hitherto cajoled the Lutherans in order to keep them quiet while he crushed the more radical Protestants, but by this step he removed the mask. It was not Calvinism which he hated, but Protestantism of every variety. The Edict of Restitution is the high-water mark of Catholic success.

Imperial inconsistency. Wallenstein dismissed, 1630.

The policy laid down in the Edict of Restitution meant violence perpetrated upon every Protestant community in the land, and could be carried through only by an army. But almost simultaneously with its adoption the emperor was guilty of the fatal inconsistency of weakening his forces. In the year 1630 a Diet was held at Ratisbon (Regensburg). Here the long-pent-up opposition to Wallenstein found a voice. His misdemeanors were enumerated: his army exhausted the country, weighing on Catholic and Protestant alike, his imperial plans were revolutionary, and his personal ambition dangerous and boundless. A unanimous cry went up for his dismissal, which the timid emperor could not face. He deprived Wallenstein of his command at the very moment when the Edict of Restitution for the first time united Protestant opposition against him, and when a new power appeared on the scene to give a new turn to the war.

The Swedish Period (1630–35).

Gustavus Adolphus lands in Germany, July, 1630.

In July, 1630, Gustavus Adolphus, king of Sweden, landed on the Baltic coast at the head of an army. We have seen that some years before, when James I. of England attempted to create a great Protestant combination, Gustavus had declined to take a hand in it. He was at the time engaged in securing his position on the Baltic against the Poles. Since then Wallenstein's astonishing triumph in the north had filled the mind of the Swedish king with not a little alarm. He held the ambition of securing for himself the first place on the Baltic, of making, in fact, the Baltic a kind of Swedish lake, and here was Wallenstein apparently reviving

the defunct Empire, carrying its banners into the north, and talking of launching a fleet upon the sea. Concerned about his safety, he resolved to enter the war for the purpose of driving the imperial forces out of northern Germany. But there was more than this in the bold enterprise of Gustavus. As an ardent Protestant he had sympathized from the first with the Protestants of Germany, but not till the publication of the Edict of Restitution did he feel that unless a blow were struck for it, Protestantism in Germany was doomed. Thus Swedish patriotism as well as love of religion spurred him to action. Did he act selfishly or unselfishly? An idle question the present writer thinks, since human actions cannot often be classified under such simple categories as good and bad, selfish and unselfish. Naturally, he acted as was demanded by his conception of the interests of Sweden. To have done otherwise would have been a disavowal of his responsibilities as head of the nation. But it was perfectly compatible with a national policy to entertain also a love of the Protestant religion. At any rate, although he penetrated into Germany as a conqueror, he rescued German Protestantism from destruction, and has ever since been sung and idolized by the Protestants of Germany, who have not hesitated to associate his name with that of Luther.

Gustavus and the Protestant princes.

Gustavus is the greatest figure of the Thirty Years' War, and succeeded during his brief presence on the stage in bringing into the barren struggle something of an epic movement. Let us follow his brilliant course. His first concern on landing in Germany was to secure the alliance of the Protestant princes, for their salvation, together with the safety of his Swedish kingdom, formed the double object of his coming. But here he encountered his first difficulties. The Protestant princes had, on account of the Edict of Restitution, little or no affection left for the emperor, but they hesitated about allying themselves with a foreigner and aiding him in

getting a foothold in their native land. While Gustavus was in turn coaxing and threatening them, help came to him from another quarter. We have remarked that France, from ancient enmity against the Hapsburgs, had followed the German war with interest, but had been unable to interfere, owing to troubles with the Huguenots. By 1629 these troubles were dispelled, and Richelieu was free to follow a more vigorous foreign policy. His point of view was entirely untrammelled by religious considerations, being determined exclusively by his conception of the interests of his country. Imbued with the idea that the thing needful was to hinder the formation of a strong power to the east of France, he welcomed with open arms every enemy of the emperor. Gustavus could from the first count on his good-will, which in January, 1631, took the substantial form of an alliance—the Treaty of Bärwalde—wherein France agreed to pay the king of Sweden a considerable annual subsidy toward the prosecution of the war. With characteristic caution Richelieu would go no further for the present.

Alliance between Sweden and France, 1631.

The first operations of Gustavus were directed to the reduction of the strongholds of Pomerania for the purpose of acquiring a secure base for his campaign. While he was thus engaged, Tilly, who since Wallenstein's dismissal was at the head of the combined forces of the League and emperor, stormed and utterly sacked the great Protestant city of Magdeburg. The horror of the terrible massacre was heightened by the fact that the inhabitants, in their despair, themselves set fire to their town in order to bury themselves in its ashes. When the smoke and fury had passed, the cathedral alone was seen solemnly towering over the ruins. This deed turned Protestant sentiment more strongly than ever toward Gustavus, and when, shortly after, Tilly wantonly invaded Saxony, the elector of Saxony, the greatest of the Protestant princes, put an end to his indecision. Together with

Sack of Magdeburg May, 1631.

the elector of Brandenburg, and followed by many minor princes, he entered into an alliance with Sweden, which so far secured the hold of Gustavus on the north that he was able to seek out Tilly for a decisive encounter. In September, 1631, a great battle took place at Breitenfeld, near Leipsic, in which Swedish generalship and discipline astonished the world by utterly defeating the veteran army of Tilly.

Saxony and Brandenburg join Sweden.

The victory of Breitenfeld laid all Germany at the feet of Gustavus. Never was there a more dramatic change. The Catholics, who a year before had held the reins in their hands, were now in exactly the same helpless position in which the Protestants had found themselves. Gustavus, received everywhere as a deliverer by the Protestants, marched without opposition straight across Germany to the Rhine. In the episcopal town of Mainz he took up his winter quarters. What more natural than that in the presence of a triumph exceeding all expectations, his plans should now have soared higher? With Sweden safe and German Protestantism rescued, his expedition had secured its original objects. But as he looked around and saw Germany helpless at his feet, visions arose of himself as the permanent champion and head of the Protestant section of the German people. The ambition was tempting, but before he could give it a precise form there was practical work to do. As long as Bavaria and the Hapsburg lands were unconquered, he could not hope to be unquestioned arbiter in Germany.

Gustavus takes winter quarters on the Rhine.

In the spring of 1632 he again took the field, aiming straight at the country of his enemies. At the river Lech, Tilly opposed him with the remnant of his forces, only to have them annihilated and be himself killed. Therewith Bavaria was at the great Swede's mercy, who now entered its capital, Munich, in triumph. His next objective, naturally, was Vienna and the emperor. If he could enter

Gustavus in Bavaria, spring, 1632.

Vienna, opposition would be crushed and all Germany would become his prize. In this critical situation Ferdinand turned to the one man who seemed capable of averting the final doom—Wallenstein. That general, since his dismissal, had been sulking on his estates. When Ferdinand's ambassador besought him for aid, he affected indifference, but at length allowed himself to be persuaded to collect an army upon condition that he should be given unlimited control. As soon as the famous leader floated his standards to the wind, the mercenary soldiery gathered round them.

Wallenstein.

In the summer of 1632 Wallenstein and Gustavus, the two greatest generals of their day, took the field against each other. After long, futile manœuvring around Nuremberg, the two armies met for a decisive encounter at Lützen, not far from Leipsic (November, 1632). After the trumpeters had sounded the hymn of Luther, "A Mighty Fortress is our God," and the whole army had knelt in prayer, Gustavus ordered the attack. The combat was long and fierce, but the Swedes won the day; they won, but at a terrible cost. In one of the charges of horse, the impetuosity of Gustavus had carried him too far into the ranks of the enemy, and he was surrounded and slain.

The battle of Lützen, November 16, 1632.

Death of Gustavus.

With the death of the king of Sweden all higher interest vanishes from the war. His great achievement had been this: he had saved the cause of Protestantism in Germany; that is, he had saved a cause which, however narrow and unattractive in some of its manifestations, was an important link in the movement of human freedom. But he left Germany in hopeless confusion. The rage between Protestants and Catholics, now almost unappeasable, was complicated by the territorial greed of the princes, and as if such misery were not enough, foreign powers took advantage of the impotence of the nation to appropriate some of its fairest provinces.

Degeneration of the war on the death of Gustavus.

On the death of Gustavus, Wallenstein was the great figure among the leaders of the war, and Wallenstein, a man not without large views, resolved to strive for a general pacification on the basis of toleration for the Protestants. As he felt that he could never win the emperor and his Jesuit councillors to such a plan, he proceeded secretly, and thus laid himself open to the suspicion of treason. If his army would have followed him through thick and thin, he might have defied the emperor, but some loyal colonels, shocked at the idea of turning against the head of the state, formed a conspiracy against their general, and in February, 1634, murdered him in the town of Eger, before he had effected any change in the situation.

Wallenstein's treason and death, February, 1634.

Meanwhile, the Swedes were doing their best to retain the extraordinary position which Gustavus had won for them. The political direction fell into the hands of the Chancellor Oxenstiern, who ruled in the name of Gustavus's infant daughter Christina, while the military affairs were on the whole very creditably managed by various generals whom Gustavus had trained. But in 1634 the Swedes were signally defeated by the Imperialists at Nördlingen and had to evacuate southern Germany. With fortune smiling once more on the emperor, he resolved to take a really sincere step toward peace. Calamity had taught him to moderate his demands, and he declared to the elector of Saxony his willingness to sign with him a treaty of peace, to which all Protestants should be invited to accede, on the basis of a virtual withdrawal of the obnoxious Edict of Restitution. The proposition was formally accepted at Prague in May, 1635, and such was the longing for peace, that it was welcomed, in spite of its shortcomings, by nearly all the princes of Germany. If Germany had been left to itself, peace might now have descended upon the harried land, but, unfortunately, the decision between peace and war had by

Swedish interests directed by Oxenstiern

The emperor comes to terms with the elector of Saxony, 1635.

this time passed out of German hands and now lay with those foreigners whom the division of the Germans had drawn across the border. It was too late in the day to bid Sweden be gone, especially as France, after having contented itself thus far with granting Sweden money aid, now entered the struggle as a principal. The favorable hour, which Richelieu had patiently awaited, had struck at last. The battle of Nördlingen, followed by the Peace of Prague, had left the Swedes so weak and isolated that they made a frightened appeal to France. Richelieu strengthened the alliance with them and sent a French army into the field. Therewith the war had entered a new phase.

The French Period (1635–48).

Richelieu in alliance with Sweden and the Dutch against the two branches of Hapsburg.

From now on the war was an attempt on the part of the allies, Protestant Sweden and Catholic France, to effect a permanent lodgment in Germany. The word religion was still bandied about, but it had no longer any meaning. Richelieu's opportunity to weaken the House of Hapsburg had come, for which reason, while he attacked it in Germany, he resolved also to face that branch of it established in Spain. The Spanish Hapsburgs were at that time involved with the Dutch Republic, the old struggle having been renewed in 1621. In the very year (1635) in which Richelieu entered the German war, he formed a close union with the Dutch and declared war against Spain. Thus the leading aspect of the Thirty Years' War in its last phase is that of an immense international struggle of the two Houses of Hapsburg and their friends against the House of Bourbon and such allies as it could muster.

The French and Swedish plan of campaign.

The German campaigns of the French Period consist of a patient forward thrust across the Rhine on the part of France, and a steady movement southward from the Baltic

on the part of Sweden. The object of the allies was to crush the emperor between them. It remains a matter of astonishment that that sovereign, exhausted as he was and ill-supported by the German people, who had fallen into a mortal languor, should have made so stubborn a resistance. In the early years he even won some notable successes. But year after year the French and Swedes fastened upon his flanks and with each season he found it more difficult to shake them off. The nation meanwhile, sucked dry by a soldiery which had grown insensible to every appeal of justice and pity, was dying by inches. The cities fell into decay, the country became a desert. In view of the certainty that the product of labor would become the booty of marauders, nobody cared to work. So the people fell into idleness, were butchered, or died of hunger or of pestilence. The only profession which afforded security and a livelihood was that of the soldier, and soldier meant robber and murderer. Armies, therefore, became mere bands organized for pillage, and marched up and down the country, followed by immense hordes of starved camp-followers, women and children, who hoped, in this way, to get a sustenance which they could not find at home.

The long agony of Germany

Accumulated disaster finally brought the emperor to terms. The forces of France had been growing gradually stronger and stronger, and under the leadership of the fiery prince of Condé and the gifted strategist Turenne penetrated far into southern Germany. The honors of the last campaigns rested entirely with them. The emperor saw that it was useless to attempt to turn these strangers from the gates, and accepted the decree of fate. But it was not Ferdinand II. who bared his head to receive the blow. He had been succeeded, on his death in 1637, by his son, Ferdinand III. (1637–57), who opened negotiations with France and Sweden, and after wearisome delays, brought

French and Swedish victories bring the emperor to terms.

them to a successful termination in 1648, in the Treaty of Westphalia.[1]

The main subheads of the Peace of Westphalia.

The Peace of Westphalia is, from the variety of matter which it treats, one of the most important documents in history. First, it determined what territorial compensation France and Sweden were to have in Germany for their victories over the emperor; second, it laid a new basis for the peace between Protestants and Catholics; and third, it authorized an important political readjustment of Germany. All these points will be considered separately.

Cessions made to Sweden and France.

As to the first point, Sweden received the western half of Pomerania, and the bishoprics of Bremen and Verden. By these possessions she was put in control of the mouths of the rivers Oder, Elbe, and Weser, and therewith of a good part of the ocean commerce of Germany. France was confirmed in the possession of the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, which she had acquired under Henry II. (1552), and received, in addition, Alsace, securing therewith a foothold on the upper Rhine. The free city of Strasburg, however, was expressly excluded from this cession.

Dispute about Church lands settled in favor of the Protestants.

Turning to the second head, the great question was how to settle the seizures of Church property which the Protestants had made since the Peace of Augsburg. The Catholics, it will be remembered, had always held that these seizures were illegal, and by the Edict of Restitution of 1629 the emperor had ordered their surrender to the Roman Church. In the peace negotiations the Protestants demanded that their brethren in the faith be restored to all the possessions which they held in 1618, the year when the war broke out, but they compromised at last on the year 1624. Whatever was in Protestant hands on the first of January of

[1] The Peace of Westphalia receives its name from the province of Westphalia on the Rhine, embracing the two cities of Münster and Osnabrück, in which the plenipotentiaries of the powers met.





that year was to remain Protestant; what was in Catholic hands was to be reserved to the Catholics. This settled the question of the disputed lands in the main in the Protestant interest, but involved a concession to the emperor in so far as it sacrificed Bohemia to Catholicism. Concerning Calvinism no further difficulty was made, for the faith was put, in the eyes of the law, on the same footing as Lutheranism.

Political disruption of Germany.

Under the third head it is necessary to note a variety of political and territorial changes within Germany. First, the princes were given a number of new sovereign rights, among others the right of forming alliances with each other and with foreign powers. Therewith the decentralization of Germany was completed, and the single states made as good as independent. If the emperor was weak before, he was now no more than the honorary president of a congress of sovereign powers. Of three of these constituent states of the Empire, the Palatinate, Bavaria, and Brandenburg, a word remains to be said. The Palatinate, which the emperor had confiscated in the early stages of the war, was restored in a mutilated condition to the son of the elector and winter king of Bohemia, Frederick. At the same time this son was recognized as the eighth elector, for the dignity which had been transferred to the duke of Bavaria was not restored. Bavaria, under its elector, Maximilian, had played the most effective part of any German principality in the war, and its increase in power was in strict accordance with merit. From this on Bavaria aspired to the leadership in southern Germany, while the leadership of northern Germany was, as a result of the Peace of Westphalia, practically secured to the elector of Brandenburg. Brandenburg received additions of territory —eastern Pomerania and four bishoprics—constituting a possession so considerable as to enable it to replace Saxony at the head of Protestant Germany and to give it a position

The Palatinate.

Bavaria.

Brandenburg.

second only to that of Austria. From this on the rebirth of Germany would depend on the ability of some one prince or line of princes to accomplish the task of unification wherein the emperor had failed. The fate ruling nations assigned this task to the House of Brandenburg, which achieved it by steps forming henceforth the leading interest of German history.

Switzerland and the Netherlands.

As a last curious detail it may be added that Switzerland and the Dutch Netherlands (Seven United Provinces), which had once been members of the Empire, but had long ago won a practical independence, were formally declared sovereign and free from any obligations to that body.

Effect of the war on Germany.

Germany, after her insufferable crisis, lay insensible and exhausted. Perhaps the contemporary stories of the ruin done by the war are exaggerated; in any case it is certain that the country took more than a hundred years to recover from its disasters. In some respects, doubtless, it has only lately recovered from them. The simple fact is, that the material edifice of civilization, together with most of the moral and intellectual savings of an ancient society, had been destroyed, and what was left was barbarism. The generation which survived the war had grown up without schools, almost without pastors and churches, and to its mental and moral deadness it added, owing to the long rule of force, a disdain for all simple and honest occupations. Respecting the disaster wrought by the war, figures help us to realize the terrible situation. Augsburg, the great southern centre of trade, had had 80,000 inhabitants; the war reduced the city to a provincial town of 16,000. Thousands of villages were destroyed, whole districts were depopulated. In Brandenburg one could travel days without meeting a peasant; in Saxony bands of wolves took possession of the empty villages. In general, the population of Germany fell from one-half to one-third of the numbers before the war.

The Peace of Westphalia closes the period of religious wars.

The Peace of Westphalia dealt with so many matters, not only of German but also of international interest, that it may be looked upon as the basis of European public law till the French Revolution. We may also take it to mark a turning-point in the destinies of civilization. From the time of Luther the chief interest of Europe had been the question of religion. Europe was divided into two camps, Catholicism and Protestantism, which opposed each other with all their might. In the Peace of Westphalia the two parties recorded what they had gradually been learning—which was, that such a fight was futile, and that it was the part of wisdom to put up with each other. Almost imperceptibly men's *minds* had grown more tolerant, even if the *laws* were not always so, and this is, when all is said, the more satisfactory progress. The best proof of the improved state of the European mind toward the middle of the seventeenth century is offered by the practical application of this very peace instrument. The toleration there granted was merely of the old kind—each prince could settle the religion of his principality without any obligation of tolerating dissidents—yet, persecution of individuals was henceforth the exception, and not the rule. It would be an exaggeration to say that the principle of toleration had now been conquered for humanity, or that the squabbles for religion's sake ceased in the world, but it may be asserted, without fear of contradiction, that toleration had won with the Peace of Westphalia a definite recognition among the cultured classes. During the next one hundred and fifty years the principle filtered gradually, through the literary labor of many noble thinkers, to the lowest strata of society, and became in the era of the French Revolution a possession of all mankind.

The principle of toleration.

PART II

THE ABSOLUTE MONARCHY