

vantage which France secured on that occasion may be written down to his statesmanlike conduct of the government.

Bloom of
French culture.

Many criticisms can be urged against Richelieu's rule; for instance, his handling of the finances was mere muddling, and his exaltation of the monarch at the expense of every other institution in the state led in the eighteenth century to dire disasters. But the sum of his achievement is none the less immense, when we reflect that he welded France into a solid union and made her supreme in Europe. The new splendor could not fail to stir the imagination, and favor the bloom of art and literature. The cardinal himself established the famous Academy of France as a kind of sovereign body in the field of letters (1635), and lived to see the birth of the French drama in the work of Corneille ("The Cid," 1636). This is an important circumstance, for France was destined in the days after Richelieu to exercise an even wider empire through her culture than through her arms.

CHAPTER X

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR AND THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA

REFERENCES: WAKEMAN, *Europe 1598-1715*, Chapters IV., V., VI.; GARDINER, *The Thirty Years' War*; GINDELY, *The Thirty Years' War* (a detailed and scholarly work); FLETCHER, *Gustavus Adolphus*.

SOURCE READINGS: ROBINSON, *Readings*, Vol. II., Chapter XXIX. (The Jesuits in Germany, Sack of Magdeburg, Treaty of Westphalia, etc.).

THE Peace of Augsburg of the year 1555 was undoubtedly a victory for the German Protestants. But it was also, since it took the affairs of religion out of the hands of the emperor and put them in the hands of the local powers, a victory of the princes. Henceforth the decline of the emperor was more certain than ever, while at the same time it became plain that the future of the German people depended on the ability of the princes to shape their territories into modern states.

Religious and political bearing of the Peace of Augsburg, 1555.

But if the Peace of Augsburg represents a victory of Protestantism over Catholicism, and of the princes over the emperor, it was far from being a final settlement of the troubles of Germany. The peace left important matters in suspense. To mention only two: (1) It recognized Lutheranism without extending any rights whatever to Calvinism; and (2) the article called the Ecclesiastical Reservation, as interpreted by the Catholics, prohibited any further seizures of Church property. None the less, the Lutherans, who put their own reading upon the Ecclesiastical Reservation, continued to take monastic property and to appropriate abbacies and

Unsolved religious problems.

bishoprics wherever they had the power. Calvinism, too, in greater favor than Lutheranism among Protestants radically inclined, continued to spread, although no law protected it. Add to these difficulties the hot passion which every question of religion excited in the sixteenth century, and it is plain that the country was drifting into another civil war.

Continued
Protestant
successes.

That the struggle was adjourned for over half a century was due to a variety of causes. In the first place, the immediate successors of Emperor Charles V., Ferdinand I. (1556-64) and Maximilian II. (1564-76), were moderate men, who did their utmost to preserve peace. Their views were seconded by the leading Lutheran princes, inclined by the natural conservatism of successful men to rest content with what they had won. Besides, these princes entertained the hope that without war, by gradual infiltration into all classes of society and through all districts, Protestantism might make a clean sweep of Germany. And, really, for some years the prospects were excellent. Protestantism possessed youth and confidence, and, in the Lutheran form at least, had a legal sanction. It continued to mount, like a tide, until it had covered the whole centre and north of Germany, and threatened the great bishoprics along the Rhine and the Hapsburg and Bavarian dominions in the south. To a dispassionate observer it must have looked highly probable that the Roman Church, undermined in these, its last strongholds, would soon topple. But this culminating catastrophe never took place. For one thing, the dominant Lutherans were of too lax a temper to make the best of their opportunities, and in the second place, in the very nick of time the Catholic Counter-Reformation reached Germany, and instilled into the dying cause a new vigor.

The Catholic
reaction.

We have already taken note of how the Jesuits and the Council of Trent steadied the wavering Catholic ranks all

over the world. This effect did not make itself felt in Germany until the last quarter of the sixteenth century, when Rudolph II. (1576-1612) was upon the throne. Breaking away from the moderate policy of his immediate predecessors, he set his heart on bringing the Roman Church once more to the front, and did all in his power to favor his friends, the Jesuits. Operating from the court of Vienna as a centre, and also from that of Bavaria, whose ruling family was, if possible, even more narrowly Catholic than the Hapsburgs, the devoted followers of Ignatius Loyola gradually spread in every direction. Their churches multiplied, and their schools, conducted with energy and intelligence, were largely attended. Presently the Protestant advance was checked all along the line, and an energetic Catholic propaganda began to score triumphs in those doubtful regions, chiefly of the south, where Protestantism was as yet but a matter of isolated outposts.

By the beginning of the seventeenth century the tension between the parties was nearing the danger point, and every new incident increased the probability of a rupture. The affair of Donauwörth indicated from what quarter the wind was now blowing over Germany. Donauwörth, on the upper Danube, was a free city, meaning, it will be remembered, that it governed itself like a small republic. The Protestant townsmen, being in the majority, ventured to break up a Catholic procession, for which deed the Emperor Rudolph put the city under the ban of the Empire, and commissioned the duke of Bavaria to occupy it with an armed force. This done, the Catholic worship was re-established and Protestantism put down (1607). It was a high-handed act and so excited the more radical Protestants that in 1608 they formed a Union to check similar aggressions. The duke of Bavaria met this measure by associating himself with a number of bishops and abbots in a Catholic League

Increasing
tension.

The Protes-
tant Union,
1608.

The Catholic
League, 1609.

The outbreak
in Bohemia,
1618.

(1609). When men between whom no love is lost go about armed, the chances of a clash are greatly increased. Nevertheless, so general was the dread of civil war that, in spite of ever-increasing difficulties, the peace was preserved for another decade.

The occasion that finally precipitated the long-expected conflict was furnished by Bohemia. Bohemia was a kingdom but recently added to the dominions of the House of Hapsburg. Its inhabitants were Germans and Czechs, the Czechs, a Slavic people, being decidedly in the majority. In the fifteenth century Bohemia had risen into European prominence through its great citizen John Huss, who initiated a reform movement in the Church, and was condemned for it to a heretic's death at the stake. The wild rebellion of the followers of Huss was after many failures put down, but the discontented province continued to be a likely field for revolutionary agitation. In consequence, when Luther lifted his voice in Saxony his words raised an echo across the border and made many converts. Nor was the movement much hindered by the authorities until Emperor Rudolph came to the throne. Devoted son of the Church that he was, he tried to suppress it, but, incapable and half insane, he only botched matters, and was in the end constrained to grant the Protestants a limited toleration in a charter of the year 1609. But both Rudolph and his successor Matthias (1612-19) carried out the terms of the charter grudgingly, and by many high-handed acts kept the suspicions of the Protestants alive. In the year 1618, angered beyond endurance by the duplicity of their ruler, they rose in revolt. The emperor resided at Vienna, and was represented at Prague, the capital of his Bohemian kingdom, by a body of governors. These the insurgents attacked, invaded their castle, and summarily tossed two of them, with their secretary, out of the window into the fosse below. It was a fall

of sheer one hundred feet, but, wonderful to say, had no evil consequences. The grateful victims, on scrambling out of the ditch, ascribed their rescue to the intervention of the Virgin Mary, but sceptical Protestants called attention to the soft heaps of refuse which had accumulated in the moat. As soon as the deed was done, the insurgents set up a government of their own. Thus far the rebellion was a local Bohemian incident; but it proved to be the event which lighted the long-laid fuse and precipitated the great struggle known as the Thirty Years' War.

Whoever makes a study of the Thirty Years' War will be struck by the fact that it is really not so much a single war as an aggregation of wars. It therefore falls naturally into different periods, designated by the question or power which is uppermost at the time. Five such periods are clearly distinguishable: the Bohemian Period (1618-20), the Palatine Period (1621-23), the Danish Period (1625-29), the Swedish Period (1630-35), and the French Period (1635-48). These divisions indicate how the struggle, beginning in Bohemia, spread like an infection, until it included all Europe. From Bohemia, where, we have seen, it had its origin, it ate its way into southern Germany into the region known as the Palatinate; this is the Palatine Period. Then slowly northern Germany and its nearest Protestant neighbor, Denmark, were drawn into its sphere: this is the Danish Period. And finally one and another foreign country was moved to take part, until the war, while continuing to be a German civil struggle, acquired something of the aspect of a world-clash between Protestantism and Catholicism, and something, too, of a duel between the two greatest reigning houses of Europe, Hapsburg and Bourbon.

The periods
of the Thirty
Years' War.

The Bohemian Period (1618-20).

The Bohemians appeal to the German Protestants.

The revolutionists at Prague had hardly set up their government, when they appealed to the German Protestants for help. The Lutherans of the north denied them even their sympathy, while the Calvinists, inhabiting chiefly the south and associated together in the Protestant Union, offered advice, but little help. The fact was that the Bohemians were in rebellion, and rebellion is a matter which conservative men will always treat with caution. There were, however, in the Union a number of flighty, sanguine characters, who were bent on striking, through the Bohemian matter, a blow at the Hapsburgs and Catholicism. Chief of these was the president of the Union, the Elector Frederick, ruling over the region called the Palatinate, of which Heidelberg was the capital. He began by giving the rebellion secret help, nursing the hope, meanwhile, that he would in the end be able to draw the Union with him. In this he was mistaken. The Union temporized, adopted a few useless measures, and before long dissolved itself. Its history is practically zero.

Ferdinand II., 1619-37.

Meanwhile, hostilities had begun between the emperor and his revolted subjects. They had not advanced far when the incapable Matthias died (March, 1619), and the Hapsburg dominions passed to a better man, Ferdinand II. He had been brought up by the Jesuits and filled by them with their devotion to the Church. He was small and feeble, with hooked nose, weak eyes, and thin hair—plainly not the captain of men who shakes the world with his ambitions. Nevertheless, where his convictions were involved this frail sovereign proved himself more immovable than men of a more heroic aspect. Having made sure of the attachment to himself of all the Hapsburg dominions save Bohemia, he set out for Frankfurt, where the assembly of German electors

was convened, after the usual fashion, to name the successor of Matthias. Although three of the seven electors were Protestants, the electoral college so far accepted the time-honored ascendancy of the House of Hapsburg as to raise him to the imperial dignity. Having gained thus much, Ferdinand felt that he must strain every nerve to recover Bohemia. The case was rapidly becoming urgent, for almost at the same moment that he was acclaimed at Frankfurt, the Bohemian struggle had entered a new and more dangerous phase: the revolutionists had made an offer of the crown to the Elector Frederick. Frederick hesitated, torn between anxiety and hope, but in the end, spurred on by his ambition, set out for Prague, and on November 4, 1619, was crowned king.

The Elector Frederick becomes king of Bohemia, 1619.

While making preparations for a vigorous campaign, Ferdinand approached the Catholic League for aid. This organization, which was destined to play a very considerable rôle in the Thirty Years' War, was, in distinction from its rival, the Union, most efficiently managed by its president, Maximilian, duke of Bavaria. Maximilian proved himself, in the course of the war, to be the most capable sovereign of Germany. He had been brought up, like Ferdinand, by the Jesuits, and shared the new emperor's devotion to the Church. He tempered that devotion, however, with a statesmanship such as the imperial dreamer and bigot had no inkling of. From the moment of his accession he prepared for the coming crisis by laying up money and drilling an army. In the hard struggles of this world it is generally such men as Maximilian who succeed, men who exercise foresight and energetically carry through well-laid plans. Maximilian was thoroughly aroused over what he considered the Elector Frederick's usurpation, and did not require much coaxing to put his forces at Ferdinand's disposal.

Maximilian of Bavaria.

The decisive
Bohemian
campaign of
1620.

In the year 1620 there followed the campaign which decided the fate of Bohemia. Was the country to remain Protestant under its new king, Frederick, or to be won back by the Catholics and handed over to Ferdinand? If the Protestants had had a different champion, their outlook might have been more brilliant. Frederick was a man of little brains, and such spirit as he had was largely supplied by his wife. What made greatly against his chances was that politically he stood alone. The Union, in spite of his appeals, did next to nothing, while among the Lutherans one man, the powerful elector of Saxony, acted with Ferdinand. The forces of the League, under the command of General Tilly, penetrated into Bohemia until they came within sight of the towers of Prague. They found Frederick's army drawn up on the White Hill to the west of the town, and the ensuing battle was a crushing defeat for Frederick, who fled for his life. The Jesuits had mockingly foretold that he would prove but a winter king, a man of snow, vanishing at the first ray of the sun, and they were right. Ferdinand, followed by an army of priests and Jesuits, took possession of Bohemia, confiscated the immense estates of the revolted nobles, and gradually forced the people back to Catholicism.

The Palatine Period (1621-23).

Seizure of the
Palatinate.

The Bohemian episode was closed, and lovers of peace hoped that the war would now end. They were disappointed, for neither would the defeated Frederick give up his claims, nor could the elated Catholics resist the temptation to make the most of their victory. An entirely new cause of war was created when the emperor, egged on by his Jesuit advisers, deprived Frederick of his electoral title, and commissioned Maximilian, together with his allies, the Spaniards, to take military possession of the Palatinate. This

looked dangerously like violence, especially as a Catholic army encamped among Protestants was sure to kindle fierce resentment. Frederick, with a little help from various quarters, made what resistance he could, but had to yield to the more disciplined troops of his adversaries. By the end of the year 1622 not a foot of his inherited states was in his possession. The emperor, victorious beyond his dreams, thought he could now dispose of the Palatinate as a conquered province. He transferred (1623) the electoral dignity from Frederick to Maximilian, duke and henceforth elector of Bavaria, and still further rewarded his ally by conferring upon him a part of the Palatine territory (the Upper Palatinate).

Meanwhile, Protestant Europe had watched with alarm the progress of the Catholic arms. The tie of religion was still so close that various Protestant powers, England, Holland, Sweden, and Denmark, began to discuss possible measures for the relief of their German brethren. The leadership in any such concerted action would naturally fall to England, not only because England under Elizabeth had stepped to the front of the Protestant world, but also because the reigning English sovereign, James I., was the father-in-law of Frederick of the Palatinate, husband of the fair and ambitious Princess Elizabeth. James, to be sure, had counselled against the Bohemian adventure because he had an unreasoning aversion to rebellion, but when Frederick lost the Palatinate, too, he could not refuse to bestir himself in his cause. He began with the idea that an amicable adjustment was possible through the combined intervention in Germany of England and Spain, and planned in furtherance of this policy, a marriage alliance with the Spanish House. But the Spaniards negotiated only to gain time, waited till the Palatinate was safe in the emperor's hands, and then raised the price of their friendship. Hence-

Alarm of
Protestant
Europe.

Failure of
James of
England's pro-
jected Protes-
tant alliance.

forth James breathed war and planned a great alliance to wrest the Palatinate from the Catholics by force. Here, too, ill luck pursued him. The Dutch had in 1609 signed a truce with the Spaniards which had just (1621) expired. The renewed war with their old tyrants fully occupied their energies. Sweden, ruled by Gustavus Adolphus, listened, but proposed a plan that was not to James's liking. Besides, Gustavus had troubles with Russia and Poland, which seemed as much of a load as his shoulders could bear for the time being. There remained Denmark, and James signed a treaty with the king of that country, Christian IV., by which England promised to supply him with money in case he headed a Protestant attack. Mindful of the enmity between Hapsburg and Bourbon, James even approached France, and France, though a Catholic country, was willing to lend a hand; but unfortunately the Huguenot embers still smouldered, and Richelieu, who had just then acquired a dominant influence (1624), with characteristic caution resolved to attend first to matters at home. Before long England itself was paralyzed by domestic troubles, for James rashly involved himself in that quarrel with his people which led later to the great civil war, and which for the moment left him without funds, since his angry Parliament would put no money in his hands. The upshot of the vaunted European alliance was that the Danish king took up the war against the emperor single-handed, without so much as getting the promised money help from England.

The Danish War (1625-29).

Christian con-
fronted by
Tilly and
Wallenstein.

With the entrance of Christian IV. into the war, the scene of action was transferred from the south to the north. Tilly, who still commanded the army of the League, moved against him, but Christian at first had the advantage of position and numbers. Just as he thought he had the situation

in hand, a second Catholic army appeared and threatened his flank. Raised in the name of the emperor, this force was really the first *imperial* army put forward in this war—Tilly, it must always be remembered, was employed by the League—and was commanded by Wallenstein. Wallenstein was a Bohemian nobleman, who had remained true to Ferdinand, and who had been rewarded with immense estates taken from the defeated rebels. In order to make his master independent of the League, he had counselled him to raise an army of his own, and when the emperor pleaded poverty, Wallenstein lured him on with a plan by which the army should be self-supporting. The imperial general would simply oblige the magistrates of the districts which the army happened to be occupying, to furnish him with the supplies and ready money of which he stood in need. Such a system of forced contributions was not exactly plunder, but it was the next thing to it, and without urgent necessity the meek Ferdinand would never have given his consent to anything so irregular. Wallenstein at first exercised some restraint upon his men, but as the country grew poorer, it became harder and harder to squeeze support out of it, until the general was obliged to take whatever he could find. Naturally, his rivals were not slow in imitating him, with the result that there now began that awful harrying of Germany, the cold facts of which remain incredible to our ears and confirm the saying of a famous American general that war is hell. And this was only the beginning, for there were destined to be twenty and more years of this slow torture. A French historian has declared the fact that Germany did not become an out-and-out wilderness, one of the most extraordinary examples of endurance which humanity has furnished.

Wallenstein
creates an
imperial army

A word concerning the armies of this age will not come amiss here. To begin with, they were not national but mercenary. A sovereign, wishing to raise a force, com-

The organiza-
tion of an
army.

The order
of battle.

Christian de-
feated by
Tilly and
Wallenstein.

The Peace of
Lübeck, 1629.

missioned a number of officers, who hired men at a fixed price wherever they were to be found. In consequence, an army was likely to look more like an international congress than anything else—all races, costumes, and languages were represented. The pay of both officers and privates was high, and an army cost, at least in salaries, relatively much more than to-day. A well-balanced force would be composed of infantry and cavalry in about equal numbers, the artillery being as yet a factor of no great account. The infantry was in part armed with rude muskets, but owing to the fact that a general still counted on winning a battle by the push of solidly massed squares, the more usual weapon of the foot-soldier was a pike, some eighteen feet in length. In preparation for a battle the cavalry was drawn up on the wings, while the infantry, with the clumsy and ineffective artillery corps in front of it, held the centre. All this looks rude and primitive from the twentieth century point of view, but it remains a noticeable fact that the modern science of war took its first infantile steps in this period, chiefly under the stimulus of Gustavus Adolphus. He increased his artillery pieces, turned them to better use, and developed in his troops a greater mobility both on the march and under fire.

And now to return to the Danish War. Christian IV. was no match for the forces of Tilly and Wallenstein. A single campaign settled his fate. In 1626 Wallenstein defeated his lieutenant Mansfeld at the Bridge of Dessau, and in the same year Tilly crushed Christian himself at Lutter. Not only was Christian obliged to retire from Germany, but he was pursued into his own dominions, and had finally to take refuge in the Danish islands. He had every reason to be thankful when, in the year 1629, the emperor signed the Peace of Lübeck with him, whereby, in return for the promise not to meddle again in German affairs, he got back his Danish territories.

Even before the Peace of Lübeck was signed, Wallenstein had overrun the whole Protestant north. Nothing seemed able to resist him. Capable, unscrupulous, and ambitious—the type of the military adventurer—his remarkable mind began to nurse designs so vast and intricate that they have never yet been entirely fathomed. In the main his plan appears to have been to establish the supremacy of the emperor by overawing the princes, both Catholic and Protestant. As such a revolution in the German system could be effected only by means of the army, of which he was head, he foresaw that the really dominant rôle in reunited Germany would be secured to him. But the plan was bound to encounter powerful obstacles. In the first place Ferdinand soon showed that he had no taste for the part of conqueror which Wallenstein assigned to him, and, further, all the princes, regardless of religion, arraigned themselves against the man who tried to diminish their importance.

If we survey the German situation in the year 1629, the Catholic success seemed to be complete. In the Bohemian and Palatine stages of the war the Union had been scattered and south Germany occupied, while in the Danish stage, the victorious Catholic soldiery had penetrated to the shores of the North and Baltic Seas. In the length and breadth of Germany there was no force to resist the emperor and League, who thought they might now safely level a decisive blow at the Protestant religion. In March, 1629, Ferdinand published the Edict of Restitution, by which the Protestants were dispossessed of all Church territories seized by them since the Peace of Augsburg, signed three-quarters of a century before. The measure was a revolution. At a stroke of the pen two archbishoprics, twelve bishoprics, and hundreds of monasteries passed, without regard to the wishes of the people, back into Catholic hands. The emperor had

The revolu-
tionary plans
of Wallenstein.

Zenith of
the Catholic
triumph and
Edict of Resti-
tution, 1629.