

kissing the hands of the tall young prince—and which in one instance went so far as to make an ancient lady somewhat irreverently employ the sacred words of the *Nunc dimittis*—is a pretty object to contemplate through the haze of a century. But we cannot join in the historian's sneer at the reasoning loyalty which has taken the place of the old prostration before every wearer of a crown: "How greatly have we now improved upon those unphilosophical times! How far more judicious to value kings and governments, like all other articles, only according to their cheapness and convenience!"*

Having been in Manchester two days, the rebel army marched on the 1st of December to Macclesfield, fording the Mersey near Stockport. It was determined to proceed to Derby; but lord George Murray, with the van, moved from Macclesfield to Congleton, "which was the straight road to Lichfield; so that the enemy would have reason to think we intended to come upon them, which would make them gather together in a body, and readily advance upon that road, so that we could get before them to Derby," † The manœuvre succeeded. The duke of Cumberland, who was at Newcastle-under-Line with his army, thought the object of the rebels was to get to Wales, where Jacobitism had its adherents. He therefore marched to Stone; and left the road to London open. Murray suddenly altered his course, and passing through Leek and Ashbourn, reached Derby at noon on the 5th. The prince, with the main body, arrived there the same evening. The duke of Cumberland's spies had been taken prisoners, especially "the famous captain Weir, well known to all about court," who fell in the way of lord George Murray. "He was sent to the prince to be examined," writes the Highland officer in his Account; ‡ and whether it was clemency or prudence in the prince, Weir was saved from hanging to reveal all he knew of the movements of the English forces. In Derby the rebels obtained only three recruits; and, as was their usual course, they possessed themselves of the money collected for the taxes, which here amounted to 2500*l.* Without these resources, it is difficult to understand how this army contrived to subsist by paying for the necessaries which it wanted. The plunder was really inconsiderable. But the wants of the hardy Highlanders were easily supplied. They could march for a whole day upon a little oatmeal, which they carried in bags, mixed with the water of the streams through which they waded. It is highly honourable to these poor men, who in their own country were not

* Lord Mahon, vol. iii. p. 405.

† "Jacobite Memoirs," p. 53.

‡ "Lockhart Papers," p. 458.

averse to depredations upon a large scale which looked like warfare, that in their march through a rich land they plundered very little, and committed no wanton mischief. William Hutton justly appreciated this behaviour: "They frequently," he said, "paid their quarters—more frequently it was not expected." He has an excuse for their petty depredations: "If they took people's shoes, it was because they had none of their own; and no voice speaks so loud as that of necessity." The general expectation in Derby was that the rebels had determined to march on. The same belief prevailed in the surrounding districts. Gray has an amusing anecdote of the temper in which this possible advance was regarded: "I heard three people, sensible middle-aged men, when the Scotch were said to be at Stamford, and actually were at Derby, talking of hiring a chaise to go to Caxton, a place in the high road, to see the Pretender and the Highlanders as they passed."* This has been called "indifference," an "unconcern to the interests of the reigning family." It was simply curiosity mixed with a good deal of contempt. The unconcern at the advance into the kingdom of a small army of strangely clad and irregularly armed mountaineers, was produced by the certainty that there were in arms a very powerful force of disciplined soldiers moving to attack them, or to intercept their march to the metropolis; concentrating to put down an insane enterprise by some signal vengeance. Lord George Murray has clearly described the dangers which surrounded the adventurous prince and his men when they had reached Derby: "We did not doubt but that the duke of Cumberland would be that night at Stafford, which was as near to London as Derby. Mr Wade was coming up by hard marches the east road; and we knew that an army, at least equal to any of these, would be formed near London, consisting of guards and horse, with troops which they would bring from the coast where they were quartered: so that there would be three armies made up of regular troops, that would surround us, being above thirty thousand men, whereas we were not above five thousand fighting men, if so many." †

It is scarcely necessary to believe that, in the face of this danger, there were any especial reasons, which time has not yet developed, to determine Charles's council of war to advise a retreat. Lord George Murray has detailed the solid arguments which were opposed to the obstinate rashness of Charles. The prince did not doubt that the justness of his cause would prevail; he had hopes of a defection in the enemy's army; he was bent upon putting all

* Letter to Walpole, February 3, 1746. Works, vol. ii. p. 181—Pickering's edit.

† "Jacobite Memoirs," p. 54.

to the risk. It was vain to tell him that, if a misfortune should happen, "it could not be supposed that one man could escape; for the militia, who had not appeared much against us hitherto, would, upon our defeat, possess all the roads, and the enemy's horse would surround us on all hands."* The Highlanders in the streets of Derby were animated to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, breathing nothing but a desire for the combat with the duke of Cumberland. "They were to be seen, during the whole day, in crowds before the shops of the cutlers, quarrelling about who should be the first to sharpen and give a proper edge to their swords." † In spite of this ardour, the chiefs, one and all, combated the desire of the prince to give battle on the 6th. They knew, says De Johnstone, that, "in case of a defeat in England, no one in our army could by any possibility escape destruction, as the English peasants were hostile to us in the highest degree." They told the prince that there could be no doubt but that they should easily beat the army of the duke of Cumberland, though much superior in point of numbers; but then another battle must be fought on Finchley Common, before they could enter London; and they very quietly asked, if by a miracle they could arrive at the capital, what sort of figure four thousand men would make amidst a population of a million. ‡ This was an exaggerated estimate of the London population—a common error of that period. But the argument was equally strong if applied to a population of half a million. Before we proceed to describe the retreat, which was the result of these sensible opinions, let us, out of very imperfect materials, endeavour to obtain a glimpse of what the people of London were doing and thinking at this period, when war appeared to be closely approaching their peaceful homes.

The chief authority upon which a sober historian rests his belief that, when Charles Edward was known to have reached Derby, the English metropolis presented a frightful scene of terror and want of confidence, is the statement of the Chevalier de Johnstone: "Our arrival at Derby was known at London on the 5th of December; and the following day, called by the English Black Monday, the intelligence was known throughout the whole city, which was filled with terror and consternation." § The 6th of December was a Friday, and not a Monday. With no personal knowledge of the circumstances, De Johnstone goes on to tell us that a run was made upon the Bank; that it only escaped bankruptcy by paying in sixpences, and by sending its own agents to be foremost in

* "Jacobite Memoirs," p. 54.

† De Johnstone, p. 67.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

§ "Memoirs," p. 75.

the crowd, and to present the notes at one door, and take back the sixpences by another door. There was a Jacobite party in London, with one of the City members, alderman Heathcote, at its head; and a run upon the Bank was one of the means adopted to produce confusion. But the sixpenny story rests upon no other evidence than that of De Johnstone; and no fact is more indisputable than that a very large number of those who are called by Smollett "the trading part of the City, and those concerned in money-corporations," gave public notice that they would not refuse to receive the notes of the Bank of England, in payment of any sum of money.* Smollett indeed says that the moneyed and commercial persons "prognosticated their own ruin in the approaching revolution, and their countenances exhibited the plainest marks of horror and despair." But Smollett, entertaining himself Jacobite partialities, tells us something more: "The militia of London and Middlesex were kept in readiness to march; double watches were posted at the city-gates, and signals of alarm appointed. The volunteers of the City were incorporated into a regiment; the practitioners of the law headed by the judges; the weavers of Spitalfields, and other communities, engaged in associations; and even the managers of the theatres offered to raise a body of their dependents for the service of the government." We do not find these circumstances noticed by the historian who asks, "Had, then, the Highlanders continued to push forward, must not the increasing terror have palsied all power of resistance?" † The inhabitants of London, according to De Johnstone, fled to the country, with their most precious effects. ‡ A great number certainly left the busy streets, and were crowding up Highgate Hill. But it was to gaze upon the camp at Finchley, in which London artisans were associated with troops of the line, who could inspire courage, if such inspiration were needed, by tales of Dettingen and Fontenoy. A far larger proportion were laughing at caricatures of the Pretender, the Pope, and the king of France; and at those which, after the unvarying fashion of Englishmen to laugh at themselves, ridiculed Johnnie Cope, and did not spare the duke of Newcastle. They were reading the "Penny Post," with a border of capital letters forming the words, "No Pretender! No Popery! No slavery! No arbitrary power! No wooden shoes!" § Hogarth's wonderful print of the "March to Finchley" was not published till 1750; but from this minute embodiment of all the prevailing aspects of the outer life of the London population, we may gather some clearer notion of the realities of 1745, than from the most elaborate

* Maitland. "History of London," vol. i. p. 646.

† Lord Mahon, vol. iii. p. 413.

‡ Wright. "House of Hanover," vol. i. p. 226.

§ "Memoirs," p. 75.

description. We may here trace the military costume of the time—the Prussian sugar-loaf cap of the grenadier—the fifer then first naturalized in the British army. We may form some notion of the licence of the soldiery in those days of cheap intoxication. We may follow all the rough diversions and practical jokes of the London populace, who exhibit in their demeanour any feeling but that of terror. We may notice how the great observer of the life around him alluded to—what was perhaps the only real danger in this crisis—the prospect of a French invasion, by which, in conjunction with the Highland insurrection, “the Jacobites were elevated to an insolence of hope which they were at no pains to conceal.”* The French spy, communicating to the eager old Scot the letter which promises a descent from Dunkirk, is one of those Hogarthian groups which we may accept without hesitation as the truth of individuality.

The fashionable world of London was dull at the opening of this winter: “There never was so melancholy a town; no kind of public place but the play-houses, and they look as if the rebels had just driven away the company. Nobody but has some fear for themselves, for their money, or for their friends in the army;” † This is the serious fear which becomes a grave nation at a dangerous crisis; but it is not the fear of cowardice. To understand why there should have been fear at all, we must bear in mind how imperfect were the means of public information. The numbers of the rebels were generally estimated at fifteen thousand. But the fidelity of the common people to their government, and their aversion to the cause of the Stuarts, are unquestionable. A French ship called the *Soleil* had been taken, with many Jacobites on board, who were coming to join their Scottish friends. There was among them a member of the unfortunate family of Derwentwater. “The mob,” says Walpole, “persuaded of his being the youngest Pretender, could scarcely be persuaded from tearing him to pieces all the way on the road, and at his arrival. He said he had heard of English mobs, but could not conceive they were so dreadful.” The populace of London have, happily, long since ceased to be ferocious. In this instance, and in several others, we recognize no generous pity for the unfortunate; but we have, even in this temper, one of the many evidences of the mistake into which some recent writers have fallen—that of speaking “of the march to Derby as an enterprise, which, had it been continued, was extremely likely to overturn the Hanover settlement and restore the Stuarts to the throne.” The sensible and unprejudiced historian from whom

* Smollett.

† Horace Walpole to Mann, Nov. 29.

we quote, truly says, “The country had already pronounced upon the question, in the cold silence with which it received the Highland march.”*

But there was an influence of public opinion, not only in England but in parts of Scotland, of far more importance than the hostility of the English peasantry, and the rude aversion of a London mob,—an influence that rendered even the temporary success of the Stuart cause almost an impossibility. Mr. Hallam has pointed out that the “augmentation of the democratical influence, using that term as applied to the commercial and industrious classes in contradistinction to the territorial aristocracy, was the slow but certain effect of accumulated wealth and diffused knowledge, acting, however, on the traditional notions of freedom and equality, which had ever prevailed in the English people.” † The encouragement which Charles Edward undoubtedly received from some considerable portion of the territorial aristocracy, and on which he too confidently relied, was counteracted by the impassive calmness, or decided resistance, of the commercial and industrious classes. It was not till the too confiding prince had got to Derby, that it was pointed out to him that, “after traversing all the provinces which had the reputation of being most attached to his family, in order to enable them to join him, a single person of distinction had not yet declared himself.” ‡ The commercial and industrious classes were fairly represented at Liverpool, where a regiment of men of seven hundred foot was raised, clothed, and paid by public subscription. They were represented at Glasgow, where a body of twelve hundred men were raised, half of whom were sent to the defence of Stirling, and half retained to protect the city. In Bristol, the same spirit was displayed. We may therefore receive, with considerable suspicion, the statement of Smollett, that the trading part of the City were overwhelmed with fear and dejection. They were subscribing large sums at the beginning of December, to procure additional warm clothing for the troops engaged in the suppression of the rebellion; and the Quakers even provided woollen under-waistcoats for the troops in the North. London had received its abundant share of that commercial prosperity which, in twenty years, had added a third to the value of the country’s exports; and which had enabled the wages of the labourer to command a larger portion of subsistence than at any previous period of our history.§ The community in general was flourishing and contented; and whilst

* Burton, “History of Scotland,” vol. ii. p. 448.

† “Constitutional History,” chap. xvi.

§ Malthus, referred to by Hallam.

‡ De Johnstone, p. 71.

Smollett, speaking from his own political prejudices, says that many who had no property to lose, thought no change could be for the worse, we may, on the contrary, believe that the bulk even of the humblest, who lived under equal laws which protected labour as much as capital, really desired no change, even amidst their grumbling against a German king, and their angry recollections of Excise and the Gin Act.

In periods of great political excitement, when opposite principles are ripening into active hostility, the prejudices of a people, and the unreasonable suspicions of a government, are almost as destructive of the peace of society as the positive dangers of insurrection and anarchy. There is an instance of the terror produced by apprehensions of popular violence, in the case of the father of Nollekens, the sculptor. The old man, a Roman Catholic native of Antwerp, lived in Dean Street, Soho, at the time of the Rebellion. He was a hoarder of his money; and he became so convinced that, as a foreigner and a papist, his house would be attacked by a mob, and his precious savings carried away, that "he lingered in a state of alarm until his death," in 1747.* The suspicions attached during this crisis to Scotsmen in London are described by sir Andrew Mitchell, in a letter to Duncan Forbes, of the 23rd of October: "Already every man of our country is looked on as a traitor, as one secretly inclined to the Pretender, and waiting but an opportunity to declare. The guilty and the innocent are confounded together, and the crimes of a few imputed to the whole nation."† An example of this indiscriminating suspicion may be found in a curious incident in the life of a very remarkable man, the founder of the great banking-house of Drummond. Andrew Drummond was the brother of sir William Drummond, who became viscount Strathallan in 1711. Strathallan was taken prisoner at Sheriffmuir, in 1715, but was released, and continued to reside in Scotland. Andrew, like many other younger branches of high Scottish families, felt that he must endeavour to secure independence by a mercantile pursuit. He settled in London soon after the Union; uniting the proper business of a banker with that of a goldsmith, according to the fashion of earlier times. His ledger of 1716, in the possession of his successors, shows that he sold and exchanged jewellery, such as diamond ear-rings, buckles, and other personal adornments. In the early years of his banking business he was chiefly entrusted with the management of the pecuniary affairs of the friends of the House of Stuart, particularly of those who were

* Smith. "Nollekens and his Times," vol. i. p. 2.

† "Culloden Papers," p. 426.

abroad. Without compromising himself, he rendered valuable assistance to many who were exiled or suspected; not in assisting designs against the reigning family, but in a faithful administration of their private funds. "His brother sent up to him his two nephews, Robert and Henry, with whom he shared whatever emoluments he derived from the services he rendered to the royalists; and in this way grew up the banking establishment which his descendants have ever since carried on."* In 1745, when lord Strathallan was actively engaged in the Rebellion, suspicion not unnaturally fell upon the banker at Charing Cross. A warrant was sent into his house, and his books and papers were seized. A report was spread that he was ruined. It was the crisis of the thriving Scotsman's fortune. He published a notice in the Gazette that he would instantly pay all his creditors in full. Confidence did not desert him. The government could find nothing to inculcate him after the most searching examination; and obtained no knowledge from his papers "of what was going on in Scotland." His books and papers were returned; and a round-robin was signed by every member of the Cabinet as an approving testimonial of his conduct. The king desired to see him at St. James's; but at that interview the sturdy banker turned his back upon the Secretary, sir Edward Warrington, to whom he attributed the calumny against him. Andrew Drummond's bank became the favoured establishment of the aristocracy of all parties. George II. there kept his private account, and so also George III. This is one of the many instances of the rapidity with which, after the final struggle, national and dynastic contests became merged in individual confidence and public tranquillity. There were national prejudices of Englishman and Scot still to overcome; but these were only as the shifting clouds after a storm. The trust in Andrew Drummond, the banker, of the second and third sovereigns of the Brunswick line, may be regarded as a graceful tribute, not only to his individual integrity and honour, but as exhibiting some sympathy for the misfortunes of his house. The representative of the elder branch of that house, the duke of Perth, died on shipboard after his escape from Scotland in 1746. The head of the other branch, lord Strathallan, was killed at the battle of Culloden.†

But if the ancient resistance and disaffection of the Jacobite party gradually melted away in the security for good government

* Memoir of the House of Drummond, in "Histories of Noble British Families," vol. ii. p. 21.

† There is a portrait of Andrew Drummond by Reynolds, and a very admirable one by Zoffany, in the possession of his great-grandson, Mr. Andrew Mortimer Drummond, to whose kindness we are indebted for some facts here mentioned.

which the nation enjoyed under the Act of Settlement, the fears of the Administration, and the traditional feelings of the people, too long endured in the penal laws against Roman Catholics. There was no attempt at their conciliation at the crisis of the Rebellion. At the beginning of December, 1745, a proclamation was issued, calling upon magistrates to discover and bring to justice all jesuits and popish priests; and offering a reward of one hundred pounds for the apprehension of any such objects of the severity of the earlier statutes. This proclamation called forth a strong remonstrance from the resident ministers of various Catholic states, and especially on the arrest of a domestic of the Venetian ambassador. They contended that the law of nations had been violated; and that the Act of Anne, which forbade the arrest upon civil process, of the ministers of foreign powers, or of their servants, was infringed in these proceedings. The Secretary of State, in his reply, did not approve of the arrest of the Venetian ambassador's domestic; but he rested the justification of the government upon the plea that chapels, with an enormous number of priests, were maintained, wherein mass was celebrated, not for the use of the minister's family, but rather for the sake of allowing the king's converted subjects to be present at mass, contrary to law. "The number of national Roman Catholic priests, who swarm more than ever in this town, was found dangerous to the State, especially at a time of open rebellion in favour of a Pretender of the same religion."

CHAPTER XXIX.

Charles Edward retreats from Derby.—The retreating army pursued.—Skirmish of Clifton.—Bombardment and capitulation of Carlisle.—Charles Edward in Scotland.—General Hawley takes the command of the king's troops.—Battle of Falkirk.—Retreat of Hawley to Edinburgh.—Lord Lovat.—The duke of Cumberland in Scotland.—Flight of the Highland army from Stirling.

THE retreat from Derby, regarded as a military operation, was highly creditable to the officers by whom it was conducted, and especially to lord George Murray. He was foremost to advise that retreat; and to his prudence and watchfulness may be attributed, in great measure, that the depressed Highlanders marched back to their own mountains, without serious disorganization. "I offered," he says, "to make the retreat, and be always in the rear myself."* Before daybreak on the morning of the 6th of December, the little army left Derby. The men thought they were advancing to attack the duke of Cumberland. "As soon," says De Johnstone, "as the day allowed them to see the objects around them, and they found that we were retracing our steps, nothing was to be heard throughout the whole army but expressions of rage and lamentation."† The prince, as blindly confident as the brave and ignorant Highlanders who would have followed him to destruction, was no longer cheerful and alert. "In marching forwards he had always been the first up in the morning, and had the men in motion before break of day, and commonly marched himself a-foot; but in the retreat he was much longer of leaving his quarters; so that, though the rest of the army were all on their march, the rear could not move till he went, and then he rode straight on, and got to the quarters with the van." Such is the relation of lord George Murray. The partizans of this young prince have delighted to exhibit his condescending participation in the fatigue and privations of his followers, when leading them, as he and they thought, to the rewards of his bold enterprise. His moody displeasure and haughty indifference when his insane plans were opposed and rejected, show how truly he adhered to his family convictions, that the sovereign will should over-ride every other consideration; that, to use

* "Jacobite Memoirs," p. 55.

† "Memoirs," p. 72.