

of Baden; and third, Weimar, Hesse, and all the rest, constituting the small states. Now the national party, headed by the Prussian statesman, Stein, demanded a close federal union, but Metternich, who feared that a united Germany would not serve the interests of Austria, carried the day and persuaded the German delegates to be content with a loose association under the name *Bund* (Union). The Bund was to transact business through a Diet of state delegates assembled at Frankfort-on-the-Main, but as the heads of the states yielded none of their sovereignty to the common Parliament, it will be seen—and such was Metternich's plan—that the Bund, as a means of effective union, was a farce. Germany remained a mere geographical expression, and the disappointment of the patriots was keen.

he reaction.

But there was another sentiment besides that of nationality offended at Vienna. We have glanced at the enthusiasm over legitimacy, a significant sign of the widely prevalent animosity felt against the Revolution and its democratic principles. The fact is that Europe was swept in 1815 by a wave of religious and political reaction that carried the Viennese diplomats off their feet. The evidence is furnished by a document drawn up by Czar Alexander, in which he pledged himself to govern his state in accordance with Biblical principles, and which he induced all his brother-potentates either to sign or give their assent to. This treaty has become famous under the name of the Holy Alliance,¹ not by reason of anything which the document itself contains, for it is a heap of well-meant platitudes, but because the name Holy Alliance became popular as a designation for the leagued reactionaries of Europe. In this sense all Europe constituted the Holy Alliance for a time; but as liberal principles gradually reasserted themselves in the

The Holy Alliance.

¹ See the text in *Translations and Reprints* (University of Pennsylvania), Vol. I. "It is verbiage," said Metternich on perusing it.

west, England and France refused to coöperate in the suppression of democratic activity, and Russia, Austria, and Prussia were left to sustain the conservative doctrines as best they could. But if the Holy Alliance itself is only a collection of sounding phrases, the strong conservative sentiment of Europe managed to create at least one practical means of expression. It was agreed that the powers who had reorganized Europe should meet in congress, from time to time, for the purpose of considering the European situation and for "the maintenance of all transactions hitherto established." This was tantamount to a declaration of war against all favorers of change and progress, and Metternich, the clever promoter of the congressional policy, presently resolved to use the parliament of Europe for the purpose of crushing revolutionary activity in any country as soon as it arose. This is the Austrian chancellor's famous policy of intervention, and congresses and intervention, not Alexander's mystico-bombastic Holy Alliance, are the real tools by which the reaction held Europe in a vice. Such was Metternich's authority, that he imposed his machinery of repression for some time with the consent of the powers, but England, as we shall see, presently grew suspicious, and the policy of shutting Europe in the mausoleum of conservatism had to be given up. But summing up what has been said, it will be seen that the conservative framers of reconstructed Europe ranged against themselves the forces of *liberalism* as well as those of *nationalism*, and that from this circumstance the whole history of the nineteenth century takes its imprint. Our subsequent chapters are the tale of the heroic struggles by which liberalism and nationalism acquire an honorable recognition.

The first serious test of Metternich's Chinese policy of a Europe cast in an unalterable mould came when the Mediterranean countries were shaken by a series of revolutions.

Periodical congresses.

Intervention.

Reaction versus liberalism and nationalism.

Revolution in Spain, 1820.

The beginning was made by Spain. The fall of Napoleon had brought back the deposed Bourbon monarch, Ferdinand VII., who showed his moral fibre by beginning his reign with a perjury. Although he had sworn to maintain the constitution, called the Constitution of 1812, and drawn up during the sovereign's absence by the heroic defenders of the Spanish soil, he not only set it aside as soon as he had his hand once more on the helm, but encouraged a cruel and wholesale persecution of the patriots, on the ground that they bore the taint of liberalism. Spain fell back into the Middle Ages, and the court, with its corruption, and the clergy, with its Inquisition, governed the country in accordance with their selfish interests. But disaffection kept pace with the hateful tyranny, and when in January, 1820, a few soldiers declared themselves in rebellion, the whole country almost in an instant caught fire. In Madrid there was a riot, which was not appeased until the cringing sovereign had made his bow to the masses by restoring the Constitution of 1812.

Revolution in
Naples.

Revolution in
Portugal.

This Spanish success created imitators. In Naples the fall of Napoleon had brought back another Bourbon, also named Ferdinand, who bore a remarkable moral resemblance to his relative of Madrid. On receipt of the happy news from Spain, the army raised the banner of revolt, and with the aid of the people forced the king to accept for his realm of Naples the now popular Spanish constitution. Nor did this complete the tale of revolution. The contagion spread to Portugal. In the absence of the royal family, which was still in Brazil, whither it had fled on Napoleon's invasion in 1807, a provisional government was hurried into office which tried to conjure the storm by a profusion of liberal promises.

Against these popular movements in the Latin south the indignant Metternich resolved to set in action his ma-

chinery of congresses and intervention. But if he hoped for unanimity among the powers for the maintenance of what he called "order," he soon saw his mistake. A meeting at Troppau (1820), called for the discussion of Neapolitan affairs, which from their nearness were the most pressing, revealed that England and France had no desire to share in a crusade against democracy. But the Austrian's counsel still prevailed with Russia and Prussia, and intervention was agreed on in principle, though it was not to begin until Ferdinand himself had been heard in the case. The congress was therefore adjourned to Laibach, near the Italian border, and the mendacious Bourbon had no sooner appeared (1821) and denounced his late liberal acts as wrung from him by force, than Austria accepted the commission of her friends and marched an army into Naples.

The
congresses
of Troppau
and Laibach

Unfortunately, the Neapolitan liberals had not been able to call a strong government into being. They lacked experience, and worst of all, by falling out with the island of Sicily, which asked for home rule, were obliged to send a part of their army across the straits to maintain their authority. The mere approach of the Austrian forces served to scatter the Neapolitan soldiery and break all opposition to the restoration of Ferdinand as absolute king. When the patriots in the Italian north, and especially in Piedmont, tried to raise an insurrection in the Austrian rear, in aid of the liberal movement in the south, Austria marched an army into Piedmont also. Thus Metternich, by the exercise of a police power, for which he found authority in his own principles and in the mandate of the eastern potentates, practically made himself master of Italy.

Intervention
of Austria in
Naples, 1821

This first success only stimulated the appetite of the three eastern courts, and when the court of Paris, which had been

Intervention
of France in
Spain, 1823.

wavering, now came over to their side, they could take another important step. At a congress held at Verona (1822) they commissioned France to interfere in Spain. A French army under the duke of Angoulême, the king's nephew, crossed the Pyrenees, and entered Madrid practically without opposition. The downfall of Spanish liberalism was as swift and ignominious as that of Naples, and for substantially the same reasons. The leaders were violent and inexperienced, and failed to attach the impoverished and ignorant masses to their programme. Priest- and beggar-ridden Naples and Spain were not good soil for the Tree of Liberty. The result of French intervention was a second restoration, marked, like that of Naples, by a cruel persecution of the liberals. The Spanish sovereign, as revolting a combination of imbecility, ignorance, and duplicity as ever disgraced a throne, now hoped that the European monarchs would extend their services to America. The Spanish colonies, embracing the vast regions of Central and South America, were in revolt, and Ferdinand argued that to put down rebellion across the seas was as holy work as repressing it in Spain.

Question of
the Spanish
colonies.

Their freedom
secured by
Canning and
President
Monroe.

The rebellion of the Spanish colonies had run a curious course, for it had begun not with a movement against the mother country, but with the patriotic refusal to accept the usurper, Joseph Bonaparte. During Napoleon's struggle in Spain the colonies had governed themselves, and acquiring a taste for independence had, on Ferdinand's restoration, declared their unwillingness to return to the old allegiance without some provision for home rule. This the stubborn Ferdinand had rejected, with the result that the colonies, one after another, had renounced the Spanish connection. On Ferdinand's appeal to the powers, the question of supporting him was taken up, when the English minister, Canning, heartily seconded by the United States, put a

quietus on the matter. Canning adopted the bold measure of publicly acknowledging the colonies as sovereign states, and President Monroe went a step farther by threatening to regard any interference in American affairs as an act unfriendly to his government. The declaration of the American president, made in 1823, furnishes the basis of what has since been called the Monroe Doctrine. The upshot was that the Spanish colonies made good their independence, and that the leagued champions of reaction, to the joy of the liberal parties the world over, met their first serious check. Shortly after, they became aware that there were regions, even in Europe, which they could not control. For with Naples and Spain won back to absolutism, logic demanded that Portugal be served the same way. But Portugal being on the coast was accessible to England; and when Canning prepared to protect it from interference by sending an army thither, the allies saw fit to abandon their enterprise.

Failure of the
Holy Alliance
in Portugal.

Reviewing the great events in the Mediterranean countries, we observe that the reaction headed by Metternich won some significant triumphs, but had to relax its principles in at least two instances, owing chiefly to the veto of England. Such strength as the conservative programme mustered resulted from union, and the defection of England under the direction of Canning showed that union, on the absurd basis of political immobility, could not be long maintained. It is frequently said that Canning broke up the Holy Alliance. A more correct statement would be that England under Canning deserted the Holy Alliance, and that, weakened by defection, it was shortly after broken up by another event to which we now turn—the Greek revolution.

The reaction
begins to lose
ground.

At the very moment when the eastern powers were formulating their policy against popular movements at the congress of Laibach, the news reached them that the nefarious

The revolt of
Greece, 1821.

Relation of
Turks, Greeks,
and Slavs.

spirit of revolt had raised its head in the Turkish Empire also, and that the Greeks, subjected for centuries to the Sultan, demanded independence. If the diplomats of the school of Metternich had been accessible to generous impulses, they would have applauded a movement which aimed to cast off the tyrannical yoke of the Mohammedan conqueror; but, blinded by prejudice, they unhesitatingly laid their curse upon the new rising. The case of the Greeks was as follows: With the growing decay of the Turkish Empire the government of the Sultan, conducted by venal and cruel pashas, had grown steadily more despicable, while the Greeks, largely through the stimulating influence of the French Revolution, had experienced a renaissance. Their language and literature bloomed anew, they studied with enthusiasm their great past, and they accumulated wealth by almost monopolizing the commerce of the eastern Mediterranean. Angered by the failure of Europe to do anything for them after the fall of Napoleon, they formed a secret society, and in 1821 rose by concerted action. The mass of the nation lived in the restricted territory of ancient Hellas, but offshoots spread in complex ramifications throughout the Slav populations of the Balkan region. Further, the Slavs, having been Christianized in the days of Greek ascendancy, belonged to the Greek Orthodox Church, and their clergy, especially the prelates, were of Hellenic blood and speech. The leaders of 1821 therefore planned to make the revolt a general Christian movement under Greek guidance, and were not a little disconcerted to discover that the Slavs would not follow them. In fact, the religious predominance of the Greeks was so unpopular among the Roumanians and Bulgarians, that they loved their Christian teachers little better than their Mohammedan masters. The rivalry appearing at this point between Greeks and Slavs, and later among the various tribes of Slavs, has greatly retarded the liberation of

the Balkans. In the year 1821 it threatened ruin, until the Greeks, discovering that they could depend on none but themselves, bravely shouldered the whole responsibility. In a sudden rush they succeeded in clearing almost all of the Morea (Peloponnesus) and central Greece of the enemy.

The Sultan, boundlessly enraged at this success, made formidable efforts to recover the lost territory. His armies penetrated (1822) into the revolted districts, but failed to break the undaunted resistance of the little people. Balked of their prey, the Turks committed abominable atrocities, to be followed presently on the part of the Greeks by acts of similar fury. The tale of mutual butchery surpasses belief, and becomes intelligible only when we remember that the animosity, usual between slave and master, was here blown into an unquenchable flame by religious fanaticism. In the year 1824 the Sultan, feeling the exhaustion of his resources, invited the coöperation of his powerful vassal, Mehemed Ali, pasha of Egypt, and the arrival on the scene of this capable and unscrupulous ruler soon gave another complexion to affairs. Using the island of Crete as a base, he penetrated into the Morea from the south, and by 1826 had made such great strides that to the casual view the Greek cause seemed doomed. But at this point Europe, hitherto shamefully indifferent, interposed, and Greece was saved.

As long as Metternich's influence prevailed, it was clear that Europe would quietly look on while the Sultan waded in the blood of his Christian subjects. The *peoples* of Europe, it is true, in contrast to the *governments*, made no secret of their sympathy with the cause of freedom. Bands of volunteers, among whom was the most famous poet of the time, Lord Byron,¹ gathered under the Greek banners,

¹ He died of fever, a martyr to the cause, in 1824 at Missolonghi.

The Sultan
fails to subdue
the Greeks.

The Sultan
calls upon
the pasha of
Egypt for help.

England, Russia,
and France
agree to interfere in
behalf of Greece,
1827.

They destroy
the
Mohammedan
fleet at
Navarino.

War between
Turkey and
Russia, 1828-
29.

Otto of Ba-
varia is called
to the Greek
throne.

but such occasional help hardly delayed the triumph of the Egyptian pasha. Finally, in 1826, Canning succeeded in interesting the new Czar, Nicholas I., who had just succeeded his brother Alexander, in the Greek cause, and together they agreed to interpose. In the next year they succeeded in bringing France to their side, and the three powers agreed (Treaty of London) to end hostilities at once. This resolution, taken by a majority of the powers, and formed in behalf of freedom against an established and legitimate sovereign, may be accepted as the finishing blow to the so-called Holy Alliance. The fleets of the three powers sailed to the Morea to inform the Egyptian commander that warfare must cease, and when the outraged Mussulman refused to comply, his fleet was attacked at Navarino (October 20, 1827) and utterly wrecked.

The roar of the guns at Navarino announced the birth of a free state to the world, but the Sultan was not yet willing to yield the point. Mistakenly thinking that he could save the day, he issued a defiance to his nearest enemy, the Czar, who answered with a declaration of war. Thus the Greek struggle terminated in a Turco-Russian war, in which the Russians soon proved their superiority, crossed successively the Danube and the Balkans, and moved upon Constantinople. In this crisis the Sultan's resistance collapsed, and in the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) he yielded every point at issue. Not only did he grant the powers the right to settle the affairs of Greece, but he also conceded home rule to the Roumanian provinces (Wallachia and Moldavia). Furthermore, Russia acquired a right of perpetual interference in the affairs of Turkey, which practically put the Sultan at her mercy.

After prolonged discussions over the future of Greece, the powers agreed that the country was to constitute a free monarchy and settled the crown upon Otto, a Bavarian

prince. But before this result was reached, Europe itself had broken with the reaction by a general revolutionary upheaval, having its origin in the old centre of disturbance, France.