Spanish resources for his own, and not exclusively for Spanish ends.

Strength of nation sapped by growing absolutism.

But other causes which lay back of the reign and personality of Charles contributed to the decay of Spain. We have seen that the royal power grew greatly under Ferdinand and Isabella, and that such growth was on the whole to the advantage of the country, because it humbled the nobility and facilitated the suppression of the robber-knights. Under Charles this centralizing movement began to show some of its darker sides. In the early part of his reign, in 1521, the cities revolted as a protest against the excessive taxation to which they were subjected. After a fierce struggle their revolt was put down, with the result that the government, henceforth suspicious of the towns, cancelled many of their liberties. In the same way the Cortes, the parliament of Castile, once the proudest self-governing body of Europe, was slighted and abased on every occasion. It still maintained its right of voting the taxes which the government demanded, but the act tended more and more to degenerate into a mere mechanical registration of the king's wishes,

while all share in the making of the laws was practically surrendered. Thus the initiative of the Spanish people in local and national affairs was systematically checked, and where a policy of this sort holds sway it is safe to assert that a people is running the risk of losing its vigor.

Foolish economic policy.

Economic causes also contributed powerfully to the early decay of Spain. We have seen that the king in order to carry on his European wars was obliged to tax the Spanish people heavily. Now the mere drain of money was in itself serious enough, but the Spanish Government made it nearly unbearable by coupling with it a fiscal and industrial policy which could not have been worse had it been dictated by Spain's worst enemy. The ordinary tax (*alcabala*) was a duty of ten per cent on everything sold, which naturally had the effect of totally discouraging commerce, while industrial enterprises, like the manufacture of cloth, were weighted with so many burdens and regulations that they were smothered in the cradle. Add to these discouragements a certain southern slothfulness and a national fondness for the display of elegant leisure, and it becomes plain why Spain never developed her natural resources but grew visibly poorer from decade to decade.

Intellectual paralysis caused by the Inquisition.

And from this analysis of the malady of Spain, let not the Inquisition be omitted. We have seen how, though operating against heretics, it possessed from the first a special significance, because the heretics, being Jews and Moors, happened to be a racially foreign body. Its political character was confirmed by the fact that the crown and not the Pope controlled the institution, and that its numerous confiscations flowed into the royal treasury. The Inquisition inscribed upon its banner the policy, "one faith one people," and though it accomplished its end, it did so at a terrible cost. Several thousand Jews and Moors were burned at the stake; many thousands fled or were banished. Apart

from the wrong, the mental and material loss was irreparable, since Jews and Moors represented the most active commercial and intellectual elements in the peninsula. When toward the middle of the century Protestanism raised its head here and there, it was crushed with the same relentless energy. But if the Inquisition was established to repress heretics, it soon extended its watchfulness to the whole orthodox society of Spain. Every form of intellectual activity fell under suspicion, until no man dared think a free thought, and the whole country sank into stagnation. However, since a yoke is hardly a yoke when it is borne as proudly as if it were a chain of honor, it should be remembered that the Spanish people on the whole viewed the Inquisition with profound approval. They subscribed to its general principle with enthusiasm, and in their fervid catholicity cheered the execution of their enemies. When the fire was laid in the public square to the long fagot-piles of the victims, the Spaniards crowded to the ceremony as to a bull-fight.

Philip II. succeeds to the kingdom of Spain.

The last thirteen years of his reign Charles spent in Germany. The Protestant successes there broke his spirit, and he resigned his crowns in 1556, Spain to his son Philip, Germany to his brother Ferdinand. Philip II. (1556–98) on his accession found himself at the head of states (Spain and her colonies, Naples, Milan, and the Netherlands) hardly less extensive than those which Charles had governed, and as he did not become emperor he had, from the Spanish point of view, the great excellence over Charles that he was a national king. As such he enjoyed the favor of his people, retaining it even through the disasters which mark the close of his reign.

The character of Philip II.

It is curious that this same Philip, whom contemporary Spaniards sincerely esteemed, should stand before the rest of Europe as the darkest tyrant and most persistent enemy of light and progress whom the age produced. To this traditional Protestant picture there certainly belongs a measure of truth; but calm investigation informs us that this truth is associated with prejudice and distorted by exaggeration. Philip II. was a severe, formal, and narrow-minded man, who was animated by the Catholic fervor traditional among his people and his family, and who had acquired from the sad experiences of his father Charles a perfect horror of religious diversity. Therefore his guiding thought, while there was life in him, was to maintain the Catholic faith by repression of heresy through the Inquisition, where he had the power; by war, where war had become inevitable. Every Protestant when he thinks of Philip II. thinks of the Inquisition. But the Inquisition, as we have seen, was not Philip's invention, nor did he, although he made a revolting use of it, handle it more cruelly than his predecessors. Indeed, a scrutiny of his life will convince us that the mephistophelian portrait of him which his enemies popularized does not fit the case. He was, in fact, a plodding, reticent man, who took his business of kingship very seriously, and who, but for the one spark struck from him by his radical intolerance, would have been as foreign to any kind of enthusiasm as the head of a bank. He passed his days and his nights over state affairs. Every document had to go through his own hands. Historians who have examined his papers declare it incredible that so much matter should have been written by one man in one lifetime. In fact, work was his failing, for work with him degenerated into the rage for minutiæ, and ended by enfeebling his grasp of essentials. Out of business hours this ogre of the Protestant mythology was a tender and devoted husband and father. Even his worthless son, Don Carlos, whose mysterious death in prison has been the cause of violent and frequent defamation of the royal name, he is now admitted to have treated with an exemplary forbearance.

Philip as the champion of Catholicism.

It is true that Philip became the champion of the Catholic reaction, which is to say that he identified himself with the greatest movement of his half of the century, and rushed into war with the Protestant world of the north. Doubtless, he gloried in this rôle on religious grounds; nevertheless, an impartial student must agree that his wars were as much forced upon him by Protestant aggression and the logical progress of events, as determined by his own Catholic impulses. As things stood after the Council of Trent, a great Protestant-Catholic world-war was inevitable. It came by way of the Spanish Netherlands. The Netherlands revolted, and Philip set about putting down the insurrection. When he grew aware that the question of religion was involved, his measures of repression became barbarous; they were the traditional Spanish measures, the rack and the fagot; worst of all, from the political point of view, they proved inadequate in the end. The Netherlands could not be pacified by Philip, and gradually won the sympathies and secured the aid of the French Huguenots and the German and English Protestants. So the war widened. Finding himself opposed in the Netherlands by united Protestantism, the king tried to secure the Catholic sympathies by putting himself forward as the champion of the Pope and the Church.

Philip inaugurates his reign by a war with France.

This great struggle between Philip and the Protestant powers, wherein lies the main significance of his reign, developed only gradually. When he ascended the throne, it looked as if the chief concern with him, as with his father Charles, would be to set a limit to the ambitions of France and keep her out of Italy. In the very year of Philip's accession (1556), Henry II. of France, in alliance with the Pope, began a war which is a close counterpart of the many wars waged between Charles and Francis. Now as then the chief object of contention was Italy, and now, as on all former

occasions, fortune decided for the Spaniard. France, after suffering two capital defeats in the Netherlands, one at St. Quentin (1557) and the other at Gravelines (1558), once more came to terms with her old enemy. By the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559) she accepted the Spanish domination in Italy. We may assume that France would have again returned to the attack as so often before, if civil dissensions had not broken out which fully engaged her attention for a long time to come. Philip himself became presently taken up with the question of the revolted Netherlands. Thus the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis marks an epoch. It rings down the curtain on the long political struggle with France, chiefly over Italy—a struggle which had begun more than a half century before with Charles VIII.'s invasion of 1494—and it is followed by the era of religious wars, which cover the rest of Philip's reign.

The Peace of Cateau-Cambrés's marks an epoch, 1559.

The revolt of the Netherlands.

It has already been submitted that these religious wars are not to be conceived as an act of wanton aggression on Philip's part, but rather as the inevitable consequence of the animosities and enmities aroused by Protestant thrust and Catholic parry. Their origin and centre is to be found in the Netherlands. The revolt of these provinces against Philip, their sovereign, will be treated in a subsequent chapter (Chapter VIII.). We shall find that it began before Philip's reign was ten years old, that it involved a cruel and stubborn conflict, and that if it turned finally to the advantage of the Protestant Dutch that result was due in large measure to the circumstance that the insurgents gained the sympathy and aid of the whole reformed world in their heroic struggle. For as Protestantism became aware of the vigor of the Catholic reaction, it felt threatened by the power of Spain, which had undertaken the championship of that reaction. Inevitably the Protestant peoples were drawn about brave Holland. Philip saw himself gradually

engaged in a world-war; to the war with the Dutch rebels was added a war with the French Huguenots and a war with the England of Elizabeth. Furiously Philip turned at length upon his leading Protestant enemy, England.

The Armada, 1588.

The height of the struggle between Spain and England was the sending of the great fleet, the Armada, against the heretic island-kingdom (1588). The Atlantic waters had never seen the like; but the expedition failed miserably by reason of the superior skill and audacity of the English sailors and the disasters caused by wind and water. Philip bore his defeat with dignified resignation. He spoke unaffectedly of the deep grief it caused him "not to be able to render God this great service." But the destruction of the Armada settled the fate of the religious war. It determined that the Dutch should not be reconquered; it established the Protestant world henceforth securely against the Catholic reaction; and it prepared a naval successor for degenerate Spain in youthful England.

Philip's wars with the Turks.

The Dutch and their Protestant allies were not Philip's only enemies. Worse offenders against Catholic Christianity than the Dutch, the Mohammedan Turks, engaged his attention during his whole reign. The Turks were then and continued for some generations to be the terror of the west. Bit by bit they were conquering the possessions of Venice in the Orient; foot by foot they were pushing across Transylvania and Hungary toward Germany; with the help of the Mohammedan pirate states of northern Africa, which had accepted the suzerainty of the Sultan, they were plundering the coasts of Spain and Italy, and were threatening to sweep the Christians wholly off the Mediterranean Sea. Finally, in their great need, the Pope, Venice, and Spain formed an alliance (1571), and in the same year their united fleet won a brilliant victory over the Turks off Lepanto in Greece. Rarely has a greater number of ships been brought

Victory of Lepanto, 1571.

into action, the fleet of the crescent as well as that of the cross amounting to about two hundred galleys. The commander-in-chief of the Christians was the young and chivalrous Don John of Austria, a half-brother of Philip II. Dressed in white velvet and gold he was rowed down the lanes of his galleys, crying exhortations to his men: "Christ is your leader. This is the battle of the cross." His dash and courage, coupled with an unusual display of energy on Philip's part in raising supplies, contributed the main share to the triumph. Hardly more than thirty Turkish vessels escaped the ruin; 30,000 Turks were killed, 12,000 Christian rowers freed from slavery. The victory brought neither Spain nor Christendom any great territorial benefits, but the Mohammedan sea-power was checked, and though still threatening for more than a hundred years to come, fell from this time into a gradual decline. Lepanto is one of the proud moments of the history of Philip and of Spain.

Philip acquires Portugal.

A triumph, productive at least of more immediate and material results than Lepanto, was Philip's acquisition of Portugal. Still it cannot be said that this success was due to any special skill of his own, and the sequel would show that it was hardly a success at all. Portugal was the only state of the peninsula of the Pyrenees which Spain had not yet absorbed. Frequent marriages between the royal houses had, however, prepared a union of the two states. In 1580 the last native king of Portugal died, and Philip, who had a fair claim by reason of descent (see Genealogical Table IV), thereupon took possession of the state and of her colonies. The Portuguese, proud of their nationality and their achievements during the Age of Discoveries, accepted the yoke of the greater state unwillingly. The memories of Portuguese independence would not perish, and after Spain had entered definitely upon her decline, and only forty years after Philip's death, Portugal rose and won back her freedom under

a new royal house, the House of Braganza (1640). Since then Portugal and Spain have never been united.

Further development of absolutism.

We have ill understood the cold, reticent, and obstinate mind of Philip if we have not grasped that there was not an atom of originality about it. His handling of foreign affairs, where we have just followed his course, was inspired by his father's policy, although he laid a little more stress, in accordance with the spirit of his time, upon religious considerations. And in domestic affairs, too, he copied his father slavishly, with the result that the evils already noted under Charles were rapidly accentuated. The political activity of the people still further declined. The Cortes of Castile, although continuing to meet to vote taxes, became as docile as an ancient house-dog, while the Cortes and the other free institutions of Aragon, which had exhibited a much higher degree of vitality than the corresponding institutions of Castile, met with a staggering blow in 1591. In that year the Aragonese ventured to defy the authority of the king and of the Inquisition, were overrun by a royal army, and utterly cowed. The institutions, it is true, Philip, in spite of his victory, did not much alter, but institutions, all history teaches, are nothing without their informing spirit. Thus absolutism won its last victory and held unquestioned control.

Economic ruin.

The financial and economic misery which merely showed its head under Charles became under Philip permanent and frightful. Commerce languished, industry perished, and agriculture lay in ruins, especially in the south. In the period of the Moorish supremacy the south had by an extensive and scientific use of irrigation been converted into one of the garden spots of the world, but the intolerance of the Spaniards looked askance at this prosperity. When Granada was conquered in 1492 the Moors received a guarantee of full religious liberty. But the solemn promises

made were not kept, and frequent disturbances among the outraged Moors culminated in a great rising in 1568. When this was put down in 1570, after frightful mutual massacres, Philip resolved to finish with Granada forever and at any cost. Wholesale banishment was called in to complete the work of the Inquisition, and every person tainted with Moorish blood was ordered from the province. Thus was the vexatious Moorish problem settled in Granada, but its settlement put an end to prosperity for many a year. Under the operation of these various conditions Spain became less and less able to pay the ruinous taxes demanded by its sovereign, who, however much he got, always needed more, arbitrarily reduced the rate of interest, and ended by repudiating his debts.

The Moors.

The triple malady of Spain.

In what book of history or of romance is there a more moving story than that of Spain in the sixteenth century? Fortune showered her best upon her, raised for her the loftiest throne of Europe, and set the New World under her feet for a foot-stool. But it was all for naught. The Inquisition by enforcing uniformit sapped the nation of its intellectual vigor, and absolutism by destroying self-government paralyzed the national energy. What vital germs these two insidious agents spared fell a victim to the adventurous and spendthrift policy of Charles and Philip, which induced them to interfere in the affairs of all the world. Inquisition, absolutism, and imperialism are the ills which engulfed Spain in her ruin.

Permanent decline of Spain.

Philip III. (1598–1621), who succeeded Philip II., was an utterly incapable man, the tool and puppet of his favorites. In 1609 he was forced to bend his pride and conclude with the rebel Dutch a twelve years' truce. The truce implied recognition of Dutch independence, and was at the same time a public acknowledgment of Spain's decline. Under Philip IV. (1621–65) the country dropped definitely to the

second and third rank among European powers, in consequence of the disgraceful treaties of Westphalia (1648) and of the Pyrenees (1659), which closed the long wars with the Netherlands and with France. By 1659 the political, social, and material decline of Spain was patent to every observer.

Outburst of art and literature.

It is something of a mystery why Spain, during her decline under the later Philips, should have enjoyed a remarkable literary and artistic outburst. It is true that there was no broad or general intellectual activity; the Inquisition saw to it that no such movement should gain ground. But art and literature flourished for a time, possibly signifying the last flicker of that national energy which was exhibited in such an imposing manner in the Age of Discoveries. At any rate, Spain was endowed with a great national literature, to which Cervantes (d. 1616) contributed his inimitable "Don Quixote," a satire on chivalry, floated on the most tender and uproarious humor that ever tickled poet's brain, and which Lope de Vega (d. 1635) and Calderon (d. 1681) helped enrich with a national drama, inviting comparison with the English drama of the Shakespearian period. At the same time Velasquez (d. 1660) and Murillo (d. 1681) founded a national school of painting for which the world must remain forever grateful.

CHAPTER VII

ENGLAND UNDER THE TUDORS; TRIUMPH OF THE REFORMATION UNDER ELIZABETH (1558–1603)

REFERENCES: GREEN, Short History of the English People, Chapter VI. (beginning p. 303), Chapter VII.; GARDINER, Student's History of England, pp. 361–481; TERRY, History of England, pp. 512–618; SEEBOHM, The Oxford Reformers; FROUDE, History of England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Death of Elizabeth, 12 vols.; BURTON, History of Scotland, 8 vols. (see Vol. IV. for Mary Stuart); TRAILL, Social England (see Vol. III. for civilization under the Tudors).

SOURCE READINGS: MORE, Utopia (Camelot series, 50 cents; Cassell's Library, 10 cents); TRANSLATIONS AND REPRINTS, University of Pennsylvania, Vol. I., No. 1 (letters of Henry VIII., Wolsey, Erasmus, More, etc.); PROTHERO, Statutes and Constitutional Documents, 1559–1625; GEE and HARDY, Documents Illustrative of English Church History; ROBINSON, Readings, Vol. II., Chapter XXVII. (Henry VIII., Edward VI., Mary), Chapter XXVIII. (Mary Stuart, Elizabeth).

Henry VIII. (1509–47).

England and the revival of learning.

DURING the period of tranquillity imposed upon England by the firm administration of the first Tudor sovereign, Henry VII., the country first began to show in a marked degree the effects of the revival of learning. The two universities, Cambridge and Oxford, but especially Oxford, became the centres of the new classical and historical studies which had been brought to honor again upon the Continent,